Ashokan Benevolent Hegemony

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Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and theMiddle East

Volume 29, Number 2, 2009

E-ISSN: 1548-226X Print ISSN: 1089-201X

What's Morality Got to Do with It?

Benevolent Hegemony in the International System of South Asia

Kamal Sadiq

Abstract

To understand whether ideas matter in international politics and if they can be agents of systemic

transformation, one must examine the debate about the "benevolent" hegemony of the United States.

Supporters of moral American hegemony claim that the spread of its moral values worldwide will bring

about an international transformation. In short, hegemony serves a universal good. A similar claim has

been made about the ancient international system of South Asia. The claim here is that the rule of

Asoka-the Indian ruler credited with spreading Buddhism and nonviolence to the rest of the world-was

committed to the collective good and to the propagation of an ethical code of conduct-dhamma. On this

view, Asokan moral hegemony produced a peaceful South Asia. Against this view, this article shows how

ideational variables such as dhamma were bound up with material interests to serve the strategic goals of

Asokan hegemony in the international system of South Asia. It lends support to the realist conception of

the world where strategic deployment of ideational variables and material interests enhance state power,thereby offering the best explanation of seemingly moral behavior.

Recent interest in America's role as a hegemon or empire is closely linked to the claim that moral values—a

certain benevolence—are fundamental to American global hegemony and international stability.1

From

constructivists to Wilsonian idealists and neoconservatives, the moral basis of American hegemony is continually

being reiterated.2

Freedom, democracy, human rights, and liberalism are moral principles guiding American

foreign policy. The claim is that American hegemony serves a universal good. Indeed, scholars (especially

constructivists) contend that morals and other ideational variables are driving core behavior in international

politics.3

Can benevolent hegemony by the United States lead to systemic transformation? A similar moral claim

about Asoka back in ancient India suggests it may be difficult.

The current engagement with the impact of ideas such as morals, ethics, norms, and values in international

relations revives earlier and more vigorous debates that aimed to overcome the pragmatic, strategic, and, to some,

amoral perspective often associated with realist accounts of the international system.4

Moving beyond current

"paradigmatic" debates, this article revives classical realism to argue that ideational variables are coupled with

material interests in a strategic effort to enhance state hegemonic power.5

Moral principles alone cannot

transform the international system. [End Page 306]

The study of ideational variables and hegemony, like most international relations, suffers from an Anglophone

bias. This article broadens the cultural and historical realm of mainstream international relations theory, which

ct MUSE - Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middl... http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_a

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currently neglects the historical periods of other significant civilizations.6

Hegemony or empire is not a Western

phenomenon, nor are claims of a benevolent hegemon new. To understand "benevolent hegemony" today one

needs to analyze other examples from the past, as Eliot A. Cohen stressed: "Casual talk of a Pax Americana

—harking back to the Pax Britannica, itself an echo of the Pax Romana . . . the metaphor of empire . . . deserves

careful scrutiny, because imperial history contains analogies and parallels that bear critically on the current U.S.

predicament."7

Limiting studies to modern Western historical cases, from which most scholars derive their

theories of hegemony, is detrimental to theory building.8

Is Asia somehow different, perhaps motivated by

morality and not material interests, thus leading to a different understanding of the international system? Doshared "ideas" blunt the force of insecurity felt by Asian states?

9Underlying these arguments is the belief that

ignoring Asia results in international relations theories based largely on European historical experiences that favor

realist explanations of the international system. Perhaps examining the ideational sources of long peace in Asia

could change Eurocentric understandings of international relations.

International relations scholarship has taken initial steps to expand the discussion on the role of ideas to

Buddhist morals and claims on state behavior.10

Of particular interest are the two models of statecraft, the two

wheels of dhamma —a guide to ethical action. The first model is of a universal monarch "who marshals military

strength and moral influence" to safeguard the state and its people.11

Asoka, the first great hegemon of ancient

South Asia, was seen as this universal monarch and his "idea" of dhamma radiated out as a model for governance

in Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, and Tibet—and ancient Thai, Khmer, and Sinhalese kingdoms—each balancingmoral ideas with state interests.

12In the second model, moral and political roles (the sage and the ruler) are

separate realms.13 Such legendary accounts attribute universal goodness and benevolent behavior to the Asokan

reign (as the sage). Ironically, they also explain the security competition and power politics before and after

Asoka's reign (as ruler).

In this article, I seek to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, I ask what political impact the idea of

dhamma had on state policy to provide a more complex understanding of [End Page 307] hegemonic power in

ancient India. Second, I use this counternarrative to see whether the practice of benevolent hegemeony

transformed the international system in South Asia.

In short, I contend that Asoka's reign was not a permanent turn away from violence and war intimatelyassociated with ancient South Asia. At best a brief interlude, Asokan hegemony was not solely governed by moral

behavior; rather, moral dhamma was an input shaping material interests to strengthen the hegemon. For example,

moral ideas functioned as tools for social balancing between different castes and cultures—facilitating an

empire-wide common interest—to the hegemon's advantage. The high ideals of dhamma are embedded in the

pragmatic nature of Asoka's foreign policies. Security competition shapes interunit relations, and while Asoka's

dhamma might appear to change the constitutive norms of the international system, his hegemony does not

extricate South Asia from the consequences of power politics. Asokan policies do not subvert the power politics

that prevailed at the time. This has theoretical implications for recent claims on the role of ideas in transforming

international politics, especially for those challenging the primacy of power politics associated with realist

theories.

A study of benevolence begs the question, what role do ideational variables play in international relations? The

return to the study of ideas such as morals, norms, and values stems from the belief that ideas act as guidelines for

state behavior and policy and can help determine (1) war proneness and (2) international politics. The bulk of this

literature addresses the role of ideas in the construction of foreign policy.14

However, there is no consensus on the

content of ideas. Ideas can be norms, morals, values, or ideologies. They can be shared beliefs or individual

values; they can be quantified or inferred. Similarly, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes regard them as "symbolic

technologies" associated with social phenomena.15

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane favor a three-tiered

classification of ideas—worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.16

The idea of dhamma encapsulates a

range of individual and world views that are an ethical guide to action—that is, they govern political and social

behavior.


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The lack of conceptual clarity exemplifies the tension between a rationalist emphasis on material interests (e.g.,

in classical realism and neorealism) and a desire to address normative concerns.17

If states are motivated solely by

material interests in the acquisition of power, why and how do ideas influence and shape foreign policy? Recent

innovations in the "ideational approach" focus on how ideas facilitate cooperation by " shaping state interests and

preferences" (emphasis mine).18

Cooperation occurs because states develop reciprocal interests and

understandings—a mutually shared worldview. This is an attempt to give ideas a role in the construction of

interests, without devaluing the effect of interests in the behavior of state actors. While the previous wave of ideas

literature separated ideas and material interests, recent trends integrate them. Ideas do not challenge rationalist

interest-based explanations; rather, they are their logical "completion."19

Goldstein and Keohane concur: ideas do

not "challenge the premise that people behave in self-interested and broadly rational ways," but rather ideas such

as morals, norms, and values frame individual rationality.20

The following analysis reveals the limits of the claim

to moral behavior by state actors in the international system of South Asia.

I begin by analogizing modern states with individual polities as actors in ancient [End 08] South Asia,

thus justifying my regional-empire/regional-hegemon comparison. First, I examine the period preceding Asoka's

reign—the beginnings of the Mauryan rule and its founder rulers. Throughout I highlight the power politics during

this period. Second, I examine Asoka's reign and (1) the claim to moral transformation of the international system

in South Asia; (2) the debate on the historical sources on Asoka, where I privilege the inscriptional sources over

the legendary Buddhist tales about him; and (3) the specific period in Indian history that is characterized as one of

peaceful discourse and praxis. I refer to both inscriptional and Buddhist sources to determine if the benevolent

ideas associated with Asoka engender a fundamental change in practices in the region such that the character of

ancient South Asian politics became less violent and more cooperative. Did Asoka's dhamma cause peaceful

relations that might falsify the primacy of relentless security competition? Did Asoka sustain his benevolent

hegemony by engaging in solely ethical and moral behavior? I show that the answer to both these questions is no.

