Political Law Review Case DigestsDean Sedfrey Candelaria

ARTICLE I. The National TerritoryThe national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

1. Magallona v Executive Secretary [Validity of RA 9255]G.R. No. 187167 | August 16, 2011

Petitioners: Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, Prof. Harry Roque, UP Law studs, et alRespondents: Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al.Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Summary: Magallona, et al assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 (Baselines Law). SC ruled that it is not unconstitutional for the ff reasons: (1) It did not enlarge or diminish the territory but merely demarcated PH maritime zones and continental shelf pursuant to UNCLOS; (2) Its configuration of the baselines merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and, it even increased PH maritime space (contrary to petitioners contention that it was decreased); (3) Its use of framework of regime of islands over the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal manifests its observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS; and (4) As to alleged conversion of internal waters to archipelagic waters PH still exercises sovereignty; no modern state can absolutely forbid innocent passage since it is part of customary international law. The enactment of UNCLOS-compliant baselines law for the PH archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally recognized delimitation of the breadth of PH maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is a vital step in safeguarding PH maritime zones, consistent with the Consti and our national interest.

Facts: In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating PH maritime baselines as an archipelagic State. It was based on the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. It remained unchanged for nearly 5 decades save for legislation passed in 1968 (RA5446) correcting typo errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on these grounds: That RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory and, logically, the reach of its sovereign power in violation of Art 1 of 1987 Constitution. That RA 9522 opens the countrys waters to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources. That RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue 1: Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit.Held: YES. As citizens. (not as taxpayers since no public funds involved)Ratio: We recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the case which raises issues of national significance. Owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.

Issue 2: Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.Held: YES.Ratio: Respondents writs cannot issue absent any showing of GADALEJ in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. However, when this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.

Issue 3: Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.Held: NO.

RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the countrys maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS, not to delineate Philippine territory Petitioners argue that RA 9522 discards the pre-UNCLOS demarcation provided by the Treaty of Paris which was embodied in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, PH sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. Petitioners theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among UN members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for States to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. This gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights. UNCLOS and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under IL, States acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession & prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.

RA 9522s use of the framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal are not inconsistent with the Philippines claim of sovereignty over these areas. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles. The reach of the EEZ drawn under RA 9522 now extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside PH territory because the baselines that RA9522 draws do not enclose KIG is negated by RA9522 itself Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Art. 121 of the (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. PH would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS. First, Article 47 (3) requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. The principal sponsor of RA 9522, Senator Defensor-Santiago, explained The KIG/Spatlys & the Scarborough are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating IL: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration Baselines should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago. Hence, far from surrendering the PH claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands is consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS. This manifests our responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Statutory claim over Sabah under RA 5446 retained Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah: Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

UNCLOS and RA 9522 not incompatible with the Constitutions delineation of internal waters As their final argument, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. Whether referred to as PH "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS (Article 49 [1]), the PH exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of PH law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail.

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones The enactment of UNCLOS-compliant baselines law for the PH archipelago and adjacent areas allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the PH maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Preliminary Issue: Legal Value of Article II

1. BCDA v. COAPetitioner: BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYRespondent: COMMISSION ON AUDITPonente: CARPIO, J.February 26, 2009

Summary: Read the facts below since I dont know how to make it shorter than it already is. Issues: 1.) W/N full time consultants and BODs are entitled to YEB because it is consistent with Sections 8 and 18 of Art. II? NO. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center v. CA, the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II are not self-executing provisions. 2.) W/N it violates the EPC? No. A law passed enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. Petition failed to proved otherwise. Persons are not automatically similarly situated thus, automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws just because they both "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill." Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would become forever highly improbable.

