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, c;:;A-. ~ y 5 f;cd:e- HEADQUARTERS' . ~I /"~ T .. :;:: y > /l-A'1>4 ,

\ X UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COManHA", vltlNAM APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222 STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

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COMMAND H.ISTOR:Y 1967 , ANNEX G

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PA. , PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUIN~ ~~T IS

~ OFFICE

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1 COPY No I -rS- ~ I~C:S 3-- 2,<}z, ') MACSOG Tsooo.-!r COfIES

j) AITlI- 68

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5 .• _ .. C~pSS-BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS - DANIEL BOONEI PRAIRIE FIRE (APPENDIX IV)

a. PRAIRIE FIRE operationa cCl.lal:inued.in Laos throughout 1967. ~"' __ creased recruitment II.Ild trainiDg &UIIrded &50 percent increa.e· ia. tea.m mi .. iou; and the e,stabU.hlneat.o1 .. peJ!lDl&JUlnt radio relay .ite re.ulted in a .igDilic:&At increase in eIIectl~.. The SLAM cO..at::ept wa •. ·initiated prandiag J.Dtelllgeace io.r-lucrative air, strike target. &lUi .£o,r PRAIlUE FIRE d.esblll:tiaD. mi,a~~. -

b. Cr.o •.•.• ~er 'oper~tio.a.a.lDRa Cambodia commeaced .iIl miel-year unde~ the code a.me. DANIEL BOONE. Although re.tricted,ia. te&mllumbe-r., area. of 4pe~tion and combat carabUUy; ~l~blo iAtelligence _ ia01tratlon rOllte •. &Ad eneD1y._c~rie. re.a1tri h.om DA NIEL BOONE recanaai •• &DCe D1i. "'0)18.

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Co Opo.3:;~ •••.• umed r~,..uibi.Uty:for SOG'. portioa.o£ the MUSCLE SHOALS &Dti .. ~n.dU .y~t.m. .

6. lOINT.PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER .(APPENDIX.v.)

a. J'PRC". D1iasle,A-i.a. tea FO'ri4.& c:&pIIl~ty .within USMACV 141' per­.onp.ll'_~.operatio.u. .u.b .... ~ te.termiDatiOA.o£ .earch ...... re.~ue (SAR) ~.~I lrL &c;1l=~P~"'~-!'l!'t.a(~mi .• ,.~ J'PRC, wa..a bL"nt~.iIl 39· .• ttemJh:1l.r~Ylt.ry..!~~:~l,t.'l.

. l : ". • C! .TPKC '.iHa~:a ~ari'~ll'a.m..(o.r_theretu,rJlofmi~iDl/capbU'ri pel'.~" • .r~,~.u1lA coac'\rlltl',.them. .&Jld-,&IlppD%t~d.thU p~",m with. J#.I1ot .~l:IAJLII,iA .No_rth 'fl~t.M m_.a.a.cI ,&1'\.11-1 th. SVNI C.mbodlaa berder. ." . . .

7. . LOGISTlCS . (A I'PENDlX VI)

.Lo,~c. activitie.a. d~lAg·.l'47.(e&tured_.inC1'ea.e. in. ~raOllD,e1. in area., exp&DaUui. in.al1pply &lid .-e,nico .Ilpport to keep pace with mcre. SOG actinties an~Lnew re&l e.tat. ~~eD1ent _d .the a.sociated. COil-

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KE.l.. UF!1gHb, 1'16'7 (CON1'D)

EQ.SlfION

9. Chief, PSYOP Gp

10. CO AIROP Gp

11. Chief, Plana Branch

12. Chid, Comptroller Branch

13. ChieI, JPRC

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DATES INCUMBENT

I Jan - 21 Aug LTC A V Mathwin 22 Aug - 31 Dec LTC T W Bowen

I Jan - 23 May LTC C E Kimble Z4 May - 31 Dec LTC :r Deas

I Jan - 17 May LTC J Reus -Froyilln 18 May - 31 Dec LTC C S Zoukis'

1 J~n - I May LT J R Mutchler 2 May - 22 Aug LT J Kraus

~3 Aug - 3J Dec LCDR T B Potter, Jr

I Jan - 15 Oct COL A T Sampson 16 Oct - 31 Dec COL B S Keller

U\·tLlASSiHEu··-----AP~;EN-mx-V -• .•... . .

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER

1. GENERAL.

a. JPRC, activate'd in September 1966, under the cognizance of Chief, OP-SO, continued throughout 1967 as the focal point for all inIormation and activities related to mi8ling and c~aptured personnel in Southeast A..a.ia.

b. JPRC acts as the co-ordinating authority for search mld reacue personnel recovery operations and as such develop. requirements for collection of intelligence and other data necessary concerning ~etained and mi8ling personnel: co-ordinates and maintains liaison with U. S. and Allied departments to insure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for launch of rescue/recovery operations: monitors and co-ordinates operations with participating agencies during execution of approved operations: assists in the df)Driefil:.g of recovered peraonnel: provides E &: E briefing data to component commands and oth£:r interested agencies: lLnd monitors the org&Lizatio:~ ac.d trah::.ing, ana recomm.ends employment of SOG BR!GHT LIGHT assets.

