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As old as history: Family-controlled

business groups in transport services:

the case of SEUR Elena San Romána, Paloma Fernández pérezb & Águeda Gil Lópeza

a Departamento de Historia e Instituciones Económicas II,Facultad de CCEE y EE, Campus de Somosaguas, Madrid, Spainb Departament d'Història i Institucions Econòmiques/Centred'Estudis Antoni de Capmany, Facultat Economia i Empresa,Barcelona, SpainPublished online: 16 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Elena San Román, Paloma Fernández pérez & Águeda Gil López , BusinessHistory (2014): As old as history: Family-controlled business groups in transport services: the case

of SEUR, Business History, DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2013.851523

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As old as history: Family-controlled business groups in transportservices: the case of SEUR

Elena San Romana*, Paloma Fernandez Perezb and Agueda Gil Lopeza

a Departamento de Historia e Instituciones Econo micas II, Facultad de CCEE y EE, Campus de

Somosaguas, Madrid, Spain; b

Departament d’Historia i Institucions Economiques/Centre d’Estudis Antoni de Capmany, Facultat Economia i Empresa, Barcelona, Spain

This article presents empirical evidence about the contribution of family-controlled

business groups as highly efficient alternatives to the large vertically integrated andprofessionally managed corporation in specific institutional and market environments.This hypothesis is tested with a single case study, SEUR, in the Spanish transportservices sector. SEUR is one of the most prominent Spanish courier companies. It wasfounded during Franco’s dictatorship, expanded in democratic times, andimaginatively adapted to the financial challenges of the late globalisation at the endof the twentieth century, while maintaining the traditional values based on personaltrust and family ties.

Keywords: family business; business groups; network business groups; expresstransport; Spanish business history

Introduction

Late developing economies have had a perfect market and institutional environment for

business groups, as a number of authors have indicated for many European, Asian, and

Latin American countries.1 Following these authors, business groups have often helped to

correct market imperfections, have shown strong executive skills, and have enjoyed the

frequent support of authoritarian governments, thus constituting an alternative to the big

Chandlerian corporation. Their organisation, in a diversity of independent firms linked by

formal or informal ties, has yielded some experiences of business success, depending on

the stage of development of the sectors and the markets in which they have operated in past

and present times, and on the strict or flexible regulations affecting their activities

throughout their history.

Business groups are increasingly a subject of study in peripheral European countries

like Spain, where their ownership and governance structures are often under the control of

families and dynasties. Some significant studies for Spain are those by Valdaliso on the

Aznar family, Dıaz Morlan on the Ybarras family, Fernandez Perez on the Moreda Riviere

Trefilerias group, and San Roman on the Fierros.2 As Josep Tapies, an expert in Spanish

family business groups, observed after his research on around 3000 large Spanish firms,

this kind of entrepreneurial organisation is common in Spain.3 According to this literature,

business groups in Spain are not a brand new type of business organisation. They haveexisted at least since the beginning of the industrialisation period, in the late nineteenth

q 2014 Taylor & Francis

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Business History, 2014

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century, in capital-intensive sectors where foreign and public capital dominated. Also,

business groups have been present throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, in

less technologically intensive sectors such as light metal processing, where private local

initiatives proliferated. This general framework was reinforced after the civil war of

1936–39, with the backward-looking economic policy of Franco’s dictatorship (1939–

75), and continued – with very different rules of the game – with the outward-lookingpolicies of democratic governments which integrated Spanish institutions in the European

Economic Community after 1986.

This article contributes to analysing how business groups may appear, expand, and

succeed during very different institutional frameworks, whether authoritarian and

democratic, as a response to new demands in expanding dynamic markets. Moreover, we

present theoretical arguments which reinforce the idea that in different institutional and

market environments this type of business group may represent highly efficient

alternatives to the large vertically integrated and professionally managed corporation.

This hypothesis is tested with a single case study, SEUR, in the transport services

sector. This appeared in Franco’s time, expanded during democracy, and adaptedimaginatively to the financial challenges of the late globalisation at the end of

the twentieth century, while maintaining traditional values based on personal trust and

family ties.

This case study approach has been chosen for two reasons. First, most of the leading

courier groups in the world are large, integrated Chandlerian companies, whereas the

business group of SEUR has been able to avoid that type of organisation, and become one

of the most important courier groups of companies in Spain, with 6600 employees, a fleet

of 3700 vehicles for road transport and a turnover of e558 million in 2011. Secondly,

SEUR is a business group that is not controlled by a single family or a reduced group of

families, as is often the case in large business groups in Asia or Latin America. The grouphas operated with more than 50 business-owning families, which leads us to classify this

group as a network-type business group, according to Colpan and Hikino’s classification: a

constellation of legally independent companies that cooperate for common long-term

goals.4 SEUR was not, and is not, a group controlled by a single family, but several family-

controlled firms organised in a rather cooperative horizontal way. The different families

divided the operations of the business according to geographical criteria. Each of them was

made responsible for promoting the business in one or several Spanish Autonomous

Communities. The partners were family, relatives or friends who shared very similar

values and social backgrounds. Trust, solidarity and entrepreneurship were the key ties

that made them start activities in a sector where they lacked any previous significant know-

how or experience. Literature has reinforced the importance of social networks in the

foundation and development of business groups.5 Networking between individuals who

share similar values and the same social background is a business strategy that has

historically allowed business survival under uncertain environments, as in the case of

SEUR.6 As Powell showed in a seminal work on network businesses, trust, institutional

and social context with particular combinations of legal, political or economic factors are

willing supporters of network forms.7 This article reinforces the reasons that Powell

pointed out as the main factors that foster the creation of network business groups.

Courier transport was a relatively new niche market in Spain in the 1960s, and the

general restrictions on foreign investment in Spain during Franco’s regime made them

flourish and grow spectacularly in the 1970s and 1980s. After a failed attempt to go publicon the Spanish stock market in 2000, the French group GeoPost bought a part of SEUR in

2 E. San Roma n



T a b l e 1 .

C o u r i e r g l o b a l m a r k e t : m a i n c o m p a n i e s i n 2 0 1 1 .

C o m p a n i e s

D e u t s c h e

P o s t - D H L

U P S

F e d E x

T N T

U S

P o s t a l

S e r v i c e

L a P o s t e

P

o s t e I t a l i a n e

T y p e o f

c o m p a n y

P r i v a t e l y h e l d c o r -

p o r a t i o n . F o r m e r

p u b l i c c o m p a n y

p r i v a t i s e d

P r i v a t e l y h e l d

c o r p o r a t i o n .





