Arab Nationalism Long v2

8/3/2019 Arab Nationalism Long v2

1/27

Analysing the failure of pan-arabism

The Middle East has long been a hotspot of conflict, both along ethnic and religious lines. Since

the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab portion of the Middle East has had to deal with

imperialism from the Western world and from Israel, but also with inner conflict which has prevented it

from dealing with its external threats in a unified and effective way. The pan-Arab movement was

meant to meet that objective, but it has lost its momentum to the pan-Islam movement and is now

outside of the mainstream. To this day, the Arab countries remain divided and vulnerable to foreign

meddling; in this way, pan-Arabism has failed to meet its goals. The purpose of this essay is to find out

why the main currents of the post-WWI pan-arab movements, namely Nasserism, Ba'athism and the

Hashemite family's bid, have failed to deliver on those promises. Several events have precipitated the

end of the pan-Arab movement, including the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Lebanese civil war and the

Iran-Iraq war, and the lack of leaders following Nasser's death (Lesson 4, Reasons for the

Disintegration of Pan-Arabism). However, the focus of this essay will not be to find out how those

events killed the momentum of the pan-Arab movement, but rather what prevented the pan-Arab

movement from succeeding while it had the momentum. We will find that competing allegiances,

whether at the ideological level or for self-aggrandisement, both at the top and the grassroots level, and

between member countries, were significant causes for the failure of pan-Arabism, both within and

without the movement; in other words, the diverging ideologies and self-centeredness of the Arab

nationalists caused them to drive each other away rather than to unite. Furthermore, the Arab defeat in

the Six-Day War dealt a significant blow to the pan-Arab movement. As evidence to support this

position, we will briefly discuss the historical conditions that set the stage for its emergence, then some

attempts at political unions made by Arab states in the post-WWII era, a few post-Nasser leaders, then

the way in which the Six-Day War damaged the movement. The United Arab Republic will be

compared and contrasted to the Yemeni Unification and the United Arab Emirates, which were not


2/27

known to have been influenced by pan-Arabism.

Post-WWII pan-Arab ideology was defined by two major currents. The first pan-Arab

movement was Ba'athism, which originated in Syria and predated Nasserism; it was founded by Michel

Aflaq in 1946 (Lesson 4, The Baath Party. The second pan-Arab movement was Nasserism, which

was born in the Egyptian Revolution of1952 (Lecture 4, Gamal Abdel Nasser). Pan-Arabism

predates both Ba'athism and Nasserism, and could be traced back to the 1880s (lesson 4, Pan-

Arabists). Generally, there was cooperation between those movements, but both had to compete with

other movements that attempted to unite Arab countries. For instance, Nasserism was opposed by the

monarchies of the Gulf states, notably the Hashemite royal family, who made their own attempts to

promote Arab unity in an effort to offset Nasserist republican ideals. Finally, pan-Islam seeks to unite

not only Arab countries, but all Muslim countries under an Islamic theocracy, a goal anathema to the

secular ideals of pan-Arabism. (lesson 3, Rise of Pan-Islam; Lesson 4, Gamal Abdel Nasser) Those

competing movements will be covered briefly.

Both currents of pan-arabism had three goals in common. The goals are the rejection of Western

imperialism, the unification of the Arab world under a single nation, and the modernisation of the Arab

world, which entailed the adoption of Western ideas, namely democratisation, secularism and socialism

(Kerr, 1).

Although the Ottoman empire was not Arab in origin, the Arab nation prospered as a large

cultural continuum within the state, undivided by national borders; hence the pan-Arab movement

appeals to a return to former glory. This coincided with a common Muslim identity, which explains

why pan-Islam was a strong competitor, and eventually took over. (Kramer, 171). For similar reasons,

the issue of Palestinian statehood remains a heated topic today; although like the Arab nation, Palestine

was never officially a sovereign state, its native inhabitants long for a return to their former strength as

an Arab majority. This point in common might explain why Palestine was such a central issue for the

pan-Arab movement. The Arab nationalists turned not only to Western ideas, but also to Western


3/27

imperial powers as allies in their attempt to liberate the Arab world from Ottoman domination.

Although the European powers were happy to leverage the Arabs against the Ottoman Empire, they had

little use for a united Arab nation-state whose extent of territory would have spun much of the existing

empire. The intent of the French and the British empires was to divide the territory among themselves;

the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Treaty of Sevre were clear examples of that (Lesson 5, The Sykes-

Picot Agreement; Lesson 5, The Treaty of Sevre) . The new borders that separated the former Arab

provinces of the Ottoman Empire had thus set the stage for resentment against Western imperialism.

The Palestine issue, being the most egregious affront to Arab unity, was to become a central issue in the

post-WWII pan-Arab movement (Lesson 3, The Three Phases in Middle Eastern History; Lesson 3,

The Foreign Policy Process in the Middle East; Lesson 5, The Hussein-McMahon

Correspondence).

-- Attempts to unify the Arab world --

Many attempts to unify Arab countries have been made, not all of which were associated with

Nasserist or Ba'athist pan-Arabism. Most never materialised, and of the ones that did, only a few have

lasted to this day. The only successful attempts at uniting Arab countries that last to this day are the

United Arab Emirates and the reunification of North and South Yemen. Other attempts at political

mergers ofvariable degrees ofintegration include the Federal Arab Republic, the Arab Federation, the

United Arab Republic, the United Arab States, and the attempted annexation ofKuwait by Iraq. The

Arab League, founded in 1945, is neither a federation nor a superstate, but a loose interstate

organisation which now includes all Arab states, whose charter affirms national sovereignty and

precludes intervention in the affairs of other member state (Kramer, 183).

