THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARYFOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB,EDITED BYLL.D.

fT.t E.L. A.

E.

PAGE,

O.H., LITT.D.

CAPPS,POST,

PH.D., LL.D.

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W. H.

D.

ROUSE,

litt.d.

L.H.D.

E. H.

WARMINGTON,

m.a.,

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ARISTOTLETHE CATEGORIES ON INTERPRETATIONPRIOR ANALYTICS

AEISTOTLETHE CATEGORIES ON INTERPRETATIONBY

HAROLD

P.

COOK, M.A.

FORMERLY LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY AND CLASSICS IN ARMSTRONG COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

PRIOR ANALYTICSBY

HUGH TREDENNICK,

M.A.

UNIVERSITY READER IN CLASSICS AND HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OP CLASSICS AT QUEEN MARY COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTDCAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESSMCMLXn

Firtl prinUd 10S8 Reprinted 149, LM. IMI

i I

PHnttd in

Gr^ BriUim

CONTENTSPAQE

Preface

vii

The Categories

2

Introduction

Summary

of the Principal.

Themes.

.

.

9

Text and Translation

.

.12.112 .114 .182 .196 .197198

On

Interpretation

Themes.

Summary

of the Principal.

.

Text and TranslationPrior AnalyticsIntroduction

.

. .

.

.

.

Select Bibliography

.

.

The

Traditional

Mood -Names

.

.

Text and Translation

Book BookIndex

I

II

406533

PREFACEWith an eye to the English reader, who knows, perhaps, Httle of logic and less in that case of Aristotle's, I have tried in translating these texts to bring out the philosopher's meaning as clearly as How far I have succeeded in was in my power. doing so, provided I interpret it rightly, the reader I cannot, in consequence, alone can determine. pretend that I literally translate the Greek, where it seemed that a literal translation would fail to Some scholars may achieve this main purpose. possibly object that at times I paraphrase Aristotle. I can in that case only plead that a more or less intelligible paraphrase does convey something to the reader, unlike strict adherence to the letter. Moreover, a literal translation might often repel EngHsh readers and read like some alien jargon, as well as in all probability demanding rather copious notes, which are foreign from the scope of this series. The Greek text here printed is Bekker's, except for some slight deviations that are noted at the foot of the page. The short introduction that follows was submitted to the Provost of Oriel. I have to thank my friend and former tutor, Lt.-Col. A. S. L. Farquharson, for help and advice on certain points in regard to the meaning of the texts.H. P. C.Cambridge, 1984vii

ARISTOTLE THE CATEGORIES

A 2

INTRODUCTIONWhatIn oidliiaffy is the subject of the CaUgories ? usage KUTrjyopLaf rendered in Knglish bm cMCigW// meant nothing more than a predicate' Thli meaning it seems highly probable that it retains In this text. The ten categories, then, arc ten predknUt. What sort of predicates, however, and preoicates alto of what ? Let us first raise another point here. If we ask how Aristotle came bv them, the critk The following are not in agreement. the whole, the most plausible view of the Aristotle,' says Theodor Gompert, imagines a standing before him, say in the Lyceum, in successive review the questions which may be put and answered about him. All the predicates wl^ch can be attached to that subject fall under one or other of the ten heads, from the supreme qoestloii What is the object here perceived ? down to socfa a subordinate question, dealing with mere externalities, as What has he on ? What equipment or aceoatrements, e.g. shoes or weapons ? Other questions are concerned with his quahties and his site (white,''

*

'

:

:

instructed in grammar, so many feet tall) ; onder the head of relation (Related to what) come answen in which a term such as Greater or Less, Handsomer or Uglier, implies a reference to an object or objects of comparison. The " When " is explained by a

2

INTRODUCTIONYesterday or To-morrow, the Doing and Suffering " He is cutting or burning," " He is being cut or burnt." The enumeration is intended to comprise the maximum of predicates which can be assigned to any thing or being. A maximum, be it observed for it can hardly be by chance that the full number is found in only two passages of the work, while the two which are at once the most special and the least important, those relating to Having, or possession, and to Lying, or attitude, are in every other case passed over without mention. And indeed, what sense could there be in speaking of the possessions of a stone or a piece of iron, or of the attitude of a sphere or a cube } We

by the sentences

:

;

further observe that several others of the categories are often lumped together under the one name of " Affections," while others are collectively designated ** Motions." ** Grote took a similar view. Now what is remarkable,' he wrote, about the ninth and tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only Subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the same time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least frequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in some particular way in all or part of his body ; he (and perhaps his horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover animals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle' ''

too, for

Greek Thinkers (Eng. tr.), vol. iv. p. 39. * A maximum,' a man, for a man might have no clothing on!

3

ARISTOTLElaysall

down the Ten Categories, as Smmwtm Gmerm for predications which can be made about any |five Subject, the Subject which he has whGi.

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rOof

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amohihovs yvajpifianepov av dnoSolrj ay$ptifWO ^ ^a>ov aTToStSovj- to fiv yap iBiov fiaXXov roG twos

avdpamov, ro hk Koivorepov.dnoSLSovs yvcDpLfiancpovStSous15rq

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to yoo^ rwv npatnt^ Q^oui^ wpof ra Xoina navra e^^et- Kara rovrwv y^ w^rm ra AotTrd Karrjyopctrai, rov yap rwa Mpt^wov iptlgctSi; /cai6

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24

^

CATEGORIES,If

v

turn to the species themselves, none, unless is more of a substance than another. No apter description is man of a concrete or Individual man than is horse of a concrete horse. So also of primary substances none is more a substance than others. For this or that man, for example, could not well be more truly substance than, let us say, this or that ox. Apart, then, from primary substances, species and genus alone of the things that will then remain over are rightly called secondary substance, for they of all possible predicates alone define primary substance. 1 or only by species or genus can this or that man be and we make defined in a fit or appropriate way our definition preciser by stating the species or man than by stating the genus or animal.' Anything else we might state, as, for instance, he runs or is white,* would be foreign from the purpose in So species and genera only are rightly hand. designated as substance, first substances only excepted. Substance,' again, strictly speaking, applies to first substances only, because they not only underlie but provide all things else with their subjects. Exactly as primary substance is related to all else whatever, so also are genus and species, in which is Included that substance, related to all attributes not included in genus and species. For these are the subjects of such. You may call a man learned in grammar.' And, therefore, his species and genus, that is to say, man and animal, you may also call learned in grammar.' And this will be so in all cases. That it never is present in a subject holds good of For what we call primary all substance whatever.it is

we

also a genus,

'

'

*

'

;

*

'

*

'

*

'

*

*

*

B

25

ARISTOTLE8 s

rcov 8e Scvrepojv ovcriwv avp6v fi(v leai10

cWtV OVT Kad* VnOKtifUvOV Xf/tTOU* oSrwf 6 yap diSpontOf oTt ovK elalv v v7roKi,fivu}. Kad* v7TOKLfivov fiv Tov TWOS ovSpaytTov XtyfTOlm iv uTTo/cet/icVoj OVK v Kal rovvopua Koutdv koX 6 Xoyof 6 ai^fitt ware ndvra rd drrd rCtv ovaimv koX tA imi tH/^ i hia^opcjv (Tvvojvvpxu^ Xiy^rax, riaaa 8c ovaia hoKtl toSc ti arjfuuvtUf. pLv ovv rcov TTpwroiv ovaiwv dt'aiuhio66i nrw Kol dX-qdcs eoTLV on toSc ti (Tr)pLaivi' arouov yip teal v dpidpcp ro ^r]XovpLv6v coriv* iirl rfiy S va>rriijjv f&