I n d

e p e n d e n t

f e d

e r a l a g e n c y

P u b l i c c a p i t a l

c o r p o r a t i o n

P

u b l i c c a p i t a l

c

o r p o r a t i o n

D a t e o f

e s t a b l i s h

m e n t

1 9 6 9

1 9 0 7

1 9 7 1

1 9 4 6

1 7 7 5

1 5 7 6

1

8 6 2

N a m e o f

f o u n d e r ( s ) A d r i a n D e l b e y ,

L a r r y H i l l b l o m ,

R o b e r t L y n n

J a m e s E .

C a s e y

F r e d e r i c k W

. S m i t h K e n T h o m a s

U S

A ( B e n j a m i n

F r a

n k l i n

i n i t i a t i v e )

F r e n c h s t a t e

I

t a l i a n s t a t e

M a i n a c t i v i t i e s

E x p r e s s , F r e i g h t ,

G l o b a l f o r w a r d i n g

a n d s u p p l y c h a i n

D o m e s t i c p a c k a g e

( t i m e - d e fi n i t e

d e l i v e r i e s ) , I n t e r -

n a t i o n a l p a c k a g e ,

S u p p l y c h a i n a n d

f r e i g h t

E x p r e s s , R o

a d w a y

P a c k a g e , F r e i g h t ,

S u p p l y c h a i n a n d

s e v e r a l d o c u

m e n t

m a n a g e m e n t s e r -

v i c e s

N a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r -

n a t i o n a l e x p r e s s

d e l i v e r y , F r e i g h t ,

S p e c i a l h a n d l i n g

s e r v i c e s a n d

i n d u s t r y s o l u t i o n s

D o m e s t i c ,

e x p

r e s s a n d

p r i o r i t y m a i l ,

P a r c e l p o s t ,

M e

d i a m a i l a n d

l i b r a r y m a i l

M a i l , P a r c e l ,

E x p r e s s , B a n k -

i n g a n d r e t a i l

o u t l e t s

M

a i l , B a n k i n g ,

E

x p r e s s d e l i v -

e

r y , L o g i s t i c s ,

P

a r c e l s a n d

p

h i l a t e l y

M a i n m a

r k e t s

E u r o p e

A m e r i c a

A m e r i c a

E u r o p e

U S

A

E u r o p e

E

u r o p e

P l a c e i n

r a n k i n g

G l o b a l F

o r t u n e 5 0 0

9 3

1 6 6

2 6 1

–

1 0 9

3 0 6

3

2 9

H o m e c o

u n t r y

G e r m a n y a n d U S A

U S A

U S A

A u s t r a l i a

U S

A

F r a n c e

I

t a l y ( c o n t i n u e d )

Business History 3



T a b l e 1 .

( C o n t i n u e d ) .

C o m p a n i e s

D e u t s c h e

P o s t - D H L

U P S

F e d E x

T N T

U S

P o s t a l

S e r v i c e

L a P o s t e

P

o s t e I t a l i a n e

E m p l o y e

e s

4 1 8 , 9 4 6

4 0 0 , 6 0 0

2 4 5 , 1 0 9

1 6 0 , 3 9 1

6 2 7 , 7 9 8

2 7 6 , 5 5 5

1

4 9 , 7 0 3

R e v e n u e

s

( $ m i l l i o

n )

7 1 , 1 2 0 . 9

4 9 , 5 4 5

3 4 , 7 3 4

1 1 , 3 2 9

6 7 , 0 5 2

3 1 , 3 7 7 . 8

2

8 , 9 2 2 . 2

P r o fi t s ( $ m i l l i o n )

3 , 3 6 5 . 5

3 , 4 8 8

1 , 1 8 4

6 6 0

2 8

, 5 0 5

7 2 8 . 5

1

, 3 4 8 . 2

A s s e t s ( $ m i l l i o n )

5 0 , 6 6 6 .

6

3 3 , 5 9 7

2 4 , 9 0 2

–

2 4 , 3 2 6

2 4 9 , 8 9 1 . 6

1

2 8 , 4 3 4 . 6

S t o c k h o l d e r s ’

e q u i t y ( $

m i l l i o n )

1 4 , 1 0 2 . 6

7 , 9 7 9

1 3 , 8 1 1

–

2 1

3 , 8 7 3

5 , 9 9 0 . 7

5

, 8 8 0 . 8

P r o fi t s a s % o f

( a ) R e

v e n u e s

5

7

3

–

2 1

3

2

3

3

. 5

( b ) A s

s e t s

6 . 6

1 0 . 4

4 . 8

–

2 3

5

2

1 . 3

7

. 3

S o u r c e : G

l o b a l F o r t u n e 5 0 0 ( 2 0 1 1 ) .

4 E. San Roma n



2004. Nowadays GeoPost owns 56.20% of the company. The remainder is held by the

founding family firms.

This article is divided into four sections. The first gives a brief overview of courier

activity, describing the main global actors and its historical evolution. The second part

examines the internal structure of the Spanish courier market. The third deals with the

history of SEUR: its foundation and expansion and its configuration as a network-typebusiness group. The fourth and last section focuses on the reasons that explain the

configuration of SEUR as a business group and the advantages and disadvantages of this

form of organisation.

1. The courier market in the Western world

The courier and express industry includes the provision of value-added, door-to-door

transport and deliveries of next-day or time-definite shipments across the globe.8 These

activities have a remarkable influence on the global economy. The contribution of the

express industry to European GDP reached e23 billion in 2010, supporting over 600,000 jobs.9

If we focus on ownership, there are three types of company in the express market:

private companies, public postal operators (in which express activities are part of their

core business), and, finally, companies that are the result of mergers between postal

operators and private firms. In the first group, the North American groups UPS and FedEx

are the most prominent.10 The United States Postal Service (USPS), the French firm La

Post or the Italian one Poste Italiana are outstanding examples of the second

group. Finally, Deutsche Post-DHL and TNT belong to the last group.11 Table 1 shows

the main economic data of these quoted firms in 2011 and some historical information

about each of them.

The express industry came into existence at the beginning of the last century, when the

rapid growth of global markets and world trade extended the demand for carrier services.

