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Are India and Japan

Potential Members of the

3 Great Power Club

H D P Envall and an Hall

Readers Guide

This chapter considers whether India andJapan couldjoin the United States and

China as great powers It argues that though both India and Japan may claim

such status in the future it is unclear whether either state actually aspires to this

status and that for the time being both are some way from acquiring it Both

states face major domestic challenges both have complex relationships with the

United States and China and both have political elites who are conflicted about

the best direction for their foreign and security policies

Introduction

India and Japan face some common strategic challenges-above all they both

need to manage the rise ofChina-but they do so with different sets of capabilities

and worldviews While many realists argue that wealthy and rising powers genershy

ally seek greater political and military power in international relations the cases

of India andJapan illustrate that liberal and constructivist arguments about the

ways in which international law and institutions on one hand and perceptions

and ideas on the other hand also shape the security dynamics ofthe Asia Pacific

Indias economy has grown since the end of the Cold War and it has acquired

nuclear weapons but it remains a developing country It is home to a third of

the worlds poorest people it is located in a difficult immediate geographical

neighborhood and it faces many internal security challenges Japan by contrast

is a high-income country with an advanced economy but one that has mostly

stagnated for two decades Its population is getting older as fewer children are

born to replace the aged and the aged live longerJapan has a well-equipped proshy

fessional military but there remain strict limits on what it can spend on defense

and on what it can do with its troops And though some of Indias elite aspire to

the great power club Japans elite is more ambivalent

This chapter assesses the relative capabilities ofIndia andJapan and the changshy

64 65 H DP Envall and Ian Hall

Table 31 India and Japan Key Facts

Characteristic India Japan

Official languages Hindi English Japanese Population 126 billion (2014) 1271 million (2014) Land area 33 million square kilometers 378000 square kilometers GDP $20495 billion (2014) $46163 billion (2014) Principal export United States (133) United United States (186) China

destinations Arab Emirates Hong Kong South Korea Principal import China Saudi Arabia United China United States Australia

sources Arab Emirates Number of military 2749700 (2013) 259800 (2013)

personnelbull

bullworld Bank Armed forces Personnel Total (Washington DC World Bank 2015) httpdata worldbankorgindicator MSMILTOTLP1 Source Unless otherwise specified above data are from the Australian Department of foreign Af-fairs and Trade japan Country fact Sheet (Canberra Commonwealth ofAustralia 2014) httpdfat govautraderesourcesDocumentsjapanpdf and Australian Department of foreign Affairs and Trade India Country fact Sheet (Canberra Commonwealth of Australia 2014) httpdfatgovau traderesourcesDocuments inia pdf

ing worldviews of their policymaking elites who are involved with foreign and security policy It argues that Indias rise is likely to be slower and more difficult than some enthusiasts might believe and thatJapan with its complicated history in the Asia-Pacific remains conflicted about the kind of power it wishes to be It argues that Indias ability to shape regional order is inhibited by inherited but still influential attitudes in New Delhi that are skeptical about alliances and by Chinas ability to dissuade New Delhi from courses of action that might not be in Beijings interests It argues that Japans influence will depend on whether or how it transitions from its current role as a constrained major power to becom-ing either a more modest middle power or a fully independent strategic power (table 31)

India

When India became independent in 1947 it had a population ofabout 350 million and a gross domestic product ( GDP) ofabout $222 billion1 Sixty-seven years later in 2014 Indias population was over 12 billion and its GDP was estimated at about $2049 trillion But with a huge population the bulk of which is employed in ag-riculture in global terms India remains poor with a limited capacity to maintain military forces with a regional let alone global reach

Indias leaders have tried coping with its weaknesses in different ways From

Are India and japan Potential Great Powers

1947 to 1964 under its first prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru India es-poused nonalignment aiming to maintain good relations with both East and west and the developing world but making no alliances For Nehru interna-tional security was best achieved by adhering to principles of peaceful coexis-tence-respecting the sovereignty and independence of all states not interfer-ing in their internal affairs and refraining from aggression These convictions were shaken however by Chinas defeat of India in a border war in 1962 and a series of conflicts with Pakistan

After Nehrus death in 1964 Indias foreign and security policy moved toward what is known as militant Nehruvianism India sought what it called strategic autonomy but downplayed its earlier idealism2 India modernized its military fought and won two wars against Pakistan (in 1965 and 1971) and concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics (USSR) which gave it access to Soviet markets and military hardware It also initiated a program to build a nuclear bomb in response to Chinas test of a bomb in 1964 In 1974 it tested a nuclear device but did not move to develop or deploy nuclear weapons

The collapse of the USSR in late 1991 began the third phase of Indian for-eign and security policy Plunged into economic crisis by the dramatic rise in oil prices caused by the 1991 Gulf War Indias government embarked on some liberalization of its heavily protected economy to try to stimulate growth and began to build new relationships that might give it access to badly needed capi-tal It launched a Look East policy trying to improve relations with East Asian states including]apan and the ASEAN countries3 But Indias difficult relationship with Pakistan which continued to sponsor insurgency in the disputed region of Kashmir persisted and Beijings inexorable rise caused concern to New Delhi Indias elite realized that its economy though improving might take decades to catch up with Chinas that its military was in desperate need of modernization and that unlike other regional states like Australia or Japan it was not protected by great power security guarantees

To give India breathing space to solve these problems as well as to assert its standing as a major power its leaders ordered the testing of five further nuclear devices in 1998 declared India a fully fledged nuclear power and moved to de-velop and deploy nuclear warheads and delivery systems (principally aircraft eventually to be replaced by nuclear-capable missiles launched from land and sea) This move was widely condemned by other states which were angry about the impact of Indias move on the nuclear nonproliferation program and was swiftly followed by six Pakistani tests and the announcement that Pakistan was now also a nuclear power

