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Distinguished Delegates,

Welcome to the ASEAN Regional Forum. My name Dian Aditya Ning Lestari, better known as Diku,and I’m a junior at Universitas Indonesia’s International Relations Department. I focus my study in international se-curity, particularly interested in defense and strategic studies, especially its maritime dimension. That’s why, the topic area of our committee interests me, and I hope you’ll be enjoying it as much as I do. As for MUN career, I have been lucky enough to be in Universitas Indonesia’s delegation for Harvard National MUN twice. I have also been lucky enough to be named at several awards, such as Best Delegate in JMUN and The European In-ternational MUN last year. This year, I will also be chairing The European International MUN. But of course, chairing you will also put me at my most pleasant. I’m very excited to welcome you all as my delegations in the conference room. I’m going to tell you this: our ASEAN Regional Forum is going to be tense. The negotiation is going to be thrilling. You’re going to debate to find solutions for the never-ending dispute of interest, right, and sov-ereignty: the South China Sea dispute. The impact of the dispute will not only be regional, it will be global. That’s why the ASEAN Regional Forum is the only security forum capable of discussing it wholly with regards to various actors’ interest.Uniquely upholding the principle of diplomacy of the ASEAN Way, the ASEAN Regional Forum upholds principle of consensus, non-interven-tion, and peaceful settlement of dispute. Under these three respected principle, the delegations are going to try to find a solution over the most critical and pressing issue of the region. Surely it will be a challenge for the delega-tions, but I assure you it will also be fun and meaningful to win with a principle of diplomacy.In preparing the D-Day and the substantive, I am helped by my Assistant Director, Sindhu Partomo. He is a very potential second-year student whom himself has won several awards in MUN, such as Honorable Men-tion at Hong Kong MUN this year. It is an honor for both of us to finish this Study Guide for you. We hope it will serve you well. Shall there be any questions, don’t hesitate to email me.

Regards,Dian Aditya Ning Lestari Director of ASEAN Regional ForumIndonesia Model United Nations 2012dianadityanl@gmail.comdianadityanl@yahoo.com

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INTRODUCTION

In the spirit of being the catalyst for peace and stability in the region, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created under Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a forum of Southeast Asian member states and dialogue partners from all over Asia and Pacific. It was formally

institutionalized by the declaration of the leaders in the July 1994 ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok. Since then it has become the

first-ever developing countries-led multilateral, extra-regional, security forum that would gather the region’s utmost great powers to sit in one table to discuss the region’s ultimate security issues.

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History of the Committee

The ASEAN Regional Forum was created under the decision of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference in Singapore, 23-25 July 1993, with the objectives of fostering constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and making significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific re-gion. As stated by the first chairman of ARF in the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting:

“The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific.”

With communication and cooperation, it is expected that misperception can be curbed and security dilemma can be eliminated. Therefore the ARF holds discussion on security concerns that are of the common interest of the member states so that it could be settled once and for all and no conflicts shall occur as a result of it being left in dormant. Conflicts can create instability that would be harmful towards the development of the region. Therefore it is the job of the ARF to prevent conflicts from happening in, a further even, establishes a perpetual mechanism of dispute settlement for all the member states. This end goal is stated in the Terms of Reference of ARF explaining its expected three stages of development: “Stage I : Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures; Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms; Stage III: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms.” The unclear stance between member states on to what extent they will take these developments further in the tangible level, however, remains an obstacle in actually developing a real and concrete

mechanism of dispute settlement/conflict resolution. Not the mention the set of principles in which the ARF is operating under, “the ASEAN Way,” that can both be considered as a challenge and as an opportunity.

“The ASEAN Way,” consist of the fundamental values hold by the ARF’s mother institution, ASEAN, consisted of the principle of consensus, non-intervention and pacific settlement of dispute. These principles is the status quo “rule of the game, “that has to be accepted by the ASEAN member state and any states that are taking part inside its function. The principle of non-intervention dictates that the states are to refrain from discussing any issues that is considered sensitive to any member states, and the principle of consensus enables states to suspend –or even reject it from the first place. As much as how these consequences challenges the effectiveness of the organization’s dispute-settlement mechanisms, these principles have managed to sustain the region’s stability. It enables the member states to prevent uneasiness and avoid conflicts, the consequences in which wouldn’t be there if “The ASEAN Way” never existed. Therefore the ASEAN Way can be considered as a unique feature of ASEAN in deal-ing with their problems. ARF member states are namely Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea Utara, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, East Timor, United States of America, and Vietnam. These countries aspire to protect the region future security threats, despite the current challenges they face in the absence of a real dispute settlement mechanism.

Nevertheless, it is not yet the end. Further process needs to be driven and the ARF is not to stop before it develops a true dispute settlement mechanism that fits best the interest of the region.

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TOPIC AREA: THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE AT THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The territorial dispute of at the South China Sea is a competition of claims between Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan on several islands and its surrounding water at the South China Sea. These countries are disputing over its sovereignty over the islands of the Spratly and Paracel, along with the 12 nautical miles of water area off its coastline, in which, according to the regulation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)is the territorial waters of the states it is sovereign to.

Taking into account the ancient proceedings, the dispute may have a root of over thousands of years, when the sailors of ancient China pass through the waters and found the then called “southern rocks.” However, considering the more-relevant proceedings in the modern, nation-state era, it was during the colonial times that we could found one that is most responsible for the occurring of this dispute: The failure to determine boundaries of the state they once have a de facto government upon by the colonial powers do play a significant role in setting up the de jure basis of this dispute. This condition, since then, has caused numerous security dynamics in the region, inter alia diplomatic crisis, civilian protests, and armed conflict.

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A map showing the location and area of the South China Sea. It is in this region that the countries muddled. Source: http://ars.sciencedirect.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S0025326X01002405-gr1.gif

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South China Sea itself is known as “the troubled waters, ” a title that is given for its high possibility of being the stage of an armed conflict. To be exact of its location, this sea is defined by the International Hydrographic Bureau as the area waters lying on the point of 3° south latitude, bordered by the Strait of Karimata in the South, and the Taiwan Strait to the Fukien beach of China in the North. These areas of waters are known not only for their geostrategic location and its value as a very important international shipping route, but also for its prospect of energy. For this reason, and with the consideration that the future war is more likely to happen above the waters under the air, it is not exaggerating if scholar such as Robert Kaplan outlined that the South China Sea is the future conflict. It is up to the ARF member states, though, to determine whether the thesis will or will not be proven right.

History and Discussion of the Problems

Decolonization and the Root of the Dispute Tracing the roots of the South China Sea territorial dispute, we will return to Southeast Asia at the time of decolonization. France and Japan are the two dominant powers at that time that has a lot of influence in the region of Indochina and the Pacific. France had “taken over” the sovereignty of the Islands of Spratlys in the 17th century, when the Nguyen Dynasty signed an agreement with France which stated that country is to become the dynasty’s representative of sovereignty in the international arena. This means that, de facto, the sovereignty of the Nguyen Dynasty, forcefully applied to the modern and western system of statehood international relation, is considered to belong to France. The Japanese, on the other hand, was at a time “The Sun of the Southeast Asia.” It had occupied several islands of the Spratly and Paracel in the South China Sea in its mission to conquer Southeast Asia during World War II.

From the above dynamics, one of which that led to the existence the current territorial dispute is the inability of the colonial government to define clear boundaries where the jurisdiction of its tributary states prevailed. This inability occurred because of the limitations they used to have in technology that makes it hard for them to determine and measure the boundaries of sovereignty in the area of the sea. Also, there is lack of urgency for the colonial power to determine the borders of the sea, seeing how at that time no one ever pays any attention to these then-perceived invaluable islands. Therefore, these islands are never a subject of a clear transfer of sovereignty.

The 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty as the only formal transfer of sovereignty relevant to the waters never has clauses that specifically refer to how to treat these islands. The San Francisco Peace Conference that preceded produce not any decision nor provided any statement about the islands either Spartlys and Paracels, the two largest group of islands in these waters, are left unaddressed –which makes it evident that certainly at that time none of the European political actors realize just how important these islands are. Little they did know, though, that the recently-liberated China and Vietnam were among the exceptions.

China and Vietnam are the two countries that in the future will be the two most vocal countries when it comes to the claims they made upon the islands. Ever since the time of the de-colonization, in within the formal sovereignty transfer, they have published various political statements asserting their holdings upon the islands. The first official statement comes from the government of People’s Republic of China (PRC), issued in the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, and recorded in the US-British Draft Treaty with Japan. Said Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) the then-Foreign Minister of the PRC from their home:

“.. The Draft Treaty stipulated That Japan should renounce all rights to Nan Wai (Spratly) Islands Sha Island and Si (Paracels), but again deliberately makes no mention of the problem of restoring Sovereignty over them. As a matter of fact, just like all the Nan Sha Islands (Spratlys), Chung Sha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and Tung Sha Islands (Pratas), Si Wei Nan Sha Islands and Island have

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always been China’s territory. “ The delegation of the People’s Republic of China, however, was not invited to the conference. Their voice in the San Francisco Peace Conference where represented by the Soviet Union, which at that time generously fought for their ally, by giving the statement:

“The right of the Chinese People’s Republic over Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all islands adjacent to it, the Pen(g) huletao Islands (the Pescadores), the Tun(g) shatsuntao (the Pratas Islands), as well as over the islands of Sishatsuntao and Chun(g) shatsuntao (the Paracel Islands, the group of the Amphitrites, and the shoal of Maxfield {sic}), and Nanshatsuntao including the Spratly. ”

Statement with the same purpose was issued by the Vietnamese delegation, represented by the government of Bao Dai. Through this conference, Vietnam has made its claim public. The French delegation as the one who previously colonized Vietnam supported their plea. However, knowing that—at that time, other matter was considered more important, and the case of the islands remains abandoned. In the end these documents addressing the case of Spratly and Paracel merely consists of statements, not decisions, and claims, not conferment.

Post World War II Crisis: The Cold War Incentives and the Battle of Paracel 1974 Post-World War II situation brought about at different security dynamics over the region of former Indochina, and the rest of the Southeast Asian region. Colonialism and imperialism were replaced by the rivalry between the two great superpower Soviet Union and the United States, with their each of their own contesting communism vis a vis liberal democratic values. In the land where Spratlys and Paracels are close to, they were also competing over influence, one of which that have caused the most severe political transformation in the region.

The most critical structural change was experienced by Vietnam, which separated into North Vietnam and South Vietnam as a result of

these dynamics. The separation inevitably affected the dispute over the Paracels and Spratlys Islands, particularly in the context of the struggle for sovereignty between China and Vietnam –South Vietnam that is. South Vietnam aka Republic of Vietnam was the first entity in charge of the South China Sea, as a result of it occupying the Paracel Islands in the early 1950s. It was established by the decision of Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954 and since then it has become the first nation with a military presence at the Islands (post Japanese occupation). South Vietnam was at that time the strongest military power in the region, which can freely maneuver along the islands while China was still busy doing other agendas, inter alia the issue Taiwan, Tibet, as well as domestic consolidation and itself was not yet able to project its military capability down southward. But of course, it is not long until China started its diplomatic moves. In March 1957, the New China News Agency (NCNA) broadcast a condemnation upon the South Vietnam occupation over Kanchuan Island (Robert Island), island of Chinyin (Money Island) and Sanhu Island (Pattle Island) which was considered illegal. In March 1959, 82 Chinese fishermen were detained by the army of South Vietnam as it enters the area of the Paracel Islands, which triggered the protest of the Chinese Foreign Ministry that “the South Vietnam navy has openly violated China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” and reiterated that “Hsisha Islands (Paracel) is part of Chinese territory. “ This diplomatic friction is what will later flare into become the Battle of Paracels in 1974.

It was dawn at the South China Sea and the water was calm. From the northern horizon raised the shadow of an armada. Fourteen 14 Chinese warships, including four guided missile Destroyers, along with four MiG-21 and MiG-23 were spotted. In January 1974, China launched its first military operations in the South China Sea. Its mission were to take over the Paracel, and in the attack, the South Vietnamese troops were outnumbered and easily defeated in no longer than two days.

The scenario that is believed to be the truest outlined that from 16 to 18 January 1974, little skirmishes started to occur between China and

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South Vietnam. Chinese and South Vietnamese ships that started their little hide and seek game each among the small islands. This little spark culminated into a serious battle in the early morning of January 19, 1974. However, regarding who started to attack first, China and South Vietnam accused each other. The South Vietnamese troops, nevertheless, had to accept its defeat and retreated from the Paracel Islands.

Cold War incentives is said to play a role in this incident. The United States’ decision to reduce its military aid to South Vietnam due to their domestic shortcomings forced South Vietnam to adopt a policy to reduce its military forces an all fronts. With the number of troops and armaments in the South China Sea reduced, it is of no question that the Chinese government then decided to attack.

