Dr. Michele Trizio

Qui fere in hoc sensu exponunt Aristotelem Notes on the Byzantine sources of the Albertinian notion of Intellectus Possessus

In is philosophical works, Albert the Great mentions the names of Eustratius of Nicaea1 and Michael of Ephesus2, among a list of Peripatetic philosophers, at least twice. These references may be found in relation to that particular status of the intellect that Albert defines as possessus. As scholars are probably aware, these two Byzantine Aristotle commentators, who lived and worked between the XI and XII century, are the authors of commentaries on specific books of Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics3. Eustratius of Nicaea commented on books I and VI of this work, whilst Michael of Ephesus, whose biography is still quite a mystery, commented on books V, IX and X. Both were all but neglected in Byzantium4, but in the Latin West were considered essential and authoritative sources for understanding the Nicomachean Ethics5.

The aim of this article is to account for the association between the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, in particular Eustratius of Nicaea, and the

1 On the life and thought of Eustratius of Nicaea cf. J. DRAESEKE, Zu Eustratios of Nikia, Byzantinische

Zeitschrift, 5 (1886), 319-336; E. MARTINI, Eustratios Metropolit von Nikaia, in Paulys Realenciclopedie, 1, col. 1490-1491; M. CACOUROS, Eustrate de Nice, in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, publi sous la direction de R. GOULET, III, Paris 2000, 378-388. 2 On Michael of Ephesus cf. K. PRAECHTER, Review of Hayduck 1904, CAG 22.2 (Michael Ephesii In

Libros De Partibus Animalium Commentaria), Gttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 168 (1906), 861-907; Michael of Ephesos and Psellos, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 31 (1931), 1-12. To be updated with R. BROWNING, An Unpublished Funeral Oration for Anna Comnena, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 188, n.2 (1962), 1-12. This article was reprinted in R. SORABJI (ed.), Aristotle Tramsformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, New York 1990, 393-406. 3 They are all edited, along with the anonymous commentary on books II-V, the anonymous Byzantine

commentator on book VII, and Aspasius commentary on book VIII, in Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria, ed. G. HEYLBUT (CAG, 20), Berlin 1932. On this set of commentaries cf. H.P.F. MERCKEN, The Greek Commentators on Aristotles Ethics, in SORABJI, Aristotle Transformed cit., 407-443. 4 In a private conversation J. Demetracopoulos gave me some evidence of a possible influence of

Eustratius commentaries on books I and VI on the erudite XIV century monk Barlaam the Calabrian. However, this evidence is slight and based on a mere parallelism of terms and expression easily found in Aristotle himself. But the question does indeed deserve deeper study. The question of the influence of Eustratius theological treatises in Byzantium is, on the contrary, quite a different matter. It seems that XII century theologian Niketas of Maronea used some of Eustratius anti-latin treatises in his own anti-latin dialogues; cf. A. BARMINE, Une source mconnue des Dialogues de Nictas de Marone, Revue des tudes byzantines, 58 (2000), 231-243. 5 The corpus of the Greek-Byzantine commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics was translated by Robert

Grosseteste, probably immediately before the mid-XIII century. His translation is partially edited in H. P. F. MERCKEN, The Greek Commentaries on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grossateste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253), t. 1: Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on book II, III and IV. Critical Edition with an Introductory Study (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, VI.I), Leiden 1973; The Greek Commetaries on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grossateste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253), t. 3: The Anonymous Commentary on Book VII, Aspasius on book VIII and Michael of Ephesus on Books IX and X. Critical Edition with an Introductory Study (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, VI, 3), Leuven 1991. I am personally producing the critical edition of Grossatestes translation of the anonymous commentary on book V, of Michael of Ephesus commentary on the same book, and of Eustratius commentary on book VI.

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notion of intellectus possessus elaborated by Albert the Great. I am going to present the original results of a study on Grossetestes unedited translation of Eustratius commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethicsin this regard6. This contains at least two main passages in which Eustratius mentions the notion of intellectus possessus as accounting for that peculiar status of the human intellect characterized by the acquisition of a higher form of intellection, apparently similar to the one characterising certain Albertinian arguments on the same topic.

In order to survey this topic I will first analyze the original Greek text of Eustratius commentary on book VI of the NE, indicating the sources, structure and philosophical content of the arguments that are most likely to have attracted Alberts attention. The corresponding passages in the Latin version of Eustratius commentary will be considered in order to prove Alberts textual dependence on Eustratius. Finally, both the peculiarity of Eustratius description of the status of human intellect in its highest stage and the originality of Alberts reading of it will emerge from this comparison of Eustratius position in the original Greek text and Alberts reading thereof.

1. The status quaestionis

The name of Eustratius of Nicaea and Michael of Ephesus have recently been associated with the XIII century constitution and discussion of the topic of the nature of human happiness in its final and highest degree7. These Byzantine commentators of the Nicomachean Ethics are treated as possible sources for the way in which this topic was elaborated by some Latin thinkers traditionally labelled as averroist. Moreover, scholars such as de Libera have recently linked the consideration of the role played by Eustratius and Michael to the role which was played by Albert the Great in the discussion of the idea that human happiness reaches its peek as man joins the agent intellect in a formal conjunction8. Regarding this, de Libera stresses the importance of what he calls (f)arabisme or thse farabo-avicenno-ghazalienne. However, de Libera does not neglect the evidence favouring a theory of happiness elaborated by Albert that starts from a wider range of sources, combining al-Farabi, on the one hand, and the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, on the other. According to Albert, de Libera claims, the idea that happiness consists in mans conjunction with the separate substances

6 For Grossatestes translation I will rely on the Eton College 122 manuscript.

7 On this topic see the essential L. BIANCHI, La felicit intellettuale come professione nella Parigi del

Duecento, Rivista di Filosofia, 78 (1987), 181-199; ID., Il vescovo e I filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e levoluzione dellaristotelismo radicale, Bergamo 1990, 149-195. 8 Cf. e.g. A. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie, Paris 1990, 268-269; ID., Psychologie

philosophique et thologie de l intellect. Pour une histoire de la philosophie allemande au XIVe sicle, Dialogue, 31,3 (1992), 377-397 ; ID., Averrosme tique et philosophie mystique. De la flicit intellectuelle la vie bienheureuse, in L. BIANCHI, Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento, Studi in onore di Eugenio Randi, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, 33-42. On Albert possible influence on the so-called Averroists cf. C. STEEL, Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the Averroistic Ideal of Happiness, in J. AERTSEN/A. SPEER, Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X Internationalen Kongresses fr mittelalterlichen Philosophie der Societ Internationale pour ltude de la Philosophie Mdivale, 25 bis 30 August 1997 in Erfurt, voll. 2, Berlin-New York 1998 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26), 152-174, in part. 159.

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and God is not, to quote the author directly, un ide exclusivement arabe, ni donc (f)arabienne, cest la charte du pripattisme grco-arabe9.

However, this renewed interest in Eustratius of Nicaea and Michael of Ephesus was recently demonstrated by the two articles by Fioravanti10 and Bianchi11 that appeared in the proceedings of a conference in Milan organized by the Italian Society for the Study of Medieval Thought, whose title was Le Felicit nel Medioevo (Forms of happiness in the Middle Ages). These articles attempt to rethink the traditional categories used for the description of the so-called Latin Averroism or Latin Arabism. Bianchi gives the example of Boethius of Dacias De summo bono, pointing out that the direct role played by Arabic sources, in particular that of Averroes, in Boethius elaboration of the topic of the fiducia philosophantis is actually immaterial. The idea that only philosophy can truly account for human happiness, by means of a formal conjunction with the agent intellect or in general by means of a coniunctio, copulatio or continuatio between the human mind and the separate intellects, and ultimately with God, is indeed present in Boethius of Dacia, but via other sources. Bianchi rightly points out that, given the ethical and practical undertones of what have also been called speculative happiness or mental happiness12, there are other sources which may have served the purpose of sketching an idea of philosophy as the experience of a contemplative way of life. Here he points to the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratius of Nicaea and Michael of Ephesus. In the end, Bianchi claims, we also have formulas like copulatio or coniunctio, which could resemble similar arguments to be found in the Latin translation of Arabic sources, in the Latin translation of Eustratius commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics13. Moreover, according to Bianchi, the Byzantine commentators also emphasise the idea of intellectualis vita, the idea that rational activity makes man truly and authentically man, which closely resembles certain arguments put forward in Boethius of Dacias De summo bono14.

It is as yet too early to say whether or not Bianchis intuition will prove fruitful; the author himself seems to be cautious in suggesting the possibility of a direct influence of the Byzantine commentators on the NE on Boethius of Dacia and on other so-called averroists, neither to be linked immediately to Alberts elaboration of the topic of the intellectual happiness nor to Alberts reading of Arabic or Greek source material, like Eustratius of Nicaea. What one can say is that scholars do not even agree about Alberts view on the topic at stake, namely, the nature and character of the Albertinian theory of

9 A. DE LIBERA, Raison et foi, Archologie dune crise dAlbert le Grand Jean Paul II, Paris 2993, 322.

10 G. FIORAVANTI, La felicit intellettuale: storiografia e precisazioni, in M. BETTETINI/F.D. PAPARELLA,

Le felicit nel medioevo, Atti del Convegno delle Societ italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Milano 12-13 settembre 2003, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, 1-34; cf. also. L. BIANCHI, Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la storia di unantropologia averroista, Rinascimento, Seconda serie, 32 (1992), 185-201. 11

L. BIANCHI, Felicit intellettuale, ascetismo e arabismo, in BETTETINI/PAPARELLA, Le felicit cit., 13-34; cf. also L. BIANCHI, Boce de dacie et lEthique Nicomaque, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 17 (2006), 231-248. 12

As well known these expressions were first coined by Corti in 1983; cf. M. CORTI, La felicit mentale. Nuove prospettive per Cavalcanti e Dante, Torino 1983. 13

Cf. also BIANCHI, Felicit intellettuale cit., 31, n. 48. 14

A.J. CELANO, Boethius of Dacia: On the Highest Good, Traditio, 43 (1987), 199-214, 206.

