Assignment on Election law.doc

7/27/2019 Assignment on Election law.doc

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Ramon Christopher R. Nollora LLB IIElection Laws Regular ClassTuesday 5:30pm 6:30pm

Election Law Assigned Cases

Bondoc vs. PinedaG.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

Facts:

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a

member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party.

Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the

winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura

Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This

resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET.

Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera.

Issue:

Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the

legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality

and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be

recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted

either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or

the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since a constitutional grant of authority is not

usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be

accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two

coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is

judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.

In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of

the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein

Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already

reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since

the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

Macalintal vs COMELECG.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

Facts:


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A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar,

seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)

suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject

matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,

petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified

Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates

funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations

Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.

Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or

permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their

intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the

Constitution;

That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning

candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-

President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning

candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and

That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve theImplementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the

independence of the COMELEC under Article IX-A, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Held:

1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the

Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in

connection with Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall


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provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee

voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to

enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of

origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach

voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as

voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency

requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No.

2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening

petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it

necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-

presidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section

4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to

Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-

President.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to

it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for

President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.

3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a

constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the

discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the

case of a less responsible organization.

The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political

strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a

peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body

except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings.

In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to

enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising

supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of

R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.

Domino vs. COMELEC


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G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts:

Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of

the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents filed with the

COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the

petitioner is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks

election.

Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a resolution declaring Domino

disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11,

1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his

certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a

motion for reconsideration but denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately

preceding the May 1998 election.

Held:

No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for

elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and

personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioners

domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala

Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a

house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be

indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of

permanency required to prove abandonment of his original domicile.


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The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective

office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed but also

personal presence in tha place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,

pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Records show that petitioners domicile of origin

was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City,

as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon

City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence

in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A persons domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until

a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of

residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not

adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to

reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of

ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how

long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of

the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other

circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of

intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in

Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of

residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Japzon vs. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007. Japzon instituted before the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy

on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in

the United States of America for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely

represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar


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(Barangay 6), for one year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any

foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never

actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as

required under Section 39 of Local Government Code.

Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at Barangay 6. He had

also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as

the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine

citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen. However, he alleges that prior to the election, he

had successfully reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of Allegiance

to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had also complied with the 1-year

residencey rule as shown by the following:

a.) Community Tax Certificate from Barangay 6 (March 2006)

b.) Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005)

c.) Registered voter at Barangay 6 (July 2006)

Pending this case, Ty won the elections.

The COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Ty.

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local

Government Code.

Held:

Yes. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party

actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any

given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs

parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of

choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American

citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a


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naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of

origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect

on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain

his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The

length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it

shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when,

immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine

passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years

2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality

stating therein his address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17

July 2006 in Precinct. ?????

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party GO! GO Phil., etalG.R. No. 147589. G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001

Facts:

On the registration period, the COMELEC approved the accreditation of 154 parties and

organizations but denied those of several others in its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Moreover, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a petition to delete from the

Certified List of Political Parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions and that said certified list be

accordingly amended. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for cancellation of

Registration and Nomination against some herein respondents.

Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the COMELEC Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785. Also, Bayan Muna filed a petition challenging the said resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections


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3. Whether or not party-list system is exclusive to marginalized sectors.

Held:

1. From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of

the law and the Constitution in connection with the due process clause. Basic rudiments of due processrequire that the organizations or parties should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify

under the guidelines promulgated before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be

elected under the party-list system.

2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections. Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list

system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list

system.

For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,

regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that

a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

3. No, the state policy focused mainly on proportional representation by means of Filipino-style

party-list system.

Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,

because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a

distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and

underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant,

fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,

overseas workers, and professionals.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list

system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are

interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the

phrases with which they are associated or related.

Atienza vs COMELECG.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010

Facts:


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Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his party withdrew support

for the administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. However, Atienza, LP Chairman, alleged

that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party.

Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza as

LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming

that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were not properly

convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is a three-year term. Meaning,

his term has not yet ended. However, Atienza contested that the election of new officers could be likened

to people power removing Drilon as president by direct action. Also, Atienza alleged that the amendment

to the LP Constituion providing the three-term had not been properly ratified.