Aftermath the Unification Shortly after the Battle of Paracel, “official” source North Vietnam declared that they “thanked Beijing for protecting its territory.” Not liking what happened, Beijing responded by saying that “they were protecting their own territory. ”It was because North Vietnamese had always been the supporter of its claim, that China became surprised of the reaction. The change of stance taken by North Vietnamese signaled its sudden-awareness of the importance of the islands. Or, it’s long term plan to not giving up such critically proximity area –that was also going to be the stance of what we now called as” Vietnam,” the new Vietnam that was unified as the result of the North Vietnamese winning the Vietnam War.

In 1975, when the Vietnam War has ended, the North and South Vietnam were unified under the communist structure of the North. Having a fellow communist ally occupying the whole Vietnamese territory did not make it easier for China, since by the accession of the state to North Vietnam the greatest shore continent of mainland Southeast Asia decided to adopt an against policy towards their claim to Spratlys and Paracels.

After the unification of Vietnam, the first government delegation to China led by Le Duan

tried to talk about the sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly formally. Certainly China did not welcome this, and refused to discuss the issue. Post-unification Vietnam tried to raise the issue again in1977, and was rejected again by the government of PRC.

Vietnam then decided to be more assertive towards China. On May 1977 Hanoi fired a warning shot against the Chinese ships in the areas near the Spratly, as a result, an exchange of bullets happens between the two countries. In early 1978 a truce were agreed by the two countries, but at the end of the year it simply dissolve. Propaganda actions continued until the late 1980s, followed by the increase in military capabilities and the development of infrastructure of both nations.

In February and March 1987Vietnam and China finally began shooting each other in the area of Nansha Islands (Spratlys), which caused casualties to both sides. In the March 1988 it turned into a serious military confrontation that took place around the Chigua Jiao atoll (Johnson Reef) and the Yongshu Jiao Reef (Fiery Cross Reef). This 1988 naval conflict is one of the most severe in the history of military confrontation in the South China Sea, that it leaves a scar of historical hatred in the heat of the people of Vietnam to China. This historical hatred had in the recent decade’s triggered social rejection towards the existence of Chinese navy in the islands. It seems that it is going to be hard to put the society at rest until a solution is assured over this territorial dispute.

The Kalayaan Land and The Claims of The Philippines The Philippines started to have an eye to the islands because of a civilian’s activity, to be exact, Tomas Cloma’s, who claimed himself to have discovered “The Kalayaan Land” (“The Freedomland) which were actually the Islands of Spratlys and the surroundings, that he would give to the government of Philippines. This “discovery” has since then be the basis of Philippines’ claim. It doesn’t mean, though, that before Cloma, there has never been any response voiced by the Philippines. In the year 1946, the Philippines had once issued a

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statement through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying that “’the New Southern Islands’ (a term used by the Japanese to refer to the whole island in the South China Sea) should be given to this country (Philippines). “ Cloma’s case, however, made it evident that the Philippines, too, can argue that the islands belonged to them.

In May 15, 1956, the Philippines government received a letter from its citizen, Thomas A. Cloma, who claimed that he had found a group of islands in the South China Sea. Located about 400 kilometers west of Palawan Island, this group consisted of a total area of 64976 square nautical miles and was named “Kalayaan Land” (aka Freedomland). In the “Map of Kalayaan Land” that he drew, Cloma includes the major islands of the Spratly Islands, Itu Aba, Nam Yit, and Thitu. On May 21, 1956, Cloma sent a second letter to the government of the Philippines, trying to solicit a support for his claim. In the letter, he states that “the claim on the islands was created by a ‘citizen of the Philippines,’ not ‘the Philippine government.’” Cloma, however, seems to understand the situation revolving around the island, as he stated not only “the discovery of these islands shall bring a consequence of it being integrated to the Philippines territory” but also that “the Philippines government need to bring this claim to the United Nations. ” Based on Cloma’s clam, the Philippines claimed the Islands.

In 1971 President Ferdinand Marcos brought it more formal, by addressing “the three major issues”: First, that the presence of soldiers of Taiwan (and soldiers of any country) in the islands at the South China Sea are a “serious threat” to national security of the Philippines, because of its proximity to the national boundaries of the Philippines; Second of all, the Philippines government affirmed that the Spratly Islands is considered to be under the guardianship of the de facto power of the Allied Forces, which means that no country can station any forces without the permission of Allied Forces; and third of all, the Philippines reiterated its position in 1956 about 53 islands of “Freedomland” which before its “discovery” by Cloma are in the status of res nullius , so that it is justifiable for the Philippines to have it according to the founder’s keeper rule.

Malaysia Enters the Dispute Malaysia’s claim to some islands in the Spratlys group did not become public until December 1979, when the Kuala Lumpur published the official maps of its continental shelf. On the map, the Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef, and the Swallow Reef which are part of the Spratlys are referred to as Malaysian’s. The first two islands were also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, China, and Taiwan, the third island is claimed by all except the Philippines.

For the other claimant states Malaysia’s involvement was much of a surprise, because Malaysia had never shown any interest in the islands before. The Deputy Minister of Legal Affairs of Malaysia, however, stated on May 19, 1983 that “Malaysia’s right for the Amboyna Cay is a simple matter of geography. “ It later emerged, though, that this was not particularly true.

In 1983, Malaysia brought its claim further. On September 4 they sent their troops to occupy the Swallow Reefs. Upon this action, Vietnam immediately filed a protest. But then again the reaction of Malaysia was of course, only stating that this territory had always belonged to Malaysia.

Brunei’s Claim Brunei Darussalam, the last to enter the dispute, and the smallest of all claimants, first filed its claim in 1982. Her claim, though, was made only to the one small island of Louisa Reef. Though the claim is small, the reaction it invites was quite big. A year after Brunei’s claim, Malaysia immediately sends troops to construct a lighthouse at the reef –giving Brunei no chance of occupation, making it the only claimant states that does not have any standing army at the sea.

Brunei’s claim was therefore being seen more as a bilateral issue with Malaysia. This does not mean that Brunei have no stance over China’s claim, because it was clearly against it.

It is to be noted, though, that during the Cold War times, Brunei was still a country under British protectorate (since 1888). Therefore, we can

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Overlapping claims at the South China Sea, Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b0/South_China_Sea_claims.jpg

say that his act of foreign policy prior to its independence in December 311983 was of a British’s voice. In 1984, Brunei declared officially that Louisa Reef is a part of its EEZ and until now struggle for its plead upon this small island.

