Aristotel on Interpreting
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Transcript of Aristotel on Interpreting
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On Interpretation
By Aristotle
Written 350 BCE
Translated by E. M. Edghill
SECTION 1
Part 1
First we must define the terms
'noun' and 'erb'! then the terms
'denial' and 'affirmation'! then
'"ro"osition' and 'senten#e.'
$"o%en words are the symbols of
mental e&"erien#e and written
words are the symbols of s"o%en
words. ust as all men hae not
the same writing! so all men hae
not the same s"ee#h sounds! but
the mental e&"erien#es! whi#h
these dire#tly symboli(e! are the
same for all! as also are those
things of whi#h our e&"erien#es
are the images.
This matter has! howeer! been
dis#ussed in my treatise about the
soul! for it belongs to an
inestigation distin#t from that
whi#h lies before us.
)s there are in the mind thoughts
whi#h do not inole truth or
falsity! and also those whi#h must
be either true or false! so it is in
s"ee#h.
For truth and falsity im"ly#ombination and se"aration.
*ouns and erbs! "roided nothing
is added! are li%e thoughts without
#ombination or se"aration+ 'man'
and 'white'! as isolated terms! are
not yet either true or false. ,n
"roof of this! #onsider the word
'goat-stag.' ,t has signifi#an#e! but
there is no truth or falsity about
it! unless 'is' or 'is not' is added!
either in the "resent or in some
other tense.
Part 2
By a noun we mean a sound
signifi#ant by #onention! whi#h
has no referen#e to time! and of
whi#h no "art is signifi#ant a"art
from the rest. ,n the noun
'Fairsteed!' the "art 'steed' has no
signifi#an#e in and by itself! as in
the "hrase 'fair steed.' et there is
a differen#e between sim"le and
#om"osite nouns+ for in the former
the "art is in no way signifi#ant! in
the latter it #ontributes to the
meaning of the whole! although it
has not an inde"endent meaning.
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Thus in the word '"irate-boat' the
word 'boat' has no meaning ee"t
as "art of the whole word.
The limitation 'by #onention' was
introdu#ed be#ause nothing is by
nature a noun or name-it is only so
when it be#omes a symbol+
inarti#ulate sounds! su#h as those
whi#h brutes "rodu#e! are
signifi#ant! yet none of these
#onstitutes a noun.
The e&"ression 'not-man' is not a
noun. There is indeed no
re#ogni(ed term by whi#h we may
denote su#h an e&"ression! for it is
not a senten#e or a denial. et it
then be #alled an indefinite noun.
The e&"ressions 'of 1hilo'! 'to
1hilo'! and so on! #onstitute not
nouns! but #ases of a noun. The
definition of these #ases of a noun
is in other res"e#ts the same as
that of the noun "ro"er! but!
when #ou"led with 'is'! 'was'! or
will be'! they do not! as they are!
form a "ro"osition either true or
false! and this the noun "ro"er
always does! under these
#onditions. Ta%e the words 'of
1hilo is' or 'of or 'of 1hilo is not'+
these words do not! as they stand!
form either a true or a false
"ro"osition.
Part 3
) erb is that whi#h! in addition to
its "ro"er meaning! #arries with it
the notion of time. *o "art of it
has any inde"endent meaning! and
it is a sign of something said of
something else.
, will e&"lain what , mean by
saying that it #arries with it the
notion of time. '2ealth' is a noun!
but 'is healthy' is a erb+ for
besides its "ro"er meaning it
indi#ates the "resent e&isten#e of
the state in uestion.
Moreoer! a erb is always a sign
of something said of something
else! i.e. of something either
"redi#able of or "resent in some
other thing.
$u#h e&"ressions as 'is not-
healthy'! 'is not! ill'! , do not
des#ribe as erbs+ for though they
#arry the additional note of time!
and always form a "redi#ate!
there is no s"e#ified name for this
ariety+ but let them be #alled
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indefinite erbs! sin#e they a""ly
eually well to that whi#h e&ists
and to that whi#h does not.
$imilarly 'he was healthy'! 'he will
be healthy'! are not erbs! but
tenses of a erb+ the differen#e
lies in the fa#t that the erb
indi#ates "resent time! while the
tenses of the erb indi#ate those
times whi#h lie outside the
"resent.
erbs in and by themseles are
substantial and hae signifi#an#e!
for he who uses su#h e&"ressions
arrests the hearer's mind! and
fi&es his attention+ but they do
not! as they stand! e&"ress any
6udgement! either "ositie or
negatie. For neither are 'to be'
and 'not to be' the "arti#i"le
'being' signifi#ant of any fa#t!
unless something is added+ for
they do not themseles indi#ate
anything! but im"ly a #o"ulation!
of whi#h we #annot form a
#on#e"tion a"art from the things
#ou"led.
Part 4
) senten#e is a signifi#ant "ortion
of s"ee#h! some "arts of whi#h
hae an inde"endent meaning!
that is to say! as an utteran#e!
though not as the e&"ression of
any "ositie 6udgement. et me
e&"lain. The word 'human' has
meaning! but does not #onstitute a
"ro"osition! either "ositie or
negatie. ,t is only when other
words are added that the whole
will form an affirmation or denial.
But if we se"arate one syllable of
the word 'human' from the other!
it has no meaning+ similarly in the
word 'mouse'! the "art 'ouse' has
no meaning in itself! but is merely
a sound. ,n #om"osite words!
indeed! the "arts #ontribute to the
meaning of the whole+ yet! as has
been "ointed out! they hae not
an inde"endent meaning.
Eery senten#e has meaning! not
as being the natural means by
whi#h a "hysi#al fa#ulty is
reali(ed! but! as we hae said! by
#onention. et eery senten#e is
not a "ro"osition+ only su#h are
"ro"ositions as hae in them
either truth or falsity. Thus a
"rayer is a senten#e! but is neither
true nor false.
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et us therefore dismiss all other
ty"es of senten#e but the
"ro"osition! for this last #on#erns
our "resent inuiry! whereas the
inestigation of the others belongs
rather to the study of rhetori# or
of "oetry.
Part 5
The first #lass of sim"le
"ro"ositions is the sim"le
affirmation! the ne&t! the sim"le
denial+ all others are only one by
#on6un#tion.
Eery "ro"osition must #ontain a
erb or the tense of a erb. The
"hrase whi#h defines the s"e#ies
'man'! if no erb in "resent! "ast!
or future time be added! is not a
"ro"osition. ,t may be as%ed how
the e&"ression 'a footed animal
with two feet' #an be #alled single+
for it is not the #ir#umstan#e that
the words follow in unbro%en
su##ession that effe#ts the unity.
This inuiry! howeer! finds its
"la#e in an inestigation foreign to
that before us.
We #all those "ro"ositions single
whi#h indi#ate a single fa#t! or the
#on6un#tion of the "arts of whi#h
results in unity7 those
"ro"ositions! on the other hand!
are se"arate and many in number!
whi#h indi#ate many fa#ts! or
whose "arts hae no #on6un#tion.
et us! moreoer! #onsent to #all a
noun or a erb an e&"ression only!
and not a "ro"osition! sin#e it is
not "ossible for a man to s"ea% in
this way when he is e&"ressing
something! in su#h a way as to
ma%e a statement! whether his
utteran#e is an answer to a
uestion or an a#t of his own
initiation.
