AREPORT OF AWORKSHOP HELD IN HARGEISA, SOMALILAND10th -14th December 1995

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

WORKSHOP PREPARATION FACllXfATORRhoda M Ibrahim ICD

All of the people listed above are members of the WorkshopPreparation Committee.

LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIONFaizaAbdullahi SOWDAShukri Hariir WADAMohamed Elmi Adan HAVOYOCOHassanJama Yassin HAVOYOCO

1IIIl

Awdal Rehabilitation and DevelopmentAssociationBoroma Appropriate TechnologyCommunity Based OrganisationGolis Voluntary OrganisationGerman Technical AssistanceHargeisa Voluntary Youth OrganisationIn ternational Cooperation for DevelopmentInternational NGOLocalNGOMinistry of Foreign Affairs and Nation~l

PlanningMinistry of HealthNational Demobilisation CommissionOverseas Development AdministrationOdweine Progress AssociationParticipatory Rural AppraisalRed Sea Institute for DevelopmentAdministration and ManagementSanaag Agricultural DevelopmentOrganisationSa'adadiin Rural and Urban RehabilitationAssociationSomali Reliefand Rehabilitation AssociationSomali Relief and RehabilitationOrganisationSomali Services Voluntary OrganisationSomali Women Development AssociationShiil Rehabilitation and DevelopmentAssociationWomen's Advancementand DevelopmentAssociationWomen's Veteran and VoluntaryOrganisation

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARDA

BATCBOGVOGTZHAVOYOCOICDINGOLNGOMOFAt,\,P

MOHNDCODAOPAPRARISDAM

WVVO

SARURA

WADA

SAD0

SORRASORRO

SOSVOSOWDASRDA

Note': This report may be reproduced freely without theconsent of the publishers.

Ministry of Foreign Affairsand National PlanningMinistry ofInformationARDA

(SARUURA)(RISDAM)(SORRO)(SOL-Life)(SRDA)Resource person(VETAID)(GVO)(ICD)

SORRASADOACTIONAIDGTZ

ICD consultantICD

FACIllTATORSDr Adan YusufAbokorHassan Mohamed AliOmer Edleh SuleimanZeinab Mohamed

Suleiman Dahir AfgarsheMohamed Sheik Abdillahi

SPEAKERSMohamed A Dhimbil

INVITED PARTICIPANTSAbdi Musse (Save the Children Fundi

Ministry ofAgriculture)Abdi Osrpan (Daraweine)Abdirahman YusufArtan (Yagleel)Abdirahman AbdillahiJumaale (SOSVO)Abdirahman Abdullahi (Ministry of Health and

Social Services)(Burdhaab)(SAREMO)(Ministry of thePresidency)(CARE)(OPA)(Ministry of ForeignAffairs & National Planning)(SORRA)(SOOYAAL)(SORRA)(WWO)(NDC)(ODA)(SARURA)(BAT)(Ministry of Information)(MOH)

Adan Tarabi OogleAbdullahi Mohamed HersiAli Ismail

Ali YusufAhmed Abdi IbrahimAhmed Farah Askar

RAPPORTEURSMark BradburyJudith Gardner

Ahmed Hussein AbyAsia DahirAwil SaidJamaFadumo Mohamed IbrahimFouzia Haji DahirHassan 'Embassy'Hassan HalasIsmail MuuminaarIsmail Essa AbraarDr Mohamed Abdi SaidMohamed Haji HusseinMohamedJamaAbgaalMohamed Haji RaabiMohamed Musse SaidMohamoud AliJamaMohamoud OsmanNuura MaxamuudRobert BowenSaid Warsame HersiYusufM. AbdullahiYassin Haji Mohamoud

!

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il iarti i t ry ev

A REPORT OF AWORKSHOP HELD IN HARGElsA, SOMALILAND10th -14th December 1995

First printing 1996Second printing 2000

Contents

THE FAClUTATORS 3 DAY 3: DEVELOPMENT fOR WHOM? 223.1 FIELD VISIT TO DARAWEINE 22

FOREWORD 4 3.2 AIMS OF THE DAY 22

3.3 PRA SIMULATION EXERCISE: 22

BACKGROUND CONTEXT 5 DARAWEINE

WORKSHOP SUMMARY 9 DAY 4: FINDING SOLUTIONS 24

A. THE WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES 9 4.1 AIMS OF THE DAY 24

B. THE WORKSHOP UFE-CYCLE 9 4.2 REFLECTIONS ON DARAWEINE 24

C. THE WORKSHOP PROCESS 9 PRA EXERCISE4.3 ACTING TOGETHER 27

DAY 5: STRATEGY BUILDING 27

WORKSHOP REPORT 5.1 AIMS OF THE DAY 27

5.2 CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND 27

DAY 1: PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT 10 SELF-REFLECTION

1.1 OPENING WORDS 10 5.3 MISSIONS AND VISIONS 29

1.2 OFFICIAL OPENING 10 5.4 STRATEGYBUILDING 30

1.3 INTRODUCTIONS 10 5.4.1 Force Field Analysis

1,4 KEY ISSUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 10 5.5 OUTCOMES: COMMITMENTS MADE 30

1.5 AIMS OF THE DAY 11 5.6 WORKSHOP EVALUATION 32

1.6 VISIONS AND MISSIONS OF KEY 11 5.7 CLOSING REMARKS 32

ACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 5.8 THANKS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 33

PROCESS1.6.1 Government: The Ministry ofForeign

Affairs and National Planning ANNEXES1.6.2 Somaliland NGOs: Challenges and

Opportunities ANNEX 1 WORKSHOP PREPARATION 34

1.6.3 International NGOs: An Alternative Annex la Methodology 34

Approach to Development Annex Ib Workshop Agenda 36

1.6,4 The Somaliland Media and its Role inNational Development ANNEX 2 PRESENTATIONS (DAY 1) 37

1.7 STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES 13 Annex 2a The Ministry ofForeign Affairs and National 37

Planning, RepUbliC ofSomaliland

DAY 2: DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM? 15 Annex 2b Somaliland NGOs: Challenges and 39

2.1 AIMS OF THE DAY 15 Opportunities

2.2 WHAT IS PARTICIPATORYRURAL 16 Annex 2c ACTIONAID Somaliland 43

APPRAISAL? Annex 2d The Role of the Media in National 45

2.3 PRAAND PASTORAL COMMUNITIES 17 Development

2.4 OVERVIEW OF PRA TOOLS 17

2.5 PRAAND PARTICIPATION 18 ANNEX 3 WORKSHOP EVALUATION 47

2.6 DANGERS OF PRA 18 Annex 3a Evaluation Form 47

2.7 PRA SIMULATION EXERCISE: 19 Annex 3b Participants' Evaluation 47

HARGEISA Annex 3e Faeilitators' Evaluation 48

2

..

ABOUT TIlE FACILITATORSDr Adan Yousef Abokor is a qualified physician. Between1977 and 1979 he worked at Digfer Hospital,Mogadishu, before being appointed Director ofHargeisa Group Hospital in 1980. In 1981 he wasarrested for organising a self-help group in Hargeisa toimprove conditions in the Hospital, and was held foreight years in solitary confinement as a Prisoner ofConscience by the Barre regime. Since 1990 he hasheld the respective posts of Vice President andExecutive Director of the Somali Relief and Rehabili­tationAssociation (SORRA) in Hargeisa. He has beenactive in peace and reconciliation in SomaIiIand, atthe Boroma Peace Conference in 1993, and the HarshinReconciliation Conference in 1995. He trained in Par­ticipatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) at Clark University,USA, and was a trainer for a PRA exercise in NortheastSomalia in 1994. He is a co-author of 'PRA with SomaliPastoralists', published by Clark University.

Hassan Mohamed AIi is a qualified teacher. From 1983 to1989 he worked with ACTIONAID Somalia in Sanaagregion until he was displaced by the war. He is currentlyExecutive Director ofa local Non-Governmental Organ­isation (NGO) , the Sanaag Agricultural DevelopmentOrganisation (SADO). He is a practitioner ofPRA andhas provided training in PRA for Oxfam UK/Irelandfield staff in Hargeisa. Utilising PRA methods, he hasundertaken an extensive study of 'Range Managementin Erigavo District' for ACTIONAID, the report ofwhich is published by VetAid.

Omar Edleh Suleiman is a qualified teacher and a trainedtrainer. Before the war he taught at the Somali Institutefor Development Administration and Management inMogadishu. Since 1993 he has been working forACTIONAID in the Sanaag region ofSomaliland, withwhom he has undertaken training in PRA.

leynab Mohamed Hassan has a Batchelor of Science(BSc) degree in mathematics and physics. She hasworked as a teacher in primary and secondary schools,and prior to the war held various posts within theformer Ministry of Education. These included BayRegional Coordinator for women's education, Directorof income generating programmes in the Women'sEducation Institute, and Supervisor ofwomen's incomegenerating programmes in the Institute of AdultEducation, Mogadishu. Between 1992 and 1994 shewas the Programme Coordinator for the SomalilandWomen's Development Association (SOWDA) inHargeisa. She has attended training programmes onwomen's rights, NGO management, women in

3

development and curriculum development, with theFund for Peace, Oxfam America, UNESCO andUNICEF. She has authored materials on adulteducation techniques, hand sewing, child care andnutrition, and social mobilisation against circumcision.She is currently the Gender Officer with the GermanTechnical Development Administration (GTZ) inHargeisa.

Rhoda Mohamoud Ibrahim, a development practitionerwith over 13 years experience at both community andprogramme policy level, has been working with theSomali community within the country and diaspora.She is committed to promoting human rights andconflict prevention work within the LNGO/CBOsector.

ABOUT TIlE SPONSORSInternational Cooperation for Development (ICD), thetechnical cooperation department of CIIR, recruitsexperienced professionals to share their skills indevelopment projects in Africa, the Middle East, LatinAmerica and the Caribbean. Since 1991, ICD has beensupporting local NCO programmes in Somaliland. InAugust 1995, ICD recruited Ms Rhoda M Ibrahim, as aresource person to support local NGOs andCommunity-Based Organisations (CBOs) inSomaliland. Since November 1995, ICD has placed anexperienced health trainer who will be providingtechnical assistance to the Ministry of Health.

VetAid is an international NGO which works withsmallholder farmers and pastoralists, who depend onlivestock production for their livelihoods. Since 1992,VetAid has been supporting the work ofACTIONAIDin Sanaag region to provide appropriate animal healthcare services for pastoralists. In October 1995, VetAidestablished a presence in SomaliIand in order to extendits support to local institutions working in pastoraldevelopment.

ICD is grateful to the National Demobilisation Commissionand GTl for additional support

ABOUT TIlE AUTHORMark Bradbury has worked in Somalia and SomaliIandsince 1988. He was Country Director for ACTIONAIDbetween 1988 and 1990 and again in 1992. He has alsoundertaken assignments in Somalia and SomaIiIandfor Oxfam and ICD, and carried out research on Somaliapproaches to conflict resolution. He has facilitatedtraining workshops on conflict-handling skills inSomaliland, Tanzania and Pakistan.

Recently, the term 'capacity-building' for local Non­Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has becomefashionable among international assistance agenciesin Somaliland. However, the term has been usedwithout consultation with those who are ultimatelymeant to benefit from it Nor is there any coordina­tion or common understanding among the assistanceagencies as to what kind of capacity building is beingoffered. This has led to confusion and an overlappingof resources.

In September 1995, a team from ICD (InternationalCooperation for Development), arrived in Hargeisawith the intention of consulting and supporting localNGOs in Somaliland. The mission met some of theleading indigenous NGOs to discuss their prioritiesfor capacity building. Most of those consulted expressedthe opinion that lack of coordination amongdevelopment partners is one of the major constraintsto development in Somaliland. They expressed concernthat 'NGOs' and 'development' were on the verge ofbecoming purely rhetorical terms, with little clarity asto their theoretical meaning or practical content.Furthermore, despite the rehabilitation and recon­struction of public structures by local NGOs, theircommitment to community participation was far behindwhat it should be.

Reflecting on this situation, members of severallocal NGOs, in particular SADO and SORRA, realisedthere was a need for a consultative workshop to:

• identify and determine the roles of differentpartners in development;

• introduce Participatory Rural Appraisaltechniques to local NGOs as one approach tocommunity participation; and to

• build strategies for participatory development.

The idea for such a workshop was enthusiasticallysupported by Rhoda Ibrahim, the ICD NGO resourceperson. A Workshop Preparatory Committee wasformed consisting of members of SADO, SORRA,HAVOYOCO and WADA (see Annex Ib for full list oflocal NGOs represented), and preparations took placein November and early December. The workshop,'Building Partnerships for Participatory Development',was held in Hargeisa from 10th - 14th December 1995.It brought together over 40 individuals representingGovernment, local NGOs, international NGOs, and

4

community organisations from all regions ofSomaliland.

This workshop was different to earlier workshops inseveral key aspects:

1 The workshop was conceived and facilitated bylocal Somali development workers.

2 Local NGOs from all the regions of Somalilandwere represented, together with government insti­tutions, international NGOs and donors.

3 Participants were specifically selected for theirexperience and commitment to communitydevelopment.

4 The workshop's objective was to end, not with anempty list of recommendations, but with firmcommitments to put into practice the solutionsand strategies identified during the workshop.

We are very much convinced that this workshop willbring positive changes to capacity-building approachesin Somaliland and will make a positive impact onbuilding future partnerships between the various actorsin the country's development.

We are aware that some local organisations may bedisappointed not to have participated in the workshop.This workshop was just a first step. We sincerely hopethat other organisations willjoin us in future workshops.

We would like to thank Rhoda Ibrahim for hersupport in helping to make the workshop a reality, ourco-facilitators Omar and Zeynab, and members of thePreparatory Committee: Mohamed and Hassan fromHAVOYOCO, Shukri from WADA, and Faiza fromSOWDA, for organising the logistics so well. We thankthe Minister ofForeign Mfairs and Planning, MohamedA Dhimbil, for giving his time to open and close theworkshop. We thankJudith Gardner (ICD) and MarkBradbury for their help in planning and structuring theworkshop, and writing the workshop report. We arevery grateful to ICD and VetAid for sponsoring theworkshop. Finally, we express our thanks to all the par­ticipants for their excellent participation which helpedcreate the conducive and open learning environmentthat made the workshop such a success.

Dr AdcBn VOllSef AbokorH~ssanMohamed AIiDecember 1995

hIII

I

The Somali ConflictIn 1991, the Somali state collapsed as civil war engulfedthe capital Mogadishu, and the military regime ofMohamed Siad Bane was overthrown. When thepolitical and military factions which toppled Barrecould not agree to form a united government, the wardegenerated into an even more protracted and deadlyconflict causing huge loss oflife, massive population dis­placements, and the widespread destruction ofservicesand infrastructure. The disruption caused to the ruralfood economy led to famine and mass starvation insouthern agro-pastoral areas in 1992. Vocal interna­tional NGOs and the media shamed the internationalcommunity into making an unprecedented humani­tarian intervention between 1992 and 1994. UN militaryprotection forces were deployed to secure the deliveryof humanitarian assistance to populations in need.

The human, cultural, economic and political costsof the war have been enormous. In 1988, in the earlydays of the war, an estimated 50,000 people were killedin northwest Somalia, and 600,000 people fled toEthiopia. Some 25,000 were killed in only four monthsof fighting in Mogadishu between 1991 and 1992. Bythat time, an estimated 1.5 million people weredisplaced throughout Somalia.

Already weakened by lack of investment, mal-admin­istration, corruption and state suppression, the warresulted in the total collapse ofall state institutions - thecivil service, army, police and judicial system,educational and health services, banking, and com­munications systems. All public facilities and manyprivate ones were destroyed. In Hargeisa alone anestimated 60,000 houses were demolished. At acommunity level, population displacement and themanipulation of kinship (clan) identities, caused thebreak up of communities and families, and destroyedlong-standing reciprocal relations between neigh­bouring clans, between former friends and colleagues,and even husbands and wives, parents and children.The war has tragically eroded traditionally-acceptedcodes of behaviour, common values and trusL

Reconciliation, Peace-building andReconstructionThe massive international humanitarian response inSomalia was primarily focused on the southern part ofthe country. Regions such as the northwest andnortheast were generally neglected. Here, out of the

5

rubble of war, people have begun their own processofrebuilding new civil structures. In 1991, the northwestregions ceded from Somalia to form an independentstate - the Republic ofSomaliland, although interna­tional recognition has been withheld. Traditional dan­based institutions of elders, combined with fledglinggovernmental and non-governmental organisations,have emerged to take some responsibility forgovernance, security and reconstruction, at acommunity and national level. In 1993, at the 'BoromaGrand Conference on National Reconciliation', theresponsibilities of these various institutions forgovernance, security and developmentwere defined ina National Charter.!

However, the re-establishment ofa functioning stateand the restoration of peace has not been withoutproblems. Lack of international recognition has meantthat the country is not eligible for bilateral aid, onlyshort-term humanitarian assistance. Since November1994, Somaliland, for a while the most stable area in theSomali region, has been afflicted by a new civil war.This war has set back reconciliation and much of theprogress in reconstruction made over the previousthree years. At the end of 1995, there was someoptimism that this conflict may be drawing to a close.

International ResponsesThe institutional and structural causes of the Somaliconflict have largely been ignored by the internationalcommunity. The massive humanitarian responsefocused on the provision of basic services andcommodities to populations in need. In the process,civic and civil structures were allowed to erode. TheUN military intervention ended in 1994, and conse­quently humanitarian assistance to the region hasdeclined. As the humanitarian crisis is deemed to haveceased, international agencies have begun to devotemore attention to the institutional and structural aspectsof the conflict and engage in efforts to rebuild institu­tions of civil society.

Capacity-building InitiativesIn Somaliland since 1993/4, Oxfam America, CAREInternational, the Life and Peace Institute, the GermanGovernment through GTZ, and the BritishGovernment through the Overseas Development

1 B~dbury, M. (1994) The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace. OxfamResearch Paper no.9. Oxford: Oxfam UK/I.

Administration (ODA) , have all been supporting'capacity-building' programmes. ICD has also identifiedinstitutional strengthening and capacity-building asthe main focus of its technical assistance programme.Indigenous NGOs have been the primary focus of allthese programmes, although Save the Children Fund,GTZ, ICD, and some UN agencies have also givensupport to governmental administrative structures.However, as the organisers of the workshop argue intheir Foreword, there is little coordination or commonunderstanding of what is meant by capacity-buildingamong international assistance agencies.

Two ideas usually lie behind capacity-buildingprogrammes. First is the notion that the effectivenessand efficiency ofdevelopment projects is dependent onthe well-functioning of institutions implementing thoseprojects. Strengthening local NGOs will thereforeimprove the effective implementation of projects.Second isthe notion that 'vulnerability' and 'capacity'are interrelated. Poverty and vulnerability are seen toarise from lack of organisational capacity or institu­tional strength, as much as from lack of access to orcontrol over material resources, or from poor physicalwell-being. Development generally, therefore, isperceived as a process of increasing people's capacityto reduce their vulnerability.

