Archeological Verification Fish Creek Saratoga Battlefield ...

Archeological Verification

Fish Creek Saratoga Battlefield Seigeline

American Battlefield Protection Program

Grant # GA2255-09-026

Prepared for

Saratoga Preserve Land and Nature (P.L.A.N.)

Saratoga Springs, New York

Prepared by

John Milner Associates, Inc.

West Chester Pennsylvania

December 2010

ARCHEOLOGICAL VERIFICATION FISH CREEK SARATOGA BATTLEFIELD SIEGELINE

AMERICAN BATTLEFIELD PROTECTION PROGRAM GRANT # GA2255-09-026

Prepared for

Saratoga Preserve Land and Nature (P.L.A.N.) 112 Spring Street

Saratoga Springs, New York 12866

Prepared by

Wade P. Catts, RPA Phillip Pendelton Timothy Mancl

Peter Leach, RPA

John Milner Associates, Inc. 535 N. Church Street

West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380

December 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARCHEOLOGICAL VERIFICATION- FISH CREEK SARATOGA BATTLEFIELD SIEGELINE AMERICAN BATTLEFIELD PROTECTION PROGRAM GRANT # GA2255-09-026

TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures 1.0 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Purpose and Goals of the Investigation .............................................................................. 1 1.2 Corbett Parcel Setting ......................................................................................................... 3 2.0 Historical Overview......................................................................................................................... 6 2.1 The Siege of Saratoga, 10-17 October: Context ................................................................. 6 2.2 Field Fortifications at Saratoga......................................................................................... 10 2.3 Corbett Parcel History ...................................................................................................... 12 3.0 Previous Archeological Investigations........................................................................................... 15 4.0 Research Questions and Field Methods ......................................................................................... 16 4.1 Research Questions........................................................................................................... 16 4.2 Archeological Field Methods............................................................................................ 17 4.2.1 Ground-penetrating Radar (GPR) ........................................................................ 17 4.2.2 Metal Detector Survey ......................................................................................... 19 4.2.3 Test Excavations .................................................................................................. 19 4.2.4 Topographic Mapping.......................................................................................... 19 5.0 Archeological Results .................................................................................................................... 20 5.1 Topographic Mapping....................................................................................................... 20 5.2 GPR Survey ...................................................................................................................... 20 5.3 Metal Detection................................................................................................................. 20 5.4 Test Excavations ............................................................................................................... 25 5.5 Artifact Analysis ............................................................................................................... 25 6.0 Summary and Recommendations .................................................................................................. 29 7.0 References Cited ............................................................................................................................ 30 Appendix I: Philip Pendleton, “Military-Historical Data: Fish Creek American Positions – Archeological Verification and Cultural Landscape Inventory (27 December 2010) Appendix II: Corbett Parcel Title Information (compiled by Philip Pendleton) Appendix III: William Griswold, “Management Summary: Resistance Survey of a Presumed Revolutionary War Fortification Site, Victory, New York.” On file, Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York (2006) Appendix IV: Artifact Inventory

LIST OF FIGURES


LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Project Area Location, USGS Schuylerville Quadrangle, 1967. Figure 2. View to the north of the Corbett Parcel, showing the berm along Fish Creek. The creek valley drops sharply to the left. Figure 3. View to the northwest of the Corbett Parcel, showing surface debris. Figure 4. View to the west of the Corbett Parcel during October field investigations. Total Station mapping is visible, along with metal detection. Fish Creek valley is in the background, behind the berm. Figure 5. View to the north of the concrete pillars, Fish Creek is to the left. Berm is evident. Figure 6. Lt. W.C. Wilkinson, Plan of the Position Genl. Burgoine Took at Saratoga (published by William Faden, London, 1780) Figure 7. J.H.D. Gerlach, Plan de la Position de General Bourgoyne ã Saratoga (Digitales Archive Marburg. http://www.digam.net/?dok=2058 - Ausstellung: http://www.digam.net/?exp=177). Figure 8. Henry Carrington map of the Siege of Saratoga (Carrington 1881). Figure 9. Location map for JMA archeological, geophysical, and topographic surveys, as well as the location of the previous geophysical survey by Griswold (2006) at the Corbett Parcel. Figure 10. Location of archeological and geophysical testing areas in relation to modern local topography at the Corbett Parcel. Figure 11. Three-dimensional topography and interpolated surface prior to sediment removal. Figure 12. Representative ground-penetrating radar time slice at 90 cm below surface with a 20 cm depth window. Figure 13. Representative ground-penetrating radar cross-section profile and interpreted stratigraphy. Figure 14. North profile of excavation units at the Corbett Parcel along Fish Creek. Figure 15. View of the excavation of EUs 1, 2 and 3 into the berm, looking west towards Fish Creek valley.

1.0 INTRODUCTION


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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE AND GOALS OF THE INVESTIGATION JMA (John Milner Associates, Inc.) and independent historian Philip E. Pendleton performed an archeological investigation of a study area located in and adjacent to the village of Victory in the Town of Saratoga in Saratoga County. The investigation was funded by a grant from the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) of the National Park Service (NPS). The study area, representing a portion of a larger historical resource identified by NPS as constituting the Siege of Saratoga battlefield (NY 226), is designated the Fish Creek American Positions (FCAP) (Figure 1). This battlefield was classified in the 2007 ABPP Report to Congress on the Battlefields of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 as a Priority I, Class A resource for future preservation purposes (Gossett and Mitchell 2007:53). The Siege of Saratoga, in which American troops under General Horatio Gates surrounded an invading British army under General Sir John Burgoyne and besieged the latter with bombardment and sniping, took place during 10-17 October 1777. The siege, a crucial episode in the War of Independence, resulted in Burgoyne’s surrender on 17 October. The American victory at Saratoga is generally credited with bringing France into the war on the American side and thus enabling America’s ultimate success in the conflict. The study tract, approximately 100 acres in extent, straddles Fish Creek. It contains land on the north bank of the creek through which American soldiers moved on the morning of October 11 to a planned assault on the great south redoubt in the British lines. As events developed, the assault was called off and the Americans withdrew after some skirmishing. The study area portion on the south bank of Fish Creek consists of land that was the site of the central segment of the American siege lines during the siege. An interpretive walking trail has been proposed for the project study area that would link up with the unit of Saratoga National Historical Park known as Victory Woods, which adjoins the study area to the north. Saratoga P.L.A.N. is facilitating the furtherance of that goal. There are two components to the 2010-2011 Fish Creek American Positions project. The first is a Cultural Landscape Inventory (CLI) for the entire 100-acre study area. The goals of the CLI are to 1) document the site-specific history of the study area, concentrating on changes in settlement patterns, land use, and architectural landscape over time, and in particular on the relationship of the study area to the military-historical events that took place at Saratoga in the autumn of 1777; 2) inventory the landscape characteristics and features surviving within the study area that help to convey the historic significance of the tract; 3) assess the potential National Register eligibility of the study area for its significance under Criteria A and D as a battlefield; and 4) establish a baseline of information enabling the design of a preservation program for the protection of the integrity of the historic setting and contributing historic resources within the study area. The CLI is issued under separate cover. The second component of the ABPP grant is an Archeological Verification (AV) to document the purported American siege lines located on the south bank of Fish Creek within the study area and confirm or refute the existence of remnants of the American earthworks. The subject of the present report, the AV focused its effort on a one-acre parcel, designated the Corbett Parcel, located on the heights on the south bank and containing an earthen berm that possessed potential as a rare surviving military earthworks from siege of 1777.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION


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1.2 CORBETT PARCEL SETTING The Corbett Parcel consists of an approximately 1-acre tract situated along the south side of Fish Creek (Figure 2). At the time of the archeological survey the parcel was a wooded tract with surface evidence of some sort of prior earth movement. Local informants noted that the tract had been unoccupied, vacant land throughout living memory and that the community on the south side of the Creek had utilized the property for dumping of household waste and debris since at least the 1930s (David Bullard, personal communication 16 December 2010). Surface evidence of the dumping was readily apparent during a visual inspection of the property, with recent garbage piles and other, apparently older piles of household debris clearly visible (Figures 3 and 4). The soils underlying the Corbett Parcel consist of Bernardston silt loam, a very deep, well-drained soil formed in glacial till. Typical soil development of the Bernardston classification consists of a brown silt loam, underlain by dark yellow brown channery loam to a depth of nearly 1.5 feet, and a yellow brown channery loam beneath the former to a depth of more than two feet. Beneath this channery loam the soil becomes more olive brown in color to a depth of nearly six feet (Silverman 2004:42-44). The larger soil series encompassing the project area is the Hudson-Rhinebeck-Manilus series, consisting of soils formed in glacial lake sediments on outwash plains, terraces and lakebeds of ancient Lake Albany (Silverman 2004). The underlying geology series consists of the Mount Merino and Indian River Formations composed of shale, slate and chert. Historical views and twentieth century aerial photographs indicate that the Corbett parcel has been undeveloped land since at least the mid-nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century. The only above ground evidence of use of the tract is found at the extreme northwest end of the parcel, where three concrete pillars or pylons are located (Figure 5).

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2.0 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW


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2.1 THE SIEGE OF SARATOGA, 10-17 OCTOBER: CONTEXT This section of the report presents contextual information on the military history of the one-acre Corbett Parcel project location during the final or siege phase of the Saratoga Campaign, i.e., 10-17 October 1777. In this stage of the campaign, the Crown Forces under the command of General Sir John Burgoyne was hemmed in and surrounded at the place then known as Saratoga (present day Schuylerville and Victory) by the American army commanded by General Horatio Gates. This section summarizes more detailed military-historical data compiled for this project and found in Appendix I. Understanding the land use history of the Corbett Parcel prior to, during, and most importantly, after the siege, is paramount to deciphering the potential earthwork structure extant on the tract. If archeological and geophysical techniques can be successfully applied to confirm these structures as military earthworks, than they would be the first American earthworks to be documented for the overall Battles of Saratoga battlefield. In addition to a general summary of the Saratoga Campaign, Appendix I contains the KOCOA analysis procedure and the identification of the defining features of the Saratoga Siege battlefield located in the project area vicinity. Owned by Saratoga P.L.A.N. the one-acre Corbett Parcel is the subject of the present archeological verification project undertaken to determine whether the earthen features present on the parcel represent military earthworks created by American forces in the siege of October 1777. The parcel is located adjoining the south bank of Fish Creek (Figure 1). The earthen berm structures are aligned running parallel to the creek on the north edge of the heights overlooking the creek and are thus positioned facing the documented location of British entrenchments on the opposing bluff. Similar earthen structures, also thought to potentially represent military earthworks of the American forces, are evident at other locations farther east along the north side of the heights on the south bank of Fish Creek (see Appendix I figures A-E, G, and H). British officer Lieutenant William Cumberland Wilkinson and German officer Captain Johann Heinrich Daniel Gerlach made maps of the siege battlefield, based on first-hand surveys of the troop positions and other features (Figure 6 and 7). Although these maps are not fully accurate in their depiction of location, scale, and alignment of topographic features (such as Fish Creek as it extends away from the siege area toward the southwest), they are impressively comprehensive in their approximate rendition of the landscape and the features associated with the siege. Both maps indicate American troop positions extending fully along the heights rising above the south bank of Fish Creek. This location would have served the Americans as key terrain guarding against the possibility of British counterattack, and would also have enabled the Americans to observe and fire on positions occupied by Crown forces. The importance of the heights along Fish Creek to the American position is well-documented in the first-person American and Crown Forces accounts. The sources suggest the line on the heights to the south of Fish Creek formed the central segment of the American position where the brunt of Gates’s force was disposed throughout the action. Gates had his headquarters in a dugout in the embankment by the River Road at the foot of the east edge of the heights. American chaplain Enos Hitchcock noted in his diary that Paterson’s and Poor’s brigades camped on the heights to the south of Fish Creek on the evening of 10 October (Hitchcock 1899). American Deputy Adjutant General James Wilkinson stated in his detailed memoir that at that time “the army took a position in the wood on the heights in several lines” (Wilkinson 1816:284-285). From the British perspective on 10 October, German regimental adjutant Lieutenant

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August Wilhelm Du Roi wrote in his journal that around 2 PM he saw “the enemy army arrived on the heights of Saratoga” (Du Roi 1995). The unidentified British source immortalized in the anonymous memoir titled For Want of a Nail commented that on that day “The enemy appeared on the heights of the Fish Kill in great force” (Anonymous 1961:164-165). James Wilkinson noted that after the skirmish on the morning of 11 October Nixon’s and Glover’s brigades “resumed their positions on the heights west of the great [river] road” (Wilkinson 1816:289). Based on survey of the ground and assessment of comparative elevations and sight lines, the American positions along Fish Creek would likely not have incorporated the relatively low-lying terrace area that bulges out from the south bank shoreline, situated at about 150 feet of elevation above sea level. American troops occupying this area would have been at the mercy of the British troops and especially the artillery in the British south redoubt positioned directly opposite and on ground 100 feet and more above the terrace at about 350 yards distance. Longtime local resident Albert Clements, born ca. 1789, informed local historians that he had frequently been told when young by veterans of the campaign that American artillery “erected a battery” on “a hill on the south bank of Fish Creek, nearly opposite the village of Victory”(Walworth 1891:121-122). There are unfortunately few references in the siege participants’ sources to the positioning of American artillery, which evidently numbered approximately thirty to forty field pieces at the time of the siege. On the east bank of the Hudson, General Fellows had two pieces positioned by 10 October. Brunswicker Lieutenant Du Roi noted that on the 13 October an additional “battery” was placed on heights situated at the north end of the American position east of the river (Du Roi 1995). British officer Wilkinson’s map shows two American guns placed on the heights east of the Hudson opposite the center of Burgoyne’s overall position, and another pair on the east bank but to the north, evidently the guns mentioned by Du Roi as added on the 13 October. Nearly six decades after the siege John Schuyler informed visitor Jared Sparks that by the end of the siege American guns on the high ground above the east bank were “so stationed as to command the plain and the German encampment” (Sparks 1830). On the American left flank, north of Fish Creek, light infantry commander Lt. Colonel Henry Dearborn stated that on the afternoon of 11 October reinforcing units brought “some field pieces” with them (Dearborn 1939:110-111). A day later (12 October), American diarist Lieutenant Samuel Armstrong indicated that two American batteries were established on the west side of the Crown Forces position (Armstrong 1997). This use of the term “battery” probably referred to the earthwork gun emplacement structures, with each position perhaps limited to a pair of guns, rather than the term being used to denote an artillery unit of four to eight guns. The movement of and placement of fieldpieces on the American west flank would have necessitated an arduous process of manhandling each gun (or its disassembled components) through the Fish Creek gully via the ford at the upper Schuyler milldam. In 1780, General Philip Schuyler told the visiting Marquis de Chastellux that two American cannon were moved to the north of Fish Creek and that these cannon “considerably incommoded the English” (Chastellux 1963:217-219). With the difficulty and effort involved in moving artillery pieces across the Hudson and Fish Creek, from the central (south) contingent to suitable positions on the left and right flanks, it seems safe to assert that no more than a total of 12 to 18 guns were put into action on both the east and west fronts, and that the number so disposed was probably around the lower end of this estimate. Thus the largest concentration of American artillery firepower would have been ranged along the heights on the south side of Fish Creek in the general vicinity of the Corbett parcel, probably totaling about 16 to 24 pieces. Much remains to be learned regarding the employment of the American artillery in the Siege of Saratoga. The elevation for the evident position of the American main force on the heights above the south bank of Fish Creek ranges approximately from 200 to 225 feet above sea level. Guns at this height would have



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been able to fire effectively on much of the central and northern areas of Burgoyne’s position which were probably situated on ground ranging in elevation from slightly lower (around 180 feet) to somewhat higher (250 feet). The British main artillery park position was situated at about 160 feet in elevation, making it particularly liable to bombardment. Gates’s artillery on the heights along Fish Creek would have been firing at these lower British-German positions at a range of from six tenths of a mile (0.6 mile or about 1,050 yards) to 1.3 miles. American guns on the highest near ground on the east side of the Hudson could have been well placed for elevation, at 300 feet or more in the vicinity where Route 29 ascends the heights (due east of Victory Woods and the Schuyler Mansion), but would have been firing at fairly long range, a mile and a half or more, or twice the effective target-hitting range of artillery of the period. American guns positioned on high ground (about 250 feet elevation) north of the Batten Kill creek and east of the Hudson, as some are said to have been, would have commanded the German north redoubt, but would also have been firing at mile-and-a-half distance. On the west flank, heights situated to the northwest of the present-day village of Victory and located at a distance of about a half-mile from Victory Woods, approaching 300 feet in height, would have enabled the Americans to employ the small artillery contingent in that sector against the British south redoubt in the Victory Woods area. The Americans may also have placed guns on the highest piece of ground south of Fish Creek, which rise above 300 feet in elevation, located on the east side of present-day Haas Road and due south of Victory Woods at a range of about one mile and a half. Artillery pieces at this location would not have been capable of specific target accuracy but could have inflicted random fatalities, or at least considerable psychological stress, on the densely disposed British occupants of the south redoubt. 2.2 FIELD FORTIFICATIONS AT SARATOGA During the Saratoga Campaign the Polish officer Thaddeus Kosiuszko served as the engineer for Gate’s American army and was responsible for the fortifications on the Saratoga Battlefield (Boatner 1969:590). The types of earthworks and fortifications erected by the American army were of a temporary, expedient nature, intended as field fortifications rather than formal fixed fortifications, such as those seen at Mount Independence, Fort Ticonderoga, or Fort Montgomery (cf., Fisher 2004; Starbuck 1999:124-159). With troops who were experienced, serving under knowledgeable officers, field fortifications could be constructed relatively quickly and could be easily strengthened given time (Fryman 2000:47). Temporary field fortifications were constructed of materials readily available to the “architects” or engineers (Hinds and Fitzgerald 1996:27). Often such fortifications are built of earthen mounds, faced on the interior and exterior with wooden palings or poles, sometimes with stone faces. Such earthworks are known to be present at Saratoga National Battlefield Park (Snow 1972, 1973-74). In a study of Civil War-era field fortifications archeologist Robert Fryman has identified a “distinct cognitive pattern” in the selection of the types of fortifications on the part of the engineers (Fryman 2000:47)). The preference was for redans, right lines, lunettes, and redoubts, all easily adaptable and easily constructed in a short time. While admittedly dating to a later period of warfare and entrenching, the configurations of entrenchments had not changed appreciably during that time. The Wilkinson map, drafted by an actual British participant, shows fortifications at two locations along the ridge, with one V-shaped redan or fleche situated at the center of the American line opposite the British south redoubt and another positioned on the northeasterly promontory that would have surveyed the Fish Creek bridge location (see Figure 6). A later and explicitly historical map, produced by Henry B. Carrington in 1881, represented an adaptation of the Wilkinson map with some additional details (see Figure 8). This map depicted a series of three American earthwork structures, including the redan on the promontory, as well as American gun positions lining the edge of the heights. Carrington did not



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document the source of his additional features, which may have been based on information from local informants or on a survey of the ground. Massachusetts militia private Samuel Bacon was among the troops who occupied the area and at first made camp along the crest of the ridge on the evening of the 10 October. Bacon noted in his pension application that he and his campmates were soon subjected to artillery fire from the British. “After we had built our fires,” he wrote, “the British fired some shots at us and we were ordered to put out the fires and go back under the hill out of the reach of their shot,” i.e., evidently behind the brow of the ridge and toward the southeast (Bacon 1832). The construction of siege earthworks in eighteenth-century warfare was typically undertaken as a nocturnal activity and it possible that the Americans constructed and improved such works during the night of 10 October and subsequent nights. Cannons standing along the ridge and capable of firing on British positions to the north would necessarily have been exposed to fire from the British redoubt at Victory Woods, and thus the Americans would have needed to construct earthwork gun emplacements to protect the fieldpieces and their crews, despite the inherent difficulty posed by the gravelly nature of the soil on the heights. An observer traversing the area today does not remark evident earthworks extending along the brow of the ridge. Nor, however, would a visitor easily discern British earthworks in the vicinity of the south redoubt, where their earlier existence and their demolition by landowners as the decades passed is fairly well documented. The parapet wall (defined as the principal embankment protecting the defenders) could range in height from 4 to 12 feet, while the thickness of the walls might vary considerably, but if the embankment was subject to artillery fire the walls could be between 8 and 12 feet thick (Hinds and Fitzgerald 1996:28). The exterior slope of a parapet was usually gently-sloped, in order to “withstand erosion by weather and minimize the effect of the enemy’s shot” (Hinds and Fitzgerald 1996:28). Conversely, the interior of the parapet could be almost vertical so as to allow the defenders to lean against and fire over the wall. Often this vertical, interior wall was revetted with upright planks or posts anchored into the parapet and joined by horizontal timbers across the top and a banquette, or firing step, was included at the base of the wall for defenders to stand on. The banquette might be earthen, stone, or timber. In field fortifications artillery pieces were provided with banquettes or firing platforms and ramps. Wooden planks or timbers might be placed over the earthen base of the fortification, and guns could be mounted to fire over (en barbette) or through (embrasure) the parapet wall (Hinds and Fitzgerald 1996:28). The method of mounting, the presence or absence of banquettes and firing platforms, all were based on how long the defenders had to prepare and strengthen the position. At Revolutionary War period fortifications such as Fort Montgomery the parapet of the North redoubt was 8 to 10 feet wide, stone-faced on the interior and exterior surrounded by a ditch, and the banquette or firing step was 2-feet wide (Fisher et al. 2004:74-75). Fort Montgomery was of a more permanent variety of fortification, in contrast to Fort Motte in South Carolina, where the parapet wall also 10 to 11 feet wide, faced with timbers or logs (Smith et al. 2007:22). The exterior face of the parapet, or the glacis, sometimes was strengthened with obstacles to hinder movement. An abatis made of tree tops and branches might be created, or sharpened stakes (chevaux-de-frise) could be added, as seen at Fort Motte in South Carolina (Smith et al. 2007). As with the interior treatments of the field fortification, the presence or absence of such obstacles depended in large measure on local conditions and time (Hinds and Fitzgerald 1996:29). Artifacts associated with the construction of the fortifications have been discovered at Fort Montgomery, where a shovel head was recovered at the North Redoubt (Fisher et al. 2004:73) and ammunition is often recovered from within earthworks.