To return7 of "ro"ositions one %ind
is sim"le! i.e. that whi#h asserts
or denies something of something!
the other #om"osite! i.e. that
whi#h is #om"ounded of sim"le
"ro"ositions. ) sim"le "ro"osition
is a statement! with meaning! as
to the "resen#e of something in a
sub6e#t or its absen#e! in the
"resent! "ast! or future! a##ording
to the diisions of time.
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Part 6
)n affirmation is a "ositie
assertion of something about
something! a denial a negatie
assertion.
*ow it is "ossible both to affirm
and to deny the "resen#e of
something whi#h is "resent or of
something whi#h is not! and sin#e
these same affirmations and
denials are "ossible with referen#e
to those times whi#h lie outside
the "resent! it would be "ossible
to #ontradi#t any affirmation or
denial. Thus it is "lain that eery
affirmation has an o""osite denial!
and similarly eery denial an
o""osite affirmation.
We will #all su#h a "air of
"ro"ositions a "air of
#ontradi#tories. Those "ositie and
negatie "ro"ositions are said to
be #ontradi#tory whi#h hae the
same sub6e#t and "redi#ate. The
identity of sub6e#t and of
"redi#ate must not be 'euio#al'.
,ndeed there are definitie
ualifi#ations besides this! whi#h
we ma%e to meet the #asuistries
of so"hists.
Part 7
$ome things are uniersal! others
indiidual. By the term 'uniersal' ,
mean that whi#h is of su#h a
nature as to be "redi#ated of
many sub6e#ts! by 'indiidual' that
whi#h is not thus "redi#ated. Thus
'man' is a uniersal! 'Callias' an
indiidual.
9ur "ro"ositions ne#essarily
sometimes #on#ern a uniersal
sub6e#t! sometimes an indiidual.
,f! then! a man states a "ositie
and a negatie "ro"osition of
uniersal #hara#ter with regard to
a uniersal! these two "ro"ositions
are '#ontrary'. By the e&"ression 'a
"ro"osition of uniersal #hara#ter
with regard to a uniersal'! su#h
"ro"ositions as 'eery man is
white'! 'no man is white' are
meant. When! on the other hand!
the "ositie and negatie
"ro"ositions! though they hae
regard to a uniersal! are yet not
of uniersal #hara#ter! they will
not be #ontrary! albeit the
meaning intended is sometimes
#ontrary. )s instan#es of
"ro"ositions made with regard to a
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uniersal! but not of uniersal
#hara#ter! we may ta%e the
'"ro"ositions 'man is white'! 'man is
not white'. 'Man' is a uniersal! but
the "ro"osition is not made as of
uniersal #hara#ter+ for the word
'eery' does not ma%e the sub6e#t
a uniersal! but rather gies the
"ro"osition a uniersal #hara#ter.
,f! howeer! both "redi#ate and
sub6e#t are distributed! the
"ro"osition thus #onstituted is
#ontrary to truth+ no affirmation
will! under su#h #ir#umstan#es! be
true.
The "ro"osition 'eery man is
eery animal' is an e&am"le of this
ty"e.
)n affirmation is o""osed to a
denial in the sense whi#h , denote
by the term '#ontradi#tory'! when!
while the sub6e#t remains the
same! the affirmation is of
uniersal #hara#ter and the denial
is not. The affirmation 'eery man
is white' is the #ontradi#tory of the
denial 'not eery man is white'! or
again! the "ro"osition 'no man is
white' is the #ontradi#tory of the
"ro"osition 'some men are white'.
But "ro"ositions are o""osed as
#ontraries when both the
affirmation and the denial are
uniersal! as in the senten#es
'eery man is white'! 'no man is
white'! 'eery man is 6ust'! 'no man
is 6ust'.
We see that in a "air of this sort
both "ro"ositions #annot be true!
but the #ontradi#tories of a "air of
#ontraries #an sometimes both be
true with referen#e to the same
sub6e#t+ for instan#e 'not eery
man is white' and some men are
white' are both true. 9f su#h
#orres"onding "ositie and
negatie "ro"ositions as refer to
uniersals and hae a uniersal
#hara#ter+ one must be true and
the other false. This is the #ase
also when the referen#e is to
indiiduals! as in the "ro"ositions
'$o#rates is white'! '$o#rates is not
white'.
When! on the other hand! the
referen#e is to uniersals! but the
"ro"ositions are not uniersal! it is
not always the #ase that one is
true and the other false! for it is
"ossible to state truly that man is
white and that man is not white
and that man is beautiful and that
man is not beautiful+ for if a man
is deformed he is the reerse of
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beautiful! also if he is "rogressing
towards beauty he is not yet
beautiful.
This statement might seem at first
sight to #arry with it a
#ontradi#tion! owing to the fa#t
that the "ro"osition 'man is not
white' a""ears to be euialent to
the "ro"osition 'no man is white'.
This! howeer! is not the #ase! nor
are they ne#essarily at the same
time true or false.
,t is eident also that the denial
#orres"onding to a single
affirmation is itself single+ for the
denial must deny 6ust that whi#h
the affirmation affirms #on#erning
the same sub6e#t! and must
#orres"ond with the affirmation
both in the uniersal or "arti#ular
#hara#ter of the sub6e#t and in the
distributed or undistributed sense
in whi#h it is understood.
For instan#e! the affirmation
'$o#rates is white' has its "ro"er
denial in the "ro"osition '$o#rates
is not white'. ,f anything else be
negatiely "redi#ated of the
sub6e#t or if anything else be the
sub6e#t though the "redi#ate
remain the same! the denial will
not be the denial "ro"er to that
affirmation! but on that is
distin#t.
The denial "ro"er to the
affirmation 'eery man is white' is
'not eery man is white'+ that
"ro"er to the affirmation 'some
men are white' is 'no man is white'!
while that "ro"er to the
affirmation 'man is white' is 'man is
not white'.
We hae shown further that a
single denial is #ontradi#torily
o""osite to a single affirmation
and we hae e&"lained whi#h
these are+ we hae also stated
that #ontrary are distin#t from
#ontradi#tory "ro"ositions and
whi#h the #ontrary are+ also that
with regard to a "air of o""osite
"ro"ositions it is not always the
#ase that one is true and the other
false. We hae "ointed out!
moreoer! what the reason of this
is and under what #ir#umstan#es
the truth of the one inoles the
falsity of the other.
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Part 8
)n affirmation or denial is single!
if it indi#ates some one fa#t about
some one sub6e#t+ it matters not
whether the sub6e#t is uniersal
and whether the statement has a
uniersal #hara#ter! or whether
this is not so. $u#h single
"ro"ositions are7 'eery man is
white'! 'not eery man is white'+'
man is white'! 'man is not white'+
'no man is white'! 'some men are
white'+ "roided the word 'white'
has one meaning.
,f! on the other hand! one word
has two meanings whi#h do not
#ombine to form one! the
affirmation is not single. For
instan#e! if a man should establish
the symbol 'garment' as signifi#ant
both of a horse and of a man! the
"ro"osition 'garment is white'
would not be a single affirmation!
nor its o""osite a single denial.
For it is euialent to the
"ro"osition 'horse and man are
white'! whi#h! again! is euialent
to the two "ro"ositions 'horse is
white'! 'man is white'. ,f! then!
these two "ro"ositions hae more
than a single signifi#an#e! and do
not form a single "ro"osition! it is
"lain that the first "ro"osition
either has more than one
signifi#an#e or else has none+ for a
"arti#ular man is not a horse.