Facts: On 13 March 1992, Congress approved RA 7227 creating the BCDA. Section 9 states that the Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA. Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the BSP. Accordingly, the Board adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees. On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit (YEB) granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum Board Chairman Basco recommended to President Ramos the approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme. President Ramos approved it in a 1997 Memorandum. In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 (above) the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees received a P30,000 year-end benefit. Aside from the contractual and regular employees, and Board members, the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit. Subsequently, they were audited by COA. It then disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants. The COAs Ruling (included since the Court used this din)2.1 PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid. 2.2 Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law. 2.3 Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries who serve as Ex-officio Members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to any remuneration in line with the Supreme Court ruling that their services in the Board are already paid for and covered by the remuneration attached to their office." Clearly, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. The same goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-employee relationships exist between them and the BCDA. Presumption of good faith may not apply to the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors because despite the earlier clarification on the matter by the DBM (telling them they couldnt order the increase) still, the Board of Directors granted the YEB to the BCDA personnel including themselves. Full time consultants, are also not entitled to such presumption since they knew from the very beginning that they are only entitled to the amount stipulated in their contracts as compensation for their services. Hence, they should be made to refund the disallowed YEB.

Issue: W/N Board Members and full-time consultants are entitled to YEB? NO.HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have already received.Ratio: The Boards power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem: Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase. Section 9 limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings. The specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no other. Baybay Water District: By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, x x x the law quite clearly indicates that directors x x x are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.21 DBM Circular states that, "Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law." RA No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit. With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular states that, "YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid." The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary. MAIN: Second, BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that "Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing." Third, the BCDA claims that the denial the equal protection clause. The BCDA states that "there is here only a distinction, but no difference" because both "have undeniably one common goal as humans, that is to keep body and soul together" or, "both have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill." The Court is not impressed. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. ABAKADA: A law enacted enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. Persons are not automatically similarly situated thus, automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws just because they both "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill." Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would become forever highly improbable. Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and the full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit it from doing so. The Court is not impressed. A careful reading of Section 9 of RA No. 7227 reveals that the Board is prohibited from granting its members other benefits by limiting the amount of per diem (P5,000). The specification that Board members shall receive a per diem of not more than P5,000 for every meeting and the omission of a provision allowing Board members to receive other benefits lead the Court to the inference that Congress intended to limit the compensation of Board members to the per diem authorized by law and no other. The Court cannot, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or insert into a statute what Congress omitted, whether intentionally or unintentionally. With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter states that, "YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid." The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary. The full-time consultants consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employer-employee relationship between BCDA and the consultants and that BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price. Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of the BCDA, they are not entitled to the year-end benefit which is a "personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries" and which is "paid only when the basic salary is also paid." Fifth, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are entitled to the year-end benefit because (1) President Ramos approved the granting of the benefit to the Board members, and (2) they have been receiving it since 1997. The State is not estopped from correcting a public officers erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how long, cannot give rise to any vested right.HOWEVER, Court said that they dont have to refund the benefits they got since both Board Members and consultants were in good faith because of 4 reasons: The Board members and consultants relied on (1) Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme; the fact that RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit Board members from receiving benefits other than the per diem authorized by law; and President Ramos approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme which included the granting of a year-end benefit to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. There is no proof that the Board members and full-time consultants knew that their receipt of the year-end benefit was unlawful.

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

2. ACCFA v. CUGCO [Government; functions; unincorporated]GR. No. L-21484| Nov. 29, 1969 | MakalintalPetitioner: Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)Respondents: ACCFA Supervisors Association, ACCFA Workers Association and the CIR

Summary: A CBA was entered into between the Unions and ACCFA. The Unions filed a complaint against ACCFA for ULP. During the pendency of the case, the President signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which reorganized ACCFA and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). Both Unions filed a petition for certification election and both were certified as the exclusive bargaining agents of their units. ACA challenged the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election on the ground that it is engaged in governmental functions. The Unions contend that the ACA performs proprietary functions. I: W/N ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions - GOVERNMENTAL R: ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture. The implementation of the land reform program of the government is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The land reform program contemplated is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. Aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws. The Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees the terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike. The right to strike is not granted to government employees.

Facts: A CBA was entered into by and between the Unions [ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) - supervisors and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA) rank and file] and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). After a few months, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of the CBA. Finally, the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work. The Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the CIR against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of ULP, namely: violation of CBA to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case and illegality of the bargaining contract, among others. During the pendency of the case, the President signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844), which required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of ACCFA and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). The ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition for certification election praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA. They were certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the said employees. ACA challenges the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election on the ground that it is engaged in governmental functions. The Unions contend that the ACA performs proprietary functions.

Issue: W/N ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions GOVERNMENTAL. Therefore, CIR has no jurisdiction.

Ratio: Under Sec 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, the ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture. The implementation of the land reform program of the government is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. For that purpose, EO 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made available for assignment from one agency to another, subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position classification and wage structures. The appointing authority in respect of the officials and employees of the ACA is the President of the Philippines. When the Agricultural Reform Code was being considered, the nature of the ACA was the subject of the following exposition on the Senate floor: Sen. Tolentino: "The ACA is not going to be a profit making institution. It is supposed to be a public service of the government to the lessees and farmer-owners of the lands that may be bought after expropriation from owners. It is the government here that is the lender. These considerations militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining powers in the Unions, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"): constituent: relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, regulating property and property rights, relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. The tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. This development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There is no dispute that the land reform program contemplated is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws. We hold that the Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees the terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike. This is contrary to Sec. 11 of RA 875, which provides: SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government xxx employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.7 With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of our ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the CIR in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned.

3. Phil. Society v. COA [Quasi-public corp.; private but with public character; charter test not applicable]G.R. No. 169752 | September 25, 2007Petitioner: PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALSRespondent: COMMISSION ON AUDIT, DIR. RODULFO J. ARIESGA (in his official capacity as Directorof the Commission on Audit), MS. MERLE M. VALENTIN and MS. SUSAN GUARDIAN (in their official capacities as Team Leader and Team Member, respectively, of the audit Team of the Commission on Audit)

Recit-Ready: Phil Society is a juridical entity established in 1905, composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. It was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, they were to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. However, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act 148. Thereafter, an audit team from Commission on Audit (COA) visited the office of Phil Society to conduct an audit survey. Our issue in this case is whether or not they are subject to COAs audit authority. NO. First, the "charter test" cannot be applied. The underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to Phil Society, which was incorporated in 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect. Second, The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render public service. The true criterion is to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Third, the respondents argue that since the charter of Phil Society requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, therefore they are a government instrumentality. This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers.

Facts: Phil Society is a juridical entity established in 1905, composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. Its objective as stated in Sec. 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Important to note is that the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity is distinguished from the sociedad anonimas under the Spanish Code of Commerce. Phil Society was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, they were to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. However, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act 148. Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was committed. Then Pres. Quezon issued EO No. 63 which provides that CA 148 was enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of their power to arrest persons who have violated the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books. On the same law it was required that, every Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal president to detail and organize special members of the police force, local, national, and the Constabulary to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders against the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals. On December 1, 2003, an audit team from Commission on Audit (COA) visited the office of Phil Society to conduct an audit survey. Phil Society demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of COA, citing Section 2(1) of Article IX of the Constitution which specifies the general jurisdiction of the COA: Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and officers that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. x x x Phil Society claims that (1) although they were created by special legislation, this necessarily came about because in 1905 there was as yet neither a Corporation Law or any other general law under which it may be organized and incorporated, nor a Securities and Exchange Commission which would have passed upon its organization and incorporation and (2) that EO 63, effectively deprived its power to make arrests, and that they lost its operational funding, underscore the fact that it exercises no governmental function. In fine, the government itself, by its overt acts, confirmed petitioners status as a private juridical entity.

Issue: Whether or not they are subject to COAs audit authority. NO

Ratio: First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the "charter test" cannot be applied. CHARTER TEST: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the Committee on Franchises recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the pressure of special interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation of corporations or in the regulation of the same. To permit the lawmaking body by special law to provide for the organization, formation, or regulation of private corporations would be in effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain groups, to the prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the country. And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to Phil Society, which was incorporated in 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides; (2) in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative statutes; (4) in case of laws interpreting others; and (5) in case of laws creating new rights. None of the exceptions is present in the instant case. In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact that a corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in EO 63, declaring that the revocation of the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest "corrected a serious defect" in one of the laws existing in the statute books. As a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation, which the Court will further elaborate on under the fourth point. Second, a reading of Phil Societys charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latters initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System, which should be the case if the employees are considered government employees. This is another indication of its nature as a private entity. Fourth. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation. The true criterion is to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of Phil Society requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, therefore they are a government instrumentality. This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. (Wilson v. US). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a private domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondents are ENJOINED from investigating, examining and auditing the petitioner's fiscal and financial affairs.

4. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh [Government; de facto]75 Phil 113 || September 17, 1945 Ponente: Justice FeriaPetitioner: AM (alias CO KIM CHAM) Respondent: EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila

Summary:After landing in Leyte, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, proclaimed that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. Pursuant to this, Judge Dizon refused to continue hearing the case of Co Kim Cham on because he claimed that such judicial proceedings have been nullified and without an enabling law, the court had no jurisdiction. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, governments during the Japanese Occupation were de facto governments. They fall under the 2nd kind of de facto government [That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force.] Therefore, the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts, not of political complexion were good and valid.

PRELIMINARY Facts: October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared: 1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; 2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and 3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.CASE: Co Kim Chan initiated a civil case during the Japanese Occupation. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, the respondent Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case. [Contention: the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (Government under the Japanese TAKE NOTE).] Issues:1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces? YES. [MAIN DOCTRINE]2. Whether the 23 October 1944 proclamation of MacArthur had invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts? NO.3. Whether the present courts of Philippines may continue those proceedings pending in said courts if said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by the subject proclamation? YES

Held:Respondent Judge Dizon should take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings of Co Kim Cham's civil case.

Ratio:1. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were de facto governments. Thus, the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of ade factogovernment are good and valid. KINDS OF DE FACTO GOVERNMENT1. Governmentde factoin a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter2. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force. Distinguishing characteristics: (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part." Powers and duties: Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907: "the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." [NON POLITICAL COMPLEXION] As the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of ade factogovernment, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country. [POLITICAL COMPLEXION] On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. 3. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were civil governments established by the military forces of occupation and therefore ade factogovernment of the second kind. United States in Tampico: "The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. Not only judicial but also legislative acts ofde factogovernments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalidab initio.2. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944 has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines. The judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. From the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 referring to processes of any other government, does it have effect of annulling all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines? According to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of thede factogovernments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign. Thus, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945 abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated. The said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; It is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals werefrom judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime.3. The present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. Military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant.

5. Letter of Associate Justice Puno [Government; revolution]A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA (SC Resolution)June 29, 1992

SUMMARY: Puno wrote to the SC asking for the correction of his seniority rank in the CA. He argues that he was supposed to be ranked 5th and not 26th contrary to the appointment of Aquino at the time of the signing. This is because of the rule under EO33 which amended BP129 (court reorg) which gave precedence/seniority depending on the date of appointment (appointment of Puno was in 1983). SC granted the correction but was met with an MR from two affected Associate Justices. Issue now is whether the CA is a continuation of the previous court (under 1973 Constitution) or a new court. SC held that it was a new entity. Aquino came to power because of a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people. The Aquino government is said to be revolutionary because it came into existence in defiance to existing legal processes and that it was instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to the authoritarian values and practices of the Marcos government. The Filipinos only exercised their right to revolution. It is also a new entity because the Aquino govt was established in violation of the 1973 Constitution and Aquino by appointing new officials and revamping the Judiciary and Military signalled the end of the Marcos regime. And even if the CA is not a new entity, Aquinos decision not to follow the precedence/seniority rule in the amendment to BP129(EO33) shall prevail because at that time she was exercising both executive and legislative power making her decisions supreme and the court opted not to question the non-application of the amendment to Puno.

FACTS: Petitioner is CA Associate Justice (AJ) Reynato S. Puno who wrote a letter to the SC seeking the correction of his seniority rank in the CA. From the records, Puno was appointed Associate Justice in June 1980 but only took his oath on November 1982 after serving as Assistant SolGen since 1974. January 1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (BP 129) and Puno was then appointed as Appellate Justice in of the IAC. In November 1984, Puno accepted an appointment as Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Justice thus he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was government reorganization and to effect the reorganization in the IAC and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created. President Corazon C. Aquino exercised legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued EO No. 33 for the reorganization. The Screening Committee recommended the return of Puno as AJ of CA and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices but was later changed to 26 when President Aquino signed the appointments. Puno alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could be attributed to inadvertence because it would contradict Sec. 2 of EO 33 (amending BP129) which stated that there will be 50 Associate Justices to be appointed by the President and would have precedence/seniority depending on their dates of appointment. Puno referred to the case of Judge Victoriano who was transferred from the CA to the Ministry of Justice and back to the CA and these transfers did not affect his seniority ranking in the CA. SC RESOLUTION (1990): Granted Punos request since the same was not opposed. After the resolution was issued two AJs (Campos and Javellana) filed an MR because they were affected by the correction arguing that Puno could not claim reappointment because the court he was returning to already ceased to exist. Puno argued that EO 33 granted him the rank of number 5. Even though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Freedom Constitution that no right granted under the 1973 Constitution shall be absent in the Freedom Constitution. Puno added that the power of appointment is executive in nature and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government and regulated by the Constitution. The two opposing AJs argued that the letter should be addressed to the President and not the SC thus the non-approval of the Office of the President should be respected by the SC because of the separation of powers and presumed knowledge in the law they are enforcing.

ISSUE: Whether the CA is a new court that would negate any claim of seniority enjoyed by Puno as member of the CA and IAC prior to EO No 33 or is the CA a continuation of the CA/IAC that existed prior to EO 33.

HELD: (NEW COURT BUT AQUINO CHOSE TO OVERLOOK PRECEDENCE IN PUNOS CASE) Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

RATIO: SC held that CA is a new entity which is different and distinct the CA/IAC existing prior to EO 33 because it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986. REVOLUTION: the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. Definition in Kelsens book: that which occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order, a way not prescribed by the first order itself. From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution. REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (Focus here) There were three clauses in the Freedom Constitution which basically states that the Aquino governments power is a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people. The Aquino government is said to be revolutionary because that it came into existence in defiance to existing legal processes and that it was a revolutionary government instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to the authoritarian values and practices of the overthrown governmentLEGAL ORDER / NON-CONTINUITY OF THE GOVERNMENT A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity especially if it operates under a written constitution. It is assumed that the legal order remains as a culture system of the polity as long as the latter endures BUT, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole if it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. Aquinos rise to power was not due to constitutional processes but in violation of the 1973 Constitution because Marcos was the winner of the 1986 presidential election. Mrs. Aquinos government was met by little resistance and she obtained control of government by appointing officers, cabinet members and a revamp of the Judiciary and Military. This signalled the end of the legal system (of Marcos) ceased to exist. PHASE OUT OF CA/IAC SC held that the CA/IAC existing prior EO33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the CA established under EO33 was an entirely new court with appointments having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP 129 as amended by EO33 refers to prospective situations But even if EO33 did not abolish the preceding seniority ranking, it is believed that President Aquino as head of the then revolutionary government, could disregard or set aside seniority in ranking when she made her appointments to the reorganized CA in 1986. It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of EO33, President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers, such that if she desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own EO33. President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in BP129 amended by EO33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court to question or correct that exercise.

