Artikel Clausewitz Theory on War and Its Applicability Today

8/2/2019 Artikel Clausewitz Theory on War and Its Applicability Today

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGECORE COURSE 2 ESSAY

CLAUSEWITZ THEORY ON WARAND ITS APPLICABILITY TODAY

LARRY NEW/CLASS OF 96COURSE 2SE&lINAR BDR. ILANA KASS AND COL GENE WILLIAMSCOL BRAN MCALLISTER


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Introduction

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The renowned theortst of war Carl von Clausewnz, stated,* that a certam grasp of nulitary affatrs ISvml for those m charge of general policy r Recogmzmg he reahty of government leaders not bemg m&aryexperts he went on to say. the only sound expedient IS to make the commander-m-chief a member of the cabmet.Many governments are so organtzed mcludmg the Untted States.whose Chauman o f the Jomt Chtefs of Staff IS. bylaw. the top mrlnary advisor to the President. Our record of nuhtary success111hts century mdrcatesClausewnzwas right The stronger the relatronsmp between the natrons semor nuhtary commanders and the government, themore effecave we have been at usmg the mrlrtary mstrument of forergn pohcy to acmeve nahonal polittcaiobJectrves. The strength of that relaoonshrp dependson the Commanders abrlrty to communrcateand thestatesmens abtltty to grasp the mherent lmkage between the nature of war, the purpose of war, and the conduct ofwar. CJausewrtzcalled thts lmkage a paradoxrcal trmny with three aspects. he people, the commander and hrsarm?. and the government 3 The people have to do with the nature of war the mrlttary wtth the conduct of war.and the government wnh the purpose of war Thus paper will addresshow Clausewrtzmn theory apphes toAmtncas recent htstory. and how the theory that holds true may be applied to future snuattons where the mrluaqtnstrument 1sconsidered or used m foretgn pohcy.

Definitions Before embarkmg on a &scussron of the nature. purpose and conduct of war, we must first estabhsha

pomt of reference for each of these terms. lhls paper will address hese hree terms m reference to Clausewnzwho spent a great deal of e ffort theonzmg about these three ideas and thetr relauonshrp with war The purposeand -onduct of war are arrly strarghtforward The purpose of war IS o a&eve an end state different and.hopefully better than the begmnmg state--the reason or IV@ or fighting. The conduct of war refers to the tacucs.operauons, and strategies of the war--the kow of fightmg The more nebulous term IS he nature of war. This termIS made even more vague m Clause\+nz s wntmg for a few reasons. First. the reference for this writing ISa

Carl eon Clausewrtz On W,ar trans McLel Howard .md Peter Paret (Prmceton UP 1989) 608 Ciausewnz 608 Clausewnz 89


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translation of Cl;iusewnz from hs nauve German to English language Second. he reference uses a few differentterms such as nature. kmd. and character apparently synonymously md, Clausewltz starts lus wntmgs on wardefuung it as absolute m nature Then. over a span of twelve years and eight books. he recogntzes most wars arenot fought absolutely. but with luruted meansdefined by the polmcal obJecuve.JThe absolute nature of war refersto its horror. War 1sabout people and property bemg destroyed, damaged,and captured. That 1s he prunaryreason why the declslon to use the mihtary mstrument of fore ign pohcy should not be made without considenng allits unphcatlons The &scusslon m dus paper will use Clausewltzs latter idea and descnbe the nature of a war tobe what mans a state 1sRrlllmg to de&cate to fightmg a particular war versus the nature of war m general. Thus,

Idus paper will use the purpose as the ends, the nature as the means,and the conduct as the techmques applied m