2. PRISONER OF WAR RECOVERY OPERATIOJIj"S.

a. Operation HOT SNAP. On 28, 29 and 30 December, 1966, reports were received from three separate sources concerLing aix U. S. -PWs be-ing held by an NVA battalion in the 1st Cava1ary Division area of operations. The PWs were believed to have been captured on 27 December when a 1st Cav artill~ry emplacement was overrun. On 31 December the lat Cav re­quested JPRC pe~mission to conduct a personnel recovery operation based on the above information. Permission was granted on the same date and a JPRC representative was dispatched to monitor the operation. On Z January 1967, 1/5 CaY, 2nd Brigade lall.Dched a prisoner recovery operation in Binh Dinh Province. Light enemy contact was made, but no evidence was found which suggested that U. S. PWs had been held in the a~a • .

b. Operation GREY BULL. On 10 March JPRC receh-ed a mes G) G-2, U:5: Army, Ryukyus, concerning and '-~ former VC prisoners, who were being debriefed on Okinawa concern-

ing their experiences. They were able to locate within a slz square kllc)p1eter ar.,a..l!;.llD VC from which had been released ~J! where _

welre belieVed ~"'e imprisoned. on this JPRC reClueated aerial photo-graphy from 7th Air Force and an area analysis of the suapected camp aite from'the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV). Readout of the

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ilerial photography confirmed some of the details f~rnlshed by On ""Z9 March, as a result of the accumulated evidence, liFFORCEV was brief­. ed on the sitaation. The 5th SFG was tasked by llFFORCEV to develop the situation and plan and conduct a raid on the suspected camp site, if approp­riate. A n indigenous agent of the 5th SFG was sent into the area. He re­turned with the information that there were hostile forces in the area, but was unable to confirm the presence of U. S. PWs. Despite this,. it was decided to launch a recovery operation. On 6 April a raid was conducted. A thorough sweep of the area resulted in light enemy contact, however, no t race of a PW camp was found.

c. Operation GRENADE. On 10 June JPRC received ~ report from Region IV, 135th Milit"ry ktelliger.ce Group in Car. Tho tha~ two U. S .

. PWs were being held in the vicinity of Sa Dec. The idormation was furnish­ed by a Vietnamese who had escaped Irom the cam? 0:-. t:-·~!le. Aerial photographs oI the suspected camp were taken or. 9 .-u~e. The readot:t verified both the information provided by the escapee a:.6 tr.e fact that the area was still inhabited. A JPRC representathpEo v,a.s aispatched to Can Tho for additior.al debrieIir:.g of the source and Lo or:t~ir.. the aerial pnoto­graphy. On 11 Jl:ne MACCOC was briefed and the Sedor Ad'lf·isor, IV CTZ, was tasked by the COC to determine the fea.sibility of a recovery operation. The operation was deemed feasible ar:.d plar.r.ed for the night of 12 June. The concept was to infiltrate a SEAL Team during the night, COr.dllct the raid at first light, then exIiltrate by helicopter. The 9th ARVN Recon Compa::.y was the standby reaction force with the 43i"d ARVN Bat­talion on a or.e hour alert. During a visual reconr~issance on the aIter­noon of 12 June, it WAS noted that the area photographed a~d rhe area de­scribed by the source as the camp site were not the same. This resulted in a 24 hour delay to permit additional photography Cond planning. The con­cept of operations remained the same and the SEAL Team began its infil­tration at 2359, 13 June. In the morning hours of lli Jane the team made contact with five ve, killing one and wounding two. There were no Iriend­ly casualties. Several huts were, destroyed, one r(:sdring in a secor.dary explosion. A search oI the area disclosed no U. S. or ARVN PWs. The source accompanied the raiding Iorce and aIter enteri.r.g the alleged camp site, determined that it was not the location at whkh he had been held prisoner.

TIDE. In December, 1966, an intelligence source '<..\ reporled that he knew the location oI three U. S. PWs . L were at a camp several kilometers inside Cambodia in the vicir.ity of

the Mekong River. .. claimed that his brother-i:l-law, _ was head of the camp guards and wanted to rally to the GVN. Before. could be contacted, he allegedly fled camp aIter having beer. dlscovered sLeAlir.g

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several weapons. _ reported thatet reFlaceme~t, .. w&.s a persocal [:'iend who aleo wanted to rally and was willing to a .. lst in the recovery of the U. S. PWs. Since _ was u.r.able ·to leave the camp without arousing suspicion, __ was sent to contact the orglnal head of the ca.mp guards, _ in Phnom Penh, in an atte.mpt to get him to rett:.rn to Saigon where he could be debriefed concerning the caII1p. • refused, but while returning to Saigon, _ was .. hIe to sec::re a de­tailed sketch of the camp, allegedly drawn by" .. aillo allegedly told _ that u. S. PWs were still at the cam]l.·r.1'Srn·1!atw lll!.:",t:.",bllque photography" than picked out the camp site a.nd wa"se"itt to Cha-.u Doc to obtain the precise diatance from landInarks to the camp. 0:1 7 July, ~ returned to Saigon and stated that the camp had been moved 1000 meters north of its previous location and contained six U. S. ?Ws .•. r~portedly was anxious to rally and brir...g the {j. S. FWs with him. repo rted that" had gu.ard duty from 2200 to 2400 each dgnt, togelhe r with t ..... o other guards. Based on this inform&ti.)r., it W&8 pla::lned to have ~ eliminate the other guards and lead the L. S. ?Ws to the Mekong River where'" would be waiting with a lS&mpap- to take the PWs across H',e border into South.vietnam. U. S. Navy ?BRs of the Moi-.ile Riverine

-n\ Force were to rendezvous with'" at the border and nelicopter gunships were to provide fire support. On 13 July, a J?R C field team met'" and