In time the tests stimulated a process of diplomatic reengagement between India and the United States which had long been estranged from each other but whose elites began to perceive that better relations might be in their mutual


Table 32 India Key Dates

Date Event

1947 Date of independence 1947-48 First Indo-Pakistani War April1965 and September 1965 Second Indo-Pakistani War December3-161971 Third Indo-Pakistani War 1974 First nuclear test 1998 First nuclear weapons test

interest4 This process intensified after the election of US president George W Bush in 2001 Bush saw India as a natural ally (in the words of Indias former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee)S a democratic state with values shared by Americans and a partner in managing China In 2005 the United States and India concluded a deal that acknowledged Indias possession of nuclear weapons and lifted restrictions on its access to civilian nuclear technology 6

In the mid-2000s however Indias economic growth slowed and some in In-dias elite began to express doubts about the direction of its policies stimulating a wider debate about Indias role and aspirations in the world Some regretted the close ties forged with the United States and argued for a return to nonalign-ment or just militant Nehruvianism Others sought a new more realist for-eign policy that would entail a push for great power status and capabilities as well as formal or informal alliances with the United States and some regional powers including Japan to balance Chinas growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region7

The dominant group worried about Indias ability to become a great power and recommended hedging not wanting to confront China directly and not want-ing to tie Indias fortunes to a declining United States (table 32)8

Great Power India

Indias political elite has long debated its actual and preferred status in world pol-itics9 Nehru and his followers wanted India to be acknowledged as a great power but of a new kind a standard-bearer for more peaceful and just international relations-a normative power rather than a conventional one10 This idea of Indian exceptionalism persists today even when modified by those who want India to be strong militarily as well as morally11 At the other end ofthe spectrum there are those who want India to cast off this moralistic baggage and become a conventional realist great power pursuing only its national interestsY

These elite debates depend on differing views-and differing measures-ofin-dias power and potential If we take Martin Wights realist definition of a great power-a power that has global interests and the capacity to promote and defend


them ifnecessary by force-then India is far from becoming one Indias economy is growing but remains small in comparison with those of other major powers especially in per capita termsB The World Bank ranked Indias GDP tenth in the world in 2012 at $1841 trillion but that makes its economy only about 11 per-cent ofthe size ofthe United States or 22 percent ofChinas14 Indias economy is roughly the size ofCanadas but supports more than thirty times the population About a third ofIndias people live at or below the poverty line and rural literacy rates especially among women remain poor by international standards

Indias linkages with global markets are thin it is very dependent on imported oil and natural gas especially from the Middle East though its high-technology and services sectors are well-connected into Western economies The bulk of Indias GDP growth over the past twenty-five years has come from growing do-mestic demand for domestically produced goods and servicesIS This is a source of both strength and weakness-India was arguably able to weather the global financial crisis of 2008-9 better than China because it was less exposed to global market instability but at the same time its economy would likely grow faster if it had more access to foreign capital and know-how

India has a huge number of military personnel-the third-largest globally at 13 million The army claims the biggest chunk of the defense budget arguably starving the air force and navy of resources and the quality of the equipment of all services is variable Much of the hardware is aging the bulk of Indias tanks date from the 1970s while some of its fighter aircraft were supplied in the 1960s It has roughly 80 to 100 nuclear warheads and some systems to deliver them-at present a mix of aircraft and short- to medium-range missiles-but its warhead designs are the least-tested of any nuclear power and it is far from realizing the delivery systems to which it aspires India has a weak indigenous defense indus-try-with some pockets of real excellence as in ballistic missiles-that struggles to produce good systems at a reasonable price For these reasons it has long been the biggest importer of military hardware in the world acquiring billions of dollars ofweapons from traditional suppliers like Russia and France and also from new ones like Israel and the United States But its notoriously slow-and sometimes corrupt-defense procurement system commonly delays the purchase of new equipment for years and sometimes decades 16

India is also beset with pressing complex internal and external security chal-lenges It has faced multiple insurgencies since 1947 These include the ongoing conflict with separatists in Kashmir clashes with various ethnic groups like the Mizos in Indias Northeast who fought a twenty-year conflict with government forces from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s and more recent troubles with the Maoist guerillas known as the Naxalites whose violence affected fully one-third of eastern India in the mid-2000s While these conflicts have diminished in scale in the past decade they continue to sap the resources ofthe state and undermine its legit-imacy especially where the actions of security forces are or have been repressive


The instability of Indias immediate geographical neighborhood and long-running disputes with China and Pakistan over their respective borders the treatment ofminorities and the management of resources including water also undermine Indias ability to project power and influence beyond its bordersY Political crises and conflict in BurmaMyanmar Nepal and Sri Lanka as well as illegal immigration from Bangladesh compound these problems tying up Indias stretched bureaucracy and security forces and distracting them from other issues

Finally India lacks the political and diplomatic apparatus of even a middling state let alone that of a great power Foreign and security policymaking in India is concentrated in the hands of a small group-the prime minister and a few key ministers and advisers with uniformed officers kept well away from the policy-making process for fear ofmilitary interference in civilian decision making India continues to have one of the smallest diplomatic services of any major state-it has roughly the same number of foreign service officers as Singapore-and one of the weakest academic and think tank sectors providing advice from outside government The few diplomats India has are high quality but they are widely dispersed across the Ministry of External Affairs and its overseas missions and thus are overburdened18

The Rise of India and the Regional Security Order

For the most part and in contrast to China Indias rise has been perceived with equanimity and some enthusiasm in the wider Asia-Pacific region In South Asia and in Beijing however the response has been more mixed Pakistan above all worries that a stronger India threatens its interests and even perhaps its integ-rity Beijing protested angrily about Indias nuclear tests in 1998 and refuses to acknowledge New Delhis claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Se-curity Council It has also made little effort to resolve its long-standing territo-rial dispute with India There are also periodic tensions with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as well as fears in the small states of the region-Bhutan the Maldives and Nepal-that India can be overbearing and interfering But these concerns are balanced by the hope that Indias economic growth will have spillover effects and stimulate greater regional integration

