Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1961

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1961

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VI TIONEDITORIAL STAFFCAPT JOSEPH H. POOL.EFRED M o MONTGOMERYRICHARD K. TI ER N EYDIANA G o WILLIAMS

DIGESTFEBR U AR Y 1961VO L U M E 7

N U M BER 2

RTICLES ORCEREP.S .-\ PPHEXTTCE. RiC'haro K. T:('n1t:'yPl"ZZLEHREPORT TO THE STOChHOLDEW';. Lt Col \iorri:-; G. Hawling:-;TAKE A LOOKLETS IXTEGRATE KOW Col Allen 1\1. Burdett. Jl o InfTHE C.\SE OF SERGEA:\'T X

:1Ii

10GOOD (? ) OLE I)A YS. Leo E. Carver 12

I ~ E P O R T O:\' THE "ROr.ERS EO \HD, Lt Col .John W. O-'walt. Any nTWX\ \HAT IS A:\, E X A ~ I L \ E H : )Iaj Hobert G. C u l b e r t ~ o n , lnf 20TRt;TH OR CO:\,SEQrEXCES 21THE TATSA STORY. Lt L. \V. Mays, TC . 2{;F \1.('O:\,'S NEST 2 )' IEMO FROM FLIGHT U R G E O ~ , Col Spurgeon Nee . MC('HASH SENSETHIXK BEFORE SPEAKING, Capt \Vil1iam T. POOl ' . Inf .

3133

Inside Rack

linow of a job well done A new idea? A new ofdoing an old job? Whether on operations. safety, maintenance, or training. if it 's about Army Aviation let otherin the program know about it. "'RITE IT DO'VN ANDSE D IT I:\". Picture can tell the story as well as word"

- sometime hetter. I f youhave pictures in your unitfiles on a particular operationyour unit has performed or anunusual shot of Army aireraft, SEND IT I ~ alongwith the who, what. whereand when.

'Vhatever you m a ~ hel' e tooffer - a full length article,an hit Could Happen to You,"or only a picture - is warmlyreceived. Ad(lrcss material toEditor. e. S. Army A viatio 1D i g e s t . USAA VNS, FortRucker, Ala.

. AIOll ' .\ VIATIO." SCIIOOLMaj Gen Ernest F. Easterbrook

Ct)mmanaantCol Delk :\OI OdenASSlstunt CommandantCol Warren n. W i l l j a m ~ . Jr.

Depllty A 0


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Sorcerer sApprenticeichard K Tierney

PAUL DUKAS tells in his symphonic poem The Sorcerer'sApprentice of a magician who could turn a stick into aservant. The magician's young apprentice desired to learn themagic words used to perfonn this miracle, but the sorcerersteadfastly refused to reveal them.The determined apprentice finally learned the words by con-cealing himself and eavesdropping on the magician. He thensuccessfully turned a pestle into a human figure and ordered itto fetch water. The order was obeyed, but the figure refusedto heed a command to stop bringing water. The apprentice hadfailed to learn the magic words needed to turn the servant backinto a pestle. The frustrated youth chopped the figure in two,but that only resulted in two servants hauling water to an al-ready overflowing room. Fortunately, the magician arrived intime to correct the situation.


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FEBRU RY 96

Army Aviators certainly donot indulge in sorcery, but theirattitudes toward copilots andcopilot duties can sometimes becompared to the sQrcerer's relationship with his apprentice.Experienced rm y Aviatorstoo often ignore inexperiencedcopilots and do not take timeto share their knowledge. Thisleaves the copilot with a feelingthat he is not needed and heeither half learns or does notlearn at all.How important are copilotsto Army Aviation? t doesn'tseem that they have much todo. They often appear to bejoyriding and gazing out of thewindow. Occasionally they flipa switch or dial, look overcharts, or perform other seemingly insignificant duties.Aircraft commanders knowthis is a false picture and appreciate a good copilot's as-sistance, whether Army regulations require him for a particu-lar flight or not. They know anefficient copilot is an importantfail - safe factor. How manyArmy Aviators remember thevalue of this insurance whenthey are performing as copilots? How many make aneffort to do a worthwhile job?A copilot easily can minimizehis position and make himselfas use I e s s as a passengerdreamily watching clouds driftpast. But by devoting properattention to his duties, beginning with the preflight check,the copilot can give the aircraftcommander valuable assist-ance.

When a good copilQt gazesout of the window, he is actu-ally on the alert for any air-craft that may be approachingon a collision course. When heis flipping switches or dials,he most likely is changing radiofrequencies or setting a new

course on an instrument flight.While looking over charts,he may be determining position, estimating time of arrival,or figuring true airspeed, thusfreeing the aircraft commander for other duties.A copilot can assist in manyobvious ways. He is greatly appreciated during an instrumentflight and approach in a highdensity area, especially in badweather or at night. Minutesand even seconds become invaluable as an aircraft on instru-ments rapidly approaches theairfield. The aircraft commander has his hands full controllingthe plane; he needs a copilotto help communicate with thetower and obtain approach andlanding instructions. The copilo t m u s t continually helpmonitor the instruments, han-dle and read charts, and helpscan the darkness or rain forthe runway approach lights. Healso must be prepared to instantly assume control of theaircraft if required.

Copilots, whether they realize it or not, also representpsychological factors that re-flect on both the aircraft commander and themselves. Twoindividuals working side by sideand constantly cross - checkingone another, must have a mutual understanding of theirsituation and be able to worktogether - or conditions willprove miserable, perhaps fatal.Conside'r the aircraft commander's position. He is responsible for his aircraft, passengers, and cargo. He must besure of his copilot's ability before putting too much trust inhim. Therefore, he will initially seem to minimize a new copilot's duties. This could tendto kill the initiative of manyyoung aviators and make themfeel that copilots are not im-

portant. The aircraft commander can guard against this bydiscussing the significance ofthe copilot's duties with him.A novice aviator should beeager to learn from an experienced aircraft commander, anda little attention from the bosshelps the apprentice feel he ispart of the team.Most junior officers in ArmyAviation are well qualified aviators who as copilots would nothesitate to point out an air-craft commander's miscue, provided he too were a junior officer. However, too often juniorofficers hesitate or refuse toinform their seniors of piloterror except to prevent immediate catastrophe. This is a serious mistake since every individual is subject to err. A senior officer should be j udiciously informed of an error or miscalculation. Such vigilance bythe copilot tends to keep theaircraft commander on his toes.

The copilot should g u a r dagainst an indolent attitude toward his duties. The efficientcopilot quickly determines thecharacteristics and capabilitiesof the aircraft and its commander. He detects the air-craft commander's weak spotsand then monitors and backstops. He must remember towork with, not against, the air-craft commander. Many aviators make it a point before aflight to infQrm new copilots ofthe duties expected of them. Ifthe aircraft commander doesnot do this, the copilot mustplay it by ear in an effort towork harmoniously and thusensure as pleasant and safe aflight as possible.

Copilots a r e required onArmy Aviation flights undervarious conditions as describedIn AR 95-2, par 23. In addi-


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tion, when t r n s p 0 r t i n gpassengers in CONUS the crewof each transport helicoptermust include a copilot who isqualified in the type and modelaircraft being operated (par9a, Ann e x F, USCONARCTraining Directive, 19 Jan 60).The H-37 (Mojave) is theonly Army aircraft that requires a copilot under all flightconditiQns. The twin - engineH-37 cannot be flown safely byone aviator. A constant gripmust be maintained on theflight controls, especially whilecarrying or lifting heavy lQads.A sudden loss of rpm must bequickly cQrrected by the ~pilot while the pilot maintainsthe proper attitude of the air-craft. There is nQ time forquestions or interpretations Qfindividual feelings. The avia-

A PATROL from c Com-pany was sent on a reconnaissance mission two days ago.Radio contact with this patrolhas been lost for one day. Apilot flying an L-19 aircrafthas been requested to establishradio contact with the patrol.If radio contact is made, thepilot is to determine the patrol's location and relay the information to a helicopter whichis standing by to evacuate thepatrol. The patrol has an AN /PRC-10 radio Qperating on fre-quency 35.2 mc; its call sign isMainsail 10. You are the pilotassigned the mission and youare presently flying over the

tors must work together instantly or the H-37 may fall.The same holds true whilelanding or taking off in theH-37. The aircraft commanderhas his hands full flying. A copilot is necessary to unlock orlock the tailwheel; place fuelboost pumps on emergency;change the fuel mixture torich; raise Qr lQwer the landinggear; maintain equalized mani-fold pressure; and keep the fueltransfer pumps operating.The need for teamwork between pilot and copilot is recQgnized as a must. Teamworkis stressed in the 12 hours ofcopilot training given in addition to the 35 hours of firstpilot instruction in H-37 checkout flights at USAAVNS, FortRucker, Ala.Whether the copilot is aboard

forward battle area. Aftermaking contact with the patrolon the ARC 44 radio, the patrol leader states that he isdisoriented and unable to givethe pilot the patrol's location.Your mission is to locate thepatrol. Which Qne of the following actions would you take?(1) Request that the patroldisplay SQme type visual identification marker and begin asearch pattern of the area.(2) Using the loop antennaand tuning the aircraft radioto 352 kc, have the patrol keytheir mike; and home to theirposition using the oral nullprocedure.

SORCERER S APPRENTICEan H-37, or required on anotherflight, or just buddy riding,it is easy to see his potentialvalue as a safety factor. Howt o change this potential intoreality is the difficult part. It'sa two-way street, requiring mutual understanding and team-work. The aircraft commandermust be able to accept constructive criticism without re-sentment and be willing to passon the knowledge he has gainedfrom experience. The copilotshould know the aircraft andits commander's capabilities;do a conscientious job; and bewilling to benefit from any informal instruction offered.A good copilot indicates agood professional aviator andrepresents one of the best safe-ty factors possible aboard anaircraft. 0

(3) Request the patrol keythe mike of their radio. Thentake two or three bearings withyour ARC 44 homing device,establishing their position byintersection.