This! then! is another instan#e of
those "ro"ositions of whi#h both
the "ositie and the negatie
forms may be true or false
simultaneously.
Part 9
,n the #ase of that whi#h is or
whi#h has ta%en "la#e!
"ro"ositions! whether "ositie or
negatie! must be true or false.
)gain! in the #ase of a "air of
#ontradi#tories! either when the
sub6e#t is uniersal and the
"ro"ositions are of a uniersal
#hara#ter! or when it is indiidual!
as has been said!' one of the two
must be true and the other false+
whereas when the sub6e#t is
uniersal! but the "ro"ositions are
not of a uniersal #hara#ter! there
is no su#h ne#essity. We hae
dis#ussed this ty"e also in a
"reious #ha"ter.
When the sub6e#t! howeer! is
indiidual! and that whi#h is
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"redi#ated of it relates to the
future! the #ase is altered. For if
all "ro"ositions whether "ositie
or negatie are either true or
false! then any gien "redi#ate
must either belong to the sub6e#t
or not! so that if one man affirms
that an eent of a gien #hara#ter
will ta%e "la#e and another denies
it! it is "lain that the statement of
the one will #orres"ond with
reality and that of the other will
not. For the "redi#ate #annot both
belong and not belong to the
sub6e#t at one and the same time
with regard to the future.
Thus! if it is true to say that a
thing is white! it must ne#essarily
be white+ if the reerse
"ro"osition is true! it will of
ne#essity not be white. )gain! if it
is white! the "ro"osition stating
that it is white was true+ if it is
not white! the "ro"osition to the
o""osite effe#t was true. )nd if it
is not white! the man who states
that it is ma%ing a false
statement+ and if the man who
states that it is white is ma%ing a
false statement! it follows that it
is not white. ,t may therefore be
argued that it is ne#essary that
affirmations or denials must be
either true or false.
*ow if this be so! nothing is or
ta%es "la#e fortuitously! either in
the "resent or in the future! and
there are no real alternaties+
eerything ta%es "la#e of ne#essity
and is fi&ed. For either he that
affirms that it will ta%e "la#e or
he that denies this is in
#orres"onden#e with fa#t!
whereas if things did not ta%e
"la#e of ne#essity! an eent might
6ust as easily not ha""en as
ha""en+ for the meaning of the
word 'fortuitous' with regard to
"resent or future eents is that
reality is so #onstituted that it
may issue in either of two o""osite
dire#tions. )gain! if a thing is
white now! it was true before to
say that it would be white! so that
of anything that has ta%en "la#e it
was always true to say 'it is' or 'it
will be'. But if it was always true
to say that a thing is or will be! it
is not "ossible that it should not
be or not be about to be! and
when a thing #annot not #ome to
be! it is im"ossible that it should
not #ome to be! and when it is
im"ossible that it should not #ome
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to be! it must #ome to be. )ll!
then! that is about to be must of
ne#essity ta%e "la#e. ,t results
from this that nothing is un#ertain
or fortuitous! for if it were
fortuitous it would not be
ne#essary.
)gain! to say that neither the
affirmation nor the denial is true!
maintaining! let us say! that an
eent neither will ta%e "la#e nor
will not ta%e "la#e! is to ta%e u" a
"osition im"ossible to defend.
,n the first "la#e! though fa#ts
should "roe the one "ro"osition
false! the o""osite would still be
untrue. $e#ondly! if it was true to
say that a thing was both white
and large! both these ualities
must ne#essarily belong to it+ and
if they will belong to it the ne&t
day! they must ne#essarily belong
to it the ne&t day. But if an eent
is neither to ta%e "la#e nor not to
ta%e "la#e the ne&t day! the
element of #han#e will be
eliminated. For e&am"le! it would
be ne#essary that a sea-fight
should neither ta%e "la#e nor fail
to ta%e "la#e on the ne&t day.
These aw%ward results and others
of the same %ind follow! if it is an
irrefragable law that of eery "air
of #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions!
whether they hae regard to
uniersals and are stated as
uniersally a""li#able! or whether
they hae regard to indiiduals!
one must be true and the other
false! and that there are no real
alternaties! but that all that is or
ta%es "la#e is the out#ome of
ne#essity. There would be no need
to deliberate or to ta%e trouble!
on the su""osition that if we
should ado"t a #ertain #ourse! a
#ertain result would follow! while!
if we did not! the result would not
follow. For a man may "redi#t
an eent ten thousand years
beforehand! and another may
"redi#t the reerse+ that whi#h
was truly "redi#ted at the moment
in the "ast will of ne#essity ta%e
"la#e in the fullness of time.
Further! it ma%es no differen#e
whether "eo"le hae or hae not
a#tually made the #ontradi#tory
statements. For it is manifest that
the #ir#umstan#es are not
influen#ed by the fa#t of an
affirmation or denial on the "art
of anyone. For eents will not ta%e
"la#e or fail to ta%e "la#e be#ause
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it was stated that they would or
would not ta%e "la#e! nor is this
any more the #ase if the
"redi#tion dates ba#% ten
thousand years or any other s"a#e
of time. Wherefore! if through all
time the nature of things was so
#onstituted that a "redi#tion
about an eent was true! then
through all time it was ne#essary
that that should find fulfilment+
and with regard to all eents!
#ir#umstan#es hae always been
su#h that their o##urren#e is a
matter of ne#essity. For that of
whi#h someone has said truly that
it will be! #annot fail to ta%e
"la#e+ and of that whi#h ta%es
"la#e! it was always true to say
that it would be.
et this iew leads to an
im"ossible #on#lusion+ for we see
that both deliberation and a#tion
are #ausatie with regard to the
future! and that! to s"ea% more
generally! in those things whi#h
are not #ontinuously a#tual there
is "otentiality in either dire#tion.
$u#h things may either be or not
be+ eents also therefore may
either ta%e "la#e or not ta%e
"la#e. There are many obious
instan#es of this. ,t is "ossible that
this #oat may be #ut in half! and
yet it may not be #ut in half! but
wear out first. ,n the same way! it
is "ossible that it should not be
#ut in half+ unless this were so! it
would not be "ossible that it
should wear out first. $o it is
therefore with all other eents
whi#h "ossess this %ind of
"otentiality. ,t is therefore "lain
that it is not of ne#essity that
eerything is or ta%es "la#e+ but in
some instan#es there are real
alternaties! in whi#h #ase the
affirmation is no more true and no
more false than the denial+ while
some e&hibit a "redis"osition and
general tenden#y in one dire#tion
or the other! and yet #an issue in
the o""osite dire#tion by
ee"tion.
*ow that whi#h is must needs be
when it is! and that whi#h is not
must needs not be when it is not.
et it #annot be said without
ualifi#ation that all e&isten#e and
non-e&isten#e is the out#ome of
ne#essity. For there is a differen#e
between saying that that whi#h is!
when it is! must needs be! and
sim"ly saying that all that is must
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needs be! and similarly in the #ase
of that whi#h is not. ,n the #ase!
also! of two #ontradi#tory
"ro"ositions this holds good.
Eerything must either be or not
be! whether in the "resent or in
the future! but it is not always
"ossible to distinguish and state
determinately whi#h of these
alternaties must ne#essarily #ome
about.
et me illustrate. ) sea-fight must
either ta%e "la#e to-morrow or
not! but it is not ne#essary that it
should ta%e "la#e to-morrow!
neither is it ne#essary that it
should not ta%e "la#e! yet it is
ne#essary that it either should or
should not ta%e "la#e to-morrow.
$in#e "ro"ositions #orres"ond with
fa#ts! it is eident that when in
future eents there is a real
alternatie! and a "otentiality in
#ontrary dire#tions! the
#orres"onding affirmation and
denial hae the same #hara#ter.
This is the #ase with regard to that
whi#h is not always e&istent or not
always none&istent. 9ne of the
two "ro"ositions in su#h instan#es
must be true and the other false!
but we #annot say determinately
that this or that is false! but must
leae the alternatie unde#ided.
9ne may indeed be more li%ely to
be true than the other! but it
#annot be either a#tually true or
a#tually false. ,t is therefore "lain
that it is not ne#essary that of an
affirmation and a denial one
should be true and the other false.
For in the #ase of that whi#h e&ists
"otentially! but not a#tually! the
rule whi#h a""lies to that whi#h
e&ists a#tually does not hold good.
The #ase is rather as we hae
indi#ated.
Part 1
)n affirmation is the statement of
a fa#t with regard to a sub6e#t!
and this sub6e#t is either a noun or
that whi#h has no name+ the
sub6e#t and "redi#ate in an
affirmation must ea#h denote a
single thing. , hae already
e&"lained' what is meant by a
noun and by that whi#h has no
name+ for , stated that the
e&"ression 'not-man' was not a
noun! in the "ro"er sense of the
word! but an indefinite noun!
denoting as it does in a #ertain
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sense a single thing. $imilarly the
e&"ression 'does not en6oy health'
is not a erb "ro"er! but an
indefinite erb. Eery affirmation!
then! and eery denial! will
#onsist of a noun and a erb!
either definite or indefinite.
There #an be no affirmation or
denial without a erb+ for the
e&"ressions 'is'! 'will be'! 'was'! 'is
#oming to be'! and the li%e are
erbs a##ording to our definition!
sin#e besides their s"e#ifi#
meaning they #oney the notion of
time. Thus the "rimary affirmation
and denial are 'as follows7 'man is'!
'man is not'. *e&t to these! there
are the "ro"ositions7 'not-man is'!
'not-man is not'. )gain we hae the
"ro"ositions7 'eery man is! 'eery
man is not'! 'all that is not-man is'!
'all that is not-man is not'. The
same #lassifi#ation holds good
with regard to su#h "eriods of
time as lie outside the "resent.
When the erb 'is' is used as a third
element in the senten#e! there
#an be "ositie and negatie
"ro"ositions of two sorts. Thus in
the senten#e 'man is 6ust' the erb
'is' is used as a third element! #all
it erb or noun! whi#h you will.
Four "ro"ositions! therefore!
instead of two #an be formed with
these materials. Two of the four!
as regards their affirmation and
denial! #orres"ond in their logi#al
seuen#e with the "ro"ositions
whi#h deal with a #ondition of
"riation+ the other two do not
#orres"ond with these.
, mean that the erb 'is' is added
either to the term '6ust' or to the
term 'not-6ust'! and two negatie
"ro"ositions are formed in the
same way. Thus we hae the four
"ro"ositions. >eferen#e to the
sub6oined table will ma%e matters
#lear7
A! A""ir#ation B! $enial %an is
&'st %an is not &'st ( ) * ) ( $!
$enial C! A""ir#ation %an is
not not+&'st %an is not+&'st
,ere -is- an. -is not- are a..e.
eit/er to -&'st- or to -not+&'st-!
This then is the "ro"er s#heme for
these "ro"ositions! as has been
said in the )nalyti#s. The same
rule holds good! if the sub6e#t
isdistributed. Thus we hae the
table7
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A-! A""ir#ation B-! $enial
E0ery #an is &'st Not e0ery
#an is &'st ( ) * $-! $enial ) (
C-! A""ir#ation
*ot eery man is not-6ust Eery
man is not-6ust et here it is not
"ossible! in the same way as in the
former #ase! that the "ro"ositions
6oined in the table by a diagonal
line should both be true+ thoughunder #ertain #ir#umstan#es this is
the #ase.
We hae thus set out two "airs of
o""osite "ro"ositions+ there are
moreoer two other "airs! if a
term be #on6oined with 'not-man'!
the latter forming a %ind of
sub6e#t. Thus7
A! B! Not+#an is &'st
Not+#an is not &'st (
) + *
$! ) ( C! Not+#an is not
not+&'st Not+#an is not+&'st
This is an e&haustie enumeration
of all the "airs of o""osite
"ro"ositions that #an "ossibly be
framed. This last grou" should
remain distin#t from those whi#h
"re#eded it! sin#e it em"loys as its
sub6e#t the e&"ression 'not-man'.
When the erb 'is' does not fit the
stru#ture of the senten#e ?for
instan#e! when the erbs 'wal%s'!
'en6oys health' are used@! that
s#heme a""lies! whi#h a""lied
when the word 'is' was added.
Thus we hae the "ro"ositions7
'eery man en6oys health'! 'eery
man does-not-en6oy-health'! 'all
that is not-man en6oys health'! 'all
that is not-man does-not-en6oy-
health'. We must not in these
"ro"ositions use the e&"ression
'not eery man'. The negatie must
be atta#hed to the word 'man'! for
the word 'eery' does not gie to
the sub6e#t a uniersal
signifi#an#e! but im"lies that! as a
sub6e#t! it is distributed.
This is "lain from the following
"airs7 'man en6oys health'! 'man
does not en6oy health'+ 'not-man
en6oys health'! 'not man does not
en6oy health'. These "ro"ositions
differ from the former in being
indefinite and not uniersal in
#hara#ter. Thus the ad6e#ties
'eery' and no additional
signifi#an#e ee"t that the
sub6e#t! whether in a "ositie or
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in a negatie senten#e! is
distributed. The rest of the
senten#e! therefore! will in ea#h
#ase be the same.
$in#e the #ontrary of the
"ro"osition 'eery animal is 6ust' is
'no animal is 6ust'! it is "lain that
these two "ro"ositions will neer
both be true at the same time or
with referen#e to the same
sub6e#t. $ometimes! howeer! the
#ontradi#tories of these #ontraries
will both be true! as in the
instan#e before us7 the
"ro"ositions 'not eery animal is
6ust' and 'some animals are 6ust'
are both true.
Further! the "ro"osition 'no man is
6ust' follows from the "ro"osition
'eery man is not 6ust' and the
"ro"osition 'not eery man is not
6ust'! whi#h is the o""osite of
'eery man is not-6ust'! follows
from the "ro"osition 'some men
are 6ust'+ for if this be true! there
must be some 6ust men.
,t is eident! also! that when the
sub6e#t is indiidual! if a uestion
is as%ed and the negatie answer
is the true one! a #ertain "ositie
"ro"osition is also true. Thus! if
the uestion were as%ed $o#rates
wiseA' and the negatie answer
were the true one! the "ositie
inferen#e 'Then $o#rates is unwise'
is #orre#t. But no su#h inferen#e is
#orre#t in the #ase of uniersals!
but rather a negatie "ro"osition.