From a broad perspective one can see that Indias rise has affected the regions security order in three ways First its 1998 nuclear test decisively shifted the strategic balance in Asia even if commentators argue about Indias capacity to properly deter China19 Introducing nuclear weapons into South Asia dramatically raised the stakes of conflict with Pakistan and China as well as providing an op-portunity for a partial rapprochement with the United States Debate continues to rage about the effectiveness of the deterrent postures ofboth countries and about whether they have increased or undermined the stability of the India-Pakistan relationship20 What is clear however is that the tests had significant


results India got the breathing space it needed to concentrate on economic development and on modernizing its conventional military Pakistan succeeded in balancing Indias conventional superiority and arguably in reducing the like-lihood of another decisive defeat at the hands of its military

Second Indias rise has brought about the forging ofa strategic partnership with the United States changing the dynamics not just of their relationship but also ofAmerican and Indian relations with Beijing India and the United States are very far from being fully fledged allies but they now cooperate in ways that were inconceivable before 1998-in intelligence sharing for example and counterter-rorism In turn this new partnership has helped American-aligned states in the region to improve their relations with New Delhi not least Australia and Japan which have both moved to improve security cooperation and open economic opportunities in India And although neither India nor the United States wants to try to contain China both see value in coordinating their hedging strategies against the risk of more assertive (or even outright aggressive) Chinese policies that might emerge in the near future

Third Indias rise is changing the nature and intensity of its relations with states across the Asia-Pacific from West Asia to the Southwest Pacific As they develop their economies China and India are becoming more dependent on key commodities above all oil and natural gas on the security of the transit routes and on the stability of their suppliers Chinese and Indian attention is thus in-creasingly focused on the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean-and on their control21

Both China and India are increasingly bound to the Middle Eastern states In-dia is particularly dependent on Iranian crude oil This growing dependence is beginning to have effects on both the security order in the Middle East and the wider Asia-Pacific effects that will become more pronounced as the United States moves to energy independence As China and India become ever more involved in the dynamics of the Middle East driven by their interests in its hydrocarbon resources they will reshape its security order Arguably they already have Chi-nese support has helped to stymie Western efforts to aid Syrias rebels in its civil war while Indian connections to Iran have led to exceptions being made to US and UN sanctions on Tehran concerning its oil exports

Indias impact on the regional security order has been diminished however by its elites ingrained attitudes concerning the West alliances and multilat-eralism Indias elites have long been suspicious of Western motives scarred by their experience of European imperialism They remain wary especially of American intentions in the region and therefore also of American initiatives Nehrus intellectual legacy makes them cautious about realist tools like military alliances-redolent as they are ofthe kind ofpower politics he disdained-along with multilateralism except when it is under United Nations auspices or driven by developing countries India has now several strategic partnerships with


Asian states-not least with Indonesia Japan Singapore and Vietnam-as well as a partnership ofsorts with China And India is a member ofseveral important regional institutions including the East Asia Summit But India remains reluctant to make the kinds of binding commitments inherent in alliances or supranational institutions and it remains unclear whether these strategic partnerships which vary dramatically in content and momentum will provide the kind of returns that India seeks in terms of economic investment trade and security

Like India Japan may have claims to great power status in the future But as is discussed in the next section it is unclear whether Japan aspires to this status and whether it is close to acquiring it

Japan

Japans rise to great power status in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-turies was unique Facing increasing challenges from Western imperialism in Asia Japan responded by replacing feudal isolation with a modern economic po-litical and social system The slogan ofstrong army rich nation (fukokukyi5hei) encapsulated the governments strategic thinking during this period Japan would modernize by building up its economic and military structures to achieve greater prestige and powerY

Japans strategy proved remarkably effective and the country quickly sought to take a leading role in international affairs Indeed unlike much ofAsia Japan was not only able to resist Western incursions but also soon came to emulate Western imperialismB Starting in 1876 when it became increasingly active on the Korean Peninsula until its empire reached its zenith in 1942Japan amassed colonies throughout Asia and the Pacific By August 1945 howeverJapans strate-gic overreach and the increasing militarization of its foreign policies had led the country to disaster in its push for empire Japan had suffered immense physical economic and social destruction while also inflicting enormous suffering on the peoples ofAsia and the Pacific24

The legacies ofthese horrors and the comprehensive reforms implemented by the United States-led Occupation authorities in Japan from 1945 until1952 had a major impact on the countrys postwar society They also continue to resonate in Japans strategic thinking today The immediate Occupation reforms focused on democratization demilitarization and economic revitalization with an important change being the introduction of a new Constitution For foreign affairs it was Article 9 of this new document that left the greatest legacy underpinning the pacifism ofJapans postwar security strategy by renouncing war as a sovereign right25 When the Occupation ended Japan entered into an alliance with its former enemy the United States which would underpin Japans national security strategy for the remainder ofthe Cold War and beyond Yetthe relationship with the United States was an unequal one Japans security was now provided by the United States


in return for the provision ofbases for US military forces in Japan In the ideolog-ical and strategic confrontation of the Cold War Japan had become an important but junior ally of the United States within the San Francisco alliance system26

This unequal relationship required Japan to reassess its strategic priorities The country now focused on economic development while leaving its security to the United States This policy was encouraged by the United States but political leaders like former prime minister Yoshida Shigeru also resisted demands for the country to quickly rebuild its defense capabilities Indeed Yoshida and his suc-cessors were so successful in these endeavors that the countrys grand strategy came to be known as the Yoshida DoctrineP The subsequent story of]apans Cold War strategic thinking is one ofthe nations leadership coming to terms with the implications of these new largely self-imposed constraints