The first of these ideas tends to underlie capacity­building programmes with NGOs in Somaliland. Theemphasis is on strengthening organisations throughtraining programmes in 'organisational development'to implement projects defined by internationalagencies. In this way NGOs become sub-contractors inthe international aid system.

The expansion of the indigenoos Somali NGO sectorLocal NGOs are not new to Somalia. They have a historythat stretches back to the early 1980s, the Ogaden war,and the advent of structural adjustment policies andtheir accompanying welfare safety nets. The recentproliferation oflocal NGOs in Somaliland and Somaliais, however, a direct result of the war. The local NGOsector has emerged in response to the collapse ofgovernment, public services, civic structures and the lossof human and material capital. In Somaliland mostlocal NGOs have been founded by Somali profession­als who have been displaced by the war and are nowliving in communities where they have family roots.Limited job opportunities and a genuine concern to

meet urgent rehabilitation needs has led to the creationof local NGOs as a means of accessing resources fortheir communities. The lack of an internationally­recognised government has also meant that interna­tional assistance agencies have sought out local NGOsas indigenous partners to work through.

As the paper by Mohamed Sheik Abdillahi (Annex2b) makes clear, local NGOs have played a significantrole in the country's rehabilitation to date. As well asimplementing many crucial projects, they have beenvocal advocates for assistance to different regions ofthe country, thus ensuring a more equitable distribu­tion of aid. They have also been active in peace andreconciliation efforts, providing logistical, secretarialand moral support for the important peace conferencesin Sheik (1992), Boroma (1993), Sanaag (1993) andHarshin (1995). Women's organisations, in particular,actively promoted peace and reconciliation efforts in1992 and 1993, and the protection of the rights ofwomen.

Who is responsible for development in Somaliland?NGOs (local and international) are not lone actors inSomaliland's recovery and the re-emergence of civilsociety. The efforts of community-based councils ofelders in peace and reconciliation, the efforts ofGovernment in the re-establishment of security andbasic public services, and the investment of privatebusiness in some essential public services, indicatesthat governmental, non-governmental, and community­based institutions all have a role and future stake inrebuilding a 'civil' society.

In December 1995, ICD assisted a committee oflocal NGOs in organising a workshop in Hargeisa,which brought together representatives ofGovernment,local NGOs, the media and international agencies todiscuss some of these ideas and contribute todevelopment practice in the country. The title of theworkshop, 'Building Partnerships for ParticipatoryDeVelopment', made 'partnerships' and 'participation'the core themes of the workshop.

Afascinating debate emerged on the first day of theworkshop regarding the nature ofdevelopment policiesin Somaliland. It was noted that in much of Africa,development policies are passed down from the top,rather than emerging from or in response to needs atth~ grassroots. This was certainly the case under themilitary regime of Siad Barre. In a break with the past,

.....

the Somaliland National Charter adopted at the 1993Boroma Conference, defines the responsibilitiesdesignated to local communities and authoritystructures for security and development Many inter­national and local agencies question the extent towhich local NCO groupings of professionals are trulyrepresentative of the communities they work in, andwhether their commitment to participation is merelyrhetorical. Perhaps a more crucial question is the extentto which capacity-building oflocal NCOs can increasethe ability ofrural or urban communities to overcomepoverty, and to prevent future conflicts.

Building partnerships for participatory developmentThe uncoordinated response of the internationalcommunity in Somaliland has done much to createtensions and competition among the local organisa­tions and institutions involved in the country's recon­struction and development. At a local level, NGOs viewith each other for donor funds. At a national level, theGovernment resents the channelling offunds throughlocal NGOs, while the local NGOs in turn resentGovernment attempts to coordinate and regulate theiractivities. Somaliland's recovery centres on the need tobuild political consensus on a common vision and acommon set ofvalues. The workshop sought to addressthis by helping to build and strengthen partnershipsamong the main actors in the country's reconstruc­tion and development.

7

Workshop participants

----- - ------------ ---------------

Workshop SummaryA. TIlE WORKSHOP OBJECTIVESTo bring together people from local NGOs, CBOs,international NGOs, and Government, as well asindividual development practitioners and researchers,in an environment of effective and open communica­tion:• to exchange and share experience and ideas

about the development process and practice inSomaliland in order to achieve a commonunderstanding;

• to enhance the skills and awareness ofparticipatory approaches in development practice(including PRA);

• to create and strengthen links and develop astrategy for future working relationships amongdevelopment partners;

• to contribute to understanding and thinking onapproaches to development in Somalilandthrough the production of a workshop report inEnglish and Somali to share the workshop'soutcomes with relevant organisations, NGOs,Government Ministries and other groups.

B. TIlE WORKSHOP LIFE-CYCLEPartners in

/

Development~

(Day 1) '\Strategy DevelopmentBuilding for Whom I?(Day 5) (Day 2)

\ )Working DevelopmentTowards for Whom II?Solutions (PRA Field Exercise)

(Day 4)~ (Day 3)

C. TIlE WORKSHOP PROCESS• Day 1- Partners in Development introduced keydevelopment 'actors', the Government, local NGOs,international NGOs and the media, and gave a repre­sentative from each the opportunity to present theirinstitution's 'mission' and 'vision'. An attempt wasmade to distinguish and clarify appropriate roles, andto look at the comparative strengths and opportuni­ties of each institution. For most participants, this wasthe first forum in which they had heard representa­tives from both Government and NGOs discuss anddebate their institutions' different visions and objectives,and their potential for collaboration and partnership.

9

• Days 2 &3 - Development for Whom? aimed to questionsome of the assumptions that lay behind the visionsand missions, and to focus participants on their rela­tionship with the communities and people whom theysupport. Participants were introduced to the theoryand methodology of Participatory Rural Appraisal(PRA) as a means of exploring participatory approachesto development planning and to raise questions ofequity in decision making. On Day 3, the workshopparticipants travelled 30kms outside ofHargeisa to visitthe rural community ofDaraweine, in order to practiceusing some of the PRA tools introduced the previousday. For many, this experience with the communitybrought home the rhetoric and reality of muchdevelopment practice.• Day 4 - Moving Towards Solutions began with partici­pants reflecting on the previous day's field visit, theapplication of PRA and its relevance to the work ofdifferent development partners. Through the mediumof a role play, the participants explored the constraintsand confusion surrounding the relationships betweenthe various development actors and the implications ofthis for development, rehabilitation and emergencyinterventions. With heightened awareness of theproblem and its consequences, work moved on toidentify strategies to improve the situation so as topromote a more positive working relationship amongdevelopment partners.• Day 5 - Strategy Building enabled the participants toend with an agreed way forward. The question for theday was 'how do we develop a strategy for future workingrelationships among development partners?'. LocalNGOs identified core characteristics and values oforganisations calling themselves humanitarian NGOs.Exploring whether local NGOs in Somaliland canachieve a common vision, participants used a 'forcefield analysis' to distinguish the forces and factors whichcan both prevent and promote a common vision.Having identified those constraints which NGOs canthemselves address, the workshop concluded with par­ticipants proposing the next steps for building part­nerships for participatory development. Practicalcommitments were undertaken by all the organisationsrepresented at the workshop with regard to: improvedcommunication, collaboration, the exchange of skillsand the establishment of regional forums for localNCO coordination. A commitment was also made tohold a follow-up workshop within six months.

Day 1Partn rs in Dev lopment1.1 OPENING WORDSDr Adan opened the workshop by extending a warmwelcome to Mohamed A Dhimbil, the Minister ofForeign Mfairs and National Planning (MoFANP) andall the participants. He explained how this workshopwas different to other previous workshops.

Firstly, the workshop brought together a rich mix ofparticipants from all five regions of Somaliland andincluded representatives of government, local NGOs,international NGOs, the Somaliland media and otherprofessionals.

Secondly, the participants were personally selectedby the Workshop Preparatory Committee, on the basisof their long experience and commitment todevelopment, and as people who would contributeopenly and constructively to the workshop.

Thirdly, the workshop was conceived and organisedby, and would be facilitated by, Somali professionals.

1.2 OFFICIAL OPENINGThe Minister ofForeign Mfairs and National Planningofficially opened the meeting. He thanked ICD forsupporting the workshop and bringing together theparticipants. He saw the workshop as a chance for theparticipants to exchange their views on development,so that each of them could clearly see their role in theprocess ofreconstruction. He encouraged all the par­ticipants to actively contribute to the workshop and,through this, reach an understanding that 'we are allworking together as a family'. The workshop wouldprovide an opportunity to try and narrow the gapbetween each other and to overcome any misunder­standings. He noted the appropriateness of theworkshop title. The word 'partnership' stressed theneed to all work together; 'participatory' emphasisedthat everyone had a role to play in the workshop andin the rehabilitation and development of the country.

1.3 INTRODUCTIONSWith over 40 participants coming from different regionsof the country, some time was spent on introductions.Participants introduced themselves to each other inpairs and then to the wider group. For some, this wasquite an emotional experience. There were old friendswho had not seen each other for several years becauseof the war. Others had known each other as teachersand pupils. A full list of participants is found in Annexlb.

1.4 KEY ISSUES AND CONTRIBUTIONSMter the organisers had presented the workshopobjectives to the participants, people were divided intoBase Groups (see annex la) and asked to do thefollowing:

11 identify two key issues that you would like theworkshop to address;

11 identify two key contributions you intend to maketo the workshop.

The responses are summarised in the box below.

KEY ISSUES:

11 what is participatory development11 planning and management of development

programmes11 capacity building for local NGOs11 specific problems facing Somaliland:

environment and peace11 how to find a balance between collaboration

and diversity of people in development11 how to include marginalised and powerless

groups in the development process• assisting rural communities to have a

participatory role in their own development11 the role of different development institutions in

the advancement of participatory developmentapproaches

11 the role of NGOs11 building partnerships between local NGOs,

international NGOs and government

CONTRIBUTIONS:

11 views on the role and responsibilities of NGOs11 views on how to better coordinate development

activities11 actively participate in discussions, question,

comment11 discuss experiences of PRA11 experience of group members11 compose an entertaining role play11 remind participants of the workshop ground

rules11 ,host the team at Daraweine.

10

b

1.5 AIMS OF THE DAYThe war has touched all parts of the country and allsections ofsociety. There are many organisations, insti­tutions and individuals who are already actively involved,or have a stake in and wish to be involved, in the recon­struction of the country. These include local authorities,local NGOs, community groups, professionals, as wellas international assistance agencies, be they NGOs orUN agencies. They come to the task with differentresponsibilities, skills, philosophies, interests, agendas,goals and objectives. In pursuance of these, there isoften little communication, interaction or sharing ofideas and experience. While diversity is important forcreativity, it can lead to a conflict of interests andcompetition.

The aim of the first day of the workshop was toidentify the different 'actors' involved in the rehabili­tation and reconstruction of the country, to achievean understanding of their visions and missions, and toexplore their relationship with other developmentactors. This was done through the presentation anddiscussion of four papers by a representative of theGovernment, a local NGO, an international NCO, andthe media respectively. (For the full text of these papers,refer to Annex 2).

1.6 VISIONS AND MISSIONS OF KEY ACTORSIN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

1.6.1 Government: The Ministry of Foreign Affairsand National Planning

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Planningpresented a paper which set out the objectives andresponsibilities of the Ministry in terms of planningand implementing the rehabilitation of the country.These responsibilities had been approved by theCouncil of Ministers.

The Minister emphasised that the role ofgovernment was to guide the country's development byformulating social and economic development policiesand plans. The Government had a responsibility tomeet the nation's aspirations for employment oppor­tunities, standards of living and basic services. TheMinistry was constrained by a lack of resources(including human resources) and data. This wouldtake time to build up. Achieving these ends required thecollaboration of local and international NGOs. Inpursuance of its objectives the Ministry had institutedsectoral coordination meetings, through which it isintended to formulate Somaliland's first National Plan.

The Minister's paper stimulated discussion on anumber of key issues:

Cl Coordination and Implementation: It was suggestedthat the paper described the Government as a 'do-all'agency, leaving no room for NGOs or the businesscommunity. The Minister was asked to clarify whetherthe Government saw itself as an implementor orcoordinator. If it was as an implementor, this wascontrary to the National Charter formulated at theBoroma Conference in 1993, which gave responsibili­ties for implementation to local communities. TheMinister reiterated that the government's role was notto implement, but to guide policy.

11 Cooperation with other partners: The Ministeremphasised again that the Ministry faced manyconstraints. It did not have the capacity alone toimplement social and economic national planning.He asked that local NGOs cooperate with the Ministryin this task. For example, a mass ofdata was lost duringthe war. Local NGOs could assist the Ministry to collectdata from any documents they may possess. Shortageof human resources was also a problem within theMinistry. The Minister was seeking assistance from localand international sources to rectify this, but realised thatit would take time.

• The responsibilities of the MoFANP and the Ministryof Rehabilitation: The role of the MoFANP was tocoordinate, while the Ministry of Rehabilitation wasresponsible for implementation.

41 Rural-Urban Disparity: It was suggested that one ofthemajor failures of the Barre government was to get acorrect balance between rural and urban developmentToday many of the development agencies are locatedin the urban areas, while rural areas are still neglected.The Minister was asked whether the Government hada vision so that it could avoid past mistakes. The Ministeragreed that the country's development depended onthe rural areas ('development begins at home').However, it would take time to redress this imbalance.

41 'Top-down' or 'Bottom-up' Development: Oneparticipant observed that by 'social development' weusually mean development from the 'grassroots'.However, in Mrica, this in reality usually means top­down development. The question is whether, as a newcountry, Somaliland now has an opportunity to bringthese approaches together. The Minister suggestedthat there was a need to choose something in between.The problems of 'top-down' approaches todevelopment were all too obvious under Barre's regime.However, going to the other end - extreme decentral-

11

isation - may create confusion. While the principle ofdecentralisation set out in the National Charter isadmirable, without a common vision there is a dangerthat society will fragment. There must be participa­tion, but there must also be consensus and some formof acceptable regulation and coordination.

1.6.2 Somaliland NGOs: Challenges andOpportunities

Mohamed Sheik, Director of the Awdal Rehabilitationand Development Association (ARDA) , presented apaper on the challenges and opportunities facing localNGOs.

The paper provided a useful history ofSomali NGOsprior to the war. Somaliland NGOs were as new as thecountry, a product of the conflict. Most NGOs hadbeen formed by Somali professionals who weredisplaced by the war and found themselves living inrural communities where they had family ties. Limitedemployment opportunities and the desire to dosomething to rehabilitate their country led to theformation ofseveral NGOs. The creation of these NCOswas also prompted by the need of international agenciesto work through alternative local partners in theabsence ofan internationally-recognised government.Local NGOs had achieved a great deal, but they wereweak in several areas and their relations with otherpartners and communities had become fraught withtensions. Internal competition had prevented collab­oration among local NGOs. As funding for rehabilita­tion in Somaliland has now declined, local NGOs areincreasingly facing a crisis of identity. It was likely thatmost would go through a process of transformation,during which some will collapse and disappear, whileothers will change and survive.

Mohamed Sheik's paper provoked discussion on anumber of interesting issues:

.. The future of indigenous NCOs: The paper suggestedthat local NGOs are providing services which wereformerly provided by government. Furthermore, someNGOs have disappeared as their staffhave found othersources of employment. A question was raised aboutwhat strategies NGOs should pursue in the future as theeconomy improves. Mohamed suggested that the majorreason for the growth of the NGO sector had been theease ofaccess to resources. Many NGOs will die a naturaldeath in the future as funding dries up. However, therewill always be a role for socially-<:ommitted local NGOs,although their roles will change and become morecomplex.

• NGOs and politics: It is usuallywriuen into their con­stitutions that NGOs are non-political organisations.A question was raised as to how feasible this is in asociety which is politically divided? Mohamed suggestedthat, in reality, this was impossible. NGOs do not workin a vacuum. NGOs have a role to play in peace and rec­onciliation and this inevitably involves politicking.NGOs are, and have to be, political, but not in asectarian sense.

1.6.3 International NGOs: An AlternativeApproach to Development

Omar Edleh presented ACTIONAID Somaliland'sapproach to development. He emphasised that thepaper was a statement of ACTIONAID Somaliland'sdevelopment principles and a description of its ownvision of development. It did not represent the positionof other international NGOs, and was not intended tochallenge the Government's, local NGOs' or otherinternational agencies' perspectives on development.

ACTIONAID first began working in Sanaag regionin 1986, supporting rural community development.The war caused the programme to dose in 1989. In1992, ACTIONAID returned to Sanaag to support therural population in the rehabilitation ofwaterresourcesand improved animal health care systems. In 1993 itsupported a major project to rehabilitate the watersupply of Erigavo town. ACTIONAID works closely withthe regional committees ofelders and has, in the past,provided support to 'grassroots' regional peace andreconciliation initiatives. It has also provided supportto local NGOs in the region, through training in PRA.

ACTIONAID's approach emphasises participationand local decision-making. As a development organi­sation with charitable motives it exists to serve its'clients'. It therefore respects local priorities and localinterpretations ofproblems. Itworks with local skills andresources to support self-governance and self-reliance.It recognises the complexity of rural livelihoods andbelieves that local resources are best managed by thosewho depend upon them. It is committed to supportinglocal problem-solving capabilities, by strengtheninglocal institutions, while addressing the needs ofwomenand the poor.

Rather than growing in size, ACTIONAID choosesto work through local forums, thus increasing localcapacity. In the future ACTIONAID plans to continuesupporting work in the sectors of water, pastoraldevelopment, food security and distance education,as well as continuing to support processes whichstrengthen peace and reconciliation.

The paper was followed by a short discussion:

12

..:5

1

• International NGOs and local partnerships: Therewas a view that while this workshop was about buildingpartnerships, many international agencies did nothingto actively promote such partnerships. For example,the European Union had recently stopped all localNGOs from using the ECHO flight, while internationalagencies continued to use it. Omar was asked whetherACTIONAID worked with a counterpart who wouldtake over its role when it left. Omar said thatACTIONAID in fact works with several local NGOs,providing them with training. The organisation alsoworks closely with the Erigavo NGO CoordinatingCommittee appointed by elders.

• International NGOs and local clients: One participantdescribed how many international NGOs easily becomedependent on and influenced by local clients and'protectors' (abaan). These are people from whomthey rent vehicles or houses. If communities areunhappy with the agency, they are unable to doanything about it because the agency is protected by theabaan. However, if the abaan is unhappy they can easilyget rid of the NCO.

• Educational priorities: A question was asked as to whyACTIONAlD had chosen to focus on 'distance learning'for secondary schoolleavers and students, when therewas such a Widespread need for basic education. Omarresponded that the decision had come from elders.

• Factors affecting distribution of internationalassistance: A question was raised as to why interna­tional agencies had neglected the eastern regions andwere concentrated in the west. Accessibility and securitywere given as two reasons. It was also suggested thatinternational agencies preferred to work close to eachother. International agencies are also influenced bythe lobbying of people from an area. It was suggestedthat there was a need to distinguish between physicalpresence and support. UNICEF and Save the ChildrenFund, for example, currently support programmes inall five regions of the country.

1.6.4 The Somaliland Media and its Role inNational Development

Mr Suleiman Dahir Afgarshe, an experienced radiobroadcaster with the BBC Somali Service and RadioHargeisa, and an advisor to the Ministry oflnformation,presented a paper on the role of the media indevelopment.

Suleiman described the importance of the media insociety and its ability to influence people. It is the

'sacred right' of people, he argued, to be informedabout plans that are being made for them and aboutdecisions which affect their lives. He outlined theresponsibilities of the media to provide independent,accurate and timely information. The media offereddifferent actors in development the opportunity bothto gauge the feelings ofa large number ofpeople, andto extend ideas and information to them. He said,however, they rarely use the media creatively, only fortheir own publicity purposes. The media can play avital role in national development, peace, demobilisa­tion and the revitalisation of cultural traditions.However, the media in Somaliland is bereftofresources- trained men and women, equipment and finance. Ifits role had been recognised and supported, he argued,many of the current problems besetting the countrywould have disappeared.

The paper provoked a lively discussion on:

• The impartiality of the media and its relationship togovernment: Participants recognised the power of themedia to affect people's minds and ideas; televisionenables us all to know what is happening around theworld. However, some believed that the media is notneutral. The previous regime invested the largest shareof the national budget in the military and the secondlargest share in the Ministry of National Guidance.Privately-controlled media can be equally powerful andnot necessarily neutral. The question is how to developa national media and ensure it is not used against thepeople it is supposed to serve. Suleiman was askedwhether he was advocating for government or private­controlled media. He responded by suggesting thatno human being can be neutral on any issue. Everyonehas preferences for what they want to hear. The BBCselects from hundreds of news items it receives a day,what it considers to be 'international' news. He saidthat he himself chose not to broadcast items whichshamed national values and culture. As far asgovernment control of the media was concerned, whilethe current government does allocate finance to theradio, most of this goes on paying staff. Meanwhilethere is only one tape recorder! Government controlof the media is therefore limited.

1.7 STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNmESThe workshop went on to consider in more depth therelative roles of the development partners. Participantsbroke into four groups to consider the followingquestion:• ' Referring to the presentations, what are the

strengths of these development partners and the

13

opportunities for them to contribute to the recon­struction and development of the country?

The groups' responses are given in the boxes below.

GOVERNMENTStrengths:et government has an interest in partnershipCl it is aware of its own constraints• it has the basic organisation of government in

place• there is a desire to mobilise resourcesOpportunities:• to pursue and invest in peace and reconciliation• to win the support of the people to establish

local government structures in regions anddistricts of the country

• to step-up demobilisation and reintegrationinitiatives

In addition it was pointed out that the Governmenthas instituted a minimum wage (which is more than theGovernment in Britain has!). Opportunities requireresources and given the resource constraints on theGovernment, there is a question over whether or notthese opportunities really exist. Human resources doexist both within and outside government and could becalled upon if the Government took the initiative.However, it was felt that the Government can onlyutilise these resources if it has the support of the people.

lOCAlNGOsStrengths:• less bureaucratic than other partnersCl closer to the grassrootsCl flexibility to implement different programmesCl can make use of minimum resources to

maximum benefitCl can be a catalyst for developmentCl are advocates for development of communitieset invest in the development of human resourcesOpportunities:Cl to be more accessible to donors• to increase mobilisation of local and

international resources• better positioned to win the trust of the

community• to empower the poorCl disseminate information and communication

within and outside the country• to enhance their role in peace

14

INTERNATIONAL NGOsIUNStrengths:• resources• management and technical know-howIII experienceIII access to donors• communication systemsWeakness:• lack of local know-how• biased (show superiority)• waste resources• say but do not do capacity building• refusal to acknowledge presence of governmentIII lack of coordination within and between

international and local NGOs• short term projectsOpportunities:Cl conducive environment for reconstruction (ie

donors will give money)Cl available human resourcesCl no regulations at all on their work• easy access to:

- top government officials- community elders- opinion makers of society

• to assist with the rehabilitation of the countryConstraints:• conflict! insecurity in certain areas• poor infrastructure• lack of coordination• dependent upon and influenced by certain

individuals

The notion that international NGOs lack localknowledge was contested by some Somali representa­tives of international NGOs. Most of the internationalagencies do have a great deal of experience; some arelong-established organisations. In addition it was notedthat they do have the opportunity to work across clanboundaries, in a way that Somali NGOs andGovernment representatives may not. With theresources at their disposal, they also have theopportunity to make a change. However, one has toask whether the amount of resources invested havebrought about the changes we see today, or whetherthese changes have come about through local efforts.Finally, it was felt that because their projects are shortterm, international NGOs give no thought to sustain­ability.

-- --------------

'these are the right people to be selected.'

'the participation of women was poor.'

'the papers were good.•.we needed more time fordiscussion.'

te?III

Reflections on Day 1'the topics are pressingissues... the workshop was needed.'

'there was much criticism of international NGOsand too little of local NGOs.'

'people are meeting people they have not seen foryears.'

'the frankness of the participation is good•••it isnice to see people engaged in something together.'

ay2velop

for Who

MEDIAConstraints:41 limited capacity of radio (limited coverage,

airtime, and poor reception)• lack of trained professionals (production)48 lack of material resources• untimely (late) newsStrengths:• provides a wide range of educational coverage

on topics such as health, agriculture48 provides information on on-going development

programmes• provides information on Government

development policies and priorities48 provides entertainment programmes for

motivation (development) purposesOpportunities:• to support the cultural homogeneity of the

country• to support the revival of national values through

on-going peace and reconciliation efforts• a growing potential of people trained in the

media• government financial allocations for the media

are increasing• private participation and support of the media

is increasing• to be an agent of positive change towards

development

Further discussions focused on the role of the media asa vehicle for change, and as a 'watch-dog' in society.While it was recognised that the capacity of the mediato influence the situation in the country is limited by thefact that there are only two radio stations working (inHargeisa and Boroma), the media was criticised for itstendency to focus only on tragic news. It does little topromote the exchange of useful information, forexample on development issues. Less attention is givento reporting on and promoting 'peace' and 'prosperity'than, for example, political fighting or camel thieving!

Suleiman's paper argued that the media should beneutral. However, participants felt that the mediaexaggerates political hostilities, and thus underminesits claim to provide balanced reporting. It was suggestedthat there needs to be a balance between reportingfalse information or suppressing news, and omittingnews and information which could provoke hostilities.

2.1 AIMS OF THE DAYThe objective of the second day was to begin to developa clearer definition of 'development' by addressingthe question: 'who is development for?'.

Workshop participants were introduced to Partici­patory Rural Appraisal (PRA) , as one approach to par­ticipatory development The idea was to test some of theassumptions behind the Visions and Missions of thevarious actors in development as outlined on Day 1.

Since the mid-1980s, the approach and method­ologies of PRA have, in many countries, become analmost standard part of non-governmental and somegovernmental community and rural developmentprogrammes. However, it was little known in Somaliabefore the war. The fact that it is only now beingintroduced in Somaliland, is an indication of theisolating effects of six years of war. The fact also thatseveral international agencies, notably ACTIONAID,CARE and GTZ are providing training in PRA, isindicative of a confidence that rehabilitation anddevelopment is a feasible goal in Somaliland itself, and

15

-

in some parts ofSomalia Italso signifies a new approachto development in Somaliland- with more emphasis oncommunity participation and involvement.

PRA training programmes usually take place overseveral days or longer. Participants at this workshopwere only given an introductory taste of PRA and itscomparative advantages. In preparation for a visit tothe rural community of Daraweine on Day 3, the par­ticipants were taken through a simulation exercise inorder to practice the PRA techniques they had beenintroduced to in the morning.

The following section provides a summary ofPRA,but for more detailed information about PRA toolsand techniques please refer to specialist manuals. 1

2.2 WHAT IS PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAl?PRA developed from Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), aresearch technique developed in the late 1970s andearly 1980s by researchers in international developmentas an alternative, and complement to, conventionalsurveys.

PRA is a method for learning from and withcommunities. A key feature ofPRA is its use ofmulti-dis­ciplinary teams which include community members.Technical teams with a single focus or limited rangeof skills often only see one side of a problem. Anexclusively male or female team could overlook halfof a community.

While having a multi-disciplinary team of 'experts'live in the field for a period of time is often not cheap,PRA practitioners argue that it is a cheaper form ofdata collection than more conventional survey methods.Structured surveys can be a quick means ofgeneratingdata. However, the analysis can take a long time. Prac­titioners assert that PRA can reveal qualitativeinformation, at least as accurate, in a shorter time. Thereason is that community members are part of the teamand data collection and analysis is done in the field.PRA, however, is not necessarily rapid. It takes time tounderstand changing attitudes and processes.

The choice of methods used depenc1s on the kind ofinformation required. While it can be argued that PRAreveals little about the wider, macro-economicenvironment within which communities live, the

1 The PRA training materials used in the workshop are taken from:PRA with Somali Pastaralists: Building Community Institutions forAfrica J Twenty-First Century, a case study based on fieldworkcarried out inJeded village, Gardo District, NortheasternSomalia. Published by Clark University, USA, December 1994;and Theis,]. and Grady, H.M. (1991) ParticipaUlTY Rapid Appraisalfor Community Development. A Training Manual Based onExperiences in the Middle East and North Africa. Published bythe International Institute for Environment and Developmentand Save the Children Federation, London.

WHAT IS PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL?

PRA is an intensive, systematic but semi-&tructuredlearning experience carried out in a community bya multi-disciplinary team which includescommunity members. It can be used for:• needs assessments• feasibility studies• prioritising development activities• implementing development activities where new

information needs to be collected• monitoring and evaluating activities

It requires attitudes favouring:• participation• respect for community members• interest in what they know, say, show and do• patience (not rushing or interrupting)• listening, not lecturing

• humility• methods which empower community members

to express, share, enhance and analyse theirknowledge

question PRA practitioners ask is whether communitiesactually need and can use such sophisticated data PRAcannot replace more formal survey techniques.However, if the main objective is to learn aboutcommunity attitudes and opinions then PRA is anappropriate method.

PRA VERSUS OlllER RESEARCH MEllIODS

Participatory Appraisal Questionnaire Research• short time • longtime• low cost • high cost

• flexible • fixed• high participation • low participation

• on-the-spot analysis • analysis in the office• little statistical analysis • statistical analysis

• semi-structured • formal questionnaireinterviews and and individualgroup discussion interviews

• multidisciplinary team • enumerator• non-hierarchical • hierarchical

• best for learning and • best for gatheringunderstanding rural representative datapeople's opinions, and statisticsbehaviours & attitudes

Finq.lly, PRA can be used for all parts of the projectcycle, from the design stage to evaluation.

16

2.3 PRA AND PASTORAL COMMUNITIESAlthough PRA was developed from research insedentary rural farming communities, it has been usedin many different fields, including research into pastorallife, in urban environments, impact assessments ofnatural disasters and attitudes to health practices.ACTIONAID uses PRA extensively in its work withpastoral communities in Sanaag region. PRA has alsobeen used to design development projects in pastoralnomadic communities in North East Somalia, wheresome of the training material for this workshop wasdrawn from.2

All societies are complex, and development workersshould not assume that they know everything aboutthe communities, whether rural or urban, with whomthey work. Each community has a resource base, onwhich community members apply different skills. Afarmer, herder or trader will apply different skills tothe same resource. People's ability to utilise a resource,often depends on their position of power and influence.

Rural communities are also dynamic. Pastoralcommunities in Somaliland, for example, have changeddramatically over the past few decades and the war hascaused even more rapid change. The greater emphasisplaced on breeding livestock for export has prompteda change in the breeds oflivestock favoured by herders.This has an impact on the environment, on eatinghabits and the health of pastoralists. PRA can help tounderstand the complexity and dynamic nature ofsocieties. Its starting point is the knowledge thatcommunity members have about their social, economic,political and natural environment

The features of PRA which enable deVelopmentworkers to better understand the complexity of anycommunity, and incorporate that community'sknowledge of their own environment into the work,were outlined for participants.

Mapping GarbageIn Erigavo, the local NGO SVA (Sanaag VoluntaryAssociation) wanted to do something about thegarbage problem. They drew a map of the townand identified households nearest to the garbagesites. SVA then asked those living nearest togarbage how they wanted to solve the problem.Each household decided to take responsibility toclear their area. The areas around those houses arenow clean.

2 Op. cit.

MAIN FEATURES OF PRA

Triangulation:A means of cross-checking information using:• multi-disciplinary teams, including men Bc

women, insiders and outsiders.• a variety of sources of information (people,

places, events).• a mixture of techniques and tools.Flexibility and Infomality:• plans and research are revised and modified as

the field work proceeds.In the Community:• learning from and with community members

(participatory)• activities are done jointly with community

membersOptimal Ignorance:• avoiding unnecessary information• knowing what is not worth knowingOn-the-Spot Analysis:• undertaking analysis in the field itselfOffsetting Biases and being Self-Critical:• seeking out the poorest, women, disadvantaged• avoid only talking to the better-off, educated,

articulate and men• looking for remote areas• being aware of seasonal biases• being aware of one's own biases

2.4 OVERVIEW OF PRA TOOLSPRA incorporates a range oforal and visual techniquesand tools to facilitate community involvement in allaspects of data collection and analysis, project design,implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Some ofthe common ones include:

.. Spatial mapping: can include natural resource maps,opportunities and services maps, village householdmaps, or transects, depending on the nature of theenquiry.

• TempOral maps and trends: these can include seasonalcalendars, or historical time-lines, and can be used toshow how the environment and priorities have changedover time.

.. Institutions: various kinds of diagrams can be usedto describe the different institutions existing in ac9mmunity, and their relative influence and power indecision-making.

17

• Ranking: various forms of ranking can be used toidentify priority ne~ds. These are usually done withdifferent community members, such as men andwomen, old and young people who often have differentpriorities.

The development agency or the research team shouldselect the most appropriate techniques for the giventask, as well as experiment and adapt methods asnecessary. The crucial point is that the maps shouldbe drawn by the community and, like the ranking, donethrough group discussion.

THE RANGE OF PRA TECHNIQUES & TOOLS• Secondary data review• Direct observation• Semi-structured interviewing• Focused group discussion• Preference ranking and scoring• Pairwise and matrix ranking• Wealth ranking• Analysis through group discussion• Diagrams• Mapping and modelling• Transect walks• Seasonal calendars• Time trends• Historical profiles• Livelihood analysis• Oral histories• Workshops• Stories• Case studies• Proverbs

2.5 PRA AND PARTICIPATIONA major aim ofPRA is to overcome some of the short­comings of 'top-down' approaches to development,whereby projects are planned and implemented byoutside agencies (government and NGOS) , with theminimal consultation and participation of communitymembers. Community members are unlikely to takeresponsibility for such projects unless they are involvedin designing them, or they are appropriate tocommunity needs.

Local NGOs sometimes assume that they do notneed to spend time in the community, as they are partof it. However, as most NGOs are urban-based, theyare also 'outsiders' even to the nearest rural community.They often make assumptions based on their own inter­pretations and understanding of problems.

'I was displaced from Mogadishu by the war. 1thought 1knew my community, but 1was wrong. Wefound that people knew their priorities better thanthose who came from the town. The situation ischanging fast. These PRA tools were designed inother cultures. What we need to do as intellectualsor local NGOs is to take these tools, test them andfind out if they are applicable.'Said WarsameGVO (Gollis Voluntary Organisation), Sanaag

APRA training exercise with Oxfam in a communityoutside Hargeisa, revealed that the priority need ofthe community was not for more water, as Oxfam hadassumed, but for a health clinic.

In Sanaag region ACTIONAID had developed 15indicators to assess the quality ofwater resources theywere helping communities to rehabilitate. A recentevaluation carried out together with communitiesproduced a list of 45 indicators!

Another PRA exercise carried out by the local NCOYagleel with pastoral communities in Sanaag regiondiscovered that one family travelled some 3,000 kmsin one dry season. This helped explain why the people'scattle were malnourished and thin!

2.6 DANGERS OF PRAIfproperly used, PRA has a wide range ofapplications.However, like any set of tools, there can be problems ifpeople are insufficiently trained to use it, or do notapproach it with the right attitude. The shortcomingsare often less to do with the tools themselves and moreto do with attitudes and behaviour.

SHORTCOMINGS OF PRAPoor PRA exercises may arise from the following:• difficulty in finding right team• superficiality from being too rapid• preference for statistics and quantitative data• preference for fixed questionnaires• not seeking out the poorest, least educated,

women• failure to involve community members• lack of rapport with community• failure to listen• making value judgements• lecturing instead of listening• raising expectations in communities• male teams neglect women• poor team work• wrong attitude and behaviour• lack of humility

18

Low

High

Medium

sudden population growth due torefugee influx and subsequenteconomic boomlowest population due to civil war

returnees from refugee campscivil war & upsurge of violence

September, October, November• shortage milk, fruit and vegetables• shortage of income• shortage of fodder in town• demand for heavy clothes• increase of local cereals• skin and eye diseases increase• increase of fuelwood and charcoal

June, July, August• increase in sale of ghee, hides and skins• more physical constructions• schools open - increase in wedding ceremonies• increase of livestock export and meat

production

December, January, February• water shortages• decrease business transaction and decrease in

incomes• increase in qat prices• increase of pneumonia• shortage of local grain• shortage of fruit and vegetables• deterioration in livestock quality• increased malnutrition among women and

children• increase in 'supper begging', especially for men• increase in beggars• increased demand for heavy clothes

HARGEISA CAlENDAR OF SEASONAl ACTIVITIES

March, April, May• early rains set in• decrease tomato production• increase milk sales, March• decrease charcoal sales• shortage of livestock sales• increase of milk in April• increase in malaria and infectious diseases• transport disrupted• increase in water availability

1988-19911991-19941994

1978-1988

196019611964

HARGEISA POPULATION TRENDS

1948-1958 Hargeisa grew from a rural village tourban capital

1958-1968 population grew slowly, physicalexpansion of town

1968 -1978 steady population growth

1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1995

2.7 PRA SIMULATION EXERCISE: HARGEISAIn order to practice using some of the tools, partici­pants simulated a PRA exercise in Hargeisa, Thefollowing are examples ofsome of the data generated.