Geostrategic Value of the South China Sea

It is not an anomaly that these countries fought over South China Sea, for it possesses a great deal of importance. At this 4 million km2 area of waters, lies about 200 inhabitable islands, which may seem valueless, but actually possess great economic, strategic, political, and legal benefits. Of the most important, is its role as a shipping route. The South China Sea is one of the most im-portant sea lanes in the world, for it connects the emerging markets of East Asia, South Asia and the consumer countries of Southeast Asia, with oil-producing nations of Middle East, and also connect further shipping towards the wealthy nations of Europe and America in the Atlantic. The South China Sea is vital to the world trade and any instability in this region will bother the interest of world. We are to bear in mind that 90% of the world trade occurs via the sea lane and 45% of them occurred at the South China Sea. Countries such Japan depends a lot to the accessibility of this water, for 80% of its trading activity passes through the South China Sea. It is for this reason that the United States of America supports freedom of navigation at the sea.

(Seeing the traffic of word container as shown above, South China Sea is the most vita.)

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The Energy Potential of the South China Sea The South China Sea is estimated to have a quantity of hydrocarbons and petroleum in a significant amount. China’s Ministry of Energy predicts that of this area might hide a total number of oil as much as 213 billion barrels, with the pos-sibility of producing 1.4 - 1.9 million barrels a day. This founding is crucial to the surrounding coun-tries Southeast Asian and East Asian Countries, which energy consumption is predicted to increase steadily in the average pace of 4% in the next 20 years.

The 1991 Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas China passes the Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas, formalizing its claim to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Indonesia orga-nizes a meeting for the six claimants to the Spratly Islands to find a peaceful solution. At the meeting, China and other countries along the South China Sea agree to resolve differences peacefully and to avoid unilateral actions that would increase tension.

The 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea Responding towards the Law released by China, led by Indonesia, the ASEAN nations de-cides to set up their own position on the territorial dispute of the South China Sea. The states gathered in Manila, 22 July 1992, to lay out in the 1992 Dec-laration on the South China Sea. In the Declaration the states emphasize the necessity to resolve all sov-ereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force and urges all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.

The 1995 Mischief Reefs Incidents China and the Philippines have a conflict in Mischief Reef, signaling China’s aggression toward nations besides Vietnam in the South China Sea. In August, the Philippines and China reject the use of force to settle their disputes; the Philippines and

Vietnam negotiate a similar creed in November. This incident is said to have represented China’s stance that they are not willing to give up its sover-eignty for a better relation with Southeast Asia.

The 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration on the Code of Conduct of the South China Sea (DOC) In May 2000, Chinese and Philippine foreign ministers agree to “contribute positively to-ward the formulation and adoption of the regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” In De-cember, Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve long-standing territorial disputes over the Gulf of Tonkin. In 2002 ASEAN as a regional body started to objectify its significant role in tackling the dispute. The steps towards the creation of the Code of Conduct went further when in November China and ASEAN adopt the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea, set-ting the stage for possible commercial cooperation and long-term stability. In the future, the DOC did fuel up cooperation such as joint-exploitation at the South China Sea. However it will prove to have loopholes and in the end, a legal binding Code of Conduct should be the real target of the claim-ant states. The adoption of this Declaration of the Code of Conduct, however, signaled an increase of commitment amongst the member states to pro-mote cooperation, and in the case of China this has shown that the Chinese government is willing to work together in a more accommodative manner.

Interest of Global Actors As the South China Sea is important to the trading activity of the nations, it is of no anomaly that non-claimant states also consider it crucial and they each have their own interest. The United States has always for maintaining the freedom of naviga-tion at the sea, as stated by President Barack Obama in the latest East Asia Summit at Bali, 2011. . The United States and its western alliance has always been in full support of the regime such as Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Friendship (ZOP-FAN) as well Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) to be implemented in accordance to the creation of peace in the region,

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including the South China Sea. Australia also alleg-edly have similar interests with the U.S. in order to maintain stability at the waters, and the presence of U.S. Marines in Darwin shown enough much of the country’s commitment. Joint-training between the United States and Philippines –its alliance in the region—shows the same—despite the anxiety it had caused to China. The training is a part of Mutual Defense Agreement package. However, the agree-ment is taken into effect only when dealing with undisputed sovereign areas, opening chances for peaceful negotiation in the disputed ones. Japan also has an interest to maintain the stability for the sake of its trading lane, and India has always been for the assurance of cooperation –for it itself is drilling some oil out of the South China Sea. India had since long signed an agree-ment on oil exploitation around the Spratlys with Vietnam. India’s state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed a deal with Viet-nam’s Petro Vietnam to purchase BP’s stakes in oil and gas development in waters off the Vietnamese coast.

Legal Instrument Surrounding the South China Sea Currently the most powerful and the most relevant legal instrument when it comes to manag-ing the dispute is the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Born formally in its last version in 1982, the UNCLOS itself is a diplo-matic triumph for countries such as Indonesia, the biggest countries in the region of Southeast Asia, leading the fight of the archipelagic states in attain-ing the best interest. Article 121 in Part VIII of the UNCLOS stated that uninhabitable rocks and island is not a subject of any EEZ. This is problematic because it gives the chance for the claimant states to create installations anywhere they like without worrying about other country’s exploration and economic rights. Article 15 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea discuss the boundaries of territorial waters (12 nautical miles offshore), emphasizes the use of the principle of the median line in determining the territorial boundary line( in case the 12 nautical miles clashes), unless there are historical reasons for rights or other circumstances. Article 15 should be a basis for the settlement of the dispute. Howev-er, since the states are still debating on their historic

rights, the dispute seems to go nowhere near a solvency. Rules on the continental shelf stated that the outer limits of continental shelf shall not ex-ceed 350 nautical miles from baselines or may not exceed 100 nautical miles from the boundary line of the depth of 2500 meters isobaths. This rule sup-posedly caters the geographic reality which needs to be considered when talking about boundaries of the sea. Article 5 on the Exclusive Economic Zone specifies in the area of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea (where they have a full sovereignty upon),a state shall have a sovereign rights for exploitation and economic activity. This EEZ rules justify all the exploration done by claimant states in the South China Sea, which is not problematic if the claimants do not fight upon their territorial rights over the seas. Their thirst for sovereignty over the futures may fuel an uneasiness, which should have been pre-vented, not justified, by UNCLOS.

Current Situation

The current situation in the South China Sea shows just how difficult it is for the interna-tional community to find a solution towards this matter. Though situation is cooling down and never have any confrontation as severe as those that hap-pened in the past emerged, diplomatically, friction still exists between the claimants every time any of the states decides to take an action further. After-math the 2002 Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, it seems that the battle continues on the discussion table between the diplomats.