The nature of warClausewitz stated. the first. the supreme, the most far-reachmg act of Judgment that the statesmanand

commander have to make 1s o estabhsh. the kmd of war on whch they are embarkmg . 5 The nature of CmtedStates u?arssmce World War II has been pnmanly asymmemc With the advent of nuclear weapons andsophisticated blologlcal andchemlc,alweapons. or weaponsof massdestruction (WMD) the United Stateshaspostured these weapons as a deterrent to others who have sun&u capablhhes At the same ime we have withheldtheir use,vlewmg them as a last-resort measure o be employed only when our survlvai IS at stake. Therefore withone posilble excephon, we have fought wars wnh lunned means The exception IS he Cold War It could beargued that from the resources de&cated to the Cold War arms T;1Le terms of quantity. quahty and share ofgross domesuc product. the Lnlted Statesdedicated all meansavtiable to the Cold War--an unlunlted war. Onthe othel; hand. notwnhstandmg the Cold War exception applied to the Soviet Union. our adversanes m large-scalewar> such as Korea and Vietnam. have not had weaponsof m&assestruction However, they did use all means attheir disposal to fight the war, m,akmg or unhmlted war trom theu perspective Asymmetnc wars result when the

a Clausewitz 815 Clauses itz. 88


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nature 1s umted for one side and unltmtted for the other The fatlure to recogmze he asymmemc nature of thesewars contnbuted to thetr dubious results. In the case of Vietnam, there was an apparent assumption that oursupenonty at the pomt of contact would lead to vrctoty. Though we dtd not lose battles m the field, we lost the warto a patient enemy wrllmg to dedtcateunrestncted tune and resources o therr cause In both wars, the means wewere wdlmg to comnut drd not a&eve a vtctory They ended wtth a cessauonof hostthues under condmons farshort of, our idea of a destrable end state.

There are two pomts to consider about the concept of hmned versus unlmuted wars First, they are notmutually exclusive types, but exist on a contmuum. The term linnted only has meanmg m us relatron to theunlmuted means a country has avatlable The unhmtted meansdefine one end of the contmuum wlule the lumtedend has no absolute value, tt can approach, but not reach zero or war would not exrst This will have bearmg mthe ensumg section on future wars. The second pomt 1s hat lunrted and unlumted are tdeas also used m referenceto wars obJectrves. Wars obJecaveswrll be addressedm the secnon on the purpose of war rather than m thenature of war.

;Our last large-scale war, the Per-sumGulf War, gave a hmt of what future wars may portend Wnh both

sides possessmgWMD, the nature of war may have two faces The pnmary face reflects the weaponsdrrectlybrought to bear and the shadow face retlects those weaponsnot used but extstmg Gas deterrent to each other Thepnmary face of the Gulf Wars ~ture was asymmemc m that the coalition fought with lmuted means while Iraq sPresident. Saddam Hussem.called on hts nation to fight a Jrhad. or holy war (In retrospect. Hussems Jrhad wasmore a strategy of mtmndauon than of execuaon The au war placed Hussems army m a state of tsolatton anddecunauun. and they enher surrenderedor retreated. vutually en masse,when engagedby coalmon ground forces 1IIraq called for all means and dedicated many more of therr assets han the coahtton. m terms of a portton o f thengross domesnc product Yet. the shadow face of the war s nature was symmemc m that both srdespossessed utwrthheldusmg WMD Presumably, Iraq was deterred from mtroducmg WMD as a result of the warnmg fromSecretary of State Jim Baker hat the US would retaliate m kmd If so, Baker may have set a precedent bydetemng Iraqs chemical andbtoiogical weapons wnh US nuclear weapons Thus precedent could remforcecommon ,treatment ot these weapons& the genenc term. weaponsof massdestructton. unphes Treatmg the

fP nuclear. blologlcril. ,md chemrcal weapons m a generic WMD category IS rn the US tntere\t We have uahen he


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approach of destroqmg our arsenal of blologlcal and chenucal weapons o set an arms-contro l example for the restof the world Our only deterrent m the WMD category 1sour nuclear capablhty

The nature of future warsWith the LS emergmg from the Cold War as the worlds only superpower, he nature of future wars seems

to have acqurred two charactenstzs sunllar to the Gulf War. Fu-st,our most hkely conflicts appear o be agamstenenues that are fightmg a total war from theE perspective The ethmc, rehgous, and ldeologlcal confhcts thatseemmost predommant for the near future are hstoncally fought by zealouspeople with unlmuted meansSecond, with the current prohferauon of W MD, the hkehhood of future belligerents possessmgand directly usmgthem mcreases. Both of these pomts should nnpact our nauonal secunty strategy.