By the 1970s Japan was no longer a country devastated by war but was again a leading economic power Yet it remained largely absent from the security field and implemented a range of pacifist policies such as those based on its three nonnuclear principles-banning the possession manufacture and introduction of nuclear weapons into the country28 According to constructivists this has been evidence that Japans grand strategy has not followed a realist path but has in-stead been based on the structure ofthe state and a mix ofsocial and legal norms These norms have included the primacy of economics over security and a post-war culture of antimilitarism Others have continued to view Japan in realist terms but as a mercantile rather than traditional realist 29 Japan undoubtedly developed new ways of thinking about security broadening the terms mean-ing from the late 1970s under the banner of comprehensive security to also include energy food and other types of security30

When the Cold War came to an end however the international environment underpinningJapans strategic thinking disappeared Japan was again searching for a new international role The 1991 GulfWar exposed the nation to accusations offree-riding on the United States security guarantee and ofresorting to check-book diplomacy as a result of its failure to do little more than provide financial support albeit to the tune of $13 billion The shifting post-Cold War order also prompted wider reassessments Realists soon came to argue that the changes to the international order would increasingly push Japan toward accepting a more normal international role to not do this would be a structural anomaly Such diplomatic humiliations and wider changes would lead the country to engage in a lengthy debate over its international role (table 33)31

Great Power Japan

Given this complicated strategic legacy is Japan a great power today If measured by defense spending the answer is yes At $501 billion in 2013Japans spending on defense remains the seventh highest in the world and Japans defense forces


Table 33 Japan Key Dates

Date Event

1876 Began colonial expansion August 11894-April 17 1895 First Sino-Japanese War July 7 1937-September 9 1945 Second Sino-Japanese War December 7 1941 Entered World War II September 2 1945 Surrendered to end World War II 1945-52 Occupied by the United States 1947a Adopted its Constitution

bullThe Constitution was promulgated in 1946 but it is generally referred to as the 1947 Constitution after the year it came into effect Government of]apan The Constitution ofjapan (Tokyo Government of]a pan 2015) httpjapankanteigojp constitution_and_government_ of_japan constitution_ e html

have been described as the most modern Asian armed forces in terms of equip-ment32 This is true despite the fact that the country spends less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense Although its security strategy remains defensive Japan continues to strengthen its hard power capabilities In August 2013 for example Japan launched the 27000-ton helicopter carrier the Izumo allowing it to deliver air defense more effectively over its distant territo-ries In its National Security Strategy of December 2013Japan announced that it would build a comprehensive defense architecture while also focusing on the protection of the nations territorial integrity33

The question of whether Japan is a great power therefore has so far revolved largely around whether Japan desires to be one Power as constructivists might argue is what states make of it34 In the debate that followed the 1991 Gulf War politicians and commentators began to question whether the country needed to become a normal nation (futsii no kuni) once again During this debate figures such as Ichir6 Ozawa argued thatJapan should take up greater responsibilities as part of the international community35 This would include working more closely with the United Nations and other multilateral organizations in activities such as international peacekeeping and official development assistance For others how-ever becoming a normal nation entailed removing the postwar restrictions on national security such as Article 9 of the Constitution and the Yoshida Doctrine They argued that Japan needed to become a country more capable of defending itself and its partners Since 2001 prime ministers such as Junichir6 Koizumi and Shinz6 Abe have strongly argued that becoming a normal nation required chang-ing the Constitution relaxing restrictions on arms exports and giving Japan the right to collective self-defense that is the right to help defend others if they are under attack36

Japans self-conception of its international role thus remains ambivalent


Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon have argued that during the 1990s Japan first sought to define itself as a global civilian power before becoming a global ordinary power37 Conversely Yoshihide Soeya has argued that Japans na-tional strategy has effectively remained consistent-a de facto middle power choice38 Soeya sees the idea of middle power diplomacy as an appropriate en-capsulation of Yoshidas decision to rely on the United States for security and instead focus on economic development This decision has been maintained into the post-Cold War period despite the efforts of nationalist politicians such as Koizumi and Abe Indeed Japans policies Soeya argues hardly reflect the sort of diplomacy conducted by strategically independent great powers39

Yet if]apan is a middle power it is an atypical one In addition to its high level ofdefense spending as well as the exceptional technical proficiency ofits defense forces Japan has considerable capacity to upgrade its strategic capabilities As the worlds third-largest economy and being still far more advanced technologically than other countries in the Asia-Pacific it enjoys the industrial base to further develop its defense forces even within current political constraints Japans ca-pacity to influence regional diplomacy through links resulting from its extensive trade and official development assistance also continues to be strong even if]a-pan does not dominate the regions economy as it once did Japan remains a key ally of the United States If it could further reorient its national security strategy continue strengthening its diplomatic partnerships around the region and press ahead with economic reform Japan could once again become a strategically in-dependent great power40

Japan and the Regional Order In Decline or Resurgent

How might a shift in Japanese power-toward either middle power or great power status-affect the regional order Until now Japans postwar grand strategy to-ward the region has been heavily reliant on strategic reassurance41 That is mind-ful ofthe mistrust in the region due to its legacy ofaggression from World War II Japan accepted the limitations on its own power as a way to reassure the region about its intentions The vital alliance with the United States provided a so-called cap in the bottle of potential Japanese militarism by sidestepping the need for Japan to rapidly rebuild its own defense capabilities To this Japan added an ex-traordinarily cautious defense policy known as defensive defense (senshuboei) while committing to never again play a unilateral military role in the region42 At the turn of the century therefore it could be argued that Japan was a cir-cumscribed balancer weary of creating countervailing alliances and avoidant of developing offensive grand strategies43