HARGEISA TIME LINE1948 Hargeisa becomes capital1950 Local councils introduced1952 Major institutional developments made1954 Haud and reserve areas ceded to

Ethiopia1957 Hargeisa Hospital opened1958 1st election of local authorities and Ill'st

printing press openedIndependence and unificationFirst coup attemptConstitutional referendum (black &white boxes)Riots against taxation ('bakayle qaleen')Ethiopia-Somali war

1969 Military Coup1972 Somali script introduced & expansion of

education system1977 Somali-Ethiopia war & influx of refugees1980-82 franco valuta1982-84 upheavals & demonstrations1988 SNM incursion in Hargeisa1991 Rebirth of Somaliland1993 Egal's government elected1994 Hargeisa civil war

19

.i.

GENDER ACTIVITIES

Women

Girls

Men

Boys

Dailyfood preparation andprocessing; groceryshopping; mother householdduties; bread winning

household cleaning services;assist mother in daily activities;baby sitting

family affairs management;bread winning

schooling; sporting

Weeklywashing clothes;house cleaning; friends visits;household maintenance

assist mother in weeklyactivities;se~-grooming

Fridayprayers; resting;chewing with friends

resting; sporting

Seasonallyplanning seasonal householdneeds; adjust householdmanagement to seasonalneeds

assist mother inseasonal activities

physical constructionof house

school vacation

PAIRWISE RANKING Of PROBLEMS IN HARGEISA

PROBLEMS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91 Shelter x se wa sh un sh sh sh w2 Security x x se se se se se se se3 Water x x x wa wa wa wa wa wa4 Sanitation x x x x un in ge sa w5 Unemployment x x x x x un un un un6 Inflation x x x x x x in in w7 Education for girls x x x x x x x ge w8 Transport x x x x x x x x w9 Women's exhaustion x x x x x x x x x

Problems ScoreShelter (sh) - 4Security (se) - 8Water (wa) - 7Sanitation (sa)-lUnemployment (un) - 6Inflation (in) - 3Education for girls (ge) - 2Transport (t) - 0Womens'.exhaustion (w) - 5

Rank512836794

Problems ranked in order of prioritySecurityWaterUnemploymentWomen's exhaustionShelterInflationEducation for girlsSanitationTransport

The ranking exercise identified security as the major problem, with water second. Transport was considered theleast priority.

20

HARGEISA RESOURCE MAP

Resource map was adjusted through discussion in the plenary, with some dams added. The maps illustrated thedifferent perspectives ofwomen and men.

~"ou(U """'rof

~A~C1~I~A

f,-

oo

HARGEISA OPPORTUNmES AND SERVICES MAP

@ I-I('\~ smA.-')<

[(] fl),U

,MU! fvldt.v C~lJ hU'l11l u.,ll-("

iN

21

Day3Develpmentfor Whom?Reflections on Day 2'some parts were informative and motivating.'

'too much information...not enough discussion.'

'it was good when people gave their ownexperiences.'

'people have difficulty understanding what ismeant by opportunity.'

3.1 FIELD VISIT TO DARAWEINEThe theme of 'who development is for' was carriedinto Day 3, and made more real by a visit to Daraweinevillage.

3.2 AIMS OF THE DAYThe aim of the day was to put into practice some ofthe theory learned in Day 2. It also gave participantsfrom the regions a chance to experience current lifeoutside of Hargeisa and to see for themselves in whatways it was similar or different to their owncommunities. The bus journey to Daraweine did nottake long but itwas enjoyed by everyone. It felt good tobe going somewhere together to learn and share.

The Daraweine community had been consultedbeforehand by the Workshop Preparatory Committeeand had agreed to take part in the exercise and to hostthe participants with a lunch (fully paid for by theworkshop). In return for the time and effort given bythe community, the Workshop Committee had invitedand arranged for two representatives from thecommunity, an elder and a local NCO member, toattend the full five days of the workshop.

• Daraweine Village: Daraweine village is located some30 kms to the north east of Hargeisa. The village issited next to a 'tug' (river). A shallow water table enablesvegetable and fruit cultivation. most ofwhich is sold toHargeisa. Before the war a major army camp was

situated next to the village. During the war the army cutdown many of the best trees and looted severalirrigation pumps. In 1993, after the war, the army basewas used as one of the main demobilisation camps formilitia.

There were two features ofDaraweine which particularlysurprised the workshop visitors. First, it is a villagewhere people from several different clans lived inapparent peace, despite the hostilities in other parts ofthe country. Second, there is an unusual communalsystem offarming (guus) , which was introduced by thefounder of the village 40 years earlier.

3.3 PRA SIMULATION EXERCISE:DARAWEINE

PRA exercises were carried out in four groups. Theexercises included: transects, semi-structured interviews,historical time line, seasonal calendar farm maps,service mapping, problem ranking. Some of the datagenerated by the groups is presented on the followingpages.

DARAWEINE TIME LINE

1956 first settlement1957 malaria epidemic with high mortality1959 drought, Daraweine used as water source1960 independence1962 'agricultural revolution', from pulley to

donkey irrigation1963 extinction of lions, thinning of forest1968 resettlement near the river bank1969 Siad Barre revolution1971 introduction of diesel water pumps1972 drought, Daraweine used as water source1973 military garrison established

flood and farms damaged1977 Ogaden war, increase in widows1978 primary school built in self-help scheme

cutting trees for commercial purposes1979 water source for dam in refugee camp1980 Development Bank loan to farmers for

pumps1984 severe drought, Daraweine used as water

source1988 civil war, population partially displaced1991 fall of Siad Barre, return of refugees1994 floods, malaria, demobilisation camp1995 diarrhoea, chicken pox

22

DARAWEINE VILLAGE MAP

c=:J "",c,,.oI ""'<\

® .....,\'\"<.""1 '~/.->r

;;::::;:: <tt(,,~\S

r :;;:\:::l.:~'

~ n~tJ('~tS

,---' t'\<\',-l ,-C'"J I

bb Ctl\1et"''-j

~ "'11).vy"

S"hOo<

• ,,,,,I!l"IVw,.11

DARAWEINE PAIRWISE PROBlEM RANKINGPROBLEMS UNLINED WELLS PUMP PARTS WATER CATCHMENT HAND TOOLSUNUNED WELLS pump parts water catchment unlined wellsPUMP PARTS pump parts pump parts pump partsWATER CATCHMENT water catchment pump parts water catchmentHAND TOOLS unlined wells pump parts water catchment

SCOREpwnp parts =6water catchment =4unlined wells =2

hand tools =0

This ranking exercise revealed that spare parts for the pumps was a major need. A second need identified wasfor sub-surface dams. The ranking led onto a discussion about credit. Prior to the war villagers had received loansfrom the Development Bank for water pumps. They had paid back the loans. Now they needed assistance to buynew spare parts, but the bank was destroyed during the war.

DARAWEINE SEASONAl CAlENDAR

NOVEMBER, DECEMBER, JANUARY'jiilaal'

• land preparation• caring for big trees• repair fences• tilling• levelling• desilting

JUNE, JULY'xaggaa'

• fencing• land preparation• tilling• levelling• distilling• harvesting• marketing

FEBRUARY

I• nursery

preparation• pleating

[

• watering• manuring• fertilisers

AUGUST

MARCH, APRIL, MAY'gu'RAINY SEASON

• out planting• watering• manuring• fertiliser• 'gullS'

activities

SEPTEMBER, OCTOBERRAINY SEASON

• out planting• watering• manuring• fertilisers• 'guus' activities• marketing crops• preserving seeds

23

.,.,.-------------------------------~

Day 4 FindingSolutionsReflections on Day 3'The best thing about the field exercise was to visita place with lots of potential. It shows what ispossible ifone is committed to development.'

'Development workers have much to gain fromcommunities. It is a step forward when they taketime to talk with and learn from communities.'

'The main thing we learnt is that the exercise is notsimple.'

The visit to Daraweine and the PRA exercise wereintended to promote a more participatory approach todevelopment and to focus attention on 'thecommunity'. The visit reminded participants ofwhoseproblems they (as local NCO workers or governmentemployees) were working to address. It reinforced theimportance ofbeing open to seeking and taking ideasfrom the community.

4.1 AIMS Of THE DAYThe aim ofDay 4 was to move the participants forwardfrom identifying problems to identifying solutions. Theday began with participants reflecting on the usefulnessof PRA as an approach to participatory developmentand its relevance to the work of different developmentpartners.

4.2 REFLECTIONS ON DARAWEINE PM EXERCISETime was sufficient during the workshop to provideparticipants with only a taste ofPRA and its potential.PRA is difficult to do properly and requires propertraining, preparation and practice. Dr Adan recalledthat the PRA exercise in which he had participated inJeded in North East Somalia had involved three weeksof training, and even then there were still aspects hefound difficult to do.

Participants were asked to reflect on the visit toDaraweine and the application of the PRA approach

'I remember we used to sit in the office and designcommunity development projects without going tothe communities.'Dr Adan SORRA

and tools. They were guided by a series of questions.The answers are summarised below:

1. What was the most useful part of the exercise?• finding out a lot of information in a very short

time• the community's full participation41 detailed mapping of Daraweine village• touring and talking to people• meeting the Daraweine community• practical experience in the field

2. What was the most difficult part?• ranking• how to avoid possible misunderstandings and

raising expectations41 people were asking for assistance• how to engage the community in discussions

along the lines of PRA; it was difficult sometimesfor the community to understand the questions

• there was not enough time to analyse information

3. What was the most surprising part?• the attitude of the farmers and their readiness to

cooperate• the Traditional Birth Attendant's way of record

keeping of every child born in the community(collecting a stone for every birth)

• absence ofwomen in the fields and the lack offruit and vegetables

• such a large community without a health post• community composed of multi-elans• crop sharing practices• high level incidence of malnutrition, given the

available food sources41 a lot of information was collected in a short time

4. What kind of information was easiest to obtain?• information on problems• observation related information ego the transect

map• physical setting of the village• health and agricultural information• history of the village

5. What kind of information was most difficult toobtain?• disclosure of assets and property

24

• the power structures within the community• socio-economic status of people• income and gender work differences

6. Was there anything you were unable to fmd out?• the power structures within the community• absentee landlord's part of the story; we only

talked to the workers• how families from different clans manage to live

together in harmony in the current circumstances

7. How has the day's experience changed yourideas about development and the way you will workin the future?• it will encourage us to repeat the PRA exercise

agam• development workers have a lot to gain from the

beneficiaries (the community)• learning how to gather information• that it is always crucial to collect developmental

information• it has not changed anything

8. How relevant is the PRA approach for thedifferent partners in development: community;local NGOs; government; international NGOs;UN/donors?• it is relevant to all the different partners in

community development• highly relevant• very relevant for coordination and co-financing• it gives the community the opportunity to

participate in their own development and givesother institutions a true and realistic picture oftheir activities

• it can be very useful for local NGOs in their workif they gain sufficient confidence to use it

• Expectations: Several people stressed the difficultyofavoiding raising expectations in the community. It isimportant to 'leave the village with something'.Normally an organisation would use PRA if it wereinvesting work and resources in a community on aparticular project.

The most important aspect of PRA is that it helpscommunities to organise their own ideas, and to identifyfor themselves where they need assistance. Mter thevisit to Daraweine, the next stage would normally be todevelop a Community Action Plan. This would involvethe community in planning activities and projects toaddress certain problems identified and prioritised

through the PRA. Dr Adan recalled that one of thepositive outcomes of the exercise inJeded communityin Northeast Somalia had been the formation of aVillage Steering Committee and Task Force. This wasa new village institution which included elders, youthand women, who were to take forward decisions madeon projects in the village. Creating a new institutionhelped to overcome some of the problems elders feltabout involving women in decision-making.s One ofthe benefits that had come from the visit to Daraweinewas the opportunity for some of the women there tomeet with women's organisations from Hargeisa.

• Ranking: All the groups found ranking the mostdifficult tool to use. This was partly because they did notdistinguish between the symptoms (indicators) andcauses of problems. Each sector and each village grouphas multiple problems and there is a need to focus.This can only be done over time. The facilitators notedthat in their experience, communities in Somalilandfind pairwise ranking easier than scoring.

• Team composition: This was found to be an importantissue. Not all of the teams worked well together. In anyPRA exercise there can be a communication breakdownwithin the multi-disciplinary team and between theteam and the community. One way ofdealing with thiscan be to agree at the outset a 'contract' or 'groundrules' for the team. It is not necessary for all themembers of the multi-disciplinary team to come fromoutside. It is possible to create a team from thecommunity, by including teachers, sheiks, women.

• Timing and informants: Timing and the availability ofpeople was an issue. Some teams had difficulty findingpeople to talk to. People had work to do and did nothave the time to sit and talk. Many women were absentselling their vegetables in Hargeisa. Other villagewomen were busy preparing the meal for the visitors!This restricted the ability to collect information fromwomen. The problem of finding people might havebeen overcome if the teams had stayed overnight inthe village. One group was able to talk to a large groupoffarmers, but this had been organised in advance byone of the team members from the village. Thisreinforced the importance of preparation.

• Project proposals: It was suggested that PRA couldgenerate important information for project proposalsoflocal NGOs. Including PRA information in a project

3 ,PRA with Somali Pa.sUrralisL5: Building Community Institutions forAfrica sTwenty-First Century. Op. Cit.

25

b

BIYO GUDUUD ROLE PLAY

PROBLEMS IDENTIFIEDMedia• unreliable and exaggerated information• lack of capacity to cover the story adequately,

there was no reporter on-the-spot• a mouth-piece of the government, not reflecting

the views of others• the wording of the information was loaded• the media do not always exaggerate, the

problem can also be the reliability of sources

Government• very demanding and harsh attitude to

international agencies• lacking a proper situation assessment• too dependent on external aid• disorganised in presenting their needs• reliance on interpreter meant there were

communication problems• failed to recognise the role of other

development partners and local institutions• asked for resources to be channelled through

them

Local NGOs• individualistic attitude• prejudiced attitude towards others• playing the government's role• reactive to the problem• unorganised to present the case properly to

UN/donors

International NGOs• poor communication with the local institutions• lack of proper situation assessment• irrelevance to priority needs• 'red tape' of bureaucracy

UNIDonors• continual refusal to cooperate directly with the

national institutions• slow response• too focused on clan issues, contributing to

fragmentation

26

PROPOSED STRATEGIESMedia• check the facts• reflect different view-points• be ready to criticise• improve capacity• promote harmony through fair, credible and

objective reporting

Government• verify the facts• make a press release about the emergency• mobilise local resources• initiate and create coordination between

partners• ensure facilities are in place and supervise; they

do have some capacity if they are prepared toorganise it

Local NGOs• have a clear strategy• work against individualism and avoid selfishness• create a representative body at different levels• avoid a monopolistic attitude• preparedness, rather than reacting after the

event is important• they need to have a clear vision and focus• they cannot work without partners

International NGOs• improve their strategy of working with different

development actors• reduce bureaucracy• develop partnerships with local NGOs

UNlDonors• needs to be a willingness to cooperate with local

institutions• work towards strengthening the capacity of the

national institutions (local NGOs andgovernment)

• minimise the bureaucracy associated with them• ensure equity in distribution of resources and

the dependency of the helper-helpedrelationship

proposal can provide evidence that an NGOunderstands the issues from having spent some timetalking with the community involved.

4.3 ACTING TOGETHERFor some people, the visit to Daraweine and the PRAexercise had enhanced the primacy of the relationshipbetween the 'outsider' agencies and their targetbeneficiary communities, or 'clients'. Itwas importantto get this relationship right before all others. Theworkshop went on to explore the confusion andtensions surrounding the relationship between otherdifferent development actors, and to begin to identifystrategies to address them. This was done through themedium of a role play.

The role play, enacted by the facilitators, was basedon a hypothetical disaster that struck the remote villageof Biyo Guduud in Sanaag region. The role play char­acterised the responses of the media, government,local NGOs and international agencies to theemergency situation. The media exaggerated the extentof the emergency; the government was officious anddemanding towards international assistance agencies;armed with a half page proposal a local NGO insistedthat theywere the only real representatives of the area;the international agencies were slow and bureaucraticin their response, and unwilling to trust and collaboratewith local and national institutions.

The participants divided into five groups repre­senting the media, government, local NGOs, interna­tional NGOs, and UN/donors, and were asked toconsider the following:• Think about the role play and identify the main

problems between the development actors.• Devise a strategy which your development partner

could follow to improve the situation.The analysis is summarised in the facing table.

At the end of the fourth day participants were asked toidentify issues that theywanted to cover during the lastday of the workshop.

Participants Suggestions for Issues toCover in Day 5• local and national networking• coordinating resources provided by

international NGOs• coordinating capacity-building programmes• local NGOs reflecting on their situation• strategies for 1996

DaySStrategyBuildingReflections on Day 4'participants need a deeper understanding of

'today was a real workshop••. there was lots ofdiscussion and participation.'

'people are beginning to identify issues we hopedwould come out - identifying a strategy, commonunderstanding of roles.'

'although the Government is fragile peoplerecognised a need to harmonise relations withgovernment. '

'people recognise their own weaknesses andindividualistic behaviour.'

5.1 AIMS OF THE DAYThe aim of Day 5, the final day. was to take forwardthe work begun the previous day on strategy building.Discussion focused on the role oflocal NGOs and theirrelationship with other development actors.

One of the suggestions made on the previous day forissues to be covered was 'for NGOs to reflect on theirreal situation'. The day therefore began with criticalanalysis and self-reflection, and ended with the differentorganisations committing themselves to implementsteps to improve their partnerships as key developmentactors.

5.2 CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND SELF-REFLECTIONDr Adan opened the session by stating that local NGOsare an important link between the various actors indevelopment. The paper by Mohamed Sheik hadmentioned many of their strengths and their short­comings. The purpose of this session was to think aboutthese. Dr Adan added:

'When looking to find a cure it is important toidentify what is wrong. Although we have done

27

this kind of self-analysis before in workshops,nothing seems to change. Maybe the diagnosis ordoctor is wrong.'

Participants were dived into four groups and consideredtwo questions:• what are we, as local NGOs, doing right?• what are we, as local NGOs, doing wrong?The following is a summary of the group presentations.

What we (LNGOs) are doing right1 LNGOs are the first group in society who

dedicated themselves to working for developmentin every aspect.

2 They have introduced the concept ofLNGO toSomaliland.

3 LNGOs have achieved much in the rehabilitationand reconstruction of the country and haveprovided services in areas where internationalNGOs (INGOs) have not reached.

4 LNGOs have played a role in communityawareness-raising and mobilisation for self-help.

5 LNGOs have shown they can be helpful inmaintaining local security (particularly forforeigners) .

6 LNGOs have a liaison role with INGOs anddonors and act as intermediaries between donorsand communities.

7 . LNGOs are able to advocate on behalf of theircommunities, and help attract funds to otherareas which have been neglected.

8 LNGOs provide job opportunities/employmentoutside of the government sector, and this is anew phenomenon in Somali experience.

9 LNGO workers show a sense ofcommitment andpromote the concept and attitude of'voluntarism'.

10 Through the LNGO movement the importantrole ofwomen's organisations and theimportance ofwomen in development is beingrecognised for the first time.

11 LNGOs promote the development of humanresources.

12 LNGOs retain important skills locally and reducethe brain-drain.

13 LNGOs have an advocacy and leadership role.14 LNGOs contribution to PEACE and

RECONCILIATION.15 IfLNGOs put all their project proposals and

problem identifications together we could form anational plan.

What we (LNGOs) are doing wrong1 LNGOs are jacks ofall trades and masters of

none. They lack a clear focus for their mandatesand activities.

2 LNGOs may lack a community base; limitedparticipation by communities/beneficiariess inthe planning phase.

3 LNGOs have a deficit of experience andunderstanding of the principles ofvoluntaryservice.

4 LNGOs are reactive and donor-led, with nolong-term plans or programmes.

5 LNGOs have a deficit of management skills andaccountability.

6 LNGOs are engaged in aggressive competition forresources and can be contributing to localisedconflicts.

7 LNGOs lack coordination and communicationamong/between themselves.

8 LNGOs are orientated towards the physicalaspects of development - buildings, wells,infrastructure - to the neglect of the social andhuman side.

9 LNGOs are too many, fragmented and clan-based.10 The working hours ofLNGOs are too short.11 LNGOs lack prioritisation, favouring quick

interventions that can bring funds whether ornot they are suitable.

12 LNGOs dance to the donor's tune: act ascontractors for donors not as agents of socialdevelopment!social change.

13 LNGOs take community support for granted.14 In emergency situations LNGOs take a limited

amount of initiative; they tend to leave it to theINGOs.

15 LNGOs rely on external funds.16 LNGOs do not have clear constitutions. Ifwe have

a constitution, we don't use it. Those people whowere heading NGOs in 1991, are still doing so.

17 LNGOs do not properly document theirachievements/initiatives so what they do which isgood is not known about.

18 LNGOs lack accountability to anyone.

The self-reflections provoked a lively plenary discussion.The frankness of the self-criticism was useful. As oneparticipant commented:

'If we are able to work like this, be honest in ourself-analysis, we will soon be able to dance to ourown tune.'

28

5.3 MISSIONS AND VISIONS

'We all have a common purpose...or should have.'Workshop Participant

The next session moved forward from self-reflectionand an analysis of weaknesses towards developing acommon vision ofwhat the role oflocal NCOs shouldbe in the reconstruction and development of thecountry.

Having identified 'what we are doing wrong', oneway forward was to ask: do we have an idea of what wewant to do? This question was explored by trying todefine what a local NGO is or should be, by identifyingvalues that should be common to indigenous NGOsin Somaliland.

The same four groups were asked to consider thefollowing:

• what are the characteristics which define a localor indigenous NGO?

• agree and list four values that should be commonto local or indigenous NGOs.

CharacteristicsThe four groups identified the following characteristicswhich should define a local NGO in Somaliland:

THE ORGANISATION• Unbureaucratic• A clear organisational structure• Clear policies and strategies for development• Proper constitution and well-definedjob

descriptions• To possess or employ experts who can identify,

design, prioritise, plan, implement, monitor andevaluate their programmes

• A viable office/base and specific emblem• The capacity to develop programmes• The capacity to solicit resources (technical and

material)

THEPlllLOSOPHY• Non-political• Non-profit making• Non-partisan or clan-basedIt Devoted to humanitarian principles and

dedicated to development• A clear focus and mission• Transparency and accountability• Voluntarism

• To be proactive and initiate change, not donordriven

• Be professional

THE CONSTITUENCY/TARGET GROUP• Legitimacy with their constituency (communities)• All activities should be undertaken on a

participatory basis4& Proper systems for collecting and disseminating

informationIII Grassroots, community-based and participatory• Advocate for and empower the marginalised

One group attempted a definition of a local NCO:

'An organised group with a dearly definedmanagement structure that is committed to theimprovement of the quality of life of specifictarget groups.'

The four groups then identified values and principlesthat should be common to all local NCOs:

THE VALUESIII Integrity• Trustworthiness and accountability• Self-reliance and empowerment• Cooperative and participatory• Active and supportive• Mutual respect• Ethical (professional and culturally sensitive)• Concern for the stability of the country• Respect for traditional values and cultural

heritage

THE PRINCIPLES• Commitment to voluntary consciousness• Commitment to improving the lives ofpoor

people• Commitment to the development of civil society

and its institutions• Commitment to democratisation and human

rights• Commitment to peace and reconciliation and the

promotion of conflict resolution.

The exercise led to a vigorous discussion on whether ornot NGOs can be profit-making organisations, andwhether or not they can be political. Itwas pointed outthat in most countries in order to obtain tax free status,NGOs have to register as non-profit making, and non­political organisations.

29

• To be for profIt or not-for-profit: One opinion offeredwas that NGOs are formed for different purposes, andnot all NGOs are not-for-profit organisations. Onlythose which are charities are non-profit-making.Without making profits, NGOs in Somaliland will notsurvive.

The alternative opinion, voiced by the maJority ofparticipants, was that local NGOs should not be profit­making organisations. The terms 'voluntary' and'humanitarian' define the kind of organisations NGOsare. They are different to community-based organisa­tions, companies or cooperatives. Itwas important notto confuse profit-making with income-generation.NGOs must have an income generating capability tosustain themselves and to invest in projects, but this isdifferent to making a profit Profit means materialisticexploitation. Profit-making is, therefore, exploitativeand thus contradicts all the values of an NGO.

• Fundraising: Local NGOs recognised they are heavilydependent on international NGOs and donors. Donorsupport for Somaliland is vanishing and local NGOsmust begin to rely more on their own efforts andresources. It was felt there was a need to learn fromlocal NGOs in other countries about how to tap localsources of funds and other resources.

• Politics: It was generally felt by participants that localNGOs are political organisations because, as socialactivists, they have a commitment to working with thepoorest and marginalised in society. In Africa, it wasargued, wars are born because of a lack of balancebetween the rural and urban populations, between therich and poor. One participant observed:

'The rural people have come to the towns andthey have looted us. This is because of animbalance between 'haves' and 'have-nots'.'

NGOs should be working for equity and to changesociety. If NGOs are working forequity then, byimplication, NGOs must be political in order to bringabout social change.

However, it was pointed out that there is a need tobe careful about how the word 'political' is used. Thehead of a local militia or a politician may also beconcerned with change, to address the needs of aparticular marginalised group or constituency. Thedifference between politicians and sodal workers isthe means they use to bring about change, and whothe change is for. NGO workers are social activists, notpoliticians. They must understand politics in order to

30

be aware of the context in which they are working, butthis does not make them politicians. NGO workersmust work for equity and justice, but be non-partisan.

5.4 STRATEGY BUILDING

'The fact that the government is not recognisedoutside Soma1i1and should not prevent us frommoving forward.' Workshop Participant

Having critically examined what local NGOs are doingright and wrong, and having defined some commoncharacteristics and values, the workshop moved on tostrategy building. The question to be addressed was:

• How can we (local NGOs) achieve a commonvision?

This question was tackled by using a strategy-buildingtool called a 'force field analysis'.

5.4.1 Force Field AnalysisParticipants in the same groups first listed those'favourable' factors or forces which can help localNGOs achieve a common vision, and then listed'opposing' factors or forces preventing them fromdoing so. The groups then identified which of theopposing forces they could address. These were notnecessarily the biggest or most urgent problems theyface, but the ones they felt were within their capacity aslocal NGOs to address. The strategy was thus to work onthose factors people felt it was possible to deal with, inorder to shift the balance offorces to the positive side,and towards achieving a common vision. (See box onpage 31.)

5.5 OUTCOMES: COMMITMENTS MADEThe final stage of strategy building was for the organ­isations represented at the workshop to develop a firmset ofcommitments on practical steps they would taketo deal with the 'opposing forces' and other issuesidentified in earlier sessions.

The participants divided into regional groups oflocal NGOs, international NGOs and Government.They were all asked to consider the following question:

'What steps will your group take over the nextyear to address those issues identified in theforce field analysis?'

FORCES AFFECTING LNGOs ACHIEVING ACOMMON VISION

FAVOURABLE FORCESestablishing office basecommunity base mobilisationhave focus or area of specialisationvoluntarismaccountability and transparencycollect data and develop projectscloser relations with communitiesadvocates for community needsgood human resourceslocal knowledge and understanding of culturerespect of communitiesunderstand donor languagelocal economic

From the list ofopposing forces, the participants identified

(*) those they felt able to address tl1t;mselves.

The following agreements were made on what stepseach group would take:

What Awdal region LNGOs will do:Priority issues to focus on are: coordination, capacitybuilding and participation. The remedies proposedby the Awdal NGOs are:

The establishment of AAIN (Awdal Association ofIndigenous NGOs):

i. Complete preliminary consultations, draft by-lawsand code of conduct.

31

OPPOSING FORCESabsence of seed fundingcompetition among NGOs and failure to win the

confidence and respect of communities*insecurity of fundingpoverty, corruption, lack of awareness*low technical capacity*unemployment, high opportunity costslimited community participation*poorly defined focus*limited facilitieslack of fundingorientation of development programmes to

physical aspectslack of access to donorsdestructive competition*selfishness*bias and inclined to certain ends*oriented to other culturesnot recognising that some cultural values are out of

date and cannot keep pace with modernisationbeing affiliated to certain parties (partisan)*poor communication*individualistic behaviour*state of the countrylack of infrastructureconflict*untapped resourceslimited education/technical skillsinsularity*lack of access to technical informationpoor communication with INGOs*lack of connection with community'"lack of coordination

ii. Formal formation -workshops, conferences,briefings etc - December,January, February 1996.

iii. AAIN becomes operational- March/April 1996- orientation- conscientisation- confidence building

iv. Programme activities- capacity-building- conflict mediation- preparing the social deVelopment agenda forAwdal- networking with local and internationalorganisations/NGOs

What Toghdeer region LNGOs will do:i. LNGOs coordination bodies to take shape within

1996.ii. Transfer expertise among the LNGOs.iii. Establish a networking system, to be built and

improved in the future.iv. Establish closer links with the communities and

encourage their participation.

What Sool region lNGOs will do:Establish a regional forum to achieve the following:i. Networking: coordination, information dissemi­

nation, guidance for on-going activities, policiesetc.

ii. Capacity-building: training, obtaining equipmentand office facilities etc.

iii. Creation of data bank.iv. Introduce and monitor code of conduct.

What Hargeisa LNGOs will do:i. Create a regional umbrella (coordination) group.ii. Training, sharing experience, skills and

knowledge, create a resource centre.iii. Contribute to peace and reconciliation activities.iv. Involve the community in planning, implement­

ing, monitoring and evaluation of projects.v. Capacity-building of LNGOs.

What Sanaag region LNGOs will do:i. Establish and strengthen the coordination body

which has already been started so as to be fullyfunctional by March 1996.

ii. Improve and exchange expertise and informationamong LNGOs (process already underway).

iii. Develop conflict resolution mechanisms andstrategies.

iv. Promote participatory deVelopment approachesamong all development partners.

v. Work towards specific focus and build experienceupon it.

What the Government will do for LNGOs:1. Develop policy and procedures to regulate

LNCOs - to be in place by 1996.ii. Develop a well-functioning coordination body to

facilitate LNCOs activities.iii. Promote the capacity of the government

personnel related to the LNCOs.

32

iv. Encourage LNGOs and support their activitiesthroughout the country.

v. Share the LNCOs' experience in communitydevelopment.

WhatINGOs will do:1. Advocacy role: use the workshop report to lobby

other INGOs and the international communityon behalf of LNCOs which exercise 'goodpractice' in their work.

ii. Assist in providing information about donorpolicies and INCO mandates, areas ofinterest.

iii. Promote support for coordination among LNGOsand through LNCO forums.

iv. Try to respond to technical assistance needs andskills deficits within the LNGO sector.

v. Provide access to reference books andinformation.

vi. Facilitate future workshops, seminars and trainingon issues which LNCOs propose.

Additional agreements made by the workshopparticipants• To hold a one-day workshop for national policy

makers, international NCOs and UN/donoragencies to appraise them about the outcomes ofthe workshop. A committee selected from theworkshop should represent the local NGOs, onefrom each region and two facilitators. To be timedto coincide wi th the publication of the workshopreport.

• To hold another workshop in six months' time(June 1996) in another region (Sanaag or Awdal)to assess the extent to which the next steps havebeen implemented, and their outcomes. Toappoint a committee to make the necessarypreparations.

5.6 WORKSHOP EVALUATIONThe next steps brought the main part of the workshopto a close. Time was given for individuals to completean evaluation form (see Annex 3a).

5.7 CLOSING REMARKSThe Minister of Foreign Mfairs and National Planningwas able to rejoin the workshop on the last day andoffered some closing remarks.

He was pleased to have been able to witness theclosing of the workshop. He thanked ICD and VetAid

for their sponsorship of the event, and the facilitatorsfor their work throughout the five days. He believed thateveryone who had participated had benefited.

The Minister concluded that the task which faces allofus is how best to work with people in the rural areasand help them deal with their problems. The intellec­tuals have a role in helping them to think throughtheir problems and overcome them. However, if thebeneficiaries do not take part in those discussions thenthey will not benefit. A person who stays only in theurban areas cannot help someone who lives in the ruralareas. 'We must live, love and eat with them,' he said.That is where the planning starts and not, as underthe old regime, at the centre. The role of centralgovernment is to develop vision, and local NCOs andthe private sector have an important role to play. Butwhat we have learnt from the past is that people resentcentralised planning. The local NCO forums such asthose discussed during the workshop will help withcoordination and enhance the partnership betweenorganisations.

Finally, the Minister noted that learning is always aprocess. The participants of this workshop had beenthrough such a process, and he hoped that it wouldbe possible to extend the opportunity to others infuture.

5.8 THANKS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSRhoda Ibrahim (leD) closed the proceedings bythanking the Minister for his words. She thanked VetAidagain for their assistance with sponsorship, and thefacilitators for their work. Finally she thanked the par­ticipants for their contribution to an excellentworkshop. Thanks are also due to Oxfam UK andIreland.

33

ANNEXES

Annex 1Workshop PreparationAnnex la

METHODOLOGYPreparing a workshop takes time and requires considerableplanning. Thought needs to be given to the organisation andlogistics, the role of the various participants, as well as thevenue, structure, agenda, and methodology of the workshop.The organisers and facilitators also need to be clear aboutwhatthey expect to achieve from the workshop, and what they expectthe participants to take away from the workshop.

The following notes outline the planning process that thepreparatory committee went through in preparing for theworkshop on Building Partnerships for ParticipalOlY Development.These are included here for workshop participants and readersfrom other organisations who may wish to organise a similarworkshop in the future.

Annex 3c includes notcs on an evaluation of the workshopconducted by the organiscrs and facilitators in order to assessthe extent to which the workshop achieved the originalobjectivcs.

WORKSHOP PlANNING CHECKLISTThe following checklist was uscd for planning the workshop.WHEN date

durationtime

WHERE venueaccommodation

WHY rationaleaims/objectivesoutputs

WHAT titleworkshop structurecontent

HOW approachprocessesevaluation

WHO organiscrssponsorsfacilitatorsparticipants (sort/numbers)

WHYRationale for WorkshopTh~ ra?onale for havi~g the workshop was determined byasking: what can be achlcved through a workshop that cannotbe achicved by other means?'• to be a TIRST STEP in a longer term process• to overcome lip service to 'participatory development'• to bring partners together• to develop an understanding of participatory

development• to clarifY the role oflocal NCOs in development of the

country• to develop effective systems of communication among

partners

• to identifY training needs ofLNGOs and CBOs• to identifY whether there is a need for LNGO/CBO fora

to address their own common problems• to bring a large number of people together at one time• to learn from each other and get to know each other• to raise levels of 'awareness' about communities among

NCOs• to seck common values• to build confidence in Somali ownership of the

development process• to coordinate capacity-building exercises• to overcome hostility bctween partners: to build

partnerships

OutputsThe facilitators also considered what the immediate outputsof the workshop would be.

What do we (facilitators) want out of the workshop?• increased social capital• mechanism for pcople to work together• a strategy for future working relationships• commitment to participatory development• commitment to work together• framework for developing xeerbetween all partners• local NCOs/code of conduct (values/practice)• directory oflocal NCOs• developmen t of a network• increased human capital- new skills, practicc, attitude,

approaches, knowledge

What will participants take from the workshop?• new skills and practice, attitudes and approaches,

knowledge - increased human capital• better links: feeling more included, less isolated, more

confident• clearer understanding of participatory development• better understanding ofdevelopment needs and roles of

'partners'• common base of understanding• develop future strategies for capacity-building• increased ability to provide and access development

assistance (funding, technical advice, skills sharing andtraining)

• develop networking mechanisms• positive experience• enhanced awareness of own potential

HOWProcessIn designing the workshop programme, the facilitatorsconsidered the question: what makes a good workshop?• good preparation• active participation• level of commitment of participants• conducive environment• facilitation• good time management• clear workshop objectives• group work• content of workshop• motivation• warming up techniques• role play• ground rules• 'base group formation

WORKSHOP GROUND RULESParticipants' mutually agreed 'grouud rules' to whicheveryone would adhere during the workshop:11 respect11 no smoking in the hall11 attendance11 self-discipline

Grouud Rules and Base Group FormationA successful workshop depends on the active participation andcontributions ofits participants. While the workshop objectivesand agenda had been defined by the preparatory committee,the theme of the workshop was 'participation'. It was importantto ensure that the workshop met the needs of the participantsand that they felt a sense of ownership. This was achieved inseveral ways.

Firstly, workshop 'ground rules' were mutually agreed.Secondly, participants were divided into 'Base Groups'. Thosewho were going to stay for the five days were further divided intoBase Groups. These were mixed by region, profession andgender. Meeting at the end ofeach day, the Base Groups wereencouraged to critically review the day and report theirimpressions to the main group the following day. This providedan ongoing evaluation and enabled the workshop planninggroup and facilitators to ensure that the workshop wasresponding to the needs of the participants.

In addition to the Base Groups the workshop used a varietyof small working groups, plenary sessions, formal presenta­tions, practical exercises and various visual techniques includinga role play to ensure maximum participation. While English wasthe preferred language for plenary sessions, Somali was themedium for small group sessions.

Thirdly, and in addition to the objectives identified by theorganisers of the workshop, the first task for participants intheir Base Groups was to:11 identify two key issues that they would like the workshop

to address;11 and two key contributions that they intended to make to

the workshop.