Third, I trace the decline of the Mauryas, confirming that the practice of benevolent hegemony failed to escape

the ever-present possibility of war.

Ancient Regional Empires as Modern Regional Hegemons

Before undertaking the study of ancient India, one must examine the analogy between the modern sovereign state

and the individual unit as an actor in ancient India. I justify the treatment of South Asia as an international system

on two grounds. First, ancient South Asia was similar in geographical scope to the international system of

medieval and early modern Europe—a subject of many international relations debates. Second, ancient South Asia

was home to a variety of polities—southern kingdoms such as the Chola, Pamdya, Keralaputra, and Satyaputra

and frontier kingdoms such as Kalinga to the east and the Greeks (Bactria) to the west. Clearly, during the period

there were multiple autonomous, self-regarding entities that had to secure themselves by self-help. The assumption

of decentralized anarchic political units in contact with one another and not controlled by a central authority

permits Indian experts on international law to treat these political units as states. Speculating on the lack of

"enforcement machinery" in ancient India, the eminent international lawyer Nagendra Singh contends that "there

were political units varying in size, shape, quality and character. . . . In a state of society which was developing, it

would be needless to insist on concepts of sovereignty and equality as attributes of each state since the law of

interstate conduct as known in ancient India applied to all political units which had a separate autonomous

existence."21

Many scholars of interstate relations during the early part of the century did not consider boundaries

of state, kingdom, vassal, or empire problematic. They recognized that the modern state had a different form from

earlier political units, and it did not deter them from the study of ancient India. Thus N. N. Law, in 1921, in his

classic work Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity, wrote that "the ancient Hindus knew of both small and large states,

kingdoms, and empires," while H. N. Sinha, in 1938, examined the concept of sovereignty in ancient India in the

hope of tracing the evolution of the "early Indian state."22

The political units in this article comprise kingdoms (the Chola, Pamdya, Keralaputra, and Satyaputra) and

regional empires (Mauryan and Asokan) that performed domestic administrative functions, monopolized the use


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of force, recognized the "sovereignty" of other units, negotiated treaties, and sent diplomatic envoys. I concur

with Neta C. Crawford's assessment [End Page 309] that, so long as such units performed certain "governing"

functions, it is possible to treat their behavioral patterns as one would the actions of modern states.23

Following

this model, I propose that ancient regional empires in South Asia—the Mauryan, Asokan, and Mughal

empires—be treated like regional hegemons of today, consisting of states seeking regional hegemony aggressively.

Since hegemons cannot dominate the entire globe, they project power in their own region.24

Behavioral

propositions about the aggressive regional hegemonic state are analogues to the conduct of ancient regional

empires. These regional empires aggressively conquered neighboring states, thereby preempting any future

challenge to their capabilities, and used ideational variables such as morals to legitimate their strategic goals much

like any hegemon of the modern era. The state-individual actor and regional-empire/regional-hegemon analogy

under security competition can be justified in the case of this article if, in Lakatosian terms, it explains more than

its rivals—a purpose that this study attempts to serve with regard to ancient South Asia.

Power Politics before Asoka's Conversion: The Rise of Mauryas

The roots of South Asian "stateness" have been traced to the fourth century BC, when India had its first large

empire—the Mauryan dynasty.25

Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph have noted "the contingent and

layered distribution of power among regional kingdoms and local chiefs that prevailed through much of Indian

history."26

It is this dispersed and layered form of power that characterized many of the Aryan tribes that

coalesced into small kingdoms by about 600 BC. An important study, by prominent Indian historians using earlyBuddhist sources, notes the presence of as many as sixteen "nations" between the Kabul valley (now in

Afghanistan) and the banks of the Godavari river (in India).27

According to Indian textbooks, this patchwork of

kingdoms was "constantly at war" trying to acquire new territory or to gain strategic control of the rivers.28

The

period was marked by a policy of expansion and intense security competition among the neighboring kingdoms

until four of them became more powerful than the rest—Avanti, Vatsa, Kosala, and Magadha. The fifth and sixth

centuries BC have been compared to the conditions in fifteenth-century Italy and Germany as "a flowering chaos

of petty principalities and free cities, all vying with each other jealously, desperately fighting for survival and

struggling for ascendancy, most of them doomed to become absorbed or subordinated in the end by larger, rising

states, governed by uncontrollable monarchs."29

Magadha emerged from these struggles as the most powerful

kingdom in northern India. The conqueror Bimbisara (accession ca. 545 BC) played the most crucial role in the

ascendancy of the Magadhan dynasty in northern India. He attacked and conquered the strategically placed

kingdom of Anga southeast of his territory, which not only provided Bimbisara an outlet to the sea but also gave

him access to material power through coastal trade and control over the lower parts of the Gangetic plain along

the river Ganges.30

The growing strength of Bimbisara posed a security threat for the neighboring ruling families

of Kosala and Vaisali, who subsequently entered into "matrimonial" alliances with Bimbisara.31

The policy of

expansion was continued by Bimbisara's son, Ajatashatru, who occupied the throne by murdering his own [End

Page 310] father.32

Matrimonial alliances did not bequeath direct rule, and so he attacked his uncle, the king of

Kosala, and after a long, drawn-out war conquered the Vrijji territory and established the hegemony of Magadha

in the region.

The period after Ajatashatru, according to the Puranas, was marked by a series of patricides that led to theSisunaga line of rulers, who absorbed the rival kingdom of Avanti.

33The Sisunaga dynasty was followed by the

Nandas, started by Mahapadma. There were as many as nine Nanda rulers in twenty-two years, which indicates

the level of uncertainty and "use of force" that characterized this period.34

The Nanda dynasty faced the threat of

Alexander the Great, who had established his control over northwestern parts of the Indian subcontinent after

conquering several clans and kingdoms.35

Alexander retreated after the difficulties the Greeks had in controlling

the conquered territories, thereby reducing the security threat to the Nandas nearby.

The imperial system controlling a unified vast area was a new development.36

While the power politics of the

Nandas allowed them to establish an empire, it was never as extensive as the Mauryan empire, founded by


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Chandragupta Maurya and his Machiavellian adviser Kautilya.37

The treatise on statecraft, the Arthashastra,

reputedly authored by Kautilya, is the science of polity that laid the foundations for Chandragupta's expansion of

his empire. According to the Arthashastra, the seven elements that constitute sovereignty and allowed the king to

achieve his mandala (circle of states) are "the king, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army, and

the friend." Issues of international peace or order were secondary; all that mattered was how an ambitious king

could improve and maintain his kingdom's power. This meant the pursuit of power, and for Kautilya, power lay in

the strength of the army—that is, in material capabilities.38

Quincy Wright documents that the large army

Chandragupta maintained consisted of six hundred thousand infantry, thirty thousand horsemen, thirty-six

thousand men with elephants, and twenty-four thousand men with chariots.39

The Greek sources mention the

standing army of six hundred thousand men with which Chandragupta "traversed India and conquered the

whole."40

Chandragupta's conquests allowed him to control most of modern northern India, central India, some

parts of modern Afghanistan, and Baluchistan and Punjab in modern Pakistan. He also made regional alliances

with powerful neighbors. He maintained diplomatic and trade relations with the neighboring Greeks to the west

(Seleucus Nikator of the Seleucid dynasty), with whom a treaty in 303 BC formalized relations.41

The success of

his strategic alliances and war strategy is evident from the relatively short [End Page 311] timeline of twenty-five

years that covers his conquests, regional consolidation, and administration of the conquered territories.42

Indian historians view the expansion and establishment of a large empire by Chandragupta as the fulfillment of

a nationalist agenda, whereby Chandragupta set out to achieve the unity of India. 43 Nothing could be farther fromthe truth. Chandragupta was a shrewd conqueror, securing his power through self-help. He depended on material

power—the military and administrative capacity—to expand and maintain an empire. The building of such a

regional hegemon was due not to any national or moral consciousness rooted in the ethos of the South Asian

subcontinent but to the imperatives of power politics in a war-prone system.

The period is distinguished by distrust and security dilemmas between the patchworks of political units that

dotted South Asia. Territorial expansion through conquest ensured security; thus Chandragupta's personal

expansionist goals were a result of systemic pressures.44

Kautilya's Arthashastra reflects these conditions and

advises rulers to make alliances against a shared threat with those who are invincible (as he did with the Seleucid

dynasty) while sowing dissension among those who oppose him.45

Based on Kautilya's treatise, Chandragupta's

actions reflect the self-interested moves of a hegemon seeking power and aiming to establish larger territorialcontrol through conquest and war strategy, even if it also had the unintended consequence of unifying a major part

of South Asia. For a system conforming to the law of the fish, Matsya-nyaya (the greater fish eating the smaller

ones), the Arthashastra embodies the rationalist material interests pursued by Chandragupta.

The expansionist policy of Chandragupta was continued by his son Bindusara, "slayer of foes," when he

ascended the throne in 297 BC.46

His period of rule was also marked by several campaigns to acquire new

territory. Bindusara took the Mauryan forces to the south and conquered much of the Deccan plateau as far as the

city of Mysore. Henceforth, the Mauryan empire included almost the whole of India and parts of modern-day

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through its aggressive conquest of other polities, the Mauryan empire established and

expanded its hegemony in the region.

Thus a study of the period preceding Asoka's reign highlights the power politics of the era. Mutual distrust and

enmity among differing political units led to frequent attempts by powerful neighbors to conquer and enhance

their power, spheres of influence, and chances of survival in the absence of the moderating influence of an

overarching institution. Kautilya's treatise, the Arthashastra, was a useful reference for rulers coping with security

competition since it explained how a king acquired and maintained power through being vigilant against surprise

attacks, remaining aggressive, and being wary of neighbors as a source of actual or potential enmity.47 Singh

postulates a dichotomy between laws that restricted warfare and the practices of actors in ancient India, which

may have been a result of the absence of an "enforcement machinery" in international relations that was "lacking

then and is lacking today."48

Realpolitik was characteristic of the international system in South Asia. [End Page


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312]

Asoka's Benevolent Hegemony

Asoka's idea of dhamma (Sanskrit: dharma), influenced by Buddhist Pali canonical and non-canonical tales,

stands in stark contrast to the power-seeking ethos previously propounded by the Arthashastra, wherein morality

and politics were separate realms, and strength and aggrandizement were the superior qualities.49

Max Weber

found a "radical Machiavellianism" in the Arthashastra, downgrading The Prince as "harmless" in comparison.50

S. J. Tambiah argues that Asoka's pronouncements "have as their point of reference the politics of his own time"even though the Arthashastric ethos was "obviously current practice."

51He asserts that Asoka's pacific discourse

of dhamma was "a denunciation and rejection of the Kautilyan mores; if not, we can equally plausibly surmise that

they were a rejection of the kind of mores reported in the work that were operative in his time in dynastic

politics."52

Others maintain that the idea of dhamma is the exercise of "absolute power" and, therefore,

complementary to the pursuit of material interests.53

Diverse claims about Asoka require that a distinction be made between sources making claims mainly on the

basis of Asoka's own inscriptions (his famous edicts) on pillars, rocks, and caves, known as the Rock Edicts, and

the Buddhist sources consisting of Ceylonese chronicles of the Theravada tradition—the Dipavamsa (Chronicle

of the Island) and Mahavamsa (Great Chronicle) —and northern Buddhist legends, particularly the Divyavadana

and Asokavadana, which are preserved in Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist sources.54 The edicts of Asoka have been assigned greater authentic value by scholars because of both their immutability and their contemporaneity,

while the Buddhist religious sources have been criticized on both grounds. Vincent Smith, one of the earliest to

write on Asoka, dismisses the Sri Lankan sources as "tales told by monkish romancers," while Indian scholars such

as Radha Kumud Mookerji and Romila Thapar view them skeptically for their tendency to exaggerate Asoka as "a

monster of piety."55

However, Tambiah defends the Buddhist (Theravada) literature on Asoka because it serves

as a model of kingship, "generating and legitimating political action," and states that it should be treated more

seriously in as much as it has become a part of history.56

Given the problem that legendary sources may reflect a

particular set of concerns and biases, I would privilege the immutable inscriptional sources.

The analysis in this article distinguishes between two different readings of Asoka's reign. The first view is as the

pragmatic imperial ruler who combines ideational variables (i.e., Buddhism and dhamma) and material capabilitiesto enhance hegemonic power. This view of Asoka comes from a careful reading of his edicts. The second view of

Asoka, based primarily on Buddhist legends, endorses him as the first selfless "righteous ruler" (dhammiko

dhamma-raja), whose policy of pacifism and ethical standards arose from his belief in Buddhism.57

This heralds

the power of moral discourse. John S. [End Page 313] Strong has captured the essence of the diverse views on

Asoka, who is "heralded as a champion of Buddhist socialism, as a founder of Indian nationalism, as an advocate

of animal rights, as the prophet of pacifism. Likewise he has [also] been lambasted as a hypocrite, a totalitarian

Big Brother, a maker of monastic landlordism."58

Asoka: The Ambitious Ruler

There is general agreement that Asoka was not the direct heir and that, in a power vacuum, his ascent to thethrone resulted from a succession struggle among the princes. According to Buddhist literature, Asoka ascended

the throne after killing his brothers. Both the Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa state that he killed ninety-nine of his

brothers; the north Indian Buddhist source, the Divyavadana, states that he connived with a minister to seize the

throne and have his brother killed; and a Tibetan source, by Lama Tarantha, says that Asoka had six of his

brothers murdered.59

While one may disagree with the exaggerated figures of ninety-nine fratricidal deaths, it is

probable that Asoka's succession was not smooth and that some measure of scheming and killing was involved,

indicating that Asoka was an ambitious heir acting in self-interest, comparable to any modern politician.

After his ascendancy to the throne, Asoka carried out his only known military campaign against the neighboring

people of Kalinga, which completed the conquest of the South Asian peninsula begun by his grandfather,


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Chandragupta. Historians note the absence of any provocation; instead, the desire to conquer and accumulate

power was "a sufficient justification" for the time.60

Excluding the passive kingdoms of the Cholas and Pamdyas

in the extreme south, Asoka's empire now extended from Gandhara in the northwest (Afghanistan) to the

Himalayas and then to peninsular India in the south. With the subcontinent under his control and hegemonic

power established, Asoka, disgusted by the horrors of war, "seems" to undergo a moral transformation and

renounces war forever. Rock Edict 13 encapsulates this event:

The Kalinga country was conquered by King Priyadarsi, Beloved of the Gods, in the eighth year of

his reign. One hundred and fifty thousand persons were carried away captive, one hundred thousandwere slain, and many times that number died. . . . The Beloved of the Gods, conqueror of the

Kalingas, is moved to remorse now. For he has felt profound sorrow and regret because the conquest

of a people previously unconquered involves slaughter, death, and deportation. . . . But there is a

more important reason for the King's remorse. The Brahmanas and Sramanas [the priestly and

ascetic orders] as well as the followers of other religions and the house-holders . . . all suffer from the

injury, slaughter, and deportation inflicted on their loved ones. . . . Thus all men share in the

misfortune, and this weighs on King Priyadarsi's mind.61

(Emphasis mine)

The moral transformation after war marks Asoka's turn to righteousness, compassion, and morality, that is, to

dhamma. The policy to conquer by violence is replaced by a satisfaction through moral victory (Rock Edict 13);

Asoka proclaims in Rock Edict 4 that "the sound of war drums" will be replaced by the norms of dhamma

(emphasis mine).62

The discursive power of moral ideas (dhamma) is expected to bring about systemic change,

according to this view. However, critics have questioned Asoka's motivation(s) in adopting a pacific policy and his

intense moral transformation.63

Tambiah argues that Asoka was "a mature king in his forties" and that by fighting the Kalinga war he "had made

the last territorial conquest necessary to make his vast empire complete."64

[End Page 314] This conquest was a

calculated move to increase Mauryan material capabilities and both military and economic power, since Kalinga

was rich in resources. Strategically, the conquest of Kalinga allowed Asoka to control the coastal trade on the east,

defend the Ganges valley from the southeast, and control a source of income since this was a prosperous maritime

region.

