Armor Magazine, November-December 1990

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, November-December 1990

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These are incredibly extraordinary times inwhich we live. External forces are pushing andpulling the Army to and from so many direc-tions simultaneously that we are forced to putthe sign that says "Business as usual" into thesame drawer that already contains articles onhow to fight the Central European war andthreat charts on Warsaw Pact armies.

.Germany is once again a single nation.Only a year ago this notionwas unimaginable.And when the protests and agitation began,who predicted that unification would followwithin 10 months? We congratulate our friendsin the Bundeswehr and their countrymen onthis accomplishment and offer our best wishesin the task they face, which is unique in his-tory. You know the impact of this historicevent on our force structure.0We are in the midst of the largest overseasdeployment of U.S. orces since the VietnamWar. The threat posed by the man on ourcover came suddenly and has led to the firstsubstantive deployment of armor and cavalryunits to a hostile theater since the late 196Os,and the first call to active duty for Guard and

Reserve units since that time..We are witness to the largest and mostcomplicated multinational military effort since

WWII. For the first time since 1945, Americansand Soviets stand side by side. Whether thecrisis is resolved diplomatically or throughmilitary action, it will certainly be most interest-ing to read the accounts this operation willspawn on logistics and command and control.

How would you talk to a Syrian commander inhis T-72 from the turret of your Ml? How doyou identify friend or foe targets on theground or in the air?0Someone has said that half the Army is in-

volved in DESERT SHIELD, while the otherhalf is downsizing. Proof of that statement'sveracity came at the end of September at aceremony here at Fort Knox. The 194thSeparate Armored Brigade is probably a faircross-section of the Army. While hundreds ofthe brigade's soldiers have deployed to unitsin support of DESERT SHIELD, the remainderof the brigade's combat units downsized froman infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, andtwo tank battalions to one combined armstask force. I know of no other instance in ourhistory when parts of a unit deployed, whileother parts folded their colors.

Even If the Mideast situation is resolvedsoon, there should be some long-term effects.0NBC training and equipment are receivinga lot more than lip service..The pressing need for strategic air and

sealift have been underscored.0The on-again, off-again Armored Gun Sys-

tem program looks like it is on again, and withtop priority.Godspeed to all our guys and gals over there.

-PJC

By Order of the Secretary of theArmyCARL E. WON0General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

~

Official:THOMAS F.SIKORABrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-90-6

Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS C. FOLEYARMOR (ISSN 00042420) is publishedbimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121,Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does it

change or supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications.Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach heavy brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion

headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-pany, and motorized brigade headquarters ofthe United States Army. In addition, Armylibraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA andMACOM staff agencies with responsibility or ar-mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or-ganizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-inchief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the U.S. Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponency in-cludes: al l armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers: all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 1Qseries enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively; training for all SC 12A, 128, and12C officers and for all CMF-1Qseries enlistedsoldiers; and information concerning the train-ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armorand armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi-ment level and below, to include Threat units atthose levels.Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.November-December1990, Vol XCIX No. 6

Features6

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MQS...What It Is, How It Will Workby Center for Army LeadershipThe Sword of Saddam,An Overview of the Iraqi Armed Forcesby Major John F.Anta1A Military Analysis of Iraqi Army Operationsby Aaron DanisThe Tanks of BabylonMain Battle Tanks of the Iraqi Armyby C aptain James M. WarfordFighting Under Desert Conditionsby Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Ret.Failureof Israeli Armored Tactical Doctrine,Sinai, 6-8 October 1973by M ajor Edwin L. KennedyChemical Reconnaissanceby Captain Dennis M. VerpoortenThe Missing Link: Making the H M M W Scoutworthyby First Lieutenant Kenneth L. DealAmerica's Improved World War II Tanksby Konrad F.Schreier, Jr.Employing a Brigade Scout Platoonby Major Kent D. Thomas

Departments2 Letters 7 Driver's Seat2 Contacts 50 Bustle Rack5 Commander's Hatch 53 Books

Secondclas8oftlclal mail postage paid at Fort Know. KY, and addltlonal malllng oftlces. Postmaster:Dlslributlon Rwtrlctlon:Approvsd for publlc release; dMributlon s unllmHed.

Send address changes to Editor. ARMOR, ATTN: ATSEAM. Fort Knox. KY 40121-5210.USPS 467-970


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CSM on Target!Dear Sir:CSM John M. Stephens, in his commen-tary, "The Amazing Scouts," in the May-

June 1990 issue of ARMOR was, as usual,right on target, and most timely in view ofthe pending drawdown of the total forceand with current force requirements n theMiddle East!

The article reminded me of a similarhard-hitting commentary by thenBrigadier General David K. Doyle in theSeptember-October 1977 issue of ARMOR

titled "The Indispensable Scout." GeneralDoyle was then assistant commandant ofthe Armor School.

The two articles combined set forth thedemanding requirements of the scout in agraphic manner - requirements thathave changed little over the years otherthan gaining the knowledge of moresophisticated warfighting as we have"evolutionized" from the days of thewestern frontier to the 1990s and into theyear 2000.The basic ingredient is still totransmit quickly information to the com-mander gathered with eyes, ears - andperhaps even smell.

At the time General Doyle's article waspublished, it was my privilege to com-mand the 5th Cavalry Brigade (Tng),which upon mobilization had the respon-sibility to take raw recruits and turn theminto qualified and able 19 Delta cavalryscouts - and I migM add, within a rela-tively short period of time. GeneralDoyle's article became required readingfor all my officers and senior noncommis-sioned officers. During my three-year tourwith the brigade, our graduating drill ser-geants received a copy of the article as acontinuing reminder of their sole missionwithin the Army - to train "IndispensableScouts!"

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.DIRECTORY - PointsOf Contact Commercial prefix is Area Code 5 o 2 - t m - m ) .A R M O R Editorial Offices

Editor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick J. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonProduction AssistantMary HagerContributing ArtistSPC Jody Harmon

22492240261026102610

MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATSB-AM, Fort b o x , KY 40121-5210.ARTICLE SUBM ISSIONS: To improve speed andaccuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals orclear copies, either typed or printed ou t in near-letter-quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on5-1/4" floppy disks in Microsoft WORD, MultiMate,Wordperl'cct, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please in-clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra-tions submitted.PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problemsor changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circula-tion manager, (502)942-8624.UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problcmsor changes of address to Ms. Mary Hager, AV 464-2610; commercial: (502)624-2610. Requests to beadded to the free subscription list should be in theform of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

U.S. R M Y A R M O R SCHOOLCommandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas C. Foley 2121Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)BG James L. Noles 7555Deputy Assistant C ommandant (ATSB-DAC)COL Anthony TriGletti 1050Com man d Sergeant M:i,jorCSM Jake Frycr 4952Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)COL James R. Joy 8346Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS)COL J. W. Thurman 5855

(ATSB-WP)eapons Dept.COL George R. Wallace I11 1055Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-TD)COL Donald E. Appler 7250Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant Scliool (ATZK-NC)CSM John .I. Beck 5150COL Eduard Yates 1351Directorate of Total Armor ForceDirector, Reserve Comp onent Spt (ATZK-RC)

(ATZK-TF)_-J:-___ 7809Board (ATCT-AE)

7850(ATSB-TS)WUVL a p V ~ ~ IUI 1 llin aystemsCOL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 A R M O R - November-December 7990


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I urge those officers and senior noncom-missioned officers (irrespective of com-ponent) engaged in either training cavalryscouts or working with scouts on a dailybasis to read and retain as a constantreference each of these two outstandingarticles as part of their ongoing profes-sional development!

As General Doyle said, "Whether in therole of the commander who must fight themain battle, or the staffer trying to scopethe needs of the battle force - he heartof it all is - he SCOUT!" Then, as statedso well by CSM Stephens, "A TRUE scoutis a scout - job requirement (of thescout) should not be taken as a secon-dary mission. It has to be in his guts!"

I fear some commanders without a caval-ry orientation may at times not use their19 Delta cavalry scouts as intended,probably because they do not understandthe unique role of the cavalry scout andthat their scouts are "at the heart of it all"and provide "a major contribution to thesuccess q r ailure of the mission!"

The cavalry scout - a proud member ofthe Combined Arms Team!

PHILLIPJ. ZELLER, JR.BG, AUS, RetiredJunction City, Kansas

Scouts Clearly NeededDear Sir:In reading CSM Stephens' remarks

about the importance of the 19D cavalryscout (May-June 1990 ARMOR), I wasonce again dismayed that his wordsshould even be necessary. If NTC resultsdo not make the imperative need forrecon specialists clear, then the entire his-tory of the art of war does. How many bat-tles have been lost due to poor battlefieldintelligence? Plenty. Sure, you might getby without scouts, but you can lose justas easily. With Jeb Stuart's scouts absentat Gettysburg. General Lee could havemounted up infantrymen in their place,but it's just not the same, and he knew it.

The amount of skills needed to be agood scout is awesome, as the 19D Sol-dier's Manual illustrates. And it takes farlonger to make an experienced scoutNCO than in any other field, includingarmor and infantry. If the Army hastrouble at recon now, what will it be like

without that wily old scout platoon ser-geant? I'd say i t'll be pretty grim.

I would guess that those who think wecan do without scouts have never ex-perienced (or have forgotten) the feelingof standing in the smoky darkness, wear-ing MOPP 4, and desperately needing toknow where the enemy really is. And,then, the squelch breaks and over theradio comes the clear, steady voice of ascout. .

RICHARD D. PHILLIPSCPT, ArmorPhiladelphia, Pa.

Caption CorrectionDear Sir:The excellent article "Waking Up from

the Dream: The Crisis of Cavalry" (May-June 1990) by ARMOR'S managing editorbrought pleasant memories, because I en-listed in the 6th Cavalry, Fort Oglethorpe,Ga., in July 1939. I have always been gladthat I had the privilege of serving for atime in a mounted regiment in the "OldArmy."