At that time a niche market was formed in freight transport, untouched by the public postal

operators. The first private companies were created in the United States to satisfy

increased demand for private and fast courier services. As Table 2 shows, the three top

companies that currently lead the global express mark et come from the US. The table

includes TNT as the fourth leading company in 2009.12

In this first stage, the economic role of entrepreneurship is highlighted in all cases and

the entrepreneurs founded companies capable of facing the growing demand for fast and

reliable transport services. However, there were different ideas about how to develop an

express delivery service and different economic means to achieve it. Four outstandingexamples are representative of the diversity. First, Jim Casey, who founded UPS in Seattle

Table 2. Market shares of the main carriers, by geographic area in 2009 (%).

America Western EuropeEastern Europe,

Middle East and Africa Asia Pacific

DHL 16 37 46 34FEDEX 57 10 – 21UPS 24 23 9 10

TNT – 16 12 –Others 3 14 23 18

Source: DBK , ‘Sectores’ (2011).

Business History 5



when he was 19, with only $100 loaned by a friend. His company concentrated on

delivering ground-based parcels of a weight above the limit reserved by law for the US

Postal Service. A different business model was TNT, founded by Ken Thomas when he

was 33. All his capital was a small amount of money and a single truck. It was an

Australian-based company which sought to dominate the small Australian domestic

market, then tried to break into new European and American markets. In a third example,the founder of FedEx, Fred Smith, while at Yale University wrote an essay highlighting the

need for a ‘next-day’ delivery service in the United States.13 The idea seemed so absurd to

the academic world that the essay received a low mark. Despite this, Smith kept his idea in

mind and, while serving in the Army, learned carefully how the military delivery process

was developed. When he finished his military service, he achieved his dream of creating a

business that did not exist: a night express courier service. In this case the start-up capital

was greater than that used by his above-mentioned competitors: $80 million provided by

several investors, including his brothers. This capital allowed the company to develop an

innovative organisational method based on three concepts: (i) night air transport, (ii)

operation based in a central platform for distributing documents and parcels, (iii) and atracking system for monitoring deliveries in real time.

Finally, in a fourth example of diversity in this new business, Adrian Dalsey, Larry

Hillblom and Robert Lynn, founders of DHL, also developed a new business model shortly

after their graduation. They launched a service that no other company offered because they

managed to reduce the time spent in customs procedures. Their business idea was oriented

to an international service based on time-sensitive, low-weight but high-value goods,

especially documents, trying to take advantage of world trade and economic globalisation.

In a short time, the international courier leaders began to diversify and grow, starting

the second stage of courier history. They offered new services in addition to express

transport, ranging from integrated logistics, national and international transport of full orpartial loads, air and ocean freight services, insurance and consulting, among others. At

41%

77%

50%

12%

36%

15%

44%

57%

13%

32%

21%

50%

35%

F r a n c e

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

K i n g d o m

S p a i n

I t a l y

S w e d e n

N e t h e r l a n d s

P o l a n d

S w i t z e r l a n d

R u s s i a

T u r k e y

B e l g i u m

I r e l a n d

Figure 1. Joint market share of leading express carriers, by European countries, in 2010. Note: Thecompanies included are: DHL, UPS, FedEx, TNT, GLS/Royal Mail and DPD/GeoPost. Source: A.T.Kearney (2011b).

6 E. San Roma n



this stage, which lasted throughout the last quarter century, some public postal operators

began to work in a market that presented, at this moment, great opportunities for profit. For

example, in 1999 the French public postal operator La Poste entered the courier business

by creating GeoPost.

The third stage of courier history began with the twenty-first century. The

liberalisation and globalisation of the European express industry, and the changes incommunication technologies led to a broad transformation of postal services. As a mature

economic sector, the express industry began a process of supply concentration and

strategic partnership.14 The large operators launched numerous mergers and acquisitions

of companies whereby they strengthened their market share, their geographical coverage

and their portfolio of services. Through these operations, the multinationals have tried to

seek and conquer new emerging markets by the acquisition of host firms. In recent years,

Asian and Latin American markets are the favourite destinations for investors.

As a result, the sector concentration has not stopped growing. Figure 1 indicates the

market shares of the large international operators in the European express market. As the

figure shows, the leading carriers control the main European markets, with an average jointshare of 45% in 2011b.15

2. The Spanish courier market: business structure

The Spanish courier industry is formed by a large number of companies, mostly small in

size: in 2010 6045 firms operated in this market as stated on the website of the Spanish

National Statistics Institute.16

Although large foreign multinational groups operate in Spain, a few large Spanish-

based companies dominate the market. As Table 3 shows, from 2004 to 2010 five

companies hold an average 40% of the market. All these companies, SEUR, MRW, Nacex,

Chronoexpres and DHL Iberia, share its Spanish origins except the last one.17 Table 4

summarises some characteristics of these five market leaders.

What are the main features of the express carriers that work in the Spanish courier

market? In broad terms, there are five types of firms according to their ownership and

origin, as seen in Table 5: (i) subsidiaries of foreign companies, (ii) Spanish firms acquired

by foreign multinationals, (iii) Spanish companies that have evolved from ordinary

transport to courier, (iv) Spanish firms that were established to operate on courier

Table 3. Market share of the top five companies in the Spanishcourier sector, 2004–10.

Year Share (in %)

2004 41.42005 40.12006 40.22007 40.52008 41.22009 43.52010 44.3

Note: Figures are from the business parcel market segment. (It is usual todistinguish two segments in the courier sector: business parcel and industrial

parcel. The former includes activities with a greater component of emergencyand deliveries of lightweight goods. The second one is usually related toregular and scheduled shipments especially to industrial companies.)Source: A.T. Kearney (2011a).

Business History 7



T a b l e 4 .

M a j o r e x p r e s s c a r r i e r s i n t h e S p

a n i s h m a r k e t .

N a m e

D a t e o f

E s t a b l i s h m e n t

F o u n d e r

D e l e g a t i o n s i n

S p a i n ( o w n a n

d

c o l l a b o r a t o r s )

F l e e t ( t r u c k s

a n d d e l i v e r y

v e h i c l e s )

A i r c r a f

t fl e e t

S a l e s

2 0 0 9 a

S a l e s

2 0 1 0 a

I n t e r n a t i o n a l

p a r t n e r s

S E U R

1 9 4 2

J u s t o Y u ´ f e r a

M o r e t h a n 1 0 0 0

3 7 0 0

–

5 6 9

5 6 9

G e o P o s t ( 5 5 % )

M R W

1 9 7 7

F r a

n c i s c o

M a

r t ı ´ n F r ı ´ a s

6 2 1

3 0 0 0

8 b

5 8 5 . 8

5 6 3

N o

D H L E x

p r e s s

I b e r i a

2 0 0 3

I n t e g r a t i o n o f

G u i p u z c o a n a ,

E u r o E x p r e s s ,

D a n z a s a n d D H L

n . a .