(4) Request the patrol keythe mike of their radio. Thenc r n g e the communicationhoming switch in the aircraftto the homing position, turningright when you hear a u( -) and left when you heara D - ), until an on-coursesignal (steady tone) is receivedby the pilot.Solu tion to uzzler will e

found on page 113


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R PORT TO THSTO KHOLDERS

Lieutenant olonel Morris G Rawlings

I T IS CUSTOMARY, in somebusinesses, to accompanysmall dividend checks with anelaborate statistic - studded re-port attempting to explain whythe return wasn't greater. Asdividends grow larger, reportsgrow smaller.This is the report of theArmy Aviation within a corpsfor the period beginning 1 July1959 and ending 30 June 1960.It contains a fair amount ofstatistics, but no d i v i e n dcheck. When you have read it,you will probably have one ofthree reactions:

1) I knew it all the time.l R awlings was assigned to V

Cm ps, Seventh rm y ,

(2) The man is crazy.(3) Ugh.Within the units of the corps,347 aviators (63 on ground

HOURSMONTH FLOWNJuly 6,766August 6,062September 7,627October 5,463November 3,127December 3,512January 3,673February 5,147March 6,082April 6,692May 7,592June 7,200TOTALS 68,943 IN

duty) flew a total average of235 aircraft for a total of 68,-943 hours. They were kept inthe air through the combinedINAVAILABLE WITHAIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS157 1163 68 55 1157 1158 2163 2168 1158 5158 5155 1155 1157 WITH 20


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efforts of 376 mechanics and af ie I d maintenance company.They suffered 20 major accidents, and two fine young aviators were killed.Taken more gently, thesestatistics are shown on page 4An additional 2,800 hourswere flown by these aviators infloat aircraft loaned to themby the TAAM Co However,these hours accrue to the owning unit rather than to the using organization.

Trends are difficult to recognize through figures alone. Agraph is more comprehensible,but it is obviously impracti-cable to construct one whichwill allow for one accident to be

tenance are computed up 0 nthese programmed flying hours.For our aircraft 4,721 hoursper month were programmed.This figure is at the 100 percent line on our graph.Our target for aircraft availability is 68 percent of the totalassigned. Of our 235 aircraft,160 in flyable status representthe 100 percent line on ourgraph. A target for aircraftaccidents is more controversial.For our purposes, it is properto anticipate one accident inapproximately 5,000 hours offlight. This goal, representingone accident per month, is alsoat our 100 percent line. Here isthe graph:

FY 1960 V CORPS AVIATION SUMMARY FY 1960ul Aug Sep Oct Nov De c Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

17016u15014 0130120

AI \I \I \r , / \, " \, \, \, \1 10 , \

J70160150140130120110

100 , u .. , ........f I. 10090 , I 90\ \v j60 : 80706tl\\ ,

LEGEND:Target Availabilit), Rate (J 60) =Target Flying Hour s (4721 per mo) - __ _Target Accident Rate (1 per month)

5040302010

ul Aug Sep Oct Nov De c l l n Feb Mar Apr MdY lUll

presented against 7,600 flyinghours in a mathematical progression. A comparison can bedrawn only if predeterminedgoals can be used to representthe average or 100 percent line.What is the goal for flyinghours? Those figures are shownby SB 1-1 and legitimatized byAR 95-70. The purchase ofspare parts and required main-

Taking each line of the graphin turn, four facts can be drawnfrom the line representing ourflying hours.(1) Corps units exceed programmed maximum (125 per-cent) during 7 months of theyear.(2) They never fall belowprogrammed minimums.(3) Average utilization is at

REPORT TO THE STOCKHOLDERS123 percent of the programmedflying hours.(4) Flying hours fluctuatewidely from month to month.From our availability rate,two facts become readily apparent.(1) The rate remains relatively constant throughout theyear.(2) Peaks are reached at theend of the summer season andin midwinter.From the accident rate, thesefacts are determined:(1) Accidents, flying hours,and aircraft availability neverreach simultaneous peaks.

(2) The accident rate is atits lowest when flying is at itsgreatest.These facts permit certaingeneralizations which could beconsidered by those who estab-lish policy. The first of these

relates to the availability ofaircraft as opposed to the num-ber assigned.Aircraft utilization is not adversely affected by maintenance requirements.Look again at the graph.During the month of September, units flew at a peak num-ber of hours while availabilityalso rose. However, in May, theunits again exceeded all programmed flying hours whileavailability dropped to its lowest point. Of the 7 months inwhich flying exceeded all programmed hours, only 2 foundus with more than 160 aircraftavailable.Here com e s the questionfrom commanders, Are youtrying to tell me that you wouldfly as much in 160 aircraft asyou would if all 235 were operational ?

Yes sir. Look at the record. We flew 68,943 hours inorganic aircraft and 2,800 in'floats' for a total of 71,743.5


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FEBRUARY 1961Had each of our 235 been flyable every day, and had weflown at the maximum rate of125 pe r c e n t of that programmed by SB 1-1, we wouldhave flown only 70,815.Forget the 'floats.' We'retalking about our own equipment.Yes sir. In that case, wewould have been allowed 1,872hours of additional flying toreach our maximum. Statedanother way, a 33 1/ 3 percentincrease in aircraft would havenetted us only 2 percent of ourflying time.The commander mayor maynot be convinced. He is at leastready for the next generalization:Decreasing aircraft utilization to any amount greaterthan zero will not result in adecreased accident rate.

This is obvious, but not necessarily understood. The rateis dependent upon the numberof accidents per 100,000 flyinghours; therefore, a decrease inhours and accidents does notchange the rate.My answer:Aircraft accidents can bestbe reduced by increasing thenumber of flight hours whichall aviators obtain.During August and September, our aviators are at theirbest. The weather is, and hasbeen, good. They have thespring practice months behindthem. We' :lave had no accidents. Comes winter with itsbad weather, and the fairweather man drops out afteran accident. Comes spring, andthe rusty aviator bangs up another machine getting currentagain. The cycle occurs overand over. Accidents do not occur in this corps to those aviators who consistently average300 hours each year. Part-time6

aviators will seldom reach thisamount. More bluntly, semiprofessional aviators will neverbe accident-free.

t is customary for a stockholder's report to be closed inone of two ways. Either thereport itself is so flowing asto require only self-congratulations on the part of the directors, or the final paragraphsare devoted to those plannedchanges which paint a rosy future.We congratulate ourselves onour flying record in that we didour job well and still remainedwithin the budget. We makeno apologies for our maintenance record, and consider thatan increase in flyable aircraftwill be purchased only by anexcessive expenditure of moneyand time.We admit that our accidentrecord must improve. Frankly,we do not consider this a necessity to retain aircraft, nor foreconomic reasons. Our real andirreplaceable loss is manpower.Two fatalities and six hospitalizations are a great price to payfor peacetime preparations.

We must ensure that thosewho, for reasons beyond theircontrol, are not fully proficient

are not s s ~ g n e d mISSIons beyond their capabilities. Further, we will insist that ourmost proficient aviators accompany those not fully proficienton all flights when the slightest doubt of successful completion may occur.We shall continue to stressa mandatory 8 hours of training per week for all aviators,regardless of their duty assignment.

We shall insist upon placingsupervisory error on those whoassign missions which result inaccidents, where such accidentsshow proper supervision couldhave prevented them.We shall insist that piloterror be more carefully defined - as errors in judgment,in technique, or as the result ofa violation of regulations.We shall try to more thoroughly indoctrinate commanders with their responsibilitiesas opposed to those actions forwhich the aviator must takefull responsibility.

We shall never apologize for,nor make disparaging remarksabout, that group of Army Aviators and mechanics who perform dual roles in the serviceof the stockholders. 0

The following excerpts are taken from a letter by General Clark L. Ruffner, quoted in Letter No. 15 to Army Aviators by Brig Gen Clifton F. Von Kann, Director of ArmyAviation.I do not advocate the reduction of a single, solitarytactical mission ever in order to have a lower accident rate.I advocate command attention, emphasis, leadership, andconstant harping on the subject to wake these young boysup. . . . while I commanded the 2nd Armored Division inEurope, we flew twice the number of hours of any otherdivision in Europe in one year. ' .. and we had but one accident :. we flew tactical missions, we flew them when noone else was flying them, and we didn't let safety interferewith tactics . . I attribute full credit for this successfulprogram t my Division Aviation Officer.


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ROUTE TO BE FLO W NFR VFR ALTITUDE ROUTE TO

V 000 L7h /VV 16 0 0 0 / /- 7 CTY ALTERNAn; % HE v 1


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TO INTEGRATE or not tintegrate, that is the ques-tion. This important point re-garding Army Aviation is stillbeing widely debated by manypeople and groups both in and

outside the Army.Should aircraft be assignedto the subordinate units of ourdivisions, or should they be re-tained under centralized con-

trol at division level?T h e Combat Developments

Office of the U. S. Army Avia-tion School has recently com-pleted an in house study onw he t h e I or n o t aviationshould now be included as anorganic component of the sub-ordinate units of the division.This study has been approvedby the Commandant and itsrecommendations are being im-plemented.

In preparing the study, per-sonnel of the CO mbat Develop-ments Office maintained closecoordination with the field andwith the user branches. Theirwants and needs were carefullyconsidered.User desires are expressed instudies prepared by the variousservice schools. An InfantrySchool study, for example, hasstated a current requirementfor at least eight utility VTOLaircraft per battle grO Up. Theseaircraft are needed t furtherthe Infantry's capability forsustained ground combat op-erations. The Armor Schoolhas stated a current requirement for a significant increasein the number O f aircraft fO reach armored division with or-ganic aircraft for each tankbattalion, for each armO red in-

~ n t r y battalion, and for each8

Colonel Allen M. Burdett, Jr., Infground troop of the reconnais-sance squadron. The Artilleryand Missile School has longbeen on record as wanting or-ganic aircraft fO r the divisionartillery. In essence, the branchschools of the combat arms fa-vor aviation which is organicto the subordinate combat ele-ments of the division and theretention of a sizeable aviationunit at division level.