For instan#e! if to the uestion ',s
eery man wiseA' the answer is 'no'!
the inferen#e 'Then eery man is
unwise' is false. But under these
#ir#umstan#es the inferen#e '*ot
eery man is wise' is #orre#t. This
last is the #ontradi#tory! the
former the #ontrary. *egatie
e&"ressions! whi#h #onsist of an
indefinite noun or "redi#ate! su#h
as 'not-man' or 'not-6ust'! may
seem to be denials #ontaining
neither noun nor erb in the
"ro"er sense of the words. But
they are not. For a denial must
always be either true or false! and
he that uses the e&"ression 'not
man'! if nothing more be added! is
not nearer but rather further from
ma%ing a true or a false statement
than he who uses the e&"ression
'man'.
The "ro"ositions 'eerything that is
not man is 6ust'! and the
#ontradi#tory of this! are not
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euialent to any of the other
"ro"ositions+ on the other hand!
the "ro"osition 'eerything that is
not man is not 6ust' is euialent
to the "ro"osition 'nothing that is
not man is 6ust'.
The #onersion of the "osition of
sub6e#t and "redi#ate in a
senten#e inoles no differen#e in
its meaning. Thus we say 'man is
white' and 'white is man'. ,f these
were not euialent! there would
be more than one #ontradi#tory to
the same "ro"osition! whereas it
has been demonstrated' that ea#h
"ro"osition has one "ro"er
#ontradi#tory and one only. For of
the "ro"osition 'man is white' the
a""ro"riate #ontradi#tory is 'man
is not white'! and of the
"ro"osition 'white is man'! if its
meaning be different! the
#ontradi#tory will either be 'white
is not not-man' or 'white is not
man'. *ow the former of these is
the #ontradi#tory of the
"ro"osition 'white is not-man'! and
the latter of these is the
#ontradi#tory of the "ro"osition
'man is white'+ thus there will be
two #ontradi#tories to one
"ro"osition.
,t is eident! therefore! that the
inersion of the relatie "osition
of sub6e#t and "redi#ate does not
affe#t the sense of affirmations
and denials.
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SECTION 2
Part 11
There is no unity about an
affirmation or denial whi#h! either
"ositiely or negatiely!
"redi#ates one thing of many
sub6e#ts! or many things of the
same sub6e#t! unless that whi#h is
indi#ated by the many is really
some one thing. do not a""ly this
word 'one' to those things whi#h!
though they hae a single
re#ogni(ed name! yet do not
#ombine to form a unity. Thus!
man may be an animal! and bi"ed!
and domesti#ated! but these three
"redi#ates #ombine to form a
unity. 9n the other hand! the
"redi#ates 'white'! 'man'! and
'wal%ing' do not thus #ombine.
*either! therefore! if these three
form the sub6e#t of an
affirmation! nor if they form its
"redi#ate! is there any unity about
that affirmation. ,n both #ases the
unity is linguisti#! but not real.
,f therefore the diale#ti#al
uestion is a reuest for an
answer! i.e. either for the
admission of a "remiss or for the
admission of one of two
#ontradi#tories-and the "remiss is
itself always one of two
#ontradi#tories-the answer to su#h
a uestion as #ontains the aboe
"redi#ates #annot be a single
"ro"osition. For as , hae
e&"lained in the To"i#s! uestion
is not a single one! een if the
answer as%ed for is true.
)t the same time it is "lain that a
uestion of the form 'what is itA' is
not a diale#ti#al uestion! for a
diale#ti#al uestioner must by the
form of his uestion gie his
o""onent the #han#e of
announ#ing one of two
alternaties! whi#heer he wishes.
2e must therefore "ut the
uestion into a more definite
form! and inuire! e.g. whether
man has su#h and su#h a
#hara#teristi# or not.
$ome #ombinations of "redi#ates
are su#h that the se"arate
"redi#ates unite to form a single
"redi#ate. et us #onsider under
what #onditions this is and is not
"ossible. We may either state in
two se"arate "ro"ositions that
man is an animal and that man is a
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bi"ed! or we may #ombine the
two! and state that man is an
animal with two feet. $imilarly we
may use 'man' and 'white' as
se"arate "redi#ates! or unite them
into one.
et if a man is a shoema%er and is
also good! we #annot #onstru#t a
#om"osite "ro"osition and say that
he is a good shoema%er. For if!
wheneer two se"arate "redi#ates
truly belong to a sub6e#t! it
follows that the "redi#ate
resulting from their #ombination
also truly belongs to the sub6e#t!
many absurd results ensue. For
instan#e! a man is man and white.
Therefore! if "redi#ates may
always be #ombined! he is a white
man. )gain! if the "redi#ate
'white' belongs to him! then the
#ombination of that "redi#ate with
the former #om"osite "redi#ate
will be "ermissible. Thus it will be
right to say that he is a white man
so on indefinitely. 9r! again! we
may #ombine the "redi#ates
'musi#al'! 'white'! and 'wal%ing'!
and these may be #ombined many
times. $imilarly we may say that
$o#rates is $o#rates and a man!
and that therefore he is the man
$o#rates! or that $o#rates is a man
and a bi"ed! and that therefore he
is a two-footed man. Thus it is
manifest that if man states
un#onditionally that "redi#ates
#an always be #ombined! many
absurd #onseuen#es ensue.
We will now e&"lain what ought to
be laid down. Those "redi#ates!
and terms forming the sub6e#t of
"redi#ation! whi#h are a##idental
either to the same sub6e#t or to
one another! do not #ombine to
form a unity. Ta%e the "ro"osition
'man is white of #om"le&ion and
musi#al'. Whiteness and being
musi#al do not #oales#e to form a
unity! for they belong only
a##identally to the same sub6e#t.
*or yet! if it were true to say that
that whi#h is white is musi#al!
would the terms 'musi#al' and
'white' form a unity! for it is only
in#identally that that whi#h is
musi#al is white+ the #ombination
of the two will! therefore! not
form a unity.
Thus! again! whereas! if a man is
both good and a shoema%er! we
#annot #ombine the two
"ro"ositions and say sim"ly that
he is a good shoema%er! we are! at
the same time! able to #ombine
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the "redi#ates 'animal' and 'bi"ed'
and say that a man is an animal
with two feet! for these
"redi#ates are not a##idental.
Those "redi#ates! again! #annot
form a unity! of whi#h the one is
im"li#it in the other7 thus we
#annot #ombine the "redi#ate
'white' again and again with that
whi#h already #ontains the notion
'white'! nor is it right to #all a man
an animal-man or a two-footed
man+ for the notions 'animal' and
'bi"ed' are im"li#it in the word
'man'. 9n the other hand! it is
"ossible to "redi#ate a term
sim"ly of any one instan#e! and to
say that some one "arti#ular man
is a man or that some one white
man is a white man.
et this is not always "ossible7
indeed! when in the ad6un#t there
is some o""osite whi#h inoles a
#ontradi#tion! the "redi#ation of
the sim"le term is im"ossible.
Thus it is not right to #all a dead
man a man. When! howeer! this
is not the #ase! it is not
im"ossible.
et the fa#ts of the #ase might
rather be stated thus7 when some
su#h o""osite elements are
"resent! resolution is neer
"ossible! but when they are not
"resent! resolution is neertheless
not always "ossible.