5 0 0 0

3 4 2 c

5 1 6 . 8

5 1 4 . 4

D e u t s c h e P o s t

( 1 0 0 % )

N a c e x

1 9 9 5

G r u p o B u r g a l

3 1 1

1 5 2 1

4 b

2 2 6

2 2 3

N o

C h r o n o e x p r e ´ s

1 9 8 3

J e t

S e r v i c e s

5 4

1 7 6 7

–

1 3 2 . 5

1 3 2 . 1

N o

N o t e s : T h

e l a t e s t d a t a a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e c o m p a n i e s a r e c i t e d .

( a ) M i l l i o

n o f e u r o s ; ( b ) S u b c o n t r a c t e d ; ( c ) I t c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e g l o b a l d i v i s i o n D H L

E x p r e s s .

S o u r c e : C

o m p i l e d f r o m d a t a p r o v i d e d b y S E U R

a n d D B K ,

‘ S e c t o r e s ’ ( 2 0 1 1 ) .

8 E. San Roma n



activities, and (v) Spanish and European public postal operators that have acquired private

companies to expand their activity to the courier sector.18

In the first group DHL, the first international express carrier to enter in Spain, in 1979,

is an outstanding firm.19 DHL is also the biggest foreign company that operates in the

Spanish and Portuguese markets through its subsidiary DHL Express Iberia. Other

multinationals decided to purchase Spanish companies in order to enter this market: suchwas the case of UPS, which acquired Cuallado, as well as TNT, which bought the two

Spanish Unitransa and TG þ . Transportes Ochoa, which has recently ceased its activity,

is the most representative example in the quoted third type of firm: it was a traditional

Spanish freight carrier that extended its activity to become a courier. In the fourth

category, firms that were established to offer express delivery services, SEUR, MRW,

Nacex and Halcourier are the most important ones. All these firms adopted the franchise

structure in order to cover the entire Spanish territory. In recent years, a wide range of

small firms were established with this legal structure to enter certain express market

segments in which the entry barriers are low. Envialia, ASM, Zeleris, Mex or Redyser are

some examples. Although its turnover volume is not as high as the big express carriers,

they have achieved a prominent place in the Spanish market, so they are serious

competitors in particular business niches. Finally, the former public postal operator,

Correos Group, also has presence in the Spanish courier market. Correos entered the

courier sector by acquiring the French firm Chronopost, later renamed Chronoexpres.20

3. A historical approach to SEUR

SEUR is the oldest express carrier company in Spain: it was established in 1942 and, until

the late 1970s, it was the only one operating in the Spanish courier market.21 The arrival of

competition came in 1977 with MRW, another Spanish company. A few years afterwards,

the major global operators such as the European DHL and TNT or the American UPS andFedEx arrived in Spain. The long history of SEUR (the company was 70 years old in 2012)

can be summarised in three stages of asymmetrical length. These stages coincide roughly

Table 5. Types of businesses in the Spanish courier industries.

Business model Cases

Subsidiary of foreign company DHL (1979), Jet Services (1983)

Foreign multinationals that acquiredSpanish firms TNT (Unitransa, 1988; TGþ

, 2005),UPS (Cuallado, 1991), Mayne Nickless (Helguera, 1990)*

Spanish companies that evolvedfrom ordinary transport to courier

Ochoa (1980s)

Spanish companies that were bornexclusively to operate in courier

SEUR, Halcourier, MRW, Nacex

Public postal operators that acquiredprivate firms to enter in courier

Deutsche Post (Guipuzcoana, 1999),Correos (Chronoexpres, 50% in 1998 and the remaining50% in 2003), Correios de Portugal(Tourline Express, 2005), La Poste (Brokers Worldwide,1997; Chronopost; SEUR, 2004**)

Notes:*The acquired company is presented in brackets.**La Poste, through its subsidiary GeoPost, holds a 56.20% stake in SEUR.Source: Munuera Aleman and Rodrıguez Escudero, Estrategias, 529.

Business History 9



with the ones we have set for the development of courier companies in the Western world:

(i) a difficult start until the end of the 1950s, (ii) a long period of growth and

diversification, accompanied by an intense professionalisation of the company, until the

end of the century, and (iii) the time of alliances, joint ventures and mergers of companies

during recent years. This stage involved the sale of 56.20% of SEUR to the French

operator GeoPost, a subsidiary of La Poste.

3.1 The difficult beginnings in post-war Spain

SEUR began operating in 1942, three years after the end of the Spanish civil war. The

country was facing one of its most difficult historical periods: the beginning of the

dictatorship of General Franco. The international economic isolation and Franco’s

protectionist policy extended the time to reach normality and plunged Spain into a period

of delay that did not help the creation of new businesses. In addition it should be recalled

that the term ‘courier’ did not exist in Spain, a country whose terrible communications and

endowment of infrastructures have been a historical problem for its economicdevelopment. The time of delivery of any goods was long in the 1940s and nobody

seemed to consider the need to shorten them.

Two young people without university education, training or resources launched SEUR.

They were Justo Yufera and Jorge Fernandez.22 The two partners began to deliver goods

between Barcelona and Madrid with minimum capital and a telephone as their only assets.

From the start, the two partners decided to share profits equally and to each keep the

ownership of their part of the business: the business was thus set up as two independently

owned companies operating in partnership. This idea started in their initial agreement to

divide profits equally and to keep business independence, and was maintained throughout

seven decades, as new members joined the network. It became a feature of corporateidentity and a rarity in the industry as most courier companies often distribute benefits

unequally, in favour of the city that sends a parcel. Parcels travelled from city to city by

train, and each of the partners, Yufera in Madrid and Fernandez in Barcelona, was in

charge of deliveries in their respective city.23 The business worked slowly for 20 years,

following the same slow rhythm of growth as the Spanish economy.