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happiness, i.e. whether this form of contemplative happiness involves a purely rational effort by human beings or a form of mystical union15.

Given that we do not here intend to make a survey of this topic, it is sufficient that we remember that the notion of intellectus possessus elaborated by Albert and regarded by him as the Greek term corresponding to the Arabic notion of intellectus adeptus is essential for the whole Albertinian theory of contemplative happiness, being the idea of conjunction between the human intellect and the separate substances and God. This statement is even more relevant if one bears in mind that, as we will show in the present paper, the notion of intellectus possessus seems solely terminologically referable, among the Greek thinkers mentioned by Albert, to Eustratius of Nicaea.

2. Albert the Great on the Greek notion of intellectus possessus

As stated above, the names of these two Byzantine Aristotle commentators are to be found in Albert the Great concerning that particular state of the intellect which he labels as possessus. These references are to be found in arguments dealing directly with the topic of contemplative happiness. A brief reconstruction of the two main passages in which Albert mentions Eustratius and Michael in relation to the notion of intellectus adeptus/possessus follows.

In his De XV problematibus, Albert first introduces what he calls the standard ancient position of all Peripatetics as determined by Alfarabi. Here, the author is referring to the idea that the potential intellect is the species of all intelligibles, though it is not entirely in material potency in regard thereto. Albert elaborates this argument further by mentioning the Graeci sapientes, namely Porphyry, Eustratius of Nicaea, Aspasius, Michael of Ephesus, and all others following Alexander of Aphrodisias (who is said to be in agreement with Epicurus). They all share the characterization of the human intellect as possessus. Possessus is, according to Albert, a term peculiar to the Greek philosophical tradition. However, Albert makes it clear that the term possessus employed by the Greeks has the same meaning as the term adeptus used by Arabic philosophers in regard to the same status of the human intellect. Both terms, possessus and adeptus, refer to one and the same idea: that which is possessus is other and different in nature from the subject possessing this or that disposition (aliud est et alterius naturae a possidente)16.

In a well-known passage of his De anima, Albert proposes a similar scheme and a similar explanation of the concept of adeptus/possessus in the case of the human intellect. In discussing the way in which the conjunction between the potential and the agent intellect takes place, Albert refers to one of the main points of his theory on the intellect,

15 For an overview of the different opinions on the nature of Alberts theory of contemplative happiness, cf.

J. MLLER, Natrliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus, Mnster 2001, 80-135. 16

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De XV problematibus, Opera Omnia XVII,1, 1975, 32,62-71: Hoc igitur omnium Peripateticorum antiqua est positio, secundum quod eam Alfarabius determinavit. Ex qua sequitur intellectum possibilem intellegibilium omnium esse speciem et non omnino potentiam esse materialem ad ipsa. Post hoc Graeci sapientes, Porphyrius scilicet et Eustratius, Aspasius et Michael Ephesius et quam plures alii venerunt praeter Alexandrum, qui Epicuro consentit, qui omnes intellectum hominis intellectum possessum et non de natura intelligentiae existentem esse dixerunt. Et quem Graeci sapientes possessum, eundem Arabum philosophi Avicenna, Averroes, Abubacher et quidam alii adeptum esse dicebant, quia id quod possessum est, aliud est et alterius naturae a possidente..

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namely, the idea that the agent intellect does not act as a mere efficient cause of our knowledge, but acts beyond this towards the potential intellect as its formal cause, as a form acting upon its matter (sicut forma materiae)17. The intellectus adeptus, which can also be called possessus, according to Albert, is the result of precisely this composition between the agent intellect and the potential one, evidently following a process of progressive actualization of mans intellectual potentialities. It is through this particular compound (compositum) that we achieve our proper nature and essence as man fully, and are allowed the intellection of separate substances (intelligere separata)18. Albert ascribes this form of conjunction to book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle describes the intellect as our most divine part and contemplation as the highest activity which can be performed by a human being19. Albert ascribes the idea of a formal conjunction between the agent and potential intellect to Aristotle himself, remarking that this very same type of conjunction can also be found in the above mentioned Eustratius of Nicaea and Michael of Ephesus20.

These two passages are well known to most specialists. Needless to say, Alberts theory of the intellect entails a series of aspects whose complexity cannot be treated here. Problems like the relation between the doctrine expounded by Albert in his philosophical works and the one to be found in his theological one, as well as the problem of the different chronological phases of the Albertinian elaboration of his main standpoints, go beyond the scope of this paper21. Nevertheless, the reasons why Albert mentions Eustratius in regard to the status of the intellect which he calls possessus have still not been studied by modern scholarship and deserve great attention. These reasons, as I will try to show, are related to the sources employed by Eustratius in order to construct the main arguments in his commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, in particular the Neoplatonic source material22.

3. Eustratius and the intellectus possessus/pkthtoj.

17 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, III,3,11, Opera Omnia VII, pars I, 1968, 222,15-28.

18 On the intellectus adeptus, cf. the recent L. STURLESE, Vernunft und Glck. Die Lehre vom intellectus

adeptus und die mentale Glckseligkeit bei Albert dem Groen, Mnster 2005 (Lectio Albertina, 7). 19

ARISTOTELES, EN, X,VII,1177a13-18. 20

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, III,3,11 (Et est digressio declarans veram causam et modum coniunctionis intellectus agentis nobiscum), Opera Omnia VII, pars I, 1968, 222,4-14: Et hoc vocatur a philosophis moveri ad continuitatem et coniunctionem cum agente intellectu; et cum sic acceperit omnia intelligibilia, habet lumen agentis ut formam sibi adhaerentem, et cum ipse sit lumen suum, eo quod lumen suum est essentia sua et non est extra ipsum, tunc adhaeret intellectus agens possibili sicut forma materiae. Et hoc sit compositum vocatur a Peripateticis intellectus adeptus et divinus; et tunc homo perfectus est ad operandum opus illud quod est opus suum, inquantum est homo, et hoc est opus, quod operatur deus, et hoc est perfecte per seipsum contemplari et intelligere separata. Et iste modus et ista coniunctionis concordat cum Aristotele in X Ethicae, ubi gere dicit ista, et praecipue concordat Eustratio et Michaeli Ephesio, qui fere in hoc sensu exponunt Aristotelem ibidem.. 21

In this respect it is always useful to refer to H. ANZULEWICZ, Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie im System des Albertus Magnus, Archives dHistorie doctrinale et littraire du Moyen Age, 70 (2003), 165-218. 22

Cf. MICHELE TRIZIO, Eustrazio di Nicaea, Studio storico dottrinale del commento al VI libro dellEthica Nicomachea, doctoral dissertation, University of Bari, 2006, 116-289. Here I largely accounted for the dependence of Eustratiuscommentary on book VI of the NE upon Proclean sources.

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Eustratius acquaintance with Neoplatonic literature is not an entirely new issue, although this dependence has often been described in vague terms or left unqualified. In his monumental monograph on Michael Psellus, published in 1920, Zervos points out some evidence of Eustratius dependence upon Proclus, linking this dependence to the same Psellian heritage and influence on the immediately following generation of thinkers23. However, it was through a study by Giocarinis that Eustratius positive attitude towards Neoplatonism became evident24. This impressive study on Eustratius commentary on NE,I,4, where the commentator criticises Aristotles arguments against the Platonic ideal Good, could show how extensively this commentary depends upon the Neoplatonist philosophy. In particular, as recently shown by Carlos Steel, the main source of Eustratius own counter criticism to the Aristotelian standpoints seems to be Proclus commentary on Platos Parmenides25. To this commentary by Proclus seems to refer the very same periphrasis through which Eustratius introduces his counter arguments. That is, the meaning of the attribution of these counter arguments to those around Parmenides and Plato26, whereas neither Parmenides nor the Platonic dialogue named after him seem to produce such a defence of the doctrine of Ideas.

In a previous article of mine I showed not only that the influence of Proclus is consistent with both the terminology and the arguments developed by Eustratius, but also that the presence of Proclus seems to be widespread through all the three commentaries written by our commentator27. Focusing on the problem of the Aristotelian distinction between absolute (plj) and conditional necessity (x poqsewj), I could show how Eustratius interprets the distinction at stake within a non-Aristotelian framework. Despite the complementary nature of the two kinds of necessity in Aristotle, the commentator strictly applies absolute necessity, on the one hand, to what he calls beings in the proper sense of the term(kurwjnta), i.e. those beings properly called so that always remain self-identical (kurwj nta t e kat t ut ka satwj conta); and conditional necessity, on the other, to that which is never a proper being (ntwjodpoten), which he associates to what is subject to coming to be and passing away28. He also collocates this particular interpretation of Aristotles different kinds of necessity within the framework of the distinction between causes (atia) and concomitant causes (snaitia). Only the first can be considered proper causes as they are the only ones which transcend their effect (mna tn atiatn xrhtai)29. In both cases,

23 Cf. C. ZERVOS, Un philosophe noplatonicienne du XIe sicle: Michel Psellos, New York 1973 (II ed.),

225-227. 24

Cf. K. GIOCARINIS, Eustratios of Nicaeas Defense of the Doctrine of Ideas, Franciscan Studies, 24 (1964), 159-204; Cf also A.C. LLOYD, The Aristotelianism of Eustratios of Nicaea, in J. WIESNER, Aristoteles, Werk and Wirkung, Mlanges P. Moraux, t. II, Berlin 1987, 341-351, 350. 25

Cf. C. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus, Bullettin de Philosophie Mdivale, 44 (2002), 51-57, in part. 52-53. 26

EUSTRATIUS, In I EN, ed. Heylbut, 49,7-11. 27

M. TRIZIO, Eustratius of Nicaea on Absolute and Conditional Necessity. A survey of the Commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur, XII (2006), 35-63. 28

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 293,10-20 (ed. Heylbut). 29

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 267,18-22 (ed. Heylbut).

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Proclus seems to be the ever-present shadow behind these arguments put forward by Eustratius30.

This Proclean influence on our commentator is relevant for the discussion of the topic of the present paper. In fact, Proclus seems to be the direct source of Eustratiuss two main arguments, which seems to account for Alberts reference to the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics when dealing with the notion of the intellectus possessus/adeptus. As a matter of fact, there are two passages in the Latin version of Eustratius commentary on book VI of the NE in which this notion can be found. They correspond to 303,19-26 and 314,8-18 of the Heylbut edition. These passages are very similar to each other. Nevertheless, it might be convenient to analyze them both.

Let us start with the first one (303,19-27, ed. Heylbut), here quoted along with the Latin translation.

EUSTRATIUS GRAECUS, In VI EN, 303,19-27 (ed. Heylbut): gryucjm,nyucneiligmnwj nerge, sullogizomnh ka metabanousa ej sumpersmata kprotsewn, j d, metcousa no plj pibllei, cousa m,n ka tj rcjkatojroujjnophcmata,ginomnhd,katotwnpkeina,tannoergnhtai,tojnohtojnohtjpibllousa,ekamqrwjkamojkaq'parxin,llkaq'nperiecomnhtpntakanoosakaq'kaston,dikatoiath katstasij o fsij ll xij tj yucj nomzetai, j xwqenpeisiosakaginomnhpkthtoj.

EUSTRATIUS LATINUS, Eton College 122, f 110 ra: Anima enim ut quidem involute operatur, syllogizans et transiens in conclusiones ex propositionibus, ut autem participans intellectu simpliciter apponit, habens quidem et principia et definitiones ut intellectus, facta autem ultra haec, cum intellectualis fiat, intellectualibus intellectualiter congruens, si et non repente et simul ut qui secundum existentiam ut ab extra superveniens et ingrediens et facta possessa..

This passage represents nothing more than an interweaving puzzle of quotations taken from Proclus. The soul qua soul possesses the intelligibles in an unfolded manner (neiligmnwj/involute), that is to say within the dimension of discursive reasoning, which acts syllogistically (sullogizomnh/syllogizans), passing from the order of premises to the order of conclusions (metabanousa ej sumpersmata kprotsewn/transiens in conclusiones ex propositionibus). It means that at first the soul possesses the intelligibles in a divisive, non-coordinated, and non-articulate manner. But the soul when participating of the Intellect can grasp the intelligibles by means of direct apprehensions (plj pibllei/simpliciter apponit). In this way the soul somehow transcends the dimension of discursive reasoning, thus beginning to recollect the intelligible contents that it has itself possessed since the beginning.

This basic description of the twofold manner in which the soul relates to the intelligibles in the process of concept formation, passing from discursive to non-discursive thought, is nothing but a summary made up of technical terms and expressions

30 EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 267,19-22 (ed. Heylbut): tj m,n gr gnsewj rca o roi ka t

ximata pge tnnagkawn, tjd,prxewjtpoihtikkat telik. tatagrmnakurwj atia, ti ka mna tn atiatn xrhtai. = PROCLUS, Elementatio theologica, 75 (ed. Dodds): Pntkurwjkurwjkurwjkurwjatiatiatiationlegmenonxrhtaixrhtaixrhtaixrhtaitopotelsmatoj.

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to be found in Proclus works31. Even the very same structure of the argument seems to be borrowed entirely from Proclus. As a matter of fact, Eustratius emphasises the distinction between, on the one hand, the soul qua soul (jm,nyuc), which acts by passing (metabanousa) from the premises to the consequences within the sequence of a syllogism, and on the other, the soul as participating in the Nous (j d, metcousano), thus being capable of grasping the intelligibles in an immediate and direct way (pljpibllei). If one turns to Proclus commentary on the Timaeus he will find the very same argument in regard to the ways in which the logos can attain the knowledge of the eternal Being (te n)32. The logos qua logos (jm,nlgoj) acts by passing from (metabatikj) one content to the other within the discursive and analogical reasoning; on the contrary, the logos in its intellectual activity proper (jd,non) acts in a simple (metplthtoj) and direct way.

Nevertheless, as known to the specialists of Proclus, the latter would have stressed that even after recollection, when the passage from discursive to non-discursive thought takes place, our knowledge of the intelligibles remains somehow metabatikj33. If before, within discursive reasoning, we were forced to pass from the order to the premises to the one of the conclusions as a result of the dianoetic activity of the soul, the present direct grasping of the intelligibles still cannot attain simultaneous and unified knowledge of them: the particular souls can grasp the intelligibles only one by one, one after the other, running around the Intellect and dancing around it in a circle, as Eustratius himself had previously said in his commentary on book I of the NE (47,4-11, ed. Heylbut), literally quoting from Proclus commentary on the Parmenides34. It is not the case that in the passage we are analyzing, Eustratius also follows an argument from Proclus commentary on the Parmenides closely in order to emphasise the fact that the soul cannot grasp the intelligibles simultaneously nor all at once (m qrwj kamo)35; on the contrary, the soul can embrace all the intelligibles singularly (kaq' nperiecomnh t pnta), grasping and thinking them one by one, one after the other (noosakaq'kaston)36.

31 The idea that the soul is all forms in an unfolded manner (neiligmnwj) can be found in PROCLUS, In

Eucl., 16,10-16 (ed. Friedlein); In Tim., 1,342,16 (ed. Diehl). For non-discursive reasoning as proceeding through direct apprehensions or direct grasping of the intelligibles (plj pibllei/toj nohtojnohtj pibllousa) see PROCLUS, In Parm., 704,28-34 (ed. Cousin); In I Alc., 246,15-18 (ed. Westerink); In Tim., 2,313,13-15 (ed. Diehl); Eclogae de philosophia Chaldaica, fr.4,1-4 (ed. Des Places). 32

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 303,19-21 (ed. Heylbut): gryucjm,nyucneiligmnwj nerge,sullogizomnhkametabanousaejsumpersmatakprotsewn,jd,metcousanopljpibllei. = PROCLUS, In Tim., 1,246,5-7: j m,nj m,nj m,nj m,n lgoj nerge metabametabametabametabatikj, j d,j d,j d,j d, nonnonnonnon metplplplplthtoj. The expression metcousano, referred to the particular soul (and not to the divine ones) in its participation in the Intellect, is to be found in many Proclean passages literally. Cf. PROCLUS, Theol. Plat, 3,21,26-27 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink); 5,85,24. The same expression also occurrs in the specific case of the divine souls, like in PROCLUS, El. Theol., 182,8-10. 33

Cf e.g. PROCLUS, Theol. Plat., 4,43,20-22 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink); In Tim., 1,219,1-3 (ed. Diehl); 2,219,4-5. 34

Cf. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources cit., 52-53. 35

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 303,23-24 (ed. Heylbut): ekamqrwjkamo...= In Parm., 1165,24-25 (ed. Cousin): ote gr lhn atn (scil. the soul) momomomo toj to no pargein nomasin: o grqrwjqrwjqrwjqrwjatpfukenrn. 36

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 303,24-25 (ed. Heylbut): kaq' nperiecomnh tpntaka noosakaq'kaston. = PROCLUS, In Parm., 808,12-14 (ed. Cousin): kaqorsa (scil. the particular soul) d, kakastonkastonkastonkastontnllwn,kakaq'nkaq'nkaq'nkaq'n pntapntapntapntakaoc'mopntanoosanoosanoosanoosa.

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What is interesting here is that Eustratius compares the way in which the particular soul possesses the intelligibles with the way in which the intelligibles are embraced and grasped by what he calls the Intellect by existence ( kaq' parxin /qui secundum existentiam). It is clear that if the particular souls can grasp the intelligibles only one after the other, then the Intellect secundum existentiam embraces them in a simultaneous, concentrated, and unified manner. Elsewhere37, the commentator elaborates this different possession of the intelligibles further, freely borrowing a distinction between a nojkat'osan/intellectus secundum substantiam and a noj kaq' xin/intellectus secundum habitum from an argument available in Proclus commentary on the Timaeus38. Proclus describes the latter status as being that disposition by means of which the soul becomes intelligent. Eustratius simply extends this description, which Proclus specifically refers to the case of the World-Soul, to the cases of individual particular souls, evidently on the grounds that what is valid for the World-Soul must also be considered valid for the lower realms, namely, for the individual and particular souls.