'>Lit was decided to have" accompany'" to the c~mp to assist in elil"T\in­ating the guards and freeing the PWs. In the late evenir.g of 14 July, the oper .. tion began as the PBRs r:eached their stations on the Mekong River, just below the Cambodiall border. They reInained on station until first light, but neither __ or the sampan appeared. On the possibility that the PWs had escaped, but had been unable to read: the border and were forced Eo hide during the day, the PBRs ret'-lrned the next night, bl.:t

agab no contact was II1&de. Nothing more was heard of" until earl;­Octooer when he was arrested by the Vietnamese Military Security Service (MSS). Results of his interrogation by the MSS indicate.d that there pt"o­bably were U. S. PWs at the camp in lIlid-July and that _ had failed to carry out his part in the operation because he was afl'aid. Although the services of'" have b6en terIninated, at the (lnd of 1967, attempts were still being II1&de to collect inIorII1&tion on PW camps in the RIP TIDE area. By DeceInber, a bilateral operation of the 525th MI Group and MSS had succeeded in establishing contact with a number of individual. in the area who it is believed can provide inIorII1&tion on possible U. S. PWs h61d in Cambodia.

e. Operation SHA~OCK SEVEN. A s a result of increa.ed PW aighlingll in the area west of Quar.g Ngai city between June ar.d Aug·.lst, jPRC tasked intelligence units in the area to increase their collection eIIortli in iln

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X~II.--··- -.- .--attempt to pinpoint camps containing U. S. PWs. From:; through 10 August a J?RC representative visited Task Force O~EGON and briefed the G-2 on accumulated sightings. On 18 .Augt'.st a :?F soldier, _ _ who claimed to have recently escaped from .. VC PW camp, report­~d to CAS, Danang, thd camps containing U. S. PWs ~ere located south­.vest of Quang Ngai. During the next few day~ identified two U. S. PWs from photographs ar.d located the camps dl!.ri~g .. 1-1.su&1 reconnaissance flight over the area. On 23 Aug'.18t JPRC and ill MAF 'Nere !totiIied of this !::y CAS and on Z5 Aug;!st a JPRC representative .. rrh~d .t HQ, ill MAF where he was briefed. The same day an aerial photogral»l'.y a!ld IR miuion failed to confirm the location of the camps and the CG, w MAF stated that he fett there was ir.st;lficient information to reconuner:.6 rEcovery operations, __ 'Was then returned to Danang for a more detaii.ed Ciei-riefiLg. He pro-­-.rided sKetches of the PW camps and an .Air Force ~;~lot I.::!.d CAS case officer who had accompanied hi.m on the earlier visuai recO::7..!.. .. LsSLr.CE confirmed the loca.tion of the camps. The CG. ill M.AF was m;)r~ fa"lOr&biy impreued with this additional information lind tasked Task Fo:r-~e OREGON to plan and execute a F-W camp rdd. On I September the 2:"'-0 BLtt .. Ec:.... 5{)2:r:ci Air­Dorr.e !nf&ntry, TaSK Force OREGON, raided twu ?W ca.m~s in the area. Twenty Vietnamese prisoners were recovered ar.d o::!.e VC acd one civil ciefendez:.t were captured at one camp. Evidence lo<:.:::.d at tile other camp indicated that U. S. PWs had been held at the c':mp. The rele&sed PWs indicated that U. S. PWs had been evacuated approximllltely 30 ol.ys prior to the raid. There were no friendly casualties as • result of hostite action.

f. Operation LUCKY LEAF. In late August .rPI\C rece:"'1eci the 135th MI Group debriefing report oC & PF soldier who daimed to have escaped Crom a VC PW camp in the lower U -Minh Forest. The sol<iif:r cb.imed that a U. S. master sergeant and a U. S. captain were being held at the camp when he escaped. He was subsequently shown at::rid pl'.otography and was .ble to ider.tHy work areas near the camp. He 'Nas the!>: flown o·o'er the a.xea by a FAC ar..d located the camp from which he eS';.p1ed. Following this, he was given a polygraph examination and 1:.0 dece,.tion was z:.oted. Raid plar.niz:.g began with an execution date of 13 3eptem"er. A team from ;) Company, 5th Special Forces Group was tasked 'Nah plaruling ~nd ex­ecutiz:.g the raid. Because of the diIfic~lt terrain :r.r.d l~c~ of detailed ~ntdl"gence, the t~am required an additional two 'NeEks to allow for thorough pi&nning ar.d rehearaal. Final plans caUtldl lor a Speci&l Force. team to infiltrate the area, perform reconnaisscr'.ce a..r.d then assault ar.d hold the clomp tmtil recovered personnel could be evacu&ted ~y helicopter. An inIantry battalion (airmobile) from the U. S. 9th :r..Ilu.try DiYision wa.s to be positioned near the camp to act as a reser .... e/re1c::io.-r. force. Dc. the r.ight of 1 October the SF team infiltrated the are~. :t rem£i.r.~ci it:. the &rea for 36 hours without findiz:.g evidence of the camp or comi:::g i:::. contad ';fith

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hostile forces. The team was e.xfiltrllted without bcidect. }, post ope ratio!;. ir.ter:oogation of the PF soldier indicated deverd discrepanciee in his or­igir.al story. It appeared that the PW camp was .. ctually 10-15 kilometers north-northwest of the area that had been reconnoitered by the SF team.

g. Operation BLACK KNIGHT. On 20 A:lgust :?RC received a report from CAS which indicated that a camp containing U. S. PWs was located in the Upper U-Minh Forest. Based on this report, additior..t.l r&q'.2irements were levied on the CAS source. and Region IV, SZStb ~vU Group, Can Tho, ar.d an area study was requested from the Comc.ined intelligence Center, St="L,"

Vietnam 'CICV). Despite the increased collectio:l eIfort. e.o additional in- I.' , \ pr .. formation was received on the camp. JPRC proposed that OP-30 send a team into the area. The proposal was returned late in October with the recommendation that a USN SEAL Team would be more suital:.le. With this in mind. aerial photography and an IR were requested of the Suspected camp site. On 11 November before the results were :-eceived. ...

were released by the NLF in ClLmooriis. A former VC who had Chieu Hoild read their story in the r.ewspl.?er aI...l rep.orred that he had interrogated them at a camp in the upper U -Micil f.orest iI. early l~c 7. The camp he described was at approximately the S&me. location as the one ear-lier reported. The Chieu Hoi's story was confirmed b.y the deb of

••••••••• who st&ted that was left at the camp when they were released. On 7 Decemher &11 available inIor­~tion and intelligence was passed to the Frovir::c! .. l RecoOnr.aissance Unit (PR U) Directorate. SaJgon. for action.

h. In additi.on to the above described operations. there were IZ other PW recovery operations th"t neve.r got beyond the ptantbg stages or whose status was doubtful at the end of the year. This VO<IU prbnarilv due to the following factors!

