ARTICLE INFORMATION WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND …

901

ARTICLE

INFORMATIONWARFARE,INTERNATIONALLAW,ANDTHECHANGINGBATTLEFIELD

Dr.WaseemAhmadQureshi*

ABSTRACTTheadvancementof technology in the contemporaryerahas

facilitatedtheemergenceofinformationwarfare,whichincludesthedeploymentofinformationasaweaponagainstanadversary.Thisisdoneusinganumberoftacticssuchastheuseofmediaandsocialmedia to spread propaganda and disinformation against anadversaryaswellastheadoptionofsoftwarehackingtechniquestospread viruses and malware into the strategically importantcomputersystemsofanadversaryeithertostealconfidentialdataorto damage the adversary’s security system. Due to the intangiblenatureofthedamagecausedbytheinformationwarfareoperations,it becomes challenging for international law to regulate theinformation warfare operations. The unregulated nature ofinformation operations allows information warfare to be usedeffectivelybystatesandnonstateactorstogainadvantageovertheiradversaries. Information warfare also enhances the lethality ofhybridwarfare.Therefore,itistheneedofthehourtoarrangeanewconvention or devise a new set of rules to regulate the sphere ofinformationwarfaretoavertthepotentialdamagethatitcancausetointernationalpeaceandsecurity.

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................901 I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................903 II. WHATISINFORMATIONWARFARE?..............................905

A. DefinitionofInformationWarfare.............................906

*AdvocateSupremeCourtofPakistan.

902 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.43:4

B. DifferenceBetweenInformationWarfareandCyberwarfare......................................................................907

III. SOMEMAJORTACTICSOFINFORMATIONWARFARE...........................................................................................................909 A. UseofMedia........................................................................909

1. PsychologicalWarfare.............................................909 2. TheApplicationoftheFramingTheory:

RelationshipBetweenMediaandForeignPolicy...........................................................................................910

B. RelianceonSocialMediaPlatforms..........................912 C. IntrusionofCyberspace.................................................914 D. DataTheft.............................................................................914 E. RhetoricBuildingoftheMassesoftheAdversary

State.........................................................................................917 F. InformationWarfarebyTerrorists...........................919

IV. INFORMATIONWARFAREREVOLUTIONIZINGWARFAREINTHECONTEMPORARYERA.....................921 A. WagingWarWithouttheConventionalUseofForce

...................................................................................................921 B. MakingtheInternettheBattlefield...........................922 C. AugmentingtheEffectofuseofForceintheEvent

ofanArmedConflict........................................................923 D. InformationWarfareasanElementofHybrid

Warfare..................................................................................924 V. INTERNATIONALLAWANDINFORMATIONWARFARE

...........................................................................................................926 A. TheLawofWar..................................................................926 B. ChallengesFacedbyInternationalLawin

RegulatingInformationWarfare................................927 1. Intangibility..................................................................927

a.UnregulatedIntangibleDamage.....................928 b.IntangibilityLeadingtoTangibleDamage.928

2. TheInherentRighttoFreedomofOpinionandExpression....................................................................929

3. TheOuterSpaceTreatyandtheCHMPrinciple...........................................................................................930

VI. SUGGESTIONSTOREGULATEINFORMATIONWARFARE.....................................................................................932

2020] INFORMATIONWARFARE 903

A. EnactNewLaws,Rules,andPrinciples...................932 B. ArrangeaNewConvention:TheNeedoftheHour

...................................................................................................934 VII. CONCLUSION...............................................................................935

I.INTRODUCTIONInformation warfare is a combination of multifarious

strategies aimed at harming the reputation or informationalinfrastructure of an adversary.1 This tactic can be employed intimes of both peace and war.2 In particular, the informationwarfare strategy is relied upon widely by the actors of hybridwarfare.3 States and nonstate actors involved in waging hybridwarfare employ information warfare tactics either to demonizetheir adversary by spreading disinformation, fake news, andpropaganda or to harm the online security protocols of theiradversary.4Forinstance,surreptitiousandsuddenonlineattackson an adversary’s cyberspace via hacking, the stealing of anadversary’s confidential data adversary, or the deployment ofsocialmedia campaigns to spread rumors against the adversaryare some of the various tactics pursued within the sphere ofinformationwarfare.5Inshort,informationwarriorsrelyonusinginformation as a precursor to causing intangible damage to theadversary.6 The intangible damage can, sometimes, also bringtangible damage with it. For instance a virus attack on thecommandandcontrolsystemsofanenemy’sjetfighterscanhinder

1. SeeLAWRENCET.GREENBERGETAL.,INFORMATIONWARFAREANDINTERNATIONALLAW

1(1998).2. VINCENTF.HENDRICKS&MADSVESTERGAARD,REALITYLOST:MARKETSOFATTENTION,

MISINFORMATIONANDMANIPULATION69(2018).3. See,e.g.,PrzemyslawFurgacz,RussianInformationWarintheUkrainianConflict,in

COUNTERINGHYBRIDTHREATS:LESSONSLEARNEDFROMUKRAINE207(NiculaeIancuetal.eds.,2016).

4. Seeid.SeealsoCristianBarna,TheRoadtoJihadinSyria:UsingSOCMINTtoCountertheRadicalizationofMuslimYouthinRomania,inCOUNTERINGRADICALISATIONANDVIOLENTEXTREMISMAMONGYOUTHTOPREVENTTERRORISM193(MarcoLombardietal.eds.,2015).

5. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.6. AlexanderNitu,InternationalLegalIssuesandApproachesRegardingInformation

Warfare,inPROCEEDINGSOFTHE6THINTERNATIONALCONFERENCEONINFORMATIONWARFAREANDSECURITY201(2011).


pilots in controlling planes, which can result in crashes andpossibly causinghumancasualties.7 In suchanevent, the lawofarmedconflictwouldbeappliedasthenatureofthedamagehasturnedfromintangibletotangible.8Ontheotherhand,whentheimpactof informationoperationsis intangibledamage,therearechallengesinregulatinginformationwarfareundertheauthorityofinternationallaw.9

Additionally,therighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,the common heritage of mankind (“CHM”) principle, and theprovisions of the Outer Space Treaty create restrictions forinternational law in regulating the operations of informationwarfare.10 These restrictions make it difficult to legally bringinformationwarfarewithintheregulationofthenorms,rules,andprinciples of international law.11 Consequently, informationoperations become unrestricted in their scope and functioning,which poses risks to international peace and security. This isbecause a lack of regulation can make the use of informationwarfarestrategiesuncontrolled, invitingrivalstates touse themagainsteachotherunrestrictedly.12Theriskstopeaceandsecuritydeepen when information operations are installed by militantterroristsandanti-stateactors.13Therefore,itisessentialthattheinternationalcommunityunites to legislatenewrulesregulatingtheconductofstatesandnonstateactorswhenevertheyusethestrategies and tools of informationwarfare against any state orentity.Theunderlyingchallengesindoingsocanbemetthrougharranging a new convention on the issue and holding dialogues

7. E.g.,MichaelJ.Robbat,ResolvingtheLegalIssuesConcerningtheuseofInformation

Warfare intheInternationalForum:TheReachoftheExistingLegalFramework,andtheCreationofaNewParadigm,6B.U.J.SCI&TECH.L.26(2000).

8. Id.at13.9. See,e.g.,GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.SeealsoPhillipA.Johnson,IsitTime

foraTreatyon InformationWarfare?, inCOMPUTERNETWORKATTACKANDINTERNATIONALLAW439(MichaelN.Schmitt&BrianT.O’Donnelleds.,2010).

10. Id.11. Johnson,supranote9,at445-46.12. Nitu,supranote6,at200-01.13. M.A. Hannan Bin Azhar & Thomas Edward Allen Barton, Forensic Analysis of

SecureEphemeralMessagingApplicationsonAndroidPlatforms,inGLOBALSECURITY,SAFETYAND SUSTAINABILITY: THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE CONNECTED WORLD 27 (HamidJahankhanietal.eds.,2017).


amongstatestocontroltheunrestrictedarenaoftheinformationoperations.14

This Article will include an exploration of the differentoperations of information warfare. It will also include anexplanationofhowchallengingithasbecomeforinternationallawtoregulateinformationoperations.Afterabriefintroductiontothewhole Article in the Part I, Part II will include the definition ofinformation warfare and information operations. Part III willhighlightsomeofthemajorinformationoperationsandstrategiesof informationwarriorsthatarebeingcarriedout inthecurrentera.PartIVwilldiscusshowsignificantlythearenaofinformationwarfarehasrevolutionizedtheconceptofwarfareinthecurrentera and how substantially the information operations areaugmentingthelethalityofhybridwarfare.PartVwillincludeanevaluation of the key challenges that are being faced byinternational law, especially by the international law of armedconflict, in regulating information warfare. Finally, Part VI willinclude some suggestions for regulating information operations,primarilybybringingthesphereofinformationwarfareunderthebroadumbrellaof international law. InferenceswillbedrawnattheendoftheArticle.

II.WHATISINFORMATIONWARFARE?Informationwarfareisasetofcontemporarytacticsadopted

by states as well as nonstate actors to achieve competitiveadvantageovertheiradversaries.15Thesetacticscanbedeployedwithorwithouttheuseofforce.16Generally,informationwarfarecauses intangible damage to the adversary by deteriorating itsreputation through propaganda, disinformation, or “fake news,”which is carriedout via theuseofmassmedia, socialmedia, orsimilar.17However,whenthesoftwareintrusionmethodsareused

14. SeegenerallyJohnson,supranote9.15. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.16. MarkkuJokisipila,E-Jihad,CyberterrorismandFreedomofSpeech,inWAR,VIRTUAL

WARANDSOCIETY:THECHALLENGETOCOMMUNITIES94(AndrewR.Wilson&MarkL.Perryeds.,2008).

17. SeeNitu,supranote6,at204.SeealsoAnna-MarieJansenvanVuurenetal.,TheSusceptibilityoftheSouthAfricanMediatoBeUsedasaToolforInformationWarfare,in


to cause damage to the strategically or economically importantcomputer data systems of an adversary, then that intangibledamage from information warfare can sometimes also producetangible damage to the adversary.18 This happens in particularwhenthemilitarycommandandcontrolsystemsofanadversaryare attacked with malware or viruses.19 If such an attack islaunchedonweaponrysystemssuchascomputercontrolsystemsoffighterjetsorotherexpensivemilitarytools,thenthedamagecan be tangible and produce heavy financial losses.20 Humancasualties can also result if weapon systems become out ofcontrol—e.g.,thecrashingofjetplanes.21

The emergence of information warfare operations can beascribedtoadvancementsintechnology,asmostofthedangerousinformation warfare tactics include the use of advancedtechnological tools.For instance, thespreadofmalware,viruses,etc. requires modern computer hacking technologies.22 Thus,technology is used or misused against an adversary with theintentionofeithercausingintangibledamagetotheadversaryorgainingcompetitiveorstrategicadvantageoverit.23

A.DefinitionofInformationWarfareThere isnounanimouslyaccepteddefinitionof information

warfare so far.Nonetheless, thedefinitionspresentedby theUSJointChiefsofStaffandtheUSAirForceare,tosomeextent,famousinthescholarlyworld.24Theformerregardsinformationwarfareas “information operations” and defines it as “the integratedemploymentofelectronicwarfare,computernetworkoperations,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INFORMATIONWARFARE AND SECURITY127(RobertErraed.,2012).

18. Robbat,supranote7,at8–13.19. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1–2.20. Robbat,supranote7,at8–13.21. Id.22. DR. YANA KOROBKO&MAHMOUDMUSA, THE SHIFTING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER:

PERILSOFAWORLDWARANDPREVENTIVEMEASURES105(2014).23. See generally ROGER DEAN THRASHER, INFORMATION WARFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR

FORGINGTHETOOLS(1996).SeealsoGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.24. See details provided in the text under the footnote 5 in Christopher Joyner&

CatherineLotrionte, InformationWarfareas InternationalCoercion:ElementsofaLegalFramework,827EUR.J.INT’LL.825-65(2001).


psychological operations, military deception, and operationssecurity, in concert with specified supporting and relatedcapabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarialhuman and automated decision making while protecting ourown.”25 On the other hand, the US Air Force has definedinformationwarfare as “any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, ordestroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protectingourselvesagainst thoseactions;andexploitingourownmilitaryinformationfunctions.”26

Thesedefinitionssuggestthatinformationwarfareisasetoftechniques that employ information to achieve strategic orcompetitiveadvantageoveranadversary.Additionally,theaboveprovided definitions also suggest that gaining such competitiveadvantage also requires ensuring adequate security from theinformation operations of the adversary.27 Hence, thestrengtheningofsecuritysystemswouldplayanessentialroleinthe quest to gain advantage over an adversary in the arena ofinformationwarfare.

B.DifferenceBetweenInformationWarfareandCyberwarfareAlthough there are some similarities between information

warfare and cyberwarfare, the scopes of the two fields aresignificantly different. Information warfare is an olderphenomenonthancyberwarfareandhasbeenafundamentalpartof conventional war throughout the course of history.28 On theotherhand,cyberwarfareisarelativelynewphenomenon,becauseit has emerged only since the invention of the internet andcomputers, unlike a number of informationwarfare operations,whichexistedlongbefore.29

25. Fordetails,seeU.S.DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSE,THEDICTIONARYOFMILITARYTERMS

261(2009).SeealsoMARCOBOSCINI&LEVERHULMETRUST,CYBEROPERATIONSANDTHEUSEOFFORCEININTERNATIONALLAW11(2014).

26. ATHINAKARATZOGIANNI,THEPOLITICSOFCYBERCONFLICT100(2006).27. Id.28. DavidR.Mets,AIRPOWERANDTECHNOLOGY:SMARTANDUNMANNEDWEAPONS:SMART

ANDUNMANNEDWEAPONS139(2008).29. RyanWhiteetal.,TheDifferenceBetweenCyberandInformationWarfare,CYBER

SECURITY&L.POL’Y(Feb.20,2018),https://blog.cybersecuritylaw.us/2018/02/20/the-difference-between-cyber-and-information-warfare[https://perma.cc/3CDP-J6AY].


Primarily, in the sphere of information operations, it isinformationthatisusedasaweaponagainstanadversary.30Inthisregard,theUSJointChiefsofStaffhaverecognizedthreedistinctelementsoftheinformationoperations:theseincludethephysical,cognitive, and informational arenas.31 The list of endeavors thatcanbe carriedout in the sphereof informationwarfare isquiteextensiveandincludesdisseminatingpropaganda,“fakenews,”ordisinformationthroughmediaandsocialmedia.32Italsoincludesspreading malware and viruses and making denial-of-service(“DDoS”)attacksonthemilitarycommandandcontrolsystemsofan adversary.33 On the other hand, cyberwarfare only includesrelianceoninternetandcomputersasameansofgainingstrategiccompetitiveadvantageoveranadversary.34CyberwarfarereliesonDDoSattacks,computerviruses,hacking,andmalwareattacksonanadversary’sstrategicallyimportantcomputersystems.35Thus,information warfare is a bigger umbrella, including print andelectronic media, computers, software, surveillance, andespionage, while the scope of cyberwarfare is limited to theinternetandcomputers.36Cyberwarfareisalsoonlyonedimensionordisciplineinthemultidimensionalfieldofinformationwarfare;however, owing to the worldwide emergence of technologicalrevolution, cyberwarfare in the broad spectrum of informationwarfare is crucially important and, therefore, cannot beneglected.37

30. Rex Mbuthia, Cyber Warfare Versus Information Warfare: Two Very Different

Concepts, LINKEDIN (July 16, 2017,) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cyber-warfare-versus-information-two-very-different-concepts-mbuthia [https://perma.cc/4QFJ-YZ2W].

31. See ISAAC PORCHE ET AL., REDEFINING INFORMATIONWARFARE BOUNDARIES FOR ANARMYINAWIRELESSWORLD12(2013).

32. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1–2.33. Seeid.34. See STEVE WINTERFELD & JASON ANDRESS, THE BASICS OF CYBER WARFARE:

UNDERSTANDINGTHEFUNDAMENTALSOFCYBERWARFAREINTHEORYANDPRACTICE16(2012).35. SeeWhiteetal.,supranote29.36. Id.37. Id.


III.SOMEMAJORTACTICSOFINFORMATIONWARFAREInformation warfare is a complicated arena which relies on

numerous tactics that are employed against an adversary.38 It is pertinent to mention here that the tactics of information warfare are also being adopted in waging hybrid warfare.39 Thus the similarity of the tactics of information warfare and hybrid warfare indicates toward a close mutual relationship that exists between these two arenas of unconventional warfare.40 The most common of these tactics areelucidatedbelow.

A.UseofMediaAccording to Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, information warfare

always entails certainobjectives aimedat an adversary.41Theseobjectives primarily include waging propaganda anddisinformation against a rival.42 For this purpose, manipulatedinformationisdisseminatedagainstanadversarythroughcertainmediums,amongwhichmainstreammediaappearsthegreatest.43Acertainkindofperceptioniscraftedoftheadversary,whichisrealizedthroughtheuseofprintandelectronicmediasources.44

1.PsychologicalWarfareThemediaisalsoregardedasatoolofpsychologicalwarfare,

becausethenarrativeamongthepeople—shapedbythemedia—fundamentally affects their psychological comprehension of aparticular situation.45 Primarily, it is the media that shapespeople’s opinions about any incident, activity, or situation. Themedia can also incite the sentiments of the public by spreadinghatred-oriented information among them about a particular

38. See,e.g.,Furgacz,supranote3,at207.39. Id.at215.40. Id.41. Fordetails, seeAki-MauriHuhtinen,DifferentTypesof InformationWarfare, in

ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS: CONCEPTS,METHODOLOGIES,TOOLS,ANDAPPLICATIONS291(AnttiroikoAri-Veikkoed.,2008).

42. SeeGREENBERGetal.,supranote1,at1.43. SeeVuurenetal.,supranote17.44. Id.45. See, e.g., WAEL ABDELAL, HAMAS AND THEMEDIA: POLITICS AND STRATEGY 145-46

(2016).


activityorsituation.46Forexample,themediacanincitepatrioticsentiments among people by spreading hatred-orienteddisinformationaboutacompetitornation.47Themassesmaystarttobelievethedisinformation,particularlywhenthemajorityofthepeoplehavenodirectaccesstothecorrectinformationaboutthatparticular adversary. Such incidents are observed in totalitarianstates,wherethegovernmenthasfullcontroloverthemediaandallows thedisplayof onlymanipulated content andnewsonTVchannels.48

2.TheApplicationoftheFramingTheory:RelationshipBetweenMediaandForeignPolicy

The use of media as a tool of information warfare is alsoregarded as soft part of information warfare.49 To explain thisfurther, the “framing theory” becomes applicable.50 That is, themedia frames a particular activity or entity of having certainattributionsandpromotesitsmanipulatedinterpretationsofthatactivity.51Suchframingcaneitherdemonizeorglorifythatentitydependinguponthenegativeorpositiveframingofthatentitybymedia,respectively.52

Often, the framing theory becomes relevant in shaping thedeterminantsofnations’foreignpolicy,inwhichadversarystatesareregardedasevilandnegative,whilefriendlystatesaregivenapositivereputation.Thisisconstructedwithorwithouttheuseofproper factual information.53 The foreign policy of the state isshaped by various factors, such as the geopolitics of the state,

46. Forexample,mediacanincitepatrioticsentimentsamongthepublic.Fordetails,seeLYNGORMAN&DAVIDMCLEAN,MEDIAANDSOCIETYINTOTHE21STCENTURY:AHISTORICALINTRODUCTION82(2ded.2009).

47. Id.48. See,e.g.,id.49. Fordetails,seeHuhtinen,supranote41,at292.50. To understand the framing theory, see Ingrid Volkmer, Framing Theory, in 1

ENCYCLOPEDIAOFCOMMUNICATIONTHEORY408(StephenW.Littlejohn&KarenA.Fosseds.,2009).

51. AshliQuesinberryStokes,Clinton,Post-Feminism,andRhetoricalReceptionontheCampaignTrail, in THE2008PRESIDENTIALCAMPAIGN:ACOMMUNICATIONPERSPECTIVE133(RobertE.Denton,Jr.ed.,2009).

52. Id.53. INGAVONDERSTEIN,THEMEDIAASANINSTRUMENTOFINFORMATIONWARFARE(2016),

availableathttps://www.grin.com/document/337247[https://perma.cc/VN6S-2RSV].


which, of course, are obviously accounted by the media inspreading any narrative about any aspect or issue.54 However,foreign policy and the media’s narratives are significantlyinfluencedby“thepoliticalandeconomicsystemsofthestate.”55This is evident from theColdWar era, especially duringRonaldReagan’sreigninpower,whentheUSmediavehementlyopposedthesocialistandcommunistagendasoftheSovietUnion.56Inthatera, rigorous media campaigns demonizing communist theorieswere launched by the US mass media.57 At the same time, USgovernmentalagencies,especiallytheCentralIntelligenceAgency(“CIA”), also supported antisocialist narratives.58 Both the USmedia and the government’s foreign policy were “framing” theSovietUnionand itscommunistagendaasa threat to theentireworld.59Infact,thethreatdidnotloomovertheentireworldbutonly over the capitalist system prevalent in the United StatesduringtheColdWarera,andthedemocraticpoliticalsystemoftheUnitedStatescouldnotaffordanykindofdemiseofthecapitalistsystem.60 Thus, for the strength and dominance of its capitalistsystem in opposition to the Soviet Union’s communism andsocialism, the US government relied on its media to launchinformation warfare against the Soviet’s communism.Concomitantly,theUSmediareliedontheinformationavailabletoit,as interpreted inaccordancewithUS foreignpolicyregardingthe threatsposedby socialismand communism to the capitalisteconomicanddemocraticpolitical systemof theUnitedStates.61Consequently, the US media launched antisocialist andanticommunistpropagandacampaignsagainsttheSovietUnion.62Thus, the framingof aparticular issue in the foreignpolicyof astate is reflected in the information disseminated by themedia

54. Id.55. Id.56. NANCYBERNHARD,U.S.TELEVISIONNEWSANDCOLDWARPROPAGANDA,1947–1960,

43-45(2003).57. Id.58. Id.SeealsoGORMAN&MCLEAN,supranote46,at133,59. SeeGORMAN&MCLEAN,supranote46,at133.60. See JAMES R. ARNOLD & ROBERTAWIENER, COLDWAR: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE

GUIDE,XIII(2012).SeealsoSAMAARONOVITCH&RONSMITH,THEPOLITICALECONOMYOFBRITISHCAPITALISM:AMARXISTANALYSIS143(1981).

61. Forexample,asdescribedbyGORMAN&MCLEAN,supranote46,at133.62. Id.


aboutthatissue.63Furthermore,byrelyingonsuchmediaagencies,it becomes quite convenient for a state to launch informationwarfareviadisinformationandpropagandaagainstitsadversary.

B.RelianceonSocialMediaPlatformsInthecontemporaryera,owingtotheriseoftechnologyand

the consequent emergence of smartphones and the use of theinternet,socialmediahasappearedasoneofthemostprominentsources of the dissemination of information.64 An estimated 3.5billionpeople,ornearlyhalfofthehumanpopulation,usesocialmedia.65Inparticular,Facebookhas2.4billionusers,YouTubehas1.9 billion, andWhatsApp, owned by Facebook, has 1.6 billion.These are the most commonly used social media platforms.66Theseforumsarethequickestmodesofinformationdisseminationastheyallowanyinformationtogoviralwithinonlyafewhours.67Furthermore,therearenosignificantcostsassociatedwiththeuseofalmostallofthesocialmediaplatforms.68Socialmediaforumsare very convenient and simple to use, and do not require anyproper identity verification of the individuals who make theinformationgoviral.69Furthermore,theinformationdisseminatedthrough social media platforms keeps on reaching a largeraudience.Thatis,theinformationcanbesharedonandonandthuscreatesamultipliereffectintermsofthenumberofpeopleitcanreach.70 Therefore, social media is considered a quick way of

63. SeeSTEIN,supranote53.64. Eda Turanci, Consumption in the Digital Age: A Research on Social Media

Influencers,inHANDBOOKOFRESEARCHONCONSUMPTION,MEDIA,ANDPOPULARCULTUREINTHEGLOBALAGE269(OzlenOzgened.,2019).

65. SeeSimonKemp,Digital2019:Q2GlobalDigitalStatshot,DIGITALPORTAL(Apr.25, 2019), https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-q2-global-digital-statshot[https://perma.cc/3GEG-TXMW].

66. Id.67. See Jethro Tan et al.,Building National Resilience in the Digital Era of Violent

Extremism:SystemsandPeople,inCOMBATINGVIOLENTEXTREMISMANDRADICALIZATIONINTHEDIGITALERA316(MajeedKhaderetal.eds.,2016).

68. SeeJASONFALLS&ERIKDECKERS,NOBULLSHITSOCIALMEDIA:THEALL-BUSINESS,NO-HYPEGUIDETOSOCIALMEDIAMARKETING233(2011).

69. Id.Readabout fake identitiesonsocialmediaasdescribedbyR.J.PARKER&J.J.SLATE,SOCIALMEDIAMONSTERS:INTERNETKILLERS185(2014).

70. Automatedbotsoftwareisalsousedforthispurpose.Toreadmoreaboutbots,see Stefano De Paoli, A Comparison and a Framework for Investigating Bots in Social


disseminatinginformationtoalargenumberofaudiences.71It isregarded as one of the most essential tools of informationwarfare.72

Additionally, another feature is paid campaigns on certainsocial media websites such as Facebook, which facilitates paidpromotion of the content shared on Facebook.73 This featuremakesthesharedcontentvisibletoahighernumberofFacebookusers.74 The price to be paid for such social media campaignspromotingparticularcontentistoosmall.75Ascampaignsmakethecontent reach a larger audience,76 they are used by informationwarriors to wage informational attacks on their adversaries.77These informational attacks mainly include the spread ofdisinformation and propaganda on social media against anadversary.78 If propaganda or disinformation is spread so as toincite or challenge the religious or ideological inclinations of anation,thensuchpropagandacanurgethemtoprotestagainsttheindividualssharingpropagandaonsocialmedia.Theresharingofcontentonsocialmediamayfurtheraggravatetheiremotionsandmake the information go viral, reaching more people and thusinviting stronger reactions. Such utilization of social media canprovetobedetrimentalforpeacewhenitisemployedbyanti-stateactors to spread propaganda against the state.79 Herein, socialmedia appears a negative and lethal component of informationwarfare as it allows any information to go viral, demonize the

NetworksSitesandMMOGs,inHANDBOOKON3D3CPLATFORMS:APPLICATIONSANDTOOLSFORTHREEDIMENSIONALSYSTEMSFORCOMMUNITY,CREATIONANDCOMMERCE60(YeshaSivaned.,2015).

71. JAYLEVINSON,GUERRILLASOCIALMEDIAMARKETING:100+WEAPONSTOGROWYOURONLINEINFLUENCE,ATTRACTCUSTOMERS,ANDDRIVEPROFITSxii(2010).

72. SeeVuurenetal.,supranote17.73. Fordetails,seeKRISOLIN,FACEBOOKADVERTISINGGUIDE36(2009).74. Id.75. Id.76. Id.77. SeeVuurenetal.,supranote17.78. TOBYMATTHIESEN, SECTARIANGULF:BAHRAIN,SAUDIARABIA,ANDTHEARABSPRING

THATWASN’T33(2013).79. SIMON HARDING, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH GANG BEHAVIOR, VIOLENCE, AND

WEAPONSUSE117(2016).


reputation of an adversary within a short passage of time, andincitetheemotionsofthegeneralpublicintouproarandtumult.80

C.IntrusionofCyberspaceTheintrusionofcyberspaceisanothertacticalmoveregarded

asanelementofinformationwarfare.81Thepracticeofintrudingon cyberspace is dependent on technology. The intrusion ofcyberspaceiswhenthestrategicallyimportantcomputersystemsofanadversaryareattackedwithvirusesormalwareviahacking.82Manyexamplesof such incidents canbe found in recenthistoryand are continuing today. For instance, according to the USDepartmentofDefense,thePentagonhastofoilaround36millionemail breaches on a daily basis to secure their computernetworking systems from hackers.83 This highlights the seriousnatureofthethreatsposedbytechnologytothesecuritysystemsofastate.84Therefore,everystatetriestomaintainstrictsecurityoveritsstrategicallyimportantdatasystems.