Ta%e the "ro"osition '2omer is so-
and-so'! say 'a "oet'+ does it follow
that 2omer is! or does it notA The
erb 'is' is here used of 2omer only
in#identally! the "ro"osition being
that 2omer is a "oet! not that he
is! in the inde"endent sense of the
word.
Thus! in the #ase of those
"redi#ations whi#h hae within
them no #ontradi#tion when the
nouns are e&"anded into
definitions! and wherein the
"redi#ates belong to the sub6e#t in
their own "ro"er sense and not in
any indire#t way! the indiidual
may be the sub6e#t of the sim"le
"ro"ositions as well as of the
#om"osite. But in the #ase of that
whi#h is not! it is not true to say
that be#ause it is the ob6e#t of
o"inion! it is+ for the o"inion held
about it is that it is not! not that it
is.
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Part 12
)s these distin#tions hae been
made! we must #onsider the
mutual relation of those
affirmations and denials whi#h
assert or deny "ossibility or
#ontingen#y! im"ossibility or
ne#essity7 for the sub6e#t is not
without diffi#ulty.
We admit that of #om"osite
e&"ressions those are
#ontradi#tory ea#h to ea#h whi#h
hae the erb 'to be' its "ositie
and negatie form res"e#tiely.
Thus the #ontradi#tory of the
"ro"osition 'man is' is 'man is not'!
not 'not-man is'! and the
#ontradi#tory of 'man is white' is
'man is not white'! not 'man is not-
white'. For otherwise! sin#e either
the "ositie or the negatie
"ro"osition is true of any sub6e#t!
it will turn out true to say that a
"ie#e of wood is a man that is not
white.
*ow if this is the #ase! in those
"ro"ositions whi#h do not #ontain
the erb 'to be' the erb whi#h
ta%es its "la#e will e&er#ise the
same fun#tion. Thus the
#ontradi#tory of 'man wal%s' is
'man does not wal%'! not 'not-man
wal%s'+ for to say 'man wal%s'
merely euialent to saying 'man is
wal%ing'.
,f then this rule is uniersal! the
#ontradi#tory of 'it may be' is may
not be'! not 'it #annot be'.
*ow it a""ears that the same
thing both may and may not be+
for instan#e! eerything that may
be #ut or may wal% may also
es#a"e #utting and refrain from
wal%ing+ and the reason is that
those things that hae "otentiality
in this sense are not always
a#tual. ,n su#h #ases! both the
"ositie and the negatie
"ro"ositions will be true+ for that
whi#h is #a"able of wal%ing or of
being seen has also a "otentiality
in the o""osite dire#tion.
But sin#e it is im"ossible that
#ontradi#tory "ro"ositions should
both be true of the same sub6e#t!
it follows that' it may not be' is not
the #ontradi#tory of 'it may be'.
For it is a logi#al #onseuen#e of
what we hae said! either that the
same "redi#ate #an be both
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a""li#able and ina""li#able to one
and the same sub6e#t at the same
time! or that it is not by the
addition of the erbs 'be' and 'not
be'! res"e#tiely! that "ositie and
negatie "ro"ositions are formed.
,f the former of these alternaties
must be re6e#ted! we must #hoose
the latter.
The #ontradi#tory! then! of 'it may
be' is 'it #annot be'. The same rule
a""lies to the "ro"osition 'it is
#ontingent that it should be'+ the
#ontradi#tory of this is 'it is not
#ontingent that it should be'. The
similar "ro"ositions! su#h as 'it is
ne#essary' and 'it is im"ossible'!
may be dealt with in the same
manner. For it #omes about that
6ust as in the former instan#es the
erbs 'is' and 'is not' were added to
the sub6e#t-matter of the
senten#e 'white' and 'man'! so here
'that it should be' and 'that it
should not be' are the sub6e#t-
matter and 'is "ossible'! 'is
#ontingent'! are added. These
indi#ate that a #ertain thing is or
is not "ossible! 6ust as in the
former instan#es 'is' and 'is not'
indi#ated that #ertain things were
or were not the #ase.
The #ontradi#tory! then! of 'it may
not be' is not 'it #annot be'! but 'it
#annot not be'! and the
#ontradi#tory of 'it may be' is not
'it may not be'! but #annot be'.
Thus the "ro"ositions 'it may be'
and 'it may not be' a""ear ea#h to
im"ly the other7 for! sin#e these
two "ro"ositions are not
#ontradi#tory! the same thing both
may and may not be. But the
"ro"ositions 'it may be' and 'it
#annot be' #an neer be true of
the same sub6e#t at the same
time! for they are #ontradi#tory.
*or #an the "ro"ositions 'it may
not be' and 'it #annot not be' be at
on#e true of the same sub6e#t.
The "ro"ositions whi#h hae to do
with ne#essity are goerned by the
same "rin#i"le. The #ontradi#tory
of 'it is ne#essary that it should
be'! is not 'it is ne#essary that it
should not be!' but 'it is not
ne#essary that it should be'! and
the #ontradi#tory of 'it is
ne#essary that it should not be' is
'it is not ne#essary that it should
not be'.
)gain! the #ontradi#tory of 'it is
im"ossible that it should be' is not
'it is im"ossible that it should not
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be' but 'it is not im"ossible that it
should be'! and the #ontradi#tory
of 'it is im"ossible that it should
not be' is 'it is not im"ossible that
it should not be'.
To generali(e! we must! as has
been stated! define the #lauses
'that it should be' and 'that it
should not be' as the sub6e#t-
matter of the "ro"ositions! and in
ma%ing these terms into
affirmations and denials we must
#ombine them with 'that it should
be' and 'that it should not be'
res"e#tiely.
We must #onsider the following
"airs as #ontradi#tory
"ro"ositions7
,t may be. ,t #annot be.
,t is #ontingent. ,t is not
#ontingent.
,t is im"ossible. ,t is not
im"ossible.
,t is ne#essary. ,t is not
ne#essary.
,t is true. ,t is not true.
Part 13
ogi#al seuen#es follow in due
#ourse when we hae arranged the
"ro"ositions thus. From the
"ro"osition 'it may be' it follows
that it is #ontingent! and the
relation is re#i"ro#al. ,t follows
also that it is not im"ossible and
not ne#essary.
From the "ro"osition 'it may not
be' or 'it is #ontingent that it
should not be' it follows that it is
not ne#essary that it should not be
and that it is not im"ossible that it
should not be. From the
"ro"osition 'it #annot be' or 'it is
not #ontingent' it follows that it is
ne#essary that it should not be
and that it is im"ossible that it
should be. From the "ro"osition 'it
#annot not be' or 'it is not
#ontingent that it should not be' it
follows that it is ne#essary that it
should be and that it is im"ossible
that it should not be.
et us #onsider these statements
by the hel" of a table7
A! B!
,t may be. ,t #annot be.
,t is #ontingent. ,t is not
#ontingent.
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,t is not im"ossible ,t is
im"ossible that it
that it should be. should be.
,t is not ne#essary ,t is
ne#essary that it
that it should be. should not
be.
C! $!
,t may not be. ,t #annot not
be.
,t is #ontingent that it ,t is not
#ontingent that
should not be. it should not
be.
,t is not im"ossible ,t is
im"ossible thatit
that it should not be. should not
be.
,t is not ne#essary that ,t is
ne#essary that it
it should not be. should be.