3.2 Growth, diversification and professionalisation

The change came in the early 1960s when the increasing openness and integration of Spain

into international markets led Spain to a quick take-off.24 Under the expansion of private

consumption, SEUR began to grow significantly. Among the first customers were

bookstores, car repair shops, banks and brokers, along with many businesses related to the

textile industry. For the customers, the new company offered two advantages: saving time,

and the opportunity to reduce inventories and storage costs. This historic time of growth

coincided with the arrival of Yufera’s son in law, Ramon Mayo, in the business.25 Ramon

Mayo gave a great boost to the company. He promoted the use of trucks instead of the

railway, and the construction of a network covering the whole territory.26

SEUR left railroad transport in the late 1970s: it was a rigid system, subject to

schedules and weight limitation. The trucks gave freedom to the company as it did not

have to depend on others to ensure quality. In 1978 SEUR began the first tests of courier

transport by road between Madrid and Barcelona. When the system was proved reliableenough it was implemented in all the lines. The freight trucks belonged to self-employees:

SEUR had no money or credit to buy them.

10 E. San Roma n



The road transport system was the starting point to spread the network throughout

Spain. Within a few years new affiliates were created in all the Spanish provinces. As

Figure 2 shows, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s almost all of the network was set

up. These affiliates were born as independent family businesses. They were linked by ties

of trust, a strong sense of belonging to the company and the shared commitment to quality.

SEUR was also characterised by a certain lack of formality in management forms andsignificant improvisation in making decisions. While the volume of business permitted,

the discipline imposed by the founders and the high degree of trust between the partners

allowed the company to work largely through oral ‘gentlemen’s agreements’.

The move to the road and the building of the network brought a spectacular growth to

the business and forced some changes in the company management. From the mid-1980s

SEUR began an intensive task of professionalisation and legal reorganisation.27 In the

professionalisation field, the company began to employ external experts in all areas of

management. In the legal field, there were two significant events: the legal foundation of

SEUR Espana Inc., in 1984, and the transformation of the company into a franchise

system, in 1997. SEUR Espana Inc. was established as a company owned by all theaffiliates according to their turnover.28 It was set up to represent all the affiliates and to

assume all the functions that went beyond the geographical scope of each of them. In

particular, SEUR Espana Inc. took over the management of common services such as

accounting, advertising, insurance contracts, relationships with shared clients and legal

advice as well as tax and labour advice of the network. The new company also took care of

everything related to the SEUR brand. In 1984, the brand was already an asset of great

value to the Group and it became the property of SEUR ESPAN A Inc.29 The franchise

system was chosen as the most convenient way to give a legal framework to the

relationships among the network affiliates. Of course SEUR was and is a very atypical case

of franchising since franchisees are the owners and founders of the franchise company.

3.3 The arrival of GeoPost

The beginning of the twenty-first century brought profound changes for SEUR. The

company had spent several years seeking alliances abroad that would allow more growth

and international presence. Despite the efforts no significant results were achieved. The

failures in the different negotiations led to a significant exhaustion between the owners of

SEUR, and the idea of selling the business began to spread among many of them. The

prospect of achieving substantial profits by selling were an incentive for the owners of

SEUR: most had started with nothing and had faced long and hard working lives. Some

had no further chance of succession within the family and this situation fed the desire to

sell the company. For members who planned to stay, the entry of a large foreign partner

was a way to simplify the structure of SEUR and hence the possibility of expediting

decision-making in key areas such as investment in logistics and new technologies. From

the point of view of the economic situation, the beginning of 2000 seemed the right time to

achieve the sale. The first attempt to purchase SEUR was made by the investment

company Vista Capital, a company owned by the Bank of Santander and the Royal Bank

of Scotland.30 Despite the time spent on it, the purchase transaction of the company failed

in the spring of 2002.

Two reasons explain this failure: first, the complex corporate structure of SEUR that

complicated the examination of accounts and the question of fixing a price for each of thefranchises. On the other hand, the international economic situation worsened after the

Islamic terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In this context, Vista Capital made an offer

Business History 11



F i g u r e

2 . T h e b u i l d i n g o f S E U R n e t w o r k : c i t i e s a n d y e a r s . S o u r c e : C o m

p i l e d f r o m p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w s w i t h t h e o w n e r s .

12 E. San Roma n



that SEUR did not accept, because it was a lower price than that offered before the 9/11

events. An operation that had been announced as the largest venture capital deal made so

far in Spain was thus frustrated.31 After the failed attempt to sell, SEUR’s owners made

some changes in the legal structure of the company, providing for other future purchase

operations. In particular they changed the name of the franchisor in 2001 from SEUR

Espana Inc. to SEUR Inc. and, above all, they modified the franchise agreement in 2003.The new franchise agreement strengthened the power of the franchisee and accentuated

the unusual structure of SEUR, in which the franchisee has tended to increase its

importance versus the franchisor.32

In 2003 there was another attempt to buy SEUR, this time led by the American

company Merrill Lynch. A year later came the final assault: GeoPost entry in the

shareholding of SEUR. GeoPost had tried to enter the Spanish market through a joint

venture with the Spanish public postal operator, Grupo Correos, which failed.33 In 2004

GeoPost joined SEUR as an international partner first, and then as owner by buying some

franchises.34 Among the most important franchises acquired was that of Madrid. The

founder of the business, Justo Yufera, left SEUR, although he was named HonoraryPresident of the company.

In recent years GeoPost has strengthened its position in the company to nearly 56.20%

of the property. The remaining 43.80% is still in the hands of the historical families that

began the business. Some of them have increased their percentage of ownership by buying

franchise partners. The current corporate structure can be seen in Figure 3.

4. A network-type business group in a late developed economy

The SEUR case study shows an efficient alternative to the large vertically integrated and

professionally managed corporation: the network business group.Why was SEUR established as a network-type business group? And, what advantages

and disadvantages did this form of organisation have?

4.1 Social and institutional context to foster network-type business groups

Powell has pointed out three conditions that encourage the formation of network forms

of organisation: (i) the demand for speed, (i) know how and (iii) trust.35 Powell focused

his attention on biotechnological industries, and thus he believed that networks have a

comparative advantage in coping with environments that place a premium on

innovation products and that network business groups are well-suited for highly skilled

labour force environments where participants possess a know-how that cannot easily

succumb to monopoly control or expropriation by the wealthiest bidder.36 The SEUR

case study shows that the theory about what external conditions may foster network

business organisations also fits well into less technologically intensive industries.

Powell’s theory applies well to the development of courier services in late developed

economies like Spain.

On the one hand, network forms may fit businesses with low entry barriers because a

network form of organisation offers a way to link competitors and avoid excessive

competition at the beginning of a business when the market is growing very fast and it is

difficult for only one of the competitors to monopolise. On the other hand, network-type

business groups offer a real possibility of growth with low investment or risks. And this isespecially interesting for entrepreneurs with not many possibilities for credit and

investment: none of the families that began the SEUR adventure could have built the

Business History 13



F i g u r e 3 . C o r p o r a t e s t r u c t u r e o

f S E U R ,

2 0 1 3 . N o t e s :

1

F r a n c h i s e

s o w n e d b y h i s t o r i c a l p a r t n e r s , t h a t i s , f a m i l y - c o n t r o l l e d fi r m s t h a t f

o u n d e d

S E U R i n t h e i r p r o v i n c e s .

