Assessing Cox

Assessing safety culture in oshore environments

S.J. Cox, A.J.T. Cheyne *

Centre for Hazard and Risk Management, The Business School, Loughborough University, Leicestershire

LE11 3TU, UK

Abstract

This paper discusses a joint industry and UK Health and Safety Executive research projecton the assessment of safety culture in oshore environments. It particularly describes thedevelopment of a safety culture assessment methodology which is based on a systems

approach to organisational culture. This approach combines a number of assessment meth-ods, such as: questionnaires, focus groups, behavioural observations and situational audits, todescribe and explore the ecacy of health and safety management systems. The evidence

produced by these methods are complementary rather than alternatives and provide dierentviews of organisational health and safety culture by tapping many aspects of the organisa-tions structure, function and behaviour. The assessment techniques have been piloted within

collaborating organisations, both within the UK and the Gulf of Mexico. The culmination ofthe work is the Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit which is now published and availablefor use by managers and safety professionals within the oshore oil extraction industry.

# 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Organisational culture; Safety culture; Health and safety management; Cultural assessment;

Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit

1. Introduction

In the decade following the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster many of the oshore oil andgas processing organisations within the UK have made changes in the manner inwhich they manage health and safety (Alexander et al., 1994; Flin et al., 1996; Coxand Cheyne, 1999). The majority of these changes were precipitated by developmentsin the oshore health and safety regulatory regime following on from the recom-mendations of the Cullen Report (Cullen, 1990), including, for example, the estab-lishment of the Oshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)and the application of the Oshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (1992).

Safety Science 34 (2000) 111129

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* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-1509-222162; fax: +44-1509-223961.

E-mail address: [email protected] (A.J.T. Cheyne).

In the wake of such changes, a Cross Industry Safety Leadership Forum has beenestablished to facilitate the sharing of safe working practices. The members of thisforum recently highlighted a number of indicators of improved safety performance(Cross Industry Safety Leadership Forum, 1997), including an overall decrease inreported injury frequency rates and an estimated $5 billion in investments in healthand safety-related improvements. However, despite these overall eorts, there issome evidence to suggest that the rate of improvement, as measured by accident/injury frequency, has slowed down over the past 2 years (HSE, 1997; Cox andCheyne, 1999). Furthermore the Cross Industry Safety Leadership Forum (1997)have also confirmed that much of the existing eorts in support of these improve-ments have been focused upon technology and management systems rather thanhuman factors. They also suggest that potential for future improvements may bestbe realised through enhanced eorts in the areas of human factors and through theassociated developments in health and safety culture. In light of this initiative thispaper considers how oshore installation managers can gauge their safety culture.Discussion here focuses on the development of a generic safety culture assessmentmethodology which was designed to support improvements in safety performanceacross the sector.This paper describes a series of studies that are focused on the practical needs of

oshore managers and workers for the monitoring of safety culture through thedevelopment of a self-assessment tool. It aims to give a broad overview of thedevelopment of this methodology (Cox and Cheyne, 1999) and draws heavily uponrecent work carried out in the UK sector of the North Sea. It also explores thepractical utility of the concept in oshore environments. The methods describedhere are concerned with both the development and piloting of this tool. Whereas themethodology is based on sound safety science, the overall aim of the assessmentprocess is to chart a path through, what is increasingly becoming, a conceptualminefield (Cox and Flin, 1998), and one in which researchers have been challengedby industry to address practical issues (Cox and Lacey, 1998). Although much hasbeen done in other sectors (e.g. Hale and Hovden, 1998; Hofmann and Stetzer,1998) in these studies the cultural context for investigation is set within the oshoreindustry.

1.1. Previous studies

A number of previous studies in oshore environments have, either directly orindirectly, considered employee perceptions and elements of health and safety cul-ture. In an early study, Marek et al. (1985) examined risk perceptions, stress andaccidents among dierent work groups on an oshore installation. They identifiedthe main influences on safety as the implementation of a safety policy, correctsafety management and safety promoting activities, and incorporation of employeesviews in designing safety programmes. Similarly Rundmo (1993) implemented aquestionnaire survey of personnel on eight oshore installations in the Norwegiansector of the North Sea; firstly to determine the personnel evaluations of riskresources and, secondly, to identify dierences in risk perceptions among dierent