(I) Insufficient intelli.gence with which to ,?h.::. and ~xeCl;.te the oper-ations.

(2:} Information on PW camps that proved to I:-e l .. lee upon detailed an&.lysis or additional debrieIings ol the sources of the information.

3. -PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED.

a. To .date, the greatest problem has been in obt:o.lning 8ulilcient acc­urate data with which to plan and initiate PW reco-.-ery operations. This pro­b�em is a reeult of the following factors:

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(1) VC security of PW camps is excellent; they are usually located in inaccessible areas which are under VC control.

(Z) U. S. PW. are segregated from other ?Ws and are usually kept in small groups of no more than five men.

(3) U. S. PWs are frequently moved. appare~tl'f as a matter of routinl

(4) Indications are that a number of U. S. :?Ws have been taken to Cambodia where information collection is diIIicillt.

(5) Intelligence personnel. particularly at the lower echelons. have not been aware of th~ existence or intelligence reQt.:.irements of JPRC.

b. In an attempt to solve these problems. JPRC has tlLken the following 8 teps:

(1) Contact has been made with the Provincb.l Reconnaissance Unit Directorate (PRU). Saigon. The PRU employ smaH indigenolls reconnais­eance teams under U. S. leadership that have the capability to operate in VC controlled areas. not normally accessible to U. S. persor.nel or in­digenous sources employed by the U. S. intelligence community. A t the end of 1967 the PRU'were 'invclvedtnbtG'potentiai reco'.ery operations.

(Z) J'PRC has provided guidance to intelligeIlce ~Ilit8 in the field so that tMly can target sources against suspected PW cs.mp sites in South Vietr.am and Cambodia.

(3) Since approximately June 1967. JPRC represe:ntatives have spent considerable time in the field briflfing intellige!Lce personnel on JPRC act­ivities. !n addition, newly arrived intelligence personnel now receive a JPRC briefing at an orientation course sponsored by the 5Z5th MI Group.

4. RECONNAISSANCE OF SUSPECTED PW CAMP SITES.

a. Operation DOUBLE TALK. On 13 January. based on information from a Chieu Hoi ralHer. two reconnaissance patrols' from the 3rd Marine Division were inserted into an area approximately 35 miles l"est of Danang tasked with surveillance of a suspected PW camp site. Surveillance of the camp .site and reconnaissance of the area, were, conducted until 16 January. but no U. S. PWs were observed. On 16 January the Chieu Hoi led one of the pat'rots into the PW camp. The camp consis~ed of five partially de-

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stro';ed huts and had not been occupied in at lelLst a month. While taking photos of the camp the patrol became engaged in a Iirefight and was forced to exit the area. Two VC were killed: there were ",0 friendly casualties,

b. Operation WIGWAM. At the end of Febr14ary J?RC receh'ed four separate reports of PW sightings in an area appro:.dma.t61y 20 miles south­west of Danang. A lthough the information did not appear as valid aIt6r the sources were reinterviewed, III MA F flew aerial photography and sent two recon patrols into the area. The photography was negative. 0:1 10 March a new report based on the debriefing of two Vietr.amese released by the VC :n December, 1966, provided informa.tion similar to that ir..itiatly received, On 11$ March JPRC received a report from G-2, :!1 MAF which indicated that two recon teams, one from the 5th SFG and one from E! MA F, had completed a thorough' search of all suspected camp sites. Trail activity was noted, but no evidence of a PW camp was discove:-ec.

c. Operation HA VA NA. On 21 April ';-:21'< C rece£ v'eo a rep.ort based on

information from an AR VN coded source that two U. S. ar-,ii 30 AR VN ?Ws had been sighted ilpproxim&te1y 20 miles east of Ta'; ~l:-Lh cit7. This re­port coincided with previous reports. The 1st YrJa.::.try Dbrision, co::tducHng Open.tion MANHATTAN in the area, wall req;..:ested to cor.Ilrm or deny the report and, accordingly, conducted II; thorough IIweep i:-. the area. No e'n.der.ce of recer.t occupancy, bhabitants or activity wa.s discovered.

5. , RECOVERY OF AN ALLEGED ESCAPEE FROM A CAMBODrAN ?RISON.

On 18 October JPRC received spot reports irom the 5lh SFG and the ~j5th MI Group that two American PWs were attemptir:.g to C!.scape bom Cambodia into Chau Doc ?ro·n.nce, South Vietr .. m. Repre:s6ntatives of both these organizations took immediate action to re:cover the P-N's. On the morning of 20 October an individual who claimed to b", a Hungarian citizen turned himself in at a Po'pular Forces outpost in Chau Doc Pro, vince near "Ehe C&inhodlau border •. He claimed no knowledge of U. S. PWs and stated that in order to avoid deportation to Hungary he had escaped from a prison in Phnom Penh together with a South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese, pouibly a CIDG loldler, wal recaptured by the VC before he was aMe to cross into South Vietnam.