65

With the acquisition of Kalinga, "territorial conquest was almost at an end for Asoka, unless he was to be deliberately provoked by any country."

66

There was no opposition powerful enough within the international system of South Asia to balance Asokan rule.

The distant Greek kingdoms (of the Seleucid dynasty) continued to maintain diplomatic relations, formalized by

Asoka's grandfather, Chandragupta. The frontier people were already under his rule, and the extreme southern

kingdoms, having been impressed by Mauryan military strength over the years, accepted Asoka as "the nominal

suzerain."67

Additionally, the Asokan state maintained very close ties with Ceylon (Sri Lanka). It was from Asoka

"that Buddhism penetrated into the island in the 3rd century B.C. and became the official religion there."68

The

close alliance and political relationship between Asoka's empire and Ceylon led to a security dilemma for the

southern Indian kingdoms (the Chola, Pamdya, Keralaputra, and Satyaputra), which failed to organize and balance

against the Asokan or Ceylonese state.

Asoka's change of policy from power through conquest to the morals of dhamma, after having conquered the

strategic region of Kalinga, appear to some analysts as "an efficacious ideology of pacification, political stability,

and security."69

Most likely, Asoka deployed the idea of dhamma as a way to integrate moral and material

interests in the service of power. For Asoka does not express his regret for war in the Rock Edicts at Kalinga (the

site of the massacre); instead, he adopts a "paternal" view of his subjects as his children and expresses concern for

their welfare.70

No mention of the war that changed Asoka's beliefs and his imperial policy is made in the edicts.

Apparently, his remorse and "renunciation of war" is not considered apposite for the victims of his war campaign.

Importantly, moral transformation does not lead him to permit an independent status for Kalinga or undo the


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effects or fear of the war; nor does it drive him to abolish the death penalty. Buddhist precepts appear as mere

rhetoric, serving to discourage any challenge, domestic or international, to Asoka's regional hegemony.

Asoka's propagation of dhamma did not lead to significant changes in his adoption of military force either.

"Military power was thus retained as a means in reserve if the policy of pacification by persuasion failed."71

Asoka's Schism Edict refers to kotavishaya, or "districts with forts," which were "maintained to keep various

territories under subjection"—an act contrary to his moral, compassionate image.72

For example, despite his

proclamation in Rock Edict 13 that he desires moral conquest (dharmavijaya) everywhere, particularly among the

frontier and border peoples, Asoka does not hesitate to threaten the "forest peoples" (mainly tribals in histerritory); he reminds them, if they do not "adopt his way of life and . . . ideal[s]," "he exercises the power to

punish, despite his repentance."73

Thus, more than a "moral revolution," the idea of dhamma serves as a unifying

ideology that allows him to control the empire through traditional units of power and force (administration,

officials, spies, army, etc.) under a loosely defined policy of pacification. In fact, at the end [End Page 315] of his

famous "renunciation of war" (Rock Edict 13), he emphasizes that these edicts are for his "sons and great-

grandsons" and that though they should consider "moral conquest" as superior, "if they do conquer, let them take

pleasure in moderation and mild punishments"—a declaration that warfare was inevitable and legitimate; force

had not been altogether banished and could be used when necessary.74

In fact, an absolutist streak can be ascribed to Asoka, as he strives to ensure that all the people in his kingdom

aspire to his moral ideals, which he achieves through a comprehensive network of officials dispatched throughout

the empire called the Mahamantras. Irfan Habib and Vivekanand Jha note that these "high officials were expected

to spread the word of this edict with a view apparently to getting it enforced."75

The moral idea of dhamma is a

regulative measure, in line with Weber's observation that Buddhism is a tool for Asoka to achieve "political

centralization" and "domestication of the masses."76

This analysis shows Asoka as a pragmatic ruler who adopts a

moral ideology without foregoing material interests. He conveniently renounces war and force after removing all

potential challenges to his hegemony, yet he retains the right to use force, while proclaiming the virtues of a

peaceful and moral life. Asoka integrates the pursuit of material and moral goals, adapting each to increase

hegemonic power.

If one considers the "low caste" origins of the Mauryas, the universal ethic of dhamma allowed Asoka to

legitimately forge links with other unorthodox elements, further challenging the hold of Brahmanic orthodoxy.77

The Buddhist Sangha (church) became, along with traditional identity markers, another center of identity.

Buddhism came at a time when there were widespread social movements questioning the traditional caste

hierarchy in society. Asoka's dhamma allowed him to become a part of this social movement while he

consolidated power over an empire that included people of diverse caste backgrounds (and loyalties). As Thapar

states, "A king with a policy only slightly more imaginative than usual would have come to terms with such an

important new development . . . it was an ideal tool for an ambitious ruler of Asoka's caliber."78 Dhamma was a

policy of persuasive assimilation for a diverse polity, a diversity that still characterizes the subcontinent.

The "idea" of dhamma became a foreign policy tool much like "freedom" and "democracy" today. Rock Edict

13 mentions the dispatch of emissaries specifically "to preach dhamma to the neighboring kingdoms" of Chodas

and Pamdiyas (southern kingdoms) and as far as Tam-bapamni (Sri Lanka).79

Asokan inscriptions in Greek and

Aramaic have been found as far as Afghanistan, suggesting possible envoys to Hellenistic parts of the Middle

East.80

Dhamma was translated as eusebeia, meaning "duty" or "obligation." Interestingly, it has been noted that

"there is no reference to the Buddha which might have been expected if the edicts were centrally concerned with

propagating Buddhism among those unfamiliar with it."81

This lends credence to the argument that dhamma

integrated material interests into a spiritual base.

The discourse on peace became relevant after the use of force-established dominance (hegemony) in the whole

region. It is important to note that while the idea of pacifism implies nonviolence, "pacifism can [also] be

pragmatic (based on a weighing of outcomes)," such that Asoka's dhamma appears to help him consolidate an


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empire while promoting relations with other states.82

Arguably, the "necessity" of dhamma was being given the

appearance of a virtue.83

In this view, Asoka's practices reflect self-interested behavior of a hegemon, rendering

[End Page 316] his idea of dhamma dependent on the continued dominance of the region—at best making his

reign a case of benevolent hegemony. As I show below, Asokan moral practices directed to empire maintenance

could not bring about communitarian and peaceful relations in the ancient South Asia after his reign. Units

continued to act based on threat or use of force. From this reading of Asoka, the realist system never ended.

World Renouncer: The Discourse of Peace

The second interpretation of Asoka, posited as counterfactual, is as "world conqueror and world renouncer" which

according to Buddhist canon are "two sides of the same coin."84

It is said that Buddhist universalistic and ethical

conventions coincided with Asoka's conversion to Buddhism, in which Asoka is seen as the first ideal selfless king.

In this view of Asokan hegemony, dhamma is not serving material interests, rather it is a solely moral, benevolent

worldview practiced by the "universal monarch."

According to N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon, "The study of dharma [dhamma] is a study of attitudes and

motives which transforms the customary principles of action."85

There appear to be similarities between Buddhist

proclamations and the postmodern critical discourse. Richard Ashley has argued from a genealogical standpoint

that "what catches the eye is motion, discontinuities, clashes, and the ceaseless play of plural forces and plural

interpretations on the surface of human experience. Nothing is finally stable. There are no constants, no fixedmeanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history."

86Similarly, in

Buddhism there is nothing permanent: "It is all a mere mass of change. . . . It is a continuous river passing on;

every moment a fresh mass of water passing on. So is this life, so is all body, so is all minds."87

Individuals are free

to create their own destiny, and systemic change comes through ideational means.

Buddhism presumably influenced Asoka in both substance and style. It must be remembered that Buddhist

sources do not mention the Kalinga war at all and emphasize Asoka's moral revolution after he came under the

influence of Buddhism. It has been said that Buddha sent forty of his disciples throughout the world, directing

them to "mix with all races and nations and preach the excellent gospel for the good of all, for the benefit of

all."88

This narrative could have been the inspiration for Asoka's Mahamantras, a network of high officials who

traversed the empire, persuading (maybe even forcing) locals to follow the doctrine of dhamma and reporting onlocal attitudes to the central authority.