This conceptual diptych of noj kat' osan and noj kaq' xin is used by Eustratius to describe, again in terms which closely resemble several Proclean arguments, the difference in possession of the intelligibles between the separate Nous and the particular souls. The first possesses all the intelligibles in-itself (pntacwnnauttgnwst)39, grasping them by means of a direct and simultaneous act of intellection (plajpibolajkaqroijkatalambnwnat)40, never losing or abandoning them (odpotexstataip'atn)41. The second is characterized by a dispositional status (kaq'xin), and by its discursive activity, which has the common notions in the realm of syllogistic argumentation as its starting point42.

Nevertheless, the intellect also possesses innate contents, which Eustratius describes as certain echoes in it of an absolutely existing Intellect (phcmattinanauttopljprcontojno). This description of the innate knowledge in us is again rooted in Proclus43, and it also occurs in the passage previously subject to my analysis (303,19-23, ed. Heylbut). In his Super Ethica Albert discusses this latter expression used

37 EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,19-23 (ed. Heylbut): m,ngrkat'osannojpntacwnnaut

tgnwstkaplajpibolajkaqroijkatalambnwnatodpotexstataip'atn, d, n mn noj kaq' xin cwn t enai, mnaj cei x rcj tj koinj nnoaj okeanergmatakanomataphcmattinanauttopljprcontojno. 38

PROCLUS, In Tim., 2,313,1-4 (ed. Diehl). Cf. also In I Alc., 65,19-66,6 (ed. Westerink). 39

Cf. e.g. PROCLUS, El. Theol., prop. 194 (ed. Dodds): Psa yuc pnta cei t edh, nojprtwjcei. 40

Cf. n. 32 and 37. 41

Cf. PROCLUS, In I Alc., 188,8-11 (ed. Westerink): otegrtkrettonagnhtjmetrajyucjdi maqsewj ersewj tugcnei tj autn teleithtoj: e gr snesti toj autngnwstojkaodpoteodpoteodpoteodpotefstataistataistataistataiatnatnatnatnod,ndeggnetaitjokeajgnsewj.In this passage Proclus claims that the classes superior to our soul do not attain perfection through a learning process, for they are always united to their objects of knowledge and they never leave them (odpote fstataiatn). 42

The term common notions (koina nnoiai) used to describe the starting points of discursive reasoning and the principles of scientific demonstrations is very common in the Neoplatonic literature. Cf e.g. SYRIANUS, In Met. (ed. Kroll.), 18,9-10; 21,31-34; PROCLUS, In I Eucl., (ed. Friedlein), 240,11-14; AMMONIUS, In de Int., 7,16-22 (ed. Busse); ASCLEPIUS, In Met., 158,11-13 (ed. Hayduck); JOANNES PHILOPONUS, In A.pr., 2,24-27 (ed. Wallies). Cf. also D.J. OMEARA, Le problme de la mtaphysique dans l'antiquit tardive, Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie, 33 (1986), 1-14, 12-13. 43

See for instance PROCLUS, In I Alc., 99,13-19 (ed. Westerink).

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by Eustratius at length, rightly pointing out that it should be understood within the distinction between the possession of the intelligible forms in the separate intelligences and in the human intellect. Forms are to be found in us as a kind of resonance (per redundantiam) of the forms to be found in the separate intelligences, which are the sources from which they are emanated (sicut in fonte profundente eas)44. But nevertheless, Albert seems to diverge in opinion from Eustratius as he claims that these echoes are not the substance of our intellect (substantia intellectus nostri), but almost an accident in the soul (accidens in anima), insofar as we are generally forced to attain the knowledge of the forms from the particular individuals45. On the contrary, all the evidence suggests that according to Eustratius the echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect are to be linked to the logoi ousiodeis of the Neoplatonic tradition46, the logoi which Proclus, for example, describes as a kind of breathing thought in us47, and which the soul literally projects before itself within distinct and articulated acts48. Eustratius reference to the echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect reflects the idea that the soul proceeds from the Intellect, preserving the character of its cause, though only secondarily49. This is why the Intellect is all forms in a unified and concentrated manner, whereas the soul is all forms in a discursive, analogical, and unfolding manner. The presence of echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect relates to precisely this principle, namely, that in the particular souls the indivisible forms have become logoi. These logoi are ousiodeis, in the sense that, far from being mere accidents of the soul, as stated by Albert, they constitute the very essence of the soul itself.

What is more interesting is the way in which Eustratius describes the intellectual state which he calls kaq' xin, for it relates directly to the Albertinian notion of intellectus possessus. In the passage previously analyzed (303,19-27, ed. Heylbut), after stressing the different kinds of possession of the intelligibles between the particular soul and what he calls Intellect by existence (kaq'parxin), he claims that the expression intellect by disposition (kaq' xin) refers to a condition (katstasij) of our soul which is as such neither natural (o fsij) nor essential, but merely dispositional. Dispositional means, Eustratius explains, that this condition comes over the soul from outside (xwqen peisiosa/ab extra superveniens) thus becoming acquired (ginomnhpkthtoj/facta possessa).

The Greek term pkthtoj, acquired or possessed, is rendered as Grossetesta as possessa. The feminine is easily explainable here by the fact that possessa refers to the soul (anima) in its participation in the Intellect (participans intellectu). But, as it is clear from the text, the term pkthtoj/possessa is explanatory of the term xij/dispositio in

44 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Ethica, Opera Omnia XIV,2, 1987, liber VI, lectio VIII, 452,46-50.

45 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Ethica, Opera Omnia XIV,2, 1987, liber VI, lectio VIII, 452,50-52.

46 Cf. C. STEEL, Breathing Thought: Proclus on the Innate Knowledge of the Soul, in J.J. O CLEARY (ed.),

The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism, Leuven 1997, 293-309, 295-299. 47

Cf. PROCLUS, In I Alc., 192,2-4 (ed. Westerink) 48

Cf. PROCLUS, In Eucl., 17,4-5; 46,12-13 (ed. Friedlein); In Parm., 896,1-4 (ed. Cousin). 49

Other passages in Eustratius in which the terms phcmata occurs in a similar context are: EUSTRATIUS, In II An., 222,24-25 (ed. Hayduck); 257,37-38; In VI EN, 315,33-34 (ed. Heylbut), 377,37; 379,29-30. In all these passages the expression is referred to the common notions or the axioms upon which discursive reasoning depends. It means that the expression at stake already refers to the unfolding and discursive manner in which innate knowledge is present in our soul. Cf. also. K. IERODIAKONOU, Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition: Eustratios of Nicaea on Universals, Quaestio, 5 (2006), 67-82, in part. 81, n. 30.

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regard to the expression nojkaq'xin. Briefly: the two expressions mean one and the same thing.

As already shown, this Eustratius passage is heavily influenced by Proclean arguments. The description of the dispositional status of our intellect as acquired or possessed does not represent an exception. The term pkthtoj can often be found in Proclus as a description of a state or condition that does not belong to something substantially, but only in a participating or dispositional manner. For example, in his commentary on the Republic, Proclus claims that every God is essentially or substantially (ntwj) good, insofar as it is constituted in his substance (osiwmnoj) according to the good, and it does not possess the good as something acquired (pkthton) or as a disposition (jxin). In fact, continues Proclus, that which is good in this latter way is neither essentially nor truly good (tnti), but has only participated in the good (togaqometscen)50. Even more striking is a passage from Proclus commentary on the Timaeus, for it relates directly to the problem of the different types of knowledge to be found in the particular souls and in the higher order of realities. The arguments at stake run as follow: if knowledge among the Gods is belongs to them essentially and substantially (kat' osan), and if their intellection is not acquired (pkthtoj), then they will know what they know in a way coordinated to their essence51.

Eustratius description of the dispositional state of our intellect as acquired or possessed is borrowed from Proclus in its entirety. The commentator simply applies the general Proclean conceptual opposition kat'osan- pkthtoj to the specific case of the different status and nature of the separate Nous and the human intellect. This description has to be understood within a Neoplatonic metaphysical framework, which can once again be traced back to Proclus, characterized by the distinction between that which exists and acts by its own essence and that which exists or acts by participation.

As shown before, the term pkthtojis to be found in Proclus as opposed to kat'osan, referring to the distinction between a participatory or dispositional character to the possession of a property vis--vis the essential possession of this or that property, as is clear from the Proclean passages mentioned previously. The same can be said for the notion of kaq' parxin, which Eustratius associates with the Intellect that he also defines, as we have seen, askat' osan, or kurwj or kriojnoj, referring to the Supreme Intellect52. As a matter of fact, the concept ofkaq'parxin - referred to the separate Intellect by Eustratius which is to be understood as the essential possession of the proper mode determining a character, is to be found in Proclus within a threefold distinction of the modes in which characters exist, namely in their causes (kat'atan), substantially or existentially (kaq'parxin), and by participation (katmqexin)53. Or, and this resembles the case of Eustratius more closely, Proclus simply refers to the

50 PROCLUS, In Remp., 1,28,17-20 (ed. Kroll).

51 PROCLUS, In Tim., 1,352,19-22 (ed. Diehl). However, it is also true that in the Elements of Theology

Proclus clearly states that since the substance of every God is supra-substantial goodness, he has goodness neither as a disposition (kaq'xin) nor substantially or essentially (kat'osan), but in a supra-substantial manner. Cf. PROCLUS, El. Theol., 119,16-19 (ed. Dodds). 52

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 314,16 (ed. Heylbut); 317,27. 53

PROCLUS, El. Theol., 65 (ed. Dodds); 140,17-18. On this topic, cf. C STEEL, UPARXISchez Proclus, in F. ROMANO/D.P. TAORMINA (eds.), Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel nel neoplatonismo, Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo, Universit degli Studi di Catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992, Firenze 1994, 79-100.