As we look around the globe, our potent& adversanesare ones whose mihtanes are mferior to ours.Hence, k would seem hey would only provoke a confhct with us d they nuscalculate our reachon, or believe theirtotal means will prevzul over our hnuted means Tlus was true for the Gulf War and Somaha, and will hkely betrue for future wars m that region. It would also seem rue for the war m the former Yugoslavia. a war we areabout to mcrease our mvolvement m and North Korea one that certamly has potential

Weapons of mass destruction can not only lead the US to the moral &lemma of whether to du-ectly use ourown WMD. or what means we are wlllmg to commit, but they also necessanly dnve our grand strategy m threeways Fvt. we must contmue to possess sufficient deterrent to W-MD by havmg cre&ble hke-weapons of ourown. Deterrence has a successful track record a la the Cold War and the Gulf War, and. as such, constitutes aprudent mvestment For deterrence o work, It must present a credible and convmcmg threat to an adversary suchthat he does not want to nsk suffermg their consequences.Second.we must consider the posstbihty o f a ttack on uswith WMD any tune we contemplate usmg the mlhtary msuument of fore ign pohcy agamst an adversary whopossesseshem Thud. once we have decided to take the nsk of facing an adversary who may use WMD we mustbe prepared for the change m the nature of the conflict If deterrence a& and the weaponsare du-ectly employedagamst us Our declslon to ret&ate with nuclear weapons would change he nature of the war to one of symmetryBoth sides mould be fighung with meansapproaching. If not on. the unluruted end of the contmuum prevrouslyaddressed These factors require a reevaluation of the purpose and conduct of the W& X% well as It5 nature The


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paradoxical mmty of nature purpose. and conduct. and the enemys ablllty to escalatewould detemune how far weare wdlmg to escalate An escalation declslon without consldermg the paradoxical truuty leads to an end state&fferent, and probably less desnable than the ongmaL Another factor m the escalation declslon needs o be thecrelblhty of deterrence or future confhcts once deterrencehas faled m the current confhcr.

Recogntzmg these changes m the nature of current and future war also provides mslght mto thetechnology development and acqulsiuon we need to fight future wars As menhoned above, we need to conunue todevelop and stockplle nuclear weapons wlthm the constramts of non proliferation and other mternatlonal treaties.and wrthm the levels assessed s bemg requued for deterrence. Thusmihtary approach should be accompamedbycontmyous econonuc and &plomanc efforts towards mcreasedarms control and arms reduchons. The hghdemand for WMD, and their avtiabihty on the mternattonal market make the chances of thev ehmmatlon shmWhile we may be able to reduce our nuclear arms, It would not be prudent to eliimate them wtile a threat existswhich they may deter We should push technology towards producmg meansof deterrence hat will convmceadversanes hey cannot afford to suffer the consequences f employmg such weaponsagamst he US or our alliesFmally with the draw down of forces after the Cold War, we need o optunlze our mvestmentson conventionalcapabdlty to sustam supenonty over adversaneswho may derllcate all their means o acluevmg then ObJectives

The nature of war IS changing Wars m the future may be asymmetnc m terms of the prunary face ottheir nature. but there mat be a deterred symmetnc face representmgWMD possessed y both sides Beforedeadmg to enter wars we need to recogmze he mherent dangersof tightmg wars of asymmetry. the deterrencethat may be mvolved m a shadow face of the war. and the nsk of deterrence admg. We must also arm ourselves toconductland wm not only a war of asymmetry, but also to present a credible deterrence,and a suitable retahatlon ifdeterrence fa&

The bonduct of warThe conduct ot US wars IS surfacmg a few trends ot note Since the end ot the Vietnam w


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C-5 s or C- 14 s at Dover Au Force Base. Delaware. can be a strong negahve m Amencan sentunent about warIn addition. the CNK factor, among other thmgs. drives the US to mmrmrze collateral damage As was the casem the Gulf War, collateral damage results m an unmedlately transmnted global unage mcttmg strong negativesentunent These trends will affect the conduct of future wars and must. therefore. be considered for strategy andweapons acquisition