There are varying accounts of Asoka's moral transformation and turn to ideas. Northern Buddhist sources in

Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan tend to portray Asoka as a wicked man before his conversion to morality and

Buddhism.89

Others highlight his horror at the Kalinga war. After his transformation, as a Buddhist ruler, there is

little disagreement that he abolishes (or restrains the use of) the death penalty, preaches respect for all groups, has

wells dug and trees planted on the roadside, puts restrictions on the slaughter of animals, and has medical facilities

built for both men and animals.90 Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil have argued that the transformation

of "practices and constitutive conventions" in domestic politics can change the international system.91

Whether

neighboring kingdoms adopted such policies is unclear; however, what is apparent is that during Asoka's reign

there is no mention of war or conquest (aside from Kalinga). Similarly, Singh highlights Asoka's place in world

history as "a political force" that established peace internally [End Page 317] and internationally.92

Asoka's

change of norms and practices are said to undermine the war proneness of the earlier Arthashastric era, leading to

shared interests and understandings.

It is important to recognize the reinforcing character of Asoka's dhamma, practice of hegemony, and

transformative behavior. The changed intersubjective meanings created the most peaceful period in the

international system of South Asia. Singh has thus argued that Asoka's "empire of peace" was a confederation of

units that earlier shared antagonistic relations but now "renounced their right of war" with one another, thus

attesting to Asoka's success in establishing peaceful and cooperative relations in the region.93

However, these


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peaceful and cooperative relations would not be successful without first the presence, leadership, and force of a

regional hegemon such as Asoka. Peaceful and cooperative relations between states with antagonistic relations

simply do not occur—they have to be enforced by a greater power.

According to this argument, Asoka's cooperative spirit (as a "benevolent" hegemon) also underlies his foreign

relations, which were characterized by resolving conflicts through negotiation and engaging in dialog rather than in

warfare. He is believed to have concluded treaties and exchanged ambassadors in pursuit of "friendly" and

peaceful relations, which also would have allowed him to spread his idea of dhamma while maintaining strategic

control over the entire operation. Buddhist sources mention nine missions that Asoka sent—six within his empireand three to Ceylon, "Yona" country or (Greek) Bactria, and Suvarna-bhumi in the Burma-Siam region—not to

mention peaceful engagement with the southern kingdoms of Chola, Pamdya, Keralaputra, and Satyaputra.

Arguably, Buddhist sources have created an idealized image of Asoka as the universal monarch, overlooking his

parallel pursuit of geostrategic power. Legends go so far as to present him as the defender of Buddhism (the story

of the expulsion of eighty thousand heretics) and the builder of numerous Buddhist shrines all over his empire.94

However, one can view Asoka's strong defense of Buddhism as an opposition to social and religious movements

that questioned its superiority and therefore his hegemony. In this reading, Asoka's idea of dhamma acted as an

ideological tool regulating other religions.

Still, other scholars maintain Buddhism's role in the transformation of Asoka's view of mankind as a family, a

realization that opens possibilities for a "world community." Asoka's dhamma, much like global cosmopolitanism,

provides "a code of personal conduct, a bond of human relations and political justice, and a principle of

international relations, and Dhamma turns the lives of men away from evil deeds, mutual intolerance, and armed

conflict" (emphasis mine).95

Dhamma is viewed as a guide to action. Tambiah interprets the policies of Asoka as

having "imbibed the inner spirit of Buddhism," reflecting its message of peace to all and nonviolence to all living

things. In this view of Asoka, ideas matter. Borrowing a Keynesian concept, Tambiah notes the presence of the

"multiplier effect" in Buddhist discourse, where the righteous rule of the king constitutes the norms of the rest of

the society: "When rajahs (kings) are righteous, the ministers of rajahs also are righteous. When ministers are

righteous, brahmins and householders also are righteous. Thus townsfolk and villagers are righteous. This being so,

moon and sun go right in their courses. This being so, constellations and stars do likewise; days and nights, months

and fortnights, seasons and years go on their courses regularly; winds blow regularly and in due season."

96

Thisframework outlines how ideational variables (such as morals) have the potential to transform the international

[End Page 318] society by changing intersubjective identities of states. A Buddhist ethos inspires Asokan

hegemony and acts as a positive and regulative force, but its all-encompassing character can also represent

centralized absolutism.

Asoka's moral revolution can be explained by a model existing in Buddhist literature. Buddha recalls his earlier

life as a ruler who ruled "righteously, not needing (the) rod and sword," which in the case of Asoka happened only

after the bloody conquest of a kingdom.97

Asoka's reported killing of his brothers or his violence in the Kalinga

war preceding the adoption of dhamma point to an enduring Buddhist dilemma—the necessity to kill before

establishing "righteous rule." This dilemma leads to violent absolutism, as shown through the histories of the Thai,

Sinhalese, Burmese, and Khmer kings.

The Reemergence of Power Politics after Asoka's Death

There is near unanimity among historians that the period after Asoka, whether due to economic reasons (excessive

taxation) or over decentralization or inept rulers, reverted to a period of power politics and disintegration of small

principalities and kingdoms that is akin to the conflict following the decline of any hegemon.98

The Mauryan

dynasty had six rulers whose total reign lasted a mere fifty-two years after the death of Asoka. According to

Buddhist sources, the decline of the Mauryas coincided with the revival of a Brahmanic orthodoxy within the

empire. As Asoka's reign waned, the tension between the Hindu orthodoxy and his moralistic pro-Buddhist

policies led to a mounting confrontation.99

The reemergence of orthodoxy challenged the legitimacy and ideology


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of the rulers influenced by or linked to Buddhism.100

Others maintain that the empire was plagued by a power

vacuum, with "rivalries in the imperial family" rising to the point where the empire was divided among Asoka's

sons upon his death: "The western provinces could have passed to Kunala, and the eastern lands with the capital

at Pataliputra remained under the rule of Sampadi or Dasaratha."101

Additionally, movements for independence among several provinces challenged the hegemony of any "central

authority."102

Weakened, units of the empire reverted to threat or use of force, as the unifying force of

Dharmavijaya (moral conquest) was abandoned.

103

Moving away from the idea of dhamma, ideational variablessuch as moral benevolence no longer moderated the acquisition of material power by individual actors. New

invasions by the Sakas and the Kusanas occurred as the Andhras and the Kalingas in the south regained their

independent status. The northwest region, which once belonged to the Seleucid dynasty, was recaptured by the

powerful invasions of the Greeks (Bactria)—notwithstanding earlier diplomatic treaties. Once the Asokan empire

diminished in material power, long-established relations with Greeks (from the period of Seleucid and

Chandragupta to Asoka) lost diplomatic force.104

The Greeks saw this as an opportunity to reassert claims to land

they once lost. Realpolitik marked the international system of South Asia, as self-interested generals and other

state officials lay claim to various units.105

In fact, one of the last Mauryan leaders, Brihadratha, whose reign

lasted merely seven years, was overthrown in a coup by his own commander.106

In short, balance of power and security competition with other claimants to regional hegemony marked this period. No powerful ruler emerged to inherit the centralized behemoth that Asoka created. The region

disintegrated into small kingdoms and principalities jostling [End Page 319] one another for power. The

international system regressed to the power struggles of before the "golden era" of Asokan hegemony.

The foregoing analysis shows that both eras, before and after Asoka's reign, were shaped by power politics—a

realist world prevailed in the region. The preceding era was characterized by empire building by Chandragupta

(and others) through aggressive conquest of political units (kingdoms, tribal regions, principalities). The

subsequent period is replete with foreign invasions competing for territory even as formerly conquered regions

regained their independent status. The moral force of dhamma is not evident during either period. Dhamma did not

stop nearby powers from violently grabbing Asokan territory, nor did it deter domestic entities from declaring their

independence. In both periods, warfare was central to the positioning for power among self-interested actors.

Conclusion

This study of Asokan hegemony shines some empirical light on the debate between international relations scholars

of ideational variables (especially constructivists), who claim that discourse constructs social reality, and those of

realism, who claim that the logic of power politics prevails at all times and that peaceful discourse is mere rhetoric.