Japans potential impact on the Asia-Pacific order of course presupposes an already set order in the region Yet the region is undergoing dramatic change Ja-pans strategic reassurance and circumscribed balancing followed from its domi-


nance in Asia the continuance of American hegemony in the region and the rec-ognition of these realities by China-all elements of the Cold War order The rise of China and the emergence of clear Sino-Japanese rivalry since 2010 however have raised doubts about all these assumptions To understand how Japan might affect the regional order therefore it is necessary to consider simultaneously how these changes could reshape Japans future strategic circumstances and the type of power it now wishes to be

One can envisage a number of different scenarios that Japan might face in the coming decade or two and then extrapolate Japanese responses and likely effects from there At present a regional order shaped by Sino-American strategic ri-valry seems most likely Faced with such a strategic rivalry scenario Japan would most likely seek to reinforce its alliance with the United States and expand its relationships with other US partners In fact signs of this scenario are already apparent with Japan establishing a range of strategic partnerships around the region most notably with Australia and India44 Continuity would be the main feature of such a scenario and Japans great power status would have the least impact on the regional order because the pressures of a new balance of power across Asia would push Japan even further into the regions American-led se-curity framework These pressures would however also push Japan away from being a circumscribed balancer or constrained great power following a policy of strategic reassurance indeed Prime Minister Abe has already moved Japan to-ward a policy ofcollective self-defense Under such a scenario it can be assumed that this transition would continue and Japan would become a more assertive actor in international affairs though not necessarily a great power

Such circumstances might have a particularly destabilizing effect on regional order under an abandonment scenario-that is if] a pan were to be abandoned as part of a new balance of power in the region If the United States were to retrench from Asia rather than consolidate its alliance system and if this were to lead to Japans loss of Americas security guarantee Japan could respond as realists have long suggested by rapidly building up its own military capabilities such as a nuclear deterrence capability to quickly become a traditional great power45

This would likely trigger a major regional arms race heightening the risk of a confrontation between Japan and other regional powers particularly China A US departure from the region however appears a remote possibility in light of the Obama administrations efforts to boost the United States engagement with the region and the strong possibility of Obamas successor following a similar if not even more assertive approach46

Abandonment however may not come about as part of a US strategy of re-trenchment Under a concert-of-powers scenario-whereby the United States and China agree to a mutually constructed regional order-Japan would not be abandoned by the United States so much as sidelined as the United States came to a strategic accommodation with China According to Hugh White a Concert of Asia would require Japan to become a more independent actor allowing a more


even balance to emerge between the United States and ChinaY Yet it is not clear that Japan sidelined by the other great powers could then manage this kind of transition without upsetting the Sino-American accommodation The question then is whether Japan would become a destabilizing force in this new order To avoid such a scenario Japan would need to strengthen its reassurance pol-icy rather than discard it perhaps by recommitting to its postwar antimilitarist norms Yet the mixture of nationalism and security assertiveness pushed by the Abe administration belies such a possibility

In the end Japans status will depend heavily on its own capacity to build and maintain the attributes of a great power Japan has stagnated economically for more than twenty years now-the so-called lost decades-and has only rarely demonstrated the capacity or willingness to undertake the reforms necessary for recovery If this situation persists economic stagnation and demographic de-cline will make Japans great power prospects considerably different than those of younger more dynamic India Optimistically a slow decline implies that Ja-pan would become a marginal weight in regional affairs happy with its mid-dle power status and continuing to support its alliance with the United States but without being a central player48 Under a scenario where the United States retrenches from Asia a declining Japan could choose to accommodate a rising China or continue this accommodation according to some and so choose the middle power path49 Conversely extended decline could be dangerous if it were to lead to something like the abandonment scenario mentioned above In decline and in attempting to reverse such a middle power choice Japan could become more nationalistic and a destabilizing force in the region 5deg

All these scenarios contain significant elements ofrisk for both Japan and Asia An accommodation of China-particularly regarding the dispute over the Sen-kakuDiaoyu Islands-would assist in defusing the growing Sino-American ri-valry and potentially help create a concert situation like the one described above This could be Japans most positive contribution to a stable regional order Yet accepting the resulting middle power status would be unpalatable to Japanese leaders Greater nationalism in the political class especially since Abe became prime minister in December 2012 reduces the likelihood that Japan will accept such a status 51 Abe has asserted that Japan will not become a tier two nation52

Instead Japans troubled relationship with China provides further impetus for it to become a great power once again while also suggesting that any transition is unlikely to be smooth

Conclusion

Neither India nor Japan is likely to emerge as a great power anytime soon but both will play major roles in the regional security order Conscious of Chinas rise and its own limited economic and military power India like many other regional states has adopted a hedging strategy concentrating as its first prior-


ity on raising its population out of poverty acquiring nuclear weapons to buy it time to modernize its conventional forces and tentatively engaging with selected strategic partners and regional institutions This strategy is not likely to change for a decade or two unless India suffers some dramatic endogenous or exogenous shock such as a severe downturn in its economic fortunes or a surprise attack from China or Pakistan

Japans strategic direction by comparison seems poised for change Certainly its currently ambiguous status-not quite a great power but much more than a middle power-complicates the regional security order and in particular Sino-American relations Yet which strategic trajectory provides the best route to stability either for the region or for Japan is unclear CertainlyJapan has sought to develop its relationships across the region as well as its own security capabil-ities and its latent power means that it could extend its diplomatic and military capacities considerably However its troublesome relationship with China and its confused vision for its own international status means thatJapan has become less able to provide strategic reassurance to the region than in the past

In conclusion it should be observed that the policies of both India and Japan call into question a number of key theoretical arguments Neither has behaved as realists would expect putting security first building military power and us-ing force to secure their interests Instead India remains restrained even when subjected to cross-border attacks and incursions from Pakistan or China and focused on domestic challenges while Japan continues to adhere to the postwar limitations placed upon its security policies notwithstanding recent changes Both nations continue to aspire to being normative or middle powers influencing the world with ideas rather than coercion But at the same time democratic India does not always behave as liberals would predict-it remains wary about the sup-posed benefits of economic interdependence and multilateral security pacts In both states there are active debates about what sorts of powers India and Japan should be lending some support to the constructivist argument that ideas and identities shape policies and behavior