The caption under the picture on page23 states that "6th Cavalry troopers prac-tice crossing a stream at Fort Jackson in1942." 1 believe the site of the streamcrossing exercise was on the HiwasseeRiver in Tennessee in June 1941, in whichI participated. The 6th Cavalry departedFort Oglethorpe on PCS to Camp Bland-ing, Fla., 14-16 February 1942, "lessanimals and all equipment pertaining toanimals." At Blanding, the unit was reor-ganized as a mechanized cavalry regi-ment. We were not at Fort Jackson withhorses in 1942.

T. L. RANEYCOL, USA, Ret.Fairfax Station, Va.

Improvements in FuelEfficiency for M1A1Dear Sir:CPT Stephen C. Melton's excellent ar-

ticle on the future of Armor puts in print avery rational and well thought out analysisof the future of Armor in today's changingenvironment.

I would take issue only with the firstpoint under CPT Melton's proposed TOE.

CPT Melton's premise that retrofittingthe M lA l hull with diesel engines for fuelefficiency fails to recognize improvementin fuel efficiency obtainable by retrofittingthe existing M1A1 turbine engine with digi-tal controls. A new digital electronic fuelcontrol (DECU) has just been developedand tested at Fort Knox thatdemonstrated standard idle fuel savingsof almost 20 percent. The DECU hasentered production with first deliveriesscheduled later this year. The U.S. Armyis also considering auxiliary power units(APUs) and fuel bladders to extend range.The cost of retrofit and the high O&Scosts of diesel engines would not presentan acceptable cost and performancetrade-off.

Further improvement in efficiency andspace claim can be obtained with atransverse-mounted version of the currentengine and even greater savings ob-tainable from the next generation turbineengine.

The TACOM-developed Advanced In-tegrated Propulsion System (AIPS) turbineengine will also reduce fuel use by over40 percent for a battlefield day and will bevery competitive in fuel use with the mostmodern technology diesel system. The tur-bine also possesses inherent advantagesof long life, multifuel and cold weathercapability. Further, one must consider theweight limits of the current M1A1 system.The best diesel system would add up to aton of additional weight to the tank overan AlPS turbine system. Because theM lA l is very close to the absolute weightlimit, a better approach for sustainedoperational maneuver capability wouldfavor improving the existing turbine en-gine or replacement with the AlPS system.

We may not see many new majorweapon systems fielded before the turn ofthe century, however, EMIET gun technol-ogy and active armor will ultimatelyprovide that overwhelming improvementcapability. These systems, along with con-tinuing emphasis on lightening the force,demand the high power densities oflightweight turbine systems.

FREDERIC D. HYATTDirectorTextron/GEAEJoint Program Management OfficeStratford, Conn.


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The First TankWest of the Rockies?Dear Sir:I was particularly interested in the ar-ticle, " U S . Army Tank Development -

19251940," in the MayJune issue. Andregarding the statement (p. 22) that theUS. Army had only 28 tanks in1939 ...et's make that "29."

Thought you might be interested in tankproduction on the West Coast in that era.

And thus, the first excursion of the 11thU.S. Cavalry into the age of armor endedin this dismal performance. To this day,old timers prefer not to talk about the mat-ter, and it has escaped mention in all thehistory books.

Regretfully submitted,THOMAS D.GlLLlSCOL, USA, Ret.Ex-Yellow LegGreenbrae, Calif.

Back in the fall of 1935, a call went outfrom the office of the Chief of Cavalry,Maj. Gen. Leon B. Kromer, to all cavalryregiments to design and manufacture anarmored vehicle from items on hand orreadily available. At the Presidio ofMonterey, Calif., the 11th Cavalry dis-patched scouts out all over the peninsulato cover junk yards, the back lots of can-nery row, and the city dump to scour forpieces of boiler plate, iron scrap, or otheritems suitable for armor.

The basic vehicle selected for this incur-sion into the era of armor was a venerableLiberty truck, still percolating along inspite of its age. Troop farriers werediverted from their usual duties to cut,weld, and shape these diverse pieces ofmetal into a concoction that would protectthe occupants of the vehicle from anypenetration from modern weapons. Theresult was a sight to behold ..p onderous,awesome, and truly terrifying. The yellowlegs were universally proud of their crea-tion and vied to be among those whowere selected to try out this monstrosity.

Fortunately, the manufacture and birthof this pilot model took place in a troopstable on the top of Presidio hill. On theappointed day and in the presence of awild-eyed multitude, IT (no name wasever bestowed) was started and edgedout of its cocoon, pointed down the hill.Great shouts of victory rose skyward andthrongs followed along behind, as it raceddown the hill. But one flaw developed. Atthe bottom of the hill, down by the Stoatmonument, the driver turned his chargearound and pointed the nose UP the hillfor the return trip. And the crowd waited.AND waited. The "tank" wouldn't budge.Like the venerable post fire engine,placed on blocks in the firehouse at thetop of the hill so that it could respondquickly to any emergency, no amount ofcoaxing could encourage the engine toperform as expected up hill.

"Supertank" or Not,The T-64 Met Soviet NeedsDear Sir:I was glad to see Mr. Goldfarb'sresponse in the September-October 1990

Letters column to Captain Warford's ar-ticle on the T-64 (March-April 1990), andcommend Mr. Goldfarb's desire to checkthings out before drawing conclusions. Afew points should be made, however, con-cerning the 1-64, and Soviet tanks ingeneral.

There is not now, and never has been, a"supertank." As long as there are tanks,there will be people trying to defeat them.Today, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs)are in abundant supply, inexpensive (com-pared to a tank), and when used asdesigned, will defeat a tank as soundly asanother tank. The key to weaponry is inusing it in the way for which it wasdesigned. The T-64 was produced in the1960s to give certain capabilities to Sovietforces. The T-64 was unique in that itsported a 125mm main gun and had anautoloader. The large main gun made upfor minor deficiencies in ballistic perfor-mance, and the autoloader enabled areduction in tank crewmen to three, whichpermitted a smaller turret and hull, thusreducing vehicle weiqht.

The Soviets do not think of tank warfarein terms of tank versus tank. In the attack,Soviet doctrine requires a correlation offorces of at least 3:l. Though exceptionscould occur, they will not purDoselv attacka platoon position with less than a com-pany. The preferred method of fire inSoviet tank units is platoon and companyvolley. With such a volume of fire, victoryis statisticallv guaranteed. The T-64 wasdesigned for this type of combat.

Later versions of the T-64 have antiradia-tion liners, laser rangefinders, smoke

projectors, and the ability to fire an ATGMthrough the main gun tube, as well as in-creased armor protection. Though not a"supertank," the T-64 has a number of fea-tures, many of which are still absent inWestern tanks. Mr. Goldfarb cites Soviettankers who were unimpressed with the T-64. Soviet tanks are not designed for crewcomfort, and maintenance is an overallproblem in the Soviet Army, so that com-ment is not surprising. An lSyearold con-script who probably left the army aftertwo years is not, however, the best sourceof information on the quality of T-64~.even if he spent his one-and-a-half yearsof actual tank time inside one.

It is a mistake, however, to write off theT-64. Any tank, no matter how relativelyobsolete, is a threat if used properly. Asfor Mr. Goldfarb's comment equatingtanks and computers, the answer is oneof emphasis. The Russian Empire em-phasized the arts, and produced greatmusic, art, and ballet. The Soviet Union ofthe 1930s emphasized collectivization andabolished an understanding of the freemarketplace. The Soviet Union of the1960-80s emphasized the buildup of itsarmed forces, and produced the T-64, T-72, and T-80, all of which are good tanksin their intended roles.-___-

THOMAS R. HAMMETTThreat SpecialistU.S. Army Armor SchoolFt. Knox, Ky.Letter a L i l e Off TargetDear Sir:1 am writing in response to Mr.

Goldfarb's letter that appeared in the Sep-tember-October 1990 issue of ARMOR. Iwould like to thank Mr. Goldfarb for hiscomments on my article "The Tank ThatCould Have Won The Next War: An As-sessment of the Soviet T-64 PremiumTank," and for his comments concerningthe T-64 in general. Although interestingto read, his points are more than a littleoff target.

First of all, the term "supertank" is aterm used by Mr. Goldfarb and was notused in my article. If a true "supertank*does exist, it's doubtful if such a tankwould appear in Soviet markings. Itseems that Mr. Goldfarb failed to keep the1967 debut of the T-64 in mind when hewrote his letter. The well-known problemsContinued on Page 48

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Armor in the New World Orderby Major General Thomas C. Foley, Commanding General, US. rmy Armor CenterOur Armor Force is meeting the

unprecedented challenges of Opera-tion DESERT SHIELD with theskill, determination, and profes-sionalism that have characterized itslong service to our nation. Armorhas always been and will continue tobe important to our nation's needs.We are a fundamental part of Armyforces either deployed abroad orbased in the United States, ready toproject power on short notice. Alarge portion of our force is current-ly doing just that in Saudi Arabia. Itis there to provide those forcecharacteristics that only an armoredforce can offer. This deployabilityrequirement for Armor is not new,but it will be increasingly more im-portant for the remainder of thedecade. What is new is the environ-ment around which DESERTSHIELD was executed.

Armor's challenge is to be trainedand ready for contingency deploy-ment. At the same t h e , we are un-dergoing an unparalleled builddownto help the Army reshape itself forthe future. Many units have alreadybegun this process. Some havefinished. The result will be fewerunits. Some will be shaped intosmaller, yet highly capable units.The 194th Separate ArmoredBrigade is a case in point. It effi-ciently downsized, enthusiasticallyformed new units, and just as en-thusiastically supported the chal-lenge for an armored contingencyoperation. In several short months,it went through the process ourArmy will undergo ovcr the nextseveral years.

On 28 September 1990, here atFort Knox, an inactivation and reor-ganization ceremony was held forthe 194th Separate ArmoredBrigade. Four of the brigade's bat-talions (1st and 2d Battalions, 10thCavalry; 4th Battalion, 15th In-fantry; and 1st Battalion, 77th Artil-lery) and two of its separate com-panies (D Troop, 10th Cavalry; and522d Engineer Company) encasedtheir colors and guidons. In theirplace, Task Force l/lOth Cavalrywas formed. It is a combined armsmaneuver battalion consisting ofthree tank companies, twomechanized infantry companies,and one artillery battery. Becausethis unique organization will be thesubject of a future article inARMOR, want to place the 194thexperience into the context of thecurrent world situation and the fu-ture of the Army.