112 S.J. Cox, A.J.T. Cheyne / Safety Science 34 (2000) 111129

work groups. These studies indicated that those personnel who were most prone toinjuries and near misses were also those who experienced the greatest physical strainand who perceived the highest risks in relation to their work situation (Rundmo,1993). Flin and Mearns (1994) carried this work forward into the UK sector of theNorth Sea. They identified three important areas which could contribute to acci-dents and near misses: (1) individual characteristics (including experience, knowl-edge, attitudes to safety, etc); (2) job characteristics (work tasks, environment, jobstress, etc.); and (3) platform characteristics (safety culture, social support and safetymanagement systems). This study (Flin and Mearns, 1994) also indicated that man-agement commitment to safety, job satisfaction, attitudes to safety versus produc-tion and job situation had the greatest eect on workers perception of risk and theirsatisfaction with safety measures.In a study focussing specifically on safety culture, Alexander et al. (1994) used self-

administered questionnaires and supporting interviews in an attempt to measureaspects of safety culture in the oshore environment within one operating companyin the UK sector of the North Sea. The study also focussed on dierences in per-ceptions of the prevailing culture between company employees and contractors andthose working in onshore and oshore environments. The culture for safety withinthe operating company was described, in terms of employees attitudes and percep-tions, by six factors, labelled as management commitment, personal need for safety,appreciation of risk, attribution of blame, conflict and control and supportiveenvironment. Contractor employees were found to have a higher appreciation ofrisk and a higher personal need for safety compared with the operating companyemployees. Similarly, oshore workers in general had a higher appreciation of risk,greater personal need for safety and were more convinced of managements com-mitment to safety than those working onshore. Mearns et al. (1998) have continuedthis focus on human and organisational issues in their study of safety climate in theUK sector of the North Sea. Their study, based on a questionnaire survey ofemployee attitudes, provided evidence that sub-cultures, centred around, for exam-ple, work teams or parent organisations, are important for workers perceptions oftheir overall safety.There are, thus, a number of dominant themes in relation to human factors and,

in particular, safety culture emerging from these oshore studies and other reportedstudies in the literature (Cox and Flin, 1998). For example, the importance of man-agement commitment and, in particular, the perceived priority accorded to safetymatters, has been repeatedly highlighted. Equally a number of studies (e.g. Flin etal., 1996) have confirmed the need to consider not only key organisational factors,but also to take account of individual factors, such as personal appreciation of risksand involvement in safety-related decisions, as key influences on safety performance,and the related safety culture, within oshore environments. Similarly, potentialsub-cultures, characteristic of dierent occupational groups, and the concomitantinfluences on overall installation, or organisational, culture have been identified. Asa consequence of these studies, and recent discussions and conferences within theoshore environment (Cross Industry Safety Leadership Forum, 1997; Cox andLacey, 1998), the awareness and development of an appropriate safety culture is

S.J. Cox, A.J.T. Cheyne / Safety Science 34 (2000) 111129 113

now seen to be an important area of concern with managers, regulators andresearchers. It has also been argued by researchers into oshore health and safetymanagement practices that the safety culture concept has the potential to provide anumbrella for both individual and organisational safety issues (Cox and Flin, 1998)and can be used as a vehicle for framing further improvements. However, althoughthere is indeed some evidence to suggest that assessing the prevailing organisationalculture can assist in the identification and management of health and safety issues(Cox and Flin, 1998), the practical utility of the safety culture concept in securingsafety-related improvements in oshore environments has not yet been established(Lee, 1995).

1.2. The current studies

The present studies are concerned with the development and testing of an assess-ment technique which provides both a practical tool for the assessment of safetyclimate and simultaneously aids the promotion of a positive safety culture. Thestudies described here are published in the Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit(Cox and Cheyne, 1999) together with a guide for those using the toolkit. In view ofthe practical intentions of the studies and the nature of the output, potential toolkitusers in participating organisations were widely consulted in the development of theconceptual framework. This framework has been described in a number of previouspublications (e.g. Cheyne et al., 1988; Cox et al., 1998; Cox and Cheyne, 1999) andinvolves a holistic view of safety climate assessment. Assessments of safety climateare used here as an indicator of overall safety culture. Culture in general, and safetyculture in particular, is often characterised as an enduring aspect of the organisationwith trait-like properties and not easily changed. Climate, on the other hand, can beconceived of as a manifestation of organisational culture (Schein, 1985) exhibitingmore state-like properties. The nature of culture and climate and their relationshiphas also been related to the concepts of personality and mood (Cox and Flin, 1998),where culture represents the more trait-like properties of personality and climate themore state-like properties of mood. For the purposes of this discussion climate isviewed as a temporal manifestation of culture, which is reflected in the shared per-ceptions of the organisation at a discrete point in time (Cox and Cheyne, 1999).A multiple perspective, or holistic, model of the safety climate assessment process