*ow the "ro"ositions 'it is
im"ossible that it should be' and 'it
is not im"ossible that it should be'
are #onseuent u"on the
"ro"ositions 'it may be'! 'it is
#ontingent'! and 'it #annot be'! 'it
is not #ontingent'! the
#ontradi#tories u"on the
#ontradi#tories. But there is
inersion.
The negatie of the "ro"osition 'it
is im"ossible' is #onseuent u"on
the "ro"osition 'it may be' and the
#orres"onding "ositie in the first
#ase u"on the negatie in the
se#ond. For 'it is im"ossible' is a
"ositie "ro"osition and 'it is not
im"ossible' is negatie.
We must inestigate the relation
subsisting between these
"ro"ositions and those whi#h
"redi#ate ne#essity. That there is
a distin#tion is #lear. ,n this #ase!
#ontrary "ro"ositions follow
res"e#tiely from #ontradi#tory
"ro"ositions! and the
#ontradi#tory "ro"ositions belong
to se"arate seuen#es. For the
"ro"osition 'it is not ne#essary that
it should be' is not the negatie of
'it is ne#essary that it should not
be'! for both these "ro"ositions
may be true of the same sub6e#t+
for when it is ne#essary that a
thing should not be! it is not
ne#essary that it should be. The
reason why the "ro"ositions
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"redi#ating ne#essity do not follow
in the same %ind of seuen#e as
the rest! lies in the fa#t that the
"ro"osition 'it is im"ossible' is
euialent! when used with a
#ontrary sub6e#t! to the
"ro"osition 'it is ne#essary'. For
when it is im"ossible that a thing
should be! it is ne#essary! not that
it should be! but that it should not
be! and when it is im"ossible that
a thing should not be! it is
ne#essary that it should be. Thus!
if the "ro"ositions "redi#ating
im"ossibility or non-im"ossibility
follow without #hange of sub6e#t
from those "redi#ating "ossibility
or non-"ossibility! those
"redi#ating ne#essity must follow
with the #ontrary sub6e#t+ for the
"ro"ositions 'it is im"ossible' and 'it
is ne#essary' are not euialent!
but! as has been said! inersely
#onne#ted.
et "erha"s it is im"ossible that
the #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions
"redi#ating ne#essity should be
thus arranged. For when it is
ne#essary that a thing should be!
it is "ossible that it should be. ?For
if not! the o""osite follows! sin#e
one or the other must follow+ so!
if it is not "ossible! it is
im"ossible! and it is thus
im"ossible that a thing should be!
whi#h must ne#essarily be+ whi#h
is absurd.@
et from the "ro"osition 'it may
be' it follows that it is not
im"ossible! and from that it
follows that it is not ne#essary+ it
#omes about therefore that the
thing whi#h must ne#essarily be
need not be+ whi#h is absurd. But
again! the "ro"osition 'it is
ne#essary that it should be' does
not follow from the "ro"osition 'it
may be'! nor does the "ro"osition
'it is ne#essary that it should not
be'. For the "ro"osition 'it may be'
im"lies a twofold "ossibility!
while! if either of the two former
"ro"ositions is true! the twofold
"ossibility anishes.
For if a thing may be! it may also
not be! but if it is ne#essary that it
should be or that it should not be!
one of the two alternaties will be
eluded. ,t remains+ therefore!
that the "ro"osition 'it is not
ne#essary that it should not be'
follows from the "ro"osition 'it
may be'. For this is true also of
that whi#h must ne#essarily be.
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Moreoer the "ro"osition 'it is not
ne#essary that it should not be' is
the #ontradi#tory of that whi#h
follows from the "ro"osition 'it
#annot be'+ for 'it #annot be' is
followed by 'it is im"ossible that it
should be' and by 'it is ne#essary
that it should not be'! and the
#ontradi#tory of this is the
"ro"osition 'it is not ne#essary that
it should not be'. Thus in this #ase
also #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions
follow #ontradi#tory in the way
indi#ated! and no logi#al
im"ossibilities o##ur when they
are thus arranged.
,t may be uestioned whether the
"ro"osition 'it may be' follows from
the "ro"osition 'it is ne#essary that
it should be'. ,f not! the
#ontradi#tory must follow! namely
that it #annot be! or! if a man
should maintain that this is not the
#ontradi#tory! then the
"ro"osition 'it may not be'.
*ow both of these are false of that
whi#h ne#essarily is. )t the same
time! it is thought that if a thing
may be #ut it may also not be #ut!
if a thing may be it may also not
be! and thus it would follow that a
thing whi#h must ne#essarily be
may "ossibly not be+ whi#h is
false. ,t is eident! then! that it is
not always the #ase that that
whi#h may be or may wal%
"ossesses also a "otentiality in the
other dire#tion. There are
ee"tions. ,n the first "la#e we
must ee"t those things whi#h
"ossess a "otentiality not in
a##ordan#e with a rational
"rin#i"le! as fire "ossesses the
"otentiality of giing out heat!
that is! an irrational #a"a#ity.
Those "otentialities whi#h inole
a rational "rin#i"le are
"otentialities of more than one
result! that is! of #ontrary results+
those that are irrational are not
always thus #onstituted. )s , hae
said! fire #annot both heat and not
heat! neither has anything that is
always a#tual any twofold
"otentiality.
et some een of those
"otentialities whi#h are irrational
admit of o""osite results.
2oweer! thus mu#h has been said
to em"hasi(e the truth that it is
not eery "otentiality whi#h
admits of o""osite results! een
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where the word is used always in
the same sense.
But in some #ases the word is used
euio#ally. For the term '"ossible'
is ambiguous! being used in the
one #ase with referen#e to fa#ts!
to that whi#h is a#tuali(ed! as
when a man is said to find wal%ing
"ossible be#ause he is a#tually
wal%ing! and generally when a
#a"a#ity is "redi#ated be#ause it
is a#tually reali(ed+ in the other
#ase! with referen#e to a state in
whi#h reali(ation is #onditionally
"ra#ti#able! as when a man is said
to find wal%ing "ossible be#ause
under #ertain #onditions he would
wal%. This last sort of "otentiality
belongs only to that whi#h #an be
in motion! the former #an e&ist
also in the #ase of that whi#h has
not this "ower. Both of that whi#h
is wal%ing and is a#tual! and of
that whi#h has the #a"a#ity though
not ne#essarily reali(ed! it is true
to say that it is not im"ossible that
it should wal% ?or! in the other
#ase! that it should be@! but while
we #annot "redi#ate this latter
%ind of "otentiality of that whi#h
is ne#essary in the unualified
sense of the word! we #an
"redi#ate the former.
9ur #on#lusion! then! is this7 that
sin#e the uniersal is #onseuent
u"on the "arti#ular! that whi#h is
ne#essary is also "ossible! though
not in eery sense in whi#h the
word may be used.
We may "erha"s state that
ne#essity and its absen#e are the
initial "rin#i"les of e&isten#e and
non-e&isten#e! and that all else
must be regarded as "osterior to
these.
,t is "lain from what has been said
that that whi#h is of ne#essity is
a#tual. Thus! if that whi#h is
eternal is "rior! a#tuality also is
"rior to "otentiality. $ome things
are a#tualities without
"otentiality! namely! the "rimary
substan#es+ a se#ond #lass #onsists
of those things whi#h are a#tual
but also "otential! whose a#tuality
is in nature "rior to their
"otentiality! though "osterior in
time+ a third #lass #om"rises those
things whi#h are neer a#tuali(ed!
but are "ure "otentialities.