2

B a r c

e l o n a h a s m o r e p a r t n e r s i n i t s s h a

r e h o l d i n g a p a r t f r o m S E U R S A a n d S E U R G e o P o s t S L .

S o u r c e : C o

m p i l e d

f r o m d a t a p r o v i d e d b y S E U R .

14 E. San Roma n



network alone. Finally, in Powell’s explanation, trust is related to the institutional and

social contexts, which he believed were under-analysed factors that should explain

network forms of businesses organisation. According to Powell, certain kinds of

institutional contexts, with particular combinations of legal, political or economic factors,

are ready supporters of network forms, and certain social contexts may encourage

cooperation, especially when the participants of a business have a common backgroundthat makes it easy to sustain network-type arrangements. This idea helps explain

the history of SEUR. Recent studies on business groups dealt with this problem with the

creation of 15 country-specific patterns of business groups.37 Most of them examine the

degree to which political, economic and socio-cultural factors influence business groups.

As the network type is not deeply examined in these studies, and Spain is not a country

included among the analysed cases, our study contributes to this line of research with new

empirical evidence.

What kind of political and economic conditions encourage or support network

firms? The environment which gave birth to SEUR seemed perfect ground for the

network form of organisation: a closed market, with legal protection, in a latedeveloped economy. Until 1987 road transport in Spain was ruled by a law enacted in

1947.38 This law was extremely protectionist and hindered the entry of foreign firms

into the domestic market. It explains the freedom of SEUR to operate for years without

overseas competition. As it was designed to encouraged rail transport, the law was not

particularly helpful for road transport, but was enough to protect domestic courier

companies. SEUR thus had legal protection in the late 1980s when the network was

being formed and during the company’s taking off. In 1987, a new Act, called LOTT,

provided a starting point in the courier market. The LOTT Act removed the

subordination of road transport to railway and made the market more flexible.39 From

this moment onwards SEUR was firmly settled in Spain and Portugal and could moreeasily cope with competition.

If the legal and political framework helps us to understand the first stage of growth of

SEUR, the Spanish economic situation offers an additional explanation. Why a network?

The founders of SEUR had an original business idea, but no money or credit. In a country

burdened by the lack of credit, network financing was an effective way to reduce costs by

sharing and dividing expenses between the partners.

The social context adds further reasons to understand the functionality of the network-

type form of business group. Following Powell, ‘the more homogeneous the group, the

greater the trust, hence the easier it is to sustain network-like arrangements’.40 At the same

time, when repeated trading occurs, there is limited need for hierarchical oversight

because the desire for continued participation discourages opportunism. This was SEUR

exactly: a homogeneous group in which every partner depended on the others.

Homogeneity was the result of the origins of the partners. There were three types of

them: founder’s family, founder’s former employees and founder’s friends. Relatives,

employees and friends started their own family business in the area of the country

entrusted to them. These partners, joined by family and friendship ties, had two other

characteristics in common: they were relatively young and had no experience in the

transport sector. In fact, more than half of the members were under 30. This is not

irrelevant. The beginnings of the company were hard: 12-hour workdays and nights

travelling on rough roads were part of everyday life. Only young members could deal

with these working conditions. Their academic background was limited: none of themhad finished a degree and only a few had gone to university, always for a short while.

Many did not even have elementary schooling. Their work history was varied but

Business History 15



mostly far from the transport sector: with the exception of some truck drivers, the

members of the network were painters, electricians, housewives, etc. Necessity made

ties and trust grew between partners: several members had been unemployed and most

of them risked their small savings to start the business. SEUR was a chance of survival.

Operation through verbal agreements evidenced the strength of these ties. And there

was no necessity for oversight as the daily business was a permanent supervision.When a partner did not fulfil his duties the network noticed immediately and the

partner was expelled.

4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of a network-type business group in the courier

market

There are four remarkable advantages to the network-type business group adopted by

SEUR. First, the network system favoured proximity to customers. Each partner lived in

his local market and knew it perfectly. This closeness made it easy to design routes of

distribution or marketing strategies. The owner heard of any incident in real time andcould solve it quickly and efficiently.

Secondly, the close ties between partners facilitated the learning process. Before

starting the business in a city, new members used to spend several days alongside some of

the veterans. In a usually short training, the new members learned the key aspects of the

business. The main lesson was the importance of speed, i.e. the importance of providing

quality service. Every owner knew that SEUR did not sell just transport but also time. That

was a big difference because time is an intangible of immeasurable value. Another

important lesson was that SEUR could transport any item. In Spain, transport companies

discriminated against certain goods. SEUR instead moved it all: slot machines, donkeys

and even coffins. The learning process also included marketing skills and all those relatedto managing the business. This possibility of learning through partners highlights the role

of social relations in learning.41

Thirdly, the partners developed a real ‘family spirit’ which led them to collaborate and

transfer any innovation to the network. The solidarity between partners was not only to

share advances in computer systems, conveyer belts or vehicles, but to lend money or

logistical support when a member needed it.

Fourthly, the atypical franchise system adopted by SEUR kept alive the multi-family

nature of this firm and it served to solve several problems related to franchising.42 In fact,

the case of SEUR shows an efficient solution to avoid free-riding in franchise chains.43

SEUR’s franchisees are the owners of the franchisor company, that is SEUR Inc., and the

owners of the brand, so that all of them have tried to protect the integrity of their brand

name, hence opportunism is mitigated. Moreover, the high level of interaction between

partners along with the family nature of the business enabled every innovation and all

knowledge and business practices to be shared among the entire network, avoiding the risk

of franchisees being more involved in the day-to-day work than attending training

sessions.44

On the side of disadvantages, all the problems arising from a decentralised system

should be noted. The multi-family network nature of SEUR has been a valuable asset to

the viability of the company. However, it has been a source of instability. SEUR is a

reverse franchise. The franchisees have more negotiating power within the network

because they are the owners of the franchisor company. The greater importance of franchisees versus the franchisor has slowed decision-making. It is not easy for 80 owners

to reach agreement. This problem has particularly affected key strategic decisions such as

16 E. San Roma n



the technological modernisation of the company and its incorporation into the

international market. The owners, immersed in day-to-day business, did not always

maintain an overall strategic vision. And the franchisor executives did not always have

enough operational capacity to impose strategic decisions.