The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing

assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. Moreover, the COMELEC ruled that

since the said Constitution was not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-over capacity since his term

has been ended already.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons

term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza et al. sought to

enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum. The

COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al.s petition. As for the validity of petitioners

Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue

that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party

matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party dispute.

Held:

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket

authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free

to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes

internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.

The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions

under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political

party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. Moreover, the COMELECs power to register

political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus,


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the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an

incident of its power to register political parties.

The COMELEC did not err when it upheld Roxas election but refused to rule on the validity of

Atienzas expulsion.

BANAT vs. COMELECG.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to

Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the NBC.

BANAT filed its petition because the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have announced in

the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall iomplement the Veterans Ruling,

applying the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. NBC denied the herein petition of BANAT

for being moot and academic. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC resolution instead

it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC resolution.

Moreover, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to

reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution because

the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of R.A. No. 7941. On the same day, the

COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issues:

1. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

2. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list

elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Held:

1. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.

7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

a.) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based

on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

b.)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes

cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.


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c.)Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be

entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are

allocated.

d.)Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they

have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available

seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System

less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.

7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

2. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to

participate in the party-list elections. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties

from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended

the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by

vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from

participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Lewis vs. COMELECG.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

Facts:

The petitioners who already acquired Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 prayed that they be

allowed to vote as part of their right. When the petitioners sought registration and certification as

Overseas Absentee Voters, they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that a COMELEC

letter stated that the petitioners have yet no right to vote due to their lack of one-year residence

requirement prescribed by the Constitution.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. A week before the May 10, 2004

elections, the COMELEC filed a comment. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation on May

20, 2004 stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos including dual citizens who care to exercise the right

of suffrage, may do so. However, the 2004 elections ended already, so the petition becomes moot and

academic.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired

Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA 9189

Held:


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Yes, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of RA 9189 become citizens

of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 of Article V of the 1987 Constitution prescribes

requirements as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 of Article V of

the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying

that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency proscription in the preceding Section, be

allowed to vote.

There is no provision in RA No. 9225 requiring dual citizens to actually establish residence and

physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA No.

9225, in implicit acknowledgement that duals are most likely non-residents, grant under its Section 5 (1)

the same right of suffrage as granted an absentee voter under RA No. 9189. It cannot be

overemphasized that RA No. 9189 aims, in essence to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas

Filipino who save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,

are qualified to vote.

With the passage of RA No. 9225 , the scope of overseas absentee voting has been

consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of their countries, subject,

however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the expansion of the scope of

that law with the passage of RA 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise

the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme.

Tecson vs. COMELECMarch 3, 2004

Facts:

On December 31, 2003, Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy for the position

of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP).In his Certificate of

Candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. His real name was stated to be

Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.

On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to Disqualify FPJ

and to Deny Due Course or to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a

material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.

According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American


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and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Even

if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because

FPJ was illegitimate.

Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie

Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. Even

if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of

FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September

16, 1940 where Allan was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American.

FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Poe. No birth certificate for

Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as

a Filipino residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born

on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Espaol father and to a

mestiza Espaol mother.

In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following pieces of

evidence:

a.) Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ

b.) Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy

case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)

English translation of (b)

Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe

Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office stating that a

Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907

Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that there was no

available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe

On their part, FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:

Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the

registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan

Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no

available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez

Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe


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Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Poe,

Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Poe

Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Poe

Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley

Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records

of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II

On January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier

filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was denied by the COMELEC en

banc on February 6, 2004.

On February 10, 2004 Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for Temporary

Restraining Order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or

execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the

jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive

jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed.

2. Whether or not FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially

misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?

Held:

1. The COMELECs decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate could be

elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the

presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on the following:

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed

by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required

under Section 74 is false (Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78)


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the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws

relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free, orderly and honest elections (Sec.

52, same)

any interested party authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of

candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same)

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court

under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the

Constitution, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on

certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.

Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine

whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch of instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution).

In Tecson petition and Velez petition:

The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the

COMELECs jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition because the Supreme Court

sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of

the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

A contest refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election protests or a

quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner from office. The Rules of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:

Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to qualifications of the President or Vice-

President of the Philippines. (Rule 12)

An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quo-warranto

against the President or Vice-President. (Rule 13)

Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the second or third

highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-Presidentby filing a

verified petitionwithin 30 days after the proclamation of the winner. (Rule 14)

The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-President.


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2. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born

citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have

himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent

prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from the

presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the

year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of

residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place

of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Poe would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"

that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.