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Part 14
The uestion arises whether an
affirmation finds its #ontrary in a
denial or in another affirmation+
whether the "ro"osition 'eery
man is 6ust' finds its #ontrary in
the "ro"osition 'no man is 6ust'! or
in the "ro"osition 'eery man is
un6ust'. Ta%e the "ro"ositions
'Callias is 6ust'! 'Callias is not 6ust'!
'Callias is un6ust'+ we hae to
dis#oer whi#h of these form
#ontraries.
*ow if the s"o%en word
#orres"onds with the 6udgement of
the mind! and if! in thought! that
6udgement is the #ontrary of
another! whi#h "ronoun#es a
#ontrary fa#t! in the way! for
instan#e! in whi#h the 6udgement
'eery man is 6ust' "ronoun#es a
#ontrary to that "ronoun#ed by
the 6udgement 'eery man is
un6ust'! the same must needs hold
good with regard to s"o%en
affirmations.
But if! in thought! it is not the
6udgement whi#h "ronoun#es a
#ontrary fa#t that is the #ontrary
of another! then one affirmation
will not find its #ontrary in
another! but rather in the
#orres"onding denial. We must
therefore #onsider whi#h true
6udgement is the #ontrary of the
false! that whi#h forms the denial
of the false 6udgement or that
whi#h affirms the #ontrary fa#t.
et me illustrate. There is a true
6udgement #on#erning that whi#h
is good! that it is good+ another! a
false 6udgement! that it is not
good+ and a third! whi#h is
distin#t! that it is bad. Whi#h of
these two is #ontrary to the trueA
)nd if they are one and the same!
whi#h mode of e&"ression forms
the #ontraryA
,t is an error to su""ose that
6udgements are to be defined as
#ontrary in irtue of the fa#t that
they hae #ontrary sub6e#ts+ for
the 6udgement #on#erning a good
thing! that it is good! and that
#on#erning a bad thing! that it is
bad! may be one and the same!
and whether they are so or not!
they both re"resent the truth. et
the sub6e#ts here are #ontrary.
But 6udgements are not #ontrary
be#ause they hae #ontrary
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sub6e#ts! but be#ause they are to
the #ontrary effe#t.
*ow if we ta%e the 6udgement
that that whi#h is good is good!
and another that it is not good!
and if there are at the same time
other attributes! whi#h do not and
#annot belong to the good! we
must neertheless refuse to treat
as the #ontraries of the true
6udgement those whi#h o"ine that
some other attribute subsists
whi#h does not subsist! as also
those that o"ine that some other
attribute does not subsist whi#h
does subsist! for both these #lasses
of 6udgement are of unlimited
#ontent.
Those 6udgements must rather be
termed #ontrary to the true
6udgements! in whi#h error is
"resent. *ow these 6udgements
are those whi#h are #on#erned
with the starting "oints of
generation! and generation is the
"assing from one e&treme to its
o""osite+ therefore error is a li%e
transition.
*ow that whi#h is good is both
good and not bad. The first uality
is "art of its essen#e! the se#ond
a##idental+ for it is by a##ident
that it is not bad. But if that true
6udgement is most really true!
whi#h #on#erns the sub6e#t's
intrinsi# nature! then that false
6udgement li%ewise is most really
false! whi#h #on#erns its intrinsi#
nature. *ow the 6udgement that
that is good is not good is a false
6udgement #on#erning its intrinsi#
nature! the 6udgement that it is
bad is one #on#erning that whi#h
is a##idental. Thus the 6udgement
whi#h denies the true 6udgement
is more really false than that
whi#h "ositiely asserts the
"resen#e of the #ontrary uality.
But it is the man who forms that
6udgement whi#h is #ontrary to
the true who is most thoroughly
de#eied! for #ontraries are
among the things whi#h differ
most widely within the same #lass.
,f then of the two 6udgements one
is #ontrary to the true 6udgement!
but that whi#h is #ontradi#tory is
the more truly #ontrary! then the
latter! it seems! is the real
#ontrary. The 6udgement that that
whi#h is good is bad is #om"osite.
For "resumably the man who
forms that 6udgement must at the
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same time understand that that
whi#h is good is not good.
Further! the #ontradi#tory is
either always the #ontrary or
neer+ therefore! if it must
ne#essarily be so in all other
#ases! our #on#lusion in the #ase
6ust dealt with would seem to be
#orre#t. *ow where terms hae no
#ontrary! that 6udgement is false!
whi#h forms the negatie of the
true+ for instan#e! he who thin%s a
man is not a man forms a false
6udgement. ,f then in these #ases
the negatie is the #ontrary! then
the "rin#i"le is uniersal in its
a""li#ation.
)gain! the 6udgement that that
whi#h is not good is not good is
"arallel with the 6udgement that
that whi#h is good is good. Besides
these there is the 6udgement that
that whi#h is good is not good!
"arallel with the 6udgement that
that that is not good is good. et
us #onsider! therefore! what would
form the #ontrary of the true
6udgement that that whi#h is not
good is not good. The 6udgement
that it is bad would! of #ourse! fail
to meet the #ase! sin#e two true
6udgements are neer #ontrary
and this 6udgement might be true
at the same time as that with
whi#h it is #onne#ted. For sin#e
some things whi#h are not good
are bad! both 6udgements may be
true. *or is the 6udgement that it
is not bad the #ontrary! for this
too might be true! sin#e both
ualities might be "redi#ated of
the same sub6e#t. ,t remains!
therefore! that of the 6udgement
#on#erning that whi#h is not good!
that it is not good! the #ontrary
6udgement is that it is good+ for
this is false. ,n the same way!
moreoer! the 6udgement
#on#erning that whi#h is good!
that it is not good! is the #ontrary
of the 6udgement that it is good.
,t is eident that it will ma%e no
differen#e if we uniersali(e the
"ositie 6udgement! for the
uniersal negatie 6udgement will
form the #ontrary. For instan#e!
the #ontrary of the 6udgement
that eerything that is good is
good is that nothing that is good is
good. For the 6udgement that that
whi#h is good is good! if the
sub6e#t be understood in a
uniersal sense! is euialent to
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the 6udgement that whateer is
good is good! and this is identi#al
with the 6udgement that
eerything that is good is good.
We may deal similarly with
6udgements #on#erning that whi#h
is not good.
,f therefore this is the rule with
6udgements! and if s"o%en
affirmations and denials are
6udgements e&"ressed in words! it
is "lain that the uniersal denial is
the #ontrary of the affirmation
about the same sub6e#t. Thus the
"ro"ositions 'eerything good is
good'! 'eery man is good'! hae for
their #ontraries the "ro"ositions
'nothing good is good'! 'no man is
good'. The #ontradi#tory
"ro"ositions! on the other hand!
are 'not eerything good is good'!
'not eery man is good'.
,t is eident! also! that neither
true 6udgements nor true
"ro"ositions #an be #ontrary the
one to the other. For whereas!
when two "ro"ositions are true! a
man may state both at the same
time without in#onsisten#y!
#ontrary "ro"ositions are those
whi#h state #ontrary #onditions!
and #ontrary #onditions #annot
subsist at one and the same time
in the same sub6e#t.
T,E EN$
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3/