The Ba'ath Party was first founded in Syria by Michel Aflaq, and modeled after the Labour

Party of the United Kingdom. Later on, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party was subsumed by Saddam Hussein, who


4/27

had taken full personal control of both the party and the country; Hafez al-Assad did the same in Syria

(Lesson 4, The Baath Party; Lesson 3, Emergence of Pragmatic Leaders).

-- The Hashemite Royal Family and the Arab Federation

According to Karsh, the imperial ambitions of the Hashemite dynasty can be traced to shortly

before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He portrays them as opportunists who exploited what at the

time constituted a fringe movement of Arab nationalists, and unsuccessfully used the Great Arab

Revolt in a bid for legitimacy as the representatives of the Arab world. The Hashemite dynasty was less

interested in self-determination for the Arab peoples than in establishing their own successor empire,

whose scope was to extend beyond the Arab world. Claiming lineage to the Islamic prophet

Mohammed, the ultimate aim of King Hussein was to gain control over all Muslim lands in order to

reconstitute the Ummah. (Karsh, 3-5) His second son, Abdullah, shared those ambitions, and made

explicit his demands to the British government to see that the Arab kingdom is such as will make it a

substitute for the Ottoman Empire. (4). The plan fell apart when Britain refused to grant Palestine to

the Hashemite family.

Hussein's first son, Faisal, sought to set up a more modest regional empire, the so-called Greater

Syria. Described as equally opportunistic, he betrayed his father and the British by negotiating his plan

with the Ottoman ruling elite in secret, without success. He went as far as courting the Zionist

movement and promising them to promote Jewish immigration to Palestine if made king (a

geographical region which at the time included Palestine), a promise which he soon renounced upon

becoming king of Syria in 1920. After only three months, he was removed by the French (Karsh, 5-7).

From the 1930s on, the Hashemite royal family persisted with their Greater Syria ambitions.

Now ruling over Iraq and Jordan as separate branches, they sought to unite both countries under the

same house and to integrate Syria under its rule. The merger of the two Hashemite kingdoms was


5/27

considered infeasible due to economic disparities between the two countries and political differences,

namely on foreign policy towards Britain and stances on the Palestine issue. This divergence on

Palestine contrasts with the post-WWII Nasserist focus on Palestine as a cause for Arab unity. Unity

was discussed on two separate occasions after WWII: in 1946-47, again focused on Greater Syria, and

in 1951-52, in order to save the Hashemite dynasty following the assassination of King Abdullah of

Jordan.However, the decision to constitute the Arab Federation was made in haste shortly after the

formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 in order to counter its republican influence (Maddy-

Weitzman, 65-75). Although the union was primarily focused on protecting Hashemite concerns, the

union was open to other Arab members; for instance, unsuccessful attempts were made to invite Saudi

Arabia to join (Choueiri, 169; Maddy-Weitzman, 72). The union was dissolved the same year following

the Iraq coup d'tat (Maddy-Weitzman, 72).

The squabbles within the Hashemite family provide an early example of inter-Arab conflicts

which plagued most subsequent attempts at Arab political unions. A single royal family was unable to

keep its own house in order and make unified decisions, a fact made worse when it was in control of

two separate countries, which they only successfully brought together in a spontaneous afterthought

move, and were unable to stop from breaking apart once again after barely a year when one of the

houses got overthrown. The family was torn apart by the personal ambitions of its members, as would

happen to the later pan-Arab movements.

-- Nasserism and the United Arab Republic --

The United Arab Republic project began with a merger between Egypt and Syria which was

conceived in haste in 1958 and only lasted until 1961, while Egypt continued to call itself the United

Arab Republic until 1971 (Wikipedia, United Arab Republic). The project was plagued with back-

and-forths, caused by a political love triangle between Egypt, Syria and Iraq and by regime changes in


6/27

the candidate countries. Egypt and Iraq had been competing for influence over Syria since before

WWII, which did not provide a good starting point for relations between Cairo and Baghdad. The

intent of pan-arabism being to oppose Western imperialism, the comfortable relationship that the

Hashemite regime in Iraq enjoyed with the British did not sit well with Nasser (Lesson 4, Gamal

Abdel Nasser; Kerr, 2).

The Syrians had no particular historical ties with Egypt other than a common Arab identity, but

were swayed by the strong leadership of Nasser (Kerr, 3). Since 1955, they were brought together by a

common foreign policy of resistance to British and American interference; the gesture that sealed the

relationship was Nasser sending Egyptian troops to Syria during its standoff against Turkey. Nasser's

popularity had reached such a point that the Syrian public made vocal demands to their government for

a political union with Egypt (AlSayyid, 88).

Syria's motivation for the merger with Egypt was to deal with its own political instability; it

feared it could not resist a takeover by the Syrian Communist Party in the long term without requesting

Western foreign aid, and the republican Ba'athist regime felt threatened by the royalist regime of Iraq.

Egypt, on the other hand, needed allies in the aftermath of the Suez Canal crisis in order to continue

resisting Western interference. However, Syria pushed for an early merger, which Nasser was reluctant

to accept. He had originally wanted to wait for Syria to put its house in order first and to implement a

five-year transition plan, and was concerned that the new alliance would draw Western pressure.

However, he could not allow Syria to join the pro-Western Hashemite camp. Nasser accepted on the

condition that the UAR would be a centralised unitary state, and that all Syrian parties disband; the new

state was to be under the sole leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, led by Nasser. To the Syrian

Ba'athist party, it was an acceptable price to pay to further their pan-Arab vision. (Kerr, 10-11; Al

Sayyid, 87-88; Lesson 6, The Effect of the 1948 Defeat on Syria).