That citizenship (of Lorenzo Poe), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,

father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,

confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children

are legitimate or illegitimate.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of ImmigrationGR L-21289, 4 October 197141 SCRA 292

Facts:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-

immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the

Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of

P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the

Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period

as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay

in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim

Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the

Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,

after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.

The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.

Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.


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Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or

naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines

under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently

naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as

Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section

4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel

provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during

the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a

Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is

generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the

occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by

virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January

1962.

IN RE: MALLAREAdm. Case No. 533, September 12, 197459 SCRA 45

Facts:

Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962. Apparently, both his

parents were Chinese. A complaint was filed by the then Acting Immigration Commissioner, the purpose

of which is to determine whether Mallare should be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice

law in the Philippines. Consequently, Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law and his

admission to the bar was revoked. Mallare moved for reconsideration of the decision but was denied by

the Court. Mallare then petitioned that the case be opened for a new trial on the ground of newly

discovered evidences which would alter the decision previously promulgated by the Court. The evidence

consisted of an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church purporting to show

Esteban Mallare, the petitioner's father, to be the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipina; and testimonies of

certain persons who had known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime. In its resolution

dated July 31, 1969, the Court resolved to set aside its previous decision and granted the new trial prayed

for.


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Issue:

Whether or not Esteban Mallare, the petitioners father, is a Filipino, thus making petitioner

Florencio Mallare also a Filipino citizen, and therefore should be included back in the Roll of Attorneys.

Held:

The Court found sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its previous decision, and a

definite declaration that Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to

continue the practice of law. The petitioner's evidence shows that his father was born out of wedlock and

that his grandmother is a Filipina who resided in Macalelon, Quezon, affirmed by the testimonies of the

natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare

and her son, Esteban. Petitioner's father is therefore a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to

confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship; and even assuming that Ana

Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he come of age,

constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

Aznar vs. COMELEC and OsmeaG.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990185 SCRA 1990

Facts:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy

with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local

elections.

On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial

Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the

ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the

then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private

respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and

Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,

respectively. (Annex "B-1").4)

During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,

alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President

Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued


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on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone

out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines

since 19 65.5)

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for

disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is

not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.

Held:

Supreme Court dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner

failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes

provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express

renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or

laws of a foreign country.

From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine

citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine

citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance

of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously

participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a

candidate.

Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be

presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere

fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the

case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,

possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of

Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we

consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason

that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either express or

implied.


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Bengzon vs. CruzGR No. 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Cruz a natural born citizen of the Philippines, he was born in San Clemente, Tarlac

on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without

the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States of America.

As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Section 1 (4) of commonwealth Act No. 63, a

Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, rendering service to or accepting commission

in the armed forces of a foreign country. Then on June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as US citizen, in

connection with his service in the US Marine corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation

under RA No. 2630. He ran against petitioner Bengzon III then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad

Cautelam before the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), claiming that respondent Cruz

was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representative since he is not a natural-born

citizen.

HRET dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can

still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held:

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1.) by birth, and (2.) by naturalization. These ways

of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the

naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-

born thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippine

from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become a Filipino citizens through

naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised

Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act

No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of


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the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine

citizenship becomes executor only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied

that during the intervening period, the applicant has, (1.) not left the Philippines; (2.) has dedicated

himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3.) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of

Government promulgated rules; or (4.) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or

contrary to any Government announced policies.

Modes of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner

provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63, enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship

may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1.) by naturalization, (2.) by repatriation, and (3.) by direct act of

Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a

mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.

473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship is

governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire

Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualification and none of the deisqualifications mentioned in

Section 4 of CA No. 473.

Repatriation, on the hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship

due to; (1.) desertion of the armed forces; (2.) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World

War II; (3.) service in the armed forces of the United States at any other time; (4.) marriage of a Filipino

woman to an alien; and (5.) political and economic necessity.

As distinguish from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking

of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil

Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation Results in Recovery of Original Nationality

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a

naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino

citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Filipino citizenship,

he will be restored his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruzs case, he lost Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed

Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.

2630.


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Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same

in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent

Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired

at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,

or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to

perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision,

the term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Section 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perform his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1.) a person must be a

Filipino citizen from birth, and (2.) he does not have to perform any act to obtain his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were

not considered natural-born: (1.) those who were naturalized and (2.) those born before January 17,

1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those

naturalized citizens were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth

and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the

effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they had to perform

an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considered those born of Filipino mothers before theeffectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of

majority as a natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds

sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof

shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not

natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present

Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1.) those who are natural-born and (2.) those who

are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to

undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born

Filipino.

Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of separate category for persons who, after

losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,

they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship

and mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not

required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce


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a natural born Filipino. As such he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of

the House of Representatives.

Frivaldo vs. COMELECG.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996

Facts:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on

January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities,

Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity,

filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground

that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States

as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only

to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself

as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad."

He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of

democracy.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was

a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on

January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also arguedthat their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the

Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his

candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo

was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American

citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this

defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government

Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section

253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were

seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they

were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that

he was not a Filipino.

Issue:


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Whether or not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his

election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held:

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that allpublic officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific

requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be

inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section

117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a

citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,

of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a

"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The

evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the

following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly

authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,

California, U.S.A.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos

dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing

American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and

voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country

while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of

Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment

only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the

electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,

especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule

requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the

Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing allfealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the

Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great

price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This

country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once


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rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning

renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the

Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly,

he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said

province once this decision becomes final and executory.

Co vs. HRET and Jose Ong, Jr.G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident

of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of

Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,

Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern

Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following

grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for

reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the

HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.


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Held:

Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the

Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on landwhich he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a

certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was

brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of

Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed

Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong

Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932

according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong

who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and

shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became

inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan,

unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with

the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On

May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28,1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant

to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization

was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his

elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from

other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,

went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. Jose Ong graduated from

college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities

were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the

Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the

Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's


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citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.

The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was

precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: Section 1, the following are

citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon

reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in

accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect

Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,

elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous

situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a

natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect

Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-

born.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural

born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon

reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship

when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was

his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine

(9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution

would be amended to require him to have fi led a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite ofhis already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary

procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the

participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The private


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respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the

Philippines. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his

premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his

citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action

for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents

father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to

rest.

Tabasa vs Court of AppealsG.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006

Facts:

Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner

was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By

derivative naturalization, petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995 and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year.

Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained in Baybay, Malay, Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the

Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996 (pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72).

Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. Petitioner was, eventually, ordered

deported to his country of origin.

Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction

and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. Tabasa alleged, among others, that he is entitled

to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to

a Filipino citizen as provided in 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he

was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years

old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.

Issue:

Whether or not Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason

of political or economic necessity under RA 8171.

Held:


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He does not. Republic Act No. 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino women

who have lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos, was

enacted on 23 October 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz.:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born

Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or

economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not one of those

disqualified, as enumerated in the law:

Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons

who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or

association for the predominance of their ideas;

Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by

reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to

natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the

minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that, if a parent who had renounced his

Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his

repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a

former Filipino, subsequently, had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The

repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically

vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To claim the benefit of RA

8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the

parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the

capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot

apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.

Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELECG.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999207 SCRA 630


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Facts:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzanos

proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is

an American citizen.

In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the

Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino

father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and

is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as

an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate

of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual

citizens are disqualified from running for any position.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was

both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the

Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his

Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance

to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority,

he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his

US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen.

Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office.

Held:

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a

result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously

considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose

parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which

follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is

concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our


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Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual

citizenship:

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus

soli;

Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers

country such children are citizens of that country;

Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,

unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any

act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional

provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,

by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is

the result of an individuals volition.

LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual Citizenship

The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with

dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their

status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of

candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual

citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different

states.

By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the

other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be

that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively

renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

Petitioners Election of Philippine Citizenship

The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of registering himself as a voter was an

effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration

and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a national of the United States, whether by


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birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or

participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. But this

provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by

filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected

Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution

of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without

mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively

repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered

with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession

as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of

Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.

Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his

Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we

sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a

naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial

documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against

any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does

some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Jacot vs. Dal and COMELECG.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a naturalized

citizen of the US on December 13, 1989. Jacot sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship underRepublic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the

administrator of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate

General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of approval of Jacots

request, and on the same day, he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before

Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. September 27, 2006, the Bureu of Immigration issued Identification

Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing Jacot as a citizen of the Philippines.


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Six months after, Jacot filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the

Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. On May 2, 2007, respondent Roger T. Dal filed a Petition for

Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin agai

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