D.DataTheftDatatheftisalsooneoftheprominenttacticsofinformation

warriors.85This tactic ismotivatedbythegoalofeitherthievingconfidential and strategically important information from anadversaryorstealingfundsfromthebankaccountsofarival.86Theconsequencesmayproduceintangibledamageintermsofstealingstrategically important information and may leave the affectedparty at a strategic disadvantage compared to its rivals.87Sometimes,thedatatheftispoliticallymotivatedandisaimedatmaneuveringoraffectingpoliticalsituations.Arecentexampleof

80. Id.81. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.82. Id.83. Frank R. Konkel, Pentagon Thwarts 36 Million Email Breach Attempts Daily,

NEXTGOV.COM, (Jan. 11, 2018),https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2018/01/pentagon-thwarts-36-million-email-breach-attempts-daily/145149[https://perma.cc/63U6-6EPE].

84. Id.85. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at2.86. Id.87. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at2.


suchdata theft is theCambridgeAnalyticascandal, inwhich thedataofasmanyas87,000Facebookuserswasaccessedbyoneoftheboardmembersof the firmCambridgeAnalytica.88ThisdatawasusedforthepresidentialelectioncampaignofDonaldTrumpin 2016.89 According to the investigation reports, the data wasaccessed through an online software application created by anindependent researcher and lecturer at Cambridge University,AlexandrKogan.90Thenameoftheapplicationwas“ThisIsYourDigital Life” and itwasbasically apersonality test application.91The app became famous among Facebook users and whoeveraccessedandused theapp forapersonality testunintentionallygavehis/herentireFacebookdataand thatofhis/herFacebookfriends to Kogan’s app; Kogan later shared this data withCambridge Analytica.92 Primarily, the data was of US and UKcitizens.93Thisoccurred in2015,whenDonaldTrump’spoliticalteamwasbusyintheelectioncampaign,andoneofthemembersofTrump’spoliticalteam,SteveBannon,happenedtobeamemberoftheboardofCambridgeAnalytica.94So,heusedKogan’sappdatafor Trump’s election campaign and, consequently, Trump’spoliticalteamcraftedthecontentofTrump’sspeechesaswellasmany other election campaigning endeavors and narrativesaccordingtotheinterestsandlikesofthepeoplewhosedatawas

88. SeeOliviaSolon,FacebookSaysCambridgeAnalyticamayHaveGained37mMore

Users’ Data, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2018),https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/04/facebook-cambridge-analytica-user-data-latest-more-than-thought[https://perma.cc/74YR-T8HG].

89. Ian Sherr,Facebook, Cambridge Analytica andDataMining:What youNeed toKnow, CNET 18 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-data-mining-and-trump-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/35CC-N3BY].

90. Id.91. Id.92. SeehowFacebookusersgavetheirdatatoKogan’sappasexplainedinAndrew

Wyrich,WhatIsCambridgeAnalytica,theDataFirmConnectedtotheTrumpCampaign?R,(Mar. 19, 2018) https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-cambridge-analytica[https://perma.cc/E4LF-2QKY]. See also how Kogan shared data with CambridgeAnalyticaasexplainedbySolon,supranote88.

93. SeeSolon,supranote88.94. The Editorial Board,Facebook Leaves Its Users’ Privacy Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES,

(Mar. 19, 2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica-privacy.html[https://perma.cc/8GM6-HYZV].


accessed.95Hence,theattempttoaffecttheUSpresidentialelectionresult was made through the theft of the personal data ofthousandsofUScitizenswithouttheirpermission.96

ItwasspeculatedthatRussiamighthavesupportedthedatatheftandassistedTrump’spoliticalteamtoaccessthestolendataviaCambridgeAnalytica topavetheway forTrump’swin in thepresidential election.97 Although the investigations were alsomade,noconclusiveevidencecouldbetracedoftheRussianstate’sinvolvement.98 Nonetheless, the mere speculation of suchinterventions raised alarm bells. The likelihood of suchinterventionsinthefutureaspartofRussia’sinformationwarfarestrategycouldnotbeneglected.99Therefore, it increasedcallstoregulate social media forums, software applications, and othertoolsofinformationwarfaretopreventdatatheftandcyberattacksfrommakingpoliticaldisruptions in the future.100Consequently,the Honest Ads Act became more strictly enforced all over theUnitedStates.101Thislawmakesitmandatoryforallsocialmediaand software companies to share their policies and procedureswith the US State Department regarding running any kind ofapplicationthatcouldaccessindividuals’dataandcouldbeusedforpoliticalpurposes.102Anyapplicationthatmayappeartohavethe potential to be used for political purposes, especially anylinkages with foreign political powers, might not be allowed tooperateintheUnitedStates.103Thus,throughimplementingsuchlegal enactments, the US governmental agencies are trying tocounter the threats of informationwarfare that loomover their

95. SeeSherr,supranote89.96. Id.97. Id. See Sherr, supra note 89; see also Donna Brazile, Russia’s Interference

SpotlightsWeaknessesinUSElectionProcess,inINTERFERENCEINELECTIONS75(KristinaLynHeitkamped.,2018).

98. Fordetails,seetheconclusiveparagraphsofthearticlebySeanIlling,CambridgeAnalytica, the ShadyDataFirmThatMight be a keyTrump-Russia Link, Explained, VOX,(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/16/15657512/cambridge-analytica-facebook-alexander-nix-christopher-wylie[https://perma.cc/D5MA-5PDG].

99. Seeid.100. SeeBrazile,supranote97.101. Id.102. SeeSherr,supranote89.103. SeeBrazile,supranote97,at75.


politicalandsecurityinfrastructures.104AsCambridgeAnalytica’scofounder—Christopher Wylie—said himself regarding thethreatsofinformationwarfareinresponsetotherecentdatatheftby one of the board members of the firm causing a data-theftscandal,“Rulesdon’tmatterforthem.Forthem,thisisawar,andit’sallfair.TheywanttofightaculturewarinAmerica.CambridgeAnalyticawassupposedtobethearsenalofweaponstofightthatculturewar.”105

E.RhetoricBuildingoftheMassesoftheAdversaryStateInformationwarfareoften involves theessentialpurposeof

shapingthenarrativesofthemasses.106Thisisdonebyspreadingmanipulated information to them.107 A state or its agencies canperformthisfunctionwithorwithoutusingtheservicesofmedia.Forexample,withintheterritorialboundariesofastate,themediamay be used for this purpose.108 However, when a state or itsagenciesaimtoconstructaparticularnarrativeofthepeopleofitsadversarystate,theymayresorttoothercovertorovertactivities;for instance, theycansendtheiragents into theadversarystate,disguising their identities and spreading particular narrativesamong the general public.109 On the other hand, some otherinitiatives—such as establishingnongovernmental organizations(“NGOs”)intheadversarystate—canalsoworkastoolsforwaginginformationoperations.SuchNGOsmayoutwardlypresent theiridentities as trustworthy organizations working for thedevelopment of local people, but, underhandedly, they may beworking to spread a particular anti-state narrative among themassesbysimplyapproachingthem.110

104. Forexample,seehowthePentagonisavertinghackingthreatsasmentionedbyKonkel,supranote83.

105. SeeWyrich,supranote92.106. ARMINKRISHNAN,WHYPARAMILITARYOPERATIONSFAIL237(2018).107. Id.108. SeeAbdelal,supranote45.SeealsoHuhtinen,supranote41,at292.109. SeeGEOFFREYSMITH,ROYALISTAGENTS,CONSPIRATORSANDSPIES:THEIRROLEINTHE

BRITISHCIVILWARS,1640–16608-9(2013).110. Forexample,someNGOswerebannedbytheInteriorMinistryofPakistanas

theywerefoundtobeinvolvedinantistateactivities.Fordetails,seeIrfanHaider,PakistanWill Not Allow NGOsWorkingAgainst National Interest: Nisar, DAWN (June 12, 2015),https://www.dawn.com/news/1187773[https://perma.cc/G7RU-FDDW].


A unique example of using information warfare to build apublic narrative of an adversary state was used by the UnitedStatesinIraqin2003.111TheintentionofsuchinformationwarfarewastopavefavorableconditionsforitsuseofforceinIraq,soastominimizeresistancefromIraqiforcesandcitizens.AfewmonthsbeforetheUnitedStatesattackedIraq,theUnitedStatespublishedmanipulatedinformationinpamphletsandflyersandsuccessfullydisseminatedthemtoIraqicitizensandkeyarmyofficers.112Thecontent of some pamphlets urged Iraqi military officers not todestroy the oil wells in Iraq on the orders of the then Iraqipresident, Saddam Hussein.113 The pamphlets presented thenarrativethattheoilwellswerethepropertyoftheIraqicitizensand, therefore, theymust not be destroyed.114 Furthermore, thepamphletscontendedthattheUnitedStateswouldprotectthoseoilwellsifSaddamHusseingaveorderstodestroythemintheactofwar.115ThisishowtheUnitedStatestriedtodeceivetheIraqipeopleandtheinternationalcommunity:bypresentinganarrativethat theUnitedStateswasworking for the interestsof the Iraqicitizens,whiletheSaddamHussein’sestablishmentwasworkingfor its own interests. The US government presented the samenarrative toUS Citizens to gain support for the aimed attack inIraq.116 Hence, through such dissemination of a manipulatednarrative,theUnitedStatesinvadedIraqandfacednosignificantresistanceinitstakeoveroftheentireIraqiterritory.117Ultimately,theUSArmygotinformationaboutthehideoutofSaddamHussein,whowas arrested by the USmilitary forces and taken to court,whereatrialwasheldagainsthimthatresultedinawardinghimadeathsentence.118Thus,theinformationwarfarelaunchedbythe

111. Seee.g.,MaxieC.Thom,InformationWarfareArmsControl:RisksandCosts,INSSOCCASIONAL PAPER 45-47 (Mar. 2006),https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4d0e/22a368c6afb68a153d6fdb0411f129409c30.pdf?_ga=2.213952983.1307757924.1583038850-969704245.1580936833[https://perma.cc/MG4Z-EJD7].

