Armor Magazine, September-October 1989

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, September-October 1989

1/56


2/56

I suppose that the heavy vs. light force debatewill always be a natural by-product of con-strained fiscal resources, but 1 have to wonderwhy those who choose to advocate dismember-ment of heavy forces do so in a darkened roomin the absence of the light of history. Sure, lightforces are less expensively equipped thanheavy, and I grant that light forces are moreeasily deployed to potential or actual hot spots.But don't both forces have sufficient missionsto keep them busy - missions that each coulddo better than the other? Missions they mustdo together? Isn't our Army big enough forboth?

Can BDU shirts and automatic weapons, nomatter how well trained and physically fit theirowners, take and hold ground against an ar-mored foe? On the other hand, can a tank com-pany alone seize a built-up area without gettingits butt kicked? Despite arguments to the con-trary, the answer to these questions is "no."

Light forces can handle many of the so-calledlow-intensity situations well. But each one hasthe potential to reach an intensity with whichthey can no longer cope. When that happens,who ya gonna call?

Combined arms is the key - we've knownthat for a long time. From its very inceptionnearly 50 years ago, combined arms has beenthe bedrock of the Armored Force, thus the sig-nificance of the three colors on the triangularpatch: red (artillery), blue (infantry), yellow(cavalry).Yet, there are always some who don't think

we are needed, some who continually strive to

put all our force development eggs in the lightforce basket. The September 1989 Parameterscontains an article in which the author suggeststhat the heavy forces are a display army, whilethe light guys represent the real fighting army("Two Armies," pp. 24-34). "One might well askwhy America bothers with an expensive displayarmy at all," the author writes. "Surely five or solight infantry divisions could just as easily holdthe line in Europe, particularly if some of themoney saved by mothballing the heavy forcedinosaurs went into fielding of effective antitankweapons. This effort would seem a modest ex-penditure compared to the billions paid out forcurrent heavy tanks and sophisticated fightingvehicles."

Let's see what the 101st Airborne trooperswho were at Bastogne, and the Britishparatroopers who were in Arnhem think of this.As Colonel Harry Summers wrote in his Sep-tember 4, 1989, Army Times column (p. 23),"The average armored or mechanized division's

300 Abrams tanks, 300 Bradley infantry fightingvehicles, and the self-propelled 155-mm howit-zers and multiple launch rocket systems of itsdivision artillery provide an awesome array ofcombat power capable of standing toe-to-toeand slugging it out with any enemy force in theworld."

That's what the Army's heavy force, and othe heavy force can do for you. Those who con-tinually profess the attitude of "I'd rather be lightthan right" to the exclusion of all else need towake up and smell the diesel.

- PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:WILLIAM J. MEEHAN IIBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


3/56

I The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-89-5Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS C. FOLEYARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published

bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications.Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach heavy brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalionheadquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-pany, and motorized brigade headquarters ofthe United States Army. In addition, Armylibraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA andMACOM staff agencies with responsibility for ar-mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or-ganizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the US. Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponency in-cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 19series enlisted soldiers:any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexcluslvely: training for all SC 12A. 128. and12C officers and for all CMF-1Sseries enlistedsoldiers: and information concerning the train-ing, logistics. history. and leadership of armorand armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi-ment level and below. to include Threat units atthose levels.

Material may be reprinted. provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.

September-October1Y89,Vol XCVlll No. 5

Features5

111618

23

25

31

35

42

44

47

Gorbachevs Cuts - Ho w They Impact on the Armor Forceby GeraldA. HalbertDeveloping a Tank Autoloaderby Major John C. WoznickA British Tank Squadron Tries the M 1A1by Major D. I.ViccarsDeceptive M aneuverby Captain (P) ames F. MerkelTraining for Replacem ent Operations Warfightingby Major Jon H. MoilanenAshby Is Here!...by Major Patrick J. CooneyTank Therm al Signatures:The Other Variable in the G unnery Equationby Stephen P. Rosa and Sergeant First Class Thomas LindsleyDivision Cavalry: The Broken Sabreby Major General Robert E. WagnerArmory Training for Tank Gunneryby Lieutenant Colonel Gerald R. Whitfieldand Major Douglas L. DildayCreating an Army of Winnersby First Lieutenant Jeff SwisherCommanders and Moral Courageby Lieutenant Colonel James E.Swartz

Departments2 Letters 49 Recognition Quiz Anzwers2 Contacts 50 Bustle Rack4 Commanders Hatch 52 Books

46 Recognition Quiz

Dlsiribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution s unlimited.


4/56

Light ScoMts: the Armor Center is trying to reinventReinventing an Infantry Idea? them.Dear Sir:I would like to respond to an article in

the March-April issue of your magazine,titled "New Scout Platoon Concept WillTest HMMWVs as Stealthy Scouts."

The HMMWV or light wheeled vehiclescout platoon is not a new concept at all.In fact, these scout platoons have beenaround for at least the last two decades.These scout platoons can be found in thelight infantry battalions. It appears as if

Recently, the Cavalry has been fieldinglight cavalry troops for the light infantrydivisions and brigades. Having transi-tioned to the new light cavalry troop, I eelthat I am qualified to criticize the TO&E,organization and doctrine, and competentto offer a suggestion to improve the scoutplatoon organization.

First of all, the TOW is best left to anti-tank platoons. of which the light infantrybrigade has nine. It is virtually useless ona scout vehicle. I'm sure the design was

meant to parallel the M113/M901 mix, butthe H M M W TOW vehicle just does notcompare with the ITV. The light units aresupposed to be geared toward a low-inten-sity conflict anyway. If the other teamused a lot of tanks, the conflict would bea high-intensity war. That TOW would begetting in the way when trying to dealwith guerrillas in forests or other ThirdWorld terrain that is not as suited toarmor warfare as say, Europe. Also, wespend more time training and maintainingthe TOW than scouting. That is what 11Hsare for.Next, the M2 .50 caliber machine gun.This weapon is great on an M113, but

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.DIRECTORY - Points Of Contact Commercial prefix is Area Code 502-624-xxxx).A R M O R Editorial Offices U.S. A R M Y A R M O R SCHOOL

Editor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick .I . CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonContributing ArtistsSFC Robert TorsrudSPC Jody Harmon

22492249261026102610

MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.ARTICLE SUBM ISSIONS: To improve speed andaccuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals orclear copies, either typed or printed out in near-letter-quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on5-1/4 floppy disks in Microsoft WORD, MuItiMate,Wordperfect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please in-clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra-tions submitted.PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problemsor changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circula-tion manager, (502)942-8624.MILITARY DISTRIBUTION: Report deliveryproblems or changes of address to Ms. VivianThompson, AV 464-2610; commercial: (502)624-2610.Requests to be added to the free subscription listshould be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

Commandant (ATZK-CG)Assistant Com mandant (ATSB-AC)Deputy Assistant Com mand ant (ATSB-DAC)

MG Thomas C. Foley 2121BG J . B. Taylor 7555COL Claude L. Clark , 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM John M. Stephens 4952Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)COL .Tames R. Joy 8346Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS)COL A. W. Kremer 5855Weapons Dept. (ATSB-WP)COL George R. Wallace I11 1055Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD)COL Donald E. Appler 7250Directorate of Com bat D evelopments (ATSB-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050Dir. of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES)Mr. Clayton E. Shannon 3446Training Group (ATZK-TC-TBF)LTC William C. Malkemes 3955NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School (ATNCG)CSM Donald L. Baker 5150Director, Reserve Compon ent Spt (ATZK-DRC)COL Charles W. Davis 1351LTC Ricky M. Rowlett 7809TEXCOM Armor & Engineer Board (ATZK-AE)COL Dan E. Deter 7850TRADOC Sys M gr forTank Systems (ATSB-TSMT)

O fic e of the Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)

COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

~~

2 A R M O R - September-October 7989


5/56

when you fire it on the M1025 HMMWV,all of the brass goes down into the troopcompartment. The M60 machine gunwould be an adequate weapon to use.

The doctrine of FC 17-101 and FC 17-101-1, the Light Scout Cavalry Troop how-to-operate manual, and ARTEP MissionTraining Plan, is ambiguous and confus-ing, apparently designed to give com-manders freedom to "task organize" withmany different platoon configurations.The configurations are organized aroundthe TOW HMMWV, and as I have alreadystated, it is not suited to a reconnaissancerole. The proposals in the March-April ar-ticle calling for the Stinger missile to be in-corporated into a scout platoon also mis-ses the mark. Like the TOW, it would takeup training time from scouting to airdefense. Leave that to the 16s people. Ifthe task force or brigade commanderthought it a good idea to send TOWS orStingers forward with the scouts, he couldattach them to the scout platoon asneeded. That way you have experts in allfields carrying out the mission.I suggest that the developers of lightscout platoons adopt the organization and

doctrine of the light infantry battalionscout platoon. The Infantry has years ofexperience here, and their doctrine istime, if not battle, tested. Perhaps itwould be best if the light cavalry troopMTO&E was organized with four platoonsconfigured exactly like the light infantrybattalion scout platoon. After all, the lightcavalry troops are used in the light in-fantry divisions and brigades. It would beeasier for training and evaluation to get allscout platoons on the same sheet ofmusic, and the infantry scouts are or-ganized the best.I also propose the creation of a new

MOS for these light scout platoons. Caval-ry scouts are trained at Fort Knox and areprimarily Armor-oriented. When theycome to a light cavalry troop, they requirea lot of retraining. Infantry scouts aretrained at Fort Benning to be infantrymen,and by chance. become scouts withoutany formal training as scouts. To alleviatethese two problems. create the MOS 11D,Light Reconnaissance Scout. Thesescouts could be used in both the light in-fantry and the light cavalry.