It was ironic to many that we weredownsizing such a potent armoredforce at the same time we weredeploying other armored units toDESERT SHIELD. It was evenmore ironic that many of the sol-diers from the inactivated unitswere transferring to deploying units.With heavy hearts, they encasedtheir colors, knowing that the spiritand skills honed in their old unitswould never die. And with new en-thusiasm and the quiet sense ofprofessionalism that is characteristicof Armored Force soldiers, theyflew off to join friends and com-rades in DESERT SHIELD unitson the far distant shores of SaudiArabia. They are experienced, dedi-cated men and women who

demonstrated to the world theflexibility of the United StatesArmy. What other army coulddownsize, while executing as majoran operation as DESERT SHIELD?

Because of men and women likethese, a new world order is emerg-ing. The traditional threat from t h eWarsaw Pact is ebbing, but it is stillpotent. At the same time, newthreatening nations and alliancesare forming.

We sometimes forget that the keyword in the 194th unit title is "ar-mored," not armor. In the last 50years of American history, "ar-mored" has held a very specific andspecial meaning. It has described acombined arms team of tanks, in-fantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers,and logistical support organized asa tight, cohesive team. Armoredunits include soldiers of allbranches focused on swiftly destroy-ing our nation's enemies and strik-ing fear into the hearts of those whowould become our enemies.

That fear in our enemies has suc-ceeded; bullets were unnecessary.Our primary mission of deterrencehas been accomplished.

Now, in 1990, we honor the sol-diers of the Armored Force. Theirefforts in the long fight for freedomand liberty have been rewarded.The Iron Curtain has collapsedfrom the weight of the ideals andvalues that have been protected bythe Thunderbolt and kept powerfulby units like the 194th ArmoredBrigade. Memories and skills honed

ARMOR - November-December 7990 5


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at places like Fort Irwin and Hohen-fels, Germany, will live and be car-ried to other units on other postsand in other countries. Proud unitsnever die. They infuse vitality intoothers.In every endeavor and in the face

of every challenge, the firm dedica-tion of soldiers of the 194th hasbeen surpassed only by the activesupport and admirable unity of thespouses and families of the brigade.

In every crisis and in every deploy-ment, including support ofDESERT SHIELD, the total 194thfamily has been a beacon ofstrength. While we may downsizethe Army, we can never downsizethe importance of our families. Theopposite is true. Now more thanever we need strong, cohesivefamilies.

ture. The brigade is smaller, as theArmy will be, but it is no less anawesome fighting force. The TotalArmor Force will continue to lookto the 194th for support, and mostparticularly, to remind us of thespirit of the armored combinedarms team. Rest assured thebrigade will continue to be our"ProudLegion."

The soldiers and units of the 194thand the Army must look to the fu-

I IWhat It IsMQS... How It Will Work,

Forge the Thunderbolt!

by Center for Army LeadershipThe Military Qualification Standards

(MQS) system, the Army's new system todevelop officers as leaders, provides of-ficers, school commandants, and com-manders with a framework for commonand branch-specific training, education,and professional development. MQS I en-compasses precommissioning training,MQS II covers company grade officer train-ing, and MQS 111 applies to field grade of-ficers.

The MQS system identifies commonand branch training requirements for of-ficers. it has two components, a militarytask and knowledge component thatprovides the critical tasks on which of-ficers must train, and a professionalmilitary education component thatfocuses on improving cognitive skills.

MQS and Leader DevelopmentLeaders develop by progressive and se-quential education, training, and ex-

perience. The process starts in theprecommlssionlng phase of training: con-tinues through commissioning, brancheducation, and operational assignments:and stops only when the officer com-pletes his military service. Institutionaltraining, operational assignments, and self-development all play a part.

School commandants (and otherproponents) are most directly involvedwith institutional training, which includestraining company grade officers in the of-

ficer basic course, officer advancedcourse, and the Combined Arms and Ser-vices Staff School. Unit commanders aremost directly involved with operational as-signments. The MQS System provides thelink between institutional training andoperational assignments. it helps the com-mander construct his unit training planand design his junior officer developmentprogram to complement the training ofhis unit METL. Self development is theresponsibility of the individual officer. it in-cludes professional reading and self study.

MQS IIMQS II , which applies to company

grade officers in the Active Army, U S.Army Reserve, and Army National Guard,prepares leaders to accomplish wartimetasks, provides the basis for promotion tomajor ahd attendance at Corn-mand andStaff College (CSC), and prepares officersfor service in positions of greater respon-sibility. It guides officers through the firstand second milestones, or passagepoints, in their careers. The requirementsleading up to the passage points includecompletion of appropriate branch schoolsand developmental assignments,demonstrated proficiency on commonand branch tasks, and completion ofspecified portions of the Foundation Read-ing program. An officer reaches the firstpassage point when he enters his branchadvanced course. The second passagepoint occurs when he completes his com-pany grade career and either enters resi-dent CGSC or enrolls in non-residentCGSC.

MQS II organizes military tasks artdknowledge into common task areas,which are essential for all company gradeofficers, and branch-specific task areas.The professional military education com-ponent of MQS II consists of a readingprogram and, for selected officers, ad-vanced civil schooling. MQS providescommanders with the flexibility they needto tailor their leader developmentprograms to their METL-based unit train-ing. Unit leader development programsfocus on warfighting and the Mission Es-sential Task List (METL). Therefore, com-manders must tailor both their MQS tasktraining program and their professionalreading program to support their METL-based unit training plans. MQS does notrequire commanders to train tasks that donot support their unit METLs.

A common manual and branch manualwill support MQS II implementation. TheMQS II common manual will be dis-tributed in December, and the MQS Itbranch manuals in January to March1991. Each lieutenant and captain willreceive a personal copy of the MQS I Icommon and branch manual, which willbe fielded through pinpoint distribution,so, commanders should ensure that pin-point accounts accurately reflect bothlieutenant and captain authorizations, bybranch. The US. Army Publications Dis-tribution Center will ship the new manualsbased on specific unit requirements iden-tified on unit DA Form 12-99.

Officers should ensure that they receivea copy of the appropriate manuals bychecking with their units to verify thatcopies are on order. Once the manualsare fielded, follow-on distribution (tonewly commissioned officers) will be ac-complished through the officer basiccourse.

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CSM Jake FryerComm and Sergeant MajorU.S.Army Armor Center

To Command, "Fire!"Seventy-five percent of our tank

fleet is commanded by noncommis-sioned officers. Ninety percent ofour IFV fleet is commanded by non-commissioned officers. These fewselect noncommissioned leaders,out of our 43,017 enlisted strengthinventory, are very special and high-ly prestigious soldiers. They havethe opportunity to issue the ultimatecommand of "FIRE."

Before giving the command of ex-ecution to "FIRE," and allowingordnance to be delivered from theirrespective weapon systems to ul-timately create destruction and killan adversary, there are severalthings that have to occur.

A leader has to make a clear anddeliberate decision to initiate thecommand of execution, "FIRE."After the target acquisition processhas been completed, the propertypes of ammo chambered, and th efinal lays and ranges completed,only then can the tank or scout com-mander exercise his authority toallow the weapon system to befired. We expect these key leadersto initiate their actions quickly andinstinctively to achieve success inthe servicing of their respective tar-

gets. A successive, rapid thoughtprocess goes through his mindbefore this most important com-mand: - friend or foe - target le-thality - range - acknowledge-ment of initial fire command byother crew members - friendly dis-mounts in the area (clear fromSABOT) - wingman's actions -what type of signature will my sys-tem create, and how does it affectfollow-on mission?

All of the above are ingredients ofthe decision-making process beforethe fire command, yet few of themare taught in a classroom.

Who commands the tank? Wehave a few tank commanders who,by virtue of their leadership style,their proficiency, their indecisive-ness, and their gunner's experienceand confidence, delegate theirauthority and allow their gunner tocommand t h e tank.

The next time you're observingtank crew evaluators on live fire ex-ercises, or participating as an (IO)in a COFT exercise, be observant ofa few indicators that clearly identifya tank commander who doesn't com-mand his tank: - he announces

"FIRE" before the gunner hasranged - announces "FIRE" whena multiple return bar is indicated,and the range is obviously incorrect- announces "FIRE" before thegun is placed in electrical ormechanical safe - fails to "over-ride" his gunner for a gun lay that isquick and precise - announces hisfire commands in a voice that'scharacterized by fear, by panic, andat a speed that's nbt comprehen-sible - fails to properly prep hisstation for combat (brow pads, equi-librated commander's weapon sta-tion (CWS), occluded GPSE andcommander's sight, leg and armguards, etc.) - fails to transmit tohis crew commands that are clear,concise, and generally acceptedthroughout the armor community"traverse left, steady, on," as op-posed to ''come left more," etc.).

Not everyone gets the privilege tocommand a tank and to beentrusted with the authority to givethe ultimate fire command, the com-mand of execution, "FIRE." Forthose who are privileged, we mustreadily accept and fully use theirability to make sound and decisiveactions, not only in commanding thetank, but in everythiig they do!



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The Sword of Saddam,An Overview ofThe Iraqi Armed Forcesby Major John F. Anta1

"lIier@oreI say: Kiiow your enemyarid know yourserf;. in a hundred b at-tles you will never be in peril. Wienyoti are ignorant of the enemy butknow yourself; your chances of win-ning or losing are eqtial. If ignorantboth of your enemy arid of yotirself;you are certain in every battle to be inperil. f

Siiii Tni,500 B.C.In the early morning hours of 2

August 1990, the Iraqi Army ex-ecuted a successful coup de mainover the country of Kuwait.Kuwait's defense forces consisted,on paper, of 20,300 men, 275 tanks,190 armored cars, 330 armored per-sonnel carriers, 86 self-propelled155-mm howitzers, 70 combataircraft, and 18 armed helicopters.2Achieving strategic surprise, Iraqiforces launched a coordinated at-tack across the virtually unguardedKuwaiti border, and Saddam Hus-sein's military machine rolledthrough Kuwait without serious op-position. The Kuwaiti Emir fled mo-ments before Iraqi forces capturedKuwaiti City. By 3 August 1990,Iraq controlled the exitire countryalong with its portion of the world'soil reserves, and threatened SaudiArabia.

defend against further aggression bjIraq. Only time will tell whether thisconflict escalates into a shootingwar for America or is miraculousljsettled by peaceful means. The bot-tom line remains that American sol-diers and Marines may now be in-volved in a major land war in thedeserts of the Middle East. It is i m

American forces deployed on 7August 1990, and, as of this writing,are poised in Saudi Arabia to

7

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perative that we understand our ad-versary and learn how he fights.