Perhaps one of the best examples of this problem was their slowness in making the

decision to internationalise, despite being one of the pioneers in the industry.Undoubtedly, by the time that SEUR decided to access the international market, entry

barriers imposed by the first movers were very difficult to overcome: SEUR could not

compete either in cost or capacity with major couriers in the global market. The company

did not panic and gave a good example of its flexibility in adapting its strategy and

business model to the times.

Indeed, the decision to settle and strengthen its presence in the Spanish market was not

at all misguided. SEUR is, in comparative perspective, smaller than its international

competitors, and its international role is obviously less. This has been partly the result of

political and economic circumstances that differ greatly from those experienced by the big

couriers. While leaders conquered new markets in Europe and North America, SEURadapted to the new challenges brought with the increasing openness of the Spanish

economy and its incorporation into the European market. The introduction of competition

in the local market made SEUR focus on defending its market share rather than achieving

new international positions where leaders already enjoyed a solid position. In this way,

while other Spanish companies were bought by foreign competition, SEUR was able to

maintain its local business and then adapt to historical change.

As most scholars recognise, economic maturity and the global shift since the 1980s

towards liberalised markets have led to the demise of groups or to their adaptation by

simplifying their ownership networks and professionalising their board and executive

teams.

45

The involvement of GeoPost in SEUR has achieved this simplification becausethe network has been greatly reduced. The French partner has provided capital for

modernisation, as well as experience and international connections. With this support,

SEUR has established itself as a leading courier company.

In summary, the history of SEUR highlights the contribution of family-controlled

business groups to the economic development of Spain, in strategic sectors relatively

unknown so far, like courier services. In some institutional and market environments, like

the ones we have described for Spain in the last seven decades, this type of business group

may represent an efficient alternative to the large vertically integrated corporation.

Possibly the dynamism of the national market of courier services, despite great changes in

the institutional rules of the game (in dictatorship, and in democracy), and the high level of

trust and loyalty of the families involved in linking fragmented markets in the courier

services sector may help explain the endurance of an old business group type of

organisation in a modern economic activity.

Acknowledgements

This work stems from research funded by the company SEUR. We thank SEUR, which permitted theuse of the information contained in this paper. We especially thank Carmen Queipo de Llano(Director of Communications Department), Laura Gonzalvo (External Communications Manager)and Manuel Valle (President of SEUR at the time of the research) for all their support. We also thank

IESE Business School and its members: Professor Josep Ta`pies (Chair of Family-Owned Business)and Joaquın Molina (Director of Corporate Development) for their help and advice. We finally thank

Antonio Garrigues Walker who has enriched our view of SEUR with his comments. DBK andA.T. Kearney gave us valuable advice and some interesting data from their own research work.

Business History 17



Notes

1. E.g. Leff , “Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship”; Guillen, “Business Groups inEmerging Economies”; Kock and Guillen, “Strategy and Structure”; Valdaliso, “GruposEmpresariales, marco institucional”; Barbero and Jacob, Nueva historia empresas en Ame rica;Colpan, Hikino, and Lincoln, Oxford Handbook of Business Groups.

2. Valdaliso, Familia Aznar y sus negocios; Dıaz Morlan, Los Ybarra; Fernandez Perez, Siglo ymedio de trefilerı a; San Roman, Ildefonso Fierro.3. Tapies, Empresa familiar , 11.4. They identify two basic types of business groups: the network type in which the constituent

companies adopt the behavioural principle of alliance and the hierarchy type which areorganised by the authority. Colpan and Hikino, “Foundations of Business Groups,” 18–19.

5. Granovetter and Swedberg, Sociology of Economic Life; Granovetter, “Coase Revisited”;Casson, “Cultural Determinants of Economic Performance”; Casson, “Economics of theFamily Firm.”

6. Fernandez Perez and Rose highlight the role of social networks and their contribution to thesuccess of family business. Other papers that followed Granovetter and Casson footprints inbusiness history are Rose, “Networks, Values and Business”; Colli and Rose, “Families andFirms”; Colli, Fernandez Perez, and Rose, “National Determinants of Family Firm”; Fernandez

Perez and Puig, “Knowledge and Training”; Fernandez Perez and Rose, Innovation and Entrepreneurial Networks.

7. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy.”8. Since the late 1980s, the distinction between courier and express activities began to disappear.

The former couriers were companies providing fast and reliable delivery services, usuallyoriented to international markets. They used to employ commercial air routes. Meanwhile,national express companies organised fleets of trucks and small aircraft without relying onscheduled air routes, so they were able to carry large items on an urgent basis but supportinghigh fixed costs. Both activities, courier and express, have in common the provision of fasterand more reliable transport services than the ones provided by traditional postal operators.According to the need to respond to new demands, transportation techniques were rapidlyimproved and couriers and express national companies began to compete in the same global

delivery market: couriers started operating with owned fleets and express carriers began to usecourier services where traffic was insufficient to charter their own aircraft (Campbell, Rise of Global Delivery Services). Throughout this article, we will take both courier and expressservices as parts of the same express delivery market.

9. Oxford Economics, “Economy Impact of Express Carriers.” This is the last report published byOxford Economics, referring to the 2010 economic year.

10. United Parcel Services (UPS) was founded in 1907 in Seattle and FedEx in 1971, in Little Rock (Arkansas).

11. Deutsche Post-DHL begins its history with German operator Deutsche Bundespost and theAmerican company DHL established in San Francisco in 1969. Deutsche Bundespost wasprivatised between 1989 and 1995 and changed its name to Deutsche Post. In 1998, DeutschePost bought 51% shares of DHL. The remaining 49% was acquired in 2002. Deutsche Post-

DHL was beyond the control of state on 14 June 2005 when the financial institution KfWBankengruppe bought shares in this company valued at e2 million. DHL Express is the divisionresponsible for courier. Savignano, Multiple Identities of an Enployer , 38–40. TNT, which wasestablished in 1946, also belongs to this group of companies. In 1996 TNT was acquired by theDutch national company which had been privatised in 1986 and renamed PTT Nederland and,since 1994, Royal PTT Nederland (KPN). In 1998, the postal division of the company(including TNT) have demerged from KPN and are listed separately on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange as TPG (TNT Post Group). In 2005 TPG renamed itself to TNT and, one year later,sold its logistics division to Appolo Management. Since then, TNT has focused its business incourier and postal activities. In 2011, it was decided to separate both divisions. This transactionimplied the creation of a new express carrier, TNT Express.