JOHN A. JETTSSG, OHARNGCincinnati, OhioFlawsSeenin Light Scout ConceptDear Sir:I am writing concerning the "New Scout

Platoon Concept" article in your March-

April issue. I am currently stationed at theNTC in the OPFOR S2 section. Prior tothat, I was a crew member aboard aScout "BRDM" (visually modified HMMWV).

I am gratified to hear than someone isaware of the need for "something better"for the scouts. The Bradley is an excellentfighting vehicle, but its height and noiselevel make it a poor choice for reconnais-sance. However, 1 would like to point outsome misconceptions about the idea ofthe new "Stealthy Scout" concept. Theidea of the HMMWV as a recon vehiclehas been tried before at Fort Lewis, aspart of the motorized concept as a whole.The problems that were never alleviated,and were shown most convincingly whenthe 9th ID came to be "trained" againstthe OPFOR at the NTC, were the need forsurvivability and firepower. A HMMWV-pure scout platoon relies mainly on itsTOW and MK 19 vehicles for overwatch.The TOW. though a good defensiveweapon. was never designed to give sup-pressive fire when contact is established.The MK 19 grenade machine gun may bethe answer to the suppression issue: oddsare, however, it will not eliminate thethreat. Against a BMP or even a BRDM,the HMMWV stands little chance of evenoutrunning contact without some form ofimmediate and accurate suppressive ire.A mixed platoon of HMMWVs and Brad-leys has greater firepower, but at the

same time defeats its purpose of being"stealthy." What good is it to have excel-lent overwatch when everyone kncwsyou're there? Unless you can move ex-tremely fast over unfamiliar terrain, youcan expect an artillery barrage to fall onyour position shortly.

Lastly, a word about the use of theHMMWV as a recon vehicle at the NTC.These vehicles are visually modified tolook like Soviet BRDM-2s. armored recon-naissance vehicles. Under the MILES sys-tem. they carry lasers on the vehicle toreplicate 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machinegun fire: they carry a MILES Dragon toreplicate the RPG-16. They also carry thesame sensor belts as armored personnelcarriers. Their survivability is admirable,and by using the DragonlRPG, they canchallenge or neutralize armored threats.The important point here is that this is nota HMMWV doing the mission: rather, fi is_ _ _ _ _ _ -n armored recon vehicle.

In conclusion, while I agree with thepremise of a vehicle that is smaller,quieter, and faster, the concept of sur-vivability should not be overlooked. Adead scout is no good to anyone, andeven the best scout will encounter enemycontact at some time.

_______ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~ ~______

I am in the midst of preparing for the up-coming rotation in which the new con-figurations will have their debut. There isno more consternation than a normal"modern rotation" (Bradleys and Abrams)causes. Whether the new configurationswork out or not is anyone's guess, but Iwould like to wish the scouts of the 24thID "good luck."

RICHARD G. JOHNSTONSGT, HHC, 1-52 In BnFt. Irwin. Calif.

Zumbro Is RightAbout Armor's "Achilles Heel"Dear Sir:Your May-June issue was bursting with

timely, well-articulated and thought-provoking articles. However, RalphZumbro's, "Armor's Achilles Heel," andMG Tait's, "Leadership - Often StudiedBut Seldom Understood," were, in myview, the best. Both articles are must read-ing for all soldiers in leadership positions- at any level - as well as those aspir-ing to be.

Zumbro's clear insight on the "care andfeeding" of Armor units deployed acrossextended distances is applicable to alllevels of conflict, and applies equally toall members of the combined arms team.Hopefully, it will provoke some rethinkingand reassessment of the mobility that isrequired in our combat service supportcapabilities at brigade, battalion, and com-pany. Unfortunately, counter to past les-sons learned, we have seen a slowerosion over the past ten years in ourability to provide on-position replenish-ment of fuel, ammunition, and spareparts.

The thinking seems to be that it is betterto have the "consumer" come to the"store," than to bring the "store" to the"consumer." As Ralph Zumbro points out,it doesn't work that way in the real worldof combat!

MG Tait made a similar comment whenhe stated that the Army cannot be run likea major corporation. Yet, there are somewho thmk it can, and as the generalpoints out, those who try, do indeed "rununhappy ships," and, I might add, very in-efficient and largely ineffective ships overthe long term. Could it be that we forgotto talk to the soldiers when we began torestructure our TO&Es and reduce ourmobility and robustness in our combat ser-

Continuedon Page 43

ARMOR - September-October 7989 3


6/56

u u u u

It is

MG Thomas C. FoleyComm anding GeneralU.S.Army Armor Center

very high honor to return 1Fort Knox to become the Com-mander of the Armor Center, Com-mandant of the Armor School, andChief of Armor and Cavalry. I lookforward to this opportunity to serve.

These are great l imes for Armorand Cavalry. One has to be excitedabout the future. After all. ours isthe branch that has the legacy of abrilliant band of professionals whohave inspired us with their leader-ship. They were visionary leaders,with courage. candor, and commit-ment. who forged the thunderbolt,fought it to victory on the bat-tlefields of World War 11. and havecontinued to lead the way in shap-ing it into todays combined armsteam. But we must not rest on theirlaurels. We must move ahead in theface of todays great challenges - ashrinking budget and the growingperception that the threat hasdiminished. As the leading pro-ponent for mobile armor warfare,we mu st move out o n multiple axes:

We must develop sounddoctrine, tactics, techniques. andprocedures as the foundation ofeverything else we do.0 We must train proud, dis-ciplined, confident, and competentsoldiers ready to light and win. Wemust assist Armor and Cavalry units

in chievingreadiness.0 We must develop commis-sioned and noncommissionedArmor and Cavalry leaders who aretactically and technically competen t,bold and agressive, ready to takerisks and seize th e initiative; leade rswho will care for their soldiers andlead their units to battlefield suc-cess. We must also develop ourleaders so they are ready to assumeever higher levels of responsibility.0 We must ensure our organiza-

tions are designed against the stand-ard of battlefield operational effec-tiveness, and not efficiency.0 We must develop armoredweapons systems which capitalizeon the ingenuity and skill ofAmerican soldiers and leaders, thedictates of our operational con-cepts. and our technology.Whether Active Army or Reserve

Component members of Armor andCavalry, we must work closely withthe other members of the U.S.Army team, our sister services, andour allies. We must make the com-bined arms concept a reality.In future columns, our intent is totake a longer view of trends,developments, and outlooks, whichmay help indicate where we should

of this will cause our readers torespond. The resulting dialogue willbenefit our branch. To this end, allcommanders of tank battalions andcavalry squadrons, at that level andabove, will soon receive letters fromthe Chief of Armor and Cavalrysoliciting their advice concerningmatters of importance to ourbranch. The purpose of all this is toestablish a meaningful dialogue withthe field, so that we are responsivenot only to your immediate require-ments, but can get your views andhelp in shaping our future.As part of our dialogue, we willalso highlight and reflect on someimpo rtant anniversaries. This will in-clude the 50th birthday of the Ar-mored Force next July, as well asthe golden anniversary of th e six-teen armored divisions and theseparate tank and tank destroyerbattalions that fought in World War11.

I am fully confident that, workingtogether - reflecting on the greatlessons from those who have gonebefore, and realistically assessingthe challenges of today and tomor-row - we too will have thecourage, the candor, and the com-mitment to do what is needed.Forge th e Thunderbolt!

4 ARMOR - September-October 7989


7/56

Gorbachev's Cuts-How They ImpactOn the Armor ForceTanks will become tractors. Troops will train for theThe Soviets will retain numerical superiority, but willdefensive. Six tank divisions are going home.lose much of their potential for a surprise attack.by Gerald A. Halbert

Normally, most tankers cannot gettoo excited abobt internationalpolitics. This is both good and had.Tankers get paid to fight, not to bediplomats. Yet, in the U.S. Army,while we do not want to go to war,our job is to keep t he price of goingto war so high that any enemy wantsto think twice about fighting.

Recently, the President of theUSSR, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, haschanged the Soviet Army in such away that, if a war should come, theSoviet Army will not appear to bewhat it was several years ago. Ou rtankers ought to know about thesechanges.

O n 7 December 1988, Gorbachevannounced at a meeting of theUnited Nations in New York thatthe Soviet Union was going tounilaterally reduce the SovietArmed Forces by 500,000 men.10,OOO tanks, 8,500 artillery systems,800 aircraft, and other combatequipment. Six tank divisions aresupposed to be withdrawn fromcentral Europe and disbanded. In

addition. assault-landing and assault-crossing units will be withdrawn.Divisions remaining in EasternEurope are to be reorganized to bemore "defensive." Th e 10,000 tankswithdrawn from units will bedestroyed or converted for civilianuse.' (Wh ile the mind boggles at thecivilian use of tank chassis, this ideais not as far fetched as it seems. TheUSSR has large areas of woodlandand flatland where heavy tractorswould be useful.)Other spokesmen later amendedGorbachcv's statement. GeneralBoris Snetkov, Com mander in Chief(CINC) of the Group of Soviet For-ces Germany, later said, "In the h-

ture all the tanks will be sentbeyond the Urals. Som e of themwill be mothballed, and others willbe used in the national economyafter modifications."'The cut is not limited to men andequipment, but includes a reductionof 14.2 percent in the direct operat-ing costs of the Soviet military, anda 19.5 percent reduction in the

budget for production of arms andmilitary equipment.- Soviet tankproduction for th e years 1983-1987averaged about 3,500 per year? Areduction of 20 percent wouldreduce production about 700 tanksannually to 2,800 tanks per year.Jane's Defence Week& estimates thatthe Soviets operate about 53,000MBTs, of which 30,000 are oldermodels, such as the T-54/55 or T-62:

7

Perhaps the most significant infor-mation about the troop reductionand tank withdrawal came from aninterview with the Soviet defenseminister, Army General D. T.Yazov, in an Isvest@a interviewpublished in the 28 February 1989issue. Yazov provided moredetailed information about thereduction than Gorbachev did inthe initial announcement. Thegroups of forces in Eastern Europewill lose 5,300 tanks. The sixwithdrawn tank d ivisions will d is-band. Air assault and (presumably)engineer pontoon regiments will beremoved. The pontoon bridge units



8/56

Table 1. Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe BeforeWithdrawal"TotalGroup Of Number OfForces MRD TD ITR ITB Tank Battalions

GSFG 8 11 5 8 181CGF 3 2 3 41SG F 2 2 1 2 37NGF 1 1 1 1 20Totals 14 16 7 14 279MRD - Moto rized Rifle DivisionTD - Tank DivisionITR - ndependent Tank Regim entITB - ndep ende nt Tank Battalion, normally one organic to eac h MRD in Eastern Europe

N O T E 6f necessity, all Soviet and Warsaw Pact strength figures are ap proxim ate. Theyrepresent the best compilation of data available.

will reduce the Soviet's ability tocross water obstacles while on theoffensive." In addition, individualtank regiments in the groups of for-ces will be converted into motorizedrifle regiments.7Remaining units will be reor-ganized to look more defensive. Themotorized rifle divisions in GSFG

and CGF will lose their organictank regiment. Each MRD will loseabout 40 percent of its tanks. Eachtank division in the groups of forceswill also lose a tank regiment, orabout 20 percent of its tanks. Amotorized rifle regiment will ap-parently replace each tank regi-ment.The reorganized divisions will alsohave more antitank and antiaircraft

assets. Additional minelaying andengineer obstacle assets will beadded to the units, in addition to in-creased engineer camouflage equip-ment.8The unit and equipmentwithdrawals will be in two stages.The first withdrawals were due tostart in April 1989," and in fact thefirst reported withdrawal began on

25 April 1989 when 31 T-64 tankswere reported shipped to the USSRfrom Kiskunhalas, Hungary."Of most interest to USAREUR-oriented tankers are the Sovietreductions in the Group of SovietForces in Germany (GSFG). In1989, th e 25th Tank Division (20thGuards Army [GA]), 32nd Guard

Tank Division (20th GA), two inde-pendent tank training regiments,and eight independent battalionswill withdraw." The eight inde-pendent battalions are presumablythe independent tank battalionsfound in motorized rifle divisions.In 1990, the 7th (3d Shock Army[SA]) and 12th Guards TankDivisions (3d SA), an independenttank training regiment, an air-as-sault brigade, three unspecified

training regiments, and severalmore independent battalions willwithdraw.I3If we count just the combat ele-ments, this withdrawal almostamounts to th e removal of a tankarmy from the GSFG. It does notequate to the removal of the tankarmy because a tank army has manyother units, such as artillery, airdefense and other support units,that remain. Nonetheless, it wouldnot be unreasonable to expect thatwithin the next two to four yearsthat the Soviets might remove anarmy headquarters from GSFG. In-terestingly enough, the Third ShockArmy and 20th Guards Army are inthe central GDR, and normally con-sidered to be committed against

NATO's Northern Army Group,rather than against the CentralArmy Group, composed of themajority of USAREUR and manyFRG Army units." Because bothof these armies will lose about halftheir combat power, either armycould be deactivated.

Many Soviet units oppositeUSAREUR are in the CentralGroup of Forces (CGF) in Czecho-

Table It. Warsaw Pact Forces in Eastern Europ eOther WarsawType Of Warsaw PactEquipment Soviet Pact Total

Tanks 41,580 17,890 59.470ATGM Launchers 8,840 2,625 11,465BMPlBTR 45,000 25,330 70,330



9/56

Table 111. Soviet OldDivisional Strength2'Type Numberof TankDivision Tanks BMPS/BTR SP HOW MRL RegimentsMRD 270 680 . 197 18 1TD 330 255 165 18 3

Table IV. Soviet New Divisional Strength*Type Number of TankDivision Tanks BMPS/BTR SP HOW MRL RegimentsMRD 166 640 197 18 0TD 277 21 5 165 18 2

*Calculated by removing independent ank battalion and converting a tank regimentfrom MRD and tank regiment from TD to a motorized rifle regiment with a 40-tankbattalion.

Slovakia. C G F will lose two ind e-penden t battalions in 1989, and in1990 will lose the 31st TankDivision, an air-assault battalionand an engineer regiment. 15

Although forces in the SouthernGr o u p of Forces (SGF) in Hungarydo not directly face USAREURunits, SG F will lose the 13th TankDivision in 1989, along with an in de-pendent tank traininq6regiment andair assault battalion . Un its fromSGF could deploy against WesternEurope instead of being committedagainst the Balkans. The NorthernGroup of Forces (NGF) in Polandcould commit forces againstUSAREUR units deployed in thenorth of the Federal Republic ofGerm any. N G F will lose a tank regi-ment in 1989, along with an air-defense regiment and independenthelicopter regiment. 17

Anyway you look at it, these aresignificant reductions in force thatcould potentially be committedagainst USAR EUR .How does the reduction compareto thc total num ber of systems heldhy the Warsaw Pact in Europe? TheSoviets are notorious for not releas-ing any data on the actual strengthof their own armed forces, unless at-tributing it to foreign sources, in ef-

fect saying. we won't tell you howbig our army is, but the West says itis so big. Und er Gorbachev, thishas begun to change. In January1989, the Warsaw Pact DefenseMinisters Committee released adocument comparing th e strengthsof the Warsaw Pact and NATO,using admitted Warsaw Pact datafor the first time." A portion oft h e information is listed in Table 11.

Table V.Group OfForcesGSFGCGFSG FNGFTotals

Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe afterTotalNumber OfMR D TD ITR ITB Tank Battalions

8 7 2 0 903 1 0 202 1 0 0 241 1 0 0 1214 10 2 0 146

These changes will significantly af-fect the force structure. Ea chSoviet division exchange of a tankregiment for a motorized rifle regi-ment will reduce the strength of th edivisions significantly. Soviet tankand motorized rifle d i\* o n s wereorganized with a mirror image.Each tank division had three tankregiments, a motorized rifle regi-ment, and an artillery regiment, plussupporting units. Each motorizedrifle regiment had three motorizedrifle regiments, a tank regiment, andan artillery regiment. Under thenew concept, each motorized rifledivision will have four motorizedrifle regiments, and the tankdivision will have two tank and twomotorized rifle regiments. Tablc I11lists the strengths of old Sovictunits, while Table IV estimates thestrength of the new units.I9

The Soviet forces left in EasternEurope af ter the withdrawal willremain a considerable force, butwith limited capabilities. Table Vshows t h e overall strength of Sovietforces in Eastern Europe af ter thewithdrawals are completed. Th e146 tank battalions left represent 52percent of the original strength.

These changes are not limited tounits of the Soviet Army in EasternEurope. Other Warsaw Pact forceswill be cut back, as will Soviet for-ces in other areas.Bulgaria will reduce it's forces by10,000 soldiers, $00 tanks, and 200arti llery systems.'-Czechoslovakia plans to reduce ac-tive duty person nel by 12,000. T h e



10/56

Table VI. Soviet Forces In Western USSR*Military AirborneDistrict MRD TD Divisions TotalBaltic 6 3 1 10Byelorusslan 3 7 1 11Carpathian 7 3 0 10Kiev 4 6 0 10Moscow 4 2 1 7 1

48 Iotals 24 21 3*There are other military districts. but their forces are probably committed to other areas.The Kiev MD will probably back up the Odessa MD, but could reinforce Soviet forces inGermany and Czechoslovakia.number of tank regiments will bereduced, and three combined-arms(me chan ized infantry) divisions willbe reorganized and reduced to acadre status. Eight hundred fiftytanks and 165 armo red transporterswill be gradually eliminated. Themilitary budget would be cut by 15percent by 1 ~ 1 . ' ~zechoslovakiahas been credited with having fivetank and five motorized rifledivisions.'4 Th is will leave Czecho -slovakia with five tank divisions, twoactive MR divisions, and threecadre M R divisions.

The army of the GermanDemocratic Republic (East Ger-many) will be reduced by 10,OOOmen, six tank regiments, and 600tanks. For the East Germ ans, thisrepresents a fairly large force cut:-Th e G D R is generally credited withhaving two tank divisions and fourM R divisions.'6 Th is reductionamounts to a removal of one tankregiment per division. (It is notclear that this is how the cuts will beapportioned.)

7.5

Hungary announced that thebudget would be cut 10-17 per-cent?' Hun gary will redu ce its per -sonnel strength by 9,300, tanks by251, and eliminate 30 BTRs. It willalso remove 180 antitank weaponsfrom t he force structure.'*

Poland has been in the process ofreducing the size of the military forthe last two years. Fifteen thousandsoldiers were to be removed from

active duty, but specific numbers oftanks removed have not beenreleased. nor the number of unitsd e a ~ t i v a t e d . ~ ~The Soviets informed the Nor-

wegian government that Soviet for-ces near Norway would be cut byabout 20,000 men. The 20,000 sol-diers would come from theLeningrad Military District and theMurmansk bases on the Kola Penin-sula.30Three-fourths of the Soviet troopsin Mongolia will be withdrawn.More than 260,000 soldiers in theeastern and southern USSR will bedischarged?' In Mongolia, two tankdivisions and a motorized rifledivision \vi11 be w i t h d r a ~ n . ~ ~ha tshould leave one motorized rifledivision in M0ngolia.3~in addition, several motorized in-fantry divisions in the USSR will beconverted into relatively staticmachine pdartillery divisions,which have a defensive nature.34

According to the Warsaw Pact, aminimum of 11,901 tanks will beremoved from the force structure inEastern Europe in the next twoyears.35 If completed, this reductionwill reduce the Soviet capability tomount an offensive operationwithout reinforcements.