Aftermath the DOC The Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea supposedly contin-ued and then become a legally binding COC. But

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aftermath the DOC, that is not necessarily what happened. Process towards the creation of the COC was jammed, as China and Vietnam started to have their friction again in 2003. In two years, however, situation seems to cool off and claimant states seem to apply the agreements they have in the DOC: co-operation over conflict. Oil companies from China, Vietnam and the Philippines sign a deal in 2005 to jointly protect oil and gas resources in the Sea. Several frictions followed by uneasiness between states that later cool off were security dynamics that occurred during the next half decade. However, in the year 2011, amidst the “cooperation” and “joint-exploration” being un-dertaken, occurred another drama of which-area-belongs-to-whom. The Philippines reports that two Chinese patrol boats threatened to ram a survey ship near the Reed Bank, March China criticizes Vietnam for its offshore exploration of oil and gas in the Sea. Philippines seek U.S’s help and China is angered after the United States takes up the issue of disputes in the South China Sea at a regional forum, etc.

The 27 May Incident On 27 May 2011 an incident that would lead to a new uneasiness in between the effort for joint-cooperation. Chinese patrol boats cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship while performing an underwater survey of the South China Sea. Viet-nam accuses China of violating its sovereignty and a 1982 UN convention on the law of the sea, while China argues that Vietnam’s oil and gas operations have undermined China’s interests and rights in the area. This incident shows the loopholes of the DOC, and becoming a wakeup call for the coun-tries, to start working on a COC. In June 2011 The South China Sea dispute dominates discussion at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Vietnam confirms that it holds China responsible for the 27 May incident, while China commits itself to main-taining peace and stability in the Sea. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warns that “there will be clashes” in the Sea unless multilateral mechanisms are strengthened.

Military Measures Revolving around The Islands Military measures still revolve around the islands, signaling each countries feeling of security dilemma over the apparent projection of each other’s force. Especially after the 27 May 2011, the Southeast Asian claimant states had become more on the qui vive about China. Preparing itself for the worst by drilling itself, as well as initiating a joint-training with outside force are of the choice of the Southeast Asian claimant states

At 13th of June 2011Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea, and at28 June 2011The US and the Philippines begin routine naval drills near the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines experienced the most battle with China with the most severe lost; it is of this reason that they are the one who held these mili-tary measures most in the South China Sea. At 9th of July 2011The US, Japanese and Australian navies hold a joint drill in the South China Sea, Japan’s first joint military exercise in the territory. This has shown these external actors interest on the sea and in protecting the region for each their own sake.

The existence of outside forces, however, is no fun for China. In July 2011 American and Chinese military chiefs argue about US exercises in the South China Sea; Chinese army chief says the US military exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam were “extremely inappropriate.” The US remains committed to maintaining its presence in the Sea. At 15th of July 2011 this commitment is shown when Vietnam and the US launch a series of naval exchanges. The exercises are confined to noncom-bat training and are stressed by the US to be part of routine exchanges that were planned months in advance. China deems the timing of the exercises “inappropriate,” saying they should have been re-scheduled. With the Philippines, US began its annual marine drill at the 20th of October 2011. This drill will include a hostile beach assault exercise near the Spratlys. At the same time, a Philippine warship accidentally struck a Chinese fishing boat in near the disputed Spratly islands in the South China Sea, leading to an apology by the Philippine Navy. The United States had been an important

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Vietnamese-flagged installation at the sea, source: http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/images/stories/19541-south_china_sea.jpg

partner of the Philippines. By the time, it already had about 600 Special Operations troops in the Philippines, for the purpose of combating terrorism. Talks underway between Manila and Washington have always been potentially involving a much more extensive partnership. The “alliance” relation between both states has always been to the extent that the United States is ready to provide backup in case of emergency. Officials in the Philippines said their priority is to strengthen maritime defenses, especially near the South China Sea. They indicated a willing-ness to host American ships and surveillance aircraft. But then again the decision upon going further than joint-training and mere presence is not going to be that simple. The hope upon this dispute to be solved is still the top priority.

The strongest military presence at the South China Sea is at the time being, however, still held by China. With its nuclear-powered submarine equipped armada of the South Sea Fleet, their strength is unbearable. It is against the threat of this fleet that the Southeast Asian claimant states prepared. However, it seems that China has no intention to use this fleet for an imperialist ambition for the disputed region, at least until now.

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Chinese submarine floated at the South China Sea http://static7.businessinsider.com/image/4f1858356bb3f77e44000021-400-300/south-china-sea-is-not-the-only-thing-china-is-dealing-with.jpg

Economic Activity, Energy Explorations and its Political Challenges Due to the agreement between the states in the Declaration on the Code of Conduct, the surrounding countries not only move for better relation, but also for better cooperation. On the 27th of October 2011, Philippine and Vietnamese presidents have agreed to strengthen cooperation between their maritime forces in responding to incidents in the South China Sea. In the same month ExxonMobil announced that it discovers oil and gas off Vietnam’s central coast in an area and signalize its willingness to work together with Vietnam. However, this area falls within Chinese claims to the South China Sea, which will make it harder for the actors of this cooperation. The economic consequence of this dispute is clear: it is going to hamper the economic activity. An incident on 9 June 2011 has proven concern. Vietnam reports that a Chinese fishing boat, supported by Chinese naval patrols, cut a cable being used by a craft operated by state-run energy company Petro Vietnam. Vietnam says the ship was

operating over its continental shelf and within its exclusive economic zone. To China, though, this action is considered justifiable, for it “protects its undisputable sovereignty over the waters.”

Political hardships that challenges the future possibility of greater economic cooperation continues on as Vietnam and the Philippines have rejected China’s map of the South China Sea as a basis for joint oil and gas development. This led to another uneasiness-amidst-possible-cooperation. These political challenges can lead to possible block off towards Vietnam’s ExxonMobil cooperation and other MNC such as Russia’s Gazprom OAO (GAZP). India had also signed an agreement on oil exploitation around the Spratlys with Vietnam, and this shall be put at stake too.

China itself has started its own deep water drilling in order to obtain oil from the sea. On May 9 2012, China’s biggest offshore oil explorer, CNOOC 981 began its first-ever deep-water drilling in the South China Sea, in a

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water area just about 320 km southeast of Hong Kong. CNOOC is the country’s largest offshore oil producer and with this it is officially a capable in drilling deep water. Previously China had also opened bids to foreign companies for 19 blocks near the Paracel Islands an action in which irri-tates the Vietnamese government. CNOOC’s plan had also been released beforehand and Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry had since March 2012 said that CNOOC’s plan “violates its sovereignty.”Such po-litical response had only become a typical reaction between a claimant states every time one of them decides to stat an

exploration. No further measures are taken away and the states should be thankful for that, while trying to create a perpetual deal that would make another military skirmish undoable. However such political tension is not a good environment for economic activity, and the MNCs as the actor doing this activity in the front line is at stake. This has also adds up to the unnecessary consequences of economic actors becoming tangled in the tension.