112. Id.113. Id.114. Id.115. Id.116. Id.117. Id.118. Fordetails,seePAULR.BARTROP,ABIOGRAPHICALENCYCLOPEDIAOFCONTEMPORARY

GENOCIDE:PORTRAITSOFEVILANDGOOD136(2012).


United Statesmonthsbefore invading Iraqprovedbeneficial forthesubsequentuseofforcebytheUnitedStatesinIraq.119

F.InformationWarfarebyTerroristsSometimes,terroristornonstateactorsalsouseinformation

warfaretoshapeaparticularnarrativeamongthegeneralpublicor among themedia agencies.120 For example, the Taliban usedinformationwarfarealongsidethelawfarestrategyagainstNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(“NATO”)forcesinAfghanistanbackin2007–08.121TheTalibanusedtodisguisethemselvesamongthegeneral public in Afghanistan.122 Hence, when NATO forceslaunched military operations or air strikes them, many suchoperationsresultedinthekillingofinnocentciviliansresidinginthevicinityof theTaliban.123Consequently, theTalibanusedthelawfare strategy alongside information warfare against NATOforces to present a demonized picture of the NATO attacks.124Using lawfare, they invoked international humanitarian law(“IHL”)andpresentedanarrative that theNATO forcesviolatedIHLwiththeirmilitaryoperationsandairstrikes,resultinginthedeathsofnoncombatantcivilians.125Intheirinformationwarfare,they reached out to local and internationalmedia agencies andshared with them the pictures, videos, and locations of theinnocent civilian casualties resulting from the air strikes of theNATO forces.126 Consequently, the internationalmedia agencies,journalists, and human rights activists denounced theNATO air

119. SeeThom,supranote111,at46.120. JANTJE SILOMON, SOFTWARE AS A WEAPON: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE

DEVELOPMENTANDPROLIFERATION106-23(2018).121. CharlesJ.Dunlap,Jr.,LawandMilitaryInterventions:PreservingHumanitarian

Valuesin21stConflicts5,(CarrCtr.forHum.Rts.Pol’y,WorkingPaper,2001).122. TheEncyclopediaofMiddleEastWars:TheUnitedStates inthePersianGulf,

Afghanistan,andIraqConflicts,911(SpencerC.Tuckered.,2010).123. Charles J.Dunlap, Jr.,Lawfare:ADecisiveElementof21stCenturyConflicts,54

JOINTFORCEQUARTERLY 34, 36(2009).124. Id.125. TrevorMichael Alfred Logan, International Law and the Use of Lawfare: An

ArgumentfortheU.S.ToAdoptaLawfareDoctrine8(MO.ST.U.GraduateThesis,2017),available athttps://bearworks.missouristate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4156&context=theses[https://perma.cc/GT2G-RPSM].

126. Dunlap,Jr.,supranote121,at36.


strikes.127NATO’sofficialspokespersonrespondedtothisnegativeportrayalofairstrikesastheconsequenceofa“strategicbattle”bythe Taliban.128 Ultimately, theNATO forces started hesitating inrigorouslyconductingmilitaryoperationsandair-strikesagainstthe Taliban leaders out of the apprehensions of civiliancasualties.129 This hesitation developed primarily due to thenegative imageof theNATOair-strikesconstruedinAfghanistanandalsoduetothefactthattheTalibanleadersstartedresidinginthe civilian populous regions.130 Hence, the effectiveness of theNATO military operations in Afghanistan started to decline.131Today,asperofficialclaimsbytheAfghangovernment,theTalibancontrolsoverforty-fivepercentoftheterritoryofAfghanistan,132though unofficial claims assert that approximately sixty-onepercentoftheterritoryisnowcontrolledbytheTalibanandtheremainingthirty-ninepercent isunder thecontrolof theAfghangovernment.133 Thus, information warfare by the Taliban hasdeterioratedtheeffectivenessoftheantiterroristoperationsoftheNATOandUSforcesinAfghanistan.

Inconclusion,informationwarfareentailstheshapingofthenarratives of the general public using certain tools and sources,whichincludemassmediaagenciesincludingprintandelectronicmedia and social media platforms, software applications forhackingorstealingdata,andothertoolssuchasmalware,viruses,DDoS attacks, etc.134 Disinformation, propaganda, thedissemination of manipulated information, spreading malwareinto adversaries’ important computer software systems, andstealingconfidentialandstrategicallycriticaldatasetsaresomeofthe tactics of information warfare pursued by informationwarriors.135Itisnotonlystatesbutalsononstateactors,including

127. RABBISIMONALTAFHAKOHEN,WORLDWARIII-SALVATIONOFTHEJEWS66(2018).128. Dunlap,Jr.,supranote121,at36.129. Id.130. Id.131. Id.132. SeeAnwerIqbal,USGovtMisleadingAmericansonAfghanistan:Report,DAWN

(Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.dawn.com/news/1431814 [https://perma.cc/PNM4-UHR2].

133. See Rod Nordland et al., How the US Government Misleads the Public onAfghanistan,N.Y.TIMES,September8,2018.

134. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1–2.135. Id.


terroristsandNGOsthatemployinformationwarfaretechniquesto either pressure or gain advantage over their adversaries.136Unfortunately,informationwarfarehasspreadsignificantlyandisalso modernizing its facets in the contemporary era, which isposingachallengetotheinternationallegalexperts,whoponderwaystoregulatesuchwarfare.137

IV.INFORMATIONWARFAREREVOLUTIONIZINGWARFAREINTHECONTEMPORARYERA

Due to the novel strategies adopted by the informationwarfare, the hybridwarfare has become evenmore effective.138Thiseffectivenessisalsoinfluencedbythefactthatthetacticsofinformation warfare can also be adopted in hybrid warfare.139Thus, whenever the information warfare is waged alongsidehybridwarfareoralongsidetheconventionalwarfare,itbooststhewarfare strategy. This Part will elucidate the revolution thatinformationwarfarehasbroughttothearenaofwarinthemodernera.

A.WagingWarWithouttheConventionalUseofForceTheprevalentadoptionofthetacticsofinformationwarfare

bystatesandnonstateactorshasledtoarevolutioninwarfareinthe contemporary era.140 The key feature of this revolution inwarfare is that informationwarfare does not rely on the use ofconventional military force and can cause significant intangibledamage to an adversary even without the use of force.141 Suchintangibledamagemaynotbeimposedontheadversarybytheuseofforce.142Furthermore,theintangibledamageisnotprotectedbythe international lawofarmedconflictorby IHL.143 Information

136. Id.137. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.138. SeeFurgacz,supranote3,at207.139. Id.140. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.SeealsoADRIANR.LEWIS,THEAMERICAN

CULTURE OF WAR: A HISTORY OF US MILITARY FORCE FROM WORLD WAR II TO OPERATIONENDURINGFREEDOM387(2006).

141. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.142. Id.143. Id.


warfare relies on several other methods such as propagandathrough media, DDoS attacks, virus attacks, hacking, anddefamation through media or social media.144 None of theseinformation operations require the use of conventionalmilitaryforce.

Inparticular,whenthemilitarycommandandcontrolsystemofanadversarystateisattackedanddamagedthroughmalwareorviruses,thensuchanattackcausessignificantdamageintermsoftarnishing the reputationof thestrengthof thenationaldefensesystemofthatadversarystate,aswellasinmakingthesecurityofthat state vulnerable to cyberattacks.145 Consequently, theadversary statemaynever engage itself in any armed endeavorwith another state unless it has reapplied the security on itsmilitary command and control system.146 In sum, the malwareattack on the military command and control systems of anadversarystatewithouttheuseofactualmilitaryforce isstrongenoughtodeteranywarorarmedattackbythatadversarystate.A repeat attack by information warriors on its security wouldfurtherimperilitssecurityanddefensesfrommalwareattacksandfurtherputitintoapositionofsignificantstrategicdisadvantagecomparedtoitsadversaries.Thus,theeffectivenessofinformationwarfare shows how substantially and situationally thewager ofinformationoperations candefeat its adversaryby simplyusingmalwareorvirusattacks.Thisfurtherillustrateshowsubstantiallyinformation warfare has revolutionized and altered the face ofwarfareinthemodernera.147

B.MakingtheInternettheBattlefieldInformationwarfareismakingtheinternetorcyberspacethe

combat zone, replacing conventional battlefields.148 Theinformation operations executed in the arena of informationwarfaredonotrequirethepresenceofphysicalcombatzonesorreal battlegrounds.149 For instance, the use of social media and

144. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.145. Id.at1.146. Id.147. SeeLewis,supranote140.148. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.149. Id.at2.


electronic media for disseminating propaganda anddisinformationagainstanadversary, thespreadofmalware intothestrategicallyoreconomicallyimportantcomputersystemsormilitary command and control systems of an adversary, theintrusion into the cyberspace of the adversary and the theft ofstrategicallyimportantdataoftheadversary,etc.aresomeoftheexamplesofsuchinformationoperations.150

C.AugmentingtheEffectofuseofForceintheEventofanArmedConflict

Information warfare can also be deployed along with theconventionaluseofforce.151Insuchanevent,informationwarfarewouldenhancetheimpactsoftheuseofforce.152Forexample,asmentioned in the previous section, the United States usedinformationwarfare in disseminating pamphlets in IraqmonthsbeforeattackingIraqin2003.Thatprovedsuccessfulinfulfillingthe objectives of the United States tominimize resistance fromIraqiforcesandfromIraqicitizens,whichhelpedtheUSforcestotakeovertheentireIraqiterritorywithnosignificanttrouble.153

It is pertinent to mention here that information warfaretactics—whenwaged alongside the conventional use ofmilitaryforceinanarmedattackagainstanadversary—cancauseimmensedamage to the adversary and can give the attacker a significantcompetitiveadvantageovertheadversaryinanarmedconflict.Forinstance, the attacker can introduce malware into jet fightercomputersystems,whichmaycausethemtobehaveabnormallyor crash, causing colossal financial losses to theadversary,154orputtingtheirairforceatasignificantcompetitivedisadvantage.155Thus,informationoperationswhendeployedalongsidetheuseofforcecanmakethelattermorepotentandimpactfulinanarmedconflictagainstanadversary.