was proposed and, as such, dominated the project design. Similar approaches arediscussed within the literature in relation to the assessment of organisational climate(James and Jones, 1974; Cox and Cox, 1996; Denison, 1996). It has been suggested(Jick, 1979) that organisational researchers and practitioners can improve the accu-racy of their judgements by both utilising multiple methods and collecting dierentkinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon, in this case safety climate. Between(or across) methods triangulation (Denzin, 1978) oers such an approach. Jick(1979) cites the example of reviewing the eectiveness of an organisational leader,where eectiveness may be studied by: (1) interviewing the leader; (2) observing theirleadership behaviours; and (3) evaluating performance records. The focus remainswith the organisational issue (in Jicks, 1979 example leadership) but the mode of


data collection varies. Multiple and independent measures, if they provide suppor-tive evidence, can thus provide a more certain picture (or profile) of the issue underreview (Denzin, 1978; Cox and Cheyne, 1999).In the same vein James and Jones (1974) describe three dierent approaches to the

assessment of organisational culture (and climate) and, in doing so, oer commen-tary on its dierent (conceptual) loci. First, is the multiple measurement-organisa-tional attribute approach which regards organisational climate exclusively as a setof organisational attributes (or main eects), measurable by a variety of methods;e.g. organisational structure or organisational systems measured by propriety auditsystems. Second, there is the perceptual-organisational attribute approach, whichviews organisational climate as a set of perceptual variables which are still seen asorganisational eects, e.g. views of the organisations commitment, etc. Finally,there is the perceptual measurement-individual attribute approach which capturesorganisational climate through perceptions of individual attributes, e.g. individualsfeelings and attitudes towards organisational issues, their related behaviour, etc.Given the importance of both organisational and individual factors in influencingsafety culture (James and Jones, 1974; Denison, 1996) it is suggested that in anattempt to measure culture these dierent approaches should be treated as com-plementary and not as alternatives. Thus a multiple perspective was taken whichalso combined dierent approaches to assessment, as recommended by Jick (1979).This is illustrated in the framework model shown in Fig. 1.In such a model, the representation of organisational safety culture is consistent

with one sponsors preferred (HSE, 1997) definition. For example, the Advisory

Fig. 1. Multiple perspective model of safety culture assessment.


Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) (Booth, 1996; ASCNI,1993) definition, that safety culture is the product of individual and group values,attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine thecommitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisations health and safetymanagement (ASCNI, 1993, p. 23), is consistent with the representation in themodel. A similar approach has been taken in the assessment of safety culture in thenuclear industry (Carroll, 1998) where aspects of the organisation derived throughpeer observations and audit were considered alongside questionnaires. The datawere then used in ongoing discussions to further organisational learning.

1.3. Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit

The three methods proposed for use in a safety climate assessment exercise, andillustrated in Fig. 1, form the basis of the assessment methods included in the SafetyClimate Assessment Toolkit. The toolkit is a practical instrument for in-house useand it contains a selection of tools that can be used as part of the measurementprocess. These tools include questionnaires, interview and focus discussion groupschedules and behavioural indicators. A full text and electronic version of the toolkitcan be found at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs/safetyThe remainder of this paper discusses some of the studies that contributed to the

development of these assessment methods. Two representative studies and a caseillustration, which collectively cover the issues of exploration, instrument develop-ment and practical use, are outlined here:

. Study 1 included a series of focus discussions which formed the basis of someof the tools and measures which are developed in Study 2;

. Study 2 describes the development of a safety climate questionnaire; and

. the case illustration briefly outlines a case study application of the ques-tionnaire tools developed in Study 2 in a pilot organisation.

The accounts of the development of the behavioural indicators and the semi-structured interview schedule, also included in the assessment process, are outsidethe scope of the paper and are described within the Safety Climate AssessmentToolkit (Cox and Cheyne, 1999). The final discussions are focussed on the mutualexperiences of implementing the practical assessment process together with the per-ceived benefits; e.g. the practical utility of the output of the assessment and thepotential for action planning.

2. Focus discussion groups (Study 1)

The first study was concerned with exploring employees understanding and per-ception of safety culture. These shared understandings and underpinning con-structs were utilised in the design of subsequent studies and formed the bases of thedevelopment of the assessment methodology. Focus discussion groups were


employed here for two reasons: (1) to elicit constructs based on individuals notionsof safety culture; and (2) to provide initial indications of any dierences in overallperceptions between dierent work groups in the study organisations. The focusgroup studies were deemed to be particularly appropriate at this stage of the inves-tigations since the data collected would be utilised as the basis for the toolkit devel-opment and, in particular, the development of the questionnaire tool. Focus groupsas a method are well accepted (Krueger, 1994) but they can be biased by a numberof factors, e.g. domination of the group by one member or too much direction bythe facilitator. These biases were controlled for by the use of a small number ofgroup facilitators who followed a structured discussion format.

2.1. Method

A series of focus group discussions (n=40) were conducted using both oshoreand onshore personnel in three separate organisations, at a total of six dierentlocations. These 40 discussion groups involved 375 employees in groups rangingbetween three and 12 individuals. One hundred and eighty-one participants workedin onshore locations and 194 were based on oshore installations. Eighty-threemanagers and supervisors took part in the study. Wherever possible the groups werehomogenous and comprised either: (1) managers and supervisors; or (2) members ofthe workforce. This promoted an atmosphere of open enquiry and, wherever possi-ble, avoided inhibiting the group members (Carroll, 1998).Each of the discussions involved four questions being put to the group partici-

pants, namely what they understood by the term safety, what they understood bythe term company culture, how safety fits into their picture of company culture andwhat they understood by the term safety culture. The first three questions weredesigned to put participants at their ease and help focus their discussion of theconcept of safety culture. All members of the group were encouraged by the facil-itator to make a response to the final question.Each of the focus group discussions were recorded on audiotape and then tran-

scribed verbatim. These transcriptions were then subjected to a preliminary contentanalysis (Holsti, 1969; Dane, 1990) involving two independent raters, and theresulting keywords (based on the most commonly occurring constructs in the dis-cussions of the concept of safety culture) were tabulated. There was 96% agreementbetween raters on the classification of concepts. Where the raters did not agree onthe categorisation of a concept (in 13 cases), a third rater arbitrated. In addition tothe extraction of individual key constructs, general group feelings and perceptions ofsafety were recorded as appropriate.

2.2. Results

All groups actively participated with a good degree of co-operation. The numberof occasions each concept was mentioned during the focus discussion groups isshown in Table 1, together with a breakdown by organisation. The numbers shownin brackets indicate the number of times each issue was raised in a negative sense.


For example, in the case of involvement, the number of time individuals felt thatthey were not involved in safety issues.Many of the non-managerial participants, especially within Organisation 2,

recounted experiences of not feeling that they were adding value to safety-relatedprocesses and perceived that they were not involved in any safety decision-makingprocesses aecting anything other than routine day-to-day operations. Responsesfrom oshore workers suggest that they have a greater appreciation of risk thanonshore workers which, in turn, aects their perception of safety issues and may gosome way to explaining the many emotive comments made about the importance ofsafety oshore. The responses from the onshore groups represented a more sanitisedviewpoint, given with much less emotion than those received from the oshoregroups. Several groups expressed the view that, although attitudes to safety hadimproved, they perceived that the principles of risk management were providing themain impetus for improvements in all three organisations. Combined responsessuggest that management were quite committed to safety although improvementscould still be made. Although some non-managerial participants, particularly inoshore environments, related feelings that a blame culture existed.

2.3. Discussion

Of the constructs identified, management commitment, management actions forsafety and the physical work environment were the more common across all threeorganisations, although involvement in safety issues and the priority given to safetyissues were also highlighted as important. These results give some indication of howsafety culture is perceived by those working in the oshore environment and areconsistent with earlier findings both on and oshore (Zohar, 1980; Flin et al., 1996).The constructs uncovered provided the basis, together with the review of currentliterature on safety culture assessment (Cox and Flin, 1998) and climate identifica-tion, for the construction of a set of climate assessment tools. It should be noted

Table 1

Focus group keywords

Keyword Organisation 1 Organisation 2 Organisation 3 Total

Involvement in safety issues 6(3) 67(20) 73

Physical work environment 2(2) 52(34) 2(1) 56

Priority of safety over other issues 11(10) 44(37) 55

Management actions for safety 3(2) 20(15) 27(21) 50

Management commitment 9(3) 21(6) 7(2) 37

Apportioning of blame 5(4) 29(20) 34

Safe systems/procedures 23(17) 23

Accidents 11(10) 11

Attitudes to personal safety 10(2) 10

Safety training and instruction 2(1) 5(1) 7

Safety legislation 6(4) 6

Total number of discussion groups 7 19 15 40


that, although the results of the studies described here were used primarily as animportant and essential starting point for the project, focus groups had furtherpotential for safety climate assessment in this environment.1 Furthermore the datacollected from the focus group studies supported the holistic view illustrated in Fig.1, with reference being made to a range of organisational systems and artefacts andto both organisational and individual factors.

3. Developing assessment methods (Study 2)

The second study is focussed on the development of one of the safety climateassessment tools that are included in the toolkit (see earlier) and also builds upon theconstructs developed in Study 1. In particular this study describes the processinvolved in developing the attitude questionnaire.

3.1. Development of the question bank

Over the last 5 years, a variety of safety attitude questionnaire surveys have beencarried out in the organisations participating in the project (e.g. Alexander et al.,1994; Fitzpatrick, 1996). The common items and themes from the three surveyinstruments were identified (and highlighted in Table 2). In addition to these studies,

Table 2

Oshore attitude survey dimensions and their origin

Oshorequestionnaires

Nuclear(Lee, 1995)

Energy supply(Donald, 1995)

Chemical/process(Byrom andCorbridge, 1997)

Manufacturing(Cox and Cox, 1991)

Managementcommitment

Management/super-visor support

Managementcommitment

Priority of safety Safeness of the workenvironment

Communication Safety information Organisationalcommitment andcommunication

Safety rules Safety procedures,safety rules

Safe working proce-dures

Reporting accidentsand nearmisses

Arrangements forsafety

Supportiveenvironment

Work group support Workmatesinfluence

Personal prioritiesand need for safety

Personal role Personal scepticism,personal immunity

Personal appreciationof risk

Risk Risk-takingbehaviour

Involvementa Participation/ownership

Responsibility

Work environmenta Design Work environment:hardware

Safeness of the workenvironment

a Indicates a dimension not previously covered by the surveys in participating organisations.

1 The results not only provided this basis for future development, but also gave the facilitators valuable

insights into the organisations under study.


safety attitude measures have also been developed and utilised in other industrialsectors (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Brown and Holmes, 1986; Cox, 1988; Dedobbeleer andBeland, 1991; Cooper and Philips, 1994; Mearns et al., 1998). An initial questionbank, derived from the initial in-house studies, was refined in the light of otherpublished studies. Consideration was given to developments within: (1) the nuclearindustry (Lee, 1995); (2) the energy supply industry (see Donald, 1995, for details);(3) a variety of manufacturing settings (Cox and Cox, 1991; Cheyne and Cox, 1994;Cox et al., 1998); and (4) the HSE attitudinal indicator of safety climate (Byrom andCorbridge, 1997). Extra dimensions, not included in the common threads from pre-vious studies in participating organisations, were included if common to two ormore of the external studies and if highlighted by the focus group discussions (Study1). The full set of dimensions and their origin is shown in Table 2.In summary, the initial question bank for the questionnaire instrument was,

therefore, based on:

1. an initial review of oshore surveys within the study organisations and theestablishment of common themes;

2. comparisons between these and instruments in other industrial sectors (in par-ticular the nuclear and chemical/process industries); and

3. a review of the constructs identified in the focus discussion groups (Study 1 above).

These reviews and comparisons allowed a pilot questionnaire to be developed toinclude 47 items covering the areas of Management Commitment, Communication,Priority of Safety, Safety Rules and Procedures, Supportive Environment, Involve-ment, Personal Priorities and Need for Safety, Personal Appreciation of Risk andWork Environment. This attitude questionnaire was piloted using a population ofoshore personnel in two locations. These personnel were asked not only to com-plete the questionnaire but also to comment on the general content and any specificitems they felt to be unclear. Sixty completed questionnaires were returned. Themain objective of this pilot study was to test the face validity of the items in thequestionnaire with an appropriate group. Comments were restricted to individualitems and resulted in two items being reworded and four items being deleted. Thenew, 43-item questionnaire was tested on a larger pilot population.

3.2. Analysis

The questionnaire was distributed to 350 employees on three oshore installa-tions. Two-hundred and twenty-one questionnaires were returned, representing a63% response rate. There was no evidence that this sample was unrepresentative ofthe total population. These data were subjected to a series of statistical tests includ-ing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), internal-scale consistency and alternateforms reliability tests.

3.2.1. Factor analysisThe data were subjected to CFA using version 5.1 of the EQS (structural equation)

program (Bentler and Wu, 1995). In CFA the researcher postulates a model (a


Table 3

Standardised factor loadings

Item Loading

Management commitmentIn my workplace management acts quickly to correct safety problems 0.811Management acts decisively when a safety concern is raised 0.792In my workplace management turn a blind eye to safety issues 0.737Corrective action is always taken when management is told about unsafe practices 0.690In my workplace managers/supervisors show interest in my safety 0.520Management acts only after accidents have occurred 0.500Managers and supervisors express concern if safety procedures are not adhered to 0.440

Priority of safetyManagement clearly considers the safety of employees of great importance 0.665I believe that safety issues are not assigned a high priority 0.585Safety procedures are carefully followed 0.585Management considers safety to be equally as important as production 0.534

CommunicationThere is good communication here about safety issues which aect me 0.721Safety information is always brought to my attention by my line manager/supervisor 0.633My line manager/supervisor does not always inform me of current concerns and issues 0.594Management operates an open door policy on safety issues 0.541I do not receive praise for working safely 0.481

Safety rulesSome safety rules and procedures do not need to be followed to get the job done safely 0.724Some health and safety rules and procedures are not really practical 0.685Sometimes it is necessary to depart from safety requirements for productions sake 0.583

Supportive environmentI am strongly encouraged to report unsafe conditions 0.639I can influence health and safety performance here 0.543When people ignore safety procedures here, I feel it is none of my business 0.480Employees are not encouraged to raise safety concerns 0.421A no-blame approach is used to persuade people acting unsafely that their behaviour is inappropriate 0.367Co-workers often give tips to each other on how to work safely 0.323

InvolvementI am involved in informing management of important safety issues 0.724I am involved with safety issues at work 0.687I am never involved in the ongoing review of safety 0.524

Personal priorities and need for safetyIt is important that there is a continuing emphasis on safety 0.655I understand the safety rules for my job 0.642Safety is the number one priority in my mind when completing a job 0.623A safe place to work has a lot of personal meaning to me 0.571Personally I feel that safety issues are not the most important aspect of my job 0.500

Personal appreciation of riskI am sure it is only a matter of time before I am involved in an accident 0.782In my workplace the chances of being involved in an accident are quite large 0.464I am rarely worried about being injured on the job 0.286I am clear about what my responsibilities are for health and safety 0.273

Work environmentOperational targets often conflict with safety measures 0.795Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely 0.668Sometimes conditions here hinder my ability to work safely 0.666There are always enough people available to get the job done safely 0.596I cannot always get the equipment I need to do the job safely 0.448This is a safer place to work than other companies I have worked for 0.256


particular set of linkages between the observed variables and their underlying factors)and then tests this model statistically, examining the degree to which it fits with theavailable data. In its confirmatory approach, factor analysis is concerned withimplementing a theorists hypothesis about how a domain of variables may be struc-tured. The nine factors included in the questionnaire were already well-establisheddimensions derived from the literature and so in this case, the hypothesis that is beingtested is whether the variables actually relate to each factor, or latent variable. Anexploratory approach would have been more appropriate if there had been no theore-tical structure to the questionnaire and it was necessary to explore the factors it covered.Incremental fit indices measure the proportionate improvement in fit by compar-

ing a target model with a restricted baseline model, usually a null model in which allthe observed variables are independent. The comparative fit index (CFI) was used asit is one of the best fit indices (Marsh et al., 1996). A value of around 0.9 is acceptedas indicating good model fit.A nine factor model was proposed and tested. This model indicated a relatively

poor fit for the data (CFI=0.78) and so six constraints identified in the modelmodification statistics were released. This involved six of the items being associatedwith dierent factors. This improved the model fit (CFI=0.85) and resulted in thestructure shown in Table 3. Each item is shown in this table with its standardisedloading, all of which were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It should be notedthat those items with relatively low factor loadings may not be wholly indicative ofthe factor, but such items could be usefully consulted individually. Furthermore, inany summation of factor scores these loading might be used to weight individualitems.

3.2.2. ReliabilityTwo forms of reliability were examined, internal-scale reliability and alternate-

forms reliability. Internal-scale reliability (or consistency) is applied to groups ofitems that are thought to measure dierent aspects of the same concept (Litwin,1995). This is important because a group of items that purports to measure onevariable should be clearly focused on that variable and the accepted level for thisstatistic (Cronbachs alpha) is around 0.7. Measures of internal reliability for each of

Table 4

Factor internal reliability

Factor Cronbachs a

1 Management commitment 0.845

2 Priority of safety 0.722

3 Communication 0.734

4 Safety rules 0.715

5 Supportive environment 0.606

6 Involvement 0.705

7 Personal priorities and need for safety 0.607

8 Personal appreciation of risk 0.531

9 Work environment 0.779


the factors in Table 3 are presented in Table 4. It can be seen that all the alphasreported are in the range 0.53 through 0.84, the lower ones being consistent withthose factors where some original factor loadings were low.Alternate-forms reliability involves comparing two dierent versions of the same

measure (Dane, 1990). In the case of the questionnaire, 30 subjects were asked tocomplete the survey and then later, after an interval of at least 18 h, were asked 17 ofthose items orally as part of an interview format. These items were chosen randomlyfrom the larger questionnaire. The inter-item correlations are shown in Table 5.Only three of the inter-item correlations are non-significant, indicating overall goodalternate-forms reliability. The low inter-item correlation in these cases may havebeen due to the relatively small sample size involved and the eect of a few outlyingscores on such a sample.

