Arab Constituent Power

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AsemKhalil TheEnactmentofConstituentPowerintheArabWorld

88 ANCILLAIURIS(anci.ch)2006:88 Article

Summary

Mostmodernstateshaveadoptedwrittenandrigidconstitu

tions.Theexistenceofaconstitutionpresupposesaconstituent

power,distinguishedfromotherconstitutedpowers,createdby

theconstitutionitself.Aconstituentpowerpresupposestheabil

ityofasocietytodevelopitscapacitytoactasacollective,inorder

togain(orregain)anactiveroleintheorganizationofthelivesof

individualsandtheirsocialrelationshipswithoneanother.

ForPanArabismdefenders,the(Arab)nationexistsasaco

hesivegroupwithitsownuniquecharacteristics,derivingfroma

commonlanguage,historyandtraditions.Theethnicconceptof

nationinitiallyhelpedtojustifyanArabrevolutionagainstother

Muslims,butitwasunabletodistinguishindividualArabpeo

plesorjustifyterritorialArabstates.Itwasunavoidablethento

switchtonarrowerconceptofnationthatcoverscitizenswithin

definedstatebordersandlivingunderthesamelaws.Despitethe

reference to theprincipleofpopular sovereignty in mostArab

Constitutionsandtheincreasingattachmenttoterritoriallyde

finedstates,thereexistswidepopulardiscontentwithArabre

gimesthatcontinuetolegitimizetheirauthoritybasedonArabor

Islamicnationalistdiscourses.

Constitutionsmayfillthegapoflegitimacycrisisincontem

poraryArabStates.Theyareanecessarytoolforthenationtoex

pressitswillbutalsofortheindividualsandcommunitieswithin

thestatetoprotectthemselvesfromthenationitselfandfromits

expression,thestate.Accordingly,thereshallberedlineswhere

thepeople,ortheirrepresentatives,shallnottransgress.Thosered

linesmaybeenumeratedinatext,withparticularlegalinviola

bilitythatwillbedifficult(almostimpossible)toamendwithout

joiningageneralconsensus,thatisnottheequivalenttounanim

ity(difficulttoobtain)normajority(easytorealize).

* The author is Associate Researcher at Birzeit University, ActingHeadofResearchattheInstituteofLaw.HehasaPh.D.inPublicLawfromFribourgUniversitySwitzerland,andaMasterinPublicadministrationfromENAFrance.Thispaper includesmostrelevantconclusionsofathesisthattheauthorhadpreparedforPh.D.inpubliclawattheUniversityofFribourg,underthedirectionofProf.ThomasFleiner,directoroftheInstituteofFederalism(Switzerland). See Asem Khalil, The Enactment of ConstituentPower in theArab World: thePalestinianCase,PIFF,Helbing&Lichtenhahn,2006.

Introduction

Constituentpoweristheauthoritytoframeoramendaconstitution.Aconstitutionisalegaltextwhichsupersedesallothers.Whatdistinguishesframingpowerfromamendingpoweristhatthelatterchangestheconstitutioninwaysprovidedtherein,whiletheformeramendsitoutsideconstitutional framework.Mostmodernstateshaveadoptedrigid,writtenconstitutions.Theexistenceofaconstitution

presupposestheexistenceofaconstituentpower,asdistinguishedfromotherconstitutedpowers,createdbytheconstitutionitself.Sinceaconstitutionisthehighestlawinthestate,constituentpowermustbevestedinthoseentitledtosovereignty.Tocomefullcircle,mostconstitutionsprovidethatthoseentitledtosovereigntyarethepeople,andconsequently,thepeopleareentitledtoconstituentpower.

Constituentpowerpresupposestheabilityofasocietytodevelopitscapacitytoactasacollective,inordertogain(orregain)anactiveroleintheorganizationofthelivesofindividualsandtheirsocialrelationshipswithoneanother.1Here,severalapproachesarepossible,dependingon

theconceptofnation.ForArabnationalists,the(Arab)nationexistsasacohesivegroupwithitsownuniquecharacteristics, deriving from a common language, history andtraditions.VariousattemptsatpanArabunityallendedinfailure,andthusArabnationalismbegantoexistonlywithin,asopposedtoacross,Arabterritorialstates.TheethnicconceptofnationinitiallyhelpedtojustifyanArabrevolutionagainstotherMuslims,butitwasunabletodistinguishindividual Arab peoples orjustify territorial Arab states.WhatmakesaJordaniandifferentfromaPalestinianoraLebanese fromaSyrian?Todistinguishbetween them, itwasinevitabletoswitchtonarrowerconceptofnationthatcoverscitizenswithindefinedstatebordersandlivingunderthesamelaws.

Mostmodernstateshavewrittenconstitutionsinwhichthey declare that sovereigntybelongs to the people. TheArabworldalsowitnessedsignificantconstitutionaldevelopmentsandtherecontinuestobeaconstitutionalmovement intheArabworld.Nevertheless,oneshouldnotbe

1 SeeUlrichK.Preuss,ConstitutionalPowermakingoftheNewPolity:SomeDeliberationsontheRelationsbetweenConstituentPowerandtheConstitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, ANDLEGITIMACYTHEORETICALPERSPECTIVES148(MichelRosenfelded.,DukeUniversityPress1994).

TheEnactmentofConstituentPowerintheArabWorld

AsemKhalil*
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ANCILLAIURIS(anci.ch)2006:88 Article 89

deceivedintothinkingthatthelegislationcontainedintheconstitutioncorresponds toconstitutional law.There isaneed,infact,tostudytheconstitutionaltextinlightoftheenforcedandappliedlegislationineveryArabstate.

TherelationbetweentheArabnationandaparticularArabpeoplemaynotbeclearlyunderstoodbyusingtraditionalmeaningsofthoseconcepts.Infact,thesetwoconceptshavetobeunderstoodinthelightofthewideroneofumma,originallyusedto indicatetheIslamiccommunity,orthecommunityofbelievers.ThereisnoIslamicorArabstatethatembodiesallIslamicorArabumma;thosepