Army Basic Research…Accelerating the Pace

of Transformation

Workshop on Software Reliability for FCS

Dr. Mark L. SwinsonDirector of Mathematical and Information Sciences

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Toward a More Relevant and Ready Army …Smaller, Smarter, Lighter & Faster

From threat-based to capabilities-based approach

From the Cold War• Détente(2 superpowers) - Standoff with known enemy/threat • Anticipated battlefield – Fulda Gap• Prepositioned heavy forces and equipment• The arms race – strategic nuclear weapons

To current security environment• A Nation and Army at war• Enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology - enemy is terrorism• Conducted on homeland and across globe• Violence perpetrated against innocents

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Increased strategicresponsiveness

Future Force for Full Spectrum of Missions

High

Low

Urban

Open rolling terrain

Major Theater War

EnvironmentalComplexity

Spectrum of Conflict

Stability and Support Operations

Small Scale Contingencies

Brigade in 96 hrs; Division in 120 hrs; Five Divisions in 30 days

Fight immediately upon arrival

Simultaneous air and sea lift

Render Previous Ways of Warfighting Obsolete

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Pursuing Revolutionary Technologies… Smaller, Smarter, Lighter & Faster

Today Future Force

~100 lb load

< 40 lbeffective

load

< 20 tons

Accelerating Transformational Capabilities

70+ tons

0 mph C-130-Like

Transportability

From Platforms toSystem of Systems

Fully networked

> 40 mph

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Future Combat Systems (FCS) Maneuver Unit of Action (Brigade Equivalent)

Manned Systems:• MCS 60• ICV 84 • NLOS-Mortar 24• NLOS-Cannon 18• C2V 49• R&SV 30• Medical Vehicle 29

Medical Vehicle

LW FCS

Unmanned Systems:• UAV (CL III/IVa) 56• UAV (CL I) 54• NLOS-LS 24• MULE & ARV-A (L) 54, 27

• UGS 157• SUGV 81

Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)

Mounted Combat System (MCS)

Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Mortar

Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) -Cannon

Command & ControlVehicle (C2V)

Land Warrior (LW) FCS 2550

Recon & SurvVehicle (R&SV)

Small Unmanned

Ground Vehicle (SUGV)

Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS)

MULE & Armed RoboticVehicle – Assault (Light)

(ARV- A (L))

Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Launch System

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)(CL I)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)(CL III/IVa)

NetworkNetwork

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Our Problem:

Major DoD acquisition projects regardless of Service are at serious risk of failure and cost overruns because of software problems

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1960 1964 1970 1975 1982 1990 2000

F-4 A-7

F-111

F-15

F-16

B-2

F-22

1960 1964 1970 1975 1982 1990 2000

F-4 A-7

F-111

F-15

F-16

B-2

F-22

Sof

twar

e F

un

ctio

nal

ity

Ref: Defense Systems Management College

Capability Provided by Software in DoD Systems is Increasing but So

are the Failures……

Development Spanning

Decades and Yet No Planes in Production

Software and Testing Delays

Push Costs Above

Congressional Ceiling

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Previously Unknown Global System Instability from an Low-level Operator-Interface Mistake

Crashes entire

shipboard system

USS Yorktown 1998“The Smart Ship”

…. and set the ship helplessly adrift at sea

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During Gulf War was

blamed for the deaths of 28 US Soldiers

Subtle Timing Mismatch with Application Environment Lead to

Unexpected Failures ….

During Iraq War was

blamed for the shoot

down of a UK Tornado

Patriot Missile System

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Software Disasters

Why within the three Services are there software disasters in highly visible well designed software intensive systems?

•More dependency on software•More interconnectivity provided by software•Much more complexity in systems of systems•Unexpected system interdependencies•More intricate project management

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What about FCS?

“The software task alone is five times larger than that required for Joint Strike Fighter and ten times larger than the F-22, which after two decades is finally meeting its software requirements.”

Rep. Curt WeldonHouse Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee hearing April 1, 2004

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What has DoD done about this long term?

• Study the Problem Again and Again

• Make Small S&T Investments in Software

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Studies of DoD Software Report the Same Problems and Little Action

• “Transforming the Defense Industrial Base: A Roadmap,” DUSD (Industrial Policy) 2003

• “Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment,” Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, USD(AT&L), 2003

• “Report of the Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology,” 2002

• “Workshop on New Visions for Software Design and Productivity: Research and Applications,” Interagency Working Group on Information Technology Research and Development, 2001

• “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software,” 2000

• “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Open Systems,” 1998

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Modest DoD Software S&T Investment

• DoD was a leader in Software S&T through mid-90s

• Mindset that “COTS can do it all” almost eliminated DoD Software S&T Research Investment

• Software S&T Investments in FY04 wereServices $2M DARPA $7M

Mismatch: $20B spent in FY2000 on software for major acquisition programs supported by less

than $10M in S&T

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Why are there still problems?

–Convergence of Embedded Computing and Communications Fundamentally Changed All

–DoD Studies largely overlooked–Primary Reliance on NSF for New Ideas–DoD Very Small Part of Total Commercial

Market–Industry Demands Incentives for DoD

Problems

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What Might We Do in S&T for Future Systems?

• Prevent architecture mismatches • Make System of Systems Interactions Coherent • Make Consistent Abstractions• Reduce Interactive Complexity• Assurance & Composition• High Confidence System Design• Correct-by-Construction Software Design• Evidence Technologies for Verification and

Validation

90% of Software Problems in ACAT Projects Might Be EliminatedWith such a Research Agenda

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Role of the Workshop

• Articulate a Software Research Agenda

• Make Actionable Recommendations

• Answer the “So What?” Question

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