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opposition kaq' parxin - kat mqexin, indipendently from from the general description of the Triadic structure of Reality, in order to draw a more general distinction between the substantial inherence of a character or property as opposed to possession through mere participation in the same character54. It is therefore unsurprising that Eustratius himself refers to this Proclean principle in comparing the Intellect kaq'parxin, the absolutely (plj) existing one, with the intellect by disposition, the previously seen nojkaq'xin. The commentator confirms that this distinction has to be understood within the more general distinction between essential and participatory modes of existence of a character as he explicitly states that our intellect is neither absolute nor by existence, but by disposition, kaq'xin, where the latter expression has to be strictly understood as katmqexin, i.e. by participation55.

The second passage (314,8-18) by Eustratius in which the Latin term possessus appears shows many similarities to the one seen previously (303,19-27). As a matter of fact, Eustratius also stresses the different manner in which the intelligibles are to be found in the Supreme Intellect (kriojnoj) and in the particular soul here56. Proclus is once again the main source for the argument at stake. When pure and free from the passions (kaqar gr genomnh ka leuqra tn paqn yuc)57 the soul is illuminated because of the proximity to the Intellect (llmpetai m,n t prj nongeitnisei/resplendet ea quae ad intellectum vicinitate), thus acquiring or receiving the capacity of acting in a purely intellectual way (noerj/intellectualiter), and no longer in a merely discursive manner. It can therefore grasp the intelligibles by means of direct apprehensions, though neither simultaneously nor all at once, but dancing around the Intellect (tnnonpericoreousa) and moving (metabanousa) from one intelligible to the other.

Two things are interesting in this passage. The first one is the reference to the illumination affecting the soul as it acts in a purely intellectual manner. In fact, as the Proclus specialist is aware, the expression kat' llamyin, by illumination or irradiation, is linked to the notion of kaq' xin, by disposition, at least once in

54 Cf. e.g. PROCLUS, In I Alc., 104,7-8 (ed. Westerink). Here the Gods are said to be self-sufficient kaq'

parxin, whereas the other things are self-sufficient katmqexin. 55

EUSTRATIUS, IN VI EN, 303,16-17 (ed- Heylbut). 56

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, ed. Heylbut, 314,8-18: e gr ka noern lgei tn yucn ka nonprceinfhsnnat,ll'okosiwdjprceinnattnnontqetai,llgekthtnka j xin piginmenon, kaq ka prteron erhtai. di toto ka taj lhqeutikaj xesinatnsunhrqmhsen,rnatnkaktmenonxwqenkapoballmenon.kaqargrgenomnhkaleuqratnpaqnyuc,llmpetaim,ntprjnongeitnisei,dcetaid,keqentnoerjnergen,kaotwtntnntwnproslambneikatlhyinplajpibolajfaptomnhatn,okqronjkriojnojod,pntwnmo,llkaq' nkastonatntnnonpericoreousaka xtrwntnp'atonooumnwnejteronmetabanousa. = EUSTRATIUS LATINUS, Eton College 122, f 112 va: Etsi enim intellectualem dicit animam et intellectum existere ait in ipsa, sed non substantialiter existere in ipsa intellectum ponit, sed possessum et ut habitum supervenientem, quemadmodum et prius dictum est, propter hoc et veridicis habitibus ipsum conumeravit, videns ipsum et possessum ab extra et depositum. Pura enim facta et libera a passionibus anima resplendet ea quae ad intellectum vicinitate, recipit autem illinc intellectualiter operari, et sic entium assumit comprehensionem simplicibus appositionibus contingens ipsa, non repente ut proprie intellectus neque omnia simul, sed secundum unumquodque ipsorum intellectum circumambulans et ex alteris quae ab ipso intellectu intelliguntur in alterum transiens. 57

Cf. PROCLUS, El. Theol., 209 (ed. Dodds). A reference to this very same argument by Proclus is to be found also in EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,24-25.

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Proclus works. This connection can be found in Proclus commentary on the Alcibiades, where Proclus re-examines the threefold distinction of the types of intellect already discussed in his commentary on the Timaeus58, from the point of view of the three types of love. The third one is the one which subsists in the soul by illumination (kat'llamyin), corresponding to the intellect by disposition (kaq' xin). This reference cannot be casual, especially if one bears in mind that the illumination of the soul which grants it the possibility of acting intellectually is due to what Eustratius calls the proximity to the Intellect (t prj non geitnisei). This expression is literally borrowed from Proclus Platonic Theology59, and serves to stress the participatory and dispositional character of the intellectual operation proper to the particular souls within the argument expounded by Eustratius once again.

The second interesting element is more directly related to the topic of the intellect by disposition. Eustratius ascribes this particular characterization of the intellect to Aristotle himself. As a matter of fact, in book VI of the NE, the intellect is defined by Aristotle, along with Art, Science, Practical Wisdom, and Wisdom, as a truth attaining disposition(xij)60. The commentator claims that according to Aristotle the intellect is actually a disposition like the other four insofar as it is acquired from outside (ktmenonxwqen) and can also be lost (poballmenon). But what is surprising here is that what Eustratius ascribes directly to Aristotle is expressed with the words and arguments of Proclus.

Actually, the argument expounded by Eustratius here is almost identical to the one seen previously. The intellect does not subsist in the soul essentially (osiwdj/substantialiter), but as something acquired (kthtn/possessus), a supervening disposition (j xin piginmenon). The term kthtn is synonymous with pkthtoj, and like pkthtoj is rendered by Grosseteste as possessum. In this context it has the same function as pkthtoj did in the previous passage, namely, to characterise the intellectual activity of the particular souls as participatory and dispositional, as opposed to the essential (osiwdj/kat' osan) possession of this very same property. The same is true of the expression j xin piginmenon, which closely resembles the expression jxwqenpeisiosa employed by Eustratius in the first passage analysed here, and which immediately precedes the expression pkthtoj.

The Proclean background of these arguments now seems to be clear. If possible, one could even add that the two expressions, j xin piginmenon and j xwqenpeisiosa, to be found in the two different Eustratius passages under discussion here, appear almost literally in Proclus in one and the same passage from his commentary on the Parmenides61. Here Proclus distinguishes between two types of Multiplicity among beings, the first one essential, and the other that supervenes from outside and is adventitious (xwqen pigignmenon ka peisodidej). In this respect, these two terms are closely related to the form gggnesqai used by Proclus to describe generally

58 Cf. n. 38.

59 PROCLUS, Theol. Plat., 1,66,20-23 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink): yuc d, atoknhtoj osa tj kat

nonmetceizwjkakatcrnonnergosattjnergeajpaustonkatngrupnonzwnktjprjprjprjprjtnnonnonnonnonceigeitnisegeitnisegeitnisegeitnisewj. The same expression occurrs in EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,28-30 (ed. Heylbut). 60

ARISTOTELES, EN,VI,3,1139b14-17. 61

PROCLUS, In Parm., 1187,41-1188,3 (ed. Cousin). Cf. also MICHAEL PSELLUS, Theologica, 4,28-29 (ed. Gautier).

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that which comes into being in the soul from outside, like, for example, those concepts (nomata) which are the result of an abstractive process from sensible particulars and which do not subsist (kat'osan) in our soul essentially62.

It seems that in general Eustratius simply applies terms and expressions used by Proclus to describe the different types of existence and the different manners which a character possesses in the specific case of the different types of intellect. What is clear is that when Albert refers the notion of intellectus possessus to the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, as the general Greek counterpart of the Arabic notion of intellectus adeptus, he is probably referring to the two Eustratius passages mentioned here.

It might be objected that the notion of nojkaq'xin, which lies behind the notion of intellectus possessus, is not peculiar to Eustratius, but is also to be found in other Late-Ancient commentators. True, the expression noj kaq' xin occurs in many relevant passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias commentary on the De Anima63, as well as in Themistius64 paraphrase of the same work, and in Philoponus own commentary65. Nevertheless, according to these commentators, this expression generally refers to that particular state of the human intellect when it possesses a series of thoughts without actually thinking them66, although in Aristotles De anima (3,5,430a15) the term xij also seems to refer to the active intellect directly67.