In develO ping the study, theCom bat DevelO pments Officeconsidered many valid arguments for retaining centralizedcontrol of aviation at division.These are the principal advan-tages of centralized control:ease of control, relative ease ofmaintenance, bet t e r aircraftutilization rates, fewer sup-port personnel required, andbetter supervision of all avia-tion activities to include flightsafety and unit training. Theseare cogent reasO ns for retaining the present organizationalstructure and for expandingthe divisiO n s aviation companyinto a battalion to better meetthe additiO nal user needs.

At first glance, the experi-ence of the 82d and lOlst Air-borne Divisions tends t sub-stantiate t h e foregoing. Acloser look, however, disclosesa fundamentally different requirement for the organizationof aviatiO n within the currentROTAD division. The primaryreason for the airborne desireto retain centralized control ofaviation can be attributed tthe different method of entering combat. During the parachute assault phase of an airborne operation, the b a t t eg I 0 P and division artillery

eommanders have no way ofcontrolling or employing ArmyAviation. For that reason, itappears better to retain avia-tion under division control un-til after the airhead has beenseized, bring in the aircraftstill under division control, andthen attach in accordance withthe priorities of the subordi-nate units. Thus, because ofits different role and mission,the airborne division has a dif-ferent requirement for its or-ganization of organic aviation.For this reason, the CombatDevelopments Office a g I e e sthat aircraft should not be in-tegrated into the subordinateunits of the airborne divisionsbut should be retained at divi-sion level as a TOE aviationbattalion.On the other hand and de-spite a resulting increase inmaintenance and control prob-lems, our study concluded thataircraft should now be integrated i n t 0' the subordinateunits of the current infantryand armored divisions. In arriving at this conclusion, theou ts tand i ng contraventionseemed to be the desires of theusers (for example, a great majority of the battle group com-manders want their own aircraft) v e r sus the argumentthat the machines currently inthe inventory are too complexfor assignment below divisionlevel.Regarding user wants, weagree that if aircraft are as-signed where they are habitual-

ol Burd ett 1S Directm , e DO .rrSAAVNS IN Rwker . H e /. ;i .Ted Un nfl r lf r d amd n . ~ t r 1 , m e n t

qllol1:fied .


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ly needed and employed, suchaircraft will be mDre responsive to the desires of the commander. Furthermore, by as-signing aircraft to subDrdinateunits we feel that the combatarms will thereby develop aneven greater appreciation forthe capabilities O f Army A viation as well as a keener aware-ness of its inherent prO'blems.

Regarding the maintenancecO'mplexities, s i mil a r argu-ments were advanced w henwheeled vehicles were first introduced into the infantry bat-taliO'n and when the mO re complicated tanks were first issued to tank companies. Aswith the wheeled vehicle andthe intricate tank, some maintenance difficulties can be anticipated if aircraft integratiDnis pursued. TO preclude asmany pitfalls as PO'ssible, thesubordinate units which haveorganic aircraft must be givenadequate resO'urces fO r mainte-nance. With those resources,the subordinate units must, asin the past, perfect the techniques fO r maintaining the evermore cO'mplicated items O f military hardware.

The trend of the future appears to favor integrated aviatiO n. Many studies of futureorganizatiO'ns h a v e outlinedthis trend. If the prevalentlyexpressed belief that air vehicles will eventually be O'rganic to rifle companies is valid,this presupposes a decentralizatiO'n O f contrO'I and resPO'nsibility for aviation thrO'ughoutthe division. It appears that aphased program s h 0 U I d beadopted to smoothly transitionfrom O ur present completelycentralized contrO'I O f aircraftt a system which is decentralized. Such a transition planWO uld prO'vide fO r the gradualassumption O f pe r a t i on s,

maintenance and s a f e t y responsibilities by subordinateunits. The actiO'n prO'posed inour study represents the firststep of such a transition planfor the current infantry divisiO n.c t i 0' n recO'mmended byCDO's study is now underway.The first move was a proposalto the Infantry and the Artil-lery and Missile SchoO ls concerning integrated aviation.The views of these schools wererequested O n the organizationof aviation platoons fO r the bat-tle groups and division artil-lery of the current infantrydivision.The next actiO'n is the formation O f the DOUGHFLYPlatO O n here at Fort Rucker.This is a provisional organization which CDO in clDse coordination wi t h the InfantrySchool, will tailor to the specific needs of the battle group.The DOUGHFLY Platoon is aprovisional unit within a provisional unit; it ismanned andequipped by resources of the8305th Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company (Experi-mental). f t e r appropriatedoctrine and tactics have beenironed out and its detailed organizatiO'n established, weiplanto' send the prO'visional platoO'nto FO'rt Benning fO r demonstra-tiO n, testing, and further stUdy.As a fO'llow-on to DOUGHFLY, the study recommendedthe formation of a "CRUNCHER Platoon. This will be anaerial tank - hunter - killer unitfor primary use at divisiO'nlevel. It could be a part of thedivision's cO'mbat aviation company or of the armO'red cavalryregiment. The CRUNCHERPlatoO'n, will be organized fromresO'urces a v a i I a b I e to the8305th ACR Company (X).

LET'S INTEGRATE NOWThe cO'ncept O f integratedaviatiO'n obviO'usly r e qui res

more a i r c r a f ~ for our divisions.This, however, is in consonancewith the stated needs of theuser branches. More aircraftin the divisions will, in turn,require more personnel spaces.To fulfill the stated require-ments O f the users, more spacesmust be made available, andadequate funding must be programmed for additional equipment.

The concept of integratedaviatiO'n may very likely require the creation O f an aviation battalion for the currentROCID and ROCAD divisions.More aircraft in the divisionswill necessitate an additionalthird echelon maintenance capability. This requirement canbest be met by the creation ofan aircraft maintenance company fO r each division that hasintegrated aviation. The activation O f such a cO'mpany orthe creation O f an airlift company, as has been frequentlyprO'posed, will undoubtedly re-quire the fO'rmation of an aviation battalion. The exact compositiO'n of such a battalion cannot be precisely determined atthis time; its evO lutiO n, nevertheless, is almost certain. WithanticipatiO'n CDO I 0 0' k s for-ward to the development ofsuch a unit.

T a k in g first things first,hO'wever, CDO says let's integrate nO w. Let's give the combat arms what t h e y want.Their wants are knO wn. Themeans are available. The timeis ripe. By integrating nowArmy AviatiO'n can make amO re significant cO'ntribution toaccO'mplishing the grO'und missiO n of the combat arms andthereby increase the O'veralleffectiveness of the U n i t e dStates A ~ y

9


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I ARRIVED just as the ambulance left for the hospital.What happened?Somebody just walked intoa prop; he looked like he wascut up pretty bad.Who was it, a civilian?N0, a soldier-a mechanicwho had been around aircraftfor years.A man wondered aloud, Whydoes a guy with so much experience suddenly just walk into a spinning propeller?Nobody answered, but in thesilence that followed we allsought the answer. It mightbe eomplacency, worry, or fa tigue. In this case it was acombination of these factors,accented by an unsafe habit.Sergeant X was a good mechanic. He'd never been involved in an on-the-job acci

dent, his CO said. He knewall the sa f e t y precautionsaround props and even taughtthem to our new mechanics.Sergeant X started n aviation maintenance with a fearof propellers. He consideredALL props hot and made apoint of developing safe habitsaround them. He was a bugabout staying clear of the propeller's arc, even when the aircraft was s h u t down. Hew 0 u d make sure that allswitches were off and powerlines disconnected while working on an aircraft... If it were n e c e ~ s r y to work1

around a spinning propeller,Sergeant X would hold ontosomething solid or steady himself in some way. This minimized the chance of flicker vertigo (induced by the spinningblades) or some other factorcausing an accidental slip intothe prop.

When he knew a prop washot he insisted that a warningflag be pasted on the propeller.This served as a reminder tothe men working on and aroundthe aircraft.Sergeant X applied his safety rules around helicopters aswell as fixed wing aircraft. Hewould always approach or leavea fired-up chopper from itsfront. The pilot has plenty todo just handling that ship,he'd tell many an apprentice,and you can't be sure he always sees you. If you're fooling around behind him, hecould back right into you.Another thing, he'd add,bend over while ru n n i n garound under those blades. Attimes they're lower on the tips

than in the center and a gust ofwind could blow one down onyour head. And don't forgetto look where you're going. Ifyou're on a slope you could runuphill-right into that blade.Courtesy rules also became ahabit with Sergeant X. BeforecraI)king up he'd c e a r allequipment and debris from thevicinity of the plane, While

running up a fixed wing aircraft he was careful to makesure he was not blowing rocks,dust and dirt at someone else.Flying debris, dust, etc., ~cause painful injury or a damaged propeller that could failin flight.Prop clear? . . . Switcheson. Sergeant X followed thepreflight procedure even if thenearest person was a blockaway. It, too, had become ahabit with h i m a good habitto have.Sergeant X had attendedground safety classes and listened closely. He was a goodsupervisor and stressed safetypoints covered in the classes tohis subordinates.This, then, is the sort ofperson who suddenly justwalked into a spinning prop.But it is only the surface picture. There was an undercurrent of overlapping factors involved.