WHOResponsibilities of Workshop ParticipantsWith a large number ofpeople attending the workshop, the fucil­itators took time to consider the role and responsibilities ofthe participants. They were divided into four groups andassigned roles accordingly:

Facilitators11 develop the workshop materials11 set the objectives11 decide on workshop content11 conduct training11 facilitate11 plan, review and evaluate each day• keep time

Logisticians (from the preparatory committee)• accommodation• transport11 meals• prepare the venue• registration• per diems11 stationery11 handouts11 photocopy

Rapporteurs11 document daily proceedings• collect written con tributions/discussion papers/ training

materials• write report

Participants11 short term11 long term

The role of the participants was to actively contribute ideasand experience to the workshop. Short term participants wereresource people and guests invited specifically for the first day.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR BASE GROUPS

Participants will be organised into 'base groups'. The basegroups will be permanent throughout the five days. Therole of the base groups is to review and reflect on eachday's work. Different groups will then be responsible forleading the first quarter ofan hour ofeach day, andinvolve the whole workshop in reflecting on andevaluating the previous day.

In reviewing and reflecting on each day, the basegroups should consider the following questions:

• what are your feelings about the day?• did anything surprise you?• what was useful/not useful?• what would you like to take further during the

workshop?

It is hoped that the base groups will organise theirreflection in differen t ways.

Base Groups Names

1 Galool (A tree with multiple uses for nomads. The lossof the tree is a sign of environmental degradation)

2 Galool II3 Iskaashi ('cooperation')4 Nomads5 Hadhuud (,sorghum')

35

Annex Ib:WORKSHOP AGENDAGuleid Hotel, Hargeisa10th-14th DECEMBER 1995

DAY 2 DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM?8.15 Assemble8.30 Base Group Reflection on Day 1

8.45 WHAT IS PARTICIPATORY RURALAPPRAISAL (PRA)?

10.00 Teal coffee

10.30 OVERVIEW OF PRA TECHNIQUES AND TOOLSFOLLOWED BY PRA SIMUlATION EXERCISE

12.30 Lunch

2.00 PRA TOOLS (continued)

3.00 Teal coffee3.30 Community Action Plans4.00 PRA versus other research techniques

Dangers ofPRAPRA and the Project Cycle

4.30 Assignments for Daraweine visit

4.45 BASE GROUPS REVIEW & REFLECTON THE DAY

5.00 Close of day's programme

36

DAY 18.008.309.00

9.05

10.00

10.30

12.302.00

2.30

3.003.30

4.45

5.00

PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENTRegistrationWelcome & Administrative ProceduresOfficial Opening by the Minister of Foreign Affairsand National Planning

SETIING THE AGENDAIntroductionsWorkshop AimsBase GroupsKey Issues & Contributions

Teal coffee

MISSIONS & VISIONSPresentations by different development partners onhow they perceive their roles in the reconstruction& development of the country:i. Ministry of Foreign Affairs &Planningii. Representative from LNCOiii. Representative from INCO

Lunchiv. Representative from Media

STRENGTHS & OPPORTUNITIES

Teal coffeeCroup Presentations

BASE GROUPS REVIEW & REFLECTON THE DAYClose of day's programme

DAY 3 DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM?:DARAWEINE VISIT

7.15 Assemble7.30 Depart by bus for Daraweine8.30 Arrive Daraweine village

BEGIN PRA EXERCISE

12.00 Lunch with the community

2.00 PRA WORK (continues)

3.30 Discussion with the community4.00 Return to Hargeisa

DAY 4 WORKING TOWARDS SOLU110NS8.15 Assemble8.30 Base Group Reflection on Day 2 & 3

9.00 EVALUATING THE PRA EXERCISE INDARAWEINE

10.00 Tea / coffee

10.30 ACTING TOGETHERRole play

1.00 BASE GROUP REVIEW & REFLECTON THE DAY

1.15 Lunch & Close of Day's Programme

DAY 5 STRATEGY BUILDING8.15 Assemble8.30 Base Group Reflection on Day 4

8.45 CRITICAL ANALYSIS &SELF REFLECTION

10.00 Tea / coffee

10.30 MISSIONS AND VISIONS

11.00 STRATEGY BUILDINGForce field analysis

12.30 Lunch

2.00 NEXT STEPS

2.30 Group presentations3.00 Tea / coffee

3.30 PLENARY DISCUSSION

4.14 EVALUATION

4.30 CLOSING REMARKS5.00 Workshop ends

Annex 2Presentations (Day 1)

Annex2aTHE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAlPLANNING REPUBLIC OF SOMAlILAND

Introduction

The Ministry ofPlanning is the mother ofall other Ministries.It has the responsibility of guiding the country's social andeconomic development policies, formulating short term,medium, or long term plans as appropriate to the country'sneeds and in line with the nation's aspirations, but often subjectto economic limitation, prevailing conditions and the avail­ability of basic data. During the implementation period of agiven plan, the Ministry has the responsibility to plan and advise,make reports, oversee and evaluate the implementation ofsucha plan by ministries or parastatal corporations, as well as seekappropriate solutions for any problems encountered.

A plan is aimed at improving the lot of the population. It setstargets and defines ways ofrealising such targets. In any nation,the people want to be provided with employment opportunities,expect a rise in their standard of living and improvements inbasic services. Regarding the morale of the people and theirculture, our policies are clear and we know what we are aspiringto achieve. With the help of a plan we also know how we canachieve what we want to.

The formulation of any plan requires the availability ofbasic economic and social data. It requires the necessaryqualified personnel, finance and stability so as to conductcensus as well as social and economic studies.

Functions and Responsibilities of the Ministry

The functions and responsibilities of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and National Planning are to:

1 Study and investigate the country's economic and socialconditions, its potentialities and natural and productiveresources, in order to formulate economic and socialpolicies.

2 Examine economic and social projects which in tend todevelop the potentialities of the country, raise thestandard ofliving, exploit natural resources and increasenational production.

3 Formulate economic and social development plans thatprovide, inter alia, for their phased execution and review.

4 Coordinate all planning and development activities bothin the public and private sectors.

5 Recommend legislation deemed necessary for economicand social development.

6 Draft periodic reports of the Government and call forreports from the Ministries, departments and publiccorporate bodies on their activities in the execution andfollow-up of development projects.

7 Issue such instructions as may be necessary to ensure theimplementation and follow-up of plans.

8 Employ, as may be necessary, consultants, specialists andexperts to conduct economic or technical research, or toperform planning, engineering or other services.

9 Constitute technical and advisory Committees, working

groups and study teams, drawing on its own stafforothers to deal with any terms ofreference assigned thereby the Minister, or provided for in the regulations.

10 Carry out necessary studies to project the manpowerrequirements ofvarious sectors, at various levels, so as toconstitute the basics ofgovernment policy on theallocation of manpower resources among these sectors.

11 Receive and examine requests for external assistancefrom the Ministries and public corporate bodies.

12 Determine requirements for external assistance,including technical and financial assistance, on the basisof the approved development plans or approved projects,and requests from Ministries and public corporatebodies.

13 Act, in cooperation with a person designated by theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, as the sole channel ofnegotiations with representatives ofinternationalorganisations, foreign governments and any otherinstitutions or agencies for the provision and utilisationof external assistance.

14 Establish close liaison with the Central Bank in relation toall measures affecting foreign financial assistance.

15 Conclude supplementary agreements, within theframework of basic agreements entered into by theGovernmen t, for the provision and use ofexternalassistance.

16 Accept, substitute, extend and terminate foreign expertsand technicians assigned, or to be assigned, to anyMinistry or public body, and deal with all administrativemeasures relating to them.

17 Coordinate external assistance with developmentactivities and establish liaison with the representatives offoreign governments and international organisationsfurnishing such assistance.

18 Maintain records ofall external assistance.19 Ensure the optimum allocation and utilisation of

external assistance by the Ministries and corporatebodies.

20 Require each Ministry and public corporate body availingitselfof the services of foreign technical personnel tosubmit a periodic report, setting out the progress ofworkof such technical personnel.

21 Revise the allocation of technical personnel in theinterest of a better utilisation of their resources.

22 Review and coordinate all external assistance, includingtechnical and financial assistance, within the frameworkof the basic agreements concluded by the Governmentwith foreign government or in ternational organisations,and conclude agreements to supplement such basicagreemen ts in accordance with the general directions ofthe Government.

23 Recommend measures to improve the organisation andprocedure of the government machinery whichimplements development plans and projects.

24 Coordinate, collect, process, analyse and publish thestatistical data of the country.

25 Receive from Ministries and public corporate bodies newprogrammes or amendments to approved projects forapproval.

26 Require any Ministry or public corporate body to provideit with detailed studies and recommendations on anyproject which in its opinion would contribute to rapideconomic social development.

27 Refer back for consideration, in the light of itsrecommendation, any project submitted to it forapproval by any ministry or public corporate body if,in its opinion, such project requires further study.

28 With the approval of the Government to:a. Authorise, in writing, the execution ofanydevelopment project by any Ministry or corporate body,within the limits of the approved financial allocations fordevelopment. No Ministry or corporate body shallexecute any development project until such writtenauthorisation has been received.b. Reject any project which is inconsistent with the aims,priorities and purposes of the development plans of thecountry or which is technically and economicallyunsound.

29 Recommend to the Government the issuance ofdirectives necessary for the execution, or otherwise, ofaproject where, for any reason, a ministry, autonomousagency or public corporate body is unable to undertakean approved project in whole or in part.

30 Act as the official spokesman of the Council of Ministersand the Government on all matters concerning foreignaid and planning.

31 Carry out all other duties which may be delegated by theGovernment.

32 Undertake any other functions as may be assigned orentrusted to it by law.

33 Engage in international relations and exchangepublications.

34 Correct, approve and propose any research to beundertaken in the country.

The Ministry's duties and responsibilities to the nation arenumerous and could not all be detailed here. Some of itsfunctions would indeed depend on the country's particularneeds at a given time.

Historical Background of the Ministry Since 1991

1 We have completed for local NGOs and some of thenational staffof the ministries a 30-clay training course,on 'National Accounts' for Ministries and internationalagencies, which is essential for the Ministry of Financeand Savings and the Central Bank.

2 We have completed the law of registration of localhumanitarian agencies and have submitted it to theCouncil of Ministers for approval.

3 We have finished a project proposal for the evaluation ofthe destruction of the country, economically and socially,in collaboration with several ministries who are seekinginvestment.

4 We have appointed a Technical Committee for CAREInternational's monetisation project. CARE Internationalhas promised, when the Technical Committee finishes itstask, that it will bring food for monetisation.

5 In 1996, we are intending that Ministries prepare theirplans and will submit them, according to their priorities,to the in ternational agencies for assistance for whichlocal resources cannot pay.

National Development Plan and Policies

Somaliland can only have rehabilitation policies in the nearfuture. These can be outlined as follows:

1 The restoration ofpeace, cessation ofall hostilities andstrengthening security throughout the country.

2 The re-establishment of proper administration at theCentral, Regional and District levels.

3 The rehabilitation of basic institutions, financial, health,water, education, and capacity-building.

4 The restoration of basic infrastructure: roads, harbours,telecommunications, water systems for both rural andurban areas.

5 The re-establishment of information and a basic datacentre.

6 The agricultural sectors, fishery, livestock, farming andenvironment will be given utmost priority.

7 Community development oriented towards maximumparticipation will be followed in an effort to harmonizegrowth potential.

8 Human resource development will be pursued as animportant issue, though it needs a long term strategy.

In carrying out its activities the Ministry is faced with thefollowing constraints:

1 Lack of resources and technical input2 Lack of basic data.3 Lack of skilled manpower.

Future development strategies include sectoral planning. TheMinistry has developed a directive which divides the NationalPlan into the following sectors:

1 Agricultural sector consisting of: livestock, forestry,range, wildlife, farming, environment and fisheries.

2 Infrastructure which includes: roads, bridges, airports,ports and municipalities.

3 Water resources.4 Social services sector consisting of: health, education,

sanitation, information and mass media.5 Capacity building and demobilisation.

Within each sector the Ministry, along with the internationalagencies and organisations involved, will together draft atentative sectoral plan which integrates local resources withinternational assistance. The sectors are coordinated by fiveDirector Generals, who will submit the draft plan to the Ministryof Planning for review. The Ministry will then construct theNational Plan from plans which the sectoral teams have puttogether. The Ministry is grateful to all agencies who havecontributed or will contribute to it.

H.E. Mohamed ADhimbilMinister of Foreign Affairs and National Planning

Somaliland NGOs

The Somaliland NGOs' experiences in the five years since theirinception exhibit the following features:

4 This is a revised version of a draft paper presented by MohamedSheik Abdillahi at the workshop on 'BUilding Partnerships forParticipatory Development'.

Somaliland indigenous NGOs are as old as Somaliland andthis importan t fact must always be remembered in assessing orevaluating them. The main factors behind the emergence (andindeed mushrooming!) ofSomaliland NGOs are as follows:

their development has occurred along a regional basis,reflecting the transitional socio-economic and politicalrealities of Somaliland;the proliferation ofNGOs in every region which hascreated or reinforced negative perceptions about theNGO movement everywhere;an urban or semi-urban bias in the activities of most localNGOs;a failure to develop a clear definition of the role andresponsibilities ofan indigenous NGO. In other wordsthe search for identity is still on-going;managemen t and organisational weaknesses reflectingtheir infancy, as well as the impact of the socio-economicand political milieu in which they operate;misunderstandings and mistrust between indigenousNGOs and their linkages ie. authorities, internationalorganisations operating in the country, communities andelders, and between local NGOs themselves;the fail ure of local NGOs to organise or to develop asense of community at both the regional and nationallevels.

Somali authorities, that they had to resort to an old fascistera charity law in order to register the first onest

4 After a year-long wrangling, the Somali NGOs agreed toform a consortium, COSVADA (Council ofSomaliVoluntary DevelopmentAgencies). In December 1991, aconstitution was formed and a Secretary General chosenjust two days before war broke out in Mogadishu.

.. The forced return of so many educated and qualifiedSomalilanders to their communities and the extremelylimited job opportunities open to them.

.. The utter and unique destruction of the country and theurgent need for immediate intervention at every level.

.. The fact that it was imperative for the international aidorganisations operating in the country to do somethingimmediately in response to the prevailing tragicconditions.

.. The fact that the only avenue open for these organ­isations was to invite local NGOs as partners because ofthe non-recognition of the Somaliland administrationand because of the non-existence in the first few years, forall practical purposes, ofgovernment institutions.

.. The easy entry into the NGO sector because of thepredominance of relief and rehabilitation activities.

Yet the track record ofSomaliland NGOs in the reliefand reha­bilitation sector is quite impressive. &hools, health facilities,watering points, prisons, roads etc. have been rehabilitated,and contributions made to the peace and reconciliation process.

Somaliland NGOs, at present, are at a critical juncture in

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

The motives for establishing NCOs are deeply rooted in the phil­anthropic ethos ofmost cultures. Motives may also spring fromideological commitment to social development. The modernconcept of an NCO as generally practised today originated inthe North after the Second World War and passed throughseveral phases in its development (i.e. from relief todevelopment to advocacy).

African NCOs can be characterised by their rapid and ad hocgrowth, and as often mirroring in their structures their Northernpartners. This may not be a suitable expression of their identityor optimal for what they want to do. African NGOs on thewhole are severely limited by their dependence on externalfunding and their ability to attract technical staff with therequisite voluntary ethos or ideological commitment

All over the Third World, however, the emergence of thevolun tary sector as a force for change has been revolutionary inaddressing the age old questions ofoppression, chronic poverty,social injustice and the newer concerns of democratisation,respect for human rights, balanced development and theprotection of the environment.

1 In 1988, the World Bank established a $3 m. fund as seedmoney to encourage local NGOs to implement projectsin the basic social services sector, with the aim ofalleviating hardships resulting from the Bank-imposedstructural adjustment programme. The fund wasadministered by the Ministry of Planning. Few NGOstook advantage of it because of their limited capacities.

2 USAID established MUST (Management Unit forSupervision and Training) to support those local NGOsimplementing agency-funded projects. MUST wasengaged in training, research, monitoring andevaluation.

3 The idea ofNGOs was so new and perplexing to the then

'NGOs are, in general, private non-profit making organisa­tions that are publicly registered, whose principal functionis to implement development projects favouring thepopular sector and which receive f'mancial support.'

The definition ofan NGO (Non-Governmental Organisation)is not yet generally agreed upon. NGOs mean different thingsto different people, but for the purpose of this paper we mayadopt the following definition which seems to be the mostappropriate for Somaliland Local NGOs (LNGOs):

Annex2bSOMAULAND NGOs:CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES4

Introduction

Indigenous Somali NCOs first appeared in the early 1980s, inthe aftermath of international aid agencies who rushed in toSomalia to help with the huge influx of Ethiopian refugees asa result of the 1977 war. Local NGOs increased rapidly innumber as the 1980s progressed, but the majority were locatedin Mogadishu.

Haqabtir, Daryeel, Adamiga (women's organisation),Gurmad and Al Muntadii, among others, all started imple­menting projects mainly in the health sector and in incomegenerating activities. The following is worth noting in the NCOexperience in the Somalia era:

Indigenous Somali NGOs: Origins in Somalia

39

their development. Their tarnished image, coupled with thedeterioration of relations with their principle linkages, andtheir disorganisation, has prompted a self-examining mood atleastamong the 'first generation' ofSomaliland NGOs. The factthat the 'excitement' phase and easy access to rehabilitationfunds is almost over, heightens the growing feeling that theindigenous NGOs must either realise their potential or perish.In the following sections this paper will discuss the extraordi­narily difficult milieu in which the local NGOs have had tooperate, the constraints faced, the relationship with theirlinkages, and other pertinent matters.

The Socio-Economic and Political Milieu

Somaliland has been uniquely and systematically destroyed inthe prolonged civil conflict and the fight against a most brutaldictatorship. The utter destruction of the economy, the infra­structure and all institutions, be they civil or governmental,has created an extraordinarily difficult and chaotic situationfrom which to begin the recovery process.

The peculiar brutalities of the civil conflict, and the vortexofviolence and lawlessness it unleashed, resulted in tremendoussocial, economic and cultural upheavals in which core traditionalvalues were eroded and in which society was left anchorlessand at the mercy ofgun-toting, traumatised, youth clan militia.At the same time, the pervasive clan-politicking operating in apolitical vacuum resulted in chronic instability that bedevilsthe country to date.

It is important to remember that the nascent indigenousNGOs have had to operate in this milieu at least in the firstthree years of their existence. The situation has, since then,improved dramatically in most parts of the country and thegovernment founded at the historic Boroma Somaliland elders'conference has established governance in the areas under itsreach. However, the armed conflict between the Governmentand renegade militia that first flared at Hargeisa in November1994 and which has since spread to the central and extremewestern parts of the country, is a serious setback for the stabilityand return to normality ofSomaliland. This, needless to say, hastremendous implications for the work and growth ofindigenousNGOs, their relationships, and the emergence of a nationalNGO movement. This conflict is also extremely divisive andrubs raw clan sensitivities across the board in Somaliland.