6. Republic v. Sandiganbayan [Rights during interregnum]G.R. No. 104768.July 21, 2003Petitioner: Republic of the PhilippinesRespondents: Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano,respondents.

Summary: Upon President Corazon Aquinos assumption to office, she issued EO 1, which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). PCGG was mandated to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and associates. An investigation was conducted, and a case was filed against respondent Major General Ramas. A search warrant was subsequently issued, but the items obtained were alleged to be illegally seized, as they were not in the warrant. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint against Ramas and Dimaano on the ground that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. The Supreme Court ruled affirming the Sandiganbayans decision stating that articles and things seized from the house of Dimaano were illegally seized. Though the Bill of Rights under 1973 Constitution was inoperative during the interregnum, the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were still in effect.

FACTS: President Corazon C. Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. The PCGG, through its then Chairman Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, one of whom was respondent Major General Ramas. The AFP Board found a prima facie case against Ramas for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of PHP2,974,134.00 and USD50,000.00both of which were confiscated from a certain Elizabeth Dimaanos premises. It also recommended that Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379 or the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. The PCGG filed a case against Ramas under RA 1379, with Dimaano as his co-defendant. (Dimaano was alleged to be the mistress of Ramas, based on affidavits of military personnel). The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas.It further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the AFP and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Marcos. Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued atP700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income.He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano. Dimaano admitted her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas only. She claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team. The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its many postponements. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any. Petitioner again and again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino which held that PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos. Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint and ordered the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles to be returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

ISSUES:1) Whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition NO 2) Whether Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence NO3) Whether Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence NO (main)

RATIO:1) PCGG has no jurisdiction over the case. The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. Ramas does not fall under (2); hence, he must fall under (1) as a subordinate. However, his position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make him a subordinate.

2) Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence The Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, it kept on delaying such presentation by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint.

3) The warrant did not include the articles and things seized from the house of Dimaano; hence, they were illegally seized. The Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other itemsnotincluded in the search warrant. Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986 which wasdone in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as thede juregovernment in the Philippines, assumed under international law. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government.Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. InBataan Shipyard vs. PCGG, the Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution,expressly recognizedthe validity of sequestration orders. The Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights.Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment exceptingsequestrationordersfromtheBillofRights,the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. As thede juregovernment, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. The directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration.In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant is valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant but the seizure of items not described is void.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari isDISMISSED.The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

7. People v. Gozo [auto-limitation]G.R. No. L-36409October 26, 1973Petitioner: People of the PhilippinesRespondent: Loreta GozoPonente: J. Fernando

Nature of the case: Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the CFI of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof.

Summary:Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

The SC held that the municipal ordinance is enforceable within the US naval base. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. What only happened was the existence of the principle of auto-limitation wherein any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. But they retain their status as native soil. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear.

FACTS: Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighborsthat such building permit was not necessary for the construction of the house. Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended 4 carpenters working on the house and brought them to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation. After due investigation, Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office."City Court of Olongapo City: guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 sentenced her to an imprisonment of 1 month as well as to pay the costCFI Zambales: guilty but sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200 and to demolish the house erectedCA: Gozo put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base. The CA noting the constitutional question raised, certified the case to the SC

Issue 1: WON LGUs are devoid of authority to require building permits. [topic about police power]Held: NO.Ratio: Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu: the questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ." Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of the community. Such power has limitations. If its exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned. People v. Fajardo is NOT applicable to the instant case: the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur passed an ordinance that any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in-law) filed a written request with the municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied because the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. They proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive.

Issue 2: WON the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the US naval base in Olongapo City (leased by the Philippines to the US armed forces). [main]Held: YES.Ratio: People v. Acierto: By the Agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the US Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." Reagan v. CIR: The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty." Principle of auto-limitation: It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." The administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation: Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period of 30 days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be enforced.

Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

8. Taada v. Angara [GATT-WTO]G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on most favored nation and national treatment, require that nationals a