Aristotle on the Human Good by Richard KrautReview by: Pamela M. HubyThe Classical Review, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1991), pp. 103-104Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/712605 .Accessed: 24/10/2012 09:48

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THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 103

exclude Plotinus, who wrote a major treatise On Numbers, on the grounds that his thought is too weighty for an investigation of this kind (p. 538).

In her discussion of Iamblichus she attempts to reconcile the different orders given in different works for the kinds and components of mathematics, showing that he anticipates Proclus. She also deals with the notion of mathematics as a mesotes between sensible and intelligible, in the strict sense, linked with dianoia, a theme which may be found not only in Proclus but also in the later Aristotelian commentators, who saw soul strictu sensu from the same point of view. Iamblichus' link with earlier philosophy may be seen in his concept of each group of mathematical entities having its own arkhai, a matter which had already brought Aristotle's well-known criticism of Speusippus for making Being episodic like bad tragedy (Metaph. N 1090b19-20). An important difference is that Iamblichus' numbers are no longer primary but only secondary Being.

This review has concentrated on certain late Platonist topics, but the book amounts to a history of a crucial part of Platonism, taking in shadowy figures like Moderatus as well as Speusippus, Xenocrates, Albinus/Alcinous, Plutarch, Nicomachus and the later Platonists. Since the commonest modern reaction to Aristotle's complaint about the Platonists' use of numbers and other mathematical concepts is to ignore them, V.'s book is a salutary reminder of that fundamental importance of mathematics in Platonism which is all too often forgotten.

University of Liverpool H. J. B LU M ENTHA L

ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD

RICHARD KRAUT' Aristotle on the Human Good. Pp. xi+379. Princeton University Press, 1989. $37.50.

There are at least three possible ways of writing about Aristotle, to concentrate on problems of text and chronology, to interpret him in the light of modern philosophical developments, and to approach him on his own terms. This book is a particularly pure example of the last approach. If Aristotle had known English, there is hardly a sentence here that he would not have understood at first sight. Whether he would have agreed with it is another matter. Kraut's thesis is that the Nicomachean Ethics is a unity. Good methodology, he says, requires us to start with the assumption that it is internally consistent. He applies this principle chiefly to the relationship between the treatments of happiness in Book I and Book X, but makes considerable use of the treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX, and he also, commendably, brings in sections of the Politics often neglected in studies of the Ethics.

But one may ask whether his initial methodological assumption is justified in this particular case. Not only do we know that Aristotle's esoteric works are not unities in the sense that they were composed as unities, but in the case of the Ethics there are the grave problems of having two treatments of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, and of the complicated relationship and development between the two Ethics, none of which is even mentioned. It remains a respectable enterprise to defend the thesis that the matter begun in Book I is completed harmoniously in Book X, but it involves K. in attributing to Aristotle views that the latter fails to express, and he is driven himself at one point (p. 250) to cry 'Surely Aristotle might have spelled out his meaning more fully.' This is in connection with what seems to be a passing distinction

THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 103

exclude Plotinus, who wrote a major treatise On Numbers, on the grounds that his thought is too weighty for an investigation of this kind (p. 538).

In her discussion of Iamblichus she attempts to reconcile the different orders given in different works for the kinds and components of mathematics, showing that he anticipates Proclus. She also deals with the notion of mathematics as a mesotes between sensible and intelligible, in the strict sense, linked with dianoia, a theme which may be found not only in Proclus but also in the later Aristotelian commentators, who saw soul strictu sensu from the same point of view. Iamblichus' link with earlier philosophy may be seen in his concept of each group of mathematical entities having its own arkhai, a matter which had already brought Aristotle's well-known criticism of Speusippus for making Being episodic like bad tragedy (Metaph. N 1090b19-20). An important difference is that Iamblichus' numbers are no longer primary but only secondary Being.

This review has concentrated on certain late Platonist topics, but the book amounts to a history of a crucial part of Platonism, taking in shadowy figures like Moderatus as well as Speusippus, Xenocrates, Albinus/Alcinous, Plutarch, Nicomachus and the later Platonists. Since the commonest modern reaction to Aristotle's complaint about the Platonists' use of numbers and other mathematical concepts is to ignore them, V.'s book is a salutary reminder of that fundamental importance of mathematics in Platonism which is all too often forgotten.

University of Liverpool H. J. B LU M ENTHA L

ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD

RICHARD KRAUT' Aristotle on the Human Good. Pp. xi+379. Princeton University Press, 1989. $37.50.

There are at least three possible ways of writing about Aristotle, to concentrate on problems of text and chronology, to interpret him in the light of modern philosophical developments, and to approach him on his own terms. This book is a particularly pure example of the last approach. If Aristotle had known English, there is hardly a sentence here that he would not have understood at first sight. Whether he would have agreed with it is another matter. Kraut's thesis is that the Nicomachean Ethics is a unity. Good methodology, he says, requires us to start with the assumption that it is internally consistent. He applies this principle chiefly to the relationship between the treatments of happiness in Book I and Book X, but makes considerable use of the treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX, and he also, commendably, brings in sections of the Politics often neglected in studies of the Ethics.

But one may ask whether his initial methodological assumption is justified in this particular case. Not only do we know that Aristotle's esoteric works are not unities in the sense that they were composed as unities, but in the case of the Ethics there are the grave problems of having two treatments of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, and of the complicated relationship and development between the two Ethics, none of which is even mentioned. It remains a respectable enterprise to defend the thesis that the matter begun in Book I is completed harmoniously in Book X, but it involves K. in attributing to Aristotle views that the latter fails to express, and he is driven himself at one point (p. 250) to cry 'Surely Aristotle might have spelled out his meaning more fully.' This is in connection with what seems to be a passing distinction

104 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW

between perfect and most perfect happiness, but which K. develops into the important view that Aristotle held that there were two kinds of happiness, perfect, that of a life of contemplation, and secondary, a life lived virtuously, but without (much) contemplation, preferably as a politician. The two kinds of life could not be combined.

There follows a host of developments which also are not precisely there in Aristotle. Some readers will find his conclusions unconvincing: how many can accept this: 'Priam, having lost his family and city, could not regularly engage in ethically virtuous action during the final period of his life; political activity was of course out of the question. And the diminished level of activity caused by this loss of external goods and suffering constituted his lack of happiness'? 0 Homer! O Vergil! But he does draw one's attention to many things Aristotle says which are queer and perhaps glossed over by one who reads him with set ideas. At first sight K.'s 'So, if one polis has a much larger citizen population than another, and both require equal sharing of offices, a citizen of the less populous city is better off, since he can rule for longer periods of time' seems artificial, but in Pol. 7.3 Aristotle does consider a rather similar case. We might suppose, however, that Aristotle is not primarily concerned with plausibility and consistency, but with exploring the field and perhaps responding to questions raised by his auditors. K. ignores, for example, the fact that frequently Aristotle says 'it is believed that' and the like in such a way that it is not clear that he is endorsing such views. Again, is it true that Aristotle is simplifying in Books VIII and IX because of his desire to postpone to Book X the question whether it is better to lead a practical or a theoretical life? And the account of Book VI is ingenious, but is it valid?

He spends much time responding to the views of Ackrill, Cooper, Irwin and Nussbaum, and has an adequate coverage of other relevant works, though Austin's name is absent. There is a hint of Utilitarianism in the kind of questions he asks, like the amount of time one should spend on various activities, and he distinguishes three kinds of egoism before concluding that Aristotle was not an egoist of any kind. One misses what might be called a Rylean approach. Ryle believed that Aristotle was right philosophically, and that the complications of his arguments reflect the complications of thought involved in abstract notions. Aristotle had an excellent philosophical 'nose', but lacked some important techniques. There is none of that here, and K. focuses on the simple question whether Aristotle has an inclusive view of happiness or not. He treats pleasure as just another good, whereas Aristotle went to much trouble to show that it is a good of a peculiar kind, with a special place in an account of happiness. Old confusions survive today: in a recent panel game, contestants had to choose between Wealth, Fame, and Happiness. None replied that these were not strict alternatives. Aristotle knew people like that, and they appear at the beginning of his quest. He was searching both for an account of happiness in the form of a definition, and for that which will ensure happiness for an individual, and these are not the same. In spite of these criticisms, the book can be recommended as a thoughtful one from which everyone will learn a great deal, being forced to return to the text again and again, and frequently seeing it in a new light.

University of Liverpool PAMELA M. HUBY