6. SONNEL.

I RECOVERY OF THE BODIES OF TWO DECEASED U. S. PER-

a. On l2 May, ouring interrogation of a capllAred VG, Information G-V-7

---------~.~.--------------was obtained concerning the location of the body ol a deceiI.sed U. S. soldier who had been carried aa MIA. Acting on thia ir.iorm&tto~. a search waa cond.:cted and the remaina of a Caucaaian. later ide!l.Hned aa ___

were recovered.

b. On 19 December. Montagnard tribeamen I!car Daoc To returned the body of 4th InIantry Diviaior •.

7. EVADERS.

ATTEMPTED RECOVERIES OF DOWNbD .ArRCREWS AND

a. Operation TOMAHAWK. On 6 February an. 0-1 WLS downed in Laos. Contact waa maintained with the downed airman and a SAR helo ellected a picKup. Immediately upon pickup the helo was taken under intense ground fire. exploded. and crashed into a karst. One para-jum~er was able to exit the helo and deploy his chute belore the crash. h~ W1S picked up by a second Jolly Green which noted no evidence of othe-y- survivors. .JPRC informed the .Toint Liaison Group (jLG). CAS. Udor",. Laos. of the sit­Llatioc and requested that their assets in the area. ~eriorm a body search. JLG advised that their teams could not approach the cZ"lILsh site because it was in an area contailling sizable number of enemy troops. Because of this. pl!!s the extremely small likelihood ol crash s·.!rHvors. the ret:juest for search was withdra.wn.

b. Operation GEYSER. On 28 February ';PRC WOl.S :J.ot~fied that an 0-1 was down in the vicinity of the DMZ in South Viei:!tarn. AircraIt were in voice contact with the pilot. but SAR forces were U~liJ: ie to resch him due to poor weather conditions. A BRIGHT LIGHT reco·v·.e,ry teAm w&s alerted as an alternate recovery force. On 2 March the weather cleared and the ?ilot was picked a!, by SAR aircraIt.

c. Operation DEEP SIX. On 24 April JPRC received a message from Commander Task Group 77.0 indicating that an A6A was down approximately 40 miles northwest of Hanoi. The crew had ejected sAl&ly. were seen on the ground. and had been in voice contact with their wingman. CTG 77. 0 in­dicated that he would reQuest activation of a BRIGHT LIGHT team, if &nd when voice conta.ct with the downed crew was re-est:.r.1iahed. A BRIGHT LIGHT team waa placed on alert at Hue/Phu Bai lind a N&'VY CiA aircraIt at Tan Son Nhut waa made available to tranaport the team to the carrier KITTY HAWK. JPRC recomlTlended that a recovery attempt be made us­ing the Fulton Recovery System. A COMBAT SPEAR crew was placed on alert at Nha Trallg. and 7th Air Force placed two F4Cs on alert at Danang to make speed drop of the Fulton kit. The COMBAT 5?EA R crew suggested the following plan of action:

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(!) After voice contact was estabUshed w~tn the downed crew. ~ Fu!tor. idt would be droPFed at last ~~ght. The aellver, aircraft would notH'f the downed crew to expect pickup at a predesigr.atfld time during the night.

(2) A t the predesignated time, the COMBAT S?EAR aircraft would make their pickup run. They would be covereci i:.y appropriate MIGCA P and coordinated strike miuions. No further contact was estac.Ushed with the downed crew. CINCPA C, because of the enemy oraer of battle in the area in which the crew was down, prohibited the use of the COMBAT SPEAR HC· 130. The operation was, therefore, terminated..

d. Operation GAMBLER. On 19 Mayan A6A f::om the USS ENTERPRISE was shot down 30 miles southwest of Hanoi. Botn crewmen ejected success· fultY and landed near the center of Safe A rea Nine. This was an exceU6nt arer. for evasion. but well within the SAM er::.ve~!)?e a.nd therefore a high threat area. Voice contact with the crewmen 0;;.8 established, but no res· cue was attempted using standa.rd SAR resources [H~C • .I.:.se of the enemy order of battle. At this Foint J?RC assistan::e '1\;as requested. JPRC and Joi.::.t Search and Rescue Center (JSARC} ae-.i6ec:i a p.ta.n for a rescue a.ttem-;;: from the west, covered i:..y multiple a.ir stri~es. COl'IUll.&nder 7th Air Force vetoed this plan on the grounds that the area WL8 tOO weU defended to risit SAR assets. JPRC then presented a plan to em,~oy the Fdton Recovery System (SKYHOOK) to reco· ... er the a.ircrew. The ;>la.n was approved Qn the eve:ling 0('20 May and a J?RC representative was disp4tr.:hed to Danang to act as miuion coordinator. On the morr.ing of 2~ Ma.y a Hight of USAF F4Cs carrying Fulton Recovery kits ar.d sur7i-,-..~ eqdpment was launched from Dar.ang. Contact was establillhea with the downed crew and the kits and survival eqcipmer..t c:iro?ped. The Fulton j{:t ~.:::..ded approximately 100 yards from the downed crew and the sur-rival equ:pml!:nt 200 yards away. However, one of the downed crewme::. reporte~ tha.t he thought he could recover the Fulton kit. On schedule the COMBAT SPEAR HC-130 that was to a.ttempt the pickup of the aircrewmen departed uanang. .A flight of .F4Cs o· ... erIlew the target area to make a final check or.. the status of the airmen and to il".form them of th~ precise time that the ~:'ckup would be attempted. On establishing contact with the crewmen they !ea.rned that the Fulton kit and survival gear had been recovered earlier by the North Vietnamese. A II a result of this, the COMBAT SPEAR nUslI:..,n w.s aborted. On the evening of 21 May and morning of 22 May, re~rellentatives of JPRC, 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet met to determine what furH.er action could be taken. Consensus w.s that no further recovery .ction was feasible due to the proxiriUty of hostile forces. A total of three flights were flown over the area of the downed air crew on 22 M.y with negative contact.

G-V-9

--.-- - - - -----:-:~;::-:;~~~-"'i'rn •• -. " ~!I • A Of' ••

ow • _. •• •• ••

_. ~ -

e. Operation STIFF JOINT. On 2 July an F-105 w_s relW'rted down in North Vietnam, south of H~ong Ke. The wingmar. h'ad reporte:d a good chute and strong beoe~r and, although aircraft on the: scene did not have the pilot in sight, they also held a strong beeper. SAR .. ircraIt arrived on the scene, but had difficulty estabUshing electronic C:O!lta.ct and received ground fire from a va.l1ey to the west of the downed pilot. A Jolly Green established voice codact with the pilot, but was u:.a.:"le to localize him and aU forces departed the area to resume SAR effprt at first Ught. The 7th Air Force then requested JPRC to make ava.ilaMe a ~R=Gh"'r LIGHT team [or a joint rescue eIIort to be launched from Nakr.ol'. ?h&norn. Thailand. Additionally, a COMBAT SPEAR HC-130 with a Fulton Recovery kit was deployed at Danang to be ava.ilable to effect a pickup of the downed pilot, if needed. At first light on 3 July, AlEs returned to tt.e area and 6sta.blish­ed t~e area and a JoUy Green, although receiving ground fire, was able to pinpoint the location of the pilot and make an ARRS corneat save.

f. On 8 November &n OP-35 Spike Team in La.os re(lu.estea extraction .... hen it carne under heavy hostile fire,.. ...... Part of the tea.m was successfully extracted by helicopter. In attempting to extract the remainder of the team, three helicopters (two U. S., one VNAF) were shot do'VO'n ty ground fire. A recovery operation using SOG assets, succeeded in rescuing four U. S. anlt three VNAF crewmen who had survived the crashes of th!&ir helicopters. The bodies of six other U. S. personnel (four helicopter crewmen, two Spike Team -n1embers) killea in the crashes were located a::.d identified, cut only one body was recovered .due to the presence of hostile forces.

g. In six other opera.tior.s, planning for recovery of downed aircrews was initiated when Eva.sion and Escape V'tt I .J \ I from the a.ir or were discovered in readouts of aerial photogr&.rhy. In each case farther investigation revealed the I"A -r to ce r.r.t.:rLt phe~ome:la: had been there a long time; or had been removed.

8. RECOVERY OF DOWNED AIRCREWS - Pl{OELEM AREAS.

The Fulton Recovery System has proven to be of doubtful use in the recovery of aircrews downed in hostile environmer..ts. :f SAR forces are unable to recover downed .. irmen due to the prese:lce of hostile troops, A W, AAA fires, etc., it is extremely unlikely th!t.~ the ~se of the Fulton system will succeed where they have failed. Thedr~r' of a Fulton kH to a downed alrcrew may give away their positio~, 6.,.0 t:Ul: arr.o·~nt of time required to retrieve and activa.te the kit gives hostille forces ample time to locate and cap~l!re ,the aircrew, o,r prepare an &m:::.:sh [or the COMBAT SFEAR HC-l30 makir.g-lne pickup:-

G - V -10

--____ ... ltftlJlAtlulriLU 9. I PRISONER EXCHANGES •

. a. Operation SWA P. In October 1966 a Vietnamese Catholic priest from Hue, reported that he had been cO:lt&cted by VC who desired to exchange two U. S. PWs for'a VC captain ar.d lieute&&nt held prhoner in

~c ;: CTZ. In early November two sach VC PWs were found in the custody of the 1st ARVN Division, but before an exchange codd be arranged, theyes-caped. Although negotiations between .r.d the VC continued, no p. 3uitable VC PWs were found in I CTZ. In mid-Aprll t967 Father Dong re--... ealed that during his last contact with the VC the:r had indicated a wiUingnellll to accept VC oIIicer PWs from areas other than r CTZ. AU CTZ command­ers were advised by M.A CV J -2 to be on the lookoul for suitable prisoners to exchange. In early May advised that the two U. S. PWs who were to be ·involved in the exchange had exc"?ed [:oom the VC, although no evidence eould be found to bear lhis o.u.t. The oper .. :.i.o!'J WI.S terminated when ......... stated that the VC no longer held l:.L:.y U. S. ?Ws for -.;;:hich to negotiate.

b. Operation BANDITO. On 27 Jur,e JPRC received .. re?Ort that a Hoa Hao l'tatoon reinforced by 400 Khmer Serai had IOlJ.ght a VC I<.nit in Cam-lx>dia and had taken from them nine U. S. PWs who were ceing held .-about 20 kilometers inside C .. mbodia. The s&.me day .. source was dis­?atched to get photos and identify the U. S. PWs ar.d, if feasible, to arrange [or a meeting at the border to discuss a PW excha.nge. It WI.S understood that the RVNAF cornrnr.nd was preparing a letter of agreement to permit ~he Khmer Serai to enter South :Vietnam in exchange for the U. S. PWs. On n July U. S. and Vietnamese ~epresentatives in Cliin Tho met a man who claimed to be the leader of the Hoa Hao. The HOil Hao leader, ... was 't:,c'-­informed that negotiations for the Hoa Hao rana K"nmer Serai to enter South {, f' Vietnam in exchange for the U. S. PWs coda tegii.:. once proof of the nine f', U. S. PWs was received. .. agreed to discuss t.he matter with the leader of the Khmer Serai" •• and return to Car. Tho. It was then learned that on 5 August the deputy commander of the Hoa Hac, ~, had been dispatched to obtain photos of the U. S. PW s. _ reportedly met ~ on 5 August, but $$ 2 refused to furnish proof of the PWs because he did not believe that Khmer Serai would be permitted to enter South Vietnam with the Hoa ~ao. ..... stated that he woeld not release any U. S. PWs Il1ltil he saw the Hoa Hao enter South Vietnam. and i! the GVN would not allow the Hoa Hao and Khmer Ser .. i to enter South Vietnam with­out proof of the U. S. PWs, he 'Would terminate negotiations. Alter 5 Aug­u st there was no further contact with. or S 'I although the l35th MI Group attempted to develop sources for this purpose. On 3 October the operation was dropped from the active list. On 23 October the operation