Key Points

bull India is an emerging power but it is some way from becoming a great power-even if its elites decided that it ought to be a conventional instead of a nor-mative great power

bull India remains very cautious about binding multilateral agreements or even bilateral alliances preferring to pursue a hedging strategy to deal with the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States

bull The legacy ofJapans imperial past wartime experience and recovery during the Cold War continues to play a major role in Japans contemporary strategic thinking Of particular importance has been the Yoshida Doctrine


bull The factors shaping Japans great power status are as much political and insti-tutional as they are material Yet Japan remains ambivalent about the kind of great power it wishes to become

bull A fundamental transformation of]apans international status could destabilize the regional security order Two key variables in this respect are Japans rela-tionship with the United States and the latters own rivalry with China

Questions

1 Is Indian foreign policy still driven more by ideology than self-interest

2 Did Indias acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 enhance or diminish its security

3 How has the Yoshida Doctrine shaped Japans strategic thinking and interna-tional status

4 What does it mean for Japan to become a normal nation

5 Are India and Japan great powers or not great powers How do the different security study theories help to answer this question

Guide to Further Reading

On India Cohen Stephen P India Emerging Power Washington DC Brookings Institution

Press 2004 A classic-and very accessible-American assessment ofIndias foreign and security policy

Ganguly Sumit ed Indias Foreign Policy Retrospect and Prospect New Delhi Oxford Uni-versity Press 2012

Mohan Raja C Crossing the Rubicon The Shaping ofIndias New Foreign Policy New Delhi Viking 2003 Another classic work but written by a prominent Indian realist arguing that Indias foreign policy has been transformed since 1991

Panagariya Arvind India The Emerging Giant New York Oxford University Press 2008 The major study ofIndias changing economy

On Japan Goh Evelyn How Japan Matters in the Evolving East Asia Security Order International Affairs 87 no 4 (2011) 887-902 httpdxdoiorg101111j1468-2346201101009x

Pyle Kenneth B]apan Rising The Resurgence ofjapanese Power and Purpose New York Public Affairs 2007 Written by one ofthe foremost historians of]apan]apan Rising traces the countrys engagement with the world from the nineteenth century until today


Samuels Richard) Securing japan Tokyos Grand Strategy and the future ofEast Asia Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 2007 Samuelss Securing japan remains the seminal work on japanese strategic thinking in the twentieth century

Taylor Brendan Asias Century and the Problem of]apans Centrality International Affairs 87 no 4 (2011) 871-85 httpdxdoiorg101111j1468-2346201101008x In this important debate Goh and Taylor lay out contrasting prognoses ofjapans future significance to the Asia-Pacific order

Notes

1 jonathan Holslag China and India Prospects for Peace (New York Columbia University Press 2009) 10-11

2 Stephen P Cohen India Emerging Power (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press2004)41-43

3 Christophe )affrelot Indias Look East Policy An Asianist Strategy in Perspective India Review 2 no 3 (2003) 35-68

4 Ian Hall The Engagement of India in The Engagement of India Strategies and Re-sponses ed Ian Hall (Washington DC Georgetown University Press 2014)

5 George J Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior Growing Power and Alarm (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2012) 254

6 Harsh V Pant The US-India 1XFOHaUPact Policy Process and Great Power Poli-tics Asian Security 5 no 3 (2009) 273-95

7 Ian Hall China Crisis Indian Strategy Political Realism and the Chinese Challenge Asian Security 8 no 1 (2012) 84-92

8 Sunil Khilnani and Srinath Raghavan Nonalignment 20 A Foreign ampStrategic Policy for India in the 21st Century (Harmondsworth UK Penguin 2013)

9 For an interesting discussion see Amrita Narlikar All That Glitters Is Not Gold Indias Rise to Power Third World Quarterly 28 no 5 (2007) 983-96 and Cohen India Emerging Power

10 Ian Hall Normative Power India in China India and International Society edJa-mie Gaskarth (Lanham MD Rowman amp Littlefield 2015) On Nehrus views see inter alia Ritu Sharma Nehrus World-View An Alternative to the Superpowers Model of International Relations India Quarterly Ajournal of International Affairs 45 no 4 (1989) 324-32 The classic study of the idea of a normative power is by Ian Manners Norma-tive Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms journal ofCommon Market Studies 40 no 2 (2002) 235-58

11 Ian Hall The other Exception India as a Rising Power Australian journal ofInter-national Affairs 64 no 5 (2010) 601-11

12 See eg Raja C Mohan Crossing the Rubicon The Shaping ofIndias New Foreign Policy (New Delhi Viking 2003)

13 Martin Wight Power Politics ed Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London Leices-ter University Press 1995) 50

14 World Bank Gross Domestic Product 2012 httpdatabankworldbankorgdata downloadGDPpdf


15 For the best general discussion ofIndias changing economy see Arvind Panagariya India The Emerging Giant (New York Oxford University Press 2008)

16 Stephen P Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta Arming without Aiming Indias Military Mod-ernization (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 2012)

17 On this topic see Brahma Chellaney Water Asias New Battleground (Washington DC Georgetown University Press 2013)

18 See especially Daniel Markey Developing Indias Foreign Policy Software Asia Policy 8 no 1 (2009) 73-96 and Manjari Chatterjee Miller Indias Feeble Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs May-June 2013

19 Ian Hall The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia Nonproliferation Review 21 nos 3-4 (2014) 355-71

20 See eg Sumit Ganguly and S Paul Kapur India Pakistan and the Bomb Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York Columbia University Press 2010)

21 See C Raja Mohan Samudra Man than Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Washing-ton DC Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012)