Subtle signs of complacencyhad set in as Sergeant X hadbecome more experienced. Hereand there he trimmed the margin of safety to speed up thejob. He left no allowances forworry, fatigue and preoccupation.Illness in his family plus fi-nancial problems had kept Sergeant X awake nights for abouta week before the accident. Hewas tired, mentally and physically, when he reported for


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wQrk Qn the morning of the accident.Sergeant X had been wQrkingon L-19s and L-20s for severalmQnths, but since they wereshorthanded that morning, hedecided to help Qut Qn an L-23that was a priority job.The stage was set. A tiredman, with prQblems on hismin d, approached an areawhere fQur aircraft were run-ning up. Nearby an L-23 satidling and waiting for thepilQt s hand to transform itfrom a dQrmant mass Qf metalto. a pulsating bird, sQaring inthe sky.SpQtting Sergeant X apprQaching, the L-23 pilot signaled for chocks out Qn number one. The engines were run-ning well as Sergeant X pulledthe chQcks from the left wheel.Taking a shortcut under theleft wing he pulled the nQsew h eel chocks. Sergeant Xpitched the chQcks out to theI e f t of the aircraft; then,crouching, he started under theright wing to pull the rightwheel chocks. ThrQugh a combinatiQn of fatigue, WQrry preoccupation and an unsafe habit,

The best solution is number4. The fastest method availablefor the pilot in locating the patrol is the homing device whichis part of the ARC 44, FM ra -dio in the aircraft. After establishing voice cDntact withthe patrol Qn the ARC 44 havethe patrol key their mike. Thepilot then changes the CQm-municatiQn - homing switch inthe aircraft to the homing position and turns the aircraft

he walked through the tip ofthe number two prQP. WHY?He had gQtten away with thisunsafe habit, Qr shortcut under the wing, many times thepast few mQnths. But thistime the circumstances w e rejust right to trap him.

The key factor in this accident was the unsafe habit ofducking under the wing. Sergeant X had fostered and keptmany safe habits, but walkingAROUND the wingtip wasnQt one of them. Had habitforced him to walk aroundthe wing, this accident WQuidnot have happened.

n unsafe habit recentlyplayed a key role in an accident caused by flicker vertigo..An Army mechanic failed toproperly brace himself whiletracking an H-13 tail rDtor.CDmpletely engrDssed in hisjDb he slQwly advanced a padded stick to a point where itWDuid CQntact and mark theblade that was Qut f balance.Suddenly he became dizzy andfell tDward the aircraft. Hereached Ut to grab the tailbQQm extension, but missed andplunged his arm into the spin-until the steady on-cDurse signal is heard, turning rightwhen he hears a U ( .-)and left when he hears a D-.. ) homing Qn the patrQl sradio. Immediately upDn passing the patrQI s position, a re-versal Qf off-course signals willtake place.SolutiDn 1, request to displayvisual identification markers, isnot considered the best solutiQn because of the additiDnaltime involved in executing asearch pattern.

THE CASE OF SERGEANT Xning blades. Sunlight dancingQn the blades had induced vertigo.*If the mechanic had formeda safe habit of bracing himselfwhile working arQund s p n n n ~prDps, he WQuld nQt have fallenfDrward. Here, as in the caseof Sergeant X, a safe habitCQuld have prevented an accident.Similar accidents could occur around Qther helicQpters aswell as fixed wing aircraft.Flicker vertigD can be inducedin a matter Qf secQnds - depending Qn the circumstancesand the individual. YOU couldbe next.

We cannQt always controlworry, fatigue, complacency,Qr certain types Qf accidents.But ALL OF US CAN DISCIPLINE OURSELVES WITHSTRICT, SA F E H A BIT Saround aircraft. ONE unsafehabit can be fatal as in thecase of Sergeant X. 0*Flicker vertigo most often occursat 11-20 cycles per second, but canoccur at other speeds depending upon the angle of the sun to bladesurfaces, the angle of the bladesand the position of the .observer.

SolutiQn 2 using the oral nullprocedure with the loop anten-na, cannot be used because thelow frequency radio. will net netwith the AN/PRC 10, FM radio.SolutiQn 3, using the inter-section method with the ARC44, is n t as accurate as homingdirectly to the patrol and wouldbe m ore time consuming.References: TM 11-517,changes 1-5, par 3, 4 8, 18through 25, 27 thrQugh 31, and129. 0


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OCCASIONALLY n e encounters an aviator typeof the old school who sighsdeeply for the "good ole daysof 1941-1945. In his memorylingers the picture of flighttraining during this periodwhen instructors instructedand students learned o r elseIn his memory, diluted by timeand nostalgia, all students wereeager and all instruction per- 2

Leo E arver

fect; a condition brought aboutprimarily by the lack of interference from desk jockeys andparagraph troopers with theirfetish for improving the training situation.Further conversation withthis ardent advocate of turning the clock back generally reveals that he was an instructorand not a student during thisUtopian time frame.

The obvious gain for themodern pilot is the standard-

Mr. Carver served in Europes a fighter pilot during World1Var II A former Air F orce flightinstructor and qualified Armyflight instructor he is GeneralManager of the Hawthorne Schoolof Aeronautics Army ContractPrimary F lying School at F ortRucker.


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ization of methods. What thecurrent instructor may lack inindividualistic flash, he makesup for by standardized instruction. These techniques havebee n decided upon neitherlightly nor arbitrarily, but only after a good deal of argu-ment, head s c r t ch i n g ,thought, and experience on thepart of the school authorities.

The do it my way or elsephilosophy has been replacedby the school approach, to theadvantage of the pilot. Saferflying methods have been incorporated in these standardperformance requirements.Organization is felt in theclassroom, by the instructor,and in the manuals currentlybeing used. The advantages ofattempts to make a more exactscience out of flying are many

t the student and there arethose who feel the end productis a better one.It was, easy to recognize theprimary instructor in the olddays. Although frequentlyyounger t h n his students,there was no mistaking theparachute silk scarf (preferably scorched by fire on oneedge) and the oversize wrist-watch with its baffling arrayof gadgets. The students couldalways be identified by a lookof perpetual worry.Regardless of how low orhigh the standards, teaching astudent to fly can be a frustrat-ing and nerve-wrecking experi

ence, taxing the instructor'sjudgment and ability to the utmost. The decision to solo astudent is always a momentousone. t is a rare instructor whocan calmly munch a sandwichat the runway control unitwhile his charge becomes airborne and makes that first approach and landing. The instructor who, in a show of

bravado, attempts to eat during supervised solo will, soonerthan later, be com e badlychoked. Instructing is a hardand demanding responsibility.By the same token, student

problems were just as real tothe student as those experienced by the instructor. As acadet undergoing aviator train-ing in the good ole days, Idon't recall them as being gooda t all. As cadets, we did nothave the rights of an enlistedman nor the privileges of anofficer. If we did, no one toldus because in many cases thesupervisors were too busy telling us how stupid all cadetswere and foretelling dire andhorrible results for the war effort if, by some administrativefluke, we became rated aviators. As a young and tenderlad a long way from home, Ifound these preflight briefingssomewhat discouraging. Thisfeeling was shared by otherless hardy souls.Instruction in the air wasgenerally of the monkey see,monkey do type. Analysis ofstudent errors was seldom at-tempted. This would have beeninterpreted as making it tooeasy for the student who wassupposed to attain this information sol ely by individualtrial and error.Debriefings were generallyshort and concise, although accompanied with so m e ceremony. In my case I was gen

erally put in a brace whilethe instructor stood, feet apart,glaring at me. At the momentmy knees began to buckle, hewould utter an unsanitary wordand walk away. In all fairness,I must admit that I was noHot Rock. In truth, I wasn'teven a Smouldering Boulder.I'm sure I would have taxed thepatience of Job, but the de-

GOOD OLE DAYSbriefings did little more thanfreeze my brains and leave menumb with despair. It was allI could do to add my voice tothe others as we, upon command, broke into the strains ofthe Army Air Corps song atthe pre c i s e mom e n t wemarched under the entrancearch to the cadet area.

During my entire training asaviation cadet, I was nevercounseled privately or told mygrade for a flight. Studentswere not permitted to see theirgrades or flight records. Noneof us really knew what ourprogress was. For all we knew,each day on the flight line wasour last. Most of us didn't buyofficer uniforms u n t i l aftergraduation.True, there were good instructors dedicated to t h e i rjobs and students who excelledbecause of instructor dedication, but these individuals roseabove the standards and concepts prevalent in that day. Admittedly, pressures are toogreat and needs too urgent during a hot war to allow time foran objective and comprehensivestudy of how to improve atraining program. However, insome cases, the program washandicapped unnecessarily byattitudes that could have beenchanged within the frameworkof existing time frame and fa:cilities.You may rightly ask mewhat I'm griping about since I

made the program and theoverall t r a i n i n g was goodenough to win a World War.It's a good question and reallyI'm not complaining. MaybeI'm guilty of remembering onlythe trying times of the goodole days. I can even smilenow as I remember. I wasproud of those wings and mybranch of the Service. So proud,13


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FEBRUARY 1961in fact, that I resolved, if opportunity ever permitted, to doall I could as an individual toimprove the flight training received by military students.There is no way for a student to learn to fly in a military program without keen desire and diligent application.The program requirements arerigid but today the student hasthe advantage of a studentcentered flight and academicprogram. Teaching techniqueshave undergone revolutionarychanges. Emphasis is on providing opportunity for the student. Every encouragement isgiven short of compromisingthe program standards. Thedignity of the individual is recognized.

While, basically, flight instruction remains the same,some courses have been beefedup, others tailored to suit theelectronic age that has replacedthe fly-by-the-seat-of-the-pantstime that was.There are many old timerswho will say they don t teachthe boys to read maps anymore,but navigation courses havebeen increased in hours and thesubject broadened to includesuch aids as omni and ADF.

Weather, space satellites notwithstanding, has become anincreasingly complicated subj ect, but Qne that will alwaysremain Qf paramount interestto the pilot. This CQurse toohas become mOore sophisticated.Elementary instrument flying

is given, as it has been for manyyears, but the aviator of todayhopes to become instrumentrated eventually and thereforehis interest is keener and thesubject explored more fully.

All Qf these subjects combined with the grQwing complexity of mod rn aircraftmakes for a deal more bookcracking than the Cub days.Giant steps in training havebeen made. Still there is roomfQr improvement and new approaches in the training field.There always will be. t is astimulating challenge and onethat is nQW accQrded its properplace in Army Aviation. No,don t give me the good oledays. I ve had them, and I likethe good new days better. 0

LL AVIATORS 'kJken lfDu/II e. ci JUJ.n to. pu J.tuheJHf,UdHf,1UH4 d ill Ut the do.up Q l/ e. If U GONNA OME IN ANYWAY

Did you ever shOQt a GCA that was so good,so smooth, and so well controlled that it seemedyou were sliding down a wire anchQred to thecenterline of the runway?Sure you have, and you have probably

thought to yourself, or said alQud, that youwould fQllow one like that right down to theground on a zero-zero night..But then on the Qther hand, you ve probably shot other approaches - not so precise -when you uttered a prayer of thanks thatthere wasn t a clQud in the sky. For some reason or other either you, the controller, or theequipment wasn t working right and you

couldn t have hit the field with a bomb.Often the bad misses are caused by a trainee14

controller. But he s got to start sometimes andthe only thing he has to practice on is you.Don t worry about a precision run under actualIFR conditions; only skilled controllers areauthorized to control your aircraft then.There are at least four variables which canmake the situation more binding: controllers,the radar equipment, the weather, and you. Buteven under the best of situations, radar isn tperfect, and that is no insult t the system. tisn t intended to put you on the runway withyour eyes closed. It has earned its keep whenit puts you into a position from where you cansee the runway visually. That is why it iscalled Ground Controlled APPROACH system.-Operations Bulletin, Airfield Command,U8AAC.


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Report on the Rogers BoardLieutenant Colonel John W Oswalt Arty

N MAY 1959 the U. S. ArmyAviation School, at the direction of USCON ARC and Department of the Army, completed a study called the Development Objectives for ArmyAviat ion 1959-1970. It included forecasted organization ofArmy Aviation, doctrine, and ap ro p sed family of sevenmanned i r c r f t plus twodrones. Before this staff studywas completed, Department ofthe Army decided that in viewof long development lead timesomething should be startedimmediately on development inthe more critical areas.U sing the Army AviationSchool study as background, aconference called at CONARCby Office Chief of Research andDevelopment, DA decided thatthe areas w h i c h should begiven priority for developmentwere these: a new light observation aircraft (LOA) to re-

place the L-19, H-13/ 23; a newh e a v y observation aircraft(HOA) to carry a multisensorpackage for aerial combat sur-veillance and target acquisition; and a h e a v y tact icaltransport (HTT) for mobilityand hauling frQm the rear ofa field army area as far forward as possible without a forward area complex or signature runway.The army s t u d y requirements (ASRs) were for theLOA, ASR 60-1; HOA, 60-2;and HTT, 60-3. Industry was invited to submit studies on anyor all of the ASRs. Throughthis media the Army would beable to review industrial advancement to see what industry felt it was capable of producing to satisfy each ,requirement.In the LOA area, the Armyneeded to determine whetherone aircraft CQuld reasonably

perform the missions, of visualobservation reconnaissance,and command control (liaisQn)now performed by the L-19 andH-13/ 23. In earlier coordination by the Army AviationSchool with the combat armsuse r s requirement was expressed, without exceptJon, fora vertical riser for the tacticaluser in the forward area. Thiswas dictated by the highly dispersed and fluid battle area envisioned, in which battle unitswould be dispersed and inter-locked by fire but not necessarily in contact. In such situations there would be no distinct forward battleline butrather a series of islands of

ol Oswalt is Director Dept ofAdv F / W Tng USAAVNS FtRucker Ala. Dual rated and in-strument qualified he s a MasterArmy Aviation with over 4 500hours flight time.

15


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friendly forces with the possibility of intermingled friendlyand enemy maneuvering forces.An autogyro or STOL air-craft might be acceptable forthis forward area use if itwere substantially more reliable or cheaper than the pureVTOL aircraft. The aircraftwould remain with the tacticalunit it supported and wouldhabitually operate without benefit of landing strip. It wouldhave to operate in the field forlong periods of time, requiringno more maintenance than thatwithin the capability of one mechanic with hand tools.A primary requisite was thatit be highly reliable. If as reliable as expected, it would beintegrated down to b a t t egroup, battalion and companylevel.The L-19 is already over 11years old in basic design; theH-13 over 15 years old. Certainly, r a t h e r than furtherproduct improvement, American industry should now beable to produce a highly reliable forward area supportablehelicopter with good perform-ance to replace both the L-19and the H-13.A major amount of our L-19and H-13 aircraft were builtduring the Korean conflict andwill be over 15 years old beforethe new LOA can be delivered

in any great quantity. Withthe normal development cycleof design competition, selectionof a winner or winners, production and test of X experimental) and Y user test) modelsbefore letting production contracts, it will be beyond 1965before any quantity of the newaircraft will be delivered.If the uses and requirementsfor light observation aircraftcontinue to e x p a n d as theyhave in the past 10 years, thenew aircraft may not be available in sufficient quantity toreplace all or even most of theL-19s and H-13s by 1970. Anearlier date was not realistic,considering development andtesting time required Le., XModel by 1963, Y Model by1964). As a goal, full scaleprod uction of 500 aircraft peryear was to start in 1966. Thus,by 1968 the Army might haveapproximately 1,200 of its newLOA aircraft.DCSOPS DA presented fourpossible c 0 u r s e s of action.Course of action II was selected as a point of departure.Based on this course of actionthe requirement for light observation a i r c r a f t was toremain at a p p ro x i m a t e ly3.600 from now until 1970.This was premised upon littleif any increase in observationaircraft organic to the division

over the next 10 years. Of thepre sen t inventory, approximately 1,500 a i r c r a f t areH-13/ 23s and 1,950 aircraftare L-19s. Losses due to attri-tion average approximately 24H-13/ 23s per year and 30-34L-19s per year.

If the new LOA is as reliable and as frontline supportable as intended and if theArmy does reintegrate observation aircraft down to the bat-tle group, artillery, battalion,etc., as planned, the total number of observation aircraft required should increase considerably. This increase in requirements will cause L-19sand H-13s also L-20s) to berebuilt or repaired as necessary to keep them flying muchb ey n d their present programmed s e r v ic e life of 9years. The C-47s and C-45s ofthe AF and Navy have beenrebuilt in such a manner muchbeyond their originally plannedservice life.

The study operation whichtook place during the winterof 1959-60 became known byvarious names - Army StudyRequirements Board, the Rogers Board, and finally the ArmyAircraft Requirements ReviewBoard. Industry responded bysubmitting119 separate studiesdivided among the three studyareas. Th e s e included tiltwings, tilt ducts, tilt rotors,ducted fans, lift fans, autogyros, helicopters, compoundhelicopters and fixed win gSTOL aircraft of all varieties,powerplants and designs. Somestudies defied type classification and were listed merely asunique. The review was conducted in three phases, start-ing in January and ending witha review by a board of ten general officers headed up by LtGen G B. Rogers, CONARC


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Deputy Commanding Generalfor Developments.The conclusions of the ArmyAircraft Requirements Review

Board were presented to andapproved by the Army Chief ofStaff in March 1960. t wasrecommended that immediatedevelopment be initiated to obtain a turbine-powered, highlyreliable, 3-4 place helicopterwi t h superior performance.Turbine power was specifiedbecause of the anticipated reliability it promised (Le., RollsRoyce Dart - 2,200 hours between overhauls, etc. .

In a comparison of light turbines with comparable horsepowered reciprocating engines,even after amortization of development and production costsand extrapolation of the production cost curve into largequantity production, the turbine will cost approximatelytwice that of the reciprocatingengine and will burn approximately 35 m 0 refue l perhour. It will weigh only aboutone-fourth as much as the reciprocating engine. It is ex

p e c t ~ d that reliability and consequent savings in maintenancepersonnel, parts, and downtime will more than compensate for the higher cost andfuel consumption.Analysis of turbine powerapplication to an STOL type

observation aircraft does notresult in such a clear-cut case.It is harder to justify a turbine engine for an STOL fixedwing LOA. Fixed wing aircraft powered by a reciprocating engine normally operatesat an economical cruise ofabout 60-65 percent BHP orlower. A turbine powered airplane would operate normallyat about 90-95 percent BHP atcruise and would burn approxi-

REPORT O THE ROGERS BOARDmately twice as much fuel per breaking the radar horizon,hour. This plus an initial cost pilot reaction time to flightof twice as much per engine of hazards, etc.comparable horsepower cou- In the area of the heavypled with certain problems of tactical transportfurther studylack of braking action or drag was to be made into use of the

from the propeller on a split compound helicopter. The conshaft turbine reason against cept was for an aircraft whichuse of a turbo-prop on the LOA. could take off at full gross loadA reverse pitch propeller would STOL in the Army rear areaoffer a solution only at in- and, after burning off fuel, landcreased cost. vertically close to the ultimateThe Army Aircraft Require- destination without benefit ofments Review Board also rec- a landing strip or forward areaommended c e r t a in further complex. At reduced load thestudies and c t i on s in the aircraft could take off verticallyheavy observation aircraft and for any lateral movement ofthe heavy tactical transport troops, equipment, or supplies.areas. The former gave rise to It would have a cruising speedthe Man - Machine Project of and range exceeding that of thethe Army Aviation Board. This Caribou.project has as its purpose in- Regardless of the outcomesvestigation into problems con- in these three areas of developnected with high speed low- ment, the Army may certainlylevel flight: gust loading on expect further assistance inthe aircraft, physiological ef- improving its capabilities forfects on the crew, nap-of-the- aerial mobility and aerial comearth navigation, low-level fuel bat surveillance and target acmanagement, ability to avoid quisition. 0

Will our LOA HOA or HTT look like on of these?


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U r S. ARMYBO-ARD

FOR- I V I T I O N

.ACCIDENT RESEARCH

H-34 ENTERED FOG, crashed and burned. Pilotsuffered m.inor cuts and possible back injury;copilot minor cuts; and crewchief possible backinjury.H-23D CLUTCH SLIPPED. Aircraft toucheddown right skid first bending the front crosstube and causing minor damage . No injuries .U-l A VEERED OFF RUNWAY and caught leftmain gear in soft mud . Aircraft ground-loopedcausing major damage to rear bulkheads andtailwheel assembly. No injuries.H-13E ENGINE BACKFIRED began runningrough and lost rpm and power. Aircraft wasautorotated into rice paddy with no damage .Five spark plug electrodes were found fusedwith lead and carbon deposits. All remainingplugs were badly coated with carbon .H-13E SERVO FAILED causing aircraft to pitchup and hit hard on rear of skids. Incident damage to aft cross tube . No injuries .H-21C STRUCK WIRES while taxiing on parkingramp. Incident damage to aft rotor blade. Noinjuries.

YAC- 1 LANDED LEFT of safety line and strucksmall tree causing incident damage to leftwingtip. No injuries.H-21C STRUCK TREE while parking in tacticalarea. Incident damage to tip caps and all aftrotor blades. No injuries.L-19E SKIDDED on ice while taxiing. Propstruck empty 55-gallon drum used as temporarytaxiway marker. Light on drum not in opero tiQn Incident damage . No injuries .18

L-19A VEERED TO RIGHT during landing onicy road strip. Wheels engaged 12 - inch snow:and aircraft nosed over to inverted position .Major damage to left wing propeller rightwing cowl and vertical stabilizer. No injuries .L-20A ON 19-HOUR VFR f l ight crashed intofog shrouded hill . Pilot the only occupant killed . Aircraft destroyed .H-21C OIL PRESSURE DROP-PED during f l ightand engine oil and cylinder head temperaturesrose. Aircraft completed forced landing with nodamage. Suspect engine materiel failure .L-19 STRUCK SNOW and nosed over to in verted position during landing . Major damageto propeller vertical stabilizer rudder left wing tip and top of cabin compartment . Suddenengine stoppage. No injuries.L-20A ENGINE FAILED IN FLIGHT. Aircraftcompleted forced landing with no damage.Cause of engine failure undetermined pendinganalysis .H-13H SKID DUG into soft sand during landing .Aircraft veered to left struck tree and came toa stop . Major damage to main rotor head mainrotor blades transmission and aft cross tube .No injuries.L-23D MISSING on cross-country overwaterfl ight . Extensive search conducted by air andsea forces with negative results. Pilot and co pi lot aboard .L-23D LANDED WHEELS UP while practicingsingle-engine procedure and cartwheeled off leftside of runway . Major damage to entire air c;::raft. No injuries .


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t r o decL-19A TAIL GE R caught on telephone wireduring approach to tactical strip. Incident dam -age to tail gear spring. No injuries.H 23D CRASHED, kill ing pilot . Aircraft de -stroyed. Apparently partial engine failure fo l -lowed by attempted autorotation . Passengerseatbelt had not been secured and probablyfouled collective bottoming.H 13H FELL THROUGH during practice low-level autorotation. Incident damage to rearcross tube . No injuries .HU 1A LOST RPM approximately 75 feet fromground . Aircraft struck ground causing major damage to tail pylon skids, cross tubes, trans-mission mount, tail rotor drive shaft and mainrotor system . No injuries. Fuel control gov-ernor seized in fl ight idle sensing position .H 13H ROTOR BL DES STRUCK TREE duringattempted autorotation in vineyard because ofengine failure . Aircraft destroyed . Suspectedfuel starvation . No injuries.L 19A PROPELLER STRUCK ground on hardlanding. Incident damage to propeller. No in -juries.L 20A RIGHT GE R STRUCK powerline on ap -proach to runway . Wire snapped and lashedback into right center section of flap causingincident damage . No injuries .H 23D ENTERED severe vibrations during hover.Ai rcraft was landed . Infl ght damage to onemain rotor blade t ip assembly and mountingbracket. Vibration was caused by ice formationwithin one main rotor blade . No injuries .

and Ian.L-19A STRUCK TREE during approach to tacti-cal strip. Incident damage to left wing . Noinjuries .H 37A STRUCK TREE during approach to strip .Incident damage to tip caps of all 5 main rotorblades. No injuries .H-13E POWER DECRE SED shortly after take -off. Transmission temperature began to in -crease . Forced landing was made with no dam -age. Cooling fan was not operat ing and trans -mission was overheated . No injuries .H 13H TAIL ROTOR FAILED during hoveringf l ight . Major damage to tail rotor tail rotorguard and right skid . No injuries .L 19A LOST CONTROL during landing roll ontactical strip. Major damage to left wing leftgear and fuselage. No injur i .H 21C SETTLED during approach to confinedarea . Blades struck branches of small tree .Aircraft completed landing with incident dam-age to aft rotor blades . No injuries.L-23D GE R LEFT hard stand while taxiing fromrunway to taxiway. Propeller damaged duringcontact with concrete edge of tax iway. No in -juries.H-21 C LANDED nose hi gh and tail cone struckground during pract ice autorotation. Incidentdamage . No injur i .H 13G ENGINE FAILED on final approach toconfined area . Forced landing completed withno damage. No injuries .H 23D OIL BREATHER FROZE due to extremelycold weather. A i rcraft completed forced landingwith no damage .

9


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WhatsAnExaminerMajor Robert G Culbertson Inf

THE FATAL DAY has ar-rived This is the time whenArmy Aviators tremble in theirWellington's and contemplatetheir individual fates. This isthe day the old instrument cardMUST be renewed.As you take those final halt-ing steps towards the opera-tions office, from out of themurk and gloom looms the mosthorrendous image imaginable;it defies description. It is thegrinning, leering form of THEEXAMINER A w r w o l f20

would be friendly by compari-son. Your fate is. surely sealed.But suddenly, without rea-son or provocation, he smilesWhat can this be? He is evenm 0 r i n h u m a n than youthought. He must take fiendishdelight in gloating over thesacrificial lambThen he speaks a word ofwelcome, and it appears thathe may be almost human. Ifthis is possible, what couldhave wrnught such a changefrom the picture which has

been sO vividly described byothers who have faced him?Tn determine what kind ofman is "The Examiner," let'sreview his special requirementsand training.Maj Culberts()n is former com-mander of the Instrument Divi-sion, Dept of Adv F j TngUBAAV NB Pt R ~ t c k Ala. Now

attending the Command and Gen-eral Staff Col lege, he is dual ratedwith 3,200 flight hours.


23/40

TR INING GO LSThe Instrument Flight Examiner Course has three training objectives for its graduate.He must qualify as an Instrument Flight Examiner, an Instrument Flight Instructor andas an advisor to the aviationcommander on matters pertainingto instrument flight andinstrument flight training.

PREREQUISITESTo attain these objectivesthe student must bring to thecourse certain qualifications.Similar prerequisites are required of both the fixed wing

and rotary wing instrumentexaminers. The differences areonly those which deal with theseparate categories of aircraftto be flown. Because the Instrument F I i g h t ExaminerCourse is only 4 weeks long, agreat amount of informationmust be covered in a shorttime. For this reason the prerequisites for attendance aremaintained high. The complete listing of prerequisitesmay be found in DA Catalog20 21.. However, it is worthwhile to review the more important requirements.

15 HOURS FLIGHT TIMEThe responsibilities of an examiner require an individualwho is capable of sound airsense and judgment. Many people are capable of demonstrating judgment in various degrees regardless of the experience or amount of flying whichthey have accomplished. However, the ability to build andimprove one s judgment is basically derived from experience.If it were possible to reviewall aviators and immediatelyconclude whether or not a manis capable, our job would beimmeasurably easier. in c e

this is not possible, a minimumnumber of flight hours is required as a criteria that thepotential examiner has developed certain judgment. It thenbecomes a matter of evaluationduring the course to determineif the individual has attainedthe necessary judgment to fulfill the responsibilities of an instrument flight examiner.1 HOURS WEATHER IN THE

PRECEDING 24 MONTHSThis amount of actual weather experience is a distinctlysmall requirement. However,to require a large number of

hours to include perhaps theholding of a Special InstrumentCard would be ultra-restrictiveand totally unfair to personsassigned to areas in which actual weather conditions a r enegligible. So the requirementhas been modified to those criteria meaningful for successfulcompletion of the course.What are these criteria? Thefirst is that the potential examiner has demonstrated thathe can and will fly in actual instrument conditions. Second,and of much greater importance, is that he has an appreciation and some knowledge ofthe air traffic control facilitiesand their operation. This aspect continues to be of greatimportance t h ro ugh 0 u t thecourse.

FLIGHT EVALUATION BYN EXAMINERThe Instrument Flight Examiner Course is not designedto teach the individual how tofly instruments. Even thoughthe potential examiner maymeet all the necessary requirements, if he does not have theknowledge and demonstratedskill level to utilize all types ofnavigational and approach fa-

WHAT IS AN EXAMINER?cilities, he is in a precarious position for attendance in thecourse.

The examiners in the fieldmust carefully evaluate the applicant to ascertain that hehas a complete knowledge ofall types of facilities used inArmy aircraft. Such an evaluation must be much more extensive and complete than aninstrument card renewal examination. This is not to say thatan individual preparing for aninstrument card flight examination need not be prepared forany eventuality; however, hiscomplete knowledge and abili tyneed not be as high a caliberas that of the aviator who hasapplied to attend the Instrument Flight Examiner Course.In essence then, the prerequisites are designed to acceptonly the best qualified instrument rated aviators for attendance in the Instrument FlightExaminer Course. Actually thisobjective has a twofold purpose. First it ensures successful completion of the Instrument Flight Examiner Course.Second, upon r e t urn to hishome station, the new examiner will be wearing a badge ofdistinction. He will be recognized for his ability and whenthe tough AI flights come up,he will be called upon, as thebest qualified instrument pilotin the organization, to accomplish the mission.

EXAMINER TR ININGAfter the potential examiner has arrived at Fort Rucker, what training does he undergo to meet the three objectives already mentioned? Toappreciate the training weneed t investigate how theground school supplements andcomplements the flight trainingin each of these phases. A re-21


24/40

FEBRUARY 96

view of a few of the highlightsconcerning each of the objectives in the training programwill best illustrate how theseobj ectives are accomplished.

I NSTRUMENT FLIGHTEX MINER TR INING

Needless to say, this is theportion in which the flight lineplays the greatest part. Theflight training is divided intotwo stages of training. InStage I the individual demonstrates his ability as an instrument pilot. During this period, the instructor works withhim to correct minor deficiencies and bring his ability to ahigh point of competence. Theground school cooperates bypresenting subjects which givethe student a greater understanding and appreciation offunctions and actions of each ofthe air traffic control agencies.When Stage I is completed theindividual should be an extremely capable instrument pilot with a full understandingof what each ground facilityis doing to help a pilot accomplish an instrument flight.

During the initial days ofStage II the fledgling beginsthe process of understandingthe sequence and manner of issuing clearances. Two studentspractice on each other to develop the student examiner'sability to issue clearances andevaluate flight performance. Atthe same time the buddy stu-dent attempts equally hard totrap the examiner into irre-parable situations. e r hap sthis is the origin of some ofthose wei r d clearances youhave _been given. At the conclusion of each flight, the debriefing and evaluation of thestudent examiner is carefullyanalyzed to observe his ability22

to recognize errors and evaluate performance.As Stage II continues thestudent is introduced to thecon d u c t of the instrumentflight examination. The groundschool a g a i n doveta ils theirtraining to acquaint the stu-dent with the specific require-ments in conducting the different types of flight examinations, as well as the completionof the necessary and inevitablepaperwork.

As proficiency is gained thehopeful student examinerneedsthe opportunity to meet andevaluate the average instru-ment rated Army Aviator. Toaccommodate this need, aviators assigned to Fort Ruckerwillingly volunteer as GuineaPigs. Their purpose is to allow the student examiner anopportunity t demDnstrate tohis instructor his ability to issue clear and concise clearances, evaluate perfO'rmance,and con d u c t an instrumentflight examinatiO'n. Some inter-esting discussions have result-ed upon termination f a flightwhen the student examiner isevaluating the ride and beingevaluated upon his evaluation.This period of flight trainingtotals 40 hDurs during the 4-week cO'urse.

I NSTRUMENT FLIGHTINSTRUCTOR TR INING

To adequately perfDrm theduties of an instrument flightexaminer 50 percent or moreof his time will be spent inconducting flight instruction.The examiner is n t assigned this duties solely t administera flight examination, but to as-sist in imprO'ving the ArmyAviation Instrument PrDgram.Paragraph 4 AR 95-67 statesthat instrument examiners arerespO'nsible for assisting the

President of the InstrumentFlight Examining Board in coordinating and supervising allinstrument flight training andrelated acti vities conductedwithin the cO'mmand.

Realistically the flight train-ing presented in the examinercourse does nDt fulfill the requirements to completely qualify the individual as an instru-ment instructor. However, onthe basis of his experience andtraining f r examiner duties,it is felt that self-improvementcan be obtained upon return tohis unit and assuming the fullobligations of the instrumentexaminer. In addition, through-out the flight training phasethe instructor is constantlydropping helpful hints to as-sist the student in performinghis duties as an instrumentflight instructor.D ur i n g the course, theground school provides furtherassistance t the potential examiner in this area. The coursestresses the need to evaluateunit requirements to maintainand imprO've individual instru-ment proficiency. TO complement this evaluation, exercisesare provided to assist the newe x ami n e r in establishing atraining program t meet theneeds of the command. Suchinformation is developed as thetype subjects t include, refer-ence materials available, andassistance which may be obtained from the USAAVNS.

Not all situations can becovered under such a program.The objective is to make theexaminer think about ways toaccomplish this phase of hisduties.DVISOR TO THE

VI TION COMM NDERWe may certainly assumethat the examiner's training to


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evaluate and prepare instru-ment training p r o g r ~ n s andact as an instrument flight in-structor is of value to the avia-tion unit commander. Howeveranother r e a is evident inwhich the services of the in-strument examiner m y beused.Aviation u n i t s are beingequipped with navigational aidsto facilitate weather flights.However all the fancy gear inthe world cannot help the or-ganization perform its missionunless it can be utilized. Theaviation officer needs personnelwho are familiar with the re-quirements necessary to ensurethat the equipment may beproperly used. The examiner istrained to provide this servicefor the aviation commanderand his organization.Training n the ground schoolis devoted to familiarizing thestudent with the requirementsnecessary to establish and op-erate a navigational approachfacility. The students are in-troduced to the criteria for es-tablishing approaches on alltypes of electronic aids used byArmy Aviation at present. Bythe completion of this block ofinstruction the student hascome to recognize the problemswhere the detailed informationmay be obtained and how tosecure assistance in establish-ing facilities.

THE EX MINERBy now perhaps our monsterhas taken on somewhat less ofa ghoulish charm. It is ourintent to train and develop aninstrument f I i g h t examiner

who will be an asset to ArmyAviation and will assist in theimprovement and progress oft h e Instrument Flight Program.

The next time you see your

WHAT IS AN EXAMINER?

examiner don t wail and moanrun and hide but enlist his aid.He will welcome the opportun-ity to discuss and assist you inyour individual instrument flying problems.

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..the truth ... the whole truth... ndnothing hut the trulh "

tVtONSEQU EN ES

IKE THE CHANT in thegame of truth or consequences, heavy, heavy hangsover thy head, the necessityfor convening the accident investiga ion bo r d poses athreat to the whole command.But i the board takes thehigh-drama courtroom r 0 a d4

they 'll find it leads to nowheresville. By swearing in witnessesto tell the truth the wholetruth the board thwarts thevery thing they should be seeking: the true cause of the accident.This truth attack has noplace in an aircraft accident in-

v:estigation, when the purposeis seeking to pinpoint the reason for the accident, not theblame.The commanding officer withPrepared by the U S. rmyBoard for viation Accident Research. .


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savvy, faced with the unpleasant task of an aircraft accident investigation, realizes thatthe way to get to the bottomand sides of any accident -no matter how picayune or hOoWfatal- is to get the persons involved to talk without fear ofconseq uences.

And consequences take manyshapes. The pilot, mechanic,copilot or supervisor who fearsloss of professional reputationOor a bad efficiency repOort willtake the natural out and avoidany recounting of the accidentthat might reflect on his performance.

Conducting an investigationalong the lines of a Perry Mason grilling will not reveal pertinent unvarnished facts. Afriendly roundtable might.

In civilian aviatiOon the heated glare Oof publicity often hinders accident investigation,prej udicing testimOony, creatingwhitewash jobs, and blockinginvestigators after the facts.

While actual CAB reportsmay not be admitted as evidence, the hearings are opento the public and are widelyused as blueprints in litigation.It is a simple fact of life thatif a passenger thinks he mightcollect damages or crew members feel they might be hung,testimony will be colored.

The aircraft accident investigation for the military shOouldbe handled carefully and thewise commander will use thisopportunity to get at the truthwith the idea of preventing future accidents. It is not howthe airplane crashed but whythat is of paramount importance. The commander whorealizes this improves the operational capability of his a.irsection and the efficiency Oof hisorganization.

Once the idea that the pilotmust pay fOor what he damagedbecame unrealistic in dollarsand cents, a new era dawnedfor accident investigation. Piloterror coupled with let him payfor it became as old hat as theJenny. We like to think it wasfollowed by an enlightened peri0'd rife with pure accident research, where the real cause 0 fan accident was br0'ught tolight and preventive measurestaken immediately t0 st0'P similar incidents.

This has not always been thecase, however. Not long ago theAviation Accident ResearchBoard received. an accident reP0'rt containing 73 pages 0 fs w 0 r n, recorded testimony.Plenty of sworn testimony, yesbu t did they get to the heart0 f the matter, the real cause ofthe accident? After analysisit was decided that they hadn0't.

Here the command attitudeis vital, f0'r tOo tell the truthmight get the crew in tr0'ublewith the old man. But, if theold man realizes that to tell thetruth may save future lives andfuture headaches, his desire fordisciplinary action may wellswitch to a desire to find thecause to prevent similar accidents under his command.

Under the Federal AviationAct of 1958, certain prOoPosalsin section 702 deal with military aircraft investigation. Itstates in part: It is of the-utmost importance that all personnel understand and appreciate certain significant differences between an aircraft accident safety investigation andan aircraft accident legal investigation; otherwise the desiredpurpose and the necessary effect of these two separate proceedings are obscured."In this article we have been

TRUT OR CONSEQUENCESreferring 0'nly to the aircraftaccident investigatiOon (safety ; i.e., those investigationsconducted solely for the purpose Oof accident prevention.