150. Id.151. SeeThom,supranote111,at46.152. Markku Jokisipila, E-Jihad, Cyberterrorism and Freedom of Speech, in WAR,

VIRTUALWARANDSOCIETY:THECHALLENGETOCOMMUNITIES94(AndrewR.Wilson&MarkL.Perryeds.,2008).

153. SeeThom,supranote111,at46.154. SeeRobbat,supranote7,at13.155. Id.


D.InformationWarfareasanElementofHybridWarfareHybrid warfare is a mixture of different overt and covert

activities carried out with or without the use of conventionalmilitary force.156 Hybrid warfare also employs kinetic and non-kinetic,asymmetric,andunconventionalmeansofwarfareaspartof its hybrid strategy.157 In this regard, hybrid warfare alsoemploysinformationasaweaponwagedbyanentityagainst itsadversary.158Insuchascenario,informationasaweaponiswagedaspropaganda,disinformation,fakenews,ordefamation.159Alloftheseactivitiesarealsothetacticsofinformationwarfare,creatingan overlapping of strategies between hybrid warfare andinformationwarfare.160Ashybridwarfareisabroaderspectrumofstrategies involving the tactics of informationwarfare, it can beasserted that information warfare is an element of hybridwarfare.161Concomitantly,severalstatesaswellasnonstateactorsareusinginformationwarfareintheirendeavorsofhybridwarfareagainsttheiradversaries.162

Information warfare tactics, when employed in hybridwarfare, make hybrid warfare more lethal and severe.163 Forinstance, when certain activities such as propaganda is wagedthrough news or socialmedia against an adversary, then it canhavethetendencytomalicethereputationoftheadversary.164Inparticular,whenpropagandaisspreadoutinawaythatitcreatesaconvincingairamongtheviewersagainsttheadversary,thenthe

156. Ambassador Sorin Dumitru Ducaru, Framing NATO’s Approach to Hybrid

Warfare,inCOUNTERINGHYBRIDTHREATS:LESSONSLEARNEDFROMUKRAINE4(NiculaeIancuetal.eds.,2016).

157. See Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov Bachmann, UnderstandingLawfareinaHybridWarfareContext,37NATOLEGALGAZETTE22(2016).

158. SeeFurgacz,supranote3.159. Id.SeealsoBarna,supranote4.160. SeeBarna,supranote4.161. Id.SeealsoFurgacz,supranote3.162. SeeBarna,supranote4.163. Forexample,seehowtheRussiamadeitshybridwarinUkrainemorestringent

andeffectiveinUkrainebecauseRussiacapturedtheentireCrimeanregion,asdescribedin: Sascha Dov Bachmann & Andres B. Munoz Mosquera,Hybrid Warfare as Lawfare:TowardsaComprehensiveLegalApproach,inACIVIL-MILITARYRESPONSETOHYBRIDTHREATS67(EugenioCusumano&MarianCorbeeds.,2017).

164. Id.


reputationoftheadversarybecomestarnishedcausing it to losesupportfromtheinternationalcommunity.165

On the other hand,when other informationwarfare tacticssuch as DDoS attacks and hacking are employed in an armedconflict, then the adversary isput into apositionof competitivedisadvantageintheconflict.166Forinstance, if thecommandandcontrolsystemofanadversaryisattackedthroughDDoSattacksor hacking and is controlled against the adversary, then theadversarymay face significant damage.167 Thiswill also put theadversary into a losing position in an armed conflict. Similarly,when the adversary is unable to defend its strategic computersystemsfromtheDDOSattacks,thensuchanattackdamagesthereputation of the strength of the defense system of theadversary.168Thedamagetothereputeputstheadversaryintoaposition of competitive and strategic disadvantage against itsrivals.169 Thus, the information operations of DDoS attacks willbecomeanelementofhybridwarfareduetothecovertnatureoftheoperation.ThesituationwillthenhighlightthataDDoSattackmayhave installedthehybridwarfareagainst theaffectedpartythroughemployinginformationoperations.

Insum,informationwarfarehasrevolutionizedthefacetsofconventional warfare.170 It has taken the warfare out of theconventional battlefield and into the arena of the internet.171Cyberspacehasbecome thenewbattlespace,where informationwarriors can, without shedding opposing soldiers’ blood, causesignificant intangible damage to an adversary by destroying itsreputation, by stealing its strategically important data, or bymakingitssecuritysystemsvulnerabletoattacks.172Furthermore,information warfare has given support to the overt and covert

165. Id.SeealsoFurgacz,supranote3.166. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1–2.167. Id.at2.168. Id.169. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1–2.170. SeeLewis,supranote140.171. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.172. Id.


operabilityofhybridwarfare.173Notably,informationwarfarehasalsoenhancedthelethalityofhybridwarfareinthecontemporaryera.174Statesandnonstateactorsnowwagehybridwarfarebyonlyrelyinguponinformationwarfaretacticsandusinginformationasaweaponagainsttheiradversaries.175Hence,informationwarfarehasmadehybridwarfareaseasier.176

V.INTERNATIONALLAWANDINFORMATIONWARFAREThisPartoftheArticleincludesanexplanationoftherelevant

rules of international law that can be applied to the sphere ofinformationwarfare.Someoftheserules—forinstancetheOuterSpaceTreaty1967—endup indirectly facilitating the conditionsthat support the continuation of information warfare, leavinginformationwarfare unchecked under international law. On theother hand, the complex and variegated arena of informationwarfare makes it challenging for international norms andprinciples to regulateandcontrol informationoperations.177Forinstance,althoughthe lawofwar, the lawofarmedconflict,andIHLmakeattempts toregulate theconductofactors involved ininformation warfare, the intangibility of the damage caused byinformation warfare makes it difficult for IHL to imposerestrictionsoninformationwarfare.178

A.TheLawofWarThelawofwarorthelawofarmedconflictprotectscivilians

andnoncombatants in anarmedconflict.179 Likewise, the lawofwar also attempts to protect civilians from any informationwarfareattack.Thatis,thepartiesengagedininformationwarfare

173. For example, see how the disinformation campaign by Russia helped it to

achieveitsobjectiveinitshybridwarfareendeavorinUkraine,asdescribedinBachmann&Mosquera,supranote163,at67.

174. See,e.g.,id.175. SeeFurgacz,supranote3.SeealsoBarna,supranote4.176. Forexample,seehowtheRussiaachieveditsobjectiveinCrimea,asdescribed

inBachmann&Mosquera,supranote163,at67.177. SeeRobbat,supranote7,at8.SeealsoGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,atiii.178. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.179. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF

INTERNATIONALARMEDCONFLICT29(2004).


mustcausenoharmtothecivilianpopulation.180Thisrulecanbeapplied to the activity of hacking or the disruption of anytechnological transmission of an adversary state by a wager ofinformationwarfare.181 If suchanactivityharmscivilians inanymanner—for instance in disrupting their businesses, dailyroutines,etc.—thensuchanactivityoughttobeconsideredillegalunder IHL or the law of war.182 Several other inferences cansimilarly bemade that could ensureprotection for civilians andnoncombatants.183

B.ChallengesFacedbyInternationalLawinRegulatingInformationWarfare

Infact,therearemanychallengesfacedbyinternationallaw,inparticularby IHLor the lawofwar, inregulating informationwarfare.184Thesechallengesmainlyderivefromtheintangibilityofthedamagebroughtupbyinformationwarfare.Unfortunately,becauseofsuchchallenges, international lawbecomesparalyzedinanattempttoregulateorcontrolthebroadandcomplicatedfieldofinformationwarfare.185

1.IntangibilityThe essential challenge to international law posed by

informationwarfare is the intangibilityof thedamagecausedbythe information operations instituted by an entity against itsadversary.186Internationallaw,inparticulartheinternationallawofarmedconflict,issilentonanyintangibledamagecausedtoanadversary in times of war and peace.187 Therefore, it becomesdifficult for international law to regulate or restrict thoseinformation operations that specifically produce intangibledamagesintimesofwarandpeace.188

180. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at10–11.181. Id.at11.182. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at12.183. Id.184. Robbat,supranote7,at8.185. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.186. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.187. Id.188. Id.


a.UnregulatedIntangibleDamageWhatexactlyisincludedundertheterm“intangibledamage”

variesaccording to themodeof informationoperation launchedagainstanadversary;forinstance,whenthemediaisusedtowagepropagandaagainstanadversaryorwhensocialmediaisreliedonfordefaminganadversary, the intangibility resides indamagingthe reputation of the adversary.189 On the other hand, whendisinformation isusedas aweaponof informationwarfare, it isintangibleintermsofdeprivingthepeopleofthetrueinformationandfactsaboutacertainaspectoractivityintimesofwarorpeace.In all of these instances, the damage is not physical or tangible,which ultimately excludes the principles of international law asinapplicable to such situations.190 Consequently, it becomesimpossible to regulate such activities of information warfarepursuedbyanentityagainstitsadversary.191

b.IntangibilityLeadingtoTangibleDamageTherearecertainexceptionsinwhichtheintangibledamage

sometimesleadstotangibledamageaswell.Forinstance,whenthecyberspaceoftheadversaryisintrudedviaintroducingmalwareor a virus to the strategically important software systems of anadversary,theintangibledamagecanproducesometangiblelossintermsofdamageofinfrastructureorlossofhumanlives.192Forexample,hackingthejetfightersofanadversaryorattackingthemwithmalwarecancausecolossal financial lossaswellashumancasualties.193 However, international law does not providesufficientguidanceonsuchconductofstatesintimesofwarandfails to restrict such activities unless they result in harmingnoncombatants.194Thus, inreality, thereexistsignificantgaps ininternational law in regulating the activities of informationwarfare.195

189. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4-5.190. Id.at4.191. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.192. SeeRobbat,supranote7,at13.193. Id.194. Id.195. Id.SeealsoJohnson,supranote9,at453.


2.TheInherentRighttoFreedomofOpinionandExpressionWheninformationwarriorsusethemediaorsocialmediato

wagepropagandaorspreaddisinformationamongthepublic,thenthe individual’s right to freedom of opinion and expressionbecomes relevant in providing the freedom to informationwarriors in using the media or social media to spread thenarratives they prefer against their adversary.196 The right tofreedom of opinion and expression is protected under theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the UnitedNations in 1948.197 The text of Article 19 of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights affirms the right in the followingwords: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion andexpression; thisright includes freedomtoholdopinionswithoutinterferenceandtoseek,receiveandimpartinformationandideasthrough anymedia and regardless of frontiers.”198 In particular,Article19permitsnointerferenceinthefreedomofexpressionofan individual.199 The part of the text stating “freedom to holdopinions without interference,” thus, makes it challenging forinternational law to restrict any opinion or expression that isexpressed within the spirit of Article 19 of the UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.200

AstheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsisanessentialelementofcustomaryinternationallaw,itisthereforecustomaryinternational law that promotes the right to freedomof opinionand expression.201 This assertion further restricts internationallaw in regulating or controlling any activity of informationwarriors carried out in pursuance of their right to freedom ofopinionandexpression.Theonlythingthatcanpreventthemfromexploiting their right to freedom of opinion and expression forinformation warfare is the adversary legally proving their

196. See, e.g.,NANCYSNOW,THEARROGANCEOFAMERICANPOWER:WHATU.S.LEADERSAREDOINGWRONGANDWHYIT’SOURDUTYTODISSENT3(2007).

197. SeeTIMCROOK,COMPARATIVEMEDIALAWANDETHICS33(2009).198. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.

A/RES/217(III)(Dec.10,1948)[hereinafterUDHR].199. Id.200. Id.201. SeeOLIVIERDESCHUTTER, INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTSLAW:CASES,MATERIALS,

COMMENTARY50(2010).SeealsoMARTINDIXON,CASES&MATERIALSONINTERNATIONALLAW209(2016).


expressionofopiniontobedefamatorybyfilinglawsuitsagainstthem in a court following the international legal protocols.202Through this, information warriors can be legally restricted inexpressing their opinions if such opinions are proved legally incourt to be hate crime or utterly defamatory.203 Otherwise, theinherentrighttofreedomofopinionandexpressionisexploitedormisused by information warriors as a weapon. Hence, therelationship between the tactics of informationwarfare and therighttofreedomofopinionandexpressionunderArticle19oftheUDHR becomes challenging for international law, preventing itfromregulatingandcontrollinginformationwarfare.Thisleadstoaperpetualcontinuationofinformationoperationsbystatesandnonstateactorsagainsttheiradversaries.

3.TheOuterSpaceTreatyandtheCHMPrincipleTheTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesin

theExplorationandUseofOuterSpace Including theMoonandOther Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer SpaceTreaty,wasformallyratifiedinOctober1967.204Accordingtothistreaty,spaceandallcelestialobjectsarethecommonheritageofthewholeofmankind.205AsimilarprinciplehasbeenpresentedbytheMoonTreaty,whichwasapprovedin1979.206AccordingtotheMoon Treaty, the moon and all its resources are the commonproperty of thewhole ofmankind.207Therefore, from these twotreaties, it can be asserted that space and the resources of itscelestial objects including the moon are free to use.208 ThisassertionwasgivenundertheCHMprinciple,whichstatesthatanyobjectorpropertythatiscommontothewholeofmankindmust

202. For instance, see some examples and discussion about defamation cases as

described in DAVID STRECKFUSS, TRUTH ON TRIAL IN THAILAND: DEFAMATION, TREASON, ANDLÈSE-MAJESTÉ1(2010).

203. Seeid.at414.204. StephanHobe,TechnologicalDevelopmentasaChallengefortheDevelopmentof

AirandSpaceLaw,inANEWINTERNATIONALLEGALORDER296(Chia-JuiChenged.,2016).SeealsoFRANCISLYALL&PAULB.LARSEN,SPACELAW53(2016).

205. See also PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW:RESPONDINGTOTHECHALLENGESOFCLIMATECHANGE259(2008).

206. Id.207. Id.208. Id.


befreetobeusedbyallnations.209TheCHMprinciplealongsidethe Outer Space Treaty is applicable to information warfare,becausemostinformationoperationsarecarriedoutthroughthetransmissionofradiowaves,whichtravelthroughspace.210Thatis,whetheritisthetelecastingofnewsfromaradioortelevisionchannel, the spreading of information through social mediaplatforms,ortheintrusionofcyberspacethroughhackingviatheinternet, radio waves are employed, transmitted from artificialsatellites sent to space by the major internationaltelecommunication agencies or by some governments.211 Hence,whenever any of the aforementioned activities of informationwarfaretakeplace,spacebecomesthemediumoftransmissionofradiowaves and, hence, facilitates the pathways of informationoperations.Concomitantly,as,inaccordancewiththeOuterSpaceTreatyandtheCHMprinciple,spaceisthecommonpropertyoftheentiremankindandisfreetouseforallhumanity,theutilizationofspace is therefore free for everyone, even for carrying outinformation warfare operations.212 Hence, indirectly, the OuterSpaceTreatyandtheCHMprincipleprovide legalprotection forthecontinuationofinformationwarfareoperations.

Thus,internationallawhasstringentlimitationsinregulatingthe sphereof informationwarfare.213The limitationsaremainlyattributedtotheintangibilityofthedamagecausedbyinformationwarfare.214Theintangibilityisnotaddressedintheinternationallaw of armed conflict; therefore, how to regulate the arena ofinformation warfare becomes uncertain.215 Furthermore,internationalprotectionoftheinherentrighttofreedomofopinionandexpression—asconstitutedinArticle19oftheUDHR—furtherconsolidatesthe inability in international lawtoregulatecertain

209. GILLIAN DOREEN TRIGGS & JOHN ROBERT VICTOR PRESCOTT, INTERNATIONALFRONTIERSANDBOUNDARIES:LAW,POLITICSANDGEOGRAPHY402(2008).

210. Forinstance,asdescribedbyMedoffandKayethateverymediacompanyreliesonsatellitetelecommunicationfortransmissionofinformation.Satellitecommunicationemploys radio waves. For details, see NORMAN J. MEDOFF & BARBARA KAYE, ELECTRONICMEDIA:THEN,NOW,ANDLATER9(2016).

211. See id. See also DIANE POREMSKY & SHERRY KINKOPH GUNTER, OUTLOOK 2013ABSOLUTEBEGINNER’SGUIDE46(2013).

212. SeeTAYLOR,supranote205.213. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.214. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.215. Id.


informationoperationssuchasthewagingofpropagandaagainstanadversary throughmediaorsocialmedia.216Additionally, theOuterSpaceTreatyandtheCHMprincipleallowthedisseminationof information through the radio waves transmitted from theartificial satellites sent into space, even if such information isdeployed or used by information warriors in their respectiveinformation operations.217 Thus, indirectly, or inadvertently,international law appears to facilitate information operationsinsteadofregulatingorcontrollingthem.Therefore,ithasbecomeproblematic for international legal experts to devise ways tocontrolinformationoperations.218

VI.SUGGESTIONSTOREGULATEINFORMATIONWARFAREThelegalchallenges inregulating informationwarfareneed

tobeaddressedandevaluatedbytheinternationalcommunitytocontrol the threatening rise of information operations by statesandnonstateactorswaginginformationwarfareorhybridwarfareagainst their adversaries. This Part of theArticle includes somesuggestionsforpavingthewaytoregulatinginformationwarfareto bring it under the legal authority of international law. Onesuggestionistoenactnewlaws,rules,andprinciplesaswellastodraftanewconventiontonotonlyregulate informationwarfarebutalsoeliminatethechallengescausedbytheothertreatiesandprinciples of international law in controlling the arena ofinformationwarfare.219

A.EnactNewLaws,Rules,andPrinciplesAtpresent,thereisnoparticularsetofrulesorpoliciesunder

thewideumbrellaofinternationallawthatcoulddefineorregulateinformation operations.220 The legal vacuum is massive in thisregard, and it needs to be closed to discourage the harmfulemploymentofinformationwarfare.221Thisvacuumcanbefilled