3.3. Discussion

This study has dealt with one of the tools for use in a safety climate assessment, aswell as detailing its development, the instruments reliability and consistency hasalso been discussed. This tool has been based, wherever possible on the conceptshighlighted by the focus group discussions (Study 1) and a review of relevant lit-erature pertaining to the measurement and assessment of safety culture and climate.The organisations involved also requested that any questionnaire tool developed beconsistent with what had been used in the past. The final section of this paper brieflydescribes the use of the toolkit and discusses some of the issues raised, the profiling

Table 5

Alternate-forms reliability coecients

Item Inter-item correlation

Management acts decisively when a safety concern is raised 0.622*

Managers and supervisors express concern if safety procedures are not adhered to 0.353*

Management considers safety to be equally as important as production 0.583*

There is good communication here about safety issues which aect me 0.036

Safety information is always brought to my attention by my line

manager/supervisor

0.089

Some health and safety rules and procedures are not really practical 0.589*

Employees are not encouraged to raise safety concerns 0.561*

When people ignore safety procedures here, I feel it is none of my business 0.361*

I can influence health and safety performance here 0.555*

I am never involved in the ongoing review of safety 0.292

Safety is the number one priority in my mind when completing a job 0.564*

I understand the safety rules for my job 1*

It is important that there is a continuing emphasis on safety 1*

I am rarely worried about being injured on the job 0.664*

I cannot always get the equipment I need to do the job safely 0.361*

Operational targets often conflict with safety measures 0.363*

Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely 0.728*

*Significance at the 0.05 level.


of the results of the assessment process, and subsequent actions that may be con-sidered by those assessing safety climate. The confidential nature of the assessmentprocess makes it dicult to report this study in great detail.

4. Illustration of the toolkit in practice

The developed Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit process was initially testedin one organisation involved in hydrocarbon production. The pilot organisation isinvolved in the extraction of hydrocarbons, operating on various sites world-wide.This organisation had a strong commitment to safety, health and environmentalexcellence and also has a tradition of quality. The initial management character-isation of their culture for safety was one of total commitment and safety excel-lence. The organisation hoped to appreciate a broader perspective of sharedattitudes and communicate these goals through the use of the assessment toolkit, aswell as examining dierences between occupational groups. The toolkit procedureswere implemented by an in-house team, who only made use of back-up from theresearch team in analysing the dierences between occupational groups.The full assessment toolkit (Cox and Cheyne, 1999) consists of three sets of tools,

as described earlier: climate questionnaire, semi-structured interview schedule and aset of behavioural indicators. It also provides guidance on their application andinterpretation. The organisation using the toolkit in this case considered the fol-lowing sources of evidence:

Fig. 2. Radar plot for pilot organisation.


1. organisational documentation and team observations;2. data collected from sta interviews and focus groups; and3. data collected via an employee attitude questionnaire (described in Study 2).

Much of the data were confidential to the organisation in question; however, itwas prepared to share certain data as part of the development process. Discussionhere, therefore, focuses primarily on the use of the safety climate questionnaire inthe assessment of attitudes to safety within the organisation and its ability to dif-ferentiate between occupational groups.

4.1. Results

Two-hundred workers took part in the profiling exercise and the results of climateassessment surveys were represented on a radar plot graph (Fig. 2). These plots wereincluded at the request of the participants and provided a visual representation ofclimate profiles in dierent parts of the organisation (i.e. on dierent installations).Each of the dimensions represented on the radar plot was scored on a standardisedscale (out of 10) and included not only questionnaire dimensions but also the datacollected from interviews and document audits.Overall, the assessment process confirmed the organisations strengths in the areas

of Management Commitment and Management Style and the implementation ofSafety Systems. The questionnaire survey, however, highlighted Communicationissues (with a standardised mean of 6.1), the Supportive Environment (with a stan-dardised mean of 5.6) and Employee Involvement (with a mean of 4.9) as the threeareas most in need of improvement. The interviews and focus groups supportedthese findings in highlighting Co-operation and Safety Training as being relativelypoor, and the direct and indirect observations also found problems with Commu-nication, e.g. unclear and/or ambiguous briefing documents. These preliminaryfindings illustrate some of the relationships between separate measures, particularlythose related to the work and supportive environments and involvement, which inthis case provided the initial focus for action in this organisation.An examination of the dierences between certain occupational groups was also

made. The organisation involved in this study was particularly interested in dier-

Table 6

Means for the three work groups involved in the studya

Dependent variable Managers Production Drilling

Communication 6.4 6.24 5.56

Supportive environment 6.64 6.02 5.92

Involvement 5.75 4.75 4.45

Personal priorities 9.2 8.86 7.89

Personal appreciation of risk 8.75 7.75 7.71

Work environment 9.1 7.95 6.62

a Emboldened groups dier significantly from the others (Tukey tests, P

ences between managers, production teams and drilling teams. A series of one-wayanalyses of variance were performed for each factor in the attitude questionnaire.Dierences in mean scores (standardised to a 10-point scale for each factor) for eachof the three groups are shown in Table 6.Dierences were found in six of the questionnaire dimensions with drilling teams

showing significantly lower evaluations than managers in terms of Supportiveenvironment, Involvement, Personal appreciation of risk and Work environmentand lower evaluations of Communication and Personal priorities than both man-agers and production teams. Production teams, however, only diered significantlyfrom managers in terms of Involvement, Personal appreciation of risk and workenvironment. These finding are consistent with those of Mearns et al. (1998) sug-gesting that drilling teams, who often belong to another parent organisation mayhave their own sub-culture and may, consequently, find themselves outside variouscommunication channels.