It might also be objected that in one passage of Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima one can find a description of the nojkaq'xin that appears to be similar to the one produced by Eustratius. Actually, Alexander distinguishes between an intellect which he calls natural (fusikj) or material (likj), common to all men who are not physically incapacitated (n psin toj m pephrwmnoij), and one that is acquired (pkthtoj), which comes to be only afterwards (steron gginmenoj), and which Alexander calls form (edoj) and disposition or habit (xij), i.e. the perfection of the natural and material intellect (teleithj tofusiko)68. In this passage the term pkthtoj, which Eustratius borrows from Proclus, and the expression sterongginmenoj, similar to the forms jxinpiginmenonand jxwqenpeisiosa, which are also in Eustratius via Proclus, also characterise Alexanders notion of nojkaq' xin. But, again, despite the occurrences of the same terms, it is clear that the intellect in habit or by disposition at stake here is not the same one as Eustratius is referring to. Alexander speaks of that habit or disposition which happens to be in those who go through a process of practice and learning69. On the contrary, Eustratius notion

62 PROCLUS, In Parm., 892,17-19 (ed. Cousin).

63 ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, De anima, 86,5 (ed. Bruns); 88,6; De anima libri Mantissa, 107,20-21 (ed.

Bruns). 64

THEMISTIUS, In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis, 95,30-31 (ed. Heinze); 98,21-24; 100,2-3; 65

JOAHNNES PHILOPONUS, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria, 490,27 (ed. Hayduck). 66

For some exceptions to this general trend, see H.A. DAVIDSON, Alfarabi, Avicenna, & Averroes, on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect. & Theories of Human Intellect, New York-Oxford 1992, 10, n. 22. 67

ARISTOTELES, De anima, 3,5,430a14-15: kastinm,ntoiotojnojtpnta gnesqai,d,tpntapoien,jxijtij,oontfj. 68

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, De anima, 81,26-82,1 (ed. Bruns). 69

A different interpretation of Alexander reference to the acquired (pkthtoj) character of the intellect is to be found in M. GEOFFROY, La tradition arabe du Per no dAlexandre dAphrodise, in C. DANCONA/G. SERRA (eds.), Aristotele e Alessandro dAfrodisia nella tradizione araba, Aristotele e

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of nojkaq'xin/pkthtoj refers, as previously shown, to the participatory character of the intellectual operation proper to the particular soul, and it cannot therefore be assimilated with the analogous notion to be found in Alexander. The very same reference to the concept of katmqexin explaining the expression kaq'xinseems to leave no doubt on the Neoplatonic, and particularly Proclean root of Eustratius description of the dispositional intellect. As a matter of fact, the same Albert, who, moreover, could not have read Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima, reflects Eustratius emphasis on the adventitious and acquired character of the intellect by disposition as he claims that id quod possessum est, aliud est et alterius naturae a possidente.70.

4. Alberts reading of Eustratius intellect theory

There are some relevant observations to be made regarding Alberts reading of these and others of Eustratius passages from his commentary on book VI of the NE. Most of them are strictly related to the topic of the different states of intellect, specifically concerning the intellects which Grosseteste renders as secundum substantiam or secundum existentiam, on the one hand, and secundum habitum, on the other.

First of all, Albert must without doubt have found the general Neoplatonic flavour of certain arguments expounded by Eustratius attractive, insofar as they show apparent affinities to arguments and formulas found in the Latin translations of certain Arabic philosophical works. For instance, Eustratius reference to the different modes of possessions of the intelligible in the separate Nous (concentrated, simultaneous, and united), and in the particular soul (non-coordinated and discursive) fits in with similar but more general arguments in the Liber de Causis, for example, which concerns the different degrees of universality possessed by the intelligible contents in the various separate intelligences, as well as in Alberts reading of these arguments in the De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa71.

In the latter work Albert literally recalls Eustratius distinction between the two different statuses of the separate Nous and the particular soul, as he identifies Eustratius intellectus secundum substantiam with the notion of intellectus per essentiam72, i.e. that intellect which is always in act and identical to its thoughts, as a state belonging to the

Alessandro dAfrodisia nella tradizione araba, Padova 2002, 191-231, 217, in which the author interprets the terms pkthtoj as referring to the qraqen of Aristotles agent intellect. However, I am not sure that this, at least in De anima 81,26-82,1, is truly the case. My interpretation of Alexanders reference to the term pkthtoj is also confirmed in DAVIDSON, Alfarabi cit., 10-12 and in DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand cit., 254-255. 70

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De XV problematibus, Opera Omnia XVII,1, 1975, 32,70-71 (quoted in full at n. 10). 71

Cf. e.g. Liber de Causis, IX,8-23 (ed. Pattin); ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 2,2,22,4-14. On this topic see E. COCCIA, Intellectus sive intelligentia. Alberto Magno, Avverro e la noetica degli arabi, Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosphie und Theologie, 53, 1/2, (2006), 133-187. 72

On this notion see ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De Intellectu et Intelliggibili, Opera Omnia IX, ed. Borgnet, Paris 1890, 507b.

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intellectus universaliter agens73, as opposed to the intellectus possessus, which can only perform its operation in an imperfect manner, according to its proper limit and capacity74. In making his point Alberts argument is reminiscent of Eustratius description of the different modes of existence and operation of the separate Nous and the human intellect.

For example, other formulas employed by Eustratius seem to match Alberts own habit of refering to concepts and notions related to the category of emanationism. As we have already seen, Eustratius develops an argument according to which the illumination of the soul, which grants it the possibility of performing an intellectual operation, is due to the proximity to the Intellect (tprjtnnongeitnisei). Elsewhere he refers to the latter expression, borrowed from Proclus Platonic Theology75, within a more general argument on the status of the human intellect in regard to the nature and function of the whole process of causation76. Through the proximity to the Intellect (tprjtnnongeitnisei/quae ad intellectum vicinitate), Eustratius claims, the particular human soul acquires a certain intellectual capacity by participating in a principle superior in rank to itself (to p,r atn tetagmnou metcousan/eo quod super ipsam ordinatio participantem)77. This proximity is explained by Eustratius through reference to the general principle that the processions from the First Cause (aprodoiktjprthjataj/entium egressus a prima causa) must take place in a way that respects and preserves the unity of the causal chain or concatenation (kaq' ermn / secundum ordinem). In this respect, that which is lower in the hierarchy of beings must always be in conjunction with that which is immediately superior to it, thus keeping an element of similitude with it (e tofeimnousunaptomnou tpratoka tinaprjkeno kekthmnou mowsin/semper suppositio coniunctio ei quod ante ipsum et quamdam ad illud possidentem similitudinem).

The Latin version of this puzzle of terms and expressions taken here and there mainly from Proclus Elements of Theology78 and from other works seems to provide Albert with a terminology that is very close to that in his own works, borrowed mainly from Arabic sources. The term vicinitas, used to describe the relation between the soul and the Intellect, from which the particular soul receives the capacity of performing a purely intellectual operation , the expression entium egressus a prima causa, and finally the term coniunctio, to be found in reference to the necessary unity of the chain of causes, all closely relate to Alberts arguments on the coniunctio, continuatio, and copulatio with

73 On the aequivocity of this notion, to be found in Albert as referred to both the human active intellect and

to the separate Intelligence, if not to the Intellect of the First Cause, cf. ANZULEWICZ, Entwicklung cit., 198-199. 74

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 2,2,20,114,82-115,4: Est autem intellectus per essentiam, qui sua essentia universaliter agens est, et movens omne quod est ad formam intellectus: et hoc propter hoc quod semper in actu est, et per essentiam actu est, nec adeptus, nec possessus dici potest. Propter quod dicit Eustratius, quod possessus intellectus numquam potest tantum depurari et perfici, quod per essentiam intellectus efficiatur, vel illi similis, nisi per analogiam suae possibilitatis; 2,2,33,126,63-70; 2,1,8,16-20: Ab esse autem, quod superius est, deficit noster intellectus eo quod non habemus intellectum, qui per essentiam intellectus sit, sed potius intellectum, qui ex superiori causa influxus est nobis, cuius virtus non nisi per studium adepta est.. 75

Cf. n. 57. 76

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,28-32 (ed. Heylbut). 77

This formula is freely borrowed by Eustratius from PROCLUS, In Tim., 3,269,15-20 (ed. Diehl), where Proclus discusses the way in which the Indivisible is present in the particular souls. 78

Cf. PROCLUS, El. Theol., 11,8; (ed. Dodds); 21,15-18; 29,3-4; 132,29-30; PROCLUS, Theologia Platonica, 5,103,5-6 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink).

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the separate substances79, as well as to Albert frequent references to the term processio or fluxus in the description of the emanation process80.

Despite these similarities, which can be explained by referring to the common Neoplatonic background between Eustratius and the other sources read and discussed by Albert, like the texts of the Arabic tradition or Ps.-Dionysius, there are nevertheless consistent differences between Eustratius authentic arguments and their reading by Albert. These differences are primarily terminological.

Eustratius formulas relating to the different states and types of intellect strictly reflect his main source, namely Proclus. In his commentary on book VI of the NE, much more than in the commentary on book I, Eustratius develops a theory of recollection where the description of the transition from discursive reasoning of the particular soul to its purely intellectual activity can clearly be traced back to several Proclean arguments. This statement can also be supported by Eustratius claim that through recollection the human intellect again becomes solely itself (auto mnou genmenoj). Here the commentator literally quotes from Proclus commentary on the Alcibiades, sharing with his source the very same doctrine of the soul self-reversion as the process through which the soul regains its proper essence81.

Indeed, one could rightly argue that even Eustratius reference to self-reversion fits in with Alberts emphasis on the fact that through the formal conjunction with the agent intellect man can act and operate according to its true essence, as Albert himself states in the De anima82. Moreover, in the De intellectu et intelligibili Albert explicitly links the attainment of the status adeptionis to knowledge of the self83. But, again, several differences remain. In Eustratius there is no trace of the terminology that a Latin reader might have found in the Latin translation of the Arabic philosophical texts concerning the classification of the different types of intellects for example, nor are there any references to a system of separate intelligences comparable to the one present in the Arabic source material. On the contrary, Eustratius only seems to borrow a general metaphysical scheme from Proclus, which is founded on the distinction between the Nous as a separate hypostasis and the particular souls. This scheme can safely be assimilated into certain Arabic theories on the intellect only if it is taken in its general terms and not in its specificity. Therefore, the problem lies in understanding how Alberts reading of Eustratius combines this scheme with his own intellect theory.

79 On this topic, see A. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand et la philosophie, Paris 1990, 246-251; 262-277; ID.

Penser au Moyen ge, Paris 1991, 290-292. 80

Cf. e.g. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 1,4,1,42,35-44,3; 2,1,15,78,52-55; 2,3,3,147,71-148,9, 2,3,4,142,29-33. 81

EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,24-26 (ed. Heylbut): tand,tjtnpaqnpallagsugcsewjkatn sunhrthmnwn perarq dunmewn ka t tleion ato polyetai auto mnougenmenoj. This passage is actually constructed by assembling together two Proclean passages, namely PROCLUS, In I Alc., 224,8-9 (ed. Westerink) (a reference to Timaeus d7): tj deutraj ka trtajdunmdunmdunmdunmeij tj sunhrthmnsunhrthmnsunhrthmnsunhrthmnajat (scil. the soul), and PROCLUS, In I Alc., 20,15-14: qen dka Swkrthj p tlei to dialgou tn ej autn pistrafnta ka auto genmenoauto genmenoauto genmenoauto genmenon qewrnnteqen. On Proclus theory of self-reflection and self-reversion, cf. C. STEEL, Proclus ber Selbstreflexion und Selbstbegrndung, in M. PERCKAMS/R.M. PICCIONE (eds.), Proklos, Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik, Leiden-Boston 2006, 230-255. 82

Cf. n. 13. 83

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, II, Opera Omnia IX, Paris 1890, 515a; 516a: Ex his igitur patet qualiter per studium intellectus adipiscitur seipsum..

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In the passage from the De XV Problematibus84 seen previously Albert uses the notion of intellectus possessus synonymously to the notion of intellectus adeptus. The names of Eustratius, Aspasius, and Michael of Ephesus are given as the source of the notion of intellectus possessus. Nevertheless, as he explains what these identical notions refer to he mentions the idea that the intelligent soul is image (imago) of the 10th intelligence. As already stated, references to a system of separate intelligences comparable to the Arabic one are not found in Eustratius explicitly.

Albert also refers to the idea that the human intellect is received (possessus) and acquired (adeptus) from a superior nature (a natura superiori)85. Nevertheless, despite the reference to the Greek Peripatetic tradition, Alberts reading of Eustratius seems to focus more on the Arabic one, which Albert mentions in order to discuss the idea of the unity of the intellect. However, what one can notice is that Eustratius distinction between the two types of intellect is understood by Albert as being similar to the relation between the dator formarum and the human soul, which he ascribes to the Arabic philosophical tradition. In this respect, Eustratius seems to suggest a general Neoplatonic scheme to Albert that the latter immediately refers to his own interpretation and discussion of the Arabic theories on the intellect.

What is more problematic is Alberts reference to Eustratius in his De anima86. As said before, in this passage Albert depicts the intellectus adeptus/possessus as the result of a formal conjunction between the potential and the agent intellect in terms of compositum, like form with matter (sicut forma materiae). Albert refers this type of conjunction directly to book X of the NE, adding that the commentators on the NE, namely Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus, also interpret Aristotle in this way.

In his commentary on book X of the NE, Michael of Ephesus often employs expressions related to the term conjunction or assimilation to the divine things, often revealing a Neoplatonic background behind formulas which he usually links to the Platonicmowsijqe to be found in Thaetetus 176b, for instance87. He also develops an argument in which the intellect is said to be akin to God, stressing that this relation to God is not an essential one (suggenj d'otnosan), but is only according to the similitude of the operation (kattntjnergeajmoithta)88. Nevertheless, on the topic of the types of intellect presenting elements Eustratius, who also refers to the general idea of conjunction with the separate substances89, best fits Alberts reference to the Byzantine commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics regarding to the notion of intellectus possessus.

However, Alberts account of the formal conjunction in the De anima seems to show consistent differences to the authentic doctrine in Eustratius. In fact, according to the latter, the expressions intellectus secundum substantiam and intellectus possessus or secundum habitum strictly apply respectively to the separate Nous and to the human

84 Cf. n. 10.

85 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De XV problematibus, Opera Omnia XVII,1, 1975, 33,54-56.

86 cf. n. 12.

87 Cf. MICHAEL EPHESIUS, In X EN, 579,3-6 (ed. Heylbut); 586,9-11; 591,22-24. On Michaels dependence

upon Neoplatonic source-material cf. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources cit., 54-57. 88

MICHAEL EPHESIUS, In X EN, 603,15-20 (ed. Heylbut). Similar arguments are to be found in PROCLUS, In Crat., 128,14-21 (ed. Pasquali); In Remp., 2,85,5-7 (ed. Kroll); 2,85,20-22; 2,148,7-10; Theol. Plat., 1,24,3-11 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink). 89

EUSTRATIUS, In I EN, 6,13-18 (ed. Heylbut); 38,25-28; 63,19-25. Cf. n. 11.

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intellect. If this is the case, Alberts idea that the intellectus adeptus/possessus is the result of the composition between the agent intellect and the potential one, similar to form and matter, does not fit in with Eustratius arguments. The reason for this conclusion is that according to Albert the agent intellect is an individual principle, although it emanates from the First Intellect. However, it shares the essential character of its operation and activity with the latter intellect. Briefly, Alberts individual agent intellect is per essentiam90. On the contrary, as we have seen, according to Eustratius this notion applies univocally to the separate Nous, and not to the case of human intellect, whose intellectual operation does not belong to it essentially. According to the commentator, there is, on the one hand, a Nous to be understood as a separate hypostasis, which is the principle of its own existence and operation, and the particular souls, on the other, which exist and act by participation of something else. There is no trace in Eustratius of the idea of formal conjunction as expounded by Albert, nor that the terminology employed by the commentator can be assimilated with that of the Late-Ancient and Arabic discussion on the status of the agent intellect and the potential one.

It might be said that if it is true that the Neoplatonic doctrine of the logoi ousiodeis underlies Eustratius theory of the process of concept formation, then it is clear that one must admit a form of actuality in the particular soul, insofar as these logoi are constantly breathing and pulsating in us, and it is us who are not aware of them, as we live in a state of ignorance after the shock of birth91. Nevertheless, Eustratius never develops all the logical consequences of his reference to the doctrine of recollection, preferring simply to sketch the distinction which exists between the two modes of existence and operation belonging to the separate Nous and to the particular souls in general terms. In this scheme there is no place, neither in terms nor contents, for a solution which admits an individual principle such as Alberts agent intellect which is secundum substantiam/per essentiam, for according to Eustratius this latter mode of existence and operation belong to the sole separate Nous.

Therefore, one would not be wrong in saying that Alberts interpretation of Eustratius theory on the intellect expounded in the De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa seems to be much safer than what Albert himself ascribes to the commentator in the De anima92. But even in the De causis, the model provided by Eustratius only fits in with Alberts reading if we accept that Alberts intellectus agens universaliter univocally refers to intellect of the First Cause, as he seems to claim in one passage from the same De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa93, and not to the human active intellect, which is caused by the intellectus primae causae and which can perform intellection only in a secondary manner94.

5. Conclusion

90 Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De Intellectu et Intelliggibili, II, Opera Omnia IX, ed. Borgnet, Paris 1890, 507.

Cf. L. STURLESE, Storia della filosofia tedesca nel medioevo. Il Secolo XIII, Firenze 1996, 114, n. 188. 91

Cf. C. STEEL, Breathing Thought cit., 299. 92

Cf. n. 71. 93

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 1,2,2, 26,45-78. Cf. also n. 73. 94

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De homine, Opera Omnia XXXV, Paris 1896, tr.1, q.55, a.3, 464b.

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In his famous Albert le Grand et la philosophie de Libera reconstructs the history of the notion of intellectus adeptus starting from Alexander of Aphrodisias, showing how the arabic philosophers elaborated on this notion, in order to clarify Alberts own interpretation of it95. We are now in a position where we can update and revise de Liberas results.

As we have seen, in Alexander of Aphrodisias terms like acquired intellect (pkthtoj) and habitual intellect (nojkaq'xin) seem to characterize the intellect that results from the activity of the active intellect on the material one, which produces a sort of habit for human thought. However, this text was not available to the Latin readers, so that what Albert had in front of him was basically the re-elaboration of Alexanders notion by the Arabic philosophers. On the contrary, in the Latin version of Eustratius commentary on book VI of the NE one can find the expression intellectus possessus as the direct translation of the Greek term pkthtoj, as well as the expression intellectus secundum habitum as the translation of the Greek nojkaq'xin. We then have a path for the Latin reception of this notion other than the traditional one going from Alexander to the Latin West via the Arabic philosophers. When Albert refers to the term possessus as peculiar to the Greek philosophical tradition he is probably not referring to Alexander, but to the two passages by Eustratius studied in the present paper, for none of the Latin translations of Arabic sources seems to render the only occurrence of the term pkthtoj in Alexanders De anima as possessus96.