8 ARMOR - Vovernber-December 7990


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During defensive operations, the Iraqis proved in-flexible in reinforcing and redeploying forces oncetheir defensive lines were breached. To make up forthis inflexibility, Iraqi units sought greater survivability .by digging in their armor whenever they stopped.This article, developed from entirelyunclassified sources, provides aquick overview of the Iraqi military,how it is equipped and how it fights.

The Iraqi Military Mach ineIraq possesses the fourth largest

army on earth. With a population of16,278,000, she has fielded amilitary of more than 1 million men.Iraq generates this force throughconscription, and it is the duty ofevery young male Iraqi to serve aterm in the armed forces. Excep-tions from military service are rare.The terms of service in the Iraqimilitary are 21-24 months, but theseterms can be extended during timesof war.

The Iraqi Air Force has morethan 500 combat aircraft, consistingmainly of modern Soviet fighters,tighter bombers, and bombers. TheIraqi Air Force is organized into 13squadrons of fighter bombers, 16squadrons of fighters, twosquadrons of bombers, and twosquadrons of air transport aircraft.

The Iraqi Navy is primarily a coas-tal defense force. Its main bases areat Umm Qasr, at the mouth of thePersiail Gulf (Arabian Sea), andBasra, inland along thc Shatt elArab outlet to the Gulf.

The Army is the mainstay of Iraq'smilitary power. Consisting of955,000 active duty personnel, andpossibly an additional 480,000 reser-vists, the Iraqi Army is clearly thelargest military force in the MiddleEast. Even the Iranians boast anarmy of only 305,000. With this in-timidating force at his disposal, Sad-dam Hussein wields immense pres-tige among his Arab neighbors.

The Iraqi ArmyThe Iraqi Army is an impressive

force composed of many units thathave been battle testcd in the longeight-year war with Iran. The Armyis organized into scvcn corps hcad-quarters, with seven ar-mored/mechanized divisions, 39 in-fantry divisions (including thePeoples Army militia), fourPresidential Guard Force divisions(three armored, one infantry, andone commando battalion), and 20+special forces brigades.

The Iraqi Army in Action,Lessons of the Gulf WarOn 23 September 1980, Saddam

Hussein launched five Iraqidivisions in a quick drivc into Iranto seize the oil-rich Khorramsharand Abadan regions. His intent ap-pears to have been to conduct alimited war to grab the Iranian oilfields before Iran - weakened byrevolutionary turmoil caused by theAyatollah Khomeini's bloody rise topower - could react. The Iranians,however, rallied to the defense oftheir homeland and fought Hus-sein's forces to a standstill.

Iraqi tactical mis-takes and poor logis-tics were largely thecause ol the failure ofSaddam's units toachieve a quick vic-tory in 1980. TheIraqi armored tacticswere rigid and in-flexible, and theIranians made gooduse of restrictive ter-rain and built-upareas to wreak havocon Iraqi armored for-

~

ARMOR - November-December 7990

mations. "Iraq consistcntly failed toconcentrate its armor in the initialstages ol' the war and consistent1lost advantages of time and space."The overly rigid command slyle ofthe Iraqi Army was a major factorin preventing the Iraqis from usingtheir reserves effectively. Duringdefensive operations, the Iraqisproved inflexible in reinforcing andredeploying forces once their dcfen-sive lines were breached. To makeup for this inflexibility, Iraqi unitssought greater survivability by dig-cing in their armor whenever theystopped. "According to one report,this ...has consistently led to Iraqitanks digging in so wcll that thcycould not dig out, and thcir beingoutflanked and outmaneuvered byIranian infantry."' The biggest fail-ing of the Iraqi Army during theearly stages of the Iran/Iraq War,however, was the inability to employcombined arms.

Y

By 1982, Iraqi forces had beendriven back to their own territory,and it appeared that they wouldsoon lose the war. Hussein im -mediately sought peace with Iranbut was rebuffed by the Ayatollah,who demanded Hussein's removal

Iraqi ForcesBranch Personnel

Air Defense Artillery 10,000Air Force 40,000Navy 5,000ArmyActive 955,000Reserves 480.0001,490,000otal

Note: In addition to these regular forces, Iraq has aPeoples Army (paramilitary militia) of 650,000 en and4,800 Frontier Guard Security Troops.

Figure 19


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Iraqi Military InventoryCombat Aircraft Mig 23 Mig 21Mirage F-lECX Mig 25su-7 Tu-22 bombers

SU-25 Tu-16 bombers~~Armor T7p (500) Chieftain MK 3/5/ M-6O/M-47 (150)

T54/55/62 (4,500) M-77 (60)T59/69 ii (1,500) PT 76 (100)

Meahanized nfantry BMP-1 (1,OOO) EE-32 JararacasBRDM-2 BTR 50/60/-152FUG-70 OT 62/64ERG90 M113MOWAG Roland Panhard M-3EE-9 Cascavels

ATGMs AT4 Sagger (Soviet) SS-11 Milan (possibly)AT4 Spigot French HOT (possibly)Artillery*

s8lf-plopelled 2S1 122-mm (Soviet)253 152-mm (Soviet)155-mm Howitzer (US)130-mm M46TOWd 122-mm D-74, D-30, M-1938

Mortars 120- and 160-mmMBRLs BM-21**'The attlil.ry conslai of mom than 5,500 piece& moatly towed soviamadeartillery.**The Iraqis el80 h a n 'in excess ot xx ) multi-banel rocket launchers including awemi baterim of th e tero

ci0t.n Wet 122.mrn. 40banel BM-21,cfipable of clearinga map grid par battery volley ..'4Ses sidebarstory on page 12.

Air Defense Weapons* B m r n ZSU 234 SPzsu-57-2 SP37-mm M1939, twin 57-mmvarious8 5 , o&, and 130-mm gunsSA-3/SA-G/SA-7/SAS/SA-14 (150)Roland (60)

Additional Frog-7(30)Modified Scud B (capableof launchingeither conventional or chemical warheads)

Surface-to-Air (SAMs) SA-2 (120)

*Iraqi air d.hm system am prlmaritySudd manufsctum COndMngof somb 4,000 al r ~ w e a p o n s .

Helicopters* Mi-24 Hind w/AT-2 Swatter missile (40)SA342 Gazelle, some with French HOT missile (50)SA321 Super Frelon, some with Exocet air-to-ship missile (10)SA-316B w/AS12 air-to-ship missile (30)80-105 w/AS11 ATGM (56)Huahes (861 - 53O-F 126).50C)-D(30),OOC (30)

the employmant of hdkoptwsand s rsported tcvia and European manufacture.

Mi4 (20)Mi8 (100) SA330 Puma (10)

Frigates (4)Patrol/Coastal Combatants (38)

*W t hese cmflam soviaddgned and imsaA.1 styx shlpto-.Mp miadla.Figure 2

as a condition to any peace agree-ment. Unwilling to let Hussein getaway with his aggression againstIran, the Ayatollah ordered Iranianforces to invade Iraq. Six bloodyyears of seesaw attrition resulted.Iraq was propped up with a huge in-flux of military supplies andweapons from the Soviet Union, theUnited States, France, and severalArab states. The war now began toresemble the trench warfare of theFirst World War, waged with WorldWar 111-type weapons.

In 1985, the Iraqi High Commandbegan to use more flexible andmobile tactics. It was learning howto fight a modem war. At this time,Iraq began using chemical weapons,mainly mustard gas and nerveagents, against the Iranians. Theseweapons were usually delivered byaircraft and proved very effectiveagainst the largely unpreparedIranian forces. The Iranians wereunable to strike back effectivelywith chemical weapons of their own.Unable to protect its RevolutionaryGuards from chemical agents, theIranians took tremendous casualtiestrying to break the Iraqi defenses.

By 1987, the new tactics used bythe Iraqi Army began to turn thetide. The Iranian drive into Iraq cul-minated during the vicious battlefor Basra, Iraq's second largest city.Iran prepared for the offensive forover a year, threw every availableresource into the fight, and failedagainst a staunch Iraqi defense.Iran's army bled to death in front ofthe defenses of Basra, losing an es-timated 50,000 men killed orwounded in two months of fighting.Iran had lost the initiative to Iraq.Seizing the initiative, Saddam'sHigh Command employed elite

-70 ARMOR - November-December 7990


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units of PresidentalGuards to spearheadseveral offensive opera-tions to drive theIranians out of Iraq.Iranian will was flag-ging, and the Iranianswere desperately shortof supplies and equip-ment. "For the first timein seven years, theIranians did not mounta winter offensive in1987-88. They were un-

offensive operationsduring the Gulf war. Theoperational mobility ofthe Iraqi Army beyond1 150 kilometers, therefore,has not been proved.This is a vulnerability thatan adversary can exploitwith air superiority.

The Iraqi soldier is aAn Iraqi APC lost during a 1985 offensive in the Iran-Iraq War. tough and resilient foe

prepared for the Iraqiassault of April 1988 to retake theFaw Peninsula. This offensivemarked a new Iraqi policy - achange from static defense to hard-hitting ~f fe ns e. "~

Five big Iraqi offensives in 1988frnally brought the Iranian Army toits knees and forced the AyatollahKhomeini to bitterly accept theUnited Nations ceasefire terms.With little armor and practically noair force left, Iran was no longercapable of serious military action.The end result made Saddam Hus-sein the prominent power in the Per-sian Gulf, with a new, battle-tested,modern equipped military almostfive times the size of his 1980 force.The IraqiArmy of 1990Before the invasion of Kuwait in

August 1990, the Iraqi Army was or-ganized as follows: The First Corps(on he Kurdish or northern front),th e Fifth Corps (south of FirstCorps, assigned to the northernfront), the Second Corps (assignedto the north central front), theFourth Corps (central and south-central front, covering Baghdad, 70miles from the border), the Third

Corps (southern central andsouthern fronts), and the SeventhCorps (southern front, or Basra tothe Gulf). An Iraqi corps usuallyconsists of four divisions, with eachdivision consisting of approximately10,000 men. An Iraqi corps, there-fore, normally consists of between40,OOO and 45,000 troops?

The Presidential Guard units playa vital role in the tactical employ-ment of the Iraqi Army. ThePresidential Guard is an elite "mini-corps, with 30,000 men, commandedby General Hussein Rashid."' Con-sisting of 16 brigades of the mostpolitically reliable troops, equippedwith the best and latest weapons,the units of the Presidential Guardforces will act as the shock troopsof any major Iraqi operation.An analysis of the Gulf war points

to a demonstrated inability to in-tegrate close air support and to in-tegrate artillery fires with maneuver.This trend shows the greatest weak-ness of the Iraqi Army: employingcombined arms tactics. The Iraqiarmy also demonstrated the lack ofa solid combat service support or-ganization to maintain the tempo of

who is equipped withmodem weapons and capablevehicles. The average Iraqi unit, ac-cording to observations during theGulf war, is capable of an aw e s -sive and dogged defense, while themore elite units will be reserved forcounterattacks and offensive opera-tions. The Iraqi command system,tested in the Gulf war with Iran, hasimproved over the years, and hasproved capable of directing mobileoperations against Kuwait.

The Iraqi Army has expandedrapidly in a short time. The state oftraining of the average Iraqi unit isstill a question for debate. TheIraqis' most recent enemies, theIranians and the Kurdish rebels,were predominantly foot-mobileand generally outclassed by Iraq'smodern armored forces. TheKuwaitis, surprised and over-whelmed in hours, did not evenslow the Iraqi columns down.

Saddam Hussein has demon-strated a ruthless ability to applymilitary force. The Iraqi military hasproved its skill against its neighborsin the Persian Gulf. Iran andKuwait both underestimated Iraq'scapability to wage modern war. It

~~ ~



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would be foolish for the UnitedStates to underestimate Iraq'smilitary potential.The Iraqis, no matter how goodthey look on paper, have critical tac-tical vulnerabilities that can be ex-ploited. How well the Iraqis willhold up against a modern combinedarms force, equipped with close airsupport, remains to be seen. As SunTzu said, over 2,500 years ago:"what is of supreme importance inwar is to attack the enemy'sstrategy."" It is vital to understandthe sword of Saddam, in order totake advantage of Sun Tzu's wise ad-vice.

Notes

'Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. bySamuel B. Griffith. New York (OxfordUniversity Press, 1963). p. 84.

'The International Institute for StrategicStudies, The Militarv Balance 1988-1989,Director Francois Heisbourg. Great Britain.(The Eastern Press Ltd., 1988), p. 101. Allfigures on Iraqi military strengths werederived from this source.

3Brian Duffy et al., "The World's MosDangerous Man, U.S. News and WorliRevort, June 4,1990, p. 38.

4Mark Uoyd, Modem Combat Gear,Hong Kong: (Longmeadow Press, 1988),p. 181.

12

5Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons ofthe Iran-Iraq War: Part Two, Tactics, Tech-nology, and Training," Armed Forces Jour-nal International, (June 1982),p. 73.

'lbid., p. 74.'John Laffin, The World in Conflict,

1990. War Annual 4, London: (Brassey'sUK Ltd., 1990), p. 99.

'Richard Jupa and Jim Dingeman, "HowIran Lostllraq Won the Gulf War," Strategyand Tactics, Cambira, Calif., (Number133, March-April 1990), p. 51.

'lbid., p. 51."Sun Tzu, p. 77.

Major John F. Anta1 wascommissioned in Armor in1977 from the United StatesMilitary Academy. He hasserved as a tank platoonleader, scout platoon leader,battalion motor officer, tankcompany commander, assis-tant brigade operations of-ficer, battalion S3, G3 train-ing officer, and as the SGSfor the 1st Cavalry Division.A 1990 graduate of the Com-mand and General Staff Col-lege, he is currently the S3trainer for the Brigade Train-ing Team (BRONCOS),Operations -Group,NTC.

Iraq's ModernArtillery Assets-In assessing Iraq's militarycapabilities, a lot of attention hascentered on Saddam Hussein's verylarge tank force and his past willing-ness to employ chemical weapons.But Iraq's interest in acquiring modernartillery systems also poses a threat toforces deployed in the Mideast.

Attention was focused on this inter-est recently when authorities in Britainand Italy discovered that Iraq had con-tracted for the manufacture of the com-ponents for a "supergun" in theircountries and attempted to importthem. The project was apparentlybased on the theories of Dr. GeraldBull, a Canadian-born ballistics expertwho was mysteriously assassinated inBelgium last March.

Among Dr. Bull's more conventionalprojects were improved heavy artillerysystems. After South African weaponsimports were embargoed, he helpedadvise that nation on the design of theG5 towed and G6 wheeled 155mmsystems. His concepts were also usedin several very modern 155-mm gunsdeveloped in Austria, China, and Bel-gium, where his firm was based.

According to Jane's Armor and Artil-a ll of these systems greatly out-range the US.-standard M109 family,which is now about 30 years old. Themaximum range of the Austrian GH N-45. the Chinese WAC-21, and theSouth African G5/G6 is 30-39+ kmdepending on whether standard or en-hanced range rounds are fired. Thiscompares with the 18-24 km range ofthe M109 and 17-24 km range of theSoviet standard 152-mm gun.Jane's notes that the G-5 is "in ser-vice with Iraq" and that Austrian GH N-

45s were shipped to Jordan and re-shipped to Iraq. The Austrian armsdeal also led to a scandal in Austria,according to a recent story in Interna-tional Defense Review, Brazil, whichsupplied billions of dollars worth of ar-maments to Iraq during the Iran-IraqWar, is also licensed to produce the155-mm design.

The Italian military magazine,Italiana Difesa, noted that a G6-typesystem and a larger 210-mm wheeled,self-propelled system, called the "AlFaw," were on display at the Baghdadarms exposition in April 1989.

-ARMOR Staff

ARMOR - November-December1990


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A Military Analysisof Iraqi Army Operationsby Aaron DanisThe Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2

August has shown that Iraqi Presi-dent Saddam Hussein's army is thepremier Arab military force in thePersian Gulf. The attack, led by theelite Republican Guards Corps,took 8-12 hours to cover roughly 80miles and secure Kuwait City. Thisperformance has led many Westernanalysts to believe that Iraq's armyis unbeatable by any Mideast: army- except the Israelis. Certainly, inan era when offensive prowess byArab armies has been nearly nonex-istent, Iraq looks to be the excep-tion.

This analysis will attempt toevaluate the present-day IraqiArmy's operations and tactics, andhighlight its strengths and weak-nesses. In order to do this, it willlook at the Iraqi Army in the Iran-Iraq War during its defensive opera-tions from 1981-88 and its stunningoffensive victories during the springand summer of 1988, victories whichbrought Iran to the peace tableafter having the upper hand in thewar the previous six years. Thoughthe Iraqi Army of 1988 and later isin many ways more professionaland battle-tested than it was dur-ing its ponderous 1980-81 offen-sives,' it has glaring weaknesseswhich a U.S. armor-heavy forcecould exploit.

Iraqi defenses. The offensive punchof the Iraqi Army is concentrated inthe Republican Guards Corps(referred to in some sources as thePresidential Guards). During thegreater part of th e Gulf War, thecorps was merely a brigade/division-sized force, which was held inreserve to spearhead criticalcounterattacks. This force was ex-panded in 1987 to three armoreddivisions, one infantry division andone commando/special forces bri-gade for the spring 1988 offensives.For the Kuwaiti invasion, theGuards further expanded with threeinfantry divisions and a special for-ces division, giving it a totalstrength of eight divisions and~0,000 roops? The Iraqis alsohave another seven armored/mechanized divisions, which areused for operations in support ofthe Guards.

Finding a tactical table of organiza-tion and equipment for units in theIraqi force structure is nearly im-possible on the unclassified level?In general, Iraqi divisions are 12,000-15,000 strong, with each head-quarters usually controlling threebrigades. The Guards are muchmore flexible. A division head-quarters controls up to four (andpossibly more) brigades, with inde-pendent helicopter, artillery, andchemical units attached."Iraqi Force Structure

Though the Iraqi Army has over5500 tanks, the majority of its forcestructure consists of more than 40infantry divisions, the mainstays of

The rapid withdrawal of theGuards units from Kuwait in lateAugust, to a central location nearthe Iraq/Kuwait border, in exchangefor regular army infantry units

shows the Guards' importance toIraqi offensive/counteroffensiveplans.Perfecting the Defense:1981-1987After the initial Iraqi territorialgains of 1980-81 against Iran, the

Iranians wrested the initiative fromIraq through a series of large-scaleoffensives. The war became a defen-sive one for the Iraqi Army, whichwent on the offensive only to main-tain the integrity of the-defense. Tac-tically and operationally, the IraqiArmy had ample opportunities topractice defensive operations, usual-ly against Iranian human-wave as-saults largely unsupported byarmor, artillery, or close-air sup-port. The Iranians made up for thelack of supporting arms by using in -fantry infiltration tactics in attacksconducted at night and across thenumerous water obstacles that criss-cross southern Iraq near the city ofBasra and the Faw Peninsula.

Iraqi tactics and operationaldoctrine for the offense and defensewere based on the Soviet model andinstruction from Russian advisors.In the 1980-81 offensives, this hurtthe Iraqis because they did notlearn to execute the doctrine cor-rectly and junior officers andNCOs, though brave, lacked initia-tive and often waited for higherheadquarters to provide direction.Defensively, however, when theIraqis started to defend their homesoil after losing their initial Iraniangains, Soviet-prepared defensive tac-- -

ARMOR - November-December7990 73


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7II

mAhwaz

AI Zubalr-0

I(\ ".