22 Richard) Samuels Securing japan Tokyos Grand Strategy and the future ofEast Asia (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 2007) 15-18 See also Richard J Samuels Rich Na-tion Strong Army National Security and the Technological Transformation ofjapan (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1994) 34-42

23 Akira Iriyejapan and the Wider World From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present (London Longman 1997) 11-22

24 See Kenneth B Pyle japan Rising The Resurgence ofjapanese Power and Purpose (New York Public Affairs 2007) 185-96 For a study of the suffering inflicted by Japan on the region see Yoshimi Yoshiaki Comfort Women Sexual Slavery in the japanese Military during World War II trans Suzanne OBrien (New York Columbia University Press 1995) On the strategic thinking that led Japan to war see jack Snyder Myths ofEmpire Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1991) 112-52

25 Prime Minister of]apan and His Cabinet Constitution ofjapan May 3 1947 www kanteigo jpforeignconstitution_and_government_of_j a panconstitution_ehtml Concerning the drafting of the postwar Constitution see John W Dower Embracing Defeat japan in the Wake ofWorld War Two (New York W W Norton) 346-404

26 See Roger Buckley US-japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992) 27-114 and Kent E Calder Securing Security through Prosper-ity The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective Pacific Review 17 no 1 (2004) 135-57 See also Michael] Green Balance of Power in US-japan Relations in a Changing World ed Steven K Vogel (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 2002) 9-34 at 12-14

27 Samuels Securing japan 29-37 28 On Sates three nonnuclear principles see Andrew L Oros Normalizing japan Poli-

tics Identity and the Evolution ofSecurity Practice (Stanford CA Stanford University Press 2008) 102-7

29 For Japans postwar culture of antimilitarism see Thomas U Berger From Sword to Chrysanthemum Japans Culture of Anti-Militarism International Security 17 no 4 (1993) 119-50 On the wider norms underpinningJapanese security policy during this pe-riod see PeterJ Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara Japans National Security Structures


Norms and Policies International Security 17 no 4 (1993 ) 84-118 For Japans mercantile realism see Eric Heginbotham and Richard] Samuels Mercantile Realism andJapanese Foreign Policy International Security 22 no 4 (1998) 171-203 See also H D P Envall japanese Diplomacy The Role of Leadership (Albany State University of New York Press 2015) 63-67

30 Eiichi Katahara Japans Concept ofComprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World in Power and Prosperity Economics and Security Linkages in the Asia-Pacific ed Susan L Shirk and Christopher P Twomey (New Brunswick NJ Transaction 1996) 213-31 at 214-19

31 Christopher W Hughesjapans Security Agenda Military Economic and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder CO Lynne Rienner 2004) 159-60 Also see Samuels Securing japan 66-67 For the 1990s structural realist viewpoint on Japan as a structural anomaly see Kenneth N Waltz The Emerging Structure of International Politics International Security 18 no 2 (1993) 44-79

32 International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Military Balance 114 no 1 (2014) 250 See also International Institute for Strategic Studies Comparative Defense Statistics Military Balance 114 no 1 (2014) 23

33 Regarding the Izumo see Benjamin Schreer The Aircraft Carrier That Isnt Ja-pans New Helicopter Destroyer Strategist August 19 2013 httpwwwaspistrategist orgauthe-aircraft-carrier-that-isnt-japans-new-helicopter-destroyer OnJapans com-prehensive security architecture see Gove~nment of]apan National Security Strategy December 17 2013 15

34 Alexander Wendt Anarchy Is What States Make of It The Social Construction of Power Politics International Organization 46 no 2 (1992) 391-425

35 David A Welch Embracing Normalcy Toward a Japanese National Strategy in japan as a Normal Country A Nation in Search ofIts Place in the World ed Yoshihide Soeya Masayuki Tadokoro and David A Welch (Toronto University of Toronto Press 2011) 16-37 at 29-30

36 H D P En vall Transforming Security Politics KoizumiJunichiro and the Gaullist Tradition in Japan Electronic journal ofContemporary japanese Studies 8 no 2 (2008) www japanesestudiesorgukarticles2008Envallhtml H D P Envall Japans Strategic Challenges in Asia AliA Policy Commentary 15 (2013) 37-43 at 38-39

37 Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon Japans Emerging Role as a Global Ordinary Power International Relations ofthe Asia-Pacific 6 no 1 (2006) 1-21 at 4-5

38 Yoshihide Soeya A Normal Middle Power Interpreting Changes in Japanese Se-curity Policy in the 1990s and After in japan as a Normal Country ed Soeya Tadokoro and Welch 72-97 at 74

39 Yoshihide Soeya Japanese Middle-Power Diplomacy East Asia Forum No-vember 27 2012 httpwwweastasiaforumorg20121122japanese-middle-power -diplomacy Also see Yoshihide Soeya Nihon no MidoruPawiiGaiko Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Koso (Japans Middle Power Diplomacy The Choices and Plans ofPostwar Japan) (To-kyo Chikuma Shinsho 2005) 23-24

40 Michael J Green Japan Is Back Unbundling Japans Grand Strategy Analysis Lowy Institute for International Policy December 2013 3-4 On recent movements in Ja-pans approach to arms exports see Abe Set to Lift Arms Embargo to Nations Involved in


Armed Conflicts Asahi Shimbun February 23 2014 ajwasahicomarticlebehind_news politicsAJ201402230016

41 Paul Midford The Logic ofReassurance andJapans Grand Strategy Security Stud-ies 11 no 3 (2002) 1-43 at 1

42 Ibid 28-30 Regarding Japans role in the regionalization process see Evelyn Goh HowJapan Matters in the Evolving East Asia Security Order International Affairs 87 no 4 (2011) 887-902 at 899-900

43 Christopher P Twomey Japan a Circumscribed Balancer Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security Security Studies 9 no 4 (2000) 167-205 at 168