A few pomts are apparent when trymg to muumrze the Dover factor Frost,as the quantity o f forcesdecreases nd the technological abrlnres of the worlds mrlmuies mcrease. he quahty of our forces needs omcrease o offset the net reducnon m relanve effecuveness Second, US surface forces have not suffered attacksfrom hostile aucraft smce World War II. wluch has led many to assumeau supenonty was an automatic Amencanprerogatrve We must not forget au supenonty does not come free or automauc Guamnteemgau supenontyrequires an mvesunent m the nght aucraft capabrlmesm adequatenumbers, and the proper trauung. We havebeen able to a&eve thrs so far by the Xrr Force makmg au supenonty its number one pnonty for acqursmon viathe F-22 program However, budgets to sustamau supenonty have come under attack m recent years. Reducmgor delaying the nauonal mvestment m au supenonty undermmes Amenca s expectatronsabout the conduct of war

Slmrmtzmg the Dover factor aIs0 requrres a strategy that attacks the enemy s center of gravity. takmgawa\ then ~111o light while muurnrzmg nsk to our forces The Gulf War showed this can be accomphsheddecrst+y by cohesive employment across he enemys spectrum of warfare from tactical to strategic Iraq s willto tight, from then foot soldier to theta national command authonty, was all but ehnuMted by the au war Auforces of all the coalmon services. employed under centrabzed control, prevarled wlule our surface forces sufferedvery few losses (total Amencans lulled m combat were 147). The ensumg ground acuon was essentmlly anunexpected mop-up operatron on a fielded mrlitary that started at a strength of 44 &army ~vu~ons~ The prewart%m&% using tradmomal hmkmg. I e . direct confronratlon on the ground. were that Amencans would suffer &ashigh as 12.000 casualues 1C000 of w uch would be fatahues General H Sorman Schwarzkopf the coalmonforces comnmnder. vmdrcated his necessarychange m strategy when commenting on the conduct of future wars by

Cohn L Powell ,md Joseph E Persrco 5iv 4menc,m Joumeb tR,mdom House Vew York 1995) 517- Edwnrd C \l,ann III. Thunder and Ltahuun+r Desert Storm and he Qrxwer Dehatec (AN Unlkersn~Press +.prrl 1995) 11ISMdNl 5


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SlyUig, I am quite confident that m the foreseeable uture armed conflict wdi not take the form of huge landarm125 acmg each other across extended battle imes. as they did m World War I and World War II or. for thatmatter as the) would have If NATO had faced the Warsaw Pact on the field of battle *9 An effective. casuaity-conscious strategy and a commmnent to au supenonty wlli help mmumze the Dover factor and the accompanymgdetnmental loss of will m future conflicts

To muumlze collateral damageand its accompanying negative repercussions equires preclslon weaponsPreclslo@ uided murutlons also allow us to lull more targets with less exposure to enemy defenses,agammmunlzmg the Dover factor The Department of Defense has already recogmzed tUsand IS makmg slgnlficantmvestments m acquu-mg precision guided mumtions. and retrofittmg and bmidmg systems o dehver them Thistrend must contmue to meet the expectations of Amenca m fighun; future wars

Wuuung a quick victory m war requires both the possessionof the means with the abl1lt-y o employ them,and a stiategy that recogmzes he nature and the purpose of war are mamed to its conduct. As m the abovediscuss@ we hake seen that asqmmetnc-natured wars tend to be protracted Tius IS especially true whenextending the duration of war to mfluence the will of the opponent IS a strategy of the side fightmg the unlmutedwar The partlclpant kuh imuted ObJectives hould design strategy to draw a decisive and quick conclusion. andanplo) the means neLessa.ryo do 30 Tlus beLomesm Ironic dlLhotomy smce imiting the means of warmherznt& tends to protract the war as well Therefore the hmltatlons apphed to the means of war must beIbaLmced with a thorough assessment f the tune reqtnred for victory Tune will be a funcaon of not only ourmeans. but also therr reiauon to the opposmons means, and the rate at which they are anticipated to beencountqred Non-coherent hmitatlons on the means of warcan be a recipe for drsaster.especmiiy m asymmemcWorm,m Schwarzhopt and Peter Petre It Dor\n t TAe