4.2. Discussion

Users found the process straightforward and found little diculty in constructingtheir safety climate profile. Users then examined the initial questionnaire items andinterview responses in order to get some notion of the exact nature of any problemshighlighted by poor scores. This investigation revealed that a large number ofemployees felt that they were not involved, in, or informed of, safety initiatives,indeed it was perceived that a small group of select people were the only individualsinvolved in any safety activities, and these individuals gave little, or no, support toothers on safety issues. These feelings were also reflected with regard to safetytraining. Once again, the majority of those questioned felt that they were notinformed of relevant training or encouraged to attend courses, other than thoselegally required.Several initiatives are planned as a result of these findings. Firstly, the users have

decided to actively promote, with the help of the training manager, the range ofsafety training courses on oer. This involves listings of appropriate coursesappearing in the company newsletter, as well as announcements at all team meetingsin an attempt to reach the various sub-cultures. Team meetings are also to be used,in the first instance, to encourage individuals to get involved in, and indeed to pro-pose, new safety initiatives. The user will reassess the safety climate profile whenthese measures have been in place for at least 1 year.

5. Discussion

This paper has described the development of an innovative approach to assessingculture, and specifically safety culture and climate. The development of the SafetyClimate Assessment Toolkit has exploited the notions of multiple organisationalperspectives and data triangulation (Jick, 1979). It utilises approaches which can becombined to provide an in-depth picture of an organisations current safety climate.


During this process reliance is not placed on any single form of assessment, e.g.questionnaires, nor is it placed on any single part of the overall system, e.g. onlyorganisational systems and compliance. It builds upon a holistic approach and providesa rich-picture of the overall safety climate as recommended by Cox and Flin (1998).The immediate benefits of using the toolkit are the profiling of safety climate and

the action planning that this profile allows. In theory, achieving and maintaining apositive safety climate will provide an environment where improvements in safetyperformance can be made (ASCNI, 1993). Specific benefits of using the toolkit canbe summarised as: (1) providing a focus for raising the profile of health and safety;(2) allowing active monitoring in support of other processes; (3) providing anopportunity for sensitive issues to be discussed, which in other circumstances may beseen as disruptive; (4) providing a focus for working together on safety issues; and(5) facilitating benchmarking, both internally and externally.The particular assessment tool described in Study 2, the employee attitude ques-

tionnaire, has been extensively piloted. The initial analysis has shown the instrumentto be reliable in terms of what it measures, and sensitive enough to uncover dier-ences between occupational groups. The initial feedback also suggests that thequestionnaire is easy to administer and profile. Similarly users found the toolkitsinterview schedule and behavioural observations practical and straightforward. Theprofile, once completed in the pilot organisation, allowed the various relationshipsbetween its measures to be examined in detail. The results of the initial climateassessment exercise have provided the organisation in Study 3 with several usefulprompts for future action, as well as highlighting the level at which these actionsshould be aimed.

5.1. Future development

The employee attitude questionnaire, and the Safety Climate AssessmentToolkit in general, will be the subject of further rigorous evaluation through theiruse in the oshore oil extraction industry. In particular the utility of the instrumentsin planning improvements and their ability to detect changes will be investigated.The toolkit is freely available to interested managers and safety practitioners ineither written or electronic formats.A subsidiary aim of the assessment process is to stimulate discussion and

improvement through the assessment process. Organisations using the toolkit mayfind that, through time, it will be appropriate to customise the tools presented hereand/or develop in-house instruments to chart the full range of indicators they feelare important. User groups may also be established and thus allow for benchmark-ing and discussion across oshore installations and organisations.

Acknowledgements

The studies described in this paper have been funded and supported by the O-shore Safety Division of HSE, Chevron UK, Chevron Gulf of Mexico (Ship Shoal/


Eugene Island), Mobil North Sea and Oryx UK. The authors would like toacknowledge the assistance of Martin Alexander and Bill Cockburn in the gatheringof data. The views expressed here are those of the authors and are not necessarilyrepresentative of any other individual or organisation.

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