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The historical maps of the study area illustrate possible field fortifications along the south side of Fish Creek and documentary sources indicate that these fortifications were constructed during the week of 11 October to 17 October 1777 (Barker and Slade 2005). The contemporary maps do not indicate the precise character of the fortifications, or whether they are a continuous line along the bank of the creek, or composed of strong points and artillery batteries loosely linked by infantry formations. For example, the map published by Carrington in 1881 depicts the American position as a series of discontiguous revetments or trench lines separated by gun batteries and infantry formations (Carrington 1881:354). Ernest Johann Friedrich Schueler von Senden’s map shows similar configurations of American siege lines along Fish Creek (Barker and Slade 2005:17). The extent of the fortifications is also in question, although it seems clear from the sources that the fortification line did not extend beyond the Fish Creek upper ford to the west. Based on the few historical accounts that mention the character of the fortifications it seems that the best way to describe them is as a redan or fleche, sometimes considered to be the simplest type of field fortification (Hinds and Fitzgerald 1996:29). Massachusetts officer Lt. Samuel Armstrong noted that on 11 October his regiment “threw up several Breastworks” and the following day (12 October) the Americans “opened up two batteries upon the enemy and kept a cannonading all day” (Armstrong 1997:249-250). One German officer commented on the nature of the soils in the area, noting that the gravelly character of the soil not only impeded digging but was an additional hazard in bombardment. Lieutenant August Wilhem DuRoi of the Regiment von Specht wrote that “as the berms consisted of many little stones, these would in the case of an enemy cannonade be more dangerous than advantageous for the soldiers standing behind them” Du Roi 1995). Du Roi noted that due to the stony nature of the soil on the north side of Fish Creek, the entrenchments his regiment was able to dig extended only about one foot into the ground. The field fortifications established during the siege were substantial enough to still be discernable over a decade later. At least one post-war resident of the Victory-Schuylerville vicinity recalled that in the 1790s remnants of entrenchments were still extant, composed of pine logs and earth (Walworth 1891) and William Strickland noted that in 1794 “on the heights above Mr. Schuyler’s house [to the south of Fish Creek], redoubts and other military works remain, though so over grown with brush wood as scarcely to be accessible” (Strickland 1971:148-149). 2.3 CORBETT PARCEL HISTORY The Corbett Parcel site is situated within the large tract owned by the Schuyler family during the period from the mid-eighteenth through the early nineteenth centuries. The rocky and wooded nature of the terrain at this site suggests that the use of the land immediately surrounding the site by the Schuylers, if any, was limited to harvesting of timber and firewood. During the Siege of Saratoga in October 1777, the documentary evidence indicates that the American siege lines extended along the heights on the south bank of Fish Creek and that the west end of this segment of the line may have been located in this vicinity, just east of the upper Schuyler sawmill dam which enabled communication with the westerly segment of the American lines. (See the Title Information in Appendix II for detail on the history of successive ownership of the real estate including the Corbett Parcel). Following the bankruptcy of Philip Schuyler in 1837, this land was held successively by speculators Teunis Van Vechtel and Benjamin Losee until the latter conveyed it to the Victory Mills partners in a series of conveyances during 1845-1847 that enabled the establishment of the cotton textile manufactory. In 1910, the Saratoga Victory Manufacturing Company went bankrupt and transferred the property to the American Manufacturing Company, makers of rope and cordage.

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It was probably the American Manufacturing Company that created the surface evidence still present on the Corbett Parcel. In 1918, when the company added its major factory building, it converted to hydroelectric technology for the plant’s motive power, enlarging the Horicon Mill dam and constructing other necessary facilities, including the wires to convey the electric current and the towers to support those lines. It is possible that the development/disturbance on the Corbett Parcel was associated with the hydroelectric system. No building is featured on the Corbett Parcel on what appears to be a comprehensive plat of the property drafted in 1931, but archeological evidence (see below) indicates the presence of a large amount of architectural debris. Another possibility is that the Victory Mills management erected a structure for some purpose late in its ownership of the site. It is very unlikely that a building or structure was erected after 1928 when American Manufacturing removed to Alabama. In 1931, the great Victory Mills-Horicon Mill industrial tract was divided in two between the factory building complex and the hydroelectric facility including the Corbett Parcel location, which was acquired by the Adirondack Realty Holding Corporation (later New York Power and Light). It does not appear that there would have been any discernible purpose for the hydroelectric establishment to have constructed a building in this location. In 1989, the then-holder of the site, SNC Hydro, Inc., sold a row of four approximately one-acre house lots including the Corbett Parcel to local real estate developers Kathleen Corbett and Joan Ellen Davis. Corbett and Parcel conveyed this lot to current owner Saratoga P.L.A.N. in 2008. Later nineteenth century maps of the study area and aerial images from the twentieth century do not depict or show any structures or buildings on the Corbett tract, nor is any evidence of development or occupation of the property shown (Bricknell et al. 2008; Anonymous 2007). In addition to the topographic feature on the tract, the field view identified three large concrete pillars set in a triangular formation near the edge of the slope above Fish Creek at the northern end of the property. Based on map evidence from 1931 these pillars were the base for a transmission or powerline tower holding cables that extended from the mill across Fish Creek, then running down the creek towards the Hudson.

3.0 PREVIOUS ARCHEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS


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3.0 PREVIOUS ARCHEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A previous non-invasive investigation of the topographic feature on the Corbett property suggests that the feature could be a remnant of the American siege line, but the result was not definitive (Griswold 2006; see Appendix III). After completion of a resistance investigation at the site, Northeast Regional Archeology Program archeologist William Griswold reported that it is:

“highly likely that the area to the east of the earthen embankments was mined for earth to create the embankments. Over time, these embankments have eroded both to the east and to the west. Where the earth has washed off of the embankments and eroded to the east it has collected in the area where the soil was originally gathered. Sizeable rocks and gravel lay on the surface of the embankments and are likely the result of site deflation with the alluvium being washed down slope. The boulders that were mapped were likely too large to be moved for the construction of the original embankments. The area to the extreme east of the grid may represent natural soils, although some cultural modification may have taken place” (Griswold 2006).

The resistance survey was inconclusive regarding whether the earthen remains are definitively part of the American fortification line. Griswold noted that several correlated characteristics of the earthen remains point to a strong likelihood that they are fortifications, namely the “general placement of the earthen embankments and their close proximity to the Fishkill and corresponding view to Victory Woods, provide a compelling argument for recognizing these embankments as Revolutionary fortification features” (Griswold 2006). Griswold recommended archeological investigations as a way to provide additional information about the earthen embankment but cautioned that archeological testing “it may not provide conclusive proof either. Artifacts and/or features needed to identify it as a fortification may be lacking, especially given the haste with which these earthworks were likely erected during the Revolution and the geomorphological changes that have taken place on the embankments since the Revolution” (Griswold 2006). Griswold recommended an “exhaustive” Phase IA (literature search and historical investigation) for the Corbett property followed by archeological testing (Phase IB), the manner and placement of the test units/trenches developed based on the evidence gathered in the Phase IA and the resistance investigation (Griswold 2006). Across Fish Creek in the Victory Woods Unit of Saratoga NHP archeological investigations were conducted on purported earthwork locations associated with the Crown Forces positions during the siege. These studies are reported in Hartgen Archeological Associates (HAA 2007). Of particular interest are the results of the investigations at Trench 3, which identified the location of a Crown Forces fortification line through the use of GPR and ground truthing (trenching). The testing identified a shallow berm exhibiting inverse stratigraphy and overlying an earlier, buried ground surface.

4.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FIELD METHODS


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4.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS “Defensive structures represent a component of the built environment reflecting the cultural contexts underlying their construction“(Fryman 2000:43). Part of the cultural landscape, the analysis of the placement, construction, occupation and armament of field fortifications can provide insights into the cultural factors, such the perceptions of military engineering and tactics that integrated such temporary features into the surrounding landscape. Previous archeological investigations at Saratoga Battlefield along the Crown Forces line between the Balcarres Redoubt and the Great Redoubt and at other locations on the battlefield suggests that field fortifications constructed during the Saratoga campaign were generally built of layers of logs and earth and the logs may have been supported by wooden posts driven into the ground (Hartgen Archeological Associates 2007; Reeves and Snow 1975:43). Similar log and earth breastworks were built overnight by Baum’s Hessians at the nearby Bennington Battlefield (Lord 1989:62-63). Contemporary documentary descriptions from participants of the battle support the log and earth construction technique. The archeological signature of such military features often includes evidence of intact and extant timbers beneath re-deposited soil. Babits’ recent overview of field fortification morphology indicates that construction of earthen ramparts by soldiers should result in inverse stratigraphic sequences of soil that are visible or discernable to archeologists (Babits 2011:115).

• There are several overarching research questions that will govern the field verification, as follows:

• Are the existing landforms remnants of the fortification features from the battles at Saratoga? If

not, when were the features created and for what purpose?

• How do these fortification features compare to other Revolutionary War fortification features excavated in Victory Woods and at other sites along the Hudson including those on the main Saratoga battlefields?

• Are the artifacts visible on the surface related to the use of the feature at the time of its creation,

or are they associated with post-occupation deposition? Are there artifacts present that could be associated with the construction or military use of the topographic feature (should it actually be part of the entrenchment line), such as shovel blades and/or munitions?

Based on the results of previous archeological investigations of military earthworks and on the historical record of the Saratoga campaign, the survey team concluded that several archeological elements should be present in the project area in order for the archeological survey to verify that these are Revolutionary War earthworks:

• Stratigraphy indicative of re-deposited soil (inverse stratigraphy) above the remnant of a timber or log wall;

• The presence/recovery of eighteenth-century construction-related artifacts such as shovel blades,

hoes, etc., in direct association with the feature; and



17

• The presence/recovery of eighteenth-century impacted or spent munitions (lead balls, cannon balls) on the exterior face (i.e., creek side) of the earthwork feature or from within the interior of the feature.

The field methods outlined below were intended to recover data related to the research questions and the archeological factors. 4.2 ARCHEOLOGICAL FIELD METHODS The field team employed multiple field techniques to investigate the earthworks and determine the presence of eighteenth-century military features on the property. Military sites present a particularly difficult problem for archeologists because these site types are difficult to find using established field methods employed in traditional Phase I investigations. A testing methodology that relies solely on shovel testing or other more traditional archeological techniques to recover tangible evidence for a military occupation often does not provide the level of certainty about the presence or absence of cultural resources that will allow for relevant management recommendations. In general, military sites do not contain large numbers of non-metallic artifacts and, where found, artifacts tend to be tightly clustered. 4.2.1 Ground-penetrating Radar (GPR) GPR is a nondestructive geophysical method that uses high frequency radio waves (microwave electromagnetic energy) to record various changes in subsurface materials. The signal is reflected off these changes and its intensity and travel time is recorded along grid lines. The data are presented as a continuous cross-sectional profile that reveals subsurface anomalies in the form of any change in dielectric constants, thus vertical relationships are revealed between materials of varying electrical responses. GPR profiles are used for evaluating the location and depth of anomalies that may be related to subsurface cultural features and/or objects and to investigate the presence and continuity of natural subsurface conditions and features. At the Corbett Parcel the ground-penetrating radar (GPR) survey collected geophysical data to provide information to identify probable features related to potential earthworks based on the interpretation of detected anomalies in the data. Fieldwork was completed using a GSSI utility cart-mounted GPR system with a distance encoder wheel using a GSSI SIR-3000 Data Acquisition System with a 400MHz antenna was used for the survey. This system is registered with the FCC under CFR 47, Part 15. The maximum depth window for this system is 4 meters (approx. 13 ft). The survey was conducted within a 12 meter by 34 meter geophysical grid (Figure 9) running parallel to Fish Creek and the earthen berm of interest. Individual GPR transects were collected in a unidirectional survey pattern with individual transects running perpendicular to the earthen berm and spaced 1 meter (approximately 3.3 feet) apart. This method also facilitates the post-processing of results and the production of geophysical maps. An assumed signal velocity of 0.1 m/ns was used during the data collection, while migration-derived velocities were utilized during the post processing of the geophysical data. GPR data were post-processed using the GSSI RADAN 6.6 software package. Vertical sections and a time/depth-slice map were created and exhibit the results of the geophysical survey. It should be noted that the scale (greater than 2 meters in length) of the potential earthen fortification landscape feature did not necessitate the need for a survey interval smaller than 1.0 meter. If the landscape feature(s) that we tried to define were smaller than 1.5 meters in diameter, the survey interval would have been 0.5 meters. At the site the number of small trees prohibited the free movement of the

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GPR system across the landscape. Thus, with the density of trees, a closer interval than 1.0 meter would have resulted in individual survey lines crossing and thus reducing the validity of the resulting data. 4.2.2 Metal Detector Survey Under the direction of JMA’s professional archeologists the field team conducted a metal detector survey to identify locations and concentrations of metal objects and possible munitions. The use of metal detecting has proved particularly effective for archeological investigations on military sites. The goal of the metal detector survey will be to evaluate the presence or absence of a possible Revolutionary War component(s) within the project area. The project area, and in particular the earthen feature, was swept repeatedly. A sample of artifacts identified by metal detection was flagged, collected, and located on the project map using surveying equipment. Successful metal detection requires experienced instrument operators. The surface inspection of the project area clearly indicated that there was a large amount of surface debris that made metal detection difficult. Therefore, special attention was paid to the exterior slope (Fish Creek side) of the terrain feature, since incoming small arms and artillery rounds may have impacted this face of the feature, should they be present. 4.2.3 Test Excavations Based on the results of the GPR survey and metal detecting, the project team emplaced several hand-dug test excavations to either investigate anomalies identified during the ground-penetrating radar and/or metal-detector survey(s) to “ground truth” whether subsurface features may represent eighteenth-century military earthworks. These test pits and trenches provided geomorphic data to determine the origin of the selected geophysical anomaly(s). In order to preserve as much of the terrain feature as possible, the archeological test excavation were completed by hand, not by machine or backhoe. The test excavations were placed in such a way as to provide a cross-section of the terrain feature in order to gather stratigraphic information about its method of construction. Features were drawn and photographed in plan and profile during and at the completion of the mechanical excavations. Samples of feature fill and soils from the surrounding soil matrix within test trenches were screened through quarter-inch hardware cloth to ensure uniform artifact recovery. Artifacts were placed in bags clearly marked with provenience information. Stratigraphic profiles for all trenches were recorded and photographed. The geophysical grid and test trench locations were mapped using sub-meter accurate handheld GPS units. 4.2.4 Topographic Mapping Due to the complex local topography within the Corbett Parcel survey area it was considered prudent to conduct a high-resolution topographic survey to facilitate interpretation of the landscape, and to map archeological excavations and the geophysical grid in relation to landform elements. JMA utilized a TOPCON GTS-239W Electronic Total Station coupled with a TDS Recon datacollector running TDS Survey Pro acquisition software. Field data were collected in a local coordinate system and locational coordinates were subsequently transformed to UTM coordinates (NAD 1983 Zone 18N) in TDS Foresight DXM software based on sub-meter GPS points collected during the fieldwork. The origin of the GPR survey (N500 E500 Z50) was selected as the initial occupy point for the total station, and the survey was conducted exclusively in meters. An established vertical datum could not be located, thus elevation values were surveyed relative to an arbitrary value of 50 meters at the initial total station occupy point.