There will remain large numbersof units in the USSR, available formobilization and reinforcement of

the Warsaw Pact. As Table VI indi-cates, there are 48 divisions avail-able to reinforce GSFG and CGF?6Many of these units are kept at alower state of readiness than thosein Eastern Europe.The Soviets recognize that it willbe a challenge to reconfigure theirdivisions and revamp their tactics.Army General B. Snetkov, the com-mander in chief of the Group of

Soviet Forces in Germany, said in aRcd Star interview of 2 3 March 1989,

"I have alreadv said that we caiirtotforgo combat capabiliht. Biit the trait-sitioii of the divisions rciitaiitirtg inG D R tem-ton?o a defensive stnlchlrc- arid irt this respect the itiiiiiber oftanks will be corisiderablv reduced -arid the witlidrawal of tacticaliiiiclcar g~.steiitsro m tlie groiip of for-ccs, together with assaiilt landing aridassaiilt liver-crossing siibiiriits aridtheir aims arid eqiiipnierit, will ofcoiirse require the revision of soiitcviews on combat training. T i e rediic-tiori in tlie jorces' ofleitsive potentialpresiipposes increased atteiitiort totheir training from the point of viewof defense.

"Ti'tis task will priiiiarilv be solvedbv ertsiiriiig the qrialitatiwpuranieten of combat readiness. b tparticiilar, with regard to amis, thiswill be apparent in th e increaseditiiiitber of antitank gatenis arid artil-lenp in th e reriiairiiiig divisions. Wtliregard to tactics, greater importaricewill be attached than before to th e en-gineer eqriipriteiit of positiorts ariddefense regions. As a whole, tlte em -phasis irr troop trairiirig will be 011 thepefectioit of issues cortitected withtroop de feitse operatioris. 3 '



11/56

Cuts n Warsaw Pact forces may include bridging units, essential for a surprise attack into Western Europe.General Snetkov went on to add

of theof the mostunits. O ne regi-M. Ye Katukov, the

of Tankof Lenin,

of the Red Banner, Suvorov,

of thefor

be transferred

for thosef many units are exchanged forer units.The impact on the NATO tanker

d AT GM s. This should result in ato mount offen-

capability. In fact, if carried out, itmeets many of the objections theWest has had about the Soviets'capability to mount offensive opera-tions.While this capability is reduced, itis not totally removed, and Sovietforces should be quite capable ofmounting counter-offensives. Afterreinforcement. they could, ofcourse, mount a major attack. Anissue that may come up in futurearms reduction talks is the veryutility of the tank and otherweapons for both offensive anddefensive combat. T he Soviets clear-

ly realize that while some type ofweapons systems, such as aircraft,are for attack, others a re defensive,yet others can be used for either.They do consider the tank to be a"universal weapon," suitable for useboth in at tack and in defen~e.3~e-cause the tank is universally recog-nized as a tracked vehicle mountinga turret with a main gun largeenough to kill opposing tanks, it ispossible that the Soviets might

develop a modern assault gun. As-sault guns, by their very nature arenot as "offensive" as norm al tanks.Such a vehicle might be very hardto kill. A new assault gun combiningmissile and gun would represent aqualitative increase in effectivenessover existing systems.Even after the announced largecuts in Soviet forces, they will stillhave a effective numerical supe-riority in Eastern Europe for sometime to come. Those seeking to off-set the Soviet numerical superiorityshould ponder a statement by Mar-

shal of the Soviet UnionAkhromeyev, the former chief ofthe general staff and now apparent-ly a sp ecial m ilitary advisor to P resi-dent Gorbachev.' X t tlie saitte time, as tire stnrcture

of tlte Soviet Aimed FOKCSis itowbeing given a defensive tltizrst, newntethods are beirig iirtrodticed toiiiaiiitaiit ittilitany capacip at a levelwliiclr guarantees tlte coiottny's~~



12/56

seclirici in the event of possible rediic-tiorts irt both riiiclear mid coriwritiorr-al antis. Under srrcli cimuiistarices,it is of cnicial irtipotlarice that theamis arid the eqiipnierit supplied to(lie Anti! arid the Nmy be ejj2ctivearid of high qialip, so that tltcdderise objectives cart be met with asittaller riirriiher of weaporis.40

Although significant Soviet forceswill be left in being, these cuts whenimplemented, will lead to asignficiant reduction in the Sovietability to wage a ground warwithout extensive mobilization.Notes'"Deputy Defense Minister Comments

on Tank Cuts," article, p. 4 in the Bul-garian paper Harodna Armiva, 25 January1989, quoting Army General WtaliyShabanov, USSR Deputy Defense Ministerfor Armaments, as reprinted in FBIS-SOV-89-017, 27 January 1989, p. 1. See alsothe edltorial on p. 15, Aviation Week andSpace,ecember 12, 1988.This editorial is an extract from theDecember 7, 1988, address to the UN byMikhail Gorbachev.

'Interview with GEN Snetkov. MoscowTASS International Service in Russian0940 GMT, 17 April 1989. as reprinted inFBIS-SOV-89-074, 19 April 1989.

31nterview with LTG G. A. Stefanovskiy,Deputy Chief of the Main Policial Ad-ministration of the Army and Navy by Yu .Bychkov. "Today We Are Not On Parade,"p. 1-2. Sovietskava Kultura, 23 February1989, as reprinted on p. 99, BISSOV-89-045, 9 March 1989.

4Saviet Militarv Power 1988, p. 38,USGovernment Printing Office, Washington,D.C.. 1988.

5"Arms Cut Details Revealed," Jane'sDefence Weeklv, 28 February 1989.p. 279.

'Interview with Army General D. T.Yazov, p. 3, Izvestiva, 28 February 1989,as reprinted on pp. 14, FBlSSOV-89438,28 February 1989.

'Izvestiya article on p. 3, 27 Feburary1989, interview with General of the ArmyD. T. Yazov, as reprinted on p. 18, TheCurrent Diaest of the Soviet Press,Volume XLI. No. 9 (1989).

'Interview with Army General D. T.Yazov, p. 3. zvestiva, 28 February 1989,as reprinted on pp. 1-4, FBIS-SOV-89-038,28 February 1989. See also interview onMoscow TASS International Service in Rus-sian 0940 GMT 17 April 1989 with General

B. Snetkov. CINC, GSFG, as reprinted inFB1SSOV-89-074.g ~ d i ~nterview with Army General v.Shabanov in Hungarian, NEPSZABADSA,Budapest, 18 January 1989, as reprintedon p. 1, FBIS-SOV-89-013, 23 January1989. See also Moscow TASS Internation-al Service in Russian report, 0955 GMT,24 April 1989, as reprinted in FBIS-SOV-89-078, 29 April 1989."Photograph in The Washinaton Post,April 26, 1989, p. A23."The Militarv Balance, 1988-1989, Inter-national Institute for Strategic Studies, Lon-don, 1989, pp. 30-40.

'2"Tank Unit Withdrawals Revealed,"Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 March 1989, p.472.

I3lbid. Army subordinations from p. 47,Mark L. Urban, Soviet Land Power, Hip-pocrene Books. New York, 1985.

"Urban. p. 106.""Tank Unit Withdrawals," p. 472.l6lbid."lbid.""Statement of the Warsaw Pact

Defense Ministers Committee "On the Cor-relat ion of Warsaw Pact and North AtlanticAlliance Force Strengths and Armamentsin Europe and Adjoining Waters," asprinted in MOSCOW Pravda, 30 January1989. First Edition. p. 5. as reprinted in

lgDavid C. Isby, Weaoons and Tactics ofthe Soviet Army, Jane's. London, 1981.

?3oviet Militarv Power: An Assessmentof the Threat 1988, Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 74."The Militarv Balance, 1988-1989. Inter-national Institute or Strategic Studies, Lon-don. 1989. pp. 30-40.

''Moscow Television Service Program inRussian 1135 GMT, 18 February 1989, "Inthe Countries of Socialism," as reprintedin FBIS-SOV-89-033.21 February 1989.

*%terview with Milan Vaclavik, CSSRMinistry of National Defense by S.Vtorushin, p. 4, Moscow Pravda, SecondEdition, 9 March 1989, as reprinted in

FBIS-SOV-89-018.

pp. 79-81, 109-112.

FBIS-SOV-89-046.''Urban, p. 118.25TASS Agency News Release "GDR'sHonecker Announces Unilateral Troop

Cut," Moscow TASS in English 0629 GMT,24 January 1989, as reprinted in FB lSSOV-89-016. 26 January 1989.

%rban. p. 117.'"E. Europe Responds to Gorbachev

Cutbacks." J 7January 1989, p. 22.

"Araumentv 1 Faktv, No. 6, 11-17February 1989. p. 8.as reprinted in FBlS

29Moscow Television Service, 18SOV-89-034.February 1989.

30"Troops Near Scandinavia To Be Cutby 2O,OOO," Stockholm Domestic Servicein Swedish 1545 GMT 10 March 1989, asreprinted on p. 2, FBIS-SOV-89-048. 14March 1989.

3'Yazov interview (seenote 6).=TASS news release, Moscow TASS In-ternational Service in Russian, 1705 GMT,

15 March 1989, as reprinted in FBISSOV-89450, 16 March 1989.%Urban, p. 35.

34~azovnterview.35FBIS-SOV-89-034,p. 8.%ivision strengths extracted from

Urban, pp. 48-53.37"lnterview with Army General B. Snet-

kov. Commander In Chief of the Group ofSoviet Forces in Germany by Colonel A.Vasilete, Krasnava Zvezda, 23 March1989, p. 2, First Edition. as reprinted on p.81. FBISSOV-89-056.