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SAUDIARABIA

tics were critical to success byproviding a strong "crust" to protectBaghdad.If the Iraqi Army lacked anything

for the defense, it was strategicdepth and manpower reserves. Be-cause Baghdad is about 150kilometers from the Iranian border,trading space for time was out ofthe question, and any battle with los-ses less than three-to-one was con-sidered a defeat (Iranian populationin 1980 - 45 million, Iraqi - 15million).

Iraqi defenses usually consisted ofthree dug-in defensive bands about10 kilometers in depth. Each bandhad platoon- to company-size, tri-angle-shaped strong points, whichprovided all-around protectionthrough the use of alternate firingpositions and tanks dug in to hulldefilade. Strong points had inter-locking fire, and were covered bymassed artillery and close air sup-port. Iraq maintained air superioritythroughout the war! The CombatEngineer Corps, one of the great as-

sets o f thc. Iraqi Army, construclcclconcrctc fortifications. mincliclrls,and othcr obstaclcs. I t also builtlateral roads IO rcposition forces.Iraqi units had shown an inahilityearly in thc war to reinlorcc andredeploy once their positions hadbeen outflanked due to poor coni-mand and control.

Despite Iraq's great technological,mobility, and firepower advantages,Iranian human wave assaults, onseveral occasions, nearly succeededthrough numbers alone to breakopen the front, with penetrations upto 16 kilometers. Thc lack of mobilereserves prevented the Iraniansfrom exploiting their successes, andthe massive use of Iraqi air support,including Mi-24 and Gazelle attackhelicopters, in conjunction withlocal counterattacks, usually re-stored the line?defense, Iraq tuweapons. The f ir1982-83, when Igas to disrupt nignr numan-wave as-saults, and became necessary when-ever the Iraqis were greatly outnum-

. ..

The geographyof the 1981-88war be-tween Iran and Iraq. The Shati AI Arab isthe waterway that empties into the PersianGulf just east of the Faw Peninsula.Ixrcd o r defending a n importantposition (thc Iriiqis later usedTabun and Sarin iicrvc gases andcyanotic agents). Chemicals werenot usually decisive in and ofthemselves, however, because theIranians developed countermeas-ures and weathedwater effectsreduced their impact."Tank vs. Tank:The Battle of Susangerd

The battle for Susangerd, the onlyma,jor tank battle of the war (andthe largest since the 1973 OctoberWar), gives a rare look at Iraqi"mohile" defensive capabilities. I nJanuary 1981, the understrength- . - . . . . _. .As a last line 01 Iranian 16th Armored Uivision

irned to chemical (equipped with 300 British Chief-st use occurred in tains and American M-60s) sup-raq used mustard ported by the 55th Paratroop1 . 1 n - r - - > - --->---.-^I - _ _ _ _ _ . - - - . . - - I -migaue, conuucieu a cuunicraiiacn

near Susangerd, Iran, in order toopen the road to Ahwaz and lift an

14 ARMOR - November-December 1990


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Iraqi siege on Abadan to th esoutheast. Th e attack, forced prema-turely by political reasons, occurredduring the rainy season. Tlie Iranianavenue of approach was a sea ofmud, which inhibited Iranianmaneuver and resupply. An Iraqi ar-mored division equipp ed with 300 T-62 tanks had come to a halt, withbrigades on line across theproposed avenue of approach. On 5January, t h e Iranian forcc slowlyniovcd from thc northeast ovcr thcwct ground. with tlic thrcc tankbrigaclcs leading single file and tliepa r a t r oop Iwigadc following behind.Iraqi helicopter reconnaissance de-tcctccl the niovcmcnt. and the Iraqicommander responded quickly byconcentrating his three armoredbrigades based on thc village ol'Achnicd Abad on [he KharkhehPlain.'"

O n 6 .lanuary, t h e lead Iranian a r -mored brigade ran into tlic centerIraqi one. Thinking i r was only ;Ilight Iraqi covering force, tlieIranians pushcd forward as theIraqis withdrew, and entered aprepared kill zonc. As tank-to-tankengagements raged, most between200-1000 meters, the Iraqi com-mander moved his two flankbrigades up lo form a three-sidedtrap and faced his units inward. Thefirst Iranian brigade was soondestroyed, losing more than 100tanks. The second and third Iranianarmored brigades, unsupported bytheir infantry, blundered into thetrap on the 7th and 8th of January,respectively. The battlefield had be-com e a morass, and the fighting wasat such close range that aircraft ofboth sides were unable to intervene.The third Iranian brigade, realizingits precarious position and runninglow on main gun ammunition,withdrew."

Both the losses and lessons of thisbattle are open to debate. Each side

began with about 300 tanks, and theIraqis claimed to Iiavc dcstroycd orcaptured 214 Iranian tanks. thoughthe Iranians only admitted to losing88. The Iraqis probably lost 100destroyed o r damaged tanks, but hc -cause thcy retained the battlefieldthey were probably recoverable."In t h e following days, thc Iraqis putmore than 100 Iranian tanks and ar-mored vehicles on display in Basraand Baghdad, and a trip by jour-nalists to tlic Kharkheh Plainrevealed some 40 tanks still stuck inthe mud, along with masses ofempty shell casings and threedestroyed helicopters.

I t is obvious that the Iranian com-mander was incompetent, feedingtroops piecemeal in an attack at 3 -10-3 odds at tlic point of attack.This makes i t difficult to judge thereal qualily of the Iraqi force.though the Iraqi coinmandcr docscct high marks for his ability toreact to the situation as itdeveloped. The battle doesdemonstrate, liowevcr, that bothsides were technically deficient intank-to-tank engagements. Most ofthe Iranian losses occurred becausetheir tanks got stuck or could not besupplicd and maintained, and wereabandoned. Tlie lead-computingsights on Iraqi tanks were seldomused, thus lowering the accuracy oftlie T-62 main gun to World War I1standards. Reliable reports indicatethat both sides often had to close towithin boresight range to be effec-tive.I3 It is unknown whether th eIraqis have corrected these trainingdeficiencies with thcir T-72 crews,though they have tried to improvethe fire control systems on the tankby using Wcstcrn rangefinders andcomputers." I t is doubtful, withouta legitimate Iranian armor threat,that Iraqi armored units were ableto expend th e ammunition and timenecessary to improve thcir tank gun-

nery skills, wilh the Guards a s a pos-sible exception.

Back on the Offensive: 1988After more than six years ofstalemate and the primacy o f thedefense ovcr offensive action

(reminiscent ol World War I) , mostgulf analysts bclicved that neitherside would gain the upper hand inthe war. Iran was expectcd to con-duct yet another "final olfcnsivc" totakc Basra in the winter or spring of1988. onc of thcir niajor gcographi-cal obicclives since 1982. However,two subtle yet important actionswerc taking place in both countries.

Iran was suffering from mobiliza-tion problems in the winter of 1988.Political problems in Iran due to the"War of the Citics," and a shortageof volunteers for the frontprevented the expected winter offen-sive, and may have caused thcIranians to thin their lines.15

Iraq began to modify its forcestructure in late 1987, expanding t heRepublican Guards as previouslynoted. These highly seasoned rorcespracticcd offcnsivc combined armsoperations beforc being committedto a successful counterattack againstan Iranian salient in Kurdistan inMarch 1988 in order to hone theirskills.lG

Under these conditions, SaddaniHussein decided to launch a niajorattack to seize the AI Faw (or Fao)Peninsula west o l the Shalt-a1 Arabwaterway, which dividcs Iraq andIran and allows access to tlie IraqiARMOR - November-December 7990 75

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The Iraqi Army has a lot of experience on thedefense, and has excellent engineer support(both offensively and defensively). It has neverbeen subjected to a large, combined-arms assault.

port of Basra. Faw, on the Iraqi gulfcoast, had been captured by Iran in1986 and was their only major gainsince 1982. Its recapture would givea psychological boost to Hussein'smilitary. This battle would also bejust the first in a campaign of five at-tacks (two are covered here), whichwould push the Iranians out of Iraq.The peninsula was defended by only5,000-10,000 Iranian regulars andRevolutionary Guards bccause itwas such an exposed and untenableposition. The attack, titled "BlessedRamadan," would be launched onthe first day of t h e Moslem monthof fasting and would come as a com-plete surprise to the Iranians.

Part of thc surprisc was duc toIraq's ability to conccntrate its for-ces quickly before the attack. Usingexcellent interior lines of coni-munication (both road and rail)covered by air superiority, Iraqmoved the Republican Guards froma training area near Basra to itsjump-off positions on the gulf coastnorthwest of AI Faw, 150 kilometersto the south. Thc Iraqi Army has1500 tank transporters, which canmovc armored vehicles at speeds upto 65 kilometers-per-hour. Thisreflects a lesson of the 1973 Oc-tober War, when Iraqi tanks sent toSyria to fight Israel drove on theirtracks on rough roads and arrivedin poor shape.17

Its commander, Major GeneralMaher Abd al-Rashid, planned theFaw attack as a 4-5 day operationwith three phases: breakthrough, ex-ploitation, and mop-up. Starting onthe morning of 17 April, the attack

was launched with almost 200.000troops on two axes down the FawPeninsula. The main attack,launched by T-72-equipped ar-mored units of the RepublicanGuards, assaulted 35 kilometerssoutheast across the relatively drysalt Ilats of Manilaha from positionsaround AI Zubair and Umm Qasr.The Iraqi VI1 Corps, located 10kilometers north of Faw City,launched ii supporting infantry at-tack south along the west hank ofthe Shatt al-Arab. Iraq also ap-parently launchcd an amphibious as-sault of unknown size on thewestern side of the Iranian positionsusing the Kuwaiti island ofBubiyan.I8

A short bombardment of Iranianpositions, which included the use ofpoison gas. most probably a non-persistent nerve agent, preceded theattack. Undcr covcr ol darkncss,Iraqi commandos cut paths throughIranian defcnsive barriers andminefields, rollowed by armor, sup-ported by inrantry and attackhelicopters. Iraq claimed fightcr-bombers and hclicopters llcw morethan 318 sorties. helping to preventIranian rcinforcemcnts from rcach-ing Faw. The attack, which was ex-pected to last 4-5 clays, ended in 34hours.