A disputed, offshore oil-drilling installation by China. Source: http://www.southchinasea.org/images-2/11448637-4/

Social Unrest The effect of this dispute is not only political and economic, but also social. Especially after the 27 May incident, street protest emerged in Vietnam voicing its rejection towards the presence of China at the South China Sea. The protest continues on until several months later. In June 2011anti-China rallies continue in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi for a second straight weekend. More than 100 people

demonstrate against what they see as bullying behavior by Beijing. After several other tensions the demonstration emerged again in July, now in a form of peaceful march in Vietnam, where about 100 anti-China protesters denounce China. The territorial dispute at the South China Sea has also affect the society, whereas it is actually the responsibility of the states to protects them and preserve their well-being. Security at the Asia

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Pacific belongs not to the state, but to the people. On 14 July 2011 armed Chinese soldiers allegedly beat a Vietnamese fisherman and threaten other crew members before driving them out of waters near the contested Paracel Islands. This has angered Vietnamese citizen that, again, commence another street protest not long after that. Clearly these actions are but a consequence of the unsolved territorial dispute. For the sake of the

(Probe of a capsized oil tanker off southern Vietnam near the South China Sea. Source: http://www.marketplace.org/sites/marketplace.org/files/styles/primary-image-610x340/public/WWW/

data/images/repository/2011/06/17/20110617_south_china_sea_54.jpg)

Hopes for a Better Relations and Efforts for a Peaceful Settlement of Dispute After the 27 May incident China seemed to go diplomatically bold and the frustrated Vietnam and China seek the help from the United States and its alliance. At 27th June 2011 the US Senate unanimously passes a resolution condemning China’s use of force in the South China Sea, urging a peaceful, multilateral solution. China rejects the resolution, saying that the disputes should only be resolved through negotiations between claimants and maintaining that it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the entire Sea. China never was willing to let any external actors to meddle around this dispute, yet ASEAN’s maneuver seems to make it impos-

sible for external powers not to help out.

At 6th of July 2011 the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario decides to take it bilateral and visits China to seek a diplomatic solu-tion. Del Rosario calls for the dispute to go before a UN tribunal, but China rejects the proposal. The two countries agree “not to let the maritime dis-putes affect the broader picture of friendship and cooperation of the two countries.” This has shown us how the stance of some country in this dispute, more evidently China, is easily changed.

Philippines are at this time the one that is most assertive in managing the dispute. The

society, such action has to be made impossible and the ARF members are responsible for that.

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proposing its own proposal of conflict prevention, Philippines confidently stated that China’s refusal to allow a UN-backed tribunal to rule on the territorial dispute indicates that Beijing’s claim stands on shaky legal ground. At the 25th of July 2011Maritime and legal experts from Southeast Asia meet in Manila for two days to discuss the Philippine’s proposal for conflict prevention over disputed territory in the South China Sea, trying to see whether such proposal would work in the current environment between states.

In September 201 Philippine President Benigno Aquino III visited China, with trade and investment at the top of the agenda. The two countries signed a five-year plan to boost trade six-fold to $60 billion and promote tourism and language training. Aquino also sought to repair bilateral relations as tensions have increased over the South China Sea.

Despite its past incident, Vietnam decides to open up a chance for a better cooperation with China. In October 2011China and Vietnam held talks about control of disputed islands in potentially oil-rich waters claimed by both nations. China and Vietnam has been building stronger political relationship with some high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to raise spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. Both sides signed an agreement that seeks a peaceful resolution for the dispute by maintaining direct communications between the leaders of both countries

External actors such as Japan did not remain silence. At 18th of October 2011Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba proposed a multilateral framework to settle maritime disputes in the South China Sea during a tour of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, with China reiterating that it wants to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea through talks between nations that are directly involved, rather than involving other countries. With this current condition chances for a better relation can actually be strengthened.

This better relation can also be strived through a better economic relation. In October 2011, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. February 2012, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries. Even if it is seems smooth cruising now, there could be bumpy road ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. In addition, China’s new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

The 2011 East Asia Summit The East Asia Summit marked the diplomatic struggle of the developing countries in East Asia and surrounding, led, actually, by Southeast Asia in making their voice to be heard. Indonesia closed the last moments of its prospectus leadership during its ASEAN Chairmanship by hosting the momentous East Asia Summit in Bali. As momentous as it is, for the case of the South China Sea, it remained another diplomatic forum where the talks upon the issue brought uneasiness that could cause discomfort in working with each other.

During the East Asia conference, the US and ASEAN countries aligned to effectively pressure China on their claims to hold “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Seas. In spite of Chinese warnings not to bring up the issue, 16 of the 18 nations spoke out on the question of territorial rights, putting China on the defensive. When it came for his turn to speak, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao appeared to acknowledge the concerns of ASEAN countries. Even so, creating a real answer for the concern is another heavy task. The East Asia Summit has helped the member states for gaining support in solving this dispute from a wider international community. However making it work after con-sidering their voices is another case, and ASEAN Regional Forum as the only security forum living up the ASEAN and Asia Pacific’s dream to main-tain a region of security, peace, and stability, is to be up to it.

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Leaders held hand in at ARF summit in 2011. Source: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/21/a_step_forward_then_a_step_back_in_south_china_sea_dispute

Past Result of the ASEAN Regional Forum Regarding the South China Sea Dispute:

The 18th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bali, July 2011 The South China Sea dispute is a key topic of discussion at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali. In the Regional Forum, progress is deemed to have been made. China and ASEAN established a deal to create a set of guidelines for future negotiations to establish a “code of conduct” as a “first step” towards a more sweeping, binding code of conduct. Chinese Foreign minister Yang Jiechi has told claimants that “freedom of navigation in the region is guaranteed,” as China has sought to keep the US out of direct negotiations on the region.

The 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Hanoi, July 2010 In this meeting the Ministers stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and reaffirmed the continuing importance of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. The Ministers encouraged efforts towards the full implementation of the Declaration and the

eventual conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). They encouraged self-restraint by all the parties and to keep on promoting of confidence-building measures. They welcomed the reconvening of the ASEAN - China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC in Viet Nam in April 2010 and scheduled to hold the next Joint Working Group Meeting in China before the end of 2010.

The 16th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Phuket, 23 July 2009 The Member States of looked forward to the eventual conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and welcomed their commitment to resolving disputes by the DOC recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The 15th ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 24 July 2008 The member states reiterated the hope that ASEAN and China would expeditiously conclude the Guidelines on the Implementation of the DOC.

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The 14th ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 2 Augst 2007 The Ministers reaffirmed the DOC and acknowledged that the Declaration had been effec-tive in building mutual trust and confidence among the claimants.

The 13th ASEAN Regional Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 28 July 2006 The Ministers welcomed the steps taken by ASEAN and China towards the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) including the convening of the two Working Group Meetings which were held in Manila, Philippines and Hainan, China in August 2005 and February 2006 respectively. The Ministers noted the ASEAN-China SOM on the implementation of the DOC, in Siem Reap, Cambodia on 30 May 2006 to accelerate the implementation of the DOC. The Ministers expressed their hope that with the implementation of the DOC, ASEAN and China would move towards the eventual adoption of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea

The 11th Meeting of ASEAN Regional Fo-rum, Jakarta, 2 July 2004 The Ministers welcomed the proposal of ASEAN and China to convene a Senior Officials’ Meeting under the DOC and establish an ASEAN China Working Group that will oversee the implementation of the Declaration in spirit and letter.

The 10th Meeting of ASEAN Regional Fo-rum, Phnom Penh, 18 June 2003 The Ministers welcomed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which ASEAN and China signed in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002. They expressed their confi-dence that efforts made by ASEAN and China in compliance with the Declaration’s provisions and commitments would contribute valuably to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific and would help create the conditions for the peaceful settle-ment of the disputes in the South China Sea.

The 8th ASEAN Regional Forum, Ha Noi, 25 July 2001 The Ministers noted that the situation in Southeast Asia on the whole has been peaceful and stable. The Ministers exchanged views on the recent developments in the South China Sea and welcomed the progress in the consultations between ASEAN and China to develop a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The Ministers encouraged of self-restraint by all countries concerned and the promotion of confidence-building measures in this area, and welcomed the commitment of countries concerned to resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area.

The 7th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 27 July 2000 The Ministers welcomed dialogue and consultations, particularly dialogue in the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations, the exchange of views in the ARF, as well us in the Informal Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.

The 6th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July 1999 The Ministers welcomed the commitment of all the countries concerned to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea. They stressed the importance of freedom of navigation in this area. The Ministers noted that some ARF countries were concerned that there could be increased tensions. They further welcomed the dialogue in the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations, the regular exchange of views in the ARF, and the continuing work of the Informal Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, which have enhanced confidence building. They noted that ASEAN was working on a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

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The 5th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 27 July 1998 The Ministers welcomed the commitment of all the countries concerned to the peaceful settlement of the dispute on the South China Sea, in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, including the UNCLOS. The Ministers expressed satisfaction on the continued exercise of self-restraint by all the Countries concerned and noted the positive contributions made by the bilateral consultations between the countries concerned, the dialogue in the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations, the regular exchange of views in the ARF, and the continuing work of the Informal Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.

The 4th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Subang Jaya, 27 July 1997 On the South China Sea, the Ministers welcomed the efforts by countries concerned to seek solutions by peaceful means and the exercise of self-restraint. The Ministers also noted the positive contributions made by the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in South China Sea.

The 3rd Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 23 July 1996 The Meeting welcomed the efforts by countries concerned to seek solutions by peaceful means in accordance with international law. The Meeting also noted the positive contributions made by the Workshop Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.

The 2nd Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, August 1995 This meeting reaffirmed their commitment to the principles contained in relevant international laws and convention, and the ASEAN’s 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea.

Bloc PositionsASEAN Nations ASEAN leaders found it harder to reach some common ground on how to approach resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III urged the group’s nations to draft a code of conduct on how to resolve competing claims in the waters, which have heated up in the past year. The Philippines and Vietnam allege that Chinese naval vessels have harassed oil-exploration vessels working in what United Nations maritime laws define as these countries’ domestic economic zones. Under the Philippine plan, which was backed by Vietnam, ASEAN would present its proposal to China for further discussion. The two countries are the two most disadvantaged countries due to China’s behavior and claim. In the past, military confrontation with China has brought about historic trauma, making the two countries most threatened. This has made the two countries most dire in making the COC realized.

Malaysia, on the other hand, has taken a relatively relaxed view of the current situation in the South China Sea, at least officially. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak sounded remarkably upbeat considering the spike in tensions. Delivering the conference’s keynote speech, he declared that Malaysia did not feel threatened by China. Brunei has maintained a low-profile stance on the issue and stressed it should be settled through mutual consultation. However it is of no question that all these countries do not recognized China’s claims, nor each other. This, and the fact that each claimant states gives different reaction, shows that the claimant states does not have a common ground with regards to this dispute.

Indonesia and the others, on the side of the non-claimant Southeast Asia, have had relatively the same problem. Since the issue of the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992, Indonesia had been practicing what can be seen as a leadership role in the effort to solve the dispute.

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It has the advantage of neutrality, though it is actually siding with the interest of ASEAN as a regional body. Indonesia is very concerned about putting the dispute to an end. In July 2011ndonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono expresses frustration over the drawn-out nature of the talks and urges foreign ministers to accelerate negotiations and finalize guidelines. During its recent chairmanship in 2011 it has manage to lead China and the rest of the claimant states to agree on a Guideline of the implementation of the DOC. In the 2012, however, this effort should be led by Cambodia, the next to lead the region. However countries like Cambodia, and Myanmar, are close allies of China. Both receive significant number of economic aid from China, Cambodia itself is going to double its bilateral trade this year. Therefore, both seem to have to rethink its South China Sea policy towards Chinacarefully. Countries like Thailand, Singapore, Laos, etc., are seem to be waiting prudently in dormant. Nevertheless, ASEAN countries always try to stick together when it comes to trying to solve this dispute.

China China is the largest claimant state of this dispute, both by the total area of its own and by the total area it claims. China is also the owner of the biggest military power between all claimant states. Strong China’s stance is clear: indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea. However, ASEAN’s never-ending effort to push the implementation of the international rules challenges the sovereignty. Making notes of the current better relation with ASEAN, China maintains a more accommodative manner; though keeping its sovereignty at the sea is still a top priority. In terms of looking for a solution, China maintains that the territorial disputes should be resolved bilaterally and should not be referred to multilateral forums. Therefore China criticized certain ASEAN members for “internationalizing” the dispute by raising the issue at regional security forums such as the ARF.

United States and Allies US policy toward the South China Sea has been relatively consistent since the mid-1990s and was reiterated by Secretary of State Clinton at the ARF last year: America has a “national interest” in freedom of navigation, does not take sides on com-peting claims, opposes the use of force or threat to use force, and supports a peaceful resolution of the dispute based on international law. However, as tensions have ramped up since 2007, senior administration officials have voiced concern about growing instability in the South China Sea, and the potential damage it could cause to US economic and strategic interests. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2010, for instance, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the dispute as “an area of growing concern” for America, while Clinton called the South China Sea “pivotal” to regional security. India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the SCS. The SCS is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55% of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the SCS. Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to Mangalore through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region. To countries such as Russia, India, and some other Western European countries which MNCs are drilling in this area, stability of the region access to the sea are also important.