5.0 RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS


20


5.1 TOPOGRAPHIC MAPPING JMA surveyed with an electronic total station a total of 0.63 acres (2550 m2; 27400 ft2) within and slightly to the north of the Corbett Parcel (Figure 9). The topographic data reveal a heavily modified landscape, with a small topographic rise (50 cm to 1 meter in height) separating the majority of the Corbett Parcel from a steep slope leading down to Fish Creek (Figure 10). Directly to the east of the berm a large volume of sediment has been removed, approximately 1830 cubic yards, and the area is relatively flat and exhibits a scatter of historic artifacts and building materials (Figure 11). The area to the west of the berm appears to retain its original slope, as do the landform components south and east of the cut area. The area immediately to the south of the GPR survey area exhibits a dense concentration of historic artifacts, indicating a long-standing use of the Corbett Parcel as a dumping ground for household trash. The western and eastern edges of the cut area undulate from north to south, ostensibly related to cutting and filling episodes. Three concrete pillars are situated immediately to the north of the GPR survey area and appear to occupy a topographic depression that cuts into the existing berm. It is not clear from the topographic data whether the pillars were installed before or after the formation of the berm. 5.2 GPR SURVEY JMA surveyed one grid with ground-penetrating radar (GPR), comprising a total of 0.1 acres (400 m2; 4300 ft2) (Figures 9 and 10). The GPR grid was placed to maximize coverage of the existing berm, to assess local stratigraphy for clues related to the formation of the berm, and to overlap with Griswold’s (2008) electrical resistance survey area. The three-dimensional time slices within the GPR grid reveal complex, high-amplitude reflectors associated with the berm location (the red areas in Figure 12), which is expected due to the density of sand and gravel. To the east of the berm, however, is a large, rectangular area of low reflection amplitudes (the blue areas in Figure 12). This low-amplitude area corresponds to a surface scatter of building debris and shovel test unit stratigraphy that revealed a relatively thick deposit of brick, concrete, coal, and other materials. The geometric shape of the low-amplitude area and the presence of building materials are provocative, and could indicate that a building and associated access road was previously located in this area. JMA collected three GPR lines in addition to the GPR grid (Figure 9 and 10). To the east of the berm the GPR profile data revealed a complex stratigraphic setting (Figure 13). The GPR profile data are interpreted as comprising a layer of historic fill overlying a stratigraphic unconformity cut into relatively fine-grained subsoil to the east of the berm, and cut into coarse sand and gravel sediments immediately adjacent to the berm. The bedrock appears to be rather shallowly buried along the eastern portion of the Corbett Parcel, and buried slightly deeper and under sand and gravel units along the western side. Towards the center of line 092 the unconformity dips steeply to the west (Figure 13), correlating rather well with the cut shown in the topographic data (Figure 10) and indicating that the topography has filled in considerably since the event that removed the large volume of sediment. 5.3 METAL DETECTION Metal detection at the one-acre Corbett Parcel consisted of approximately 20 hours of detection. A Nautilus DMC2B detector was used, first with a 10.5” coil which was replace with a smaller 8” coil due to the large amount of metal objects included among the surface debris. The detection began along the

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berm and moved from north to south. Following the completion of sweeps along both the exterior, top, and interior faces of the berm, metal detection moved into other parts of the project area. Metal detection, along with test excavations, clearly revealed the extent of previous ground disturbance present on the tract. 5.4 TEST EXCAVATIONS To investigate the possible earthwork archeologically, three contiguous 50-centimeter wide trenches were excavated running perpendicular to its length (Figure 14). Each trench was one meter long. Excavation revealed a very dark grayish brown (10YR3/2) silty sand A-horizon that had been deflated at the crown of the berm, and built up along the eastern and western slopes. Otherwise, a natural stratigraphy was evident within the central and eastern parts of the trench. A cut through the two lower soil horizons was evident along the western end of the trench. The fill within the cut (Level 4) consisted of a mottling of the natural soils, likely created by slumping alongside the cut. The A-horizon held modern materials along the east end of the trench, such as cellophane, pieces of a plastic bag, and parts of an iron grate. The western end held lithics (flakes and shatter), a clamshell, fire-cracked rock and a copper shell casing. The berm appears to be the remnant of a natural landform, rather than an earthwork (Figure 15). The stratigraphy of central and western parts of the trench resembled that of shovel tests dug on the elevated areas of the parcel. For example, STU8 and STU7 were placed along the eastern edge of the 15 to 20 meter wide depressed area that ran from the northern edge of the parcel to a historic dump near its southern end. Both shovel tests consisted of an A-horizon overlaying a gravelly subsoil similar to that found in the trench. In contrast, shovel tests within the depressed area (e.g. STU5 and STU 6) consisted of a black (10YR2/1) silty sand overlying a dark yellowish brown (10YR3/4) densely packed clay. 5.5 ARTIFACT ANALYSIS Appendix IV contains the artifact inventory for the Corbett Parcel. Overall 84 artifacts were recovered through all field methods (metal detection, surface collection, and excavation). The artifacts clearly indicate a use of the property during the last quarter of the nineteenth century well into the twentieth century. No artifacts of any kind were identified or recovered that are associated with the American Revolution or date to the eighteenth century. Metal detection and surface collection recovered 16 artifacts, including a 1928 New York State license plate, a modern iron hoe blade, an iron file, a ring, a fragment of melted lead, probably solder (recovered from the immediate vicinity of the concrete pillars), and several kerosene lamp fragments. Two datable artifacts were also surface collected; a clay tobacco pipe fragment embossed with “HOME RULE” and a shamrock. Tobacco pipes bearing this decorative motif gained popularity among American supporters of the Irish home rule movement during the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Reckner 2000:110). A second surface-collected artifact was three mendable fragments of hard-paste porcelain, sometimes referred to as hotel ware, bearing the transfer print makers’ mark "RIDGWAYS/VITRIFIED/ENGLAND/L.BARTH & SON/NEW YORK" and the phrase VITRIFIED/5/07 stamped on the back. This artifact dates to at least 1890 when the word England was added to imported ceramics. Shovel test units (STUS) recovered additional historical artifacts dating to the late nineteenth through twentieth centuries. A Colgate & Co. bottle top, dating prior to 1928, and a fragment of milk glass were

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retrieved from STU 11, along with fragments of amethyst glass, aqua panel bottle glass, brown stoneware, whiteware, and hard-paste porcelain. A 1979 US penny was recovered from STU 8, and additional fragments of whiteware, stoneware, and bottle glass were found in the remaining STUs. Observed but not collected was the large amount of architectural debris in STU 4. This debris included mortar, plaster, brick, stone, and electrical fixtures. Twenty-two prehistoric artifacts were also recovered from Excavation Unit (EU) 3. This assemblage included seven chert flakes and fifteen fire-cracked quartzite fragments

6.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS


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6.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In October 2010, JMA conducted archeological investigations at the Corbett Parcel. Methods utilized included GPR survey, a detailed topographic survey, metal detection, and subsurface testing. The investigation recovered a small number of prehistoric artifacts from within the trench across the berm, and a larger amount of historic period artifacts generally dating from the last quarter of the nineteenth century well into the twentieth century. Based on the previous archeological study at Victory Woods and elsewhere on the Saratoga Battlefield, other military sites, and the documentation of the siege, three overarching archeological elements were deemed necessary to be present on the Corbett Parcel in order for the archeological survey to verify that the berm along Fish Creek is a Revolutionary War earthwork:

• Stratigraphy indicative of re-deposited soil or inverse stratigraphy above the remnant of a timber or log wall;

• The presence/recovery of eighteenth-century construction-related artifacts such as shovel blades,

hoes, etc., in direct association with the feature; and

• The presence/recovery of eighteenth-century impacted or spent munitions (lead balls, cannon balls) on the exterior face (i.e., creek side) of the earthwork feature or from within the interior of the feature.

None of these elements were identified during the archeological survey. The stratigraphy of the berm appears to be natural and consistent with the soil classification of the study area. The Testing indicates that a considerable amount of soil, estimated at 1,830 cubic yards, has been removed from a portion of the parcel. This removed soil was not redeposited along the berm. Artifacts recovered did not include any eighteenth-century military items or construction items, nor any eighteenth-century artifacts at all. While a lack of eighteenth-century artifacts was also noted at the Victory Woods excavations (Hartgen Archeological Associates 2007), stratigraphic evidence clearly supported the conclusion that earthworks were present at that location. The combination of land use history, stratigraphy, and paucity of artifacts associated with the American Revolution leads to the conclusion that the berm on the Fish Creek parcel is not a remnant of the American siege lines. Instead, the evidence supports a conclusion that the parcel has seen significant ground disturbance sometime in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, perhaps in association with the construction of the transmission tower. This disturbance likely occurred prior to current memory, since local informants do not recall the Corbett parcel as ever having been used. It is conceivable that the tract was used not only as a local community dumping area but also used by the power company to dump construction debris. While the berm along Fish Creek on the Corbett Parcel is not a remnant of the American siege lines, it is likely that archeological evidence of the American position may still be present along the creek further northeast from the tract. Higher elevation is obtained a short distance northeast of the parcel, and may have served as an American artillery position.

7.0 REFERENCES CITED


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Anonymous 1995 For Want of a Nail [account of the campaign by an anonymous British soldier] edited by George F.G. Stanley. The Tribune Press, Ltd., Sackville, New Brunswick. 2007 Cultural Landscapes Inventory, 1999 (revised 2007). Victory Woods, Saratoga National Historical Park. National Park Service, Boston, Massachusetts. Armstrong, Samuel 1997 From Saratoga to Valley Forge: The Diary of Lt. Samuel Armstrong. Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 121 (3):249-250. Babits, Lawrence E. 2011 Patterning in Earthen Fortifications. In Historical Archaeology and Military Sites: Methods and Topics. Edited by Clarence E. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas D. Scott, and David G. Orr, pgs. 113-122.Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas. Bacon, Samuel 1832 Pension Record No. W20681. Record Group M804, National Archives, Washington, DC. Barker Thomas M. and Jeffrey Slade 2005 On the Eve of Burgoyne’s Capitulation at Old Saratoga: Maps of the Emplacements of British, German, and Rebel American Forces. The Hessians: Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association 8:1-27. Boatner, Mark M. III 1969 Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. David McKay Company, Inc., NY. Bricknell, Michael, Michael Commisso, and H. Elliott Foulds 2008 Cultural Landscape Inventory for Sword Surrender Site and Setting [DRAFT]. Olmstead Center for Landscape Preservation, National Park Service, Boston, Massachusetts. Carrington, Henry 1881 Battles, Maps and Charts of the American Revolution. A.S. Barnes and Company, Chicago, Illinois. Marquis de Chastellux, Francois-Jean 1963 Travels in North America, Volume 1. Howard C. Rice, Jr. editor and translator. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Dearborn, Henry 1939 Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, 1775-1783. Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham, editors The Caxton Club, Chicago, Illinois. Du Roi, August Wilhelm. 1995 The Specht Journal: A Military Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign. Translator Helga Doblin, editor Mary C. Lynn. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut.



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Fisher, Charles L. editor 2004 “The Most Advantageous Situation in the Highlands”: An Archaeological Study of Fort Montgomery State Historic Site. New York State Museum, Cultural Resources Survey Program Series No. 2, Albany, NY. Fryman, Robert J. 2000 Fortifying the Landscape: An Archeological Study of Military Engineering and the Atlanta Campaign. In Archeological Perspectives on the American Civil War, edited by Clarence R. Geier and Stephen R. Potter, pgs. 43-55. Gossett, Tanya M. and H. Bryan Mitchell 2007 Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States. Prepared for The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, and the Committee on Resources, United States House of Representatives. Prepared by American Battlefield Protection Program, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington D.C. Griswold, William 2006 Management Summary: Resistance survey of a presumed Revolutionary War fortification site, Victory, New York. On file, Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York. Hartgen Archeological Associates, Inc. (HAA) 2007 Archeological Identification Study (Volume 2): Victory Woods, Village of Victory, Saratoga County, New York. Report prepared for the LA Group, Saratoga Springs, New York. Prepared by Hartgen Archeological Associates, Inc. Rensselaer, New York. Hitchcock, Enos 1899 Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D. Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society New Series, Volume 7: 155-158. Hinds, James R. and Edmund Fitzgerald 1996 Bulwark & Bastion. Pioneer Press, Union City, TN. Kelso, Gerald and Dick Ping Hsu 1995 Battlefield Palynology: Reinterpretation of British Earthworks, Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York. Northeast Historical Archaeology 24:87-96. Lord, Philip 1989 War Over Walloomscoick: Land Use and Settlement Pattern on the Bennington Battlefield – 1777. New York State Museum Bulletin No. 473. The State Education Department, The University of the State of New York. Luzader, John 2008 Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution. Savas Beatie, New York. Reckner, Paul F. 2000 Negotiating Patriotism at Five Points: Clay Tobacco Pipes and Patriotic Imagery among Trade Unionists and Nativists in A Nineteenth-Century New York Neighborhood. In Tales of Five



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Points: Working-Class Life in Nineteenth-Century New York (Volume II). Edited by Rebecca Yamin, pgs. 99-129. Prepared for Edwards and Kelcey Engineers, Inc. and the General Services Administration. Prepared by John Milner Associates, Inc., West Chester, Pennsylvania. Reeve, Stuart and Dean R. Snow 1975 Report on Archaeological Investigations and Excavations of Revolutionary Sites, Saratoga National Historical Park, 1974-1975. Report on file, Saratoga National Historical Park. Silverman, Mark H. 2004 Soil Survey of Saratoga County, New York. United States Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Services, Washington, DC. Smith, Steven D., James B. Legg, Tamara S. Wilson, and Jonathan Leader 2007 “Obstinate and Strong”: The History and Archaeology of the Siege of Fort Motte. South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, Columbia, SC. Snow, Dean R. 1972 Report on the Archaeological Identification of the Balcarres and Breymann Redoubts, Saratoga National Historical Park. 1972 Investigations. Manuscript on file, Saratoga National Historical Park. 1973-74 Report on the Archaeological Investigations of the American Line, The Great Redoubt, and the Taylor House, Saratoga National Historical Park. Manuscript on file, Saratoga National Historical Park. Sparks, Jared 1830 Sparks Manuscript, Harvard University Library. Copy on file at Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York. Starbuck, David R. 1999 The Great Warpath: British Military Sites from Albany to Crown Point. University Press of New England, Hanover, NH. Strickland, William 1971 Journal of a Tour of the United States of America, 1794-1795. New York Historical Society, NY. Walworth, Ellen H. 1891 Albert Clements deposition, April 13, 1877. In Battles of Saratoga. Joel Munsell’s Sons, Albany, pgs. 121-122. Wilkinson, James 1816 Memoirs of My Own Times. Abraham Small, Philadelphia. 1973 reprint edition New York: AMS Press, Inc., New York.

APPENDIX I

MILITARY-HISTORICAL DATA: FISH CREEK AMERICAN POSITIONS –

ARCHEOLOGICAL VERIFICATION & CULTURAL LANDSCAPE INVENTORY

BY PHILIP PENDLETON

DECEMBER 27, 2010

APPENDIX I

MILITARY-HISTORICAL DATA: FISH CREEK AMERICAN POSITIONS – ARCHEOLOGICAL VERIFICATION & CULTURAL LANDSCAPE INVENTORY

P. PENDLETON, DECEMBER 27, 2010

This document presents contextual information on the military history of the one-acre Corbett Parcel archeological verification project location and of the larger project area (the subject of the Cultural Landscape Inventory [CLI] portion of the study, approximately 100 acres in extent) during the final or siege phase of the Saratoga Campaign, i.e., October 10-17, 1777. In this stage of the campaign, the British army under General Sir John Burgoyne was hemmed in and surrounded at the place then known as Saratoga1 by the American army commanded by General Horatio Gates.

The military-historical data is presented in furtherance of the goals of this investigation, one of which is to determine whether the earthen structures on the Corbett Parcel owned by Saratoga P.L.A.N. represent surviving siege line earthworks thrown up by the American forces. If archeological and geophysical techniques can be successfully applied to confirm these structures as military earthworks, they would be the first American earthworks to be confirmed for the overall Battles of Saratoga battlefield.2 The military-historical research is also intrinsic to the inventory and analysis of the 100-acre study area’s cultural landscape, since the siege represents a significant historical event that took place on the subject tract. The military-historical data facilitates important aspects of the overall investigation, viz., application of the KOCOA military terrain analysis procedure and the identification of the defining features of the Saratoga Siege battlefield located in the project area vicinity.

Summary of Saratoga Campaign of 1777

The history of the Saratoga Campaign of 1777 is well known and present purposes require no more than a brief recapitulation. Lord George Germain, directly supervising the British war effort from London for the King and ministry, and Northern Theatre field commander Sir John Burgoyne envisioned a three-pronged offensive in New York state, with Burgoyne driving south from Canada along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River axis, Lt. Colonel Barry St. Leger leading a small diversionary force eastward along the Mohawk Valley, and a third and fairly major British force moving northward along the Hudson from the British base in New York to meet with or at least facilitate the progress of the other two columns. The aim of the Crown forces was to occupy the Hudson Valley corridor and thereby divide the colonies and the American forces in two, causing what the British hoped would be a collapse of American morale and irremediable dislocations in the American war effort that would contribute to a British victory in the war. Unfortunately for General Burgoyne, Sir William Howe, the commander of the main British force in New York, had his own ideas regarding the appropriate British strategy for 1777. Whether Howe misunderstood the instructions he received from Germain, or chose to willfully disregard them, or thought 1 The present‐day villages of Schuylerville and Victory. 2 The term “overall battlefield” refers to the larger area within which the actions of Freeman’s Farm or First Saratoga (September 19, 1777), Bemis Heights or Second Saratoga (October 7, 1777), and the Saratoga Siege (October 10‐17, 1777) were fought.

that all the potential objectives could be achieved because he was overly optimistic about the capability of the various British contingents to deal with American troops, he led his strike force southward in 1777 on a campaign to capture Philadelphia. As a consequence, the support that Burgoyne received from British forces in New York (then under General Sir Henry Clinton), in the form of a limited advance up the Hudson in early October, amounted to too little, too late.

Burgoyne captured the American citadel of Fort Ticonderoga handily (July 6, 1777) and dealt the retreating Americans a harsh blow at Hubbardton, VT (July 8), but this promising inception to his campaign would lead to nought. An ill-planned foray to Bennington, VT (August 16) by a force composed mainly of German auxiliaries brought a catastrophic loss of troops, some 900 or about 13% of his field force. On the Mohawk Valley front, British commander St. Leger gave up his siege of Fort Stanwix on August 22 and returned to Canada following the defection of his Indian allies. In the meantime, American reinforcements, consisting of Continentals dispatched by Washington and of militia from lower New York state and western New England—who turned out in an especially numerous and sustained response—contributed to a rapid growth of the American force opposed to Burgoyne and commanded by General Horatio Gates. This army barred the way to Albany, Burgoyne’s critical objective, at a position taken up and fortified at Bemis Heights on the west bank of the Hudson. By mid-September, Burgoyne was facing approximately 9,000 American troops (increasing by hundreds by the day) with about 6,500 British and German soldiers. Burgoyne attempted unsuccessfully to batter his way through in two successive battles fought on September 19 (Freeman’s Farm) and October 7 (Second Saratoga or Bemis Heights). After the second battle, Burgoyne’s depleted force of about 5,200 effectives, diminishing by daily desertions and almost out of supplies, faced an American army of some 15,000 troops (that would grow by a few thousand more within another week). Burgoyne pulled back to his final position at Saratoga on October 10 and, finding himself surrounded with no realistic avenue of escape, fortified it as best he could. After three days of near ceaseless bombardment by Gates’s artillery and deadly sniping by the contingent of American riflemen (October 11-13), Burgoyne negotiated a surrender of his force to Gates, with the ceremony taking place on October 17.

The fighting at Saratoga during September-October 1777 forms one of the most significant episodes in American military history, as the American victory had far-reaching consequences. The American troops, including the militia, gave a good account of themselves, and their determination to win helped convince the political leadership of France that alliance with the American rebels could prove a successful strategy, resulting in the Franco-American alliance of February 1778. The good showing by the Northern Army under Gates bolstered American morale at large at a time when the reverses suffered by Washington’s Main Army in September 1777—defeat at Brandywine (September 11) and Howe’s capture of Philadelphia (September 26)—had threatened to undermine it. At Saratoga, for the first time, “British regulars were beaten in open battle by equal numbers of Americans,” as stated by historian Brendan Morrissey. Without the financial, material, and military assistance provided by the French alliance, American independence may not have been possible. The alliance completely altered the strategic situation faced by the British, as a civil war within the Empire expanded into a global conflict akin to that of the Seven Years War, necessitating a reallocation in Britain’s land and sea forces as well as in the Crown’s strategic priorities. It would now become imperative in the summer of 1778 to send about 4,000 British regulars from the American theatre to the West Indies to defend the valuable sugar islands; combined with the loss of Burgoyne’s army of about 7,000 soldiers, this weakening of Crown forces reduced Britain’s capability to campaign aggressively in the northern colonies and necessitated a new

emphasis on the raising of Loyalist provincial regular troops. Henceforth, impressed by evidence of widespread Loyalist sympathies in the American south, the British would shift their strategic attention to the southern colonies, in hopes of raising more Loyalist regulars and of pacifying those areas through civil administration.3

The battlefield of the final siege of October 10-17 in the Schuylerville-Victory area shares fully in the historical significance of the overall Saratoga battles, although the portion of the siege area battlefield contained within Saratoga National Historical Park is limited to two comparatively small pieces, viz., the Saratoga Monument lot and the Victory Woods tract. It was at the Schuylerville-Victory location that the exertions of the American Northern Army were brought to fruition and the trap was closed on Burgoyne’s army, thus enabling the far-reaching effects of victory referred to above. The anticipated extension of an interpretive walking trail, from Victory Woods through the project area, would further facilitate public appreciation of this undervisited portion of the Saratoga Battlefield. In 2007, the Saratoga Siege Area (NY 226) was listed as a Priority I, Class A resource for preservation planning purposes in the ABPP Report to Congress surveying Revolutionary War and War of 1812 battlefields and other sites.4

Research Objectives

Military-historical research is integral to the battlefield interpretive process developed by the American Battlefield Protection Program, in which surveyors apply the precepts of KOCOA military terrain analysis. The KOCOA acronym stands for the analytical concepts of Key Terrain/Decisive Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal. With reference to a given battle location, analysis of these aspects of military movement, position and combat as they apply to that land area combines documentary research and field survey, and enables identification of the battlefield’s Defining Features and thus its appropriate boundary. The research examines and analyzes primary sources for the battle such as participants’ letters, journals, and memoirs, and early post-battle accounts based on direct experience of the terrain, to discern locational references for KOCOA elements. The KOCOA process, and the supporting research, is directly applicable to archeological investigation at battle locations, providing documentation for the military actions that took place at those locations.5

The military-historical research for this project was conducted chiefly at the library collection within the office of Saratoga National Historical Park and at the David Library of the American Revolution in Washington Crossing, PA. The historian consulted every possible primary source6 dealing with the siege of October 10-17, including the accounts of American, British, and German participants, as well as those

3 Mark Mayo Boatner III, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1966), 141‐142; Brendan Morrissey, Saratoga 1777: Turning Point of a Revolution (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2000), 88. 4 Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States, September 2007. 5 The research and survey methodology employed in this project is based on the American Battlefield Protection Program study manual compiled by David W. Lowe, Battlefield Survey (January 2000). 6 The list of sources consulted was derived from the extensive bibliographies offered in the recent in‐depth campaign histories by John Luzader—Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution (New York: Savas Beatie, 2008)—and Richard M. Ketchum—Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War (New York: Henry Holt, 1997)—supplemented by the exhaustive list compiled by the historians of the National Historical Park.

of relatively early post-battle visitors (up to 1830) who saw the area when it was relatively little altered by natural and manmade processes since the battle. Research found, however, that many of the available narratives of siege participants failed to offer specific data adequate for KOCOA interpretation with reference to the project area. Still, fifteen siege participant accounts, as well as five descriptions by travelers or residents based on experiences during 1780-1830, were identified that appeared to contain information that is adequately detailed and pertinent to the project area.