Iraq rapidly followed up its Fawvictory. On 26 June, again taking ad-tlcVantage o f thcir superior mobility,he Republican Guards and I11Jorps retook the man-made, oil-:..L hi..: -..- /..- ni,.: -....- r,1....,1,rlr;ll I V I ~ J I I U I I [ I J I I V I ~ I I U U I I ~ aimiuanorth of Basra in nine hours. At0330 hours, the Guards launchcd

the main illtack, this time an am-phibious one, storming the islandsand surrounding marshes lromsmall boats (which both sides com-monly used in the war) and am-phibious tractors. This was I'ollowedhy bridges and bullclozers to con-solidate thc gains won.

Thc 111 Corps. with 2000 tanks and000 artillery pieces, against [ewerthan 60 Iranian tanks. cleared thcarea east of the islands. Suppvrtedby a brigade ol paratroopers (pos-sibly a commando brigade) insertedinside Iran as ;I blocking force. the111 Corps advanced 32 kilometersinto Iran hefore withdrawing to theinternational border.'"

It is unknown i f the paratroopswere dropped or air-assaulted intotheir objective, though Iraq hasenough transport aircraft andhelicopters for either stylc insertion(films of the Kuwait invasionsliowcd an air-assault into KuwaitCity in support ol the attack). On20 August 1988. Iran and Iraqagrced to a U.N.-sponsoredccascfirc, Iraq having recaptured allland lost to Iran.Common thrcads run throughthese attacks:0 Olfcnsivc actions werc cxtcnsivc-

Ip rehearsed and had a set-piecequality about them (i.e. little frec-whecling maneuver covering limiteddist anccs).0 Iraq built up odds, which easilyexceeded 6-to-1, and prepositioned

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0 A non-persistent nerve strike onfront line troops, and mustard gasattack o n logistics, command posts,and reserves preceded all attacks."0 Iraq had overwhelming air-supe-

riority.0 Iranian defenses were thin, with

almost no reserves. Every battle wasa forgone conclusion before it evenbegan, and except for the chemicalstrikes, this scenario seems to fi t therecent Kuwait invasion quite well.

It is difficult to predict how theIraqi Army would I'are against theUnited States, based on its perfor-mance in the Iran-Iraq War. Formost of the war, Iraq faced an op-ponent who had thc majority of itsair and armored forces dcadlineddue to a lack of spare parts andmaintenance. By the cnd of the war,Iran's greatest resource, manpowcr,had also been drained in senselesshuman-wave attacks against strongdefcnscs. However, several salientpoints can be drawn about the IraqiArmy:0 Iraq's elitc Guards units have

seen a significant amount of combatand have been baptized in a chcmi-cal warfare cnvironment. This givesthe Iraqi lcaders conlidcnce introop performancc under degradedconditions. Non-Guards units andPeople's Army reserves are of un-even quality..The Guards units are good in

set-piece attacks over limited dis-tance, when they have been able torehearse extensively. Non-Guardsunits may be incapable of perform-ing offensive combincd-arms ma-neuvers due to a lack of training.

Tank gunnery skills are probablystill poor across the army.

.The Iraqi Army has a lot of ex-perience on the defcnse, and has ex-cellent enginecr support (both offen-sively and defensively). It has neverbeen subjected to a large, combined-arms assault, though the Iranianshad success with night attacks andinfiltration tactics. Due to poor e',Iraqi defenses may be slow to reactto a mobile situation.

Iraqi troops have always en-joyed friendly planes and helicop-ters overhead. ADA assets arebased on older Soviet missiles, andhave no t been tested against alegitimate threat. This makes com-bat troops vulncrablc to CAS.

0Due to the depth of the theaterand Iraqi air-superiority. thc logis-tics system was rarely taxed. Initialpress reports from Kuwait indicatethat Iraqi troops on theKuwaWSaudi border are goinghungry, pcrhaps rcilccting a lack ofIraqi logistical experience andcapability.

As General Colin Powell statedafter the invasion of Kuwait, theIraqis arc not "ten-feet tall." U.S.armor-heavy forces could best ex-ploit Iraqi weaknesses by flankingpreparcd positions (avoiding killzones) and engaging Iraqi armoredforces in reservc in a free-wheelingmobile battle. Taken out of a set-piece environment, it is likely, as inthe Iran-Iraq War, that Iraqi deren-ses and C3 will be incapable ofresponding to such a threat, anddenied air-superiority, would foldunder pressurc. Defensivcly, US.forces will submit an Iraqi offcnse

to a volumc of tank lire, ATGMsand CAS much greatcr than whatthey faced from the Iranian Army inthe Gulf War. It is unlikely that Iraqcould sustain an attack for longagainstU.S. orccs.

Obviously, heavy divisions are thebest force to challenge Iraq in acround war, becausc forces madeup of light infantry and airbornctroops without extensive anti-armorsupport are in dangcr or hcing ovcr-run quickly hy armor-hcavy lraqiforces. The wild card is Iraqi chemi-cal capability, though desert condi-tions are unfavorable to chemicalemployment.2' Hcrc, too, t h eniobility and protection offered by aheavy force against such an attackwill help ensure SUCCCSS.

Notes'Several works are available concerningthe initial Iraqi offensive and why it failedto defeat Iran. See the International In-stitute for Strategic Studies, Strateaic Sur-vey 1980-81, (London: IISS, 1981), pp. 49-52; Edgar O 'Ballance, The Gulf War. (Lon-don: Brassey's, 1988); John Laffin, War An-nual 1, (London: Brassey's, 1986); An-thony H.Cordes man, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," Armed Forces

Journal International (AFJI), April 1982,pp. 32-47, and "Lessons of the Iran-IraqWar: Part I I - Tactics, Technology andTraining," ANI. une 1982, pp. 68-85; andWilliam 0. taudenmaier, "A StrategicAnalysis," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli andShaheen Ayubi, eds., The Iran-lraa War:New Weapons. Old Conflicts, (New York:Praeger. 1983).'Michael Evans, "Saddam 's MilitaryStrategy Causes Surprise in West," TheTimes, 25 August 1990; see also JohnBroader and Douglas Jeal, "Iraqi Army:World's 5th Largest But Full of Vital Weak-

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nesses," Los Anaeles Times, 13 August1990; Stephen C. Pelletiere, lraai Powerand U.S. Securitv in the Middle East, (Car-lisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies In-stitute, U.S. Army War College, 1990),p.16. Pelletiere and Cordesman contendthat Iraq's 20 Special Forces Brigadescome under the Guards control. Cordes-man's figure for the size of the Guard is240,000 with a further 80,000 supporttroops, to include the Iraqi ChemicalCorps.

?he best sources on Iraqi force struc-ture are International Institute for StrategicStudies (IISS), The Militarv Balance 1989--0, London: IISS, 1989)p. 101;AnthonyH. Cordesman, The Gulf and the West,(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p. 82;Mark Heller, Dov Tamari and Zeev Eytan,The Middle East Military Balance, JaffeCenter for Strategic Studies, Tel AvivUniversity; Aharon Levran and Zeev Eytan,The Middle East: Militarv Balance, 1987-88,Boulder: Westview Press,1988).

4Anthony H. Cordesman and AbrahamR . Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War:u,Boulder, Colo: Westview Press,1990), . 355;also Pelletiere, op. cit., p.16.

'Reuters, "Iraq Pulls Elite Troops fromSaudi Border, NBC News Says," 23August 1990; lso Michael Evans, op. cit.

%lliam 0. Staudenmaier, "Iran-Iraq(1980- ," The Lessons of Recent Wars inthe Third World - Vol 11, Robert Harkavyand Stephanie G. Neuman, eds., (Lexi-ngton, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), .225.

7Helen Chapin, ed., Iraa: A Countrvw, A Pam 550-31, Q, Dept. of theArmy, 1990;and Cordesman, "Lessons ofthe Iran-Iraq War: Part 11," AFJI,p. 73.

'David Segal, in "The Iran-Iraq War: AMilitary Analysis," Foreian Affairs, Vol 66,#5, Summer 1988, pp. 956-957, laimsthat after 1984,he Iraqis abandoned theirstatic defense in favor of "a more flexibledefense." He claims that Iraq used set-piece battles where they regularly anddeliberately allowed the Iranians into killzones and then counterattacked with com-bined arms forces to cut up and annihi-late the penetration. He also claims thatthe Iraqi Army "handily won nearly all thedefensive battles of the past six years," p.954.He does not state the sources of hisinformation or site any specific instances.

'R. Jeffrey Smith, "Relying on ChemicalArms," Washinaton Post, 10 August 1990;see also Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-lraa War and Western Securitv. 1984-87,(New York: Jane's, 1987), p. 19, 63-64,97.

'?he best account of this battle is inOBallance, The Gulf War, pp. 60-63;eealso Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-IraqWar: Part 11," AFJI, p. 70; Efraim Karsh,"The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,"Adelphi Paper #220, London: IISS, 1987),p. 35: and Anthony R . Tucker, "ArmoredWarfare in the Gulf," Armed Forces, May1988,p. 226.The tactics used in this bat-tle sound similar to those mentioned inSegal's article (footnote 4), ut they werethe exception in the war, not the rule.

"lbid."These numbers are from O'Ballance,

who was one of the journalists whoviewed the aftermath of the battle.Staudenmaier, in "A Strategic Analysis,"The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons. OldConflicts, p. 40. laims that 300-400ankswere involved, with the Iraqis losing 50 T-62s, and the Iranians losing 100 Chief-tains and M-60~. These numbers werealso used in Strateaic Survev 1980-81. .50.

'%taudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis,"The Iran-lraa War: New Weapons. OldConflicts, p. 40:Cordesman, "Lessons ofthe Iran-Iraq War: Part 11" AFJI,p. 74.

14Cordesman, The Lessons of ModernWar, Vol II, p. 440.

'?he War of the Cities was an ongoingcontest between the Iraqis and Iranians tolaunch bomb and missile attacks againsteach other's major cities. It turneddecisively in Iraq's favor in the spring of1988 when modified Iraqi Scud-B missilesbegan to reach Tehran. Upwards of 150-200 missiles were fired, devastatingIranian morale.

"Bernard E. Trainor, "Iraqi Offensive:Victory Goes Beyond Battlefield," NewYork Times, 20 April 1988;and IISS, TheMilitary Balance 1989-1990,London: IISS.1989), . 101.