216. SeeUDHR,supranote198,art.19.217. SeeMEDOFF&KAYE,supranote210.SeealsoTAYLOR,supranote205.218. GREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at4.219. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at439.220. Id.221. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.


if new rules or principles are devised under the umbrella ofinternational law to regulate the conduct of parties engaged ininformation warfare.222 For this purpose, the existing laws andprinciples pertaining to curbing hate speech can be made thefoundationsforenactingthenewlaws.223Apertinentcollaborationoftheinternationalcommunitymightprovehelpfulinthisregardascertainstates,e.g.,EuropeanandScandinavianstates,maysharetheir successful experiences in curbing hate speech,disinformation,andpropagandaintheirdomesticarenas.224Here,statesshouldalsocollaboratewithoneanothertodiscussvariousaspects, tools, and areas on which special legal controls arerequired for regulating the complicated arena of informationwarfare.225Forinstance,theuseofthemediatodisseminatefalseinformation is an active platform for thewagers of informationwarfareagainsttheiradversaries.226Therefore,thisplatformhastobeanalyzedandthencarefullyregulatedinamannerthatnotonlyprotectsthenecessaryfreedomofopinionandexpression,butalso controls any kind of negative activity pursued through themediawithin the sphere of informationwarfare. It is suggestedthat a special code of conduct has to be formulated at theinternationallevel,draftedparticularlyfortheinternationalnewsmedia agencies, to prevent or criminalize the propagation of

222. Id.at439.223. Forexample,asdescribedinthisbookaboutthedefamationlawscontrolling

hatespeech:STRECKFUSS,supranote202,at1(seealsopages103and414ofthesamebook.Suchlawscanbeenactedandmadeprominentattheinternationallevelforregulatingthehatespeech,defamation,anddisinformationactivitiesofinformationwarriors).

224. Western European nations and Scandinavian states have been regarded ashaving adopted the laws curbing hate speeches alongside protecting the freedom ofopinionandexpression.Thelegislatorsofthesenationsshouldbeconsultedaboutnewrulesandprinciplesforregulatingtheactivitiesofinformationwar.FordetailsaboutEUhatespeechlaws,seeSejalParmer,TheLegalFrameworkforAddressing“HateSpeech”inEurope,at3,presentedinAddressingHateSpeechintheMedia:TheRoleofRegulatoryAuthorities and the Judiciary, in the International Conference Organized by Council ofEuropeinPartnershipwiththeCroatianAgencyforElectronicMedia(Nov.6–7,2018).

225. Forinstance,seearecentspecialregulationinEuropeforcurbinghatespeech:WilliamNew,NewEUDirectiveLimitsHateSpeech,EstablishesEuropeanContentQuotas,INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 6, 2018,) https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/11/06/new-eu-directive-limits-hate-speech-establishes-european-content-quotas[https://perma.cc/DF5D-7QDB].

226. Forexample,asdescribedbyVuurenetal.,supranote17,at127.


propaganda and hate speech.227 The new regulations shouldinclude the curbing of negative propaganda against states,religions,races,ethniccommunities,etc.Whethersuchapolicyisimplementedassertivelyornormativelyisanotherquestiontobedealtwithandonethattheinternationalcommunityhastodecideafter evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of eachstrategy.Nonetheless, therulesandprinciplesaimingatcurbingfakenews,hatespeech,andpropagandamaybeimplementedinanormativesense,buttheirnormativitymaymakethemassertivein the future if the entire international community or even theUnited Nations ends up positively endorsing them. Thus, in thesameway, all other aspectsof informationwarfare canbedealtwithandregulated.

B.ArrangeaNewConvention:TheNeedoftheHourAt present, there is no single convention on the issue of

regulating informationwarfare.228On theotherhand, statesandnonstate actors have started actively relying on the use ofinformationwarfare tacticsagainst theirrivals,229whichposesaserious threat to international peace and security. In particularwhenterroristswageinformation—astheTalibanbenefittedfromresortingtoinformationwarfarealongsidetheirlawfarestrategyagainst the NATO forces in Afghanistan,230— it consequentlyundermines the effectiveness of operations against them. Aspreviouslystated, theTalibannowhavecontrolofnearlyhalfofthe territory of Afghanistan.231 Thus, because of such threats,international legal expertshave raised their voices and scholarsendorse the arrangement of a new international policy orconvention to regulate the growingphenomenonof informationwarfare in thecontemporaryera.232Thoughthesecallshavenot

227. Forexample, as suchapolicyhasbeen recently implemented inEurope.For

details,seeNew,supranote225.228. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.229. Cristian Barna, The Road to Jihad in Syria: Using SOCMINT to Counter the

Radicalization of Muslin Youth in Romania, in COUNTERING RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENTEXTREMISMAMONGYOUTHTOPREVENTTERRORISM193(MarcoLombardietal.eds.,2015).

230. Dunlap,Jr.,supranote121,at36.231. Nordlandetal.,supranote133.232. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at439.


gainedmomentumso far, the rationalityandpracticalitybehindthemarequiteconvincing,and theworldneeds toconsider thisearnestly.233

If the calls for a new convention on regulating informationwarfare are heard positively and a new convention is arranged,thentheconventionwouldprovideanewandrigorousforumforanalyzing and regulating the different arenas of informationwarfare.Inparticular,itwouldprovideaspecialforumforstates,legal experts, and the bodies of international law to discuss thevariousaspectsofinformationwarfareandlistentooneanother’ssuggestions for regulating it. Consequently, they couldunanimously devise a new code of conduct or rules to regulateinformation operations.234 Additionally, it would also close theexisting loopholes in international law, which are indirectlyfacilitating information warfare—for instance the Outer SpaceTreaty235. Hence, it is the need of the hour to arrange a newconvention to bring informationwarfare under the authority ofinternationallegalnorms,rules,orprinciples,asdoingsowillhelpmitigate the threats posed by information operations tointernationalpeaceandsecurity.236

VII.CONCLUSIONIn the contemporary era of technological advancement,

information warfare is being deployed by states and nonstateactorsagainsttheiradversaries.237Informationwarfareentailsthedissemination of manipulated information or the access toparticularinformationandthenusingthatinformationtoacquirecompetitive advantage over an adversary.238 Some examples ofinformation warfare include the spreading of propaganda ordisinformation through the use of mass media, the spread ofmalware or viruses into computerized military command andcontrolsystemsorotherstrategically important institutions, thetheftof importantdataviahacking,andthedemonizationof the

233. Id.at453.234. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at439.235. Id.236. Id.237. SeeBarna,supranote4.238. Id.SeealsoNitu,supranote6.


reputationofanadversaryviatheuseofelectronicmediaorsocialmediaplatforms.239

Allofthesetacticsofinformationwarfarearerevolutionizingthe face ofwarfare in the current era.240 Thewar is now beingwagedonnewfronts,particularlyontechnologicalfronts,becausestates and institutions have recognized the importance ofstrengtheningthesecuritysystemsoftheirstrategicallyimportantdatasets and computer systems.241 The threat from hackers isprevalent and massive; they can cause a significant amount ofdamage, ranging from destroying a reputation to causing hugefinancial lossesand theftof confidentialdata reports.242For thispurpose,stateinstitutionsaredeployingspecialsecuritymeasurestoavertthethreatsofinformationwarfare.243

Certaintacticsofinformationwarfarecanprovetobedeadlyforinternationalpeaceandsecurity; for instance,disinformationand propaganda are tactics that can aggravate tensions amongadversary states, leading to conflict if the states get engaged inperpetual propaganda wars against each other.244 Furthermore,the tactics of information warfare when deployed by terroristorganizations can also cause detrimental damage to regional orinternational peace.245 The situationmay be very critical if theterroristsgettheirhandsonthehackingstrategyandcanspreadmalwareorvirusesortakecontrolremotelyoverthestrategicallyimportantcomputersystemsofanadversarystate.246 Insuchanevent,thethreattoregionalpeaceanddamagetothereputationofthesecurityofthestatecouldbemassive.Therefore,itistheneedofthehourtoregulatethetacticsofinformationwarfarebeforeitgetstoolatetodoso.

Nonetheless, despite the aforementioned threats tointernationalpeaceandsecurity,therehasunfortunatelybeennomechanism,policy,orsetofrulesdevisedattheinternationallevel

239. SeeNitu,supranote6.SeealsoGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at2.240. SeeLEWIS,supranote140.241. SeeGREENBERGETAL.,supranote1,at1.242. See,e.g.,Greenbergetal.,supranote1,at2.243. Forexample,seehowthePentagonisavertinghackingthreatsinKonkel,supra

note83.244. SeeKonkel,supranote83.245. Seeid.246. Seeid.


thatcouldregulatethearenaofinformationwarfare.247Moreover,thereisnotevenasingleconventionunderthewideumbrellaofinternationallawsofarthathasdiscussedtheneedtoregulateorcontrol information warfare.248 Although there have been callsraised by a number of legal experts to draft a new conventionunder theauthorityof international lawtoregulate thearenaofinformation warfare, such calls have not gained momentum sofar.249A trendseenover thepast fewdecadeshasbeen that theinternationalcommunitydoesnottakeintoconsiderationcallsfordraftingaseparateconventiononanyissueunlessthatparticularissue becomes global and very significant in nature.250 Thus, nospecial efforts have yet been made to draft either a separateconvention or special rules that could hear the calls to regulateinformation warfare.251 It can only be hoped that—if not atpresent, then in the future—the calls to regulate informationwarfarewillgainmomentum.

247. SeeJohnson,supranote9,at453.248. Id.at439.249. Id.250. Id.251. Id.at453.

ARTICLE INFORMATION WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND …

Documents

Transcript of ARTICLE INFORMATION WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND …