Arab Way Of War 04

37
THE ARAB WAY OF WAR Norvell B DeAtkine [email protected] June 200

description

 

Transcript of Arab Way Of War 04

Page 1: Arab Way Of War 04

THE ARAB WAY OF WAR

Norvell B DeAtkine

[email protected] June 2009

Page 2: Arab Way Of War 04

Application of Culture to Warfare

Generally not

done or if done

stereotypically

applied

Page 3: Arab Way Of War 04

What is Stereotyping?• Taking a kernel of truth and creating a

broad all-inclusive generalization

• It can lead to disaster in threat assessment

Page 4: Arab Way Of War 04

Pakistan outgunned and outnumbered by India launches an attack on India…….WHY?

“One Pakistani soldier equals 20 Indians”

ExampleThe Indo-Pakistan War, 1971

Page 5: Arab Way Of War 04

Culture and Stereotyping Disasters in History

• Hitler’s assessment of U.S. • war making capability

• Our assessment of the Japanese in 1940

• German assessment of the• Eastern Europeans prior to• Operation Barbarossa

Page 6: Arab Way Of War 04

Culture and Stereotyping

• Arab view of the Jews prior to 1948

• Our assessment of the North Vietnamese in 1966

• Israeli view of the

Egyptian military

in 1973

Page 7: Arab Way Of War 04

Culture and Stereotyping

• Iraqi assessment of the U.S. in 1990….and perhaps again in 2003?

• Ben Laden’s view of the U.S.?

Page 8: Arab Way Of War 04

Culture is nevertheless, a prime determinant of the nature of warfare as the history of its development in Asia clearly demonstrates.

John Keegan The History of Warfare

The beginning and the ending of handling Arabs is the unremitting study of them

TE Lawrence The Arab Bulletin Aug 1920

Page 9: Arab Way Of War 04

Attributes Not Applicable to Cultural Studies in Warfare

• Courage

• Human Intelligence

• Genetics

• Example:

Roman Imperial Army

ACCULTURATION NOT GENES

Page 10: Arab Way Of War 04

Arab Warfare in History• Amazing Arab/Islamic expansion in 7th

Century due to number of historical and social factors, but also because of………

– Extensive battle experience

– Excellent leadership

– Adaptability

– Excellent mobilization

Page 11: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WARAll peoples have a distinct cultural approach

to warfare. As Americans we have our own strengths and weaknesses. The trick is to minimize the weaknesses and use the strengths. EXAMPLE;

Kasserine Pass in WWII demonstrated our weaknesses.

Kasserine Pass

Page 12: Arab Way Of War 04

General Observations on Styles of War American

• Vaunted position of “smart weapons” and technology

• Quick resolution demanded• Decisive victory expected• Firepower decisive• War must be socially beneficial• Requires clear demarcation between peace and war• Ambiguity avoided and/or the complex

oversimplified

Page 13: Arab Way Of War 04

Arab Style of War

• Political context• Evasive/Indirection• Delay/attrite• Standoff• Deception• Defense over offense• Psychological warfare

“Victories without battles”- T.E. Lawrence 1921

Page 14: Arab Way Of War 04

STRENGHTS OF ARAB MILITARY

• * low soldier maintenance.

• * Inured to austere living conditions

• * Tradition of obedience to authority

• * Islam and the Arabic language are great vehicles for motivation and control.

• *Dogged in Defense

• *History of “rising from the ashes”

Page 15: Arab Way Of War 04

ARABWeaknesses and Vulnerabilities

• Overly Centralized– Decisions made at higher

levels– No subordinate input– Written orders a must– Top-heavy rank structure– Very little latitude given

subordinates– Stovepipe organization

inhibiting lateral communications

Page 16: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

• Inhibitions on individual initiative– “Nail that stands up gets

hammered down”– Byproduct of an

authoritarian culture– Comparison of the Israeli

and Egyptian Suez crossing in 1973

– Soviet training reinforced top-down command style

Page 17: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

• Decision-making and taking responsibility– U.S. E-7 equals authority of most Arab O-5/O-6– Always at the top– Tendency to reject personal responsibility

Page 18: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

• Distrust of military, especially ground forces– Balance of forces

• SANG and SALF• Iraqi Army and Republican Guard• Egyptian Army and Central Security Force• Syrian Army and Republican Guard