The study of the ancient South Asian international system reveals three features of Asokan hegemony. First, it is

true, according to Buddhist legends, that Asoka abstained from force in his behavior after his adoption of the idea

of dhamma; this goes against the realist claim that force is always necessary. Second, Asoka's idea of dhamma and

simultaneous pursuit of material interests suborned his subjects as well as co-opted as yet unconquered people,

thus serving Asoka's hegemonic power rather than his selfless ideals. His reign is at best a case of benevolent

hegemony. Third, the power politics and war in South Asia that prevailed before Asoka's conversion quickly

reasserted itself after his death, showing that the brief practice of benevolent hegemony brought no lasting

transformation in the region.

If one accepts the claim that Asoka brought about change or created further possibilities of change by bringing

diverse principalities and kingdoms under the moral sanction of dhamma, then the evidence suggests that this

change is a temporary possibility. More important, it coincides with the exercise of hegemony by the Asokan

regional empire and Asoka's preference, willingness, and ability to transform the international system through a

strategic use of dhamma and material capabilities. For believers in the hegemonic stability theory—a subgroup of

realists—I have substantiated an extension of hegemonic stability theory beyond economic stability and

uniformity to that of "moral stability." The Asokan period is at best a brief anomaly in an international system.


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When the principal exponent of the transformation, Asoka, was removed, ancient South Asia reverted to a world

of power politics.

In the periods before and after Asoka's reign, what accounts for the continuity in the war-prone self-help system

of ancient South Asia? A plausible explanation is that, aside from "cooperative norms" and moral practices, the

real variable was power. When Asoka died, centralized power vanished and a regional hegemon declined, which

led to the outbreak of war among previously occupied or threatened groups. This conclusion supports the realist

conception, where use and threat of force is a common feature and states strive to subjugate others and increase

their spheres of influence through conquest.107

More important for constructivists, no lasting transformation of theinternational [End Page 320] system occurred, as succeeding heirs and royal advisers abandoned the nonviolent

pacific ideals of dhamma. The (re)emergence of the Hindu orthodoxy diluted any changes in the intersubjective

identities as a result of dhamma, hence the return to power politics.

After evaluating Asoka's hegemonic reign, the link between the ideas and practices of an actor seem all too

apparent. Self-interest still motivates state behavior, oftentimes coupling "ideas" with the pursuit of "material

interests." For example, hegemons can make pronouncements about ideas such as morals and norms while

pursuing material self-interest. Mistaken claims about Asokan peace on the basis of mere morals ignore the

self-interest underlying a political actor's behavior. The Asokan empire reveals that there cannot be a long-term

transformation of the international system through benevolent hegemony, as ideational variables such as dhamma

are not divorced from interest and power. Similarly, one can argue that the moral discourse of freedom and liberty

espoused by today's hegemon—the United States—serves as a cloak for its strategic ambitions. [End Page 321]

Kamal Sadiq

Kamal Sadiq is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine, and author of

Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Become Citizens in Developing Countries (Oxford University Press,

2009).

Acknowledgement

For their comments and feedback, my sincere thanks to Jonathan Acuff, Deborah Avant, Thomas Donahue,

Rodney Hall, Ryan Harvey, Ned Lebow, Cecelia Lynch, Patrick Morgan, Nicholas Onuf, Lloyd I. Rudolph,

Romila Thapar, and Stephen Walt. None of them are responsible for any errors in this article.

Footnotes1. See the six articles on hegemony in "Hegemony and Its Discontents: A Symposium," International Studies

Review 7 (2005): 531–628.

2. See Fareed Zakaria, "An Imperial Presidency," MSNBC Newsweek , 19 December 2005,

www.newsweek.com/id/51399; David J. Rothkopf, "Inside the Committee That Runs the World," Foreign

Policy, no. 147 (2005), 30–40; and John A. Vasquez, "Ethics, Foreign Policy, and Liberal Wars: The Role of

Restraint in Moral Decision Making," International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 307–15.

3. See Steven W. Hook, "Ideas and Change in U.S. Foreign Aid: Inventing the Millennium Challenge

Corporation," Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (2008), 147–67; Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, "Beyond Belief: Ideas

and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations," European Journal of International Relations

3 (1997): 193–237; and Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,

Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).4. Richard Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics,"

Alternatives 12 (1987): 403–34; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in

International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization 48

(1994): 215–45; Rodney B. Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse

of History," International Organization 4 (1993): 479–91.

5. Michael C. Williams, "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and

the Moral Construction of Power Politics," International Organization58 (2004): 633–65.

6. Some attention, however, has been paid by a certain section of American realist writers to the Arthashastra,

reputedly authored by Kautilya, and its comparability to works by Carl von Clausewitz, Thomas Hobbes, Plato,

etc. Kenneth Waltz in his theory of international politics argued that society is ordered on coercion, concluding


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that "since Thucydides in Greece and Kautilya in India , the use of force and the possibility of controlling it have

been the preoccupations of international-political studies." Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 186. Hans Morgenthau underlined the importance of the insights made by "a

Jeremiah, a Kautilya, a Plato, a Bodin, or a Hobbes" to explaining human nature's transcendent and unchanging

nature and the explanations thereof of international politics. See Hans Morgenthau, "The Nature and Limits of a

Theory of International Relations," in Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, ed. W. T. R. Fox (Notre

Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 19. Perhaps the most famous instance of Kautilya's

incorporation into mainstream American scholarship on international relations came with George Modelski's

article "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," American Political Science Review 58 (1964): 549–60.

7. Eliot A. Cohen, "History and the Hyperpower," Foreign Affairs 83 (2004): 49–50.

8. K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Unwin

Hyman, 1985), 10. Steve Smith has noted the dominance of "realist" theories by the United States since it served

American foreign policy concerns. Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The

Development of International Relations as a Social Science," Millennium 16 (1987): 189–206.

9. Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in

Asian Regionalism," International Organization 58 (2004): 239–75; David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and

Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," International Security 28 (2003–4): 165–80.

10. Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee, eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular

Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); see especially the contributions by Donald K.Swearer, "Buddhism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Oxymoron?" 237–45, and David W. Chappell,

"Buddhist Perspectives on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 213–36.

11. Chappell, "Buddhist Perspectives," 232.

12. S. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against

a Historical Background (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 53, 47. Richard Gombrich, a prominent

Indologist, considers Asoka a model for rulers in the Buddhist world and quotes sources to substantiate: "Within

the next thousand years at least five kings of Sri Lanka prohibited the killings of animals. In Burma, Asoka's

example has constantly been invoked by kings, and Prime Minister U Nu, modeling himself on Asoka, had

innumerable small stupas put up. The great Khmer ruler Jayavarman VII . . . expressed Asokan sentiments on the

material and spiritual welfare of his subjects." Richard Gombrich, "Asoka—the Great Upasaka," in King Asoka

and Buddhism: Historical and Literary Studies, ed. Anuradha Seneviratna (Kandy, Sri Lanka: BuddhistPublication Society, 1994), 9. Among the modern leaders said to have been influenced by Asoka are Mohandas

Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, while Asoka's Buddhist rituals have been emulated by many, including the

Japanese rulers according to Shundo Tachibana. See Shundo Tachibana, "Prince Shotoku, King Asoka of Japan,"

quoted in John S. Strong, "Images of Asoka: Some Indian and Sri Lankan Legends and Their Development," in

Seneviratna, King Asoka and Buddhism, 171n65.

13. Chappell, "Buddhist Perspectives," 222, 232.

14. See Albert S. Yee, "The Causal Effects of Idea on Policies," International Organization50 (1996): 69–108;

and Ngaira Woods, "Economic Ideas and International Relations: Beyond Rational Neglect," International

Studies Quarterly 39 (1995): 161–80.

15. Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief," 194–5.

16. Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 8–11.

17. John Kurt Jacobsen, "Duelling Constructivism: A Post-mortem on the Ideas Debate in Mainstream IR/IPE,"

Review of International Studies 29 (2003): 39–60.

18. Kate O'Neill, Jorg Balsiger, and Stacy D. Van-Deveer, "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International

Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," Annual Review of Political Science 7

(2004): 161.

19. Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief," 196.

20. Quoted in ibid.; Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy , 5.

21. Nagendra Singh, India and International Law, vol. 1, pt. A, Ancient and Medieval (Delhi: S. Chand, 1973),

12–13; for anarchy, see 66.