Institutional Framework

The indigenous NCOs were operating from their inceptionwithout the benefit of an institutional framework (govern­mental or civil) to support them or to foster and facilitate theirgrowth. The Government established from the beginning aUN/NCO office with a fuzzy mandate, whose impact onindigenous NCOs was limited to registering (at a fee) anyoneclaiming to be an NCO and wishing to register in Hargeisa.

Infrastructure

Imagine a country without telephones, banks, postal services,faxes and other communication facilities and with few goodroads and one can begin to understand the isolation ofSomaliland NCOs, and appreciate the circumstances in whichthey work.

40

Cultural Factors impacting on Indigenous NCOPerformance: the 'Qat' Habit

'Qat' is a mild narcotic extensively used in Somaliland mainlyby the adolescent and adult male popUlation. The presentwidespread use (and often abuse) of 'qat' is directly related tothe trials, traumas and tribulations of the recent historydescribed above. It has a devastating effect on the country, par­ticularlyon the economy, and on the health and well-being ofits citizens.

'Qat' impacts on the resources and performance ofmanyNCOs in several ways: a) it is relatively expensive and createsexpensive social linkages; b) it is time consuming and causesinsomnia, a deadly combination which impacts negatively on theefficiency, effectiveness and capacity for work of an NCO; c)since 'qat' is addictive and since Somalis are linked by intricatekinship / friendship relationships governed by a deep-rootedhospitality ethos, the functioning NGOs are plagued in themorning hours by numerous visitors bent on shaxaad, anaccepted euphemism for gentlemanly begging. Theseencounters entail demands on both the finances and all-too­short working time ofan NCO.

Relationships with Authorities

Relations between the indigenous NCOs and authorities, atboth the regional and central levels, are often characterisedby misunderstanding, mistrust and privately-voiced recrimi­nations. The Government's barely concealed hostility towardslocal NCOs was very much evident in a draft law regulatingNCOs proposed by the Ministry oflnterior in 1994.

The whole thrust of this draft law was to circumscribe theactivities of this new fangled phenomena, ie. the indigenousNCOs. Missing from the whole text of the proposed law wasany understanding of the role ofNCOs in the reconstruction ofthe country. A steering committee of Hargeisa-based NCOsmade a strong rebuttal and clarification statement in response,and fortunately nothing more was heard about the proposed law.

The causes of the difficult relationship between theCovernment and the indigenous NCOs are, inter alia:• Acornplete lack of understanding on the part of high

government officers of the role and responsibilities ofalocal NCO because of the newness of the concept andpractice.

• The traditional adversarial relationship betweengovernments and indigenous NGOs in the Third World.The turf skirmishes have been further severelyexacerbated in the case ofSomaliland by the fact that inthe early years some of the NGOs had more resourcesthan the administration!

• The non-recognition ofSomaliland and the non­existence, for all practical purposes, of governmentalstructures resulted in the channelling of much aidthrough local NGOs in the early years. The Governmentresents this intensely.

• The local NCOs, because of their disorganisation, did notmake the necessary conciliatory moves towards theGovernmen t or explain their role and responsibilitiesclearly at the start.

• The Somali curse - which is the breakdown ofcommunication between intimately related people - isalso at work here in the troubled relationship betweenauthorities and local NGOs.

Relationships with International Organisations

The relationship between the local NGOs and internationalorganisations is at present an uneasy and wary one. It is fun­damentally skewed by the donor-recipient reality, and is char­acterised by the accumulation and nursing of grievances byboth sides.

The international organisations are, on the whole, scepticalabout whether the local NGOs are bonafide NGOs and oftenquestion their claim to be representatives ofcommunities. Theinternational organisations also often have doubts about the pro­fessional capacity of local NGOs and sometimes characterisethem as 'clan-based contractors'. The international agencies'perceptions seem to have been coloured by experiences inMogadishu, where from anecdotal evidence the local NGOsituation is out ofhand. There are reportedly more than 2,000indigenous NGOs in Mogadishu with a mixed record and talesof extreme corruption.

The indigenous NGOs perceive an inherent anti-local NCObias on the part of international organisations. They ascribethis to the international organisations' fear of the local NGOsas potential competitors. This may spring, however, from theSomali's highly sense ofconspiracyl

The local NGOs' complaints comprise, inter alia, thefollowing:

• The international organisations constantly pay lip serviceto the urgency of capacity building for local NGOs but(until recently) have not delivered on their promises.

• The international organisations down-play the impressivelocal NGOs' track record achieved under extremelydifficult circumstances and against formidable hurdles,but play up their weaknesses.

• The international organisations treat their local counter­parts as second class citizens in terms ofaccess toresources earmarked for the use of those engaged inrelief, rehabilitation and development. (An example isaccess to flights. These chartered planes consume asizeable chunk of the funds allocated as aid toSomaliland.)

Having said this, it is important to put the matter intoperspective. Most international organisations operating in thecountry have productive working relationships with local NCOs.Attitudes range from that of the British Overseas DevelopmentAdministration (ODA) , which is sympathetic and which worksexclusively with indigenous NCOs, to Oxfam which openlyvoices its distrust of and non-cooperation with local NCOs.The present misunderstandings could be cleared up or at leastminimised through improved communication between thetwo groups ofactors.

Relationships with the PublicICommunities

The litany of misunderstandings and mistrust is again at workin the relationship between the general public/communitiesand the local NGOs which purport to represent them. Some ofthe causes are:

• The near total understandable misunderstanding of therole and responsibilities ofa local NGO by the generalpublic, because of the newness of the concept TheSomali name for a local NCO, hay'ad samafal wadani ah,which could be roughly translated as 'do-gooder agency',creates raised expectations and unrealistic demands bythe public on the NGO.

• During the dictatorship, massive corruption was rampantand embezzlement of project funds and misuse ofresources was not only extremely common, but was oftenencouraged by the dictator, reflecting his clan patronagepolicy. The legacy of this tradition is the manifestation ofcorrosive cynicism on the part ofcommunities withregard to NGO-implemented projects, however small thatmay be. Rip-offs are expected and assumed.

• In the early years, members oflocal NGOs were the onlyeducated people with some income in their traumatisedand dislocated society. As such they were often the targetsof envy and resentment.

• The mushrooming oflocal NGOs in all regions, and theobvious fact that many of them were established as anincome-generating opportunity for its members,reinforces the communities' cynicism and negativeattitudes.

4} The present reality is that communities perceive localNCOs as 'middlemen' standing between them and theaid targeted for their benefit. The growing practice ofaidorganisations to deal directly with the communities hastremendous and complicated implications for therelationship under discussion.

• Local NCOs bear a major share of the blame in thesouring of their relationship with communities. After all,the main raison d' etre for their existence is the represent­ation of their communities and they should have donemore to repair the damages to that relationship.

Legal Status

Legally the indigenous NGO movement is in limbo. There are(to my knowledge) no statutes and regulations controllingthem and/or gran ting a legal space for them to operate within.This has grave implications for the legal protection of theemerging civil society in Somaliland.

Organising Efforts

From the beginning, indigenous Somaliland NGOs felt theneed to get organised in order to address the multitude ofcommon problems facing them. However, the early organisingefforts crumbled when confronted with the prevailing fractioussocio-political reality in the country, since the local NGOsarethemselves steeped in this same fragmenting and debilitat­ing social process.

In 1993, the active members of the Hargeisa-based NCOsformed an Interim Steering Committee to act as the spokesper­son and advocate of the community, and to prepare for theestablishment of a consortium of Somaliland NCOs. One ofthe first fruits of this self-organising effort was an invitationfrom UNHCR for the Committee to nominate a local NCOrepresentative in the then Tripartite Commission (comprisingthe Djibouti government, UNHCR and Somaliland adminis­tration) for the Voluntary Repatriation ofSomaliland refugees.

The Steering Committee organised a conference in March1994, at which 20 leading NGOs from all the regions met atSORRA's premises in Hargeisa to discuss an agenda for theestablishment ofa national consortium.

However, during the discussion, it became clear that thetime was not ripe for this move, as some of the NGOs voicedtheir strong suspicion about the nature and functions of anational umbrella organisation. The underlying fear was thatth.e new organisation would usurp the role ofindividual NGOs.The deeply disappointed organisers sensed the depth of

41

regional divisions within the NCO community and came torealise that organising efforts would bear fruit only when theneed was deeply felt by all, and that the best place to startorganising was at the regional level.

At present, indigenous NCO organising efforts are underwayin some form or another in most of the regions. Awdal regionis the most advanced in terms of its preparations for theformation of an accountable and credible association,advocating the interests of the region's indigenous NCOs.

Women's Organisations

Women's NCOs are now active in all regions of the country,though their development is more advanced in some thanothers. These organisations are faced with opportunities andconstraints that are gender-related and are worth mentioning.

Opportunities:

41 The staffofwomen's NCOs are on the whole drug-free ornon-'qat' chewing and this translates into enormousbenefits in terms ofwork discipline and reducedoverhead expenses.

et Women's NCOs' target communities are morecooperative and compliant than their often truculentmale counterparts. Also in the case ofwomen, benefitsgo directly to the family and are not wasted on thesatisfaction of habits. This must be morale-boosting to theimplementors of the programmes.

41 Somali women's NCOs benefit from the world-widepreoccupation with the status ofwomen. Internationalaid organisations operating in the country nearly alwayshave specific projects targeting women and prioritisetheir needs in the rest of their programmes.

Constraints:

41 Women's NCOs are severely, even critically, constrainedby the near total absence of educated and skilled womenin the country. Somali women had disproportionateaccess to education in the first place, and their educatedmembers nearly all joined (andoften led) the diasporaoverseas. The remaining Somali women with anyeducation or skills are hotly pursued by the internationalorganisations, which recruit them as secretaries, genderofficers etc.

• Women are the mainstay ofSomaliland society in thesetroubled times and are increasingly emerging as themajor bread winners and heads of households because ofthe conflict-fuelled socio-economic upheavals. Eventraditionally, Somali women were always active in familyand community affairs in contrast with many of theirsisters in the Islamic and African worlds. However, fromtime immemorial, Somali women were excluded fromthe top power structures, be it the guurti in the old daysor government structures (National Assembly, Cuurti,Cabinet or top posts in the civil service) today. The lackof exposure to executive decision-making, combined withcultural bias against women in leadership (to which evenwomen often vocally subscribe), tend to make women'sorganisations in Somaliland conflict-prone. Thus the firsttwo prominent women's NCOs in Hargeisa were nearlywrecked by disputes over legitimacy, power andpersonalities.

42

Capacity-BuildingIndigenous NCOs in Somaliland always put capacity buildingat the top ofany needs!constraints assessment or enquiry. Bycapacity building the NCOs primarily mean training and theorganisation of technical, administrative and managerial skills.This preoccupation reflects the following realities:

41 Of the hundreds oflocal NCO practitioners in all theregions only two or three persons had had priorexperience in NCO work before 1991.

• The near total lack ofaccess to data, technical literature,reference works etc. pertaining to the running ofanNCO in Somaliland.

.. Isolation of the indigenous NCO community from theexperience of the worldwide NCO movement due tosevere communication constraints.

Capacity building for the local NCOs has been a contentiousissue, souring relations between them and the representativesof the world comm unity in the country. However, capacitybuilding programmes finally took off in the second halfof 1995as can be gleaned from the following briefhistory of the subject:

October 1993 Oxfam America sponsored a week-longorientation workshop in Addis Ababa for sixSomaliland local NCOs and six from Somalia.

August 1994 Income generating activities workshop inHargeisa sponsored by the European Union.

October 1995 Capacity-building workshop in Hargeisa,sponsored by ODA.

September- Capacity-building workshops in Boroma,December 1995 Erigavo, Hargeisa, sponsored by CTZ.December 1995 Capacity-building workshop in Hargeisa,

sponsored by ICD and VetAid.

Observations and initial evaluations of the main workshops.The intensity of participation in these capacity-buildingworkshops was truly amazing. Participants from all theregions were alive, active and vocal in all the sessions.This reflects both the hunger' for this kind of experienceand the vitality of the local NCO community.

2 The relatively restrained participation offemalemembers in mixed groups was due more to language andeducation barriers than cultural constraints. Educatedand experienced Somali women are quite vocal in anygiven situation.

It is too early to evaluate these workshops against their objectives,but the following initial and broad assessment of their impactmay be in order:

1 The workshops taken together helped the participants todevelop an understanding of, or at least be introduced to,the basic values and skills needed to run a successfulNCO; in other words the role and responsibilities ofanindigenous NCO as well as its relationship with principallinkages.

2 The need for coordination, organisation, networking andthe development ofa sense ofcommunity was alsohighlighted and given an impetus.

3 A beginning has been made in these workshops inopening up the channels of communication betweenlocal NCOs, the Government and the internationalorganisations. However, due to the non-representation ofUN agencies and the under-representation ofother inter-

national organisations, and the fact that the Governmentwas represented by only mid-level officers, only a start hasbeen made. The important matter ofcreating harmonyand understanding between all actors in the recoveryprocess needs to be developed in future workshops.

Conclusion: Challenges and Opportunities

Somaliland's indigenous NGOs are confronted with a rareopportunity, that is their participation in the reconstructionfrom scratch ofan utterly and uniquely destroyed country. Thepriority areas for local NGOs in the recovery process are: conflictmediation and reconciliation: revitalisation of basic socialservices and the productive sectors of the economy: democra­tisation and governance: empowerment of the marginalisedand the disadvantaged through participatory development;and the protection and regeneration of the country'sendangered environment and eCG-system.

The challenge for the local NGOs is how to rise abovepresent weaknesses and constraints and realise their fullpotential. This could be done by developing their capacity andprofessionalism commensurate with the demands of thedaunting task outlined. This capacity must be underpinned bythe basic values of commitment to social development, peaceand reconciliation, democratisation and the preservation ofthe rich cultural heritage of the Somali people.

The challenge to the international community, theGovernment and all those concerned with the welfare of theSomaliland people and their future, is not to be put ofIby thepresent confusion in the local NGO scene, as highlighted by thebewildering array ofacronymsl They should always focus insteadon their true potential as agents ofchange, and as the buildingblocks of an emerging civil society which is essential for thedemocratisation and recovery process of this deeply troubledcountry. In other words do not lose sight of the forest becauseof the profusion of the underbush.

Recommendations

• Capacity-building: The on-going capacity building programmeshould be intensified, broadened in scope and above allcoordinated. Priority capacity building measures that should beconsidered include:

• Upgrading the technical, administrative and managerialskills of the executive staffoflocal NGOs:

• arranging study tours within the region and in Africa,and in other Third World countries facing similarproblems:

• connecting Somaliland NGOs to local NGOs in the HornofAfrica through the establishment o~reliablemechanisms for the continuous exchange of ideas,information and expertise in conflict resolution,reconstruction and development.

• Institution building: The following measures for institutionbuilding oflocal NGOs should be considered:

• The establishment ofcommon resource centres at theregional and national levels. Communication facilities,technical literature and reference works etc. may bemade available at these centres for the common use ofallbona fide local NGOs;

• the repatriation of technical data and information onSomaliland from sources in Europe and North America

for the use oflocal NGOs and the public sector;• the institution of some form ofpostal service (pouch).

Organisation of local NGOs:• Organising the local NGOs at the regional and national

levels is a precondition for their development.Organising would help in the critical areas ofadvocacy,networking, coordination, capacity building, awarenessraising and in promoting harmony and understandingwith the principal linkages such as the internationalcommunity, authorities, target communities as well as thegeneral public.

Legal status:• The legal status of the local NGO community must be

clearly defined. Local NGOs must energetically campaignfor securing the legal protection of their civil and institu­tional rights, as well as the rest of the emerging civilsociety.

Maintenance of standards:.. Funding agencies must set high professional standards as

a condition for cooperating with their local NGOpartners. This is crucial for their growth in capacity.

Mohamed Sheik AbdillahiExecutive Director, ARDA NGO

Annex 2e: ACTlONAID SOMAULAND"

DEVELOPMENT PRINCiPlES:

1 AGfIONAID Somaliland believes in participation at thelevel ofdecision-making power with local partners indesign, planning, implementation and review.

2 AGfIONAID Somaliland will identifY and work with theexisting skills of the community, in order to build onthem, employing appropriate technologies and localresources.

3 AGfIONAID Somaliland is committed to supportingcommunity activities that can lead to self-governance andself-reliance; by working with local groups employinglocal resources and when needed creating access toexternal resources which are beyond the capacity oflocalgroups; and in influencing other donors to do the same.

4 AGfIONAID Somaliland recognises that the complexityof rural livelihoods is best defined by those who surviveon rural resources. Therefore, all stakeholders should beinvolved in the assessment of the resource base and itsmanagement.

5 AGfIONAID Somaliland asserts that its best contributionis to facilitate in building the on-going problem-solvingcapability of the community.

6 ACnONAID Somaliland is committed to the strengthen­ing of the traditional institutions which will lead to socialequality, harmony and balance.

7 AGfIONAID Somaliland, while adopting an area-wisedevelopmen t approach related to natural resourcesimprovement, will address the needs ofwomen .and thepoor, in each respective area without eroding theirexisting claims and access.

5 Extract from ACTIONAlD Country Strategy Paper, August 1995.

43

ACfIONAID in Somaliland will work in the Sanaag region inthe districts ofErigavo and Eil Afweyne, with some spillover inBadhan district. Our core competency is in enabling clientgroups to plan and implement localised projects across ourwork area. We will develop this capability further. Technicalassistance and local operations will be outsourced. Key sectorsare described below.

11 Working in Conflict: We will develop ways ofworking in post­conflict and potential conflict areas. These interventions will bemostly ofprocess. There may be some projects.

11 Pastoralism: As pastoralism is the main livelihood in the area,we will work on issues related to pastoralism. These intelVentionswill be projects which have a focus on animal health and naturalresource management. Process interventions will be based oncreating local management forums.

• Water: Water is a critical factor in an almost arid region. Thepastoralist way oflife revolves around this. We will work towardsmore harvesting of rainwater and to improve existing waterpoints through water projects managed by local users.

"Food Security: Mostof the food in the area is imported againstexport of livestock. The terms of trade do not benefit theSomalis. We will work towards the future food security of the areathrough appropriate agricultural support and where feasible,trade protection. Strategy development awaits some successesin pastoralism natural resource management.

• Distance Learning: The war destroyed the educational system.Itwill take a long time to rebuild this. In the absence ofaccessto education, the human resource development of the areahas stopped. We will create access to higher educational servicesthrough distance learning. Strategy development is underwayat the community level.

The organisation which enables these in telVentions will besmall. Each intervention will be led by one national, who insteadof employing more people, will work through local people'sforums. All work will be guided by development principles andcrafting of real time strategies, in an attitude of stewardship.

Currently we are not able to finance our work from childsponsorship due to the vulnerable security situation. We will seekfinances from the ODA, CARE, Comic Relief, UNDO, UNHCRand other similar bodies. This will give us funding packages ofone to two years at a time for specific interventions.