38FBISSOV-89-056,p. 83.39"lnternational Situation-Questions and

Answers," Moscow Domestic Service inRussian, 1445 GMT 3 March 1989. asreprinted in FBIS-SOV-89-044, 8 March1989.

40MSU Sergey Akhromeyev, "The SovietUnion is Not Lowering Its Guard." Stock-holm Svenska Dagbladet, p. 3, inSwedish, 30 November 1988, as reprintedon page 119. FBIS-SOV-88-234, 6 Decem-ber 1988.

Mr. Gerald A. Halbert is aretired Army officer whoselast active duty assignmentwas with the office of theThreat Manager, Directorateof Combat Developments,U.S. Army Armor Center. Mr.Halbert served with the 8thInfantry (Mechanized) Divi-sion, 9th Infantry Division,40th Armor, 82d and 1OlstAirborne Divisions, as wellas I Corps (Group) Head-quarters and XVlll AirborneCorps Headquarters. Healso served as the A N eskofficer in the Office of theDeputy Chief of Staff for In-telligence, Headquarters,USAREUR. He is currentlyemployed by the U.S.Government in central Vir-ginia.



13/56

Developinga TankAutoloaderby Major John C.Woznick

The large-caliber. direct-fire. tankcannon has developed to the pointwhere the introduction of an ani-munition loading system orautoloader is becoming an essentialrequirement. Increases in cannoncaliber and chamber volume haveled to an increase in the size andweight of tank main gun rounds.The current generation of 120-mmtank rounds for th e M256 cannon isapproaching the limit of thecapabilities of an armor crewman toload efficiently and safely. Add ition-ally, th e use of combustible-casedammunition has resulted in an in-cre ase in the fragility of the ammuni-tion, which makes proper handlingan ev en mo re critical requirement.

The introduction of the autoloadercan offer positive impacts on system

design. A well integrated autoloadercan minimize turret volume andarmor requirements. The automaticloading of ammunition reducesworkload on the tank and offers thepossibility to reduce crew size. Newtechnologies in robotics, automa-tion, electric motors, and sophisti-cated microprocessor control sys-tems appear to be applicable to theproblem of automatic ammunitionhandling.In recent years, several countrieshave adopted autoloaders. mostnotably the Soviet Union. TheSoviets autoloade r, with an am-munition magazine below the turret,allows them to reduce the height oftheir tanks while maintaining maxi-mum armor protection. Theydecided to reduce their crew size,

Above, the TACOM Tank Test Bedvehicle has an automatically-loaded overhead gun system.saving personnel and resources. Theautoloader handles a 125-mm two-piece round, which allows them topack more propellant into a largechamber to achieve high pro,jectilevelocities. The Soviet autoloaders,therefore, represent an integratedarmament system that offers ad-vantages in survivability and lethality.

Several of our allies have intro-duced or will introduce autoloadersin their next generation of tanks.The French LeClerc tank includes abustle-mounted autoloader capableof loading the current generation of120-mm tank ammunition. Auto-loader development programs are

~~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _

ARMOR - Septernber-October 1989 11


14/56

also underway in West Germany,the United Kingdom and Japan. Inthe United States. th e Tank TestBed (TTB) and Manned WeaponStation (MWS) programs both in-cluded autoloaders as part of thesystem design, and private industryhas produced several autoloaders asIndependent Research and Develop-ment (IRSrD) projects.

The autoloader can offer ad-vantages in lethality, survivabilityand sustainability, but only if th edesign supp orts the combat system.There a re also penalties and com-promises that must be considered ifwe are t o field an autoloader..Am ong other concerns, we must ad-dress safety, reduction of th e crewand subsequent increase in th eworkload, and cost of the system.Although autoloaders look evermore attractive and producible, onlya well thought out design can offerth e benefits and avoid the penaltiesassociated with fielding a new sys-tem.

Numerous issues are considered indeveloping the optimum autoload-ing strategy to best support the mis-sion requirements of the combat sys-tem. We must explore them if th eresulting system is to meet the goalsset for the armament system andthe combat vehicle. The develop-ment of a successful system will re-quire decisions on correct trade-offsthat can only be made when the is-sues impacting on the developmentof the autoloader are understood.What then are the challenges indeveloping an autoloader for the fu-ture tank?IntegrationThe autoloader i s an integral part

of a larger system. First. it is a func-tional part of an armament system,which includes ammunition, gun,fire control. and crew. Second. theautoloader is a component in a com-72

bat system that must be optimizedfor lethality, mobility, survivability,and sustainability.Design of a system to accomplishrequired autoloader functions can

no t be done in isolation. Eachdesign decision must be consideredin light of its impacts on both thefunctional and combat systems. Thisprocess is complicated by theautoloader which is a new elementof the large-caliber direct-fire sys-tem and not a part of an establisheddesign. Systems integration issueswill include the ammunition, gun,fire control, and power supply inter-faces. Additionally we must con-sidcr vehicle spac e, survivability con-cerns, hum an engineering, and NBCprotection requirements. The intro-duction of the autoloader can affectsome integration issues; however,many will result in design trade-offsto maximize the efficiency of theovcrall systems.Letha i tyThe first requirement in designingan autoloader system is to enhancethe lethality of the weapon system.In the case of the autoloader,several concerns are paramount.You must first define the bullet.Recent ammunition lethality im-provements include larger calibers,combustible cases. and innovativewarhead and penetrator designs. Afuture possibility is using separatedammunition to increase the cham-ber volume of propellant to launchheavier payloads or attain greater

muzzle velocities. The primarydesign goal of the autoloader is toprovide safe and efficient handlingof these more lethal rounds of am-munition.Next, the autoloader must supporta high rate of fire. The rate of fire isa function of the efficiency of thedesign, and integration with the am-munition, gun and fire control. The

current rate of fire with current 120-mm ammunition is one round everyseven seconds, or 8-9 rounds perminute. The autoloader should per-form at least as well. However, a re-quirement for a higher rate of firethan necessary will force designdecisions that will adversely impactthe overall system design. For ex -ample, a requirement to load at 15rounds per minute for a sustainedperiod may require a largemagazine immediately behind thegun. This may result in a higher sil-houette and the need for increasedturret armor, with its associatedweight penalty. The engineer muststrike a balance between a higherrate of fire and the rclated designcosts. The exact rate of loading andfiring will be established by thethreat defeat criteria determined bythe user's analysis.

Another lethality design goal maybe to maximize the number of on-board rounds. As ammunition sizeincreases, the number of roundsmight be reduced as space is ex-hausted. This could occur if increas-ing the chamber volume of propel-lant (to throw a bigger and/or fasterprojectile) is required to defeat thethreat. Using the Abrams as abaseline, fewer than 40 roundsstowed on the vehicle impliesreduced system lethality.The counter-argument is that, if amore lethal round is required todefeat the threat target, the loss ofbasic load to assure a kill is accept-able. This is a trade-off that will be

mad e by the user. It must also be ad -dressed by the systems integrator he -cause the ammunition must com-pete for space with other elementsof the system. The autoloaderdesign must support the stowage ofthe maximum number of rounds.This forces the autoloaderdeveloper to locate the loadingmechanisms so they will not inter-fere with ammunition stowage, and

ARMOR - September-October 7989


15/56

Autoloading turret of the Tank Test Bed Vehicle is suspended in a vibrationtesting fixture. Rounds stored vertically in the turret basket can be seen belowthe gun.develop a storage strategy thatmak es mo st use of available space.

Given the space and configurationconstraints of the combat vehicle.not all rounds may be immediatelyavailable for loading. Replenish-ment of the ready magazine(s) maybe required from non-readystowage. This may be done by thecrew (as in the LeClerc) orautomatically (as in the NavysMK45 5-inch gun), depending onmanpower. configuration, andhuman engineering constraints.Some specified number of roundsshould be in a ready location avail-able for automatic loading to sup-port a sustained rate of fire. In thecase of the Soviet tanks. the readyrounds are located in a carouselbelow the turret floor. Non-readyrounds are manually replenished

from positions located throughoutthe tank. This approach provides apositive impact on lethality at a costin survivability and manpow er.SurvivabilitySurvivability includes many ele-ments - lethality, mobility, configura-tion of the system, and measures toreduce vulnerability, both active andpassive. Th e autoload er design must

support reducing silhouette, com-partmenting the crew from ammuni-tion, armor protection of criticalareas, warhead anti-fratricideprotection, venting of propellantfires, and p ositioning of the amm uni-tion to reduce vulnerability. Thecombat system configuration andautoloader design will include thesefeatures, but is also subject toweight and space constraints re-

quired to meet mobility, transpor-tability, and maintenance require-ments.To reduce the combat systems sil-houette constrains the location ofboth the autoloader componentsand the ammunition stowage(magazines). Additional height alsoimplies additional armor weight. Ifammunition is stowed high (say, inthe bustle) the armor envelope is ex-

tended to protect that ammunitionand critical autoloader components.This is a penalty that the vehicle sys-tem designer is loath to pay. Thedesign goal then shifts to moldingthe autoloader and ammunitionstowage into minimum space, andlocating as much of the ammunitionas low in the vehicle as possible.This was the approach taken withthe Tank Test Bed. Th e crew was lo-

ARMOR - Sepfember-October 7989 13


16/56

cated in the hull, and the turret bas-ket was then used for theautoloader and ammunition storage.This approach allowed a reductionin silhouette. which improved sur-vivability; but the design precludedany degraded mode operation andwas heavily reliant on optics andsensors to maneuver and light thetank.

If the ammunition is compart-mented. the operation of theautoloader must be compatible withthe method used. The autoloadermust have rapid access to the am-munition, yet minimize the exposureof the crew Compartment to thestowage area. Orientation of the am-munition must be considered to min-imize the danger of a high-explosivedetonation compromising the com-partment. There should beprovision for venting blast overpres-sure of high-explosive warheads andpropellant fires.