The FAA proposal furtherstates: A safety investigati0'nis always conducted. In theproceedings f0'r the aircraft accident safety investigation, thetestimony (either 0'ral or written) of a witness who is inv0'lved in the accident or astatement of a p e r son whomade an observatiOon related tothe accident, are not necessarily made under oath, and are obtained under assurance thatthe testimOony will not be usedin connecti0'n with any legal 0 rpunitive action.

This assurance is given sothat the safety investigati0' lboard is provided quickly withcomplete and truthful information of the circumstances surrounding an accident. Withoutthis assurance, aircraft accident preventi0'n pr0'grams andtheir effect W0 uld be severelycompromised a witnessmight withhold certain important evidence by invoking theprotection 0 f his constitutionalrights as to testimony of selfincriminating nature, and thusactual accident cause factorswould remain hidden and accident preventative measureswould be inadequate.

To quote further: In additi0'n the witness is not limitedt 'n0'thing but the truth,' butis invited tOo conjecture asto possible accident cause factors.

Putting a proper cap Oon it,one might say that courtroomgrilling of witnesses makes f0'rgood TV, good movies, and highdrama on stage, but dOoes notproduce the g00'ds if you are100'king for the cause Oof an aircrash.

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TheT TS

toryLieutenant L W Mays TC

COMMONLY K N O W N asTATSA, the U S. ArmyTransportation Aircraft Testand Support Activity was activated 1 July 1956 by Depart-ment of the Army General Or-der Nr. 26. This establishedTATSA as a Class I I Activityunder the jurisdiction of theChief of Transportation to belocated at Fort Rucker, Ala.and assigned to the U n i t e dStates Arm y TransportationMateriel Command St LouisMo.TATSA commenced opera-tions to provide evaluations oflogistical tests in accordancewith AR 705-40.Testing is accomplished bymilitary and civilian personnelwithin TATSA, as well as bycontracting f o r maintenanceperformed on assigned aircraft.In most cases TATSA deals directly with the manufacturerand maintains its own ware-house supply operations for allsupported programs.

TATSA s specific missionsare to conduct flight tests onArmy aircraft so that approxi-mately 1 000 hours of flyingtime can be accumulated asrapidly as possible; to deter-mine component service I i f eand inspection cycles; make

Before his recent return tocivilian life Lt Mays was assigneds a project officer with TATSAHe is fixed and rotary wing ratedand instrument qualified withapproximately 2 200 flight hours.

aircraft more serviceable easier to maintain and support, toadvance aircraft serviceability,maintainability, and supporta-bility through improvements intechnical publications, procedures, development of quickchange kits: and modifications;to determine. the requirementsfo r manpower, tools equipment, and skill.

To verify the adequacy ofspecial and common tools andequipments; to confirm echelons of maintenance and thetraining requirements there-for; to develop repair partsconsumption data for use dur-ing provisioning and supplycontrol; to develop maintenanceand operating cost data, and toenable the Commanding Gen-

CHIEF OFTRANSPORTATION

TRANSPORTATIONMAINTENANCE

COMMAND

D PT. OF ARMY

CHIEF SIGNALOFFICER

eral U. S. Army Transporta-tion Materiel Command to evaluate the results thereof; andto supervise contractual fieldmaintenance support of theU S. Army Aviation Board andU. S. Army Signal Corps A viation Test and Support Activity.Logistical evaluations byTATSA are conducted underrigidly controlled conditions developed and improved throughcontinuous analysis of the typeand degree of logistical datarequired by DA for air items.No two programs have exactlythe same requirements.

TATSA s role in the testingfield started with an accelerat-ed 1 000 flying hour programon the H-37 helicopter. Thisproject was completed in 128

US CONARC - - - - - - - - - - - - -

THIRD ARMY

IIIIIT TS ----i

IIII II I I I____________ L___________ _________ J

AVIAT ION SCHOOL -

COMMAND OR OI'ERATIONAL CONTROL- - - - - - ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPOITT AND/OIT C ORDINATION

T I t A I N ING


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calendar days. During this testTATSA pilots were flying theH-37 every hour it was not inmaintenance, every day, holiday, and weekend.This schedule was deemed

too strict for pilot safety bythe Flight Surgeon, so pilotsfor the Caribou and Mohawktests are scheduled to fly theseaircraft 50 hours every week,weekends and holidays included. This means that TATSAmaintenance crews still workaround the clock to keep theaircraft available. If TATSApilots fly 50 hours in 5 daysthey call it quits for the week,but sometimes the entire 7days are required to meet thisschedule. The 1,000-hour H-37program resulted in TATSAreceiving the American Helicopter Society Kossler Awardfor 1956.

TEST S ACCOMPLISHEDIt is beyond the scope of this

article to list all of the testsaccomplished by TATSA; however, listed below are a few ofthe more important tests thathave been completed. A 1,000 - hour comparativelogistical evaluation of t h eH-13H and H-23D helicopters.For this test a total of 4,000hours was flown on 4 aircraft inless than 6 months. A 1,000 - hour comparativelogistical evaluation of t h eH-21 and H-34 in which a totalof 4,000 hours was flown on4 aircraft in 82 days.(What s the difference between a comparative logisticalevaluation and a logistical evaluation? The same proceduresare involved, but in the comparative evaluation 2 each ofsimilar type helicopters are

evaluated to determine whichtype the Army will continue topurchase.) A 1,000-hour logistical eval-

uation of the YH-40, predecessor to the HU-1A helicopter. A 300-hour logistical evaluation on the Cessna YH-41. The first portion of a fuelstandardization test, which involved two each L-19s, L-20s,H-13s, and H-23s. These eightaircraft were selectively operated - to the componentchange life of each engine on115/ 145 grade fuel with andwithout additives. The immediate purpose of this test wasto determine whether these aircraft could operate efficientlyon a higher performance fuelthan that for which the engineswere designed. The ultimatepurpose is an attempt to standardize fuel requirements forArmy aircraft, thereby tremendously lightening the logisticalburden. A 1,000-hour logistical evaluation of the descendant of theYH-40, the HU-1A Iroquoiswhich embodies numerous design improvements.

JUST WH T IS T TS ALOGISTICAL TEST?

It is a test to determine thenecessary logistical su p p 0 r trequirements to properly maintain Army aircraft. I t is measured in terms of manpower,parts, fuels and lubricants, andtools and procedures. Logisticaltesting also assists the Armyin having the required numberof mechanics with the righttools and supply parts in theright place at the right time.

Data derived by logisticaltests permit proper programming for spare parts support,determination of realistic operating ex p en s e data andscheduling of maintenance atproper levels-consistent withthe capabilities of the variousechelons of maintenance. Suchdata also aids in the preparation of necessary t e c h n i c a

TH T TS STORY

manuals based on proved techniques and sound technical information.Two important by - productsof the logistical test must notbe overlooked. (1) The verynature of the tests involves therapid accumulation of m n yhours of service experience. Logistical tests reveal areas offaulty or inadequate design.These can be brought to the attention of the manufacturerand corrected before the initiation of quantity production.(2) These tests provide a golden opportunity for proving (ordisproving) the ability of timechange components to acceptlonger service tours. This aspect is particularly importantin tests of helicopters.

HOW?Now, how is a logistical testaccomplished? One or more(usually two) aircraft are assigned to TATSA for testing.T ATSA establishes a test program which will duplicate, overa given number of flying hours(usually 1,000), the anticipatedflying program which this typeaircraft will encounter in fielduse over a similar number ofhours. In other words, T ATSAestablishes a load, power, andmission profile which is considered to be typical of the potential field use.Along with these controlledconditions, records are kept ofall significant logistical data,such as fuel and oil consumption, parts usage, maintenancemanhours, t y pes of maintenance, all conditions requiringunsatisfactory reports, and sufficient flight data from the aircraft instruments and load datato assure us that the load,power, and mission profiles arebeing flown as programmed.This d a t a recording is, ofcourse, the heart and soul of

2T


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FEBRUARY 1961our program. It not only provides TATSA with the basic information we are seeking butallows TATSA t establish atan early period norms in eachof the areas being studied andthe ability then to detect at anearly stage any deviations fromthese norms.A recent example of theT ATSA test is the full scaleaccelerated logistical evaluation of the Y AC-1DH Cariboutransport aircraft. This project involved 1 000 flying hourson each of two aircraft so as toobtain an approximate equivalent of 3 years normal operational wear and tear in as shortan elapsed time as possible.This operation provides essential logistical planning data andinformation. The following specific areas were investigated: Airframe, powerplant andinstalled equipment componenttour verifications and determinations of detailed daily intermediate and periodic inspection requirements.o Improvement in the aircraftserviceability through improvements in technical publicationsmaintenance and inspectionproced ures, development ofquick-change kits, and the development of various airframemodifications.f Determined the manpowerspecial and standard tools servicing and support equipmentand maintenance and inspectionskill requiremen s t supportthe aircraft. Verified recommended common and s p e c i I tools andequipment to support the aircraft, and prepared recommendations for changes where appropriate. Confirmed echelons of maintenance and training require- 8

ments for maintenance personnel and recommended changeswhere appropriate. Developed data and information on repair parts consumption POL adequacy and quantities used provisioning andsupply control data, verification of source coded data, andreviews of supply documents torefine same as required. Developed controlled maintenance and operating cost data.In performing these logisticaltests, a new concept of aircraftmaintenance has also been developed at TATSA; and thereis a great probability that itwill be adopted throughout theArmy. Basically in this system the condition of the aircraft determines the maintenance requirements throughflight hours completed insteadof technical manuals being thedictator.

New terms have been introduced to replace old terms. Thepreflight inspection is nowknown as the flight readinessinspection. The pilot conductsa flight readiness inspection todetermine whether or not theaircraft is safe t perform itsprospective mission and theminimum number of systemsor items in the aircraft arechecked to determine whetherthe aircraft is in a safe flyablecondition. The daily inspectiontakes the place of the old postflight inspection

Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1961

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1961