The text below presents:

a narrative summary of the action of the Saratoga Siege, October 10-17

a list of Defining Features identified for the Saratoga Siege Battlefield, in table form

a brief military-historical context for the Corbett Parcel (subject of the archeological verification)

a military-historical context for the approximately 100-acre study area (subject of the Cultural Landscape Inventory)

a summary presentation of the 15 siege participants’ accounts, exhibiting their information on the action of the siege

a summary presentation of the five 1780-1830 narratives, exhibiting their information

In addition, the first-hand maps drafted by two participants—British officer William Cumberland Wilkinson and German officer Johann Heinrich Daniel Gerlach—will be referenced and presented as illustrations.

Synopsis for the Saratoga Siege, October 10-17, 1777

After the battle of October 7, General Burgoyne concluded that his army’s position to the north of Bemis Heights had become untenable with the loss of its right flank fortification (Breymann’s Redoubt), and that a retreat to attempt to escape encirclement by the Americans in their superior numbers had become imperative. The British force commenced its withdrawal on the night of October 8. Evidently hoping that an advance by Sir Henry Clinton from the southward might still turn the tables on General Gates and Co., and that his own army should thus be prepared to sustain a full-scale fight, Burgoyne retained his artillery, thereby slowing his retreat. The British reached Saratoga, camping on either bank of Fish Creek, on the evening of October 9. They found that an American militia contingent under General John Fellows had already destroyed the pontoon bridge spanning the Hudson that the British had earlier put in place, a bridge Burgoyne needed to continue his withdrawal, as well as the bridge over Fish Creek. Fellows was now in position with 1,300 men and two cannon on the heights across the Hudson to the east, prepared to oppose any attempt to cross the river. Burgoyne sent Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Sutherland ahead about 12 miles northward along the west bank with a large detachment of about 800 men including the British engineers to build and safeguard a new bridge across the Hudson at Fort Edward. Some American scouts on reconnaissance interpreted Sutherland’s movement as representing a continuation of the retreat by the main British force, and reported their supposition to General Gates.7

7 Luzader, Saratoga (2008), 297‐336; Boatner, Encyclopedia (1966), 140‐141.

Perhaps now confident of ultimate victory, General Gates with the main American army had been slow to pursue the enemy army as it withdrew from Bemis Heights, giving Burgoyne a sizable head start, but moved more rapidly than the mostly exhausted British. The American main body reached the south bank of the Fish Creek and went into camp on the night of the 10th. Early on the following day, Colonel Daniel Morgan’s highly effective Corps of Rangers (combining his riflemen and Lt. Colonel Henry Dearborn’s picked light infantry) began crossing Fish Creek to the west of the British and taking up positions on that flank. In addition to Fellows’s force on the east bank of the Hudson, additional American militia forces of about 1,500 men each under General John Stark, victor of Bennington, and General John Bayley had moved northward on the east bank and captured the British base at Fort Edward. Bayley took up position securing Fort Edward and the crossing. British Colonel Sutherland returned with his troops to Saratoga to report to Burgoyne that the river could not be forded due to the American militia. General Stark advanced southward along the east bank with his troops, eventually crossing the river on the night of the 12th and seizing the high ground at Stark’s Knob on the north side of Schuylerville. There would then be no possible egress from the box in which the British army found itself. On October 10, the British shifted their forces westward somewhat to their final position occupying an extended line on the high ground north of Fish Creek (today the westerly margin of the village of Schuylerville). Burgoyne burned General Philip Schuyler’s mansion house, outbuildings, and lower mills to prevent the use of these structures for cover by the Americans. These buildings were grouped along the creek on either side of the road, mostly on the south bank.

As of the early morning of the 11th, General Gates did not know the current position of all of his own outlying contingents (such as Stark and Bayley) and was not aware that the entire British force was still located just across Fish Creek; rather he thought that the enemy positions on high ground north of Fish Creek were occupied by a mere rear guard contingent shielding Burgoyne’s further withdrawal. Gates decided, uncharacteristically impulsively, to make an immediate advance on the British position, in effect a reconnaissance in force by most of his Continentals with some militia in support. This contingent could attack the British rear guard if the conditions appeared promising. There thus occurred a skirmish that was the nearest instance to an episode of direct combat that would take place in the course of the siege. In conditions of thick fog, four brigades of Continentals with at least one battalion of militia forded Fish Creek at two locations to join Morgan’s Corps for the movement forward. The Americans retreated, however, after the fog fortuitously cleared to reveal the King’s infantry and artillery in full array and the British commenced firing. After suffering some casualties in this probing engagement, the two American brigades to the eastward, those of Nixon and Glover, fell back across Fish Creek and resumed their positions on the ridge above the creek. Their comrades to westward also withdrew but remained on the north side of the creek except for some militia that had reinforced them for the advance. The brigades of Learned and Paterson shifted farther to the west to form the American left flank and were joined by Poor’s Brigade, while Morgan extended that flank well to northward. (The sources do not elucidate the positions taken by the militia brigades led by Warner and Ten Broeck, although at least one regiment under Warner, that of Woodbridge, took position on the heights south of Fish Creek.)

After the dust settled from the incipient fracas of the 11th, Gates and his officers applied their men and resources to the siege, and the American artillery and riflemen commenced subjecting the British to constant barrage and sniping, targeting the supply-laden bateaux that the Crown force had retained along the river at Saratoga with telling effect. Of the apparently at least 30 and perhaps as many as 40 field

pieces8 supervised by artillery commander Major Ebenezer Stevens during the siege, the bulk of the guns were probably positioned on the ridge rising above the south bank of Fish Creek. Some field pieces were trundled across the creek to strengthen the American left flank, however, and it appears that some others were sent north along the east bank of the Hudson to augment Fellows’s original pair.

While their army endured the punishing bombardment and rifle harassment, the British leadership convened two successive councils of war in their camp, on October 12 and 13. With only a few days’ worth of provisions remaining (at half-ration), the first council concluded that the command’s only hope lay in leaving the army’s artillery and baggage behind and attempting a very difficult, widely outflanking march up the west bank to a river crossing point well above Fort Edward. Orders were given for the march to commence that night but then countermanded in the evening after it was realized that the woods were already so thick with American pickets from Morgan’s Corps that the march could not possibly go undetected. Within a few hours afterwards, Stark’s contingent was in place on the north to oppose in force any such escape attempt. The following day’s council resolved to capitulate if honorable terms could be obtained from the Americans, and a message to that effect was sent to General Gates on the evening of the 13th. A ceasefire was called and contentious negotiations regarding the precise terms of surrender went on through the 14th, 15th, and 16th. Although his officers had evidently committed to capitulation, General Burgoyne was stalling for time while still praying that Sir Henry Clinton’s relief force would miraculously appear from the south. On the evening of the 16th, Burgoyne finally relented and bowed to the inevitable, agreeing to the surrender agreement known as the Convention. A few hours later, Burgoyne’s intrepid courier Captain Alexander Campbell returned from a mission to Clinton, slipping through the siege lines to deliver a letter from Sir Henry in New York revealing that there was no hope of relief. The surrender took place on the 17th.

Defining Features of the Battlefield

The table below presents the list of 25 KOCOA-related Defining Features identified in this study, largely via the narratives of siege participants and travelers and residents for the period 1780-1830. The table gives each Feature a number and gives references for the relevant primary sources, whether they are depicted on the Wilkinson and Gerlach siege maps (drafted on the scene by officers of Burgoyne’s army9), and the relevant report figures (as applicable). One resource, the Schuyler estate roadway, was identified as a probable Defining Feature in the cultural landscape survey component of this project and 8 Brendan Morrissey counts 22 guns served by about 400 Continental artillerymen on September 7 (in a report by Gates), and 40 guns with 498 men fit and present on October 16 (in a statement of American strength presented by Gates to Burgoyne in negotiation). John Luzader puts American artillery strength at 248 troops manning 22 guns on September 12, with 302 artillerymen present on September 19 and 498 on October 16 but with no figure for field pieces. Morrissey (2000), 26; Luzader (2008), 210, 323, 369. 9 William Cumberland Wilkinson, Plan of the Position which the Army under Lt. Genl. Burgoine [sic] Took at Saratoga on the 10th of September [sic], and in which It Remained till the Convention was Signed (London: William Faden, 1780), reproduced in Kenneth Nebenzahl and R. Don Higginbotham, Atlas of the American Revolution (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974), 100‐111; Johann Heinrich Daniel Gerlach, Plan de la Position de l’Armee sous les Ordres de son Excellence le Lieutenant General Bourgoyne a Saratoga, manuscript map (n.d.), photocopy on file at the office of Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York. The Gerlach map is featured in Thomas M. Barker and Jeffrey Slade, “On the Eve of Burgoyne’s Capitulation at Old Saratoga,” in The Hessians: Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association Volume 8 (2005), 1‐27.

not in historic documentary sources, based on the interpretive concept of Inherent Military Probability and the potential past relationship of this present-day dirt lane or track to the other historic structures of the Schuyler estate complex before 1777 as well as to the military action of the siege. Regarding figures in this document, depiction of the location of Defining Features on the current USGS topographic map is restricted to those located within the project study area (Figure A). The Wilkinson and Gerlach maps are each represented by two figures, one presenting the overall Saratoga Siege area and one concentrating on the study area. Figures B and C are the overall views for the Wilkinson and Gerlach maps respectively. Figures D and E are the study area views. Figure F is derived from the 1837 plat of the Schuyler estate drafted by Harman Van Alen. Figure G represents a detail from a battlefield historical reference map drafted by Henry B. Carrington in 1881. Figure H is taken from a 1931 plat of the former Victory Mills property, a tract that had been home to a pair of nineteenth-century textile mill complexes and that had been adapted as the site of a hydroelectric power facility in 1918.

Table A: Defining Features

No. Feature Sources Historic Maps Figures

1 British bateaux landing P1, P7, P8, P9, P12, P13, P14

Gerlach C

2 British siege line south redoubt P2, P3, P8, P13, T1, T2, T3, T4

Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C, D, E

3 British outpost works—N bank Fish Ck P10 Gerlach C, E

4 British center siege line positions T1 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

No. Feature Sources Historic Maps Figures

5 British artillery park position P7, P8 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

6 German siege line north redoubt P13, T1 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

7 American position: heights to S of Fish Ck

P6, P8, P9, P13, T2, T3, T4

Wilkinson/Gerlach A, B, C, D, E, G, H

8 American position: W & N of British P3, P8, T1, T2 Gerlach B, C

9 American position: island in Hudson River

P13 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

10 American position: east bank of Hudson R

P13, T5 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

11 American position: heights to east of Hudson River

P13, T5 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

12 Fish Creek lower ford—east of bridge location

P4, P5, P8, P9, T5 Gerlach C

13 Fish Creek embankment—N side of creek

P7 no n/a

14 Fish Creek upper ford—milldam P2, P3, P6, P8, T4 no A, F

15 “Gutter” or depression—S of S Br. Redoubt

P2, T4 no A

16 Learned Brigade’s farthest advance on 11th

P8, T4 no A

17 River road—south of bridge site P8 Wilkinson/Gerlach A, B, C, D, E

18 Schuyler House site P6, P12, P15 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C, D, E

19 Schuyler mill buildings site P2, P6, P15 Wilkinson/Gerlach A, B, C, D, E, F

20 Continental barracks site P6 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

21 Bushett-Marshall House (British Hospital)

P13, P15 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

22 Fort Hardy ruins site P7 Wilkinson/Gerlach B, C

23 Old Dutch Church site P7, P8, T3 Wilkinson B, D

24 Fish Creek Wilkinson/Gerlach A, B, C, D, E, F

25 Schuyler estate roadway no no H

The Corbett Parcel—Location for Archeological Verification Project

The Corbett Parcel, about one acre in extant and owned by Saratoga P.L.A.N., is the subject of the present archeological verification project undertaken to determine whether the earthen features present on the parcel represent military earthworks created by American forces in the siege of October 1777. The parcel is located adjoining the south bank of Fish Creek (see Figure A). The earthen berm structures are aligned running parallel to the creek on the north edge of the heights overlooking the creek and are thus positioned facing the documented location of British entrenchments on the opposing bluff. Similar earthen structures, also thought to potentially represent military earthworks of the American forces, are evident at other locations farther east along the north side of the heights on the south bank of Fish Creek (see Figures A-E, G, and H).

British officer Lieutenant William Cumberland Wilkinson and German officer Captain Johann Heinrich Daniel Gerlach made maps of the siege battlefield, based on first-hand surveys of the troop positions and other features. Although these maps are not fully accurate in their depiction of location, scale, and alignment of topographic features (such as Fish Creek as it extends away from the siege area toward the southwest), they are impressively comprehensive in their approximate rendition of the landscape and the features associated with the siege. Both maps indicate American troop positions extending fully along the heights rising above the south bank of Fish Creek. This location would have served the Americans as key

terrain guarding against the possibility of British counterattack, and would also have enabled the Americans to observe and fire on positions occupied by Crown forces.

American chaplain Enos Hitchcock (source P6 in Appendix 1) noted in his diary that Paterson’s and Poor’s brigades camped on the heights to the south of Fish Creek on the evening of October 10.10 American Deputy Adjutant General James Wilkinson (P8) stated in his detailed memoir that at that time “the army took a position in the wood on the heights in several lines.” From the British perspective on the 10th of October, German regimental adjutant Lieutenant August Wilhelm Du Roi (P13) wrote in his journal that around 2 PM he saw “the enemy army arrive on the heights of Saratoga.” The unidentified British source immortalized in the anonymous memoir titled For Want of a Nail (P9) commented that on that day “The enemy appeared on the heights of the Fish Kill in great force.” James Wilkinson noted that after the skirmish on the morning of October 11, Nixon’s and Glover’s brigades “resumed their positions on the heights west of the great [river] road.”

The sources suggest that although the Americans succeeded in encircling Burgoyne’s beleaguered army in the course of the siege, the line on the heights to the south of Fish Creek formed in a sense the nerve center of the American position, the key central segment where the brunt of Gates’s force was disposed throughout the action. Gates had his headquarters in a dugout in the embankment by the river road at the foot of the east edge of the heights.

Based on survey of the ground and assessment of comparative elevations and sight lines, the American positions would not have incorporated the relatively low-lying terrace area that bulges out from the south bank shoreline, situated at about 150 feet of elevation above sea level. American troops occupying this area would have been at the mercy of the British troops and especially the artillery in the British south redoubt positioned directly opposite and on ground 100 feet and more above the terrace at about 350 yards distance.

Artillery positions:

Longtime local resident Albert Clements (T3), born ca. 1789, informed local historians that he had frequently been told when young by veterans of the campaign that American artillery “erected a battery” on “a hill on the south bank of Fish Creek, nearly opposite the village of Victory.” There are unfortunately few references in the siege participants’ sources to the positioning of American artillery, which evidently numbered approximately thirty to forty field pieces at the time of the siege. On the east bank of the Hudson, General Fellows had two pieces on October 10. Brunswicker Lieutenant Du Roi (P13) noted that on the 13th an additional “battery” was placed on heights situated at the north end of the American position east of the river, and John Schuyler informed 1830 visitor Jared Sparks (T5) that by the end of the siege American guns on the high ground above the east bank were “so stationed as to command the plain and the German encampment.” British officer Wilkinson’s map shows two American guns placed on the heights east of the Hudson opposite the center of Burgoyne’s overall position, and another pair on the east bank but to the north, evidently the guns mentioned by Du Roi as added on the 13th.

10 References for quotations appear with the presentation of narratives later in this document.

On the American left flank, north of Fish Creek, light infantry commander Lt. Colonel Henry Dearborn (P3) stated that on the afternoon of October 11 reinforcing units brought “some field pieces” with them. American diarist Lieutenant Samuel Armstrong (P1) indicated that on October 12 two American batteries were established on the west side of the British. This use of the term “battery” probably referred to the earthwork gun emplacement structures, with each position perhaps limited to a pair of guns, rather than the term being used to denote an artillery unit of four to eight guns. The provision of fieldpieces for the American west flank would have necessitated an arduous process of manhandling each gun (or its disassembled components) through the Fish Creek gully via the ford at the upper Schuyler milldam. In 1780, General Philip Schuyler told the visiting Marquis de Chastellux (T1) that two American cannon were moved to the north of Fish Creek and that these guns “considerably incommoded the English.” With the difficulty and effort involved in moving artillery pieces across the Hudson and Fish Creek, from the central (south) contingent to suitable positions on the left and right flanks, it seems safe to assert that no more than a total of 12 to 18 guns were put into action on both the east and west fronts, and that the number so disposed was probably around the lower end of this estimate. Thus the largest concentration of American artillery firepower would have been ranged along the heights on the south side of Fish Creek, probably totaling about 16 to 24 pieces.

Much remains to be learned regarding the employment of the American artillery in the Siege of Saratoga. The elevation for the evident position of the American main force on the heights above the south bank of the creek ranges approximately from 200 to 225 feet above sea level. Guns at this height would have been able to fire effectively on much of the central and northern areas of Burgoyne’s position which, based on comparison of the Wilkinson and Gerlach maps with modern topographic maps, were probably situated on ground ranging in elevation from slightly lower (around 180 feet) to somewhat higher (250 feet). The British main artillery park position was situated at about 160 feet in elevation, making it particularly liable to bombardment. Gates’s artillery on the heights within the study area would have been firing at these lower British-German positions at a range extending between about six tenths of a mile (.6 mile or about 1,050 yards) and 1.3 miles. American guns on the highest near ground on the east side of the Hudson could have been well placed for elevation, at 300 feet or more in the vicinity where Route 29 ascends the heights (due east of Victory Woods and the Schuyler Mansion), but would have been firing at fairly long range, a mile and a half or more, or twice the effective target-hitting range of artillery of the period. American guns positioned on high ground (about 250 feet elevation) north of the Batten Kill creek and east of the Hudson, as some are said to have been, would have commanded the German north redoubt, but would also have been firing at mile-and-a-half distance. On the west flank, heights situated to the northwest of the present-day village of Victory and located at a distance of about a half-mile from Victory Woods, approaching 300 feet in height, would have enabled the Americans to employ the small artillery contingent in that sector against the British south redoubt in the Victory Woods area. Wade Catts, archeologist for John Milner Associates, has suggested that the Americans, in order to fire on Victory Woods, may also have placed guns on the highest piece of the south bank heights, which rise above 300 feet in elevation and are located on the east side of present-day Haas Road and due south of Victory Woods at a range of about one mile and a half. Guns so located could not have been capable of specific target accuracy but could have inflicted random fatalities, or at least considerable psychological stress, on the densely disposed British occupants of the south redoubt. Future studies should subject all of these potential American artillery positions to archeological study.

Potential earthwork fortifications:

The Wilkinson map, drafted by an actual British participant, shows fortifications at two locations along the ridge, with one V-shaped redan or fleche situated at the center of the American line opposite the British south redoubt and another positioned on the northeasterly promontory that would have surveyed the Fish Creek bridge location (see Figure D). A later and explicitly historical map, produced by Henry B. Carrington in 1881, represented an adaptation of the Wilkinson map with some additional details (see Figure G). This map depicted a series of three American earthwork structures, including the redan on the promontory, as well as American gun positions lining the edge of the heights. Carrington did not document the source of his additional features, which may have been based on information from local informants or on a survey of the ground.

American troops would naturally have desired to protect themselves via the erection of earthwork defenses. Toward the southwest end of the line, the American position was situated about 500 yards from the British south redoubt, where some artillery pieces and Captain Alexander Fraser’s handpicked British ranger company were stationed. It is probable that some of the men in Fraser’s unit, designated the Corps of Marksmen, were equipped with German-made rifles.11 In addition, there was always conceivably the possibility of a British counterattack or raid on some segment of the American position.

Massachusetts militia private Samuel Bacon was among the troops who occupied the area and at first made camp along the crest of the ridge on the evening of the 10th. Bacon reported that he and his campmates were soon subjected to artillery fire from the British. “After we had built our fires, the British fired some shots at us and we were ordered to put out the fires and go back under the hill out of the reach of their shot,” i.e., evidently behind the brow of the ridge and toward the southeast. The construction of siege earthworks in eighteenth-century warfare was typically undertaken as a nocturnal activity, and it possible that the Americans constructed and improved such works during the night of the 10th and subsequent nights. Cannons standing along the ridge and capable of firing on British positions to the north would necessarily have been exposed to fire from the British redoubt at Victory Woods, and thus the Americans would have needed to construct earthwork gun emplacements to protect the fieldpieces and their crews, despite the inherent difficulty posed by the gravelly nature of the soil on the heights. An observer traversing the area today does not remark evident earthworks extending along the brow of the ridge. Nor, however, would a visitor easily discern British earthworks in the vicinity of the south redoubt, where their earlier existence and their demolition by landowners as the decades passed is fairly well documented.

11 Students of this small elite volunteer unit drawn from the various British regiments (4 officers and 98 enlisted men in June 1777 at the outset of Burgoyne’s campaign, also known as Fraser’s British Rangers) hypothesize that perhaps a third of Fraser’s men were armed with rifles. Captain Fraser’s uncle, Lt. Colonel Simon Fraser of the 24th Regiment, took the initial 50 German‐made “Tower” rifles manufactured for the British Army with him when his regiment was ordered to Canada in 1776. The British also had access to Pennsylvania rifles captured from Daniel Morgan’s riflemen at Quebec on January 1, 1776, as well as French military rifles yet reposing in the Quebec armory. When the elder Fraser was made brigadier in command of Burgoyne’s Advance Corps for the ill‐fated 1777 expedition, Fraser’s Rangers became one of this elite British brigade’s chief assets. Almost half of the corps was lost at Bennington, but Burgoyne drafted selected individuals from his battalions to reinforce the Rangers. Information accessed on the Internet at http://www.csmid.com/marksmen.html ; Morrissey, Saratoga 1777, 19, 21.

The visiting English naturalist William Strickland (T2) found American military earthworks intact on the ridge above the south bank of Fish Creek in 1794. He noted that “On the heights above Mr. Schuyler’s house, redoubts and other military works remain, though so overgrown with brush wood as scarcely to be accessible.”

The Fish Creek American Positions Cultural Landscape Inventory Study Area

This approximately 100-acre tract straddling Fish Creek, the subject of the project’s Cultural Landscape Inventory study, is the proposed location for an interpretive walking trail that would exhibit to hikers the landscape of the Saratoga Siege from the vantage of the American positions to the south of Burgoyne’s army’s final position. The study area contains seven of the twenty-five KOCOA-related Defining Features associated with the Siege of Saratoga, all seven of which could be interpreted to the visiting public via the proposed trail. These Defining Features include:

Fish Creek (obstacle)

American position: heights to south of Fish Creek ((key terrain; observation and fields of fire)

Schuyler estate buildings site (cover and concealment)

River road—to south of bridge site (avenue of approach and retreat)

Fish Creek upper ford—upper Schuyler milldam (avenue of approach and retreat)

“Gutter” or depression—to south of the British south redoubt (cover and concealment)

Probable Defining Feature: Schuyler estate roadway (avenue of approach and retreat)

The CLI study area represents an important segment of the overall Saratoga Siege battlefield. It contains the position extending along the heights to the south of Fish Creek that formed the key central component anchoring the overall American siege line, as discussed above in the context section for the Corbett Parcel. The study area also encompasses the location of the ford at the upper milldam that was employed by American troops composing the western wing of the abortive assault on the morning of October 11, and which thus enabled the initial movement to form the American siege line to the west of Burgoyne’s position. It also contains the easterly portion of the ground on which the American troops advanced after fording the creek and on which they exchanged fire with the British forces manning the south redoubt. A dirt lane running along the south bank heights position probably represents a colonial-period roadway for the Schuyler estate; this road would have facilitated the American army’s exploitation of its position in this quadrant of the overall siege battlefield, enabling a rapid disposition of troops through the area.

DEFINING FEATURE: Fish Creek (obstacle)

The fast-flowing watercourse of Fish Creek and its steep-sided valley formed a terrain obstacle that clearly lent considerable defensive strength to the south side of the British position (see Figures A-F). American options for crossing Fish Creek were limited to two fords.

DEFINING FEATURE: American position: heights to south of Fish Creek (key terrain; observation and fields of fire)

This feature is discussed at length above in the section on the military context for the Corbett Parcel. The remarks in that section apply to the overall American position on the heights to the south of Fish Creek. This feature is depicted on Figures A-E, G and H.

DEFINING FEATURE: Schuyler estate buildings site (cover and concealment)

The portion of the Schuyler estate buildings complex located on low-lying ground on the west side of the river road (present-day US Route 4), as documented by National Park Service historian Stephen G. Strach in 1986, included the lower one of General Schuyler’s two sawmills, his great barn (center of the estate farm operation), and two other buildings that Strach hypothetically identifies as an auxiliary barn and a relatively large poultry house (see Figures A-E). Schuyler’s mansion, general store, mills, and various domestic and farm outbuildings figured in the history of the siege when the British destroyed them in about the late morning or early afternoon of October 10 so that the buildings would not afford cover to the besieging Americans. The mansion, store, flax- and hemp-breaking mill, and several other buildings were located across the road to the east from the study area and also on the south side of Fish Creek, while Strach asserts that the estate gristmill stood on the north side of the creek. Burgoyne’s destructive act (and its militarily sound self-protective motive) was remarked upon by the Baronness von Riedesel (source P15). English grenadier Lieutenant William Digby (P12) did not mention the mill buildings, but noted that the mansion was burnt “to prevent a lodgement being formed behind it.” American chaplain Enos Hitchcock (P6) commented that his brigade of Continentals arrived in the late afternoon to find “Genl. Schuyler’s buildings . . . all on fire.” Militia private Samuel Bacon (P2) found on the morning of the 11th that “the mills and the bridge were burnt.” Schuyler rebuilt his structures with alacrity from 1778 onward; those within the study area were supplanted by his grandson Philip’s Horicon textile mill in 1828 but the site is now partially occupied by a wing wall of the massive extant milldam that perhaps incorporates an eighteenth-century milldam structure and was apparently enlarged for the 1828 mill and then again in 1918 for the hydroelectric facility built by the American Manufacturing Company to power the Victory Mills complex.

DEFINING FEATURE: River road (avenue of approach and retreat)

A segment of the river road extending southward from the bridge site (see Figures A-E) was used by both armies in approaching the area of the siege from the south and in particular this was the location where Continental brigade commanders General John Nixon and General John Glover marshaled their regiments before crossing Fish Creek at the lower ford to commence their advance and form the east wing of the reconnaissance in force on the morning of October 11, as stated by Lt. Colonel James Wilkinson (P8). The bridge had been destroyed weeks before by the Americans while retreating southward, rebuilt by Burgoyne, and then burned again by militia General Fellows when he occupied Saratoga in an effort to impede Burgoyne’s retreat. It appears that present-day US Route 4 is located very nearly on the alignment of the colonial-period river road if not exactly congruent with it.

DEFINING FEATURE: Fish Creek upper ford—upper Schuyler milldam (avenue of approach and retreat)

The Fish Creek upper ford located at the upper Schuyler milldam (see Figures A and F) figured prominently in the action of the siege. On the morning of the 11th, American troops used the ford to cross Fish Creek for the anticipated advance on the British south redoubt. As what proved to be a skirmishing engagement developed, some of the American troops who had crossed then shifted toward the west to form the left wing of the American siege line.

Location of the crossing place can be interpreted via the site of the upper sawmill, which was not destroyed by the British as happened to the lower mills. The sawmill was still standing in 1837 when surveyor Harman Van Alen drafted a plat of the Schuyler Estate. The sawmill of 1837 and its dam were positioned immediately adjacent to one another, with the waterwheel apparently situated beneath the sawmill platform and employing waterflow from a reservoir pool or tank that filled directly from Fish Creek instead of via a headrace. Logic and the slow-changing nature of traditional sawmill technology during the period indicate that the sawmill facility present during the Siege of October 1777 embodied the same configuration as was depicted in 1837; no evidence has been found to contradict such an assertion and an account of 1825 quotes a veteran who asserted that the arrangement remained in its 1777 state. Comparison of the 1837 draft with a present-day topographical map suggests that the sawmill dam was positioned spanning Fish Creek approximately 300 feet below or northeast of the present roadway bridge at the village of Victory. This location matches closely with James Wilkinson’s specific attribution of the site as being three-fourths of a mile above Schuyler’s lower mills.

A problematic aspect of this locational interpretation for the upper sawmill has to do with the character of the topography and the configuration of the creek bank at the present day. The location at present lacks a level terrace area by the creek to serve as site for the sawmill platform itself and which would have enabled direct road access, a necessity for the operation of such a facility; instead the bank falls away sharply on the southeast side of the creek, forming an escarpment. On the positive side of the balance, the 1837 estate plat appears fairly precise as to the location, and the shape of the creek banks and the topography on the northwest side does provide the seeming remnant of a shallow, bowl-like area suggestive of a former impounded millpond (observable on the topographic map, see Figure A). It is possible that, perhaps due to the hydraulic engineering activities associated with the construction of the textile mill in the 1840s, the alignment of the watercourse has shifted somewhat from what it was in the era of the sawmill. It is also possible that major flooding has wrought a natural transformation in the topographic configuration.

The ford itself, the existence of which was enabled by the dam’s impoundment of the deep and at this point naturally rapid-flowing Fish Creek, was located just below the dam, but the water in the ford was evidently still too deep and fast-flowing for effective use by foot soldiers carrying flintlock firearms and black powder. Lt. Colonel James Wilkinson (P8), a senior member of Gates’s staff, stated that on October 11 he and his horse twice crossed and recrossed Fish Creek “at a deep and rapid ford just below the dam,” but Wilkinson’s is the only account that makes reference to such a direct fording of the creek. Wilkinson observed that earlier that morning the men of Morgan’s Corps had had to adopt the expedient of crossing by scuttling along the logs bunched up against the upper side of the dam. In Wilkinson’s words, the Corps had

crossed the Fish-kill on a raft of loose logs, at the foot of a mill pond about three-fourths of a mile above the Saratoga mills.

Lt. Colonel Henry Dearborn (P3), Morgan’s second-in-command, agreed that their men “had crossed on scattering logs.” Private Samuel Bacon (P2) of Woodbridge’s Massachusetts militia regiment, also involved in the west wing of the October 11 advance, stated that “our regiment crossed on the logs in the mill dam.” General Hoyt (T4), a military-historical tourist of 1825 guided by a veteran of Woodbridge’s Regiment, remarked that upon

Reaching the creek, we passed it on floating timbers, resting against the mill dam, and my companion remembered that his regiment passed the mill pond in the same manner and at the same place as they advanced to attack the British lines.

The upper ford would apparently also have figured in the history of the siege as the crossing location for the few artillery pieces that the Americans transferred to the west flank of the siege lines.

DEFINING FEATURE: “Gutter” or depression—to south of South British Redoubt (cover and concealment)

The “gutter” or depression below the south British redoubt is a feature associated with the skirmishing on the morning of October 11 as it transpired in the southwestern portion of the Saratoga Siege area (see Figure A). The gutter provided defensive cover for the Americans in this brief engagement. Based on the position of the south side of the redoubt within the northern half of the Victory Woods parcel (as documented in the Victory Woods Cultural Landscape Inventory of 2007), and on statements from the narrative accounts, this feature is evidently the draw or swale that extends from west to east and is located just below the south boundary of the Victory Woods property, between Cemetery Road (to the west) and Herkimer Street (to the east).

The CLI study area encompasses ground that was the site of the east or right end of the American contingent’s advance toward the redoubt. Lt. Colonel Wilkinson (P8) asserted that he arrived in time to halt the advance by General Learned and General Paterson toward the British south redoubt. Their brigades were just entering the belt of terrain that had been cleared by the British to provide a clear field of fire around the south end of the redoubt, a location that according to Wilkinson was about 200 yards from the walls of the log and earthen fortification and would thus lie within the Victory Woods tract. As the Americans fell back into the screening woodland, the hitherto concealed and silent British troops in the redoubt arose and discharged a volley of artillery and musket fire that killed several Americans.

Private Samuel Bacon (P2) was a militiaman in Woodbridge’s Regiment, which composed the right end of Learned and Paterson’s line. This right flank position for Woodbridge was stated by the informed 1825 tourist General Hoyt (T4) and is evidently corroborated in that Woodbridge subsequently pulled his unit back across Fish Creek to rejoin the main body of militia on the heights while Learned and Paterson swung their brigades to the west in retreating from the skirmish. The Continental brigades’ withdrawal away from the upper milldam ford enabled them to join Morgan’s Corps in establishing the American left flank siege line. Bacon described the advance of Woodbridge’s Regiment as the unit moved northward from the area just west of the upper milldam, passing over two fences spaced well apart. Woodbridge’s troops then

came to a gutter of considerable depth and width where we were ordered to stop and unsling our packs and stack them. . . . Shortly after we had orders to march up to the fort and we left the gutter and marched a few rods when a cannon was discharged from an embrasure opposite us and the grapeshot passed directly over our company. At this we all fell back and made for the gutter as fast as possible, we had orders to march up again but did not and why we did not, I never knew. We lay in the gutter till evening when we were ordered back . . . .

General Hoyt’s guide in 1825 was also a veteran of Woodbridge’s Regiment of Massachusetts militia. According to Hoyt, the regiment was ordered to fall back before the British opened fire (as per Wilkinson’s account). Woodbridge

retired about thirty yards to a depression in the ground, where the men were covered from the direct fire of the enemy.

After a brief interval in which (according to Hoyt’s guide) some of the militia went forward in loose or Indian-style order to take cover as the trees and other woodland obstacles offered, in order to snipe at the British, Woodbridge retired across Fish Creek.

Probable DEFINING FEATURE: Schuyler estate roadway (avenue of approach and retreat)

The attribution of the Schuyler estate roadway as a pre-1777 manmade topographic feature that represents a Defining Feature associated with the Siege of Saratoga is based on the interpretive concept of Inherent Military Probability, as developed by military historians Hans Delbrűck and A.H. Burne and described in the ABPP Battlefield Survey Manual.12 The dirt roadway extends from a location on US Route 4 just south of the Fish Creek bridge, opposite the Schuyler Mansion, running fairly directly toward the southwest and climbing the heights to intersect with Evans Street (see Figures A and H). The earliest documentation of a roadway or lane on this alignment, a plat made to accompany the deed transfer for the hydroelectric property, dates to 1931. Circumstantial evidence, however, indicates that the roadway was present and available to facilitate the tactical purposes of Horatio Gates’s army in 1777:

The road leads directly from the main Schuyler estate building complex, clustered adjacent to the river road bridge over Fish Creek, to the upper sawmill location.

The movement of the American units from the river road onto and along the ridge to take up campsites on the evening of October 10 seems to have been quite rapid.

The identification by Morgan and Dearborn or other American officers of the upper sawmill dam and the ford there, as providing an appropriate avenue to establish a foothold across Fish Creek and to thus move around the flank of the British, also seems to have developed quite rapidly. The American commanders began using the dam to take their men across well before dawn on the 11th.

The estate roadway, if it existed, would have facilitated all these activities and probably would have effectively channeled the movement of American troops along the heights above Fish Creek from the time that they reached the south bank of Fish Creek and began to become aware of the general disposition of the British position (regardless of how many of Burgoyne’s troops they thought were in the vicinity).

12 David W. Lowe, Battlefield Survey: American Battlefield Protection Program (National Park Service, 2000), 21.

PARTICIPANTS’ ACCOUNTS

P1. Name: Lt. Samuel Armstrong13

Nationality: American

Military position: Line officer in the 8th Massachusetts Regiment, in Learned’s Brigade

Defining Features: British bateaux landing

Remarks:

Armstrong noted the American bombardment and sniping that went on through the siege, and referred to the Americans’ digging of entrenchments.

Oct. 11 Armstrong commented that the American troops, in arriving at Saratoga, had found evidence “that the enemy left their former encampment in the utmost confusion, as they left great quantities of flour in the road, besides 20 or 30 bateaux full in the river, also near a hundred dead horses they had killed either from want of provender or else worked to death. . . . We threw up several breastworks against the enemy.” In referring to the British “former encampment,” based on the references to the bateaux and to the dead horses, Armstrong evidently means their camp of October 9-10 at Saratoga.

Oct. 12 “We opened two batteries upon the enemy and kept up a cannonading all day.” It is likely that this reference pertains to American artillery set up on the American left or west flank north of Fish Creek.

Oct. 13 “We still kept up a cannonading & a continual firing of small arms.”

Oct. 14 “This day Genl. Burgoyne desired a cessation of arms, which was granted.”

Oct. 15 “A cessation of arms continued. Being poorly for some time past, I set out to go down as far as the new city [Newtown].”

13 “From Saratoga to Valley Forge: The Diary of Lt. Samuel Armstrong,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography Vol. 121, No. 3 (July 1997), 249‐250.

P2. Name: Pvt. Samuel Bacon14


Military position: Private, 1st Hampshire Co. Regiment, Massachusetts militia, in Warner’s Brigade

Defining Features: Fish Creek ford at milldam; “gutter”or depression to south of south redoubt; British south redoubt (“fort”)

Remarks:

Bacon’s unit apparently started to camp on the heights on the south bank of Fish Creek, but British artillery rendered this an unsafe position. He provides an ordinary soldier’s perspective on the probing advance made by the Americans on the morning of the 11th in the western sector of the battlefield area. Evidently Warner’s Brigade was moving with those of Learned and Paterson.

Oct. 10 Bacon’s regiment marched all day and reached Saratoga in the evening. “After we had built our fires, the British fired some shots [apparently artillery] at us and we were ordered to put out the fires and go back under the hill out of the reach of their shot.”

Oct. 11 “The next morning we were ordered on towards the fort [British defensive position, evidently the south redoubt] and came to Schuyler’s mills but the mills and the bridge [over Fish Creek] were burnt and our regiment crossed on the logs in the milldam [possibly meaning the log-built dam itself]. When we got on the other side we were drawn up in a circle and informed that we were going to storm the fort and the orders were read. Then we formed a line and marched toward the fort till we came to a log fence and there we halted awhile. Orders were then given to march to another fence perhaps 40 rods ahead where we halted again a few minutes and then marched again till we came to a gutter of considerable depth and width where we were ordered to stop and unsling our packs and stack them. . . . Shortly after we had orders to march up to the fort and we left the gutter and marched a few rods when a cannon was discharged from an embrasure opposite us and the grapeshot passed directly over our company. At this we all fell back and made for the gutter as fast as possible, we had orders to march up again but did not and why we did not, I never knew. We lay in the gutter till evening when we were ordered back far enough to form a picket guard and I was one of the first on them on sentry and my post was by a tree where the cannon had raked all day.

“From that day on we lay upon our arms till the surrender of Burgoyne, a period of 7 days during which time we were called upon the lines every few hours. It is unnecessary to describe the fatigue and anxiety which we all endured during this time till Burgoyne surrendered.”

14 Samuel Bacon pension application, on file at National Archives, Record Group M804, Pension Record No. W20681. Deposition dated October 5, 1832.

P3. Name: Lt. Col. Henry Dearborn15


Military position: Commander, provisional Continental light infantry battalion assigned to operate as an element in Morgan’s Corps of Rangers.

Defining Features: Fish Creek ford at milldam; British south redoubt; American siege line position to west and north of British

Remarks:

Dearborn presents an account of the movements of Morgan’s Corps during the October 11-13 interval, including that unit’s role in the skirmishing on the morning of the 11th, during which time the Corps moved into its position that initiated the presence of substantial American forces to the west of the British and thus commenced the effective investment of Burgoyne’s army.

Oct. 10 “There is some cannonading at Saratoga this morning between Mr. Burgoyne & Genl. Fellows. Our army marched this morning for Saratoga where we found the enemy in great confusion. . . . A heavy cannonading was kept up all day [i.e., in the afternoon to evening?] & a scattering fire of musketry.”

Oct. 11 “This morning at daybreak the Riflemen & Light Infantry marched over Fish Creek, & fell in with the enemy’s guards in a thick fog, who killed 1 lieutenant of ours & 2 men, we then found ourselves close to the enemy works where their whole army lay & we about 400 strong. [We had] the enemy on one side & a river [Fish Creek] which we had crossed on scattering logs on the other side. We remained in this situation about 2 hours before we were reinforced. We were then reinforced with Genrl. Learned’s brigade, the enemy began a brisk cannonade upon us, killed several men but we held the ground & began to heave up some works. We took a number of prisoners today. This afternoon Generals Poor’s & Paterson’s brigades came over Fish Creek with some field pieces and joined us.”

Oct. 12 “The Riflemen & Light Infantry took post in the rear of the enemy & encamped.”

Oct. 13 “The light troops [Morgan’s Corps] moved to the main river in the rear of the enemy [i.e., to the bank of the Hudson River north of the British position], left some small parties to watch the roads & paths while the remainder of light troops reconnoitered the enemy’s camp. We took 15 prisoners . . . & then moved down near Genrl. Poor’s brigade, who lay on the enemy’s right wing [to the west] & partly in their rear [to the north] & encamped. A heavy cannonade is kept up on both sides today & a scattering fire of musketry.”

Oct. 14: “A cessation of arms was agreed on until sunset.” Which cessation was renewed the following day, as Dearborn notes.

15 Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, 1775‐1783, ed. Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham (Chicago: The Caxton Club, 1939), 110‐111.

P4. Name: Brig. Gen. John Glover16


Military position: Commander, Glover’s Brigade

Defining Features: Fish Creek ford below bridge site

Remarks:

Glover described his role in the abortive assault of the morning of October 11.

Oct. 11 Glover, along with fellow brigadier Nixon, was ordered by General Gates on this heavily foggy morning to attack the British position on the heights, crossing the Fish Creek at a location not far from its mouth, with Glover on the left and Nixon on the right. Gates thought that the British presence had been reduced to a rear guard. Nixon’s Brigade had forded the creek and Glover’s Brigade was poised to cross over when Glover espied and apprehended a British deserter crossing in the opposite direction. This man informed Glover that the British army was present on the heights in full strength; and his statement was soon seconded by a second, German deserter. Glover sent a messenger to Nixon to advise him to fall back. Just then, the fog lifted and the British commenced firing upon Nixon’s force with artillery and small arms; Nixon retreated.

P5. Name: Henry Hallowell17


Military position: Private, 5th Massachusetts Regiment, in Nixon’s Brigade

Defining Features: Fish Creek ford below bridge site

Remarks:

Hallowell refers to the siege in general and contributes a brief description of the October 11 crossing and skirmishing.

“They [the British] got across Schuyler’s Mills Creek [Fish Creek] and got on a hill which proved their last stand, and while they lay on said hill our general [Gates] reinforced from many quarters and almost surrounded them, and there being high mountains round them, we threw our shot into their camp, so that their general requested a cessation of arms for three days and it was granted.”

16 A Memoir of General John Glover of Marblehead, ed. William P. Upham (Salem: C.W. Swasey, 1863). 17 “Narrative of Henry Hallowell,” in Howard Kendall Sanderson, Lynn in the Revolution (Boston: W.B. Clarke Company, 1909), 165‐166.

Oct. 11 “On one morning our army was ordered to go on [to attack] and our brigade marched to the fore mentioned creek. Before we entered the water, my colonel [Rufus Putnam] dismounted his horse and ordered me [to remain] on the [south] bank to take care of his horse until further orders. Then our folks entered the water and while crossing said creek the enemy on their hill kept firing and they only wounded two of our folks for they overshot our people, and the balls flew by me in such a manner while I stood on the bank every minute expecting to be killed. . . .But the orders of taking them were countermanded and the brigade crossed back.”

P6. Name: Rev. Enos Hitchcock18


Military position: Chaplain, Paterson’s Brigade

Defining Features: American siege line position on heights on south bank of Fish Creek; Fish Creek ford at milldam; Schuyler House site; Schuyler mill buildings site; Continental barracks site

Remarks:

Hitchcock describes American troop movements, including the initial occupation of the heights above the south bank of Fish Creek on the evening of the 10th and the occupying of positions to the west of the British on the 11th, and the American artillery bombardment that went on from late on the 10th through the 13th.

Oct. 10 Brigade marched in pursuit of British at about 1 PM, following behind four other American brigades. “Arrived at Saratoga [with] sun hour & ½ high [late afternoon]—found Genl. Schuyler’s buildings & the [Continental] barracks all on fire, [and] the enemy on that [the opposite] side [of] the little river [Fish Creek]—a number of cannon shot exchanged, Genl. Fellows prevented them passing the [Hudson] river and & took their boats loaded with pork—ours & Poor’s Brigade filed off to the left & camped on the heights.”

Oct. 11 “A moderate cannonade & scattering musketry all day—Genl. Poor’s, Paterson’s & Learned’s brigades & the riflemen pass the little river about half a mile above the bridge & extend upon the left flank of the enemy within about half a mile of their lines.”

Oct. 12 “A slow cannonade most of the day.”

Oct. 13 “Some cannonading.”

18 “Diary of Enos Hitchock, D.D.” Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society New Series, Volume 7 (1899), 155‐158.

Oct. 14 “This morning Gen. Burgoyne sent in a flag requesting leave to send a field officer in for a conference on a subject of great consequence. . . . No firing this day.”

P7. Name: Col. Rufus Putnam19


Military position: Commander, 5th Massachusetts Regt., in Nixon’s Brigade

Defining Features: Embankment along north side of Fish Creek to east of bridge site; British artillery park position; Fort Hardy ruins site; British supply bateaux landing; Old Dutch Church site

Remarks:

Putnam describes his unit’s role in the skirmishing of the 11th.

Oct. 11 Referring to advance guard activity by Captain Nathan Goodale’s company, Massachusetts Continentals, in crossing Fish Creek (1783 letter to Washington, reporting second-hand information):

“(In a foggy morning) Nixon’s Brigade were ordered to cross the creek which separated the two armies. Capt. Goodale with 40 volunteers went over before the advance guard. He soon fell in with a British guard of about the same number. The ground was a clear plain, but the fog prevented their discovering each other till they were within a few yards when both parties made ready nearly at the same time. Capt. Goodale in this position reserving his fire, advanced immediately upon the enemy, who waited with a design to draw it [volley fire] from him. But he had the address to intimidate them in such a manner, by threatening immediate death to anyone that should fire, that not more than two or three [of the British] obeyed the order of their own officer when he gave the word, the event was that the officer & 34 of the guard were made prisoners.”

Referring to general activity by Nixon’s Brigade in the skirmishing or probing engagement occasioned by the crossing of Fish Creek:

“The brigade was put in motion & marched in close column to the creek [i.e., to the south or American bank], just as the fog broke away, when the whole park of the British artillery opened upon us at not more than 500 yards distant. Finding we were halted, I rode forward to the head of the brigade to enquire why we stood there in that exposed situation, but Nixon was not to be found & Colo. Graton, who commanded the lead regiment [3rd Massachusetts], said he had no orders. I then advised crossing the creek & covering the troops under the bank, which was done. I then, at the request of Colo. Stevens [commander of the artillery] advanced with my regiment across the plain, &

19 Rufus Putnam, The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam, ed. Rowena Buell (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903), 68‐69, 72.

posted them under the cover of an old stockade fort [Fort Hardy], while Stevens advanced with two field pieces to annoy the British, who were attempting to take away some covered wagons standing between us & the British battery. We remained in this situation about an hour when I had orders to retreat—I found Nixon near the church and after some debate I obtained leave to send a party & cut away the British boats [supply bateaux] which lay above the mouth of the creek. Captains Morse, Goodale & Gates, with about 70 or 80 [men], volunteered themselves on this service which they effected without any loss.”

P8. Name: Lt. Col. James Wilkinson20


Military position: Deputy Adjutant General, Northern Department, in effect a senior aide to General Gates

Defining Features: British artillery park position; British south redoubt; British bateaux landing; American siege line position on heights to south of Fish Creek; Fish Creek upper ford; Fish Creek lower ford; American siege line positions to west and north of British; location of Learned-Woodbridge farthest advance on 11th; river road to south of bridge site; old Dutch Church site

Remarks:

20 James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times (Philadelphia: Abraham Small, 1816; reprint edition New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1973), 284‐289. Wilkinson’s account perhaps should be treated carefully and with skepticism as to some particulars, as noted by at least one historic‐period commentator (Jared Sparks, in 1830). His 1816 memoirs are written with a distinctly self‐aggrandizing tone, as Wilkinson according to his own version always seems to be in just the right place at just the right time to take charge or bring decisive influence to bear on events, and then make just the right decision. Now documented as having been a secret and duplicitous traitor, Wilkinson (1757‐1825) was an equal instigator of the conspiracy of 1805‐1806 involving Aaron Burr, although Wilkinson managed to betray Burr and cover his tracks well enough to be exonerated in an 1807 court martial. He was in the pay of the Spanish government at $2,000 per annum during the period 1787‐1802 (designated “Agent 13” in Spain’s New World espionage establishment) while serving in the US Army as lieutenant colonel and brigadier general, and from 1796 as the army’s senior commander. Still, Wilkinson’s memoirs have been accepted as a legitimate source for the action of the siege period of October 10‐17 by Saratoga Campaign historian John Luzader and other scholars; his detailed relation of military actions appears to be largely consistent with other sources. Wilkinson’s account of the action on the morning of the 11th, when he depicts himself as both an omnipresent and an omniscient tactitian, was published about one year following his exoneration by a court of inquiry for his incompetent conduct of his command as a Major General during the campaigns of 1813‐1814, hence he may have possessed an emotional motive to enlarge upon his actual role in the outcome of the Saratoga Campaign. Boatner (1966), 1206‐1207; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789‐1815, The Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 113‐114, 382‐385.

Wilkinson, although probably not a reliable source as regards his own specific role in events (he seems to be have been everywhere and done everything), contributes a consistent and quite detailed recital of the action on the morning of October 11.

Oct. 10 “The [main] army did not march until the afternoon; our front reached Saratoga about four o’clock, where we discovered the British army encamped on the heights beyond the Fish-Kill, General Fellows’s corps on the opposite bank of the river, and the bateaux of the enemy at the mouth of the creek, with a fatigue party busily employed unloading and conveying their contents across the plain to the heights. The commanding officer of artillery, Major Stevens, . . . ran a couple of light pieces down on the plain near the river, and opened a battery upon the bateaux and working party at the landing, which soon dispersed it; but he drew the fire of the enemy’s whole [artillery] park upon him from the heights, which obliged him to retire after the loss of a tumbril [covered ammunition cart], which was blown up by a shot from the enemy, and caused a shout from the whole British army.

“The army took a position in the wood on the heights [above the south bank of Fish Creek], in several lines, their right resting on the brow of the hill, about a mile in rear of the Fish-kill, Colonel Morgan being in front and near the church.” That night, as Wilkinson asserts, he and General Gates conferred as to plans for the next day’s action. Gates, believing erroneously that the main British force was already moving through the dark northward in retreat, had already determined upon an immediate march in the morning by the main army in column along the great road by the river, with Morgan advancing on the higher ground on the left flank. Wilkinson protested that, without proper reconnaissance, such a move by Gates “would commit himself to the enemy in their strong position,” amounting to an unplanned frontal assault against fixed positions with massed artillery. Gates reluctantly relented somewhat, ordering Wilkinson “to attend to the movement,” i.e., supervise the reconnaissance and get the main march underway.

Oct. 11 Wilkinson states that he was familiar with the area and its topography, having studied the ground while the American army was falling back, a month or so prior. In the morning, as was typical, the area was enveloped in a thick fog. Wilkinson went early in pursuit of Colonel Morgan and his Corps of Rangers. This unit had already moved out “and with some difficulty had crossed the Fish-kill on a raft of loose logs, at the foot of a mill pond about three-fourths of a mile above the Saratoga mills” owned by Philip Schuyler. Crossing the creek, Wilkinson encountered Morgan and his men falling back after a skirmish with British troops in which the Corps had lost three men. Wilkinson directed Morgan to move to the left and around the British right flank, “and throw his corps into the air,” and that Wilkinson would see to it that two American brigades would cross the creek to fill in the gap in the line and support Morgan. Paterson’s and Learned’s brigades advanced to this purpose and forded the creek, guided by Wilkinson.

Wilkinson then rode to the head of the main column, led by the brigades of Nixon and Glover, located on the river road on the south bank of Fish Creek at a position between

Schuyler’s house and the church and near the east end of the ridge that rises on the south bank of the creek. Orders came from Gates to immediately cross the creek and advance, and Wilkinson offered to serve as guide to the column. The morning fog was still heavy at this point in time. Wilkinson and Major Stevens the artilleryman took Captain Goodale and 50 troops as an advance guard and proceeded to the ford located between the mills and the mouth of the creek. Discerning a British picket patrol across the creek, Wilkinson ordered Goodale and his company to rush the British and surprise them, in which Goodale succeeded, capturing the British lieutenant and 35 men without firing a shot. As Nixon and Glover’s troops began crossing onto the north bank of Fish Creek, Wilkinson learned from his captives that the entire British army was on post and waiting for an American assault. “Twelve or fifteen hundred [of Nixon and Glover’s] men had passed, when the fog was suddenly dispersed, and we beheld the British army under arms; their [artillery] park in our front, and our left exposed to their center [i.e., to the 20th and 47th Regiments which were holding the south-central section of the overall British position]; a heavy fire of artillery and small arms was immediately opened on us, and our troops unexpectedly attacked in flank and front, broke and retreated over the creek in great disorder.

Because of a standing order by Gates that, in the event of an attack on any American unit, all other American units should then converge and attack the British as opportunity offered, Wilkinson now became concerned that General Learned might launch a foolhardy attack from his position on the left. Wilkinson immediately rode westward along the south bank of Fish Creek, crossed the creek at the ford below the milldam, and reached the head of Learned and Paterson’s brigades just in the nick of time, to head off an ill-judged advance that was just entering the belt of terrain that had been cleared by the British, at a point about two hundred yards below the British south redoubt. He succeeded in persuading Learned to halt the advance and fall back. The British then opened fire from their redoubt with artillery and small arms, killing several Americans as the latter fell back into the screening woodland.

“The two brigades [of Learned and Paterson] fell back about half a mile to a field, where they took a strong position, which they fortified and held until the surrender of the British army; Morgan’s corps being on their left, and extended [northward] in rear of the enemy’s right; the brigades of Glover and Nixon after their repulse resumed their positions on the heights west of the great road; and the remainder of the 11th and the whole of the 12th and 13th passed without any notable occurrence, except affairs of pickets and several brisk cannonades.”

P9. Name: Anonymous source21

Nationality: British

Military position: Unknown, thought to have been a British officer

Defining Features: British bateaux landing; Fish Creek lower ford; American siege line positions on heights to south of Fish Creek

Remarks:

The source briefly describes the skirmishing on the morning of the 11th, the give-and-take combat over the supply bateaux of that day, and the bombardment and sniping that went on from the 11th through the 13th.

Oct. 9 “The artillery could not pass the fords of the Fish Kill, till the morning of the 10th . . . . On our arrival near Saratoga a corps of the enemy, between 5 and 6 hundred, were discovered throwing up entrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudson at our approach, and joined a body posted to oppose our passage there.”

Oct. 10 “The enemy appeared on the heights of the Fish Kill [heights on the south bank of Fish Creek] in great force, and making a disposition to pass [ford the creek] and give us battle.”

Oct. 11 “The morning extremely foggy. Three brigades of the enemy crossed the Fish Kill, a little brook that lay between us and them, under cover of the fog, and as we afterwards were informed had planned a general attack for that morning, had not some deserters from us, given them a very exact account of our position, which they found to be different from what they had at first imagined it. However, they made two or three faint [probing?] attacks, and found it prudent to retreat. The killed and wounded in these little skirmishes will be mentioned hereafter in the return. . . . The fog clearing, we observed the enemy throwing up batteries, which they began to fire from towards ev’ning. They were answered by ours, but the fire on either side was not heavy.

“The attacks upon the [British supply] bateaux were continued, several were taken, and retaken, but their situation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy, than to ours, it was found impossible to secure the provisions otherwise, than by landing

21 George F.G. Stanley, ed., For Want of a Nail [account of the campaign by an anonymous British soldier] (Sackville, New Brunswick: The Tribune Press, Ltd., 1961), 164‐167. The purported British first‐hand accounts bear a somewhat troublesome aspect as regards their reliability. The anonymous writer’s use of the exact same phraseology as that found in Burgoyne’s letter to Lord Germain, in at least four places, calls into question whether the anonymous account is not at least partly plagiarized. On the other hand, the anonymous account appears to add some information, such as the briefly extended nature of the skirmishing on the morning of the 11th, that enlarges the body of data in a manner not inconsistent with other available accounts. As was probably the case with Lieutenant Digby’s narrative (which shares some of this same phraseology), it could be that the anonymous memorialist consulted Burgoyne’s report afterward as a source to better access and organize his own recollections.

them, and carrying them up the hill. This was effected under fire and with great difficulty. . . .

“The bulk of the enemy’s army was hourly joined by new corps of militia. . . . Their position, which extended three parts in four of a circle round us, was from the nature of the ground unattackable in all parts.”

Oct. 12-13 “Several shot exchanged with the artillery, and popping shots with small arms constantly. . . .

“In this situation the army took the best position possible, waiting till the 13th at night. . . . During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part, even rifle shot and grape shot came into all parts of the line, tho’ without any considerable effect.

“A parley with the enemy was enter’d upon on the 14th instant.”

P10. Name: Lt. Thomas Anburey22


Military position: Line officer in the 24th Regiment

Defining Features identified: British outpost redoubt—just above Fish Creek

Remarks:

When describing the critical problem the Crown force was facing on account of water, Anburey, whose regiment was posted within the great redoubt toward the south end of the British army’s position, referred to the frustrating nearness of the Fish Creek and the presence of American marksmen. He also describes a hazardous posting for a period for his detachment in a smaller advanced breastwork close to the creek. Although this structure is missing from the Wilkinson (aka Faden) map, a small fortification is depicted on the Gerlach map, positioned immediately above the north bank of Fish Creek and just to the southeast of the British great southern redoubt.

Anburey states that access to water was prevented, “although close to a fine rivulet [Fish Creek?], it being at the hazard of life, in the daytime, to get any, from the number of riflemen the enemy had posted in the trees, and at night the men were prevented, as they were sure to be taken prisoners if they attempted it. All the water that the army was supplied with was from a very muddy spring. . . .

Anburey’s company and two others of the 24th “were posted in a small redoubt, close to the creek; our situation was . . . merely to observe if the enemy passed the creek in any force. Had they attempted it, we were to have kept up a firing during their crossing, then to have abandoned our

22 Thomas Anburey, Travels through the Interior Parts of America (London: William Lane, 1789), Vol. 2, 8‐16.

station, and joined the main body of the army. This post was a small square redoubt, constructed with logs breast high, and the only shelter afforded to the troops was from those angles which faced the enemy, as the others were so exposed, that we had several men killed and wounded in the redoubt by the riflemen, who were posted in trees. We could discern them every morning at daybreak, taking their situations upon the most lofty trees they met with. . . .

P11. Name: Lt. Gen. Sir John Burgoyne23


Military position: Commander, Crown forces

Defining Features: None referred to

Remarks:

Burgoyne’s letter reporting the outcome of the campaign to Lord George Germain was dated October 20, 1777. He describes the siege:

“The bulk [i.e., main body] of the enemy’s army was hourly joined by new corps of militia volunteers and their numbers together amounted to sixteen thousand men. Their position, which extended three parts in four of a circle around us, was from the nature of the ground unattackable in all parts. During this time the men lay continually on their arms and were cannonaded on every part, rifle and grape shot came into all parts of the line, tho’ without any considerable effect.”

P12. Name: Lt. William Digby24


Military position: Line officer in the grenadier company of the 53rd Regiment

Defining Features: British bateaux landing; Schuyler House site

Remarks:

Digby refers to the artillery bombardment and rifle sniping by the Americans that characterized the siege during the days October 11-13.

Oct. 9 “We waded the Fish Kill near Schuyler’s house, about 8 o’clock that night—the enemy having destroyed the bridge some days before—and took post soon after on the

23 Letter, Sir John Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, October 20, 1777. Copy in Sol Feinstone Collection, Item No. 134, David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, PA. 24 John Rhodehamel, ed., The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence, The Library of America series (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 2001), 330‐333.

heights of Saratoga. . . . Our only entertainment was the report of some popping shots heard now and then from the other side the great river at our bateaux.”

Oct. 10 Following the decision to give up the attempt to retreat via a crossing at Fort Edward, “we burned Schuyler’s house to prevent a lodgement being formed behind it. . . . We immediately changed our ground a little [evidently from the low ground near the river to a position along the high ground to the west], and under the protection of that night, began to entrench ourselves, all hands being ordered to work. . . . The men worked without ceasing during the night, and without the least complaining of fatigue, our cannon were drawn up to the embrasures and pointed ready to receive them at day break.”

Oct. 11 “Their cannon and ours began to play on each other. They took many of our [supply] battows on the river, as our cannon could not protect them. . . . They continued firing into us from batteries they had erected during the night, and placed their riflemen in the tops of trees; but still did not venture to storm our works.”

Oct.12 “A cannon shot was near taking the general [Burgoyne], as it lodged quite close to him in a large oak tree. We now began to perceive their design by keeping at such a distance, which was to starve us out.”

Oct. 13 “Their cannon racked our post very much; the bulk of their army was hourly reinforced by militia flocking in to them from all parts, and their situation, which nearly surrounded us, was from the nature of the ground unattackable in all parts; and since the 7th the men lay constantly upon their arms—harassed and fatigued beyond measure, from their great want of rest. All night we threw up traverse to our works, as our lines were enfiladed or flanked by their cannon.”

P13. Name: Lt. August Wilhelm Du Roi25

Nationality: German

Military position: Adjutant, Regiment von Specht

Defining Features: British bateaux landing; British south redoubt; German north redoubt; American siege line positions on heights to south of Fish Creek; American siege line positions on heights to east of Hudson; American siege line positions on east bank of Hudson; American siege line positions on islands; Bushett-Marshall House

25 August Wilhelm Du Roi, The Specht Journal: A Military Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign, trans. Helga Doblin, ed. Mary C. Lynn (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995), 94‐97.

Remarks:

This narrative from a German officer is perhaps the most comprehensive single firsthand account of the siege period, offering considerable detail on military movements and siege conditions.

Oct. 9 The British army arrived at Saratoga, making its main encampment on the plain area situated just north of Fish Creek and west of the Hudson. Entrenchments with artillery emplaced were dug along both water courses. All the bateaux were safely landed; “the army consequently did not have to fear any want for the time being.” The presence of the American militia brigade under General Fellows on the east bank of the Hudson was worrisome, however, as it meant that a crossing of the river at Saratoga was no longer feasible. Fellows began bombarding the bateaux landing with his two cannon in the evening, threatening the supplies, and continued firing at the boats all night.

Oct. 10 Despite most officers’ expectations, Burgoyne’s main army did not move northward that day. “We were still in our position at 2 o’clock in the afternoon, when we saw General Gates with the enemy army arrive on the heights of Saratoga.” British and American artillery began to duel. Du Roi states that “several enemy columns” were seen in the woods to the west. “All the regiments were ordered to dig in place as much as possible and to establish lines in the most advantageous places to be finished with [log] bulwarks.” The British units to the south succeeded well in this work but the German units to the north had a more difficult time due to the rockiness of the ground, so that their entrenchments were little more than a foot deep. “All the supplies in the bateaux were unloaded by army detachments during the night” and moved to a magazine on high ground.

Oct. 11 “Around 9 o’clock, the enemy crossed the Fishkill with 2 brigades and made preparations for attacking our army from the rear. [Du Roi is referring to Nixon and Glover’s advance on the east—he consistently refers to the British “front” as facing westward into the woods, and thus to the British south redoubt as the left and the German north redoubt as the right.] They were also quite lucky inasmuch as they captured our bateaux and picked up Lieut. Naylor, an officer of the 62nd Regiment with 40 men. A large part of our supplies was also lost on this occasion. A lively shrapnel fire aimed at the enemy forced them to cross the Fishkill again. The enemy continued to send more and more troops against Lord Balcarres’s corps [the British south redoubt—Balcarres had taken over command of Fraser’s Advance Brigade upon the death of Fraser on October 7]; they also established batteries against said corps and now the cannonade from both sides against each other would not stop.” The Germans observed a corps of about 500 American troops moving northward in the woods to the west. “At about 10 o’clock in the morning, the enemy also organized cannon on a height” on the east side of the Hudson and began targeting the British army’s wagons and baggage, which were still located on the plain leading down to the river.” The British returned fire “with such good effect that the enemy had to withdraw one gun into the woods. . . .”

“The outposts exchanged fire the whole day. The enemy lay behind the bushes on the other side of the Hudson and in part on some bushy islands in this river. From time to

time, they also waded across the river and shot at everything that could be seen on the plain. Our outposts and guards, therefore, had to try to protect themselves with small flèches.” All day the British and German troops continued work on their fortifications. The British in the south redoubt were able to build theirs very strong on all sides but the Germans to the north still did not fare well due to the rockiness of the ground. The gravel-like character of the stone not only impeded digging but could represent an additional hazard in bombardment—“As the berms consisted of many little stones, these would in the case of an enemy cannonade be more dangerous than advantageous for the soldiers standing behind them.” In addition, the German fortifications were only built facing west so that on the east they were exposed to the incoming fire of the American cannon across the Hudson, and the troops in the northern half of the north redoubt could be subject to artillery fire from a higher knob located nearby, if the Americans were to so occupy this piece of higher ground. The dense woods filling the area to the west and north of the German position was yet another liability, since the Americans could use the forest as a screen from which to snipe or through which to advance in loose Indian-style formation, while the German breastworks were insufficient to provide adequate cover to the defenders. The Germans would have no effective fortifications to mount a defense should the Americans cross the Hudson in force and attack from the east.

German commander General von Riedesel kept jägers on patrol in the woods to the west as a safeguard, but one result of this precaution was that the Americans captured a number of the jägers.

Oct. 12 “The firing was the same.” Pressure from the Americans succeeded in forcing the British to withdraw their outposts from the plain by the river into the fortified high ground area, while the Americans established outposts along the north bank of Fish Creek in the plain area.

Oct. 13 “The cannonades on both sides and the shooting of the outposts at each other did not stop the whole day. The enemy had now completely encircled us and taken his position in such a way that we could not attack him without obvious disadvantage for us. The moment for the retreat had definitely passed. On that [east] side of the river and above [overlooking] the Hesse-Hanau Regt., the enemy laid out a battery of cannon on a height in order to flank us. . . . Around noon, from this battery, the enemy cannonaded the houses which lay at the right wing of the Hesse-Hanau Regt., where sick and wounded officers were quartered. [The Hesse-Hanau was the northernmost army in the overall British position.] They also tried to fire at our regiment from there. [Regiment von Specht was positioned third from the north end.] But because our 12-pound cannon, located in an entrenchment of the Hesse-Hanau Regt., were making a lively counterfire against the enemy battery mentioned above, their 6-pounders were soon silenced. In fact, the enemy was vastly inferior to us in the use of artillery. During all these days, they had inflicted little damage on us while they suffered great losses from our cannon (as they later admitted).”

P14. Name: Sgt. Roger Lamb26


Military position: Non-com in battalion company of the 9th Regiment

Defining features: British bateaux landing

Remarks:

Lamb notes the struggle over the British supply bateaux, and refers to the general bombardment and sniping by the Americans.

Oct. 9 “This evening the van [of Burgoyne’s army] arrived at the heights of Saratoga. . . Here it was discovered that a division of the Americans [Fellows’s force] had already arrived, and were employed in throwing up entrenchments on the heights before the British, on whose approach they retired over the ford, and joined a large body there; who likewise were employed for the purpose of preventing all retreat.”

Oct. 10 “The bateaux with what little provisions remained were constantly fired upon, from the opposite side of the river; many of them fell into the hands of the enemy.”

Oct. 11 “Several men were employed this day in landing the provisions from the boats, and conveying them up to the hill, under a very galling fire from the enemy. . . . Numerous parties of the militia now joined the Americans. Roaring of cannon and whistling of their rifle pieces were heard constantly by day and night.”

P15. Name: Baronness von Riedesel27

Nationality: German

Military position: Wife accompanying the commander of hired German troops

Defining Features: Bushett-Marshall House; Schuyler House site; Schuyler mill buildings site

26 Roger Lamb, A British Soldier’s Story: Roger Lamb’s Narrative of the American Revolution, ed. Don N. Hagist (Baraboo, Wisconsin: Ballindalloch Press, 2004), 53‐54. The volume edited by Hagist represents a useful and also faithful streamlining of the two original 1809‐1811 books by Lamb, which had seen the continuity of Lamb’s original memoir text severely marred, and had also featured the extensive and rather gratuitous addition of texts from other authors. The original volumes were Journal of Occurrences during the Late American War (Dublin: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809), and Memoir of My Own Life (published privately, 1811). 27 Frederika Charlotte Louise, Baronness von Riedesel, Baronness von Riedesel and the American Revolution, trans. and ed. Marvin L. Brown, Jr. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 56‐63.

Remarks:

The Baroness took refuge for the duration of the siege in the cellar of the Marshall House, used as a British field hospital, which survives today on the north side of the village of Schuylerville. She notes in her memoir the bombardment and sniping on British positions by the Americans from multiple directions. The British army was largely deprived of water, because American soldiers positioned across the Hudson would shoot men who went to the riverside to obtain it.

Oct. 10 “In order to cover the retreat General Burgoyne ordered fire set to the beautiful house and mills in Saratoga belonging to General Schuyler.” Cannon fire and musketry commenced at about 2 PM. She could see American soldiers on the east side of the Hudson aiming their guns [apparently referring to muskets or rifles] and firing at people who were on the road on the west side, and saw a British soldier wounded by this sniping. She took shelter in the Marshall House as soon as possible, and “immediately after our arrival a terrifying cannonade began, directed principally at the house where we sought shelter” (in the perhaps somewhat ecocentric view of the Baronness).

Oct. 11 “Terrific” cannonading, now “from the other side” [either the south or the west]. In one brief interval, eleven cannon shot hit the main floor of the house, the balls heard rolling about by the wounded and refugees occupying the cellar.

ACCOUNTS by TRAVELERS & RESIDENTS, 1780-1830

The following section, covering the period 1780-1830, contains information from travelers’ observations on the battlefield landscape and accounts of local residents’ recollections that provides some potentially useful data for interpretation of the military action of the siege and the relationship of that military action to the area’s landscape.

T1. Name: Marquis de Chastellux28

Date: 1780

Position: French major general, 3rd ranking officer in Rochambeau’s expeditionary force

Defining features: British south redoubt; British center positions; German north redoubt; American siege line positions to west and north of British

28 Francois‐Jean, Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America, trans. and ed. Howard C. Rice, Jr. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), Volume 1, 217‐219.

Remarks:

While visiting Saratoga on December 31, 1780, the Marquis discussed the siege with General Philip Schuyler, then in residence in one of his tenant houses. “As for General Burgoyne’s position, it is difficult to describe it, because the ground is so very irregular, and the General finding himself surrounded, was obliged to divide his troops into three camps, forming three different fronts; one facing the Fish Creek [evidently the British south redoubt], another the Hudson River [evidently the position of the British and German regiments in the center],and the third the mountains to the westward [the German north redoubt]. General Burgoyne’s plan [the map drafted by Lt. William Cumberland Wilkinson and published by Faden of London in 1780] gives a fairly accurate idea of this position, which was not ill taken, and is only defective on the side of the Germans, where the ground forms an incline, the slope of which was against them. All that is necessary to observe is that the woods continually rise towards the west; so that the General might very well occupy some advantageous eminences, but never the summits.”

Schuyler noted that as part of the siege action, Gates sent two cannon across Fish Creek to join the contingent manning the lines to the west of the British, in order to bombard the British from that vantage. “This battery . . . considerably incommoded the English.”

T2. Name: William Strickland29

Date: 1794

Position: English naturalist and progressive agriculturalist

Defining features: American siege line positions on heights to south of Fish Creek; American siege line positions to west and north of British; British south redoubt

Remarks:

“On the heights above Mr. Schuyler’s house [to the south of Fish Creek], redoubts and other military works remain, though so over grown with brush wood as scarcely to be accessible, in which state also are those on the heights of the left [north] bank of Fishkill creek, which were occupied by the British previous to the surrender and those also of the Americans by which they hemmed them in, and prevented their retreat to Canada.”

29 William Strickland, Journal of a Tour in the United States of America, 1794‐1795 (New York: New York Historical Society, 1971), 148‐149.

T3. Name: Albert Clements30

Date: Born ca. 1782, deposition 1877

Position: Local resident

Defining features: American siege line positions on heights to south of Fish Creek; British south redoubt; old Dutch Church site

Remarks:

Clements had resided in Schuylerville since 1789. He asserted, “I have frequently heard soldiers who were in Gates’ army tell the following incident: After the retreat of the British army from Stillwater towards Schuylerville, the American army pursued them as far as a hill on the south bank of Fish Creek, nearly opposite the village of Victory [the heights extending along the south bank of Fish Creek], and there erected a battery, and fired their guns toward the point on the north side of the creek, where Burgoyne happened to be at the table eating, and a ball came on the table and knocked off a leg of mutton.

“I remember, when I was a boy [ca. 1790s], of seeing breastworks extending as much as a quarter of a mile in length along the hill where Prospect Hill Cemetery now is located [i.e., location of the British south redoubt], in the direction of the road just west of the cemetery. I assisted in tearing them down. They were made of pine logs and earth.

“I remember the old Dutch Church, which stood on the south side of the road now running from the river road to Victory; I frequently attended meeting there. It was a wooden structure, heavy timbers and clapboarded. There were no other buildings on the south side of the creek except General Schuyler’s mansion, and only two on the north side at that time.”

T4. Name: General Hoyt31

Date: 1825

Position: Traveler and evidently a man with military experience (precise identity not established)

Defining features: British south redoubt; gutter or depression to south of British south redoubt; location of Learned-Woodbridge farthest advance on 11th; American siege line positions on heights to south of Fish Creek; Fish Creek upper ford

30 Albert Clements, Deposition, April 13, 1877, in Ellen Hardin Walworth, Battles of Saratoga (Albany: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1891), 121‐122. 31 General Hoyt, “General Hoyt’s Visit,” in William L. Stone, Visits to the Saratoga Battle‐Grounds, 1780‐1880 (Albany: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1895), 202‐210.

Remarks:

General Hoyt was accompanied on an intensive survey of the siege area by an elderly guide who had himself been present at the siege serving in Colonel Woodbridge’s Massachusetts militia regiment, the same unit as Samuel Bacon (one of the accounts cited above). Similarity of this guide’s account to the narrative in Bacon’s pension application (in a deposition made seven years following Hoyt’s Saratoga visit) suggests that the guide might even have been Bacon himself. Hoyt evidently brought along a copy of the Wilkinson-Faden British map of the siege area, as he made careful comparison to the features on that map, such as unit positions, for interpretation of the siege ground. He had also taken careful note of James Wilkinson’s and other available accounts of the siege period action, and made use of those materials in his interpretation. Hoyt toured the surviving British and German earthworks on the heights on the west side of Saratoga, and implies in his account that the remnants of the fortifications depicted on the Faden map were clearly observable on the ground in 1825.

With information specifically from his guide, Hoyt states that with regard to the abortive American advance at daybreak on the “very foggy” morning of the 11th, Woodbridge’s regiment reinforced Learned’s and Paterson’s brigades in their movement across Fish Creek on the west. Woodbridge was posted at the right end of the westerly contingent. “Woodbridge’s regiment had laid down their packs and approached within ten yards of the opening” [i.e., edge of the woods]. At this point, with the British apparently ready to open fire as soon as they emerged from the forest, the regiment was ordered to fall back. Woodbridge “retired about thirty yards to a depression in the ground, where the men were covered from the direct fire of the enemy. With a temerity truly characteristic of young troops, individuals then advanced, and posting themselves behind trees, opened a scattering fire upon the enemy, who were now indistinctly seen through the fog, and received theirs in return. My companion pointed me to a large pine, not exceeding thirty yards from the British works, behind which he, with several others, covered themselves while eagerly popping at the enemy’s heads, seen over the parapet; . . . having expended several cartridges, the party fell back to the regiment, and soon after the whole retired to Fish Creek, opposite to the mills, where they were ordered to throw up defensive lines.

“Reaching the creek, we passed it on floating timbers, resting against the mill dam, and my companion remembered that his regiment passed the mill pond in the same manner and at the same place as they advanced to attack the British lines as had been related; and continuing our route along a road on the right [south] bank of the creek we came to the salient point of a hill near Schuyler’s house [perhaps referring to the promontory at the east end of the ridge rising from the south bank of Fish Creek], where a picket, of which he was one, was attacked by a party of the British in the night of the 10th of October, but after a little random firing and a few discharges of a fieldpiece which advanced to the spot, the enemy fell back.” The editor of the 1895 book in which Hoyt’s narrative appears, William L. Stone, asserts that the milldam where the floating timbers made a bridge was located precisely at “the present dam on Fish Creek at Victory Mills.” Hoyt noted that it was located “about three-quarters of a mile above Schuyler’s” house and gristmill.