As stated earlier, the Iraqi Hashemite regime felt threatened by the new alliance and joined

Jordan to form the short-lived Arab Federation. After its dissolution following the Iraqi Revolution of


7/27

1958, Arab nationalist movements formed in Iraq, but were crushed by the Qasim regime; relations

with Egypt had now soured to the point of a cold war and verbal hostilities (Kerr, 17). Meanwhile,

discontent with the political union grew among Syrians, who were being run like a colony (Kramer,

186-187). Nasser and the Ba'ath ran into increasing numbers of disagreements, the latter viewing the

Egyptian leaders pragmatism as too haphazard, compared to their rigid doctrines. The Ba'athists

believed that despite dissolving their own party, they could take effective control of Nasser's single

party, the National Union; Nasser, as president of the UAR, clashed with his Ba'athist ministers. At one

point, the Ba'athists offered their collective resignation, which he interpreted as treason. (Kerr, 12-15)

Kerr describes the situation thus: The elections and resignations dramatized the contrasting

interpretations of 'Abd al-Nasir and the Ba;th leader of the terms of the unity agreement and the manner

in which the newly established institutions were to operate. In part it was a case of clashing ambitions,

in the sense that in practice each side was claiming the right to run Syria as it saw fit (15).

The inevitable breakup drove the Syrians away from Egypt and into seeking an alliance with

Ba'athist Iraq. Despite its new-found common ideology with Syria, Iraq was unwilling to bear the

burden of its neighbour's political instability, and was still in the process of negotiations to join the

UAR with Egypt. A month after the Iraq Ba'athist coup, Syria had its own coup and Akram Hawrani

was ousted; the new Ba'athist cadre was willing to negotiate re-entry into the UAR. The clash was now

between the two Ba'athist parties and Nasser's uncompromising positions. At that point, Nasser was the

public face of Arab Nationalism, and his presence overshadowed that of the minor, uncharismatic

Ba'athist leaders (Kerr, 41-43).

The Iraqi Ba'athist coup in 1963 revived hopes for the UAR, of which Egypt was by then the

sole member. This switch of ideological focus made Iraq more amenable to a better relationship with

Egypt, whilst Syria sought to distance itself from Egypt. But once again, clashes between Nasser and

the Ba'ath Party prevented this (Kerr, 15, 41-43).

The role of North Yemen, although minor, is worth mentioning, as it was a monarchy at the time


8/27

when it allied itself with the UAR shortly after its formation; the alliance was called the United Arab

States. The Mutawakkilite monarchy opted to joined Nasser rather than oppose him as had done the

other conservative regimes of the area. Although the country adopted a flag with the pan-Arab colours,

it remained a sovereign state, where the king retained full power. To say the least, the alliance did not

pay off for the Yemeni monarchy. When the Yemeni civil war broke out a few years later, Nasser sent

military aid to fight on the side of the revolutionaries against the king (Kramer, 186-187). Nasser's

intervention caused much resentment; a British journalist denounced his firebombing raids and

highlighted the arrogance of the Egyptians : Having come directly from British colonial Aden, I

recognised the symptoms all the more easily. Creeping imperialism is a catching disease, and those

Egyptians were only a step away from clapping their hands together and shouting, "Boy!" when they

wanted service. (qtd. in Kramer, 187). Nasser cut ties with Yemen in 1963 (Kerr, 27). Unfortunately

for Nasser, the British disease alienated his allies, and caused the death rather than the birth of his Arab

empire.

The political instability and the constant shift of allegiances of Egypt's neighbours during the

Nasserist period made a political union between them unlikely. Nasser's authoritarianism did not help,

and nor did the doctrinaire attitude of the Ba'ath Party. Referring to the breakdown of talks between the

Ba'ath parties and Nasser over the UAR, Kerr summarised the in-fighting between the pan-Arab

movements brilliantly: Now it had been shown that socialists and revolutionaries were as capable of

quarreling with each other as they were with 'reactionaries' perhaps more so, in fact, because radical

militant organizations had a tendency to become prisoners of their own totalitarian ideologies and to

see themselves as indispensable national saviours. (91).

--Federal Arab Republic --

The Federal Arab Republic was a plan put forward by Moammar Gaddafi after the death of


9/27


10/27

Yemeni political life (23). By contrast, all the previous attempts to merge Arab states were abortive,

and the composition of the would-be states invariably depended on the transient alliance of the day.

North Yemen learned many lessons from the failure of the United Arab States alliance, and

those of the UAR. 30 years after the foundation of the UAR, 90 Arab scholars compiled over a

thousand pages of documents reflecting on that period (AlSayyid, 86). The reunification process

lacked the backing of a strong leader, but was characterised by compromise on both sides. Like other

Arab countries, North and South Yemen had to face political differences on their way to unification.

For instance, South Yemen was a marxist communist country, while North Yemen had a traditional

market economy. In parallel to the UAR and the reunification of West and East Germany, the merger

was between two countries of different sizes. South Yemen, having had less than the fifth of the

population of North Yemen, was wary of losing its autonomy, and especially the social progress it had

made in comparison to what it viewed as a backwards neighbour. (Whitaker, 24-26)However, the

countries took steps to facilitate integration that the UAR had not, such as agreeing to a transition

period, to which success creating a network of shared interests was key (26). Even with those

measures, the union almost broke apart, devolving into a civil war as South Yemen declared

independence in 1994, but that move was crushed by the national government. The civil war resulted in

the demise of the Yemen Socialist Party, enabling the North to dominate the political system (Wadham,

28, 39-40).

While the Republic of Yemen was indeed the result of a successful merger, pan-Arabism had

little to do with it, despite the short-lived membership of the Yemen Arab Republic in the United Arab

States. The socialist ideology of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, had some elements in

common with the pan-Arab vision of socialism, but this ended up making integration with the YAR

more difficult due to its adherence to Marxism and the Soviet state model. The fact that North Yemen

failed to unite with the UAR under pan-Arab ideology, yet was able to unite with its southern

counterpart despite having radically different political systems, is a lesson worth remembering. The


11/27

United Arab Republic episode had a strong leader but who was unwilling to compromise; the

Hashemite royal family acted out of self-interest and were only able to cobble up a last minute union

after decades of impasses, only for it to fall apart after they were unable to prevent a military coup in

Iraq.

-- The United Arab Emirates --

The United Arab Emirates is the most successful Arab political union to date, to the point that it

is recognised as a model of stability in the Arab world. Like the unification of Yemen, the unification

process had little to do with pan-Arabism, nor did it involve any strong leader or particular ideology.

At first, the conditions for the union did not seem favourable. It was formed in 1971 in response

to an unexpected British withdrawal from the region. The federation was entirely driven from the top

without grassroots support; in fact, 85 percent of the population were foreigners. The countries were

very unequal economically, as well as having populations with different education levels. Power and

wealth were concentrated in the hands of the monarchs. Economic differences were part of the reason

why the Hashemites were unable to unite Iraq and Jordan until after WWII. However, it was evident

that the founders had taken a cautious and pragmatic approach towards the formation of the new

federation. The Union project started when the sheiks of Dubai and Abu Dhabi formed their own union,

then invited the other states in the region to join. Qatar and Dubai were candidates, as well as the other

Trucial States. The founders did not intend their proposed state to be the final structure in shape and

size; rather, they adopted a temporary constitution (Heard-Bey, 101). Only a minor role was to be

given to the federal government, while the monarchs were to keep sovereignty over their respective

territories. Care was taken to avoid disputes over natural resources: the provisional constitution stated

that "the natural resources and wealth in each emirate shall be considered to be the public property of

that emirate" (105) Although the founders were absolute monarchs, they were not overly ambitious


12/27

with their project, unlike the Hashemite royal family and the Nasserist movement. The negotiators were

idealistic, but not ideologues. They saw the British departure as an opportunity not for self-

aggrandisement, but for personal accomplishment: they saw the opportunity as not only a taxing but

also an exhilarating experience which would enable them to [build] something worthwhile for their

own peopleand for the first time with little outside help (102). Although ultimately, Qatar and

Bahrain did not join the Union, the economic success and development that the United Arab Emirates

has enjoyed thanks to its oil profits is well known. A previously passive population reliant on a system

of traditional authority started to participate more in the political system. Although they were not

consulted on the constitution project, they generally welcomed it. Again, pragmatism triumphed over

charismatic leadership (100-115).

--Pan-Arab leaders ---------

The past attempts at Arab unity having been analysed, the main actors who conceived them and

otherwise promoted the ideal must now be studied, in order to find whether and how they were

responsible for the failure of the project.

A controversial Israeli professor noted for his right-wing Zionist views, Efraim Karsh has no

love for Arab leaders, whom he excoriates with rich enthusiasm. Nonetheless, in light of their failure to

bring about Arab unity, it is worthwhile to examine the views of one of their principal intellectual

opponents. He was cited earlier denouncing the Hashemite dynasty, and does not spare Nasser and

other leaders.

Gamal Abdel Nasser

Karsh portrays Nasser as an opportunist, describing him as an imperialist aspirant, cynically


13/27

exploiting pan-Arab ideals for his self-serving goal (11). Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions were more

politically motivated than sentimental, as evidenced by several quotes provided by Kersh. He allegedly

confessed to a close friend : Formerly I believed neither in the Arabs nor in Arabism. Each time that

you or someone else spoke to me of the Arabs, I laughed at what you said. But then I realized all the

potential possessed by the Arab states! That is what made me change my mind. (qtd. in 11). Karsh

described Nasser as parochial in his loyalties, and demonstrated the disdain that Nasser expressed

about the rest of the Arab world, including the countries with which he would later negotiate a political

union (12). He described the Iraqis as savage, the Yemenis as hopelessly backward and stupid and

the Syrians as irresponsible, unreliable and trecherous (qtd. in 12). By comparison, he had spoken

approvingly of the Israelis for routing the British out of Palestine and modernising the country, while

admitting his own humiliation during the 1948 war. Illustrating his early focus on British imperialism,

Nasser blamed the British for the Arab loss of Palestine, saying in 1953 that [t]he Arabs tend to forget

this fact and blame Israel and the Jews, but they are afraid to acknowledge that Britain is the cause.

(qtd. in 12).

Those characterisations, while far from impartial, give insight into the possible reasons for

Nasser's difficult relationship with the Ba'ath Party, and his inability to compromise. In that light,

Nasser's ideology of pan-Arabism served as a means to an end, namely his concerns for Egypt, which

he wanted to rid of British influence; once he had overthrown the pro-British monarchy, pan-Arabism

became a means to secure the independence of Egypt; eventually it would become a vessel for his

dreams of imperial leadership over the Arab world, with Egypt as its vanguard. In no circumstances,

therefore, could he allow Egypt to not play a role of leadership in any negotiation he had with other

Arab states, much less subsume it to the pan-Arab idea, for he could not afford to undermine his own

base of power. As ideologically inflexible as the Ba'ath Party turned out to be, its Syrian branch was

willing to dissolve its country in the name of that greater ideal. But Nasser abused of his control, and

thus the union failed (13).


14/27

Following Nasser's death, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia attempted to take the mantle of pan-

Arabism. However, as popular as the king was in the Arab world and especially at home, he did not

have the charisma of the former Egyptian leader, nor did the Saudi monarchy have the appeal of

modernity and progress associated with the republican ideals of Nasserism. Nonetheless, the Palestine

issue remained at the core of Arab nationalism, and the monarch was able to maintain Arab unity on

that issue, until his assassination in 1975 (Lesson 4, End of Arab Cooperation).

Nasser's successor, Sadat, was more pragmatic. According to Karsh, from his first moments in

power, Anwar Sadat adopted an Egypt first approach, which subordinated pan-Arab considerations to

the Egyptian national interest. (19). Like the other constituting members of the United Arab Republic

and the United Arab States, Egypt had failed to put the interests of the greater Arab nation ahead of its

own; in the same way that the other states put their own interests first and abandoned the union, so did

its principal founding member under Sadat (Lesson 4, President Sadat).

-- Moammar Gaddafi

Gaddafi's vision was largely inspired by Nasser, who said of him I rather like Gaddafi. He

reminds me of myself when I was that age (Naeem). In turn, Gaddafi considered himself the successor

of Nasser, and claimed that he had declared him his son (MacFarquar).

In addition to the Federation of Arab Republics mentioned earlier, the libyan dictator attempted

a long series of political unions, but eventually scaled down his ambitions and focused on unions

between African countries. Even those efforts were vain, as the United States State Department

observed: Libyan inclinations for full-scale political union, however, have obstructed formal political

collaboration because Algeria has consistently backed away from such cooperation with its

unpredictable neighbor. (The Maghrib). He made a similar attempt to unite with Tunisia, but his

offer was immediately repudiated by Habib Bourguiba (Libya and Arab Unity).


15/27

A former Indian diplomat wrote an editorial in the Times of India describing Gaddafi's

character: When Nasser's restraint had gone, Gaddafi became autocratic, eccentric and

megalomaniac, and the Arab League looked askance at this upstart who dared to assume a

leadership position on the strength of money alone, referring to the tremendous oil profits of

Libya. He further notes, In general, Gaddafi was interested only in Arab unity and African unity,

and had little strategy or conception of international politics. As time went on, Gaddafi became

harder and harder to meet. Indira Gandhi's special envoy in 1970, Moham-med Yunus, was kept

waiting and not permitted access. Gaddafi was always able, by virtue of holding no specific office

of government, to take credit when things went well, and decline responsibility when they went

badly. (Srinivasan).

It is interesting to note, however, that despite his notoriously eccentric behaviour and his

apparent megalomania, in his Federation of Arab States proposal, Gaddafi allowed Sadat to take the

leadership of the new country, and went so far as to offer to resign as Libyan head of state if his

departure would placate Sadat (Libya and Arab Unity). This did little, however, to ease relations

with Sadat, which soured considerably after he started to make peace negotiations with Israel (ibid).

The Gaddafi regime was arguably the most successful in warding off Western imperialism in

Libya, having nationalised the oil industry and pursued its own independent course for 40 years, until

its toppling by the rebel forces. (Lesson 2, Challenges to the Seven Sisters). But towards the end of

his regime, Gaddafi switched to a more pragmaticforeign policy, and took actions clearly meant to

curry favour with Western countries. For instance, one can recall that in 2003, Libya used the

opportunity of the Iraq WMD controversy to announce the dismantling of its own WMD program.

Gaddafi was also noted for his close relationship and business ties with former UK prime minister Tony

Blair (Brady). Gaddafi's overtures towards the West were not popular among the Libyan people, and in

any case turned out to be insufficient to serve the interests of his regime or his country in the long term.

Evidence has shown that the US and other powers funded Libyan opposition groups and armed the


16/27

Islamist rebels who successfully overthrew his regime (British Broadcasting Corporation). For context,

the NATO response to the Libyan civil war should be contrasted to their neglect of the political

repression by the Al Khalifa regime in Bahrain, an important US ally. In the end days of his regime,

Gaddafi was isolated, having alienated himself from the other the Arab leaders and failed to gain

Western support. The last leader of pan-Arabism, he died in 2011, unable to unite the Arab world, and

ultimately unable to prevent the neo-liberal takeover of his and other Arab countries.

-- Saddam Hussein--

Saddam Hussein is an example of a post-Nasser pragmatic leader. Although he was largely

successful in modernising Iraq, his rule diverged significantly from original Ba'athist ideals, turning the

state into a Stalinist dictatorship based on a cult of personality. In foreign policy, Saddam Hussein

became a rallying figure in fighting against Western imperialism. Although Saddam's support for the

Palestinian cause was reciprocated, and popular among sections of the Arab world, it did not rally the

support of the Arab leaders. His invasion of Kuwait established him as a divisive and rogue element of

the Middle East (Lesson 4, The 1990-1991Gulf War and the Collapse of Arab Unity).

Karsh implied that Saddam's claim of Kuwait had some basis in pan-Arabism; the Kuwait

Embassy expressed similar views (5, 22, Embassy of Kuwait to Japan). As stated earlier, Kuwait had

been claimed by Iraq since the declaration of its independence in 1961; the historical basis for that

claim was its having been a part of the Ottoman velayet of Basra (Karsh, 13). The Kuwait embassy

disputes this, saying that it was an autonomous sheikdom and that the Ottoman Empire had never

ruled over Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government further states that Abdullah II was expanding towards the

Kuwaiti region, until a Kuwaiti ruler sought British protection (Embassy of Kuwait to Japan). Be it as it

may, Saddam made clear statements identifying his invasion of Kuwait with the pan-Arab ideology,

claiming that the Arab world was "one entity when it was ruled by Baghdad" before being divided by


17/27

the West (Tibi, 28). In addition to his statement being historically inaccurate Baghdad was the capital

of the Abbasid Caliphate, not of the Ottoman Empire his anti-Western rhetoric contrasted with the

Western support he had received during the Iraq-Iran war. Yet, according to Kramer, Saddam made

clear that he didn't believe in pan-Arabism, and supported the status quo of each Arab state remaining

separate. That did not stop pan-Arabists from looking up to him, however (Kramer, 196-197).

Regardless of Saddam's motivations, the annexation of Kuwait was the latest major attempt at

unifying two Arab countries, the last one after the Yemeni unification, yet his move did far more to

divide the Arab world than to unite it. Saddam's lip service to pan-Arabism and his self-serving use of

its rhetoric is one of the most blatant examples of Arab leadership failure.

-- The Palestine Question and the Arab-Israeli Wars

The Palestinian Question was central to the pan-Arab movement, especially to Nasser's foreign policy

(Lesson 4, Nasser and the Focus on Palestine). But according to Karsh, Palestine was first claimed by

the Hashemite dynasty from the British Empire, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as part

of their imperial bid (8). Karsh portrayed Nasser as having little empathy for the Palestinians, but as

more than willing to use them for his political cause. The Palestinians are useful to the Arab states as

they are, quoted Karsh, We will always see that they do not become too powerful. Can you imagine

yet another nation on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean! (10). He further details how the

Palestinian refugees were denied Egyptian citizenship the Egyptian government showed no desire to

annex the Gaza Strip but instead ruled the newly acquired area as an occupied military zone (9). Given

his initial admiration for Israel, his opposition to it had little to do with empathy for the Palestinians.

But given the few things that the Arab states had in common, the loss of Palestine was one of the few

issues that Nasser could capitalise on to promote Arab unity. Hence, having earlier denounced the

British, Nasser now made Palestine the central focus of his foreign policy.


18/27

The aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was disastrous: Egypt had lost the Gaza strip and

the Sinai peninsula, while Syria lost the Golan Heights and Jordan lost the West Bank and East

Jerusalem. The psychological impact of the war was such that it was dubbed the Second Nakba, in

reference to the Catastrophe of the 1948 war (Lesson 7, slides 26-29; Kramer, 188). It goes without

saying that those territorial losses were a major setback to the pan-Arab movement. The apparent

superiority ofthe Arab side, characterised by the overwhelming numbers ofthe Arab armies and the

backing ofEgypt by the Soviet Union, with funding as well as military and technical assistance, made

the defeat all the more humiliating, and discredited the power and the very notion ofArab unity

(Lederer, 127-128). But the centrality of Palestine to the pan-Arab movement is what explains the

severe long-term damage that it suffered as a result of the Arab defeat. Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein

continued to push the Palestine issue, but although it continued to serve as part of an anti-Israel foreign

policy, it was mainly for domestic consumption. In the hands of both leaders, it was ineffective in

promoting Arab unity.

The 1967 war was a personal failure for Nasser, although he remained a unifying figure, to the

point that his offer of resignation was opposed by massive demonstrations. He renounced his

resignation, but that point had already marked a decline of decline of pan-Arabism in Egyptian foreign

policy, as he shifted his attention to Egyptian affairs during the rest of his presidency. Although Nasser

was keeping a public face of defiance, his objective had shifted to regaining the loss territories (Karsh,

18). His death two years later dealt a further blow to pan-arabism (Lesson 4, Nasser and the Focus on

Palestine).

On one hand, the loss of the war set the stage for the Islamists, who argued that the secularism

of the pan-Arab movement was responsible for its failure due to what they perceived as a lack of moral

compass to unite the people. On the other hand, the secularists, on the contrary, blamed lethargic,

backward Muslims and the Islamic faith (Ajami, 60). Another reaction was an intellectual shift from

pan-Arabism to state nationalism (Kramer, 188).


19/27

A further blow was dealt to the focus system and pan-Arabism by Nasser's successor, Anwar Al

Sadat, who abandoned the ideology, turning instead to Egyptian nationalism and catering to his

countries' interests first. He further divided the Arab world when he signed a peace treaty with Israel

(Lesson 4, President Sadat).

Pan-Islam

The final phase of the disappearance of pan-arabism as a unifying political ideology was its

replacement by the emerging movement of pan-Islam. The movement was not born from the ashes of

pan-Arabism, but as a competing movement in the late 1920s, and is credited to Hassan Al Banna, the

founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Pan-Islam, according to Olivier Roy, is really Arab nationalism in

disguise. Indeed, pan-Islam and pan-Arabism share the same enmity to Western imperialism and Israel,

and both seek the indigenous control of natural resources, especially oil. Also, the pan-Islam movement

made a similar appeal to the greatness of the past Muslim empire as the pan-Arab did. The language of

Islam is a powerful tool to Arab nationalist movements, as it was not borrowed from the West as

secularism and socialism were. But the internationalist form of Islamism that appeared in the 1970s and

the 1980s following the decline of pan-Arabism was no more successful in implementing its global

vision than the ideology it replaced. Instead, the movement remained divided by national borders. For

instance, the reaction of the Islamist movements to the US invasion of Iraq varied depending on the

national interests of the country in which they operated: the Kuwaitis approved of it, while the

Jordanians opposed it (Roy, 1-4 ; Lesson 4, slide Rise of Pan-Islam). Even within a single country,

Islamist movements cannot unite. The sectarian divisions in Iraq are a clear example of this: the Shi'ite

groups voted for the Constitution, while the Sunnis voted against it (Lesson 12, slide The Iraqi

Constitution). Given that the pan-Islam movement taps into similar sentiments as does the pan-Arab

movement, and attempts to solve the same problems with a similar type of remedy. it isn't surprising


20/27

that it would suffer from the same disunity problems as the pan-Arab movement.

-- Arab Spring --

Temlali ponders whether the Arab spring is a manifestation of the pan-Arab sentiment, or

whether it is the nail in its coffin. He takes the optimistic view that [t]he Arab Spring has played a

significant role in liberating national pride that was previously stifled or else expressed itself in

distorted and even chauvinistic ways (Temlali, 46). He further reports that Ba'ath parties have hailed

the Arab spring as an Arab revolution, and that Yahia al-Qazzaz sees it as a probable precursor to a

transnational movement of unification (46). At the same time, he notes the lack of presence of

Nasserists and Ba'athists in the uprisings, as well as the popular revolts against Arab nationalist

dictators such as Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad. Yet, one of the reasons for the Arab revolutions was the

support of the governments for Western regimes. Although the Arab spring was fueled by popular

discontent towards the corrupt governments and their enrichment at the expense of the people, there is

evidence that much of it was instigated by government-affiliated NGOs and the intelligence agencies of

the United States and other Western regimes (Nixon). Nonetheless, the Arab nationalist themes that

influenced the Arab Spring should not be discounted.

A significant feature of the Arab Spring revolutions, whether they be organic or staged in part

or in whole, is the apparent lack of leadership within. All the previous examples have shown that the

presence of strong leaders have disrupted movements towards unity rather than encouraged them. Yet,

the successful examples of the Republic of Yemen and the United Arab Emirates were characterised by

pragmatism and deliberations. It remains to be seen whether the Arab Spring movements will

overcome the external forces attempting to manipulate it and finally emerge as a force for

independence from Western imperialism. Unfortunately for Libya, prospects for independence seem

bleak. Judging from statements by government officials in the press, US political and economic


21/27

intervention is likely to happen in post-Gaddafi Libya. For example, Lindsey Graham, a Republican

senator noted for his support for interventionist foreign policy, appeared on Fox News and exhorted his

country to get in on the ground, and establish a democracy and a functioning economy based on free

market principles. , remarking that there is a lot of money to be made in the future of Libya and

admitting that the US was leading from behind (ThinkProgress).

Analysis

Given the consequences of the 1967 war, it is worth looking into why the Arabs have lost so

many wars, despite their numerical superiority. It turns out that the lack of unity in Arab politics is just

as pervasive in Arab military forces and, at least according to De Atkine, even in Arab culture. As a

retired US army colonel who served in the Middle East, including in Egypt, he witnessed Arab army

practices first hand, and noted the climate of distrust and the lack of cohesion, both within and between

the ranks. For example, he mentioned that individuals hoarded information rather than sharing it, in

order to remain useful to the army and keep their position. He noted the lack of leadership among the

superior officers, but also their disdain for the lower ranks, as well as the highly centralised nature of

their hierarchy and lack of initiative and power among the lower officers. Rivalries were rife, and often

political. An Egyptian officer admitted to De Atkine that lack of cohesion in the Egyptian army was the

cause of their defeat. The generalised self-centered nature of Arab military officers and their

competition for authority proved to be reflective of the same tendencies at higher levels during the

conflict. As an example, De Atkine noted that Nasser convinced King Hussein of Jordan to join the

1967 war on the lie that his airforce had penetrated Tel Aviv, when it had been defeated by Israel. De

Atkine further noted that not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the

Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command (De Atkine). It is worth remembering that with

the exception of North Yemen, the negotiations on the formation of the United Arab Republic mainly


22/27

took place between high army officers in control of military regimes; as such, those observations at the

lower level give a idea as to the extent of damage that the self-centeredness of the Arab leaders had

done to the cause of Arab unity.

The rivalry between the various factions of pan-Arab movements, namely the United Arab

Republic and the Arab Federation, and between the Ba'ath parties of Iraq and Syria, as well as the

competition for dominance of the Arab world between its leaders, leads to the ironic conclusion that

the pan-Arab movement contained the seeds of its own discord which contributed to the further

division of the Arab world. It would explain why the Nasserists and the Ba'athists failed to reconcile

their differences despite the similarities of their ideologies, both based on revolutionary socialism.

It is also interesting to note that two of the Arab states that were the result of successful

mergers, namely South Yemen and the UAE, were formed from small sultanates or emirates that had

jointly declared their independence from the United Kingdom (Wikipedia, Federation of South

Arabia). The other such state was itself a late merger between South Yemen and North Yemen, the

independence of the latter having been influenced by Nasserism. Those mergers, although successful,

owed little to either Nasserism or to Ba'athism, and more to pragmatism. The Yemen unification

example showed that the ability to compromise on the part of both sides made the union possible

despite their vast ideological differences.

Tibi made further observations on the lack of harmony in inter-state Arab politics, specifically

on the ideology of the pan-Arab movement. He contrasted Europe as a group equipped with

mechanisms of conflict resolution and a realistic concept of Europeanness with the pan-Arab

movement, which he characterised as Arab states blinded by ideological and extended tribal formulas

such as brotherhood and panArab harmony; he drew the following lesson from the First Gulf War:

the strength of a policyoriented, rather than an ideologyoriented, redefinition of Arabness (29).

One can clearly see the truth of that statement by recalling the successes of the Yemen Reunification

and that of the United Arab Emirates, compared to the countless failures that occurred under the aegis


23/27


24/27

happen.

A leader, no matter how charismatic, cannot be expected to unite such societies as described by

De Atkine when he was brought up in those same societies, and has not himself learnt how to resolve

conflicts or make compromises. A Bismark could not have been sufficient to bring the Arabs together:

in the German states, the conflicts were primarily amongst the princes, but not the people.

It may seem tautological or circular to say that the Arabs were unable to unify because they

were unable to end their conflicts. Yet, the goal of pan-Arab movement is the ultimate contradiction of

a culture full of contradictions: to create a common country out of a culture where each is out for his

own. Yet, there is a clear impetus for unity in one way or another, as evidenced by the replacement of

the pan-Arab movement by the pan-Islam movement. In any case, the pan-Arab movement could not

have succeeded, and is unlikely to do so until the Arab societies are able to bring themselves to

harmony.


25/27

Bibliography

Habib, Henri. "Middle East and Global Conflict." Middle East and Global Conflict. eConcordia. Web.

5 Dec. 2011. .

Kramer, Martin. "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity." Daedalus 122 (1993): 171-206.

Karsh, Efraim.Arab imperialism: the tragedy of the Middle East. Ramat-Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat

Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 2006. Print.

Tibi, Bassam. "From Pan-Arabism to the Community of Sovereign Arab States: Redefining the Arab

and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War." Middle East Dilemma: The Politics andEconomics of Arab Integration. Ed. Michael C. Hudson. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies

Georgetown University: Tauris &, 1999. 28-39. Web. 5 Dec. 2011..

MaddyWeitzman, Bruce. "Jordan and Iraq: Efforts at IntraHashimite Unity." Middle Eastern

Studies 26.1 (1990): 65-75.JSTOR. Web. 16 Nov. 2011. .

Choueiri, Youssef M.Arab Nationalism-- a History: Nation and State in the Arab World. Oxford:Blackwell Pub., 2000. Print.

Kerr, Malcolm H. The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970. London:Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford UP, 1977. Print.

De Atkine, Norvell B. "Why Arabs Lose Wars :: Middle East Quarterly." Middle East Forum. Middle

East Quarterly, 1999. Web. 05 Dec. 2011. .

Ajami, Fouad. The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 1992. Print.

AlSayyid, Mustafa K. "From Pan-Arabism to the Community of Sovereign Arab States: Redefining

the Arab and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War." Middle East Dilemma: The Politics

and Economics of Arab Integration. Ed. Michael C. Hudson. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies

Georgetown University: Tauris &, 1999. 86-99. Web. 5 Dec. 2011.

.

Whitaker, Brian. "The Birth of Modern Yemen, by Brian Whitaker."AL-BAB: an Open Door to theArab World. Al-Bab, 2009. Web. 05 Dec. 2011. .

Heard-Bey, Fauke. "From Pan-Arabism to the Community of Sovereign Arab States: Redefining the

Arab and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War." Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and

Economics of Arab Integration. Ed. Michael C. Hudson. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies

Georgetown University: Tauris &, 1999. 100-15. Web. 5 Dec. 2011.

.

U.S. Department of the Army. "Libya and Arab Unity." Country Studies. Web. 05 Dec. 2011.

. Original documents from the Federal Research Division of the
http://countrystudies.us/libya/32.htmhttp://countrystudies.us/libya/32.htm


26/27

Library of Congress.

U.S. Department of the Army. "The Maghrib." Country Studies. Web. 05 Dec. 2011.

. Original documents from the Federal Research Division ofthe Library of Congress.

Temlali, Yassine. "The Arab Spring: Rebirth or Final Throes of Pan-Arabism?" The Arab Spring:Rebirth or Final Throes of Pan-Arabism? 2.Special Issue (2011): 46-49.Heinrich Boell Stiftung Middle

East. Heinrich Boell, May 2011. Web. 2011.

.

Clifton, Eli. "Lindsey Graham: 'Let's Get In On The Ground. There's A Lot Of Money To Be Made In

The Future Of Libya'" ThinkProgress. ThinkProgress, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. 05 Dec. 2011.

.

Nixon, Ron. "Http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?

_r=3&pagewanted=1&emc=eta1." The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 15 Apr. 2011.Web. 5 Dec. 2011. .

"United Arab Republic." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 03 Dec. 2011.

.

Federation of South Arabia. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 03 Dec. 2011.

Ismail, Sharif. "Unification in Yemen: Dynamics of Political Integration, 1978-2000." Thesis. WadhamCollege, University of Oxford. UNIFICATION IN YEMEN Dynamics of Political Integration, 1978-

2000. Oxford University. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. .

Roy, Olivier. "LISLAMISME, NOUVEAU PANARABISME."Alternatives Internationales Hors

Series Les Enjeux 2006.3 (2006): 1-4. CERI Sciences Po. CERI, Dec. 2006. Web. 5 Dec. 2011.

.

Kuwait Embassy for Japan. "Kuwait Embassy-Tokyo, Kuwait Embassy - Japan, The Embassy of the

State of Kuwait.". Kuwait Embassy for Japan. Web. 06 Dec. 2011..

Naeem, Raza. "The Colonel's Labyrinth." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Limited, 3 Sept.

2009. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. .

Srinivasan, Krishnan. "Remembering The Colonel."Featured Articles From The Times Of India.Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd., 24 Oct. 2011. Web. 06 Dec. 2011.

.

Brady, Brian. "Evidence Grows of Blair's Links with Gaddafi." The Independent. The Independent, 18

Sept. 2011. Web. 5 Nov. 2011.


27/27

Arab Nationalism Long v2

Documents

Transcript of Arab Nationalism Long v2