12. The American operator UPS announced the acquisition of TNT Express, the express carriersubsidiary of the Dutch group, in March 2012. Recently, this acquisition failed. In January

2013 the European Commission announced that it was working towards proposing aprohibition decision, pointing out that the merger would mean a threat to competition in severalEuropean markets.

18 E. San Roma n



13. Tucker, Fundamentos de Economı a, 39.14. Universal Postal Union, Acquisitions, Mergers and Strategic Alliances.15. A.T. Kearney, “Estudio del Mercado de Transporte.”16. http://www.ine.es.17. In 2010, the five top companies in the business owned a joint market share of 44.3% and the 10

top ones 63.2%.

18. Munuera Aleman and Rodrıguez Escudero made a first classification that we have used andmodified. Munuera Aleman and Rodrıguez Escudero, Estrategias de marketing, 529.

19. DHL Express Iberia, subsidiary of the German group, appeared from the integration of theSpanish carriers Danzas and Guipuzcoana.

20. Correos Group, was formed after the merger of the former Correos with its subsidiariesChonoexpres, Correos Telecom and Nexea. Bahamonde, Martınez, and Otero, El Palacio deComunicaciones.

21. Tapies, San Roman, and Gil, SEUR. 70 An os de Entrega, 17–39.22. Justo Yufera was born in Barcelona in 1920. His family moved to France when he was a child.

He lived much of his youth between France, Cameroon and Guinea. Jorge Fernandez was alsoborn in Barcelona. Fernandez also belonged to a family without financial resources. JorgeFernandez left SEUR in 1985. Yufera remains as Honorary President of SEUR. Interview with

Justo Yufera Cerdan, SEUR’s founder (October 28, 2010); “Al habla con Jorge Fernandez,”14; “Al habla con Justo Yufera,” 14.

23. “Al habla con Jorge Fernandez,” 14–15.24. From 1959 to 1975 Spain experienced the most intense and uninterrupted growth in its history.

Gross domestic product increased in real terms at an annual rate above 7%. Serrano Sanz andPardos Martınez, “Anos de Crecimiento del Franquismo,” 369.

25. Interview with Ramon Mayo, ex Vice-President of SEUR, President of SEUR Foundation andowner of Alicante franchise (January 21, 2010).

26. Several partners have confirmed the role of Mayo. Interview with Justo Yufera, SEUR’sfounder (October 28, 2010); Interview with Jose Fuentes, former owner of Bilbao franchise(March 21, 2011); interview with Manuel Valle, ex-president of SEUR (May 2011); interviewwith Julian Recuenco, Vice President of Quality and Operations of SEUR (February 11, 2011).

27. Interview with Fernando Rodrıguez Sousa, Ex-CEO of SEUR (February 15, 2011).28. SEUR Espana Inc. was formally constituted on December 21, 1984. The headquarters were inMadrid. SEUR Organization Statutes (1987).

29. Formerly, the brand belonged to the founder Justo Yufera.30. Interview with Carlos Sanza, director of the Corporate Legal Advice Department of SEUR

(March 3, 2011); Interview with Daniel Fernandez de Lis, former director of the CorporateLegal Advice Department of SEUR (April 14, 2011).

31. Interview with Fernando Rodrıguez Sousa, Ex-CEO of SEUR (February 15, 2011). TheSpanish press published the news on April 25, 2002. It was published in Expansio n, Cinco

Dı as, and in national newspapers such as ABC, La Vanguardia and El Paı s.32. Interview with Carlos Sanza, director of the Corporate Legal Advice Department of SEUR

(March 3, 2011); interview with Daniel Fernandez de Lis, director of the Corporate LegalAdvice Department of SEUR (April 14, 2011); “Franchise Agreement (2003)” issued by the

Corporate Legal Advice Department.33. Interview with Yves Delmas, President of SEUR (February 25, 2011).34. The purchase of the company is covered in detail in the Proceedings of the Annual General

Meeting and in the Proceedings of the Board of Directors of the Company that we have consulted.35. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” 323–7.36. Powell, “Learning from Collaboration,” and Powell et al., “Network Dynamics and Field

Evolution.”37. The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups includes case studies from Japan, Taiwan, South

Korea, China, Thailand, Singapore, India, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Israel, Turkey,Russia and South Africa.

38. Law 27/12/1947, BOE, December, 28.39. Law 16/1.987, July 30, BOE July 31.

40. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” 326.41. Cope, “Toward a Dynamic Learning”; Hamilton, “Entrepreneurial Learning in Family

Business”; Taylor and Thorpe “Entrepreneurial Learning.”

Business History 19

http://www.ine.es/

http://www.ine.es/



42. There is an extensive literature explaining why a firm uses franchising as an entrepreneurialstrategy rather than company ownership and the consequences of these decisions. From theagency theory see Brickley and Dark , “The Choice of Organizational Form”; Caves andMurphy, “Franchising”; Fama and Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control”; Jensenand Meckling, “Theory of the Firm”; Lafontaine “Agency Theory and Franchising”; Combsand Ketchen, “Why do Firms use Franchising?”; Lafontaine and Slade, “Vertical

Integration and Firm Boundaries.” Oxenfeldt and Kelly, and Carney and Gedajlovic explainfranchising decisions from the resource scarcity perspective. Oxenfeldt and Kelly,“Successful Franchise Systems”; Carney and Gedajlovic, “Vertical Integration in FranchiseSystems.”

43. The more valuable the brand name, the greater the risk of opportunistic franchisees. Norton,“Franchising, Brand Name Capital”; Michael, “Effect of Organizational Form.”

44. Knowledge is an important asset in the franchising context and its learning process requires aninvestment of time by franchisees not always willing. Specifically, tacit knowledge is time-consuming and requires observation, demonstration and experience. Hansen, “The Search-Transfer Problem”; Hansen, “Knowledge Networks”; Von Hippel, “Sticky Information”;Zander and Kogut, “Knowledge and Speed of Transfer.”

45. Colpan, Hikino, and Lincoln, Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, 7.

Notes on contributors

Elena San Roman is assistant professor of Economic History at Universidad Complutense deMadrid, Spain.

Paloma Fernandez Perez is assistant professor of Economic History at Universitat de Barcelona,Spain.

Agueda Gil Lopez is PhD student in Economics at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.

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