G-V-ll

was reactivated when a source, ca.me to the attention of JPRC. __ stated that he had been sent to Saigon to contact represent_

~) atives of the Vietnamese government in order to negoLiate an agreement to return a 620 man Hoa Hao unit, located in Camhodia, to government control. ~ alleged that the Hoa Hao unit held eight U. S. :;'Ws. During the next two weeks, continued debriefings of Phuoc and a baCKground investigation on him revealed that his entire story had been faericated.

c. 4th Infantry Division PW Exchange. By late ;.;.ty, as a result of PW interrogations and examication of captured documents, the 4th Infantry Div­ision had determined that seven to nine of its persor-r_et were being held prisoner in Cambodia by elements of the NVA B-3 Front. CG, 4th Infantry Division suggested in a message to JPRC that the poss~(,iHty ce explored of covertly contacting NVA officials to arrange for a ?W exchange. His suggestion was concurred with and he was authorized to attempt negotiation. directly with tr.e B-3 Front commanaer. Initially, tt,c ~'a!;. was to locate, re::ruit and train a Montagnard or Cambodian to carr,- .. message to the B-3 Front commander oIIering to exchange PWs. Between rnici-Aq;ust and mid­October attempts were made by the 135th and the 149th M:: Groups and CAS, ?!eiitu, to locate and recruit such an individual. Whe::. th.ese agencies were not SUCC'llssful, MG Peers, CG, 4th!DIantry Di-J·isio::. recommended that the 4th capture a PW and release him ~ith the mesu.ge to the B-3 Front com­malAder. The message in English and Vietnamese ~a.Hs foJr a olle-for-one exchange of PWs of comparable rLnk and contah:.iI aet"UIflQ inetr:lctions on how to communicate acceptance or rejection or wiUL,gnells to f:!rther ne­gotiate. By early Decemher the 4th had captured It. suitsi:-le NVN prisoner, hat due to iocd political considerations, releas€: of ~he PW wall deierred ;.:,ntil after the Lunar New Year holidays (lat€: Jar.l.oary, 19c~~,.

EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM.

a. Survival Kits. In late January, 1967, the: p:-e~r&ti.on of air drop­.~le sury-val kits was comp.leted by JPRC. Initi:.dty, (her", were 30 kits, ten configured for drop from high p.erformance "i.rcr~i: c.c1 20 for drop from low pe.rformar.ce aircraft. The kits were 8l!~cel!l&fl<n7 teet dropped and dt:ricg the course of Lhe year were prepositioZl~CI lLt :.ill" ~,asel\ at Binh T~y, Cam Racll Bay, Danaz:.g. !'1ha Trang, Pleik;.;. &::.d T&::-. So!'. Nhut b S,~~th Vietnam and N~khon Phanom and Udorn in Th.H:t:::.d.

b. Instruction at Air Force Survival School. ![~ late 3acI.lClry a repre,... sentative of 7th .Air Force, Directorate of Operatiol:l5 Ser'rices (DOOS), coordinated with jPRC on a study being conducted hy r.~8 office to update U. S . .Air Force survival schools on E 8. E p::,oced~ll'l(;:J. As:. res~lt of

G - V -12 -.. _--- - . -.-----

this cOJ)rc~"l!tion, JPRC provided 7th Air Force, :;005, w\th mater!.al oJ!:. :?i'..C uoctrke a!ld technl~u,es to be used to L.}'Iaste klHr:.:.cHo:n at , !lur-nval schools.

c. ?rod~ction of PA CA F E to: E T rain!.ng Fitm. :r. }"1&;rch a PA CA F r-epresentt.tive visited JPRC to get assistl;T.ce in. the. fllre.r-al'ation of a tuu..i.ng film depicting the role of JFRC in E &: E i:: So·.;theast Asia, &a

wen as C:lrrent E & E procedures. He 'Was ~rovided with, VC -.nd NVA .:dforms, t.nd a BRIGHT LiGHT team and Viet::.a.~'TIe8C p;ersor.nel were se:n.t to Clark and ThaHar:.d to pari:icipate ~r. tnll prodl:.c;io::. of u;.~ fUm.

d. SAFE A rea Ratings. Iri view of the ft.ct that the enemy order of bal­t:e and accessl.bility of Se:1ected Aret.s for EVIUio!l (S/dfE) to SAR forces change consta~~:r. JPRC in coordint.tion with 7th Air F"orce and 7th Fleet .... t.s tasited by CINCPAC with the responsii;.~Hty of rn&:btai.!:.ing current SAFE .rea ratings for. t.ircrew briefing purposes. 51.:-.::e l'O'!)vem!;er, 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet have provided updai:ing i:lfo:-:nlLt:O:l o!). S;'FE are .. s to JPRC on I. monthly i::asis. JPRC thee c::.U:r.te& .r.d o:6semint.tes this ldorrnation.

e. Reece of Pick-up Points and SpE;cit.t Reece. b Oct.J:"er C!NCPAC gave ':;PRC the mission of determining retiairerner.ts for the reconnaiBst.nce

~ of specific op>ick-t.:p points within SAFE areu it! N'orth V'.et~m.. This re­COn..::Aissance is required on a continuing CL6is .0 aeterrni::..e if downed air­crews are evading in the vicinity 'Of the ~ic~-u? r>i:::ts. A t the slime time JPRC was tasked with determining specit.l recc:e reqdr~znents to be flown when it ill indicated thlLt a downed aircrew mE:mcer withl):;:t rt.dio ct.p&­bility may still be evading in the ger.ert.l .. rea of tile h&.it-o~t. "

f. Aircrew Briefings. During 1967, JFRC rc.preaen.taH·.es pres~nted l6 briefings on the JPRC mission, organization and perso!:lle1 recovery capILbilities to aircrews and E & E persoJ:lld of 7th AhForce, CTF 77 and A rmy aviation, groups.

n. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION;:;.