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ourselves up for another dubious end state We have to recogmze he countrys expectauons about the conduct ofwar Mamtauung popular support calls for quick. decisive wars avotdmg both the detrunentai aspectsof theDover factor and of negauve unpact of collateral damage Therefore, the decision to enter the war must ue theconduct to the nature and also the purpose tf we are to succeedThe !purpose of war

The purpose of war IS a pnncrple we have had problems wuh smce he end of World War II. Then, ourentreenauon understood and supported the national reacuon and goals after a dtrect and dehberate attack onAmenF We seem to have an averston to arucuiatmg the destred end state when makmg the decision to use themthtary as an mstrument of national pohcy html au-war planners for the Gulf War assumed politicd ObJeCtiVeSfrom pieced together speeches nd statementsmade by President Bush These gamed egitunacy and were adoptedin to to as they were brtefed up the cham of command uitunately to the Presrdentlo RearticuiaMg the desired endstate IS also problematic when cot&tons change durmg the conduct of war

Thrs trend IS tkeiy causedby the pohtics of dectston makmg. Poiittcs m a democratic society tend toambtgutty m policy They may be pushed toward but seldom achieve perfect clanty For the Prestdentof theUruted States to avord farlure m usmg the mtlnary instrument. he or she has to balance the politics wnh the chantyneeded n pohcy Such clarny wdi enable subordmatem&a.ry ObJectiveso achieve the destredend state Thisbecomeseven more unportant m todays world where a new term has been corned out of necessity to descnbe thenon-tradrttonai uses of the mtlnary. ~rtary-operauons-other-than-war (-MGGTW) descnbe the nation-butidmg.humamtarmn peacekeepmg, ransnat~onai,and other types of nuhtzuy employment that have recently emergedThe trend evtdenced m the current debateabout deployment of forces to the former Yugoslavia IS towards abottom-up approach versus duectmg a top-down approach To wit. mrhtary opuons are requestedwithoutduectmg what the desired end state or polmcai ObJectlvesare ClausewrY s wammg on thuspoint was. no onestarts a war-or rather. no one m his sensesought to do so-without fiit being clear m hrs mmd what he intends to

Richard T Reynolds He&art f the Storm- The Genesis ot the Au CNnnatnn a$amst rtq (AuCntverstty Press.Janu~y 1995) 19 53 95


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achieve by that war and how he mtends to conduct It The Chauman of the Jomt Chiefs of S taff General CohnPowell voiced hrs feelmgs on tius issue saymg. Whenever the mihtary had a clear set of ObJKtiWS. ..a~ IIIPanama. he Piulrppme coup, and Desert Storm-the result had been success. When the nattons pohcy was murkyor nonexrstent-the Bay of Pigs. Vietnam. creatmg a Mat-me presence 111ebanon-the result had been &saster *

Another danger IS hat the purpose of war can become detached rom the conduct of war when the purposechanges without a correspondmg reevaluation and adJustmentm the conduct lhrs led to fatlure m Somalia m1992 ye were successful at our ongmai purpose of ensurmg food reachedstarvmg masses The fatlure occurredwhen an ad&tronai arm of gettmg rrd of the mbai warlord. -MohammedFarah Atdrd, was not matched wnb anappropnate change m the means or overall mthtary strategy The hkehhood of wars purpose changmg mcreaseswith MOOTW . as it does wnh asymmemc war that becomesprotracted It follows that our decrsron o enter futurewars must provide for anucrpatmg changes m the purpose of the ear and consider the requrred correspondmgchanges to the war s conduct.

Another tssue rarsed m constdenng the purpose of wars 1s he selecttvny requrred by today-s demands orAmencan mvolvement. Our 1992 mrhtary bottom-up-review wuh a two-maJor-regional-confhct basehneset themthtary~posture he Clmton Admuustratron submttted to Congress or fundmg. This posture 1sshowmg signs ofbemg over tasked Field commandersare fiaggmg the problem by warnmg of non-mission ready statusUnacceptable stresson personnel IS mdrcated by mcreasedproblems wnh substanceabuse, spouseand child abusesuicide. etc In the current budget environment. mcreasmgour force structure seemsunhkely The alternative 1s obe more,selecttve m taskmg the nuinary Fortunately polmcs drives policy to a certam amount of selecttvny Forexample in 1991. the mrluary responsem Somaim. the itmned-to-no responsem the former Yugoslavta, and nomeanmgful response to the Kurdrsh snuatton m the ethmc Kurdtstan region were ail dnven by pohtrcs more thanby mtht~ary ap;tbthttes However as the list of suuattons where a nuhtary response1sdesued grows. we are drrvento selecttvuv based on mtlmu-v capabthty. That selecuvny reqmres esubhshmg clear cntena for how much of ourmtlnary we are wtilmg to have engaged m what types of contllcts This would set and mamtam a conststent LSpohcy that ~111 ot contuse other nations or the Amencm pubhc Excellent cntena were mtroduced by Defense

I Clausewtt7 579I PoXveIl 559


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Secretary Casper Wemberger after the Beuut. Lebanon disaster m 1983 There. 241 Marines were k&d m onesulclde attack durmg then 14 month peacekeepmgmission Wembergers cntena sad

1 Commit only If our or our alhes vltai mterestsare at stake2 If we commit, do so with ail the resourcesnecessary o wm3 Go m only with clear pohticai and nuhtary ObJeCtIVeS.4 Be ready to change the commitment d the ObJeCUVeShange, smce wars rarely stand sail5 Only take on commitments that can gam the support of the Amencan people and the Congress.6 Commit US forces only as a last resort-l3There is a problem m our democratic system with appiymg Rule 1 Regardlessof how clearly vital

mterest IS defined m practice, It normally turns out to be what the President says t is without suffenng too muchpoimcal backlash from the pubhc or the Congress. To wit. the current debate between the execuove and ieglsiauvebranches about whether the US has v&-d interests m the former Yugoslavia. The vutue IS that the problem is bemgaddressedby the debate akmg place. Ttus sameprocessneeds o occur for future Situations Rule 5 about popularsupportls mherentiy tied to Rule 1 m determmmg vital mterests. Wembergers rules encapsulatemany of thepomts m tius paper With our down-sized mihtary. m addition to the pohhcai and pohcy aspects,mxhtarycapability m terms of aggregatemtiltary taskmgshould be a conslderatlon m decisions to enter confhcts with themilitary instrument

One of the most cntlcai steps a pohcy maker must take IS o define the purpose or desired end state of theconflict, The first step to deaimg with ambiguity m purpose 1s ecogmzmg It IS mherent m our system We mustwork toyard clear pohticai ObJectives o establish a gmdmg framework for the military planner to work from Thesubsequpnt steps are for the mihtary and political leaderstip to iterate the means and ends unui a clear set ofpoimcai and military ObJectiVeSS reached Tius reqmres msatutlonairzed teamwork between the miinary andpolitIcal leadershlp H,and-m-handwith estabhshmg the purpose 1scontempiatmg the changes o the purpose hatare posslbie and acceptable. Without estabiahmg a purpose tor war one ~111 ever know how to fight or when heis finished fighting


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ConslusionThe strength of Clausewiaian theory IS that much of it withstood the test of tune and is still applicable

even now If he was remcarnated oday, he would probably be workmg on a 20th century edition of On War Withany senseof humor. he could follow the lead of Rush Limbaugh and title it. See Told You SQ! He could pointout. as this paper attempted, the importance of his paradoxical trinity m terms of the nature. the purpose, and theconduct of war He could pat himself on the back for the successhe had m his endeavor to develop a theory thatmaintains a balance among these hree tendencies, hke an ObJeCt suspendedbetween three magnets * He couldreiterate how cmt1ca.lt IS or the political leader to understand tlus trmny and how necessary t is for the militarycommander to help m that understanding We should take heed to his theory where it proves true To use themilitary successfully, we need to understand the imuts of how and why we make war- There is a declining militaryexpenence m the legislative and executive branches of government Our nation IS best served when commandersare not only familiar with the endurmg venties of war, but also able to commurucate hem effectively to thoseformulating national policy that mvolves the use of the military as ts mstrument

Clausewitz. 89

Artikel Clausewitz Theory on War and Its Applicability Today

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