22. N. N. Law, Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), 1; and H. N. Sinha,


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Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity: A Study in the Evolution of Early Indian State (London: Luzac, 1938). The

latter is a PhD dissertation approved at the University of London in 1935 and published in 1938.

23. Neta C. Crawford, "A Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois Nations,"

International Organization 48 (1994): 349–50. Kautilya used the word corporations for various forms of

collectivities in ancient India.

24. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

25. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "The Subcontinental Empire and the Regional Kingdom in

Indian State Formation," in Region and Nation in India, ed. Paul Wallace (New Delhi: Oxford University Press

and IBH Publishing, 1985), 49.26. Ibid., 50.

27. R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, An Advanced History of India (London:

Macmillan, 1950), 56.

28. This information comes from the official history textbooks for school written by a collection of prominent

Indian historians. See Romila Thapar, Ancient India (New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and

Training, 1966), 53.

29. Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India, ed. Joseph Campbell (1951; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1974), 96.

30. P. V. Pillai, Perspectives on Power: India and China (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977), 20. See also Thapar,

Ancient India, 55.

31. Realists would call this bandwagoning.32. Majumdar et al., Advanced History of India, 59. The period has been noted for prolonged conflict between

Kosala and Magadha for establishing hegemony in northern India. See Sinha, Sovereignty in Ancient Indian

Polity, 106. Sinha also notes that Ajatashatru made "annexations right and left" against his neighbors (106).

33. The Puranas is an ancient Indian text. On the Sisunaga dynasty, see Majumdar et al., Advanced History of

India, 61. See also Pillai, Perspectives on Power , 21.

34. Sinha, Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity, 130.

35. The region is modern-day Punjab.

36. Romila Thapar, Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997),

3. Referring to the conditions preceding the unifying effect of the Mauryan empire, F. W. Thomas is of the

opinion that "the invasion of Alexander found the Panjab, as we have seen, divided among a number of relatively

inconsiderable tribes, a state of things which had probably always subsisted " (emphasis mine). F. W. Thomas,"Chandragupta, the Founder of the Maurya Empire," in The Cambridge History of India, 3rd Indian ed., ed. E. J.

Rapson (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1968), 1:421. Thomas was the librarian of the famous India Office

collection, which still today remains one of the best collections on Indian history. See also B. N. Mukherjee, The

Character of the Maurya Empire (Calcutta: Progressive, 2000).

37. Chandragupta Maurya is believed to have overthrown the last unpopular Nanda king with the help of Kautilya.

The Puranas describes the uprooting of the Nandas by the Brahman Kautalya, as quoted in Thapar, Asoka, 12.

See also Thapar, Ancient India, 70. For Chandragupta's overthrow of the Nanda dynasty as well as Kautilya's role,

see Majumdar et al., Advanced History of India, 63, 98–99. For the unpopularity of the last Nanda, who was

"detested and held cheap by his subjects," see Majumdar et al., Advanced History of India, 63. Kautilya,

Arthashastra, bk. 6, chap. 1. The Arthashastra was brought to the notice of the world by R. Shamasastry's English

translation of a Sanskrit manuscript published in the first decade of twentieth century. I refer to the fifth edition of

this widely used translation published by Sri Raghuveer Print Press from Mysore in 1956, which is hereafter cited

as Arthashastra. Much has been written about the exact date (whether it was written in Chandragupta's time) and

authenticity of this text. I go with Thapar's conclusion, in which she states that "the Arthashastra was originally

written by Kautalya, the minister of Chandragupta, and who was also known as Canakya." Thapar, Asoka, 225.

For further details on the debate regarding this text, see Thapar, Asoka, 218–25, especially 225.

38. Arthashastra, bk. 6, chap. 1, translation (tr.), 291.

39. Quincy Wright, A Study of War , vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959), 148.

40. Plutarch, Lives, Greek section, pt. 2, 152, quoted in Sinha, Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity, 144. Sinha,

while describing the lack of independent city-states, quotes Plutarch on how Chandragupta with "six hundred

thousand men attacked and subdued all India" (141).


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41. Romila Thapar, Asoka, 16–17.

42. A common story recounts how Chandragupta's imperial strategy was influenced by a woman who scolded her

child for eating from the middle of the dish rather than starting from the edges, which gave Chandragupta the idea

that he should conquer the periphery first and then attack the center. Allegedly thereafter, he wandered into the

northwest frontier by securing the support of the local tribes and annexed the weakened territories of the northern

kingdom. Ibid., 16.

43. Ibid. See Radha Kumud Mookerji, The Fundamental Unity of India (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2004).

44. On conquests, see Thapar, Ancient India, 70; and Sinha, Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity, 130–31.

Interestingly, there is also a section on Chandragupta's conquests in H. G. Wells, The Outline of History (London:Cassell, 1921), 211. Continuing his conquests southward, Chandragupta controlled Avanti in central India by 313

BC. By 303 BC, he had waged a successful war against the Greek satrap Seleucos Nikator, who seceded some

parts of the northwest to the Maurya.

45. Arthashastra, bk. 11, chap. 1, contains all of these and more. Kautilya uses the word corporations to describe

a variety of political units of ancient India—tribes, small and large kingdoms, republics, city-states, etc. It

subsumes all forms of the anarchic actor of the ancient period.

46. Majumdar et al., Advanced History of India, 102; Thapar, Ancient India, 71; Thapar, Asoka, 17–18.

47. Modelski, "Kautilya," 549–60. See also Arthashastra, especially bk. 7, tr., 293–348. It has been noted that

among the leaders influenced by Asoka was Nehru, India's first prime minister, who reportedly used to write under

the pseudonym "Chanakya." See Imtiaz Ahmed, State and Foreign Policy: India's Role in South Asia (New

Delhi: Vikas, 1993), 217. Incidentally, the diplomatic enclave in Delhi that houses the foreign embassies in India isnamed after Kautilya and is called Chanakyapuri.

48. Singh, India and International Law, vol. 1, part A, 66. Such an authority on Hindu traditions as P. S.

Sivaswami Aiyer, writing on conditions in ancient India, says that "aggressive wars were not forbidden and

territorial aggrandizement or extension of sovereignty was a legitimate ambition in a king." P. S. Sivaswami Aiyer,

Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals (New Delhi: Nag, 1976), 114. Thanks to J. Duncan M. Derrett for this passage.

Derrett also points out that, despite a whole chapter on Ahimsa ("noninjury to all living things"), Aiyer nowhere

suggests a conflict between the ideal of Ahimsa and aggressive real politick as suggested by Hindu traditions

enshrined in the Arthashastra, Mahabharata, etc. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, "The Maintenance of Peace in the

Hindu World: Practice and Theory," in The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, vol. 8 (Madras: University

of Madras, 1958), 383n67.

49. Pali is the Middle Indo-Aryan language of India. The Arthashastra's realism lies in its advice for unrestraineduse of spies, prostitution, poisoning, dissension, and self-serving opportunism to bolster and safeguard the interests

of an ambitious king and his state.

50. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," quoted in Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 30. See

Max Weber, H. H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1946), 123–24.

51. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 27. See also chap. 3, "The Brahmanical Theory of Society

and Kingship," in same.

52. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 27.

53. Chappell, "Buddhist Perspectives," 222.

54. Theravada (Teaching of the Elders or Ancient Teaching) is a school of Buddhism.

55. Ananda W. P. Guruge, "Emperor Asoka and Buddhism: Unresolved Discrepancies between Buddhist

Tradition and Asokan Inscriptions," in Seneviratna, King Asoka and Buddhism, 87n11. See also Thapar's view in

Asoka, 2. Vincent Smith argues that Ceylonese sources are "crowded with absurdities and contradictions." Vincent

Smith, Asoka: The Buddhist Emperor of India (Oxford: Clarendon, 1901), 6. Smith's was the first monograph on

Asoka. Mookerji says "the inscriptions, as personal and contemporary documents, will have to be preferred" to

Buddhist legends. R. Mookerji, Asoka (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1962), 2.

56. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 54. It is significant that James Prinsep, who first

deciphered Asoka's edicts, was able to identify Asoka only after the confirmation from Pali texts such as the

Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa. See O. P. Kejariwal, "James Prinsep and the Period of Great Discoveries,

1832–1838," in The Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Discovery of India's Past, 1784–1838 (Delhi: Oxford

University Press, 1988), especially 208.


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57. The wheel on the pillar at Sarnath that Asoka erected, representing the wheel of dhamma, is part of the flag of

modern India. On top of the pillar, four lions, which are the national emblem, form the state seal.

58. Strong, "Images of Asoka," 121.

59. Thapar, Asoka, 25. See also Ananda W. P. Guruge, "Emperor Asoka's Place in History: A Review of Prevalent

Opinions," in Seneviratna, King Asoka and Buddhism, 134. Guruge speculates that Asoka could have been called

Candasoka (Asoka the Cruel) more for his wars of succession than for any of his other violent acts (138).

60. Irfan Habib and Vivekanand Jha, Mauryan India (Delhi: Tulika Books, 2004), 22.

61. All citations to the Asokan edicts are from N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon, The Edicts of Asoka (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1959), 27–28. It is one of the most reliable translations of the Asokan edicts. That thename Priyadarsi refers to Asoka is established. The figures for the war are indeed huge considering that the

population of these areas in ancient times could not have been large: 150,000 prisoners, 100,000 killed, and "many

times that number died" (i.e., died later because of their wounds, etc.). Ibid., 27.

62. Ibid., 31–32.

63. Thapar has been cautious in taking the edicts at face value, and her analysis regarding the possible motivations

for Asoka's actions have been most useful. For her critical analysis, see Thapar, Asoka; Thapar, The Mauryas

Revisited (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi and Co., 1987); and Thapar, "Asoka and Buddhism as Reflected in the Asokan

Edicts," in Seneviratna, King Asoka and Buddhism, 15–36. Also useful for the development of the "pragmatic"

argument has been Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer .

64. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 56. Thapar in Asoka (168) says that "with the conquest of

Kalinga the consolidation of the empire was complete." The following interpretation of the motivations for theKalinga conquest have also been taken from Thapar, Asoka, 168–69.

65. The argument is from Thapar's Asoka (168–69) and her Mauryas Revisited (6), where she says, "For the

Mauryas the need to conquer (Kalinga) undoubtedly arose due to the necessity to extend the availability of

resources from the more limited Ganga plain to the wider arena of the subcontinent." It would be a good strategy

for any ambitious ruler.

66. Thapar, Asoka, 169. Stanley Wolpert points out that "with its last major tribal opposition in South Asia

annihilated, the Mauryan administration could now afford . . . the more enlightened advocacy of peace and

nonviolence" (emphasis mine). Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press,

1989), 62.

67. Thapar, Asoka, 133. Here, Thapar says that "The reports of the Kalinga War must have played an important

part in their (i.e., south Indian Kingdoms) decision to submit to the Mauryan emperor." See also ibid., 202–3.68. G. M. Bongard-Levin, Mauryan India (New Delhi: Sterling, 1985), 247.

69. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 56.

70. Thapar, Asoka; Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, A History of India (London: Croom Helm, 1986),

67.

71. Habib and Jha, Mauryan India, 82–83.

72. Ibid.

73. Nikam and McKeon, Edicts of Asoka, 28–29.

74. Ibid., 30.


76. As quoted in Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 63.

77. Chandragupta reportedly became a Jain (a sect antagonistic to the high-caste Brahmanic orthodoxy) at the endof his rule, while Asoka's father is alleged to have patronized another nonorthodox sect called Ajivikas. See

Thapar, Asoka, 3–4.

78. Ibid., 2. Similarly, Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund refer to Asoka as "an astute politician" and

highlight the role that his moral policy played in consolidating his empire; see Kulke and Rothermund, History of

India, 67, 69, 70.

79. Nikam and McKeon, Edicts of Asok a, 27–30; Habib and Jha, Mauryan India, 91.

80. Habib and Jha, Mauryan India, 75.

81. Thapar, Asoka, 276.

82. Steven P. Lee, "Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Limits of Moral Understanding," in Hashmi and Lee,

Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 490.


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83. John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no.3: (Winter

1994/1995): 46. Mearsheimer uses this in the context of the disintegration in Eastern Europe being viewed as a

result of transforming ideas of "revolutionaries."

84. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 42–43.

85. Nikam and McKeon, Edicts of Asoka, xii.

86. Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," 408.

87. Ahmed, State and Foreign Policy, 224.

88. Ibid.

89. Legends about his evil character abound, such as his having a torture house from where nobody came outalive and where methods of torture were tested; his ordering a massacre of a heretic sect, the Ajivikas, because

one of them desecrated the statue of Buddha; or his having five hundred concubines burnt for teasing him. All

these are meant to highlight the transformation in his personality that Buddhism brought about later. Guruge,

"Emperor Asoka's Place in History," 192; and "Emperor Asoka and Buddhism," 46.

90. Pillar Edict 4 is often cited for Asoka's policy toward capital punishment. The crucial word "vadha" is

interpreted as "execution" in some instances and "beating" in others. However, as Habib and Jha point out "it may

be noted that though this passage from Pillat Edict IV might not refer to capital punishment [directly], Ashoka

nowhere speaks of having abolished it." Habib and Jha, Mauryan India, 77–78.

91. Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics," 223.

92. Singh, India and International Law, vol. 1, part A, 65. Gombrich describes the domestic (and personal) norms

and practices of Asoka: "Other kings go on hunting expeditions; he gets much more pleasure out of dhammaexpeditions, on which he makes gifts to Brahmins and renouncers and senior citizens. . . . Other kings have

officials; he has dhamma officials to promulgate virtue and to look after such disadvantaged people as old people,

orphans and prisoners." Gombrich, "Asoka," 4.

93. Singh, India and International Law, vol. 1, part A, 31–32.

94. I am not going into the debate on Asoka and his role as an ardent Buddhist. Some authors (Thapar, etc.)

believe that the norms enshrined in Asoka's dhamma are common principles of the region shared by most

sects—there is nothing intrinsically Buddhist about them. For the Buddhist aura of Asoka's policies, see Tambiah,

World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 58.

95. Nikam and McKeon, Edicts of Asoka, 19.

96. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer , 50–51. The reverse is also true—wicked kings or foolish

rulers have a regressive logic.97. Ibid., 56; much of the argument on this dilemma comes from 51, 53. Similarly, Guruge interprets the edict on

the Kalinga war as implying the war was an "obligation," a prerequisite to the practice of dhamma; see Guruge,

"Emporer Asoka and Buddhism," 54.

98. Guruge, "Emperor Asoka's Place in History," 218. For the section on the decline of the Mauryas, see Thapar,

Asoka, 196 and chap. 7; Sinha, Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity, xv–xvi, 132.

99. Bongard-Levin, Mauryan India, 100.

100. Katherine K. Young, "Hinduism and the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Hashmi and Lee, Ethics

and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 284.

101. Habib and Jha, Mauryan India, 89; Bongard-Levin, Mauryan India, 97–98; however, this account has been

disproved by many.

102. Ibid., 92.103. Ibid., 100.


105. Mukherjee, Character of the Mauryan Empire, 145.

106. Habib and Jha, Mauryan India, 88.

107. Some constructivists could argue that Asoka was influenced by a warlike discourse and that his practices

were not based on a fraudulent discourse of peace. Kautilya's ideas were readily available to Asoka and can

explain his behavior prior to his conversion. Thus constructivists can account for the power-political aspects of

Asoka's policy. Constructivists may argue that my analysis based on Asoka's superficial rhetoric of peace tells

only a realist story about his reign and does not in anyway invalidate constructivist theory's claim that norms,

moral values, and other such discourse shape practice. But in any society multiple discourses exist, and therefore


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any dominant series of practices of an emperor could be explained by any discourse existing at the time. Hence a

case where there is incongruence between a dominant discourse like dhamma that is personally associated with a

ruler and the ruler's most "visible" practices can be justified by the mere presence of alternative discourses.

Constructivist theory then needs to explain the disjuncture between dominant discourses and the dominant set of

practices that formed official policy.

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Ashokan Benevolent Hegemony

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