Division– Dual-edged sword– Examples

• Syrian in 1967• Egypt in 1973• Iraq in 1991

Page 19: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and vulnerabilitiesOther effects of the environment of distrust;

- Lack of effective joint operations

- Lack of effective coalition war

- Inhibitions on large –scale training

Page 20: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and VulnerabilitiesArab

• The Heavy Hand of Politicization– The Islamist threat

– The ethnicity problem

– The waning but still important place of certain ideologies

Page 21: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and VulnerabilitiesArab

• Manipulation of information and security– Information is power– Paranoia on security– Examples

• Egyptians in 1973

• Egyptians and Syrians in 1973

Page 22: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and VulnerabilitiesArab

• Dissimulation and Objectivity– Killing the messenger

– “The lie which facilitates is better than the truth which confronts”

– Arabic language as a powerful cultural influence

Page 23: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and VulnerabilitiesArab

• The Education Process– By rote– Instructor/instructors never challenged– Rigid classroom

etiquette• Questioning

• Grading

• Ranks

Page 24: Arab Way Of War 04

Weaknesses and VulnerabilitiesArab

• Officers and Enlisted Gap and Unit Cohesiveness– Non-existent NCO

Corps– EM treatment execrable– No communication– Typical Egyptian Army

weekend in tactical unit

Page 25: Arab Way Of War 04

Considerations in Assessing Arab Military Effectiveness

Arabs have a flair for the dramatic and presentOutstanding “dog and pony” shows.

Page 26: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY of WAR

• The maintenance system is culture

dependent, e.g.,

mechanical aptitude

trust in subordinates

the educational system

infrastructure

dependence on outside support

Logistics and maintenance are perennial problems.

Page 27: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR

• Urban warfare is the Middle East warfare of the past and future– 1948 Jerusalem: Israeli-/Arabs– 1967 Jerusalem: Israeli conquest(reconquest) – 1970 Amman: Jordanian conflict with PLO– 1973 Suez City: Egypt stops Israeli attack– 1975-1990 Lebanon: The civil war– 1980/1981 Iran –Iraq: Khoramshar– 1980 and 1982 : Syria. Islamist revolt– 1989- 2002 Intifadah I and II in Palestine

Page 28: Arab Way Of War 04

Arab Way of War

• Israeli Tank in Bethlehem

Page 29: Arab Way Of War 04

THE ARAB WAY OF WAR

Look For a strategy of urban terrorism:The lesson learned in the evolution of the PLO strategy is that terrorism, not conventional or guerrilla war,works.

Page 30: Arab Way Of War 04

As we must face in parts of Iraq

Page 31: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR

To begin to understand the apparent Arab propensity for self-sacrifice in terrorist attacks, one must read Eric Hofer, The True Believer, and Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind.

 

“Dying and killing seem easy when they are part of ritual, ceremonial, dramatic performance……..”

Page 32: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR

• “…One of the main tasks of a real leader is to mask the grim reality of killing and dying by evoking in his followers the illusion that they are participating in a grand spectacle.”

 • “Glory is a theatrical concept. There is no striving for

glory without a vivid audience…..the knowledge that our mighty deeds will become known to our contemporaries……….”Above quotes from Eric Hofer

 

Page 33: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR

• “It is a characteristic of the Arab mind to be swayed more by words than ideas and ideas more than facts”.

George Attiyeh in The Arabs.

Palestinian suicide bomber

Page 34: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR• The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab

Military effectiveness– A PHD THESIS by Kenneth Pollack completed

in 1996 at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

– HIS PRIMARY CONCLUSION“Arab culture had a tremendous influence on

the ability of Arab militaries to conduct maneuver warfare, and the weakness of Arab militaries in maneuver warfare was the single most detrimental aspect of their poor military performance.”

Page 35: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAROther findings of Pollock:

• Weakness in mechanized warfare

• Socio-economic backwardness

• Politicization of officer corps

• Focus on internal security

Page 36: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR

Concluding ObservationsIn the Arab World if the right hand is active, keep a sharp eye on the left.

 • Reverse the Clausewitzean theorem; War is not a

continuation of politics but actually politics is a continuation of war.

 • The Middle Eastern wars will be most often fought in

urban areas. 

Page 37: Arab Way Of War 04

ARAB WAY OF WAR

QUESTIONS?