The use of an autoloader has bothpositive and negative impacts o n theoperation of the ammo compart-ment feature. Ammunition will be inthe gun or in the compartmentwithout requiring manual contactduring the loading operation. Am-munition exposure time and size ofthe access door can be minimized.However. the penalty is that the ac-ceptablc location and configuration

of the compartment will furtherrestrict ammunition stowage andautoloader design. (Hull stowage ofammunition may be more difficultto vent without dam aging the enginecompartment or suspension).Another method of increasing sur-vivability is to reduce the demit?,ofammunition stowage, decreasing thepossibility of exceeding the ventingability of the compartment. Thisconflicts with the maimurn storageof ammunition and may cause a

~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~

reduction in the onboard load ofammunition.Another desirable feature is war-head antifratricide protection. This

involves designing obstacles to theshock waves that cause propagationof nearby high-explosive warheadswhen one is hit. This allows theblast overpressure and venting sys-tems to operate, saving the crewcompartment. This feature may bebuilt into ammunition stowagemechanisms, the autoloader, orboth.The density of ammunition

stowage, size and type of warhead,and the distribution of KE an d HEwarheads also has an effect onfratricide. If the autoloader canmaintain and control the locationand distribution of ammunition in-ventory, it can decrease thefratricide hazard. However, an-tifratricide materials decrease thedensity of ammunition stowage andcomplicate the operation of th eautoloader. Survivability has been,and continues to be, a primary con-sideration in the d esign of U.S. com-bat systems. It involves more thanarmor protection. Its impacts onautoloader design reflect the in-tegration issues which establish sys-tem con figuration.SustainabilityThe first element of this principleis reliability. This has not been anissue in the past, because the

capabilities of the human loaderwere known. The reliability of theautoloader will have a profound im-pact on the systems availability.(An underlying implication is thatthe autoloader be no less reliablethan the current loader.)Two strategies suggest themselves.First, that the autoloader be so reli-able that the infrequent loss of the

autoloader is considered an accept-able loss of the system. The secondis that the autoloader can be ser-viced manually if a failure occurs,possibly at some degradedcapability, until the system can berepaired. The first strategy will bemore difficult and costly to achieve.The second will require that eachpossible failure be identified and abackup designed for it. Eitherstrategy will have penalties as-sociated with it related to the num-ber or effectiveness of the operation-al systems available.

The materiel developer, based ondesip analysis and empirical data,will identify the autoloaders failuremodes and their effect, and analyzetheir criticality. H e will then p rqjec thow frequent and how severe thefailures are likely to be. The endproduct will be a subsystemcriticality matrix which will identifypriority failure modes and provideinformation on how to design theautoloader to support the systemreliability requirements. However,there is an inadequate current database on autoloader reliability to con-firm the design analysis. Informa-tion will be acquired only as presentand future autoloader systems aredeveloped.

The maintenance concept for theautoloader will also affect systemsdesign. Maintenance proceduresshould be designed to occur at thelowest level of support possible.Diagnostic techniques have to b e es-tablished. Maintenance engineeringidentifies what components will beclassified as repairable, partiallyrepairable, or non-repairable. Thesystem design will have to allow forefficient location of maintenancepoints, and sizing of componentsand access for autoloader andmagazine removal. However, thesefeatures cannot compromise the sys-tem survivability mechanisms



17/56

cost and force struc-

The automaticallyloaded tank introducesa new armament sys-tem component notpreviously included inThe au to loader bustle magazine of the MBT- the armor system70 project,now stored in the Patton Museum. design. This com-

(armor, compartments. venting).Th e system availability requirem entsestablished by the combatdeveloper's analysis are used torefine the maintenance concept.The availability values help thedesigner to establish mean time be-tween failure (MTBF) and meantime to repair (MTTR) goals forthe au toloader subsystem. The main-tenance concept and these goalswill drive design decisions andtrade-offs that help define the con-figuration of the autoloader. Thedesign of the autoloader canfacilitate the rearming of the com-bat system. The autoloader desig-ners should be sensitive to logisticsconcerns, and the autoloader andrearm method should be com-patible. If t he rearm is manual. theautoloader can be designed to makethe transfer more efficient. A goodexample of this is the design of th eMBT-70, which allowed for manualfeed of ammunition directly into itsrotating bustle magazine through arearm port at the rear of the turret.A future armored rearm vehiclemight offer the possibility ofautomatic transfer of ammunition. Ifthe rearm is to be automatic ormechanically assisted, this intro-duces a new interface requirementfor the system. A docking methodand data link might be required toaccomplish the transfer. The ad-vantage would be in providingrapid, under-armor, and possibly,NBC-clean rearm for the tank. The

ponent replaces func-tions previously performed reliablyand efficiently by man. Man repre-sents a known quantity whosecapabilities and limitations havebeen established by experience. Theintroduction of the autoloader, infact. is necessary because thoselimitations are exceeded by the re-quirements of the armament system.The designer of an autoloader isfaced with the challenge of replac-ing a "system" that is flexible, reli-able. and able to be reprogrammedor replaced if necessary. The newcomponent must also be reliableand maintainable. It will have to per-form several distinct operations,and must be supportable by Armylogistics systems. Whether the tankcan accommodate the loss of a crew-member without some loss ofcapability is debatable. The issuefor the designer is to develop a sup-portable system which can efficient-ly load the cannon.ConclusionThe first step in developing the

autoloader is to identify the re-quired capabilities of the system.These capabilities are establishedby the combat developer (u ser ) inresponse to analysis of requiredcombat effectiveness, including suchfactors a s the threat, availability ofapplicable technologies, and opera-tional and support costs. Thisanalysis results in the definition ofcritical performance characteristics


required to efficiently defeat thethreat. The materiel developer thenuses these requirements as designgoals for the autoloader, and formu-lates a concept that will support thegoals.

The development of theautoloader continues to be drivenby the user's requirements, but thecombat and material developersmust retain a flexibility in approachthat can allow the trade-offs thatwill occur. The prioritization of re -quirements, and consideration ofthe benefits and the associatedpenalties of various autoloaderstrategies, will define the most effec-tive system design for theau to loader deve loper . Thedeveloper thus supports the effi-cient integration of the autoloader-into the combat system.

Major John C. Woznick is a1976 graduate of the StateUniversity of New York atGeneseo, with a bachelor'sdegree in biology. He wascommissioned through OCSin 1977 and attended theArmor Officer Basic Course.He served as a cavalryplatoon leader and tank com-pany executive officer in the2nd ACR. Following AOAC,he was assigned to the 194thArmored Brigade where heserved as a S2/3, MO, andtank company commander. Agraduate of CGSC and theMateriel Acquisition Manage-ment Course, he is currentlyassigned to Benet Labora-tories, U.S. Army ArmamentResearch, Development andEngineering Center, wherehe is working on the XM91Ammunition Loading System(ALS) Program.

75


18/56

As Others See Us...A BritishTank SquadronTries the MIA1by Major D. 1. Viccars, C Sqn., 3d RTR(Reprinted with permission from TANK, the Royal Tank Regiment Journal)Soldiers of C Squadron, 3 Royal

Tank Regiment, had a good chanceto take a detailed look at the M l A lduring a Visit to 2/70 Armor Bat-talion a t Grafenwohr.This article is not intended as 3technical critique of the Abrams;rather it is compiled from the views

of 20 soldiers who drove and firedthe tank over a two-day period. Ad-mittedly, two days is insufficient tojudge the effectiveness of a mainbattle tank; however, it is longenough to create an impression...

The most impressive part of thetank is the turret. It is well laid out,the main armament having an ex-tremely easy loading and firing se-quence and seeming to be very ac-curate. The author achieved threefirst-round hits in about 30 seconds,against a mover at 1,200 meters, astatic target at 1,500 m, and a mover

at 1,800 m, all this with no prior in-struction! It is therefore a very easytank to fight. Reservists, for ex-ample, would have no difficulty atall in climbing in and operating thevehicle efficiently. Fixed ammuni-tion is a considerable advantage tothe crews and gives a really fastloading time. The sighting and firingsequenc e and the gun control equip-ment is again really slick and simpleto use. There is no complexgraticule, no ellipse, no autolay, etc.All the gunner has to do is lay acircle on the target, press one but-ton on the joystick-type gunner'scontrol, then immediately press theadjacent firing button - shouting"On the way" at the sam e time!

The relief with which British crewsgreeted a simple, clear, gunner'ssight had to be seen to be believed.Automotively, the tank seems easyto maintain and repair, and boasts

some amazingly obvious and simplefeatures which make life so mucheasier for the crew. For example,the tracks a re tensioned hydraulical-ly, all the batteries are side-by-sidein a separate armored compartmentnext to the engine, and as many aspossible of the oil reservoirs are see-through plastic, even the r oad wheelhubs! It is also very easy, and quick,to remove and replace the engineand transmission.

In addition, the United Statesmaintenance troops have a largenumber of test equipments rapidlyto isolate and identify the damagedcomponent.

Sadly though, Abrams does seemto suffer from as many electricalproblems as Challenger. In addi-tion, th e M l A l is not a vehicle thatcrews could easily live on. Mealsare prepared elsewhere, there is



19/56

limited stowage, limited tentage etc.A summary of our views follows atthe end of this article, though itmust be remembered that theseopinions were formed during a two-day visit, and more time on thevehicle is required t o obtain adetailed comparison. However, themajority view of the party was thatthey would prefer to go to war onChallenger, rather than Abrams;but if the fire and gun control sys-tem of Abrams was put in Chal-lenger, the general belief was thatChallenger would then be outstand-ing.