T5. Name: Jared Sparks32

Date: 1830

Position: Historian, writer, and Unitarian minister, later president of Harvard College, editor-publisher of the first edition of George Washington’s papers (1834-1837)

Defining features: American siege line positions on heights to east of Hudson; American siege line positions along east bank of Hudson; Fish Creek lower ford

Remarks:

Sparks toured the siege area with John Schuyler (son of General Philip John Schuyler) as guide. “He very politely went over the ground with me, and pointed out every remarkable place—Burgoyne’s fortified camp—the plain on which the British surrendered their arms—the German encampment—the position of Gates’s army, and particularly of Morgan’s Corps. Burgoyne’s drawing [the Wilkinson-Faden map] represents these particulars very accurately; except that the forces under General Fellows, on the other side of the river, instead of being stationed at one place [as on the map], were arranged along the heights for nearly two miles, with cannon so stationed as to command the plain and the German encampment. Fellows’ troops were stationed on both sides of the Batten Kill. Gates’s army was stationed on the heights and in the woods on the south side of the Fish Kill; and the line was continued by Morgan’s Corps on the west quite round to the Hudson; so that Burgoyne was completely surrounded. . . .

“The movements of the army in a fog [on the morning of the 11th], mentioned by [James] Wilkinson must all have been below the present site of the bridge, and on the plain near the Hudson, where there was a ford. The ground above the bridge is too precipitous for any such movements. Wilkinson’s description of the whole affair is unintelligible.”

32 Jared Sparks, mss. In Harvard University Library, transcript on file at the office of the Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York.

APPENDIX II

CORBETT PARCEL TITLE INFORMATION

APPENDIX II

CORBETT PARCEL TITLE INFORMATION

December 15, 1843 Teunis Van Vechten, counselor at law, Albany, to Benjamin Losee, Town of Northumberland, Saratoga County, for a parcel of 5.3 acres, representing the property containing the Schuyler sawmill and its immediate surroundings; price of $1,500. Saratoga County Deed Book (SCDB) Vol. RR, pg 104.

This parcel represented a portion of the Schuyler Estate, subdivided out from Lot No. 5 (see 1837 estate plat). In 1837, Stephen Van Rensselaer, Jr., had brought suit against Philip Schuyler for a debt of $400,000. In an indenture of July 3, 1837, Rensselaer had agreed to an assignment of the Schuyler Estate property by Schuyler to attorney Jacob T.B. Van Vechten to enable auction. Van Vechten auctioned the real estate on November 2, 1837, and Teunis Van Vechten purchased a large portion of the estate property in the Schuylerville-Fish Creek vicinity.

In addition to the relatively small sawmill lot, which encompasses the ground examined in the Fall 2010 archaeological investigation (Corbett Parcel), Benjamin Loseehad earlier acquired other portions of Schuyler Estate Lots 5 and 9, as well as other elements of the Schuyler real estate, from Teunis Van Vechten in transactions that had taken place on March 13 and 20, 1841. SCDB Vol. MM: pp 241 and 246.

Multiple conveyances from Benjamin Losee for interests in Schuyler Estate Lots 5 and 9 (excepting the Horicon Mill parcel within Lot 5):33

September 11, 1845 Benjamin Losee and wife Eunice H., Northumberland, to Enoch R. Mudge, Lynn, Massachusetts, for a one-fourth interest in Lots 5 and 9; price $7,500. SCDB Vol. UU, pg 351. In this and the other conveyances of 1845-1847, the sawmill parcel purchased by Losee in 1843 had been restored to Lot 5.

November 15, 1845 Benjamin Losee and wife Eunice H., Northumberland, to Robert B. Coleman and Charles A. Stetson, both of the City of New York, for a one-fourth interest in Lots 5 and 9; price $7,500. SCDB Vol. UU, pg 494.

March 23, 1846 Benjamin Losee and wife Eunice H., Northumberland, to David Nevins, City of New York, for a one-fourth interest in Lots 5 and 9; price $8,000. SCDB Vol. WW, pg 40.

May 28, 1846 Benjamin Losee and wife Eunice H., Northumberland, to Jared Coffin, Brighton, Massachusetts, for a one-eighth interest in Lots 5 and 9; price $4,348.35. SCDB Vol. WW, pg 207.

October 16, 1847 Robert B. Coleman and Charles A. Stetson, both of the City of New York, to William E. Wilson, New Orleans, Louisiana, for a one-eighth interest in Lots 5 and 9, and in other adjacent properties from the Schuyler Estate including Lot 15; price $7,220.26. SCDB Vol. 56, pg 143.

Conveyances for Victory Mills property:

November 12, 1849 David Nevins, New York, Jared Coffin, Brighton, Enoch R. Mudge, Lynn, William E. Wilson, New Orleans, Robert B. Coleman, New York, and Charles A. Stetson, New York, to the Saratoga Victory Manufacturing Company, for Lots 5, 9, 15, and other adjacent properties from the Schuyler Estate (excepting the Horicon Mill parcel); price $80,000. SCDB Vol. 56, pg 489.

33One of the deeds from Losee, for a one-eighth interest, was evidently never recorded.

June 17, 1910 William S. Ostrander and John B. Pitman, receivers of the assets and property of the Saratoga Victory Manufacturing Company, to Louis W. Dornedden, City of New York, for three factory properties:

Victory Mills, located in Victory, New York

Factory in Grangerville, New York

Horicon Mill, Schuylerville, New York,

plus all of the goods and financial assets and rights contained in or associated with these industrial properties; price $397,500 plus such sums in cash as were required to satisfy the company’s creditors. The sale was taking place due to a pending lawsuit for debt brought against the company before the Supreme Court of New York by Louis Robeson and James Lawrence. The Supreme Court had appointed the receivers on May 17, 1910, and had subsequently directed them to sell the property to Dornedden. SCDB Vol. 273, pg 340. The Saratoga Victory Manufacturing Company had purchased the Horicon Mill property in 1849 in transactions separate from those in which the company had acquired the other former Schuyler Estate lots.

July 18, 1910 Louis W. Dornedden, City of New York, to the American Manufacturing Company, for all of the industrial properties and assets of the Saratoga Victory Manufacturing Company that Dornedden had acquired on June 17, 1910; consideration of $1. SCDB Vol. 274, pp 192 and 238. The deed on page 192 specified the real estate parcels; that on page 238 summarized the properties and assets.

September 10, 1931 American Manufacturing Company, Brooklyn, to the Adirondack Realty Holding Corporation, Schenectady, for 13 parcels representing a large portion of the overall Victory Mills-Horicon Mill tract; price $1,000. SCDB Vol. 367, pg 579. The property being transferred contained the hydroelectric apparatus that had been built and installed by the American Manufacturing Company, and the conveyance incorporated provisions for the future possessors of the industrial buildings and structures on other portions of the Victory Mills complex to have rights to the hydroelectric power. The deed referred to a plat of the overall Victory Mills-Horicon Mill tract, made on July 15, 1931, and held in the Saratoga County records, viz., Map AA-24.

The Corbett Parcel location was situated on Parcel 1, which was 72 acres in extent, straddled Fish Creek, and included the power generating house for Victory Mills as well as other buildings and structures.

The Adirondack Realty Holding Corporation was subsequently designated the New York Power and Light Corporation and later the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.

August 20, 1986 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Syracuse, to SNC Hydro, Inc., Albany, for the same tract that had been conveyed by American Manufacturing in 1931; consideration $1. SCDB Vol. 1152, pg 88.

Conveyances for the Corbett Parcel lot:

April 3, 1989 SNC Hydro, Inc., Albany, to Joan Ellen Davis, Gansevoort, and Kathleen A. Corbett, Saratoga Springs, for four contiguous parcels, each approximately one acre in extent, in the Village of Victory, Town of Saratoga; consideration $1. SCDB Vol. 1260, pg 434.

Three of these four lots were subsequently sold during the period 2000-2003. SCDB Vol. 1542, pg 223, Vol. 1568, pg 472, and Vol. 1649, pg 563.

December 8, 2008 Joan Ellen Davis and Kathleen A. Corbett, both of Saratoga Springs, to Saratoga P.L.A.N., Saratoga Springs, for a parcel in the Village of Victory, Town of Saratoga, 0.91 acre. Saratoga County Recorder of Deeds, Instrument No. 2008040801.

APPENDIX III

WILLIAM GRISWOLD, “MANAGEMENT SUMMARY:

RESISTANCE SURVEY OF A PRESUMED REVOLUTIONARY WAR FORTIFICATION SITE,

VICTORY, NEW YORK.” ON FILE, SARATOGA NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK,

STILLWATER, NEW YORK. (2006)

Management Summary by

William Griswold, Archeologist, Northeast Region Archeology Program Resistance survey of a presumed Revolutionary War fortification site

Victory, New York. Saratoga National Historical Site

Stillwater, New York Introduction On April 17, 2006 limited resistance testing was conducted on a parcel of land across the Fishkill from the Victory Woods parcel.1 This small, undeveloped parcel is privately owned and is bounded by residentially developed plots to the north and south, by a road on the east and by the Fishkill on the west. Dave Shockley, a fortifications expert from PETE had conducted a preliminary assessment of the site in December 2005 and identified the earthen mounds as likely American fortifications. The owner of the property is involved with the Saratoga P.L.A.N. (Preserving Land and Nature), a local land protection organization and had taken the land off the market when learning that the parcel may contain American earthen fortifications from the Revolution. A limited resistance survey was undertaken to see if geophysical examination might reveal anything about the parcel’s earthen mounds. Methodology A twenty by twenty meter grid was set up on the property along a north-south axis. Central axis lines were set up using a compass and the grid was marked out every two meters using yellow and orange flags with PVC stems. Originally, both resistance and magnetic assessments were planned for the grid, but it was determined that the magnetometer/gradiometer would not provide quality information because of the amount of metallic trash (primarily ferrous) scattered across the site. The RM-15 Resistance meter, manufactured by Geoscan Research was used for the survey, with readings taken every 0.5 meter along transects separated by 1 meter for a total of 800 readings. Resistance meters, like the RM-15, measure the electrical resistance of the soil. The A-spacing (distance between the probes on the frame) on the RM-15 was set at 0.5 meters apart. The manufacturer of the RM-15 indicates that a 0.5 meter A-spacing should provide information on subsurface remains down to approximately 1 meter of depth, but optimal readings will be gathered for features buried less than a meter. A Twin array survey was then conducted across the grid with the cable for the two remote probes completely unspooled and anchored approximately twenty meters to the south of the grid. The results were uploaded and processed by the Geoplot V. 3 software, also manufactured by Geoscan Research. GPS data was collected using a Trimble Pro XR system on the four corners of the grid. Fifty points were collected for each location with a 6.0 PDOP mask and were post-processed for increased accuracy. Chris Martin, SARA

1 Victory Woods is a 22-acre parcel of land currently owned by NPS. It was fortified by the British during the Revolution and was the last encampment made by General John Burgoyne and his troops before their surrender to American forces in October of 1777.

Integrated Resources Manager, Linda White, SARA Biological Technician, and Kate Maynard, Community Planner, Saratoga P.L.A.N. assisted in setting up the grid and conducting the resistance survey. Results GPS coordinates Easting Northing Pt 1 (SW corner) 614726.85 4771579.20 Pt. 2 (NW corner) 614721.88 4771597.19 Pt. 3 (NE corner) 614741.52 4771602.39 Pt. 4 (SE corner) 614746.26 4771583.23 Coordinates are in UTM using NAD 83 Resistance, as measured in ohms, varied across the grid (Figs. 2-5).2 Areas of very high resistance (1000-2000 ohms), or slow current transmission were noted for the areas where the earth had been redeposited to create the embankments. 3 Areas of moderate resistance (∼ 500 ohms) were seen in the areas to the east and west of the embankments. One area to the extreme east of the grid, around an area that had been used for dumping, produced a low resistance value (∼ 100 ohms). This area also corresponded to a topographic low spot. This low resistance, or fast electrical signal transmission, was marked by high moisture content in the soil.

2 To convert resistance readings (ohms) to resistivity (ohm-m) the formula πRd is applied, where R equals the Resistance and d = mobile = remote probe separation. In this instance resistance is multiplied by 1.57. Resistivity is used to correct for different probe spacing. 3 Geoscan Research notes the following readings are typical for resistance studies: Background Resistance R ohms Type of site

< 40 Badly drained, high water table, deep topsoil, springs, boggy areas, adjacent to rivers, clay soils etc.

40-200 Typical of urban and rural sites, winter and

summer, gardens, grassed areas, fields, topsoil 30-40 cm.

200-1000 Thin topsoil, less than 20 cm, dry

conditions, very good drainage due to geology, for example sandy and gravely sites but with deep topsoil etc. (Geoscan 2001:6-2)

Based on the results of the resistance investigations, it is highly likely that the area to the east of the earthern embankments was mined for earth to create the embankments. Over time, these embankments have eroded both to the east and to the west. Where the earth has washed off of the embankments and eroded to the east it has collected in the area where the soil was originally gathered. Sizeable rocks and gravel lay on the surface of the embankments and are likely the result of site deflation with the alluvium being washed down slope. The boulders that were mapped were likely too large to be moved for the construction of the original embankments. The area to the extreme east of the grid may represent natural soils, although some cultural modification may have taken place. Recommendations Overall, while the area is a good candidate for the American fortifications constructed during the siege of Victory Woods, one cannot say conclusively that these remains are the remains of the American fortifications (Figures 6-9). The general placement of the earthen embankments and their close proximity to the Fishkill and corresponding view to Victory Woods, provide a compelling argument for recognizing these embankments as Revolutionary fortification features. While archeological excavations (trenching would be suggested) may provide additional information about these earthen embankments, it may not provide conclusive proof either. Artifacts and/or features needed to identify it as a fortification may be lacking, especially given the haste with which these earthworks were likely erected during the Revolution and the geomorphological changes that have taken place on the embankments since the Revolution. An exhaustive Phase IA (literature search and historical investigation) is recommended for the parcel. Archeological testing (Phase IB) should follow the results of the Phase IA, but the manner and placement of the test units/trenches should be developed based on the evidence gathered in the Phase IA and the information contained within this document. References Cited Geoscan Research 2001 Instruction Manual, Resistance Meter RM-15. Instruction Manual Version 2.5 by

Geoscan Research.

Figure 1. Location of geophysical work from GPS readings in relation to Victory Woods

Figure 2 Contours of resistance readings with scaled map of the visible remains superimposed.

Figure 3 Shaded relief map showing resistance readings with scaled map superimposed. Higher resistance readings are in black and white while lower resistance values are in gray.

Figure 4 Surface map of the resistance readings.

Figure 5 Full color surface map showing resistance readings.

Figure 6 Earthen Embankments from the SW corner of the grid.

Figure 7 Earthen Embankments from the NW corner of the grid.

Figure 8 Area as seen from NE corner of grid

igure 9 Area as seen from SE corner of grid. F

APPENDIX IV

ARTIFACT INVENTORY

ARTIFACT INVENTORYSARATOGA BATTLEFIELD

FISH CREEKSARATOGA, NEW YORK

JMA DECEMBER 2010

LOT PROVENIENCE LEVEL DEPTH CT WT ARTIFACT DESCRIPTION COMMENTS DATE RANGE

1.1 MD 1 Surface 1 0 Hardware, Metal: Door Handle or Latch Modified W/Cut or Wrought Nail Attached

1.2 MD 2 Surface 1 0 Fastener, Metal: Staple Wrought, Large, Possible Architectural

1.2 MD 2 Surface 1 0 Lamp Part, Metal: Gas or Kerosene Collar, Oil Lamp1.3 MD 3 Surface 1 0 Pipe Bowl: Decorated Ball Clay Rouletted Edge, "HOME

RULE" Over a Harp and Two Shamrocks, 19th Century

1.4 MD 4 Surface 1 0 Tool, Metal: Axe1.5 MD 5 Surface 1 0 Fastener, Metal: Spike Cut, Fragment1.6 MD 6 Surface 1 0 Tool, Metal: Hoe1.7 MD 7 Surface 1 0 Lamp Part, Metal: Gas or Kerosene Oil Lamp Burner1.8 MD 8 Surface 1 0 Miscellaneous, Metal: Iron Buckle1.9 MD 9 Surface 1 0 Miscellaneous, Metal: Unidentified Lead Valve1.10 MD 10 Surface 2 23.3 g Unidentified Metal Object: Lead Melted1.11 MD 11 Surface 1 Fishing, Metal: Weight W/Fishing Line1.12 MD 12 Surface 1 Lamp Part, Metal: Gas or Kerosene Oil Lamp Burner1.13 MD 13 Surface 1 63.0 g Unidentified Metal Object: Lead Lead Square W/ Hole Drilled in

Top1.14 MD 14 Surface 3 Hard-Paste Porcelain: Hotel Ware Mend, "TC Co" on Rim,

"VITRIFIED/5/07" Stamped on Back, Transfer Print Maker's Mark "RIDGWAYS/VITRIFIED/ENGLAND/L.BARTH & SON/NEW YORK"

Post 1890

1.15 MD 15 Surface 1 Auto/Garage/Machine, Metal: Other License Plate, "7A-42-85/N.Y. 1928"

1928

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JMA DECEMBER 2010


1.16 MD 16 Surface 1 Unidentified Hardware, Metal: Iron Possible File1.17 MD 17 Surface 1 Jewelry, Metal: Ring Small, Braided2 STU 2 1 3 Whiteware: Plain Mend 1810-20002 STU 2 1 1 Machine-Made Bottle Fragment:

Amethyst1903-1915

2 STU 2 1 2 Unidentified Nail: Cut or Wrought2 STU 2 1 2 Unidentified Bottle Fragment: Clear "…N PAT…"2 STU 2 1 2 Whiteware: Green Transfer Print 1829-19153 STU 4 1 4 Machine-Made Bottle Fragment: Clear 1903-20004 STU 5 1 2 Lamp Part, Metal: Gas or Kerosene Collar, Oil Lamp4 STU 5 1 1 Whiteware: Plain 1810-20004 STU 5 1 1 Blown-In-Mold Bottle Fragment: Aqua5 STU 8 1 1 Domestic Coin: Small Cent 1979 Penny Post 19795 STU 8 1 1 Whiteware: Plain 1810-20006 STU 11 1 1 Domestic Brown Stoneware: Albany Slip 1805-1940

6 STU 11 1 1 Whiteware: Plain 1810-20006 STU 11 1 1 Faunal: Egg Shell6 STU 11 1 1 Hard-Paste Porcelain: Plain6 STU 11 1 1 Blown-In-Mold Bottle Fragment: Aqua6 STU 11 1 1 Machine-Made Bottle Fragment: Aqua "…67 PA…26…" 1903-20006 STU 11 1 1 Unidentified Bottle Fragment: Clear6 STU 11 1 1 Pressed-Glass Tableware: Sun/Starburst Amber 1825-2000

6 STU 11 1 2 Glass Tableware: Milk Glass 1743-20006 STU 11 1 1 Grooming/Hygiene, Metal: Toiletry

Bottle Top"COLGATE & CO/NEW YORK", Predates 1928

Pre 1928

6 STU 11 1 1 Blown-In-Mold Bottle: Light Green

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JMA DECEMBER 2010


6 STU 11 1 3 Machine-Made Bottle Fragment: Amethyst

1903-1915

7 EU 2 1 1 Flake 36-40mm: Quartzite8 EU 3 1 2 Faunal: Clam Mend8 EU 3 1 1 Blocky Fragment w/Cortex 36-40mm:

Chert8 EU 3 1 1 Blocky Fragment w/Cortex 31-35mm:

Chert8 EU 3 1 1 Blocky Fragment w/Cortex 21-25mm:

Chert8 EU 3 1 1 Flake 16-20mm: Chert8 EU 3 1 4 Flake 26-30mm: Chert8 EU 3 1 15 749.8 g Fire-Cracked Rock: Quartzite8 EU 3 1 1 Flake 41-45mm: Chert8 EU 3 1 1 Flake >45mm: Chert

Total 84

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