What is interesting is that Eustratius noj kaq' xin-pkthtoj/secundum habitum-possessus, hardly fits in with the similar occurrences of these terms in the Greek-Arabic interpretation of Aristotles De anima. This expression does not relate to the kaq' xin/bil-malaka of the Greek-Arabic Peripatetic tradition, namely, the previously seen stage of the human intellect characterized by the possession of thoughts more or less without actually thinking them97. Nor does Eustratius intellectus secundum habitum match the intellectus in habitu, or even in effectu, which a Latin reader could have found in the available translations of the Arabic source-material in relation to the process of progressive actualization of the human intellects potentialities98. On the contrary, it entails a reference to that participatory disposition of the soul which renders it intelligent, and as such it is much closer to the notion of actively acquired intellect of the

95 Cf. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand cit., 251-266.

96 On the Arabic interpretation of Alexanders acquired intellect or intellect from without, see A.

BADAWI, New Philosophical Texts Lost in Greek, in P. MOREWEDGE (ed.), Islamici Philosophical Theology, Albany 4-5. The passages in the Arabic translation of Alexanders De intellectus in which the expression intellect from without is to be found, though not literally translated, are J. FINNEGAN, Texte arabe duperno dAlexandre dAphrodise, Melanges de lUniversit Saint Joseph, 33,2 (1956), 157-202, 172, 191. 97

Cf. e.g. AL-KINDI, Rasil, 1,358 (ed. Abu Rida); AVICENNA, De anima, I,5 (ed. Rahman), 49,13 (intellect in habitu, i.e. possessing the primary intelligibles); I,5,50,1 (intellect in effectu, i.e. possessing the secondary intelligibles without actually thinking them); AVERROES, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, 496-497 (ed. Crawford). Cf. also DAVIDSON, Alfarabi cit., 10-11, 84, 99-102, 273, 332-333; D.N. HASSE, Avicennas De anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300, London-Turin 2000, 178ff. 98

Cf. e.g. Liber de Causis primis et secundis, ed. R. DE VAUX, Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin, Paris 1934, 128,24-129,13; AL-FARABI, De intellectu, ed. E. GILSON, Les sources grco-arabes de laugustinisme avicennisant, Archives dHistoire doctrinale et littraire de Moyen ge, 4 (1929), ; AVICENNA LATINUS, De anima, 96,44-97,55 (ed. Van Riet).

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same Arabic tradition99, or to Alberts own interpretation of the Aristotelian passage of De generatione animalium (2,3,736b28) which he expounds in the De anima100. Nevertheless, as said before, Eustratius never speaks of a formal conjunction, nor is the participatory character of the noj kaq' xin-pkthtoj/secundum habitum-possessus explained as the result of a compound between a formal principle and a material one.

Alberts reading of Eustratius theory of the intellect seems to attempt a forced reconciliation, on the grounds of a common Neoplatonic background, between a Byzantine admirer of Proclus with the Arabic interpreters of Aristotles De anima101. Often this attempt is made difficult by the very same terminology employed by Eustratius. The Latin translation of Eustratius commentary on book VI of the NE by Grossateste offers a text in which the stage of the intellectus adeptus/possessus is generally defined as intellectus secundum habitum, making it impossible to link Eustratius arguments on the two types of intellect, separate and human, directly to the traditional Greek-Arabic classification of the different stages of intellects, in which in habitu and adeptus do not refer to one and the same intellectual stage.

Finally, despite the analogy with the Arabic notion of the actively acquired intellect, which is in the same line as the Arabic interpretation of Alexanders reference to the intellect coming from outside in the De intellectu, Eustratius intellectus possessus also shows elements of originality. In fact, this particular noj kaq' xin-pkthtoj, borrowed from Proclus in its entirety, seems as well to require a stage of activation, something comparable to Alberts notion of per studium as that which allows the attainment of the status adeptionis102. Eustratius actually follows Proclus quite strictly in stating that the transition between discursive and non-discursive thought, and in general the whole process of recollection, starts from outside, from what we collect through sense-perception103. The commentator even uses the same term employed by Proclus to explain the awakening function of that which comes from outside, from the sense-data, namely the forms related to the root neger-104. It is through a process of learning, or in general through experience within the realm of sensorial data, that the soul can revert back onto itself, leaving the dimension of discursive reasoning and becoming purely intellectual105. This participatory disposition which allows the soul to become intelligent and grasp the intelligibles directly, though not in the manner proper to the separate Nous,

99 Cf. DAVIDSON, Alfarabi cit., 11-12.

100 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, III,3,11, Opera Omnia VII, pars I, 1968, 222,29-37.

101 On Alberts dependence upon the Arabic sources for the elaboration of his own intellect theory, cf. D.N.

HASSE, Das Lehrstck von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik: von den arabischen Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus, Recherches de Thologie et Philosophie mdivales, 21-77; J. MLLER, Der Einflu der arabischen Intellektspekulation auf die Ethik des Albertus Magnus, in A. SPEER/L. WEGENER (eds.) Wissen ber Grenzen. Arabischen Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter, Berlin-New York (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 33), 545-568. 102

Cf. e.g. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, II,8, Opera Omnia IX, 514b: De intellectu adeptum per studium disseramus adeptus est qui acquiritur per studium. Adeptus igitur intellectus est quando per studium aliquis verum et proprium suum adipiscitur intellectum. 103

Cf. e.g. PROCLUS, In I Eucl., 45,10-14 (ed. Friedlein); In Parm., 894,19-23. Cf. STEEL, Brething Thought cit., 301, 303. 104

Cf. EUSTRATIUS, In II An. Post, 22,24-28 (ed. Hayduck); 265,19-24. Compare these passages for example with PROCLUS, In I Eucl., 18,17-19 (ed. Friedlein) (on the specific case of mathematics); Theol. Plat., 1,16,16-18 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink). 105

That this correspond to Eustratius position it is clear from EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 348,30-37. This passage strongly echoes PROCLUS, In Parm., 879,17-19 (ed. Cousin).

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is something which is activated only after the relation with the data of sense-perception. The latter constitute the starting point of the whole process of concept formation, which, nevertheless, is accomplished fully only when that which we collect from sensorial experience is referred to what Eustratius calls the echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect106.

Eustratius intellectus possessus conveys both the traditional understanding of the nojkaq'xin-pkthtoj, namely the progressive acquisition of a habit in thought, and the previously mentioned intellectus adeptus agens, a supervening disposition corresponding to the Arabic interpretation of the nojqraqen107. These two different types of intellectus adeptus, which De Libera calls intellectus adeptus 1 and intellectus adeptus 2108, are one and the same thing for Eustratius, one and the same acquired intellect.

Given the importance of this notion in Alberts own theory of the intellect, it is hereby clear that the role played by some of Eustratius arguments concerning the notion of intellectus possessus are relevant and cannot be underestimated by modern scholarship anymore than the equally essential Arabic source-material. But nevertheless, one cannot help but notice the originality of Alberts interpretation of these arguments.

It is still too early to say whether Eustratius may represent an alternative or additional source for the XIII century elaboration of the felicitas speculativa, besides the well researched Arabic ones. However, one can safely claim that Eustratius never developed any theory of contemplative happiness that is comparable in terms and contents to the Latin discussion of this issue. On the contrary, the commentator simply seems to depict a theory on the different types of intellect and intellection grounded entirely on Proclean formulas and arguments that are borrows freely, and which are re-elaborated by him in an autonomous argumentative structure. It is Albert the Great who employs these arguments made by Eustratius in order to support his own elaboration and discussion of the topic of contemplative happiness originating from the Arabic source-material.

What seems to emerge from Eustratius commentary on book VI of the NE is more often a theory of the process of concept formation grounded entirely on recollection, and particularly on Proclus theories of causation and intellection, with some Christian elements added quite sporadically by the commentator. If, as I have said before, it is still early to understand to what extent Eustratius played a role in the XIII century discussions on contemplative happiness, nevertheless it is at least clear that he fully deserves a relevant place in the history of the reception of Proclus in the Latin Middle Ages, and that the frequent quotations of Eustratius that are to be found in Berthold of Moosburgs commentary on Proclus Elements of Theology, for example, are an open invitation for

106 Cf. n. 31.

107 Cf. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand cit., 253-262, in part. 254. The same author accidentally refers to one of

the two passages from the Eustratius Latinus in which the notion of intellectus possessus appears in A. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grande le Platonisme. De la doctrine des Ides la theorie des trois tats de luniversel, in E.O. BOS/P.A. MEIJER, On Proclus & His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, Leiden-New York-Kln 1992, 89-119, 106, n. 61. Nevertheless, the author does not recognize the Proclean source of this passage (In VI EN, 303,19-27), nor he realizes that the Greek term correspondent to possessus is precisely pkthtoj. 108

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modern scholars to investigate this Byzantine commentators reception in the Latin West109.

109 Some intuitions concerning Eustratius role in Berthold of Moosburg can be found in T. IREMADZE,

Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgisce Mittelalter. Dietrich von Freiberg-Berthold von Moosburg-Joane Petrizi, Amsterdam-Philadelphia 2004, 62, 128ff.