17Karsh, op.cit., p. 44; Laffin, War An-p. 78;Cordesman, "Lessons of theIran-Iraq War: Part 11," AFJI, p. 74;Cordes-man, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol 11p. 356. Television footage of the Iraqi

"withdrawal'l from Kuwait indicates the im-portance of these transporters.

"The chronology of this battle is piecedtogether from four accounts: JamesBruce, "Gulf Battle Lines Continue toShift," Jane's Defence Weeklv (JDW), 30April 1988,pp. 838-839; ohn Laffin, WarAnnual 3, (London: Brassey's, 1989),pp.107-108; atrick E. Tyler, "Iraq LaunchesOffensive on Faw Peninsula," TheWashinaton Post, 18 April 1988, p. A17,A22; Trainor, "Iraqi Offensive: VictoryGoes Beyond Battlefield," New YorkTimes, and Cordesman, The Lessons ofModern War: Vol 11, pp. 373-375. he bestconsolidated account of the spring offen-sives are in Pelletiere, op. cit., pp. 25-40.

'gYoussef M. Ibrahim. "Iraqi TroopsRecapture Big Oil Field," New York Times,26 June 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, "IraqRecaptures Strategic Marshes,"Washinaton Post, 26 June 1988, p. A22-23; Iraqi Paratroops' Key Role in MajnunVictory." JDW. 9 July 1988, . 14;Cordes-man, The Lessons of Modern War: Vo l II,pp. 388-389.%. Jeffrey Smith, "Relying on Chemical

Arms," Washinaton Post, 10 August 1990,pp. A25, 7.

"Brian Duffy, et al., "The Guns ofAugust," US. News and World Report, 20August 1990, . 24.This article claims thatthe infamous gas attack against Halabjain February 1988 killed only 200 un-protected civilians in a city with a popula-tion of 45,000. asualty claims for this at-tack range as high as 4000.

Aaron Danis formerly servedas S2, 4-64 Armor and plansofficer, G2, 24th InfantryDivision (M). He is currentlyan intelligence analyst inWashington D.C. and anArmy Reserve captain withthe Army Intelligence andThreat Analysis Center(AITAC). He is a graduate ofNorwich University and willsoon receive an M.A. degreefrom George WashingtonUniversity.

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The Tanks Of BabylonMain Battle Tanks OfThe Iraqi Armyby Captain James M. Warford

In the name of increasing theirown defensive capabilities, the ar-mies of several different countrieshave undergone massive modern-ization programs. As far as armoredforces are conccrned, thesc effortshave been concentrated in twoareas; the purchase or productionof new, more capable systems, andtlic modification of well known, cur-rently-fielded equipment. When thevarious factors of combat ex-perience and combat-proven tech-nology are included, a future threatcan become a battlefield reality.The result of this effort is the crea-tion of a capable and modern tank-based, close-combat-heaw force.This is the current situation with theheavily armored ground forces ofIraq, a situation that requires amodern U.S. tank-based (heavy)solution.

According to several unclassifiedsources, the Iraqi Army currently in-cludes 5,500 to 5,800 tanks. This im-pressive nunlber is primarily madeup of both Soviet and Chinesetanks. There are, however, a small

number of British andAmerican tanks as well.In fact, if the total Iraqiarmored force is con-sidcrcd, Brazilian andFrcnch armorcd person-nel carriers, ATGMvehiclcs, and reconnais-

Iraq has mod ified older T-55s to take the powerfulSoviet 125-mm main gun .

Iraqi ArmorType NumbersT54/T-55. TR-77 (Romanian variant) 250 0Type 59, Type 69-2 (Chinese) 1500T-62 1000T-72 (T-72B, T-72G, T-72M1 ) (approx) 500Chieftain Mk 3/5 30M-60,M-47 (U.S.) unknownFigure 1

sance vehicles, as well as someAmerican M109A1 SP howitzers, alladd to the massive total of Iraqi ar-mored vehicles. Tlie Mifitan,Bnfartcc 19S9-IY90 lists the Iraqimain battle tank (MBT) fleet asshown in Figure 1.

While this force of MBTs is im-pressive by sheer numbers alone,two particular groups of Vehiclesdeserve special attention. The firstof these is the Soviet T-72 MBTsused by Iraq. There are currently14 identified variants of the T-72.While some of these variants aremuch more modern and capablethan others, the threat imposed bythe export models of the T-72 hasbecome a reality. This well-knownand very capable MBT is currentlyemployed by 16 different countries.

This list, which also includcs Syriaand Libya, is cxpectcd to continueto grow. There are also five dif-ferent countries (including tlieSoviet Union) that currentlyproduce the T-72.

Although first seen by the Westwhen the Soviets paraded it in RedSquare in November 1977, the T-72B in Iraqi service remained large-ly unknown until the outbreak ofthe Iran-Iraq war. Most of the videotapes of the war clearly show thatthe Iraqis werc proud of their T-72sand were quick to show these tanksto the world. I t must be pointed out,however, that somc of these videotapes wcre made during the carlypart of thc war and do not show tlictwo most modern of tlie Iracri T-72s.-



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While some of these variants aremuch more modern and capablethan others, the threat imposed bythe export models of the T-72 hasbecome a reality.

The Iraqi T-72G and T-72M1 aremore modern and more capablevariants of the T-72B. All threevariants mount the same 2A46 D-81TM 125-mm main gun. The ear-lier T-72B is fitted with a coin-cidence rangefiider, while both theT-72G and the T-72M1 mount laserrangefinders. This difference facili-tates variant identification: only theT-72B model has the right-side ran-gefinder ear, or end-housing, onthe turret roof. The T-72G and T-72M1 do not. The three variants areillustrated in Figure 2, at right.

The other significant difference be-tween the variants is their armorprotection. While the exact detailsof the armor composition andcapabilities are classified, open sour-ces confirm some general informa-tion. The oldest of the threevariants, the T-72B, has a conven-tionally armored RH A turret. Theglacis armor, however, consists of athree-layer design with an outerlayer of steel, a middle layer ofglass-fibedceramic material, and aninner layer of steel. Reportedly, the20

The Iraqi ArmysT-72s

I

u-Figure2

1

T72B

T72G

T72M1

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actual thickness of this compositearmor is 200mm. Like the T-72B,the T-72G has a conventional RHAturret and uses the same three-layercomposite front slope. This patternof armor protection apparentlychanged with the T-72M1. The fron-tal armor is visibly thicker, and com-posite armor is built into internalcavities on either side of the maingun. With the important exceptionof the added plate, the glacis armorused on the T-72M1 is similar to theearlier variants, and considered tobe at least as effective.

The 30-mm-thick add-on armor"face-plate" on the glacis has twoholes cut in it to allow it to fit overthe standard tow hooks. The addi-tion of this face-plate improves thealready very capable glacis armor

beyond the level of the T-72B and T-72G. Because the T-72G and T-72M1 are very difficult to tell apart,the two holes cut in the addedarmor plate (as well as the small sec-tion of the original glacis visiblebelow the tank's left and right head-lights), offer one of the few visiblevariant identification features.

Additionally, all three of these T-72 variants can be (and normallyare) fitted with forward-firingsmoke grenade launchers attachedto the turret front on both sidcs ofthe main gun.

Finally, there is some confusion inthe unclassified press concerningthe production of these T-72variants in Iraq. While both the T-72B and T-72G were exported to

ModifiedT-55Fitted with very thick multi-layer (probablycomposite) applique armor on the glacis,turret front and sides, hull sides, and turretrear. Four large multi-layer armor "boxes"cover almost the entire rear area of the tur-ret, are attached via a large metal bracket,which provides a considerable standoff dis-tance between he add-on armor and theRHA turret armor.

Iraq from the Soviet Union andCzechoslovakidPoland respectively,the origin of the T-72M1 is not asclear.

Some sources state that the Iraqisare in fact producing the T-72M1,while others report that the Iraqisare only assenibling it. I t has beenconfirmed, however, that the Iraqisare producing the T-72M 1's main



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The T-72: Identifying the Variants

Iraq also uses the T-72G, similar to this East German tank. It has a laser range-finder (note single "dogh ouse ") and sm oke grenade launchers on turret.

T-72M1 resembles the G Mod el, but has an add-o n armor plate covering thefront slope. Tow ho oks pass through add-o n plate. This T-72M1 is Finnish.

Th e M-84 version ofth e T-72 i s made inYugoslavia, wasused b y the Kuwait ihrmy, and, since theinvasion of Kuwait, isnow probably. . . .iIpmn ln \ rm r i h\i IranIII

L.,,'p,.",---. ', .-.y.Note unusualgun- ~ner's prima ry sightand wind sensor onthe turret roof.

T-72B has right side window for earlier co in-cidence rangefinder. This one is East German.

Close-up shows add-on armor plate on T-72M1front SIC

I

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Within the framework of a Persian Gulf scenario, thethreat posed by the Iraqi Army cannot be overstated. Thisthreat is based upon Iraq's massive armored force, and,more specifically, the main battle tanks that lead it.gun, ammunition, and some of th etank's electronic com pone nts. InIraqi service, the T-72M1 is knownas the "Babylon Lion."The other group of Iraqi MBTsthat deserve special attention arethe indigenously modified Soviet T-

55 MBTs. While the massive Iraqimodification effort also includes thefitting of full-length hull appliquearmor to the BM P-I, the creation ofa 160-mm SP mortar on a T-54/T-55hull, and the creation of a four-tube120-mm SP mortar on the MTLB(to name a few examples), thecenterpiece of this program is clear-ly the modified T-55. The basic T-55 has been extensively reworked,resulting in two different versions.The first involves mounting, in theT-55, the complete main gun andautomatic loading system of the T-72M1. This impressive modification,which also includes new passivenight sights, smoke grenade launch-ers, and a large turret stowage bas-ket, apparently required the turretroof to be raised a few inches to ac-commodate the automatic loader.Like the T-72 variants, this "new"T-55 is fitted with full-length non-metallic hull skirts and the T-55crew is reduced from four to threemen.

The second modified Iraqi T-55not only causes problems for

Armor Magazine, November-December 1990

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