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Timeline of Significant Events

November 2011Indonesia held the East Asia Summit where the countries express each of its own vision to the region, including on the case of the South China Sea.

25 July 2011Maritime and legal experts from Southeast Asia meet in Manila for two days to discuss a Philippine proposal for conflict prevention over disputed territory in the South China Sea. 25 July 2011In the ASEAN Regional Forum China and ASEAN established a deal to create a set of guidelines for future negotiations to establish a “code of conduct.”

19 July 2011The South China Sea dispute discussed at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali, no significant result created.

15 July 2011Vietnam and the US launch a series of naval exchanges. 3 July 2011About 100 anti-China protesters march peacefully in Vietnam, denouncing China’s actions in the Sea, despite a heavy security clampdown.

28 June 2011The US and the Philippines begin routine naval drills near the South China Sea.

18 June 2011The US and Vietnam jointly call for freedom of navigation and rejects the use of force in the South China Sea.

13 June 2011Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea. Anti-China protests break out in Hanoi.

27 May 2011Chinese patrol boats cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship while performing an underwater survey of the South China Sea.

13 April 2011The Philippines states that Beijing’s stance on the disputed areas in the Sea has no basis under international law

28 March 2011The Philippines announces its increase in air and naval patrols and its plans to upgrade an airstrip on an island it occupies in the South China Sea.

4 March 2011The Philippines reports that two Chinese patrol boats threatened to ram a survey ship near the Reed Bank.

23 July 2010China is angered after the United States takes up the issue of disputes in the South China Sea at a regional forum.

March 2005Oil companies from China, Vietnam and the Philippines sign a deal to jointly protect oil and gas resources in the Sea.

May2003Vietnam issues a “sovereignty” declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam has rights to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

November 2002China and ASEAN adopt the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea, setting the stage for possible commercial cooperation and long-term stability.

1995China and the Philippines have a conflict in Mischief Reef, signaling China’s aggression toward nations besides Vietnam in the South China Sea.

1994China distributes a map claiming the entire South China Sea, including all the Spratly Islands.

1992China lands forces on Da Ba Dau reef near Vietnam’s claims in Sin Cowe East, triggering a small military skirmish between the two powers; ASEAN issued the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea.

1991China passes the Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas, formaliz-ing its claim to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

1988China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Spratly Islands in March.

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QARMAS Seeing the development of the dispute, how to best find a solution towards this problem? Seeing that the ASEAN states have gone as far as the creation of the Guidelines on Implementing the Declaration of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, how far should we go beyond that? Should the ARF push for the creation of the Regional Code of Conduct of Parties? Or shall it wait for sake of a betterment of relation between member states? But if the ARF waits, how can we ever solve this dispute?

Knowing that generally the table is divided between those who will want this sea to be legally incorporated in her area, those who will want this sea to be divided as each claimant’s territorial waters, and those who will want it to legally be an international water, how should we deal with the status of the sea – shall there be any legal binding Code of Conduct?

Is a legal binding Code of Conduct the best answer towards this problem? For if the delegates decided yes, a proper dispute settlement mechanism is going to be needed in ASEAN, as well as an instrument to “enforce” the law. More importantly, then, is “law enforcing” in line with “ASEAN Way” that has been practiced inside this region? If not, then how can we make sure that the COC, shall there be any, is going to be implemented effectively? Is there any ASEAN Way in making the states comply?

Knowing that UNCLOS is on the table as the only international law with regards the sea, how can we best use it for our interest to solve this dispute? UNCLOS has been regularly quoted in the statement regarding the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting. But then again, how can we really implement it?

How shall we deal with the reality that half of the current world trade depends on the sea? How shall we deal with all the current exploration in this energy-rich sea? And all the current military measures that is being conducted at the sea? Of course, shall the status of the sea changed, or being divided, consequences will come and the ASEAN Regional Forum needs to think best of every country’s interest, in order for the region to be kept at peace.

1978Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos claims the entire territory as part of the Philippines, redrawing the country’s map.

1976North and South Vietnam unify.

1975South Vietnam occupies part of the Spratly Islands.

1974In January, Chinese military units seize islands in theParacels, occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and China claims sovereignty over the Spratlys.

1951Japan renounces all rights to the Spratly Islands. No resolution is made on who owns them.

1947The Philippines claims some of the eastern Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Reef.

1946China declares the Spratlys as part of Guangdong province.

1939The Spratly Islands are invaded and occupied by Japan during the Second World War.

1885China officially claims all the Spratly Islands.

200-300BCChina first discovers the Spratly Islands and other islands in the South China Sea, and begins to occupy and govern them.

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Suggestions for Further Research The delegates are to keep in mind that, though the study guide has given its substantive best to make the delegates understand the problem, there are many other ways for the delegate to get a better grip of the issue. First of all, you are advised to research over your own country’s stance, as the delegates needs to be aware that a good delegate is a good diplomat each of their own country. The study guide may have focus more on countries that are claimants in this issue, because of its responsibility to make sure you comprehend the matter. However, it doesn’t mean that other members of the ARF are not significant, and therefore it is up to you to find this significance.

Second of all, you are urged to download all the important documents related to this territorial dispute in order to totally get the past decision they have made. We are more than assured that China’s Law on the Territorial Waters and its Contiguous Zone 1991, the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties at the South China Sea are available at the internet. Do understand them, and please blow our mind with your comprehension on these past documents at the committee session.

Lastly, you are advised to go to the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN website, to have a better grip upon the forum, its ideal, and its mother body. Don’t forget to download the ASEAN Charter and the Terms of Reference of the ARF available on the site. It will give you a perspective about the “ASEAN Way,” how it is actually wished to be implemented, and how it is actually embodied in the fundamental elementary of this institution.

Closure The ASEAN Regional Forum is a triumph of the developing nations, a commitment of the developed nations, and a mutual attempt for both to maintain peace and stability in the region. Asia Pacific is the host of both the most prospectus nations as well as the most war-prone ones. It requires an undying, continuous, and integrated effort of all nations within to disband the latter and realize the first. As the only forum of security issue that lasted already for almost two decades. It is up to the ASEAN Regional Forum to settle the dispute once and for all and bring peaceful tides to the South China Sea.

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Sources-------,’Atlas of Military History’,Collins (2004)

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