44 Thomas S Wilkins Japans Alliance Diversification A Comparative Analysis ofthe Indian and Australian Strategic Partnerships International Relations ofthe Asia-Pacific 11 no 1 (2011) 115-55 H D P Envall Japans India Engagement From Different Worlds to Strategic Partners in Engagement ofIndia ed Hall 39-59

45 Samuels Securing japan 151 46 Mark E Manyin Stephen Daggett Ben Dolven Susan V Lawrence Michael F Mar-

tin Ronald ORourke and Bruce Vaughn Pivot to the Pacific The Obama Administrations Rebalancing toward Asia CRS Report for Congress R42448 (Washington DC Congressio-nal Research Service 2012)

47 Hugh White The China Choice Why America Should Share Power (Collingwood Aus-tralia Black Inc 2012) 142-43

48 On Japan becoming a marginal weight see Brendan Taylor Asias Century and the Problem of]apans Centrality International Affairs 87 no 4 (2011) 871-85 at 882

49 BjornJerden and Linus Hagstrom RethinkingJapans China Policy Japan as an Ac-commodator in the Rise of China 1978-2011 journal ofEast Asian Studies 12 no 2 (2012) 215-50

50 H D P Envall Implications for Asia in Japans Economic Decline East Asia Forum Quarterly 2 no 3 (2010) 28-29 at 28

51 H D P Envall Abes Yasukuni Visit Escalates Tensions in Asia East Asia Forum January 3 2014 wwweastasiaforumorg20140103abes-yasukuni-visit-escalates -tensions-in-asia

52 Cited by Green Japan Is Back 2


Table 31 India and Japan Key Facts

Characteristic India Japan

Official languages Hindi English Japanese Population 126 billion (2014) 1271 million (2014) Land area 33 million square kilometers 378000 square kilometers GDP $20495 billion (2014) $46163 billion (2014) Principal export United States (133) United United States (186) China

destinations Arab Emirates Hong Kong South Korea Principal import China Saudi Arabia United China United States Australia

sources Arab Emirates Number of military 2749700 (2013) 259800 (2013)

personnelbull

bullworld Bank Armed forces Personnel Total (Washington DC World Bank 2015) httpdata worldbankorgindicator MSMILTOTLP1 Source Unless otherwise specified above data are from the Australian Department of foreign Af-fairs and Trade japan Country fact Sheet (Canberra Commonwealth ofAustralia 2014) httpdfat govautraderesourcesDocumentsjapanpdf and Australian Department of foreign Affairs and Trade India Country fact Sheet (Canberra Commonwealth of Australia 2014) httpdfatgovau traderesourcesDocuments inia pdf

ing worldviews of their policymaking elites who are involved with foreign and security policy It argues that Indias rise is likely to be slower and more difficult than some enthusiasts might believe and thatJapan with its complicated history in the Asia-Pacific remains conflicted about the kind of power it wishes to be It argues that Indias ability to shape regional order is inhibited by inherited but still influential attitudes in New Delhi that are skeptical about alliances and by Chinas ability to dissuade New Delhi from courses of action that might not be in Beijings interests It argues that Japans influence will depend on whether or how it transitions from its current role as a constrained major power to becom-ing either a more modest middle power or a fully independent strategic power (table 31)

India

When India became independent in 1947 it had a population ofabout 350 million and a gross domestic product ( GDP) ofabout $222 billion1 Sixty-seven years later in 2014 Indias population was over 12 billion and its GDP was estimated at about $2049 trillion But with a huge population the bulk of which is employed in ag-riculture in global terms India remains poor with a limited capacity to maintain military forces with a regional let alone global reach

Indias leaders have tried coping with its weaknesses in different ways From


1947 to 1964 under its first prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru India es-poused nonalignment aiming to maintain good relations with both East and west and the developing world but making no alliances For Nehru interna-tional security was best achieved by adhering to principles of peaceful coexis-tence-respecting the sovereignty and independence of all states not interfer-ing in their internal affairs and refraining from aggression These convictions were shaken however by Chinas defeat of India in a border war in 1962 and a series of conflicts with Pakistan

After Nehrus death in 1964 Indias foreign and security policy moved toward what is known as militant Nehruvianism India sought what it called strategic autonomy but downplayed its earlier idealism2 India modernized its military fought and won two wars against Pakistan (in 1965 and 1971) and concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics (USSR) which gave it access to Soviet markets and military hardware It also initiated a program to build a nuclear bomb in response to Chinas test of a bomb in 1964 In 1974 it tested a nuclear device but did not move to develop or deploy nuclear weapons

The collapse of the USSR in late 1991 began the third phase of Indian for-eign and security policy Plunged into economic crisis by the dramatic rise in oil prices caused by the 1991 Gulf War Indias government embarked on some liberalization of its heavily protected economy to try to stimulate growth and began to build new relationships that might give it access to badly needed capi-tal It launched a Look East policy trying to improve relations with East Asian states including]apan and the ASEAN countries3 But Indias difficult relationship with Pakistan which continued to sponsor insurgency in the disputed region of Kashmir persisted and Beijings inexorable rise caused concern to New Delhi Indias elite realized that its economy though improving might take decades to catch up with Chinas that its military was in desperate need of modernization and that unlike other regional states like Australia or Japan it was not protected by great power security guarantees

To give India breathing space to solve these problems as well as to assert its standing as a major power its leaders ordered the testing of five further nuclear devices in 1998 declared India a fully fledged nuclear power and moved to de-velop and deploy nuclear warheads and delivery systems (principally aircraft eventually to be replaced by nuclear-capable missiles launched from land and sea) This move was widely condemned by other states which were angry about the impact of Indias move on the nuclear nonproliferation program and was swiftly followed by six Pakistani tests and the announcement that Pakistan was now also a nuclear power

In time the tests stimulated a process of diplomatic reengagement between India and the United States which had long been estranged from each other but whose elites began to perceive that better relations might be in their mutual



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