The nature ofour funding and the fluid security situationmean that we cannot orrer long-term employment contractsto our staff. Although staIfwill be on annual contracts, we willcontinue to invest in the upgrading of their skills and those oflocal partners through training, and exposure to the best ofmanagement and development ideas for adaptation asappropriate.

NEW WAYS OF lOOKING AT AND UNDERSTANDINGTIlE WORLD

The Positivist, Rationalistic ParadigmThe positivist paradigm (also called Cartesian/rationalistic)led us to believe that there is a true reality. This true reality isdriven by unchanging laws. It is possible to break down anyproblem into smaller parts, to analyse those parts, and fromsuch analysis draw conclusions. Such conclusions could bestated as generalisations. These generalisations were treated

as laws which were not subject to time/place influences. Itwasbelieved that such laws could be used to control and manageproblems.

Continuous Change in a Dynamic WorldAs more and more people applied the rationalistic approach toproblems, they discovered that the world did not stand still.Events, evolution, adaptation, and new ideas were constantlyhappening. The problem as analysed at the start of the enquiry,more often than not, no longer fitted the solution derived fromthe enquiry. As there was no fit between the problem and thesolution, problems continued and solutions did not last. Therigid frameworks of the scientific method were not able to workwith such fluidity.

Data to Information to Knowledge to WISdomBeauty lies in the eyes of the beholder. Very trite and also verytrue. We are surrounded by thousands of pieces of data. Weselect only those that interest us. Once selected, this databecomes information. Repeated use of an information-mixeventually turns into knowledge. Knowledge applied over awide range ofcircumstances and time, begins to accumulate asbits ofwisdom. At every stage of this process, itis the user of thedata who assigns a value to it. This value is derived from anevergrowing pool of logic, experience, survival strategies,spiritual values, history, myths, and often a belief in angels.

Multiple Actors with Multiple PerspectivesDevelopment issues centre around people. People who interpretthe world from their own unique, colourful viewpoint. Youdraw these people into solving a problem, you get differentviews of what the problem actually is. It follows then that eachset of people will construct different solutions, according toseason, climate, economy, and politics - especially war. Oftenchanging from month to month. Yet people adapt. By staying,leaving or changing their dependence strategies.

Alternate ParadiglllSIn such a changing, adapting, sometimes chaotic world,problems can only be defined in real time (concurrent time),by those who have a stake in solving the problem. A co-operativecommon-will needs to be created which will address the needsof the multiple stakeholders and arrive at negotiated solutions.Every solution will give rise to another set of problems withwhich all stakeholders will again define and solve in an on­going spiral of problems to solutions to problems, and so on.Each round of this spiral improves something for eachstakeholder.

Points of DepartureStrategic thinking asks questions related to effectiveness. Are wedoing the right things? Operational thinking relates to efficiency.Are we doing things right? In this paper we talk about doing theright things. Using the right means. Work Domains: This isour 'target area'. It is defined as a geographical location. Itsboundaries are defined but tend to occasionally spill overbecause local people inhabit this area. Sometimes theirlivelihood boundaries extend beyond this region.

.. The power-to-influence-change exists as a set of complex rela­tionships which usually manage a given area, but may respondto needs of nearby areas as mutual obligation.

• The Management of Development Work: Development workis normally rooted in charitable motives. These motives resultin money, often large amounts, becoming available fordevelopment work. This money and the people engaged in

spending it, must be managed by the best managementparadigms and principles.

• Using soft systems approaches: Our strategic objectives havebeen stated as system objectives. These objectives have beenderived from an analysis of CAlWOE where:

o The primacy of local clients and their representatives: Werecognise that the serious analysis of local clients is the mostappropriate place to begin an intervention. Outsiders' expertiseand positivist approaches must be subjected to scrutiny andadaptation by local experts.

@ Management by principles: While defining broad strategieshelps in setting goals, it is also necessary to define developmentprinciples within which the strategy will be carried out.

@ Management by stewardship: We exist to serve our clients.We hold in trust for them, money and knowledge. So that thistrust is not betrayed, clients must share in planning and reviewofall aspects ofour work.

These responsibilities undertaken by the media-man have toconnect him with the masses and win him their respect andfull reliance on his work. This, on the other hand, requires themedia to cope with its tasks in order to maintain that attitude.That is why. unlike all others, the media person is known asjack ofall trades and master ofall'. How come?

The media person must always research any subject, andthe personality, background and work ofanybody he/she wantsto interview. Such persons are known in the media terminologyas the 'victims'.

such runners until all concerned got the 'news', while itwas stillfresh.

With the change of times, this system was modernised. Horseswere used to ferry the communicators. Later various types ofsignalling were developed. These included the burningofbushfires on hill tops at night and smoke signals during the day.

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I don't have to wasteyour time by detailing the modernisations which have followedthose old methods, some of which are still used today by ournomads in Somaliland. The mone code, the radio, press,telephone and television are all part of the present communi-­cations revolution.

Let us now have a look at the importance ofthe media to thesociety in real life, before we go to its specific role in nationaldevelopment.

In order to take the right decision about anything, oneought to get 'right facts' (information) about the issue at hand.Somali nomads, for example, have a proverb which says 'whenyou receive news you can easily determine what to do' (war lahelyaaba lala la he~ .

Now we have to define news. Journalistically in mediaterminology 'news' is what is new and timely. News has to beresponsibly reported and as accurate as humanly possible. Andevery piece of news must answer the following five questions,known as four W's and H: What happened, when, where, why,how?

The actual role of the media is divided into three mainparts:

1 to inform2 to educate3 to en tertain

who are the clients, beneficiaries, victimswho conduct the activities in the systemwhat is the change in a defined clementwhat is the thinking which justifies thischangewho can stop this activity or demolish thesystemwhat constraints will hinder the changeEnvironment

Owners

CustomerActorsTransformationWorld view

<& Respecting local priorities: When ACTIONAID Somalilandstarted in Erigavo in 1992, it asked the local community whattheir priorities were. The Council of Elders of Sanaag spenttwo days debating the issue and finally agreed thatACfIONAIDSomaliland should work in the sectors of water and animalhealth. The experience of the past few years proves thatincreasing access to water in rural areas is a key component ofwork in a pastoralism economy, as is ensuring access to vitalvet drugs and their use. In early 1995, a group ofelders and theSultan requested assistance in education.

A system objective directs energy at making a system functionin an on-going manner as opposed to an operational objectivewhich may cease to be relevant on achievement.

OmarEdlehACTIONAID, Erigavo

Annex 2dTHE ROLE Of THE MEDIA IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

What is Required of the Media Person?

1 The media person must be on 24 hours service. Evenduring sleep, ifone remembers something worthwhile,one should wake up and write that point on the notebook in order not to forget it.

2 He/she must be able to have the instinct to smell newsand run for it so that no time is wasted. If thrown out ofthe door he/she mustjump in through the window.

3 He/she must be immune from corruption and shouldnot seek personal gain.

4 He/she must enjoy the job and should develop a love forintegrity, honour and fame.

5 When investigating and analysing case studies, oneshould not aim to criticise but to correct.

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen:Since its earliest times, the human race has learnt theimportance of communicating messages and events betweensettlements and communities in every neighbourhood. Thosemessages were short but comprehensive. First, runners weresent to the nearest settlement to convey the message in cases ofinvaders, dangerous beasts like lions or any other informationof relevance. The message would immediately be relayed by

The media person does not only disseminate information to thepublic on any subject, but endeavours to:a get the truth in fullb follow developments following the occurrencec foresee its repercussions and analyse their effects on the

,lives of the peopled suggest remedies for them

45

In order to attain the above freedom and achieve the desiredstandard, the media person must have independence of thoughtand be fully responsible to his/her organisation for his/herprogrammes or tasks. This feeling was best expressed by thefounder of the BBC in 1922, Lord Hills. When opening theBBC he said: 'Every organisation is a pyramid with somebodyat the top as boss. I want the BBC to be an inverted pyramidstanding on my back and the man behind the microphone asboss. I promise you that my back will not break. Please promiseme that you won't fail me'. We all responded positively. Anduntil now the mike-man is the boss at the BBC. No controlsare made on the BBC programmes. But woe betide anyproducer who commits a mistake. The motto again is that 'thisis my neck'.

By the above, the media people win the confidence of themasses, many ofwhom get addicted to them and are to a greatdegree influenced by them. The television, radio, press andthe like have such an effect on the people that they plan theirdaily lives in conformity with what they hear, read or view in themedia.

The aforesaid effects of the media will naturally be far morein an oral society like ours where the word of mouth travelsfaster than can be imagined. During the British Administra­tion ofSomaliland one British officer said: 'The sticks that theSomalis carry spread news much faster than the wirelessmachines.'

The Role of the Media in National Development

Having saidjust a little about the media itselfand how it works,I believe that its role in all walks of life is self-explanatory. Andsuffice to say that the masses in any society have a sacred rightto be informed of what is being done for them, what is in thepipeline in the near future and what is being planned for thenear and distant future. When the present achievements, ifany, and plans for the future are made known to the populacefor whom they are intended, the masses will be able to:

a Assist in achieving them and appreciate that somebody,somewhere is engaged in working for them.

b Plan their own lives and progress in accordance withthese plans and aspirations.

c Advise on the plans or suggest alternative or better ones,come up with corrections or similar projects completedin other countries, offer better methods and perhapscheaper machinery to that shown on paper or broadcast.

Ifyou keep plans in your head or in file locked in your desk, howcan anybody under the sun be able to know, let alone helpyou?

Cooperation with the m<:dia facilitates for you, without a cost,the following possibilities:

1 To reach your target groups of people all over thecountry and abroad at the same time, and enable them toreach you at the shortest notice.

2 To ask them for any information, all at the same time.3 To get the feedback and the true feelings of the masses in

all regions, districts and villages through the media to anyquestionnaires, all at the same time and all without anycost at all.

4 To accumulate an information data bank on any subject.

In fact the media can do miracles - miracles in the true senseof the word - when properly handled and with the adequate andessential facilities, trained personnel, constant but modest

running costs, and last but not least, the required sense ofinde­pendence and integ;nty.

The Media in Somaliland Since 1991

1. NewspapersThere are a few independent newspapers in Somali which arepublished in duplicated foolscap paper. But they have:

• no equipment• no financial backing• no objective or purpose except perhaps to earn a living

for a few mostly untrained persons• no material, only local news poorly reported.Recently only one good paperJamhuriya came out in print.

2. The Ministry of InformationThe status of the Ministry oflnformation is as follows:

i. Radio Hargeisa• very poor equipment (transmitters need valves, a studio

and new power supply)• the reach is limited to N.W Region (Hargeisa area)• programme staff are in need of training

H. Press• one newspaper, lower in quality than the independent

ones• one monthly publication in English which is mostly a

translation of Radio Hargeisa news

iii. Films and Photography• only occasional video film shot by untrained cameramen,

usually without clear objectives, direction or productionscript.

Cooperation between the Media, GovemmentMinistries and Influential Bodies

Government officials contact the Ministry oflnformation onlywhen they need publicity. International NGOs are equally unco­operative, except perhaps when they need some publicity.

Conclusion

1 The Government needs to build a strong informationservice and understand its role in national development,peace, demobilisation and the reactivation of nationalcultural values, noble traditions and customs.

2 International NGOs ought equally to cooperate and assistin the development of the media in Somaliland, both theindependent press and the state-run Ministry ofInformation.

3 The role of the media and its importance has to betaught to the media people, both government andindependent.

I am certain that had the media been brought to the standardsI have described, a lot of the present problems in Somalilandwould have disappeared long ago.Thank you for your attention.

Mr Suleiman Dahir AfgarsheHargeisa, 6th December 1995

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Annex 3Workshop Evaluation

Annex 3a: EVALUATION fORM

Please complete the following evaluation questions and returnto ICD before you leave the workshop venue.1 Have you any comments about the following aspects of

the workshop?a the workshop objectivesb the workshop's contentc the timetable over the five daysd the facilitatione the overall organisationf workshop venue and refreshments2 How, ifat all, has the workshop been helpful to your own

work?3 What changes would you recommend if a similar

workshop were to be organised again?4 Overall. what is your opinion of the workshop?

(a) very successful(b) successful(c) disappointing(d)?

5 What issues/topics would you like to see prioritised forany future workshops/training with local NGOs?

Thank you for your contribution and participation.

Annex 3b: PARTICIPANTS' EVALUATION

1 Have you any comments about the following aspects ofthe workshop?

a the workshop objcctivcs- successful- innovative and interesting- were clear and appropriate and skills to achieve them

were learnt- the objectives of the workshop were achieved- very relevant- just fine-almost met- relevant and fitted actual expectations of participants

b the workshop's contcnt- apt and useful- informative and instructive- positively informative- enough material. content, tcchniques and tools ofPRA

were contained- excellent- more open discussion and debate would have been

good- was well structured. however. the PRA training did not

equip participants who did not have previous exposureto PRA with enough skills

c the timetable over the five days- satisfactory- heavy for Somalis not used to long work hours-nicely set- enough hours- reasonably fair- the timetable was condensed. time assigned to

discussion too limited-crammed-long hours- too jammed, too short for PRA- time too short, when compared to the exercises

attempted- very detailed and helped participants follow sessions

d the facilitation- satisfactory-excellent- very very nice- bravo to the team; the trainers did a really goodjob- highly facilitated-fine- fairly satisfactory, but I felt there were certain points

when the facilitators were unable to follow theirassignments properly

e the overall organisation- satisfactory-good- the workshop was really well organised- highly organised- rclatively nice- bit loose- very informative, but a bit crowded. or too much

information for a short time

f workshop venue and refreshments-good- was sufficient and timely- well placed- too small hall without tables- main hall too small, too crowded- very good, but the classroom was not suitable for accom

modating a large number of people

g How, if at all, has the workshop been helpful to your ownwork?- it has been useful as a source for exchange of

information, meeting with other local NGOS andsharing experience

- in its introduction to PRA and in holding meaccountable (morally) to do something in a specifictimeframe

- I shared our common mistakes with our partners- the presen tation and activities were well organised; this

helps anyone- helpfUl in the community involvement and

empowerment- acquired new data collection techniques- better idea about PRA- better approach to coordination oforganisations- very much, it shed light on some important issues- important to have a community base and full

participation of the community-very helpful- had a chance to see and talk to the other LNGOs as well

as some INGOs- I met many different professionals from different

regions who will help me to do my work properly

h What changes would you recommend ifa similarworkshop were to be organised again?- to be developed in the same spirit- I would like that all INGOs come to participate for at

47

least two days with their programme- the same again- more paper presentations-longer time and smaller group- more translations for the non-English speaking Somalis- more time should be devoted to preparation, fieldwork

and group discussion; the number ofparticipantsshould be less and the facilitators should have enoughtime to practice their sessions

Overall, what is your opinion of the workshop?(a) very successful **********(b) successful ****(c) disappointing(d) ?

j What issues/topics would you like to see prioritised forany future workshops/training with local NGOs?- capacity-building through training- coordination, technical training- how we can form an umbrella organisation- participatory rural appraisal- integrated development- NGO management- activities reports, individual constraints- more detailed PRA training, community participation,

setting policies and strategies for NGOs

Thank you for your contribution and participation.Thank you tool

Annex 3c:FACIUTATORS' EVALUATION

Two days after the workshop the facilitators came together toreview and evaluate the workshop - the organisation, therationale, objectives, content and outputs (as setout in annex 1).

WHENThe duration (five days) of the workshop was felt to be sufficientfor the subject matter and content. It was good to have hadone afternoon off. The length of the daywasfclt to be a little toomuch. It may have been better to start and finish halfan hourearlier. Some people complained about the lack ofopportunityfor chewing qat! On the other hand most people stayed for thefull period, and this indicated their commitment to theworkshop.

WHEREThe venueand arrangements for accommodationwere satisfactory.The conference room was small for the number ofpeople, butthe outside space and surroundings were very good.

WHYThe fadli tators felt that the oijectivesof the workshops had beenachieved. The workshop had created an open and effectiveenvironmentJor communication. It had provided an opportunityto begin the exchange and sharing oJ experience and ideas. ThePRA exercise had helped to enhance awareness oJparticipatoryapproaches in development practice. The workshop had helped tocreate and strengthen links between local NGOs across and withinregions, and commitments to establish local NGO foraproduced a strategyJorfuture workingrelationships. It had helpedto improve relations between some of the development partners

such as the Government and local NGOs.• Outputs: The improved relationship between local NGOsand government increased social capitaL The idea of a code ofpractice/conduct had been broached, and the Awdal NGOs hadprovided an example of how this might work. The open self.critical analysis and the identification ofcommon characteris­tics and values had been important to this process. The workshophad helped raise human capital by passing on new skills andknowledge (eg. PRA). Attitudes of government and local NGOstowards each other and towards other 'actors' had improved.However, the workshop had done little to increase the abilityof the participating organisations to access developmentassistance. Discussions had in fact focused more en the need tobecome self-sustaining and self-reliant.

WHAT• Structure and content: The main themes of the workshop ­'partners in development' and 'development for whom' -stru~ka chord with the participants.

Peace and conflict resolution and reconciliation had beenraised by some participants and a session might have beenincluded on this. However, it is better to plan to tackle this ina separate workshop.

The introduction to PRA (day 2) was too long and ought to besimplified in the future or left to a separate workshop. Thereflection on the PRA exercise in Daraweine might have beenbetter if questions had focused more on 'participation' andpeople's understanding of it.

One issue that came to light during the workshop was thelack oJa common strategy among international NGOs. They couldusefully undertake a similar workshop.

HOW• Process and methodology: Many of the ingredients of whatmakes a good workshop were present. Important among thesewere careful preparation, active participation, commitment ofparticipants, clear workshop objectives, content and motivation.The small group work was particularly successful. Althoughuseful, the Base Groups had not worked so well, partly becausethey were supposed to meetat the end ofthe day when peoplewere tired. Next time they should meet in the morning.However, they were a good means of mixing people at thebeginning. The daily review and planning sessions of the facil­itators were importan t Time management was weak at times andcould be improved. The warm-up exercises and energiserscould be developed further and in the future more use couldbe made of role plays. Relying on visual aids was difficult withsuch a large group.

It was felt that using English and Somali during the workshopwasjustified. Most of the discussion occurred in small groupsin Somali, with only the plenaries in English. It was sometimeseasier to explain some concepts ofPRA in English.

WHOThe organisation and logistics of the workshop were good. Thework of HAVOYOCO and WADA in arranging transport, pho­tocopying, papers and registration meant that the facilitatorscould concentrate on their own tasks.

The Jacilitators were generally happy with their work. Theyrecognised there was room for improving their facilitation skillsand might benefit from a training of trainers course. The par­ticipants had appreciated that the facilitators were Somali andthis had encouraged an open environment. Although thenumber was large, the selection ofparticipants had been correct.It was unfortunate that some of the women invited had notcO,me. It would also have been good to have invited moredecision-makers from in temational NGOs, ifonly for the last day.

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