II. Reward Program. In lI.1ay CINCPAC approY6d a rewa.rd program proposed by JPRC. This program called for immeciate monetary rewards i:o any persons who helped U. S. airmen or .missir-g personnel to return to U. S. control, or provided information or returned equi~ment or other evidence which revealed their status or disposition.

G-V-13

-,.--. ..

•

----------

b. !A order to disseminate inIorma.tio.n on the re .... ard program. leaflets were developed from .JPRC ~rameters by MACV·PD a:l.If JUSPAO. In Jl11y and August 36 million of these leaLlets were dropped in North Viet.naJn and 3. 5 million in Laos. In October .an additional two million reYised leaflets were dropped -in North Vietnam, In December the LoatiaA leallet program was diacontinued at the r8«!ueat.I the Reyal Loatian Gon-rnment. At the end·.oI "67 tw. ether leallet pre,rama Were under den-lopmeAtr 0Aa lor the Vietnamese_Cambodi_a border. priAted·la. both-languages. and·ou tor solected area •. ot South Viotn-m

Co . Word· oI Mouth Dis .. miaatlon.·ot Information on the Reward Program. To,ether with the Advanced Besoareb Pr.ojocts A,ency (AllPA). JPllC Is den-loping a pregram to Worm selected elements oI the South Vietnamese ~ populace of the reward program through rumar or woret oC ~uth. Tar,et ( elements are lndlYictuala who Un-' in the vicinity ot suapected PW' ,camps.

d. Reward Payments. In accordance with the pre'risiona oI the reward pro,ramo r_rds were paid to the tollowing individuals durlng.1967:

(I) Two MontagDard villa,ezo. near Plelku lor asslatin, SClM Jack G. Honeycutt In retlu'Jl.i.a., to U. S. coatlNl alter he surviYed the crash oI aIL OR-23 heUcopatr GIl' September. .JAaddltf.oD" 4th Infntry Di'ria- FQ'rided JUt baxas to.~ famtly.ot the riUa,o. and a ctYlc action team p~ftded' medcapa. .repeba to the·iriJla, •• c:b .... &. dls,...ary and water pamp. and ba.Ut' a new briel.o t.ut. the ana ...

(2) A ehlen Ho.i; _ __ _ _ ~(.... a Iormer VC interreptor. whe raWed ~.tbe, aJtrinl oI 1967 ..... rewarc1edlor identU-ying cprs Walker and Verne .. Lt Bow. aadSgto J .... a .... Pltser-aad Ta&s as prisoners ( oI the ·VC. Thla i.a.Iormation".. ce,Armetl,la. NcwemDar durIns the de-brie.flnl~ oI Sits Johns-. Plber aadJ'acka_ who had beea released by the VC in early Nonmber.

(3) In December a reward ",,'paId,te lour Vietnamese IUhermen who recon-red and retu.rAeet to U. S. c:oaUol tho body oI a member eI the 199th Light Infnt~ Bri,ade who had d_1Ied during a combat operatioD.

(4) In December MontagDarda near Plelku were rewarded lor re­turning the body oI a 4th lnIa.ntry Dirialon soldier who had been kUled in action.

G-V-I.

I

12. JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION.

a. The current JTD ol JPRC ia aa .lollowa:

TITLE

Chief Opu Ie Plana Opu Ie Plana Intel OIl .InteIOt! Opu Sgt Intel Analyat Chief Clerk

SERVICE

-.AF A AF N A A II N

GRADE

06 04 04 04 04 E8 E6 ES

-~ ---~----~----~---

J A t the end ol ""7 there were !lve 'oIIicer. and !lye enll.ted mea a.aigned. The two additional enliated- men. were an E6 a..."ini.trativeapeci&llat and an E5 intelligence analyat.

. b. Ba.ed·. __ ezpe.r.ience.g.~~ln~. ,..t yeu •. ,..aUlbl~ _dfJ1ed 'u .Tl'D wa. aubmitted to CINCPAC IA N_ ... mber. The propoaec1 J'PltC Drpa-laatlon appear. below:

. Chief 05 AF' Op Sit E8 A'-SteDe E5 A

Intel Opaa/Flana

Intel OIl 04 A • Opu/Plana 04 AF Intel OIl 04 N ' Intel OIl 03A Intel Az:al E7 A Intel A_I E6 A

Sllppert

Y_man ES N .-c. The propoaed cbenge adda'two eall.ted men. an E7'InteWgence

Analyat and.anES Stenographer. Thi. la.nece.aary to meet increaaed recorda maintell&JlCe requirementa and·inteUlgeDCeinputa. lIelcUtionally. the officer strllcture haa been altered. In the Operationa and Plana Section, one oilicer position haa been changed lrom an Operationa anel Plana Olficer to an Intelligence Olficer and ha. been downgraded lrom 04 to 03. The poaition ol Chiel. JPRC haa been downgraded from. an 06 to an OS.

a v 15