Summary of 3 RTRs ViewsOUR LIKES.Turret. Fire Control and Arma-

ment0The gun. its sighting and control

equipment.Hydraulic gun control equip

meht which is easy to start. quickand very responsive, as well asbeing fast.0 Stabilized sight.0The gunners graticule - clear,0 Good. simple muzzle reference0 Easy. simple fire control orders.

Firepower - 120-mm smooth-bore; 2x7.62mm, 1x.50 cal.0 Fixed ammunition; rapid load-

ing drills.0Ammunition stowage in the tur-

ret with built-in blow-outpanels tovent any explosion out of the tank,rather than into the crew compart-ment.

simple and easy!sight.

Power Plant and Suspension0 Remarkably quiet engine, with

rapid acceleration, and very easy tooperate.0 Hydraulic hand brake, quick

and easy.0 Very responsive steering.0 Multi-fuel capability.

Very easy maintenance.0 Rapid engine repair and change.0 Batteries stored, all together,

under armor, adjacent to the en-gine, therefore easy to change andservice.

0Clear plastic oil reservoirs foreasy level checks, etc., even on theroad wheel hubs.

Hydraulic track adjusters.Communicationsand Crew Arrangements0 Secure communications to0 Well laid out crew stations, espe-0 The internal lights are blue, thus0 Excellent crew seats.0 Excellent crewmens helmets,0 The very effective heater!

platoon/troop level.cially the drivers.there is no loss of night vision.

very comfortable.

General0 Smooth. wide, warm back decks0 Small. low profile.

- good to sleep on!

OUR DISLIKESTurret, Fire Control,and Armament

Commander (apparently) can-not lay gunner sight onto target.

No wiper on gunners sights!Thermal imaging equipment

very poor in comparison to TOGS.(TOGS is the British thermal sight-ing system. -Ed.)

0 I t takes some three hours toremove th e T U .0 High profile, exposed gunners

sight with large, vulnerable glassarea.

Commander has only limitedcontrol and checks over the gun andturret.0 Prone to electrical unreliability- especially in the turret.

Very limited gun control back-up system, should the main systemfail, but very good emergency firinggear.

0 I t appears that the stub casesleft once a round has been firedtend to jam in the breech.

.The gun safety shield is not per-manently fitted, but has to be as-sembled before firing.0 Short barrel life.Power Plant and Suspension.The hand throttle in the drivers

compartment. We would prefer foot-operated controls.

Over-sensitive computer to con-trol the engine..Brakes are, if anything, TOOresponsive!

0Poor suspension when com-pared to the excellent system onChallenger.

.Very, very thirsty. The readyreckoner used was 2-1/2 gallons toone mile.0 No generator engine.0 Short track life.0Rear skirting plate allows mud

to build up around sprocket, thusencouraging a thrown track.Communicationsand Crew Arrangements0 Antiquated radio equipment,

with old audio gear and only oneradio per tank, as a standard kit.

.Limited stowage space, all ex-posed to the elements.0N o provision to enable crew to

live on the vehicle.0No internal water tank for the

crew.0 No boiling vessel!0The heater is located next to the

driver - t burns his left arm!

General0 Bad thermal signature.0 Armor - we like Chobham!



20/56

DeceptiveManeuverby Captain (P) ames F.Merkel I

The task force commander waitedimpatiently in his TOC as his unitconcluded final preparations ofdefensive positions. After conduct-ing intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB), his SZ estimatedthe enemy would attack with a tankbattalion on the northern avenue ofapproach and a motorized rifle bat-talion on the southern avenue intothe battalions sector. After analyz-ing the terrain and conducting hiscommanders estimate, the com-mander determined there were twocritical choke points, one alongeach avenue of approach, bothparallel to one another. In issuinghis guidance, the task force com-mander assigned Teams A and Bthe missions of defending the twochoke points, arrayed Team C indepth to handle any enemy forcesleaking through, and kept Team Din reserve as a counterattack force(see Figure 1).

Later that night. reports filtered inof enemy reconnaissance patrolsalong the two avenues of approach.There were reports of subsequentprobes of defenses at the two chokepoints. and between 0430 and 0515,there were reports of movement ofthe forward security elements of thetwo enemy battalions along theircorresponding avenues of approach.As the situation developed, defen-ses engaged the forward security ele-ments at the two choke points. Thebattle seemed to be going the waythe S2 predicted. As the battleprogressed. Teams A and B initiallvheld fast and began attriting the for-

ward security element. Movementof the enemys main body wasreported. Suddenly, Team Areported large numbers of tanks inits sector, many of which hadpenetrated its defenses into its reararea. As reports continued, th e pic-ture became clear. The enemy hadfixed forward defenses with themotorized rifle battalion, massedthe armor battalion and penetratedthe battalion sector along the north-ern avenue of approach. As the bat-tle progressed, enemy forcesbypassed a majority of the taskforces defenses, penetrating deepinto the rear area (see Figure 2).

What went wrong? Initially, thesituation seemed to be in hand.How was the commander sodeceived, and his defensive schemethrown off balance?

The plight of the task force com-mander in this vignette is not un -familiar to those who have fought atthe National Training Center. Whatappears to be isnt always what is.The enemys scheme of maneuverclearly deceived the task force com-mander and his subordinates, result-ing in a rout.During the course of this article,keep this vignette in mind. Thefocus will not be on the defensivetactics employed, but on how thetask force commander fell victim todeceptive maneuver. His actionstypify those falling victim to decep-tion. By understanding how onefalls victim to stratagem, we maylearn how to deceive an opponent.

With the Armys revitalization ofdeception and its associated re-education process, commanders arepondering ways to effectively in-tegrate this combat multiplier intotheir operations. The Armys cur-rent doctrine on deception, as ex-pressed in FM W-2, BattlefieldDeception, October 1985, providessome basic doctrinal guidance onplanning and executing deceptionoperations, but has little depth interms of practical application. Themanuals shallowness largely stemsfrom writing doctrine after nearly a@-year void of Army interest andexperience in deception operations.Examples of deception operationsat the strategic and operationallevels of war abound throughout t h ehistory of warfare, but those at thetactical level are woefully few.

But what of those who practice theart of warfare at the tactical. level?Does lack of recorded history meanthat deception isnt applicable or ap-plied at the tactical level? Most cer-tainly not. Then how does the com-mander integrate deception into hisscheme of maneuver? I believe thiswill become clearly evident in theremainder of this article. Beforeproceeding further, lets definedeception and further subdivide itinto types.

JCS PUB 1-DOD defines decep-tion as those measures designed lomislead erieriiy forces by manipula-tion, distortion, or falsification ofevidence to induce him to react in amanner prejudicial to his interests

78~~ ~



21/56

Fig. 1 Anticipated Enemy Scheme of Maneuver(emphasis added)." Note, the act ofmisleading the enemy commander(the deception target) is to induce areaction, not to merely convincehim of a particular falsehood. Thisdesired reaction (the deception ob-jective) should be expressed interm s of comm itting, failing to com-mit, or delaying commitment of his

lorces in a particular manner. Thestated objective must be within therealm of the enemy's capability andthe target's authority, support thescheme of maneuver, and be ex-ploitable by friendly forces.Deception can be subdivided intotwo basic forms, ambiguity (A-

Type) and misleading (M-Type).' A-Type deception increases the am-biguity in the victim's mind andlowers the probability of a correctperception by "dilution" or multi-plication of alternatives. Sur-vivability measures such ascamouflage, employment of multi-spectral decoys as alternative tar-

Fig. 2 Actual Enemy Scheme of Maneuver'ARMOR - September-October 7989 79


22/56

gets for enemy gunners, and radiolistening silence fall in this category.Such measures are applicable toand should be integrated into alloperations.

tions of the forwardsecurity element fur-ther reinforced hispreconception. Untilthe time he receivedreports of theA-Type deception measures affect

the enemy commanders decisioncycle by depriving him of indicatorsrevealing friendly intentions. Elevat-ing the targets ambiguity forces himto react in one of two ways. Am-biguity may cause the enemy com-mander to delay committing forcesto gain a clearer picture of the bat-tlefield. This essentially reduces hisreaction time, shortens his decisioncycle and potentially makes himmore reactive. Conversely, he mayrisk committing his forces without aclear understanding of the situation.Such a reaction makes the target un-predictable and could result in anunexpected andlor undesired enemyreaction.

Misleading deception, althoughmore difficult to employ, is the mostdecisive form of deception anddeception reduces the ambiguity inthe victims mind by convincing himthat a particular falsehood is true.His reaction is then based on thefalsehood. If possible, the deceptionshould play upon the targetspredispositions.

yields the biggest payoff. M-Type

Returning to our vigiette, the com-mander was already predisposed tobelieve the enemy would attackalong the two avenues of approachentering his sector. IPB and hisanalysis supported this. Initialreports received during enemyrecon probes and the following ac-

DECEPTION TIME CYCLE0 Time of m aximum disadvantage0 Enemy force execution0 Enemy commanders decision0 Enemy Intelligence System

Execution of dece ption tasks0 Dissemination of deception plan0 Planning

Fig. 3breakthrough, situation reportsfrom subordinates reinforced his ini-tial estimate.

One of the problems in employingM-Type deception is the amount oftime required. Time is less criticalin more static scenarios, such asdefenses and pre-hostility deploy-ment. However, once hostilities areinitiated and maneuver begins, timeavailable to present a deceptionstory to the enemy decreases rapid-ly. The speed of modern weaponrydrastically cuts the time available toconduct deception operations. As aresult, time required to conductdeceptive ploys must be reduced toa level allowing integration of thedeception into the scheme ofmaneuver. Before 1 can address theproblem of time reduction adequate-ly, one must first understand thedeception time cycle.

The deception time cycle is essen-tially a variation of the reverse plan-ning sequence (see Figure 3). Timeassessment, while critical to alloperations, is essential to deceptionplanning.

Improper analysis of time willresult in deception events un -synchronized with the flow of thebattle. This ultimately results infailure of the deception and missingwindows of opportunity to decisive-ly engage the enemy. The first stepin deception time analysis is to

determine the time of maximum dis-advantage. At what point is theenemy most vulnerable during thebattle? When do we want his reac-tion to occur? Such information willmost likely be determined by war-gaming the battle, analyzing its flow,and identifying trigger points keyingactions affecting the tempo.

Once the time of maximum disad-vantage is determined, the enemyforces affected by the targetsdecision must be considered. Whatsize force? If the objective is tocause the target to move forces,how long will the move take? If theobjective is to cause a delay in com-mitting an enemy force, such as hisreserve, for how long? Time mustalso be allowed for the target toissue orders and his forces to reactto them.

Next we must consider the enemycommander. Is he bold or cautious?Does he rigidly adhere to doctrinalprinciples? How much latitude doeshe have in altering his currentcourse of action? Usually at the tac-tical level, little is known about thepersonality of the enemy com-mander. Assumptions about himmust then be based on his doctrinaland sociological norms.

In further considering the com-mander, we must consider theamount of time he needs to analyzethe situation, reach a decision, and



23/56

"Deceptive maneuver is essentially ma ne we r-ing forces o n the batt lef ield in such a w f y as tolead the enemy comm ander to an incorrect es-timate of the situation...By causing an incorre ctestimate, we ho pe to gain a tactical advantageby throwing the enemy off balance ..'I

formulate and issue orders. At thispoint, the enemy's communicationsystem must also come underscrutiny. How long will the com-mander need to transmit orders tohis subordinates? What are thepotential disruptions to his C3? Thepotential effects of friendly C3countermeasures?

For the target to assess the situa-tion and make a decision, he musthave information. At this point, wemust assess the amount of time re-quired for the enemy to gather infor-mation, produce an intelligenceproduct, and provide it to the com-mander. Information may come asintelligence summaries from theGZS2 or may be in the form of spotreports from subordinate com-manders. Ideally, specific enemy in-telligence collection assets shouldbe identified as means of channel-ing deceptive information to theenemy commander.

Portraying the falsehood is ac-complished by executing events ordeception tasks supporting thedeception story. The deceptionstory is the incorrect estimate of oursituation we wish the enemy com-mander to believe as true. Conduct-ing demonstrations, feints, displays,and other such deceptive events re-quires time. We have to determinethe amount of time needed for unitsto execute the required deceptionevents. Once the time required todisseminate the plan is added, whatremains is available planning time.As evidenced by the deception timecycle, conducting deception opera-tions can be rather time consuming.

Deceptive maneuver is a means ofreducing the time cycle to a manage-able level.

Deceptive maneuver is essentiallymaneuvering forces on the bat-tlefield in such a way as to lead theenemy commander to an incorrectestimate of the situation, as oc-curred in the vignette. By causingan incorrect estimate, we hope togain a tactical advantage by throw-ing the enemy off balance, causinghim to light with forces out of posi-tion or poorly deployed. The enemycommander's incorrect estimateshould arise from his analysis of logi-cal flow of events upon the bat-tlefield.

Place yourself in the TOC of ourtask force commander. As thereports from subordinate unitstrickled in, he began to build a men-tal picture of what he believed to bethe enemy course of action. In hismind, he was already predisposedto what he thought to be theenemy's intentions and had so posi-tioned his forces. At the point thetask force commander became con-vinced his perception was accurate,he could have either remained com-mitted to his current course of ac-tion or modified it based on his per-ception of the threat - a reaction.

What was the primary source of in-telligence for this reaction?HUMINT reports from subordinateunits. Did other forms of intel-ligence weigh in? Certainly, butreports from subordinate units indirect observation andlor contactwith the enemy carry the most

weight and are usually the mosttimely. Was additional buildup timeother than the execution of thescheme of maneuver required? No ,our commander's estimate of thesituation was based entirely on hisperception of the enemy's schemeof maneuver as it logically unfoldedbefore him.

Note that sources of intelligenceother than the HUMINT threat tar-geted by deceptive maneuver usual-ly require more time for collection,processing, and analysis. In lookingback at the deception time cycle,you'll note that deceptive maneuverresulted in information quicklyreaching the target. Furthermore,portions of a story portrayed bydeception events targeting enemySIGINT or IMINT collection assetsmay not be detected or may bemisinterpreted by analysts, neverreaching the target. By usingmaneuver forces to portray thedeception story, chances of eventsbeing detected are greatly increaseddue to the amount of forces in-volved and their close proximity tothe enemy.

Because forces committed todeceptive maneuver are integratedinto the overall scheme, time isn'twasted portraying static events, suchas displays. Therefore, deceptivemaneuver reduces the time requiredto portray the deception story. Vir-tually all movement and supportingactions are purposeful, contributingdirectly to the success of the overallscheme of maneuver. As a result,troops and equipment are notdiverted to support isolated decep-



24/56

tion events, potentially draining theunit of combat power. The primarymeans of portraying the deceptionstory is a series of feints anddemonstrations by combined armsforces maneuvering in closeproximity to the enemy. Sequencingof supporting events must permitforces to be shifted and massedquickly without disrupting the logi-cal flow of the battle. T o cut theenemy commander's reaction time,we must keep him deceived as longas possible. What are the keys tomaking all this work? First, youmust put yourself in th e target's seatand look at the battlefield throughhis eyes. Given time, careful recon-naissance of an enemy's positionsmay reveal his intentions. Lackingtime. o ne m ust rely on knowledge ofthreat doctrine and reverse IPB.This may seem relatively simple forpeacetime exercises against otherU.S. forces. We operate from thesame doctrine. learn in the samemilitary schools. and also think rela-tively the same. This isn't true ofSoviet forces. Not only do they havedifferent doctrine. they also thinkdifferently. Cultural differenceshave produced a different mindset.Th e Soviet leader is much more logi-cal and his solutions must be quan-tifiable. So, what's the answer?Know your enemy. Understand thedecision-making process of yourSoviet counterpart. Understand thelimitations of his authority as a com-mand er. Don't abdicate your respon-sibility to know your enemy to th eintelligence community. Althoughmaking significant contributions, theG2/S2 won't plan the scheme ofmaneuver. More important, he

can't, as competent as he is, magical-ly emplace "gut" feelings thatmaneuver commanders need tomake quick decisions on the bat-tlefield. Part of developing these"gut" feelings is to know your op-ponent and how he thinks.Another key to employing decep-tive maneuver is security. The mostbrilliant maneuver ploys in theworld will not survive poor security.An aggressive counterreconnais-sance plan must be developed andstrictly adhered to, both in the lacti-cal assembly area and enroute tothe objective. Radio silence andother forms of signals security con-tribute to hiding forces, as docamouflage and proper terrain driv-ing techniques. To successfullppresent a false picture to the enemy

commander. we must hide our trueintentions.Although I have geared this articletoward mechanized forces, the samefundamental principles apply tolight forces. I have deliberatelyomitted discussion of deceptiondevices. such as multispectraldecoys and communications decep-tion equipment. Although they en-hance deception operations, most

units do not have access to them.Units must learn to integrate decep-tion into their scheme of maneuverwithout relying on special equip-ment.The keys to making deceptivemaneuver work are relativelysimple. One must devise a schemeof maneuver focused on throwingthe en emy off bala nce, gaining a tac-

tical advantage. T o d o this, the com -mander must know his enemy. Oncethe plan is in hand, forces must ex-ecute it with the utmost security.Such a plan, synchronized and ag-gressively executed, will greatly in-crease a unit's chances of bothsurprising and d efeating the enemy.

Notes'Daniel, Donald C. and Herbig.

Katherine L. (eds.) StrateaicDeception, New York: Pergamon Press,1982, pp. 5-6.

2FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, Oc-tober 1988, pp. 4-9, 4-10.

Captain (P) James F.Merkel was commissionedin Infantry from Texas Chris-tian University in 1979. He isa graduate of IOBC, IOAC,CASB, Battle Staff, and theBatt ef ield DeceptionCourse. He has served inthe 7th Infantry Division as arifle platoon leader, com-pany XO, support platoonleader, and battalion S4 ;and in the 82d AirborneDivision as G4 operations of-ficer, battalion S1 and riflecompany commander. Heis currently assigned asOIC, Battlefield DeceptionElement, 8th InfantryDivision (Mech ).

22 ARMOR - Sepfember-October1989


25/56

Training for Replacement Operations WarfightingI byMajor Jon H. Moilanen

The key to success in any combatoperation hinges on the ability tosustain weapon systems andoperators. This staying power is theessential mission for the combat ser-vice support leader. The on-goingchallenge for personnel servicesleaders and soldiers is to train war-fighting skills to standards that suc-cessfully support AirLand Battleconcept.

Whatever the training exercise, itis critical to effectively reinforce thebattlefield through timely replace-ment operations. Unit strengthmaintenance alone is insufficient.Weapon systems must be mannedby trained operators in proper rankand skill to achieve the best unitwarfighting performance and mis-sion success.

The Administration Module(GTA-101-2-1) and the PersoititelAdritiiiisiratiort Center Drillbook (TC12-16) are aids that can improvecombat service support training.These tools focus on effective main-tenance of unit personnel strengthand weapon systems readiness.With a system to train forecasting.procuring, and assigning replace-ments, the S1 and PAC have aframework for an effective opera-tional aid too.

Commander priorities, unit losses,and unit reorganization capabilities

establish a basis for replacement al-location. The Administration andLogistics Center coordinates thelinkup of operators and equipment.The Administration Module incor-po

Armor Magazine, September-October 1989

Documents

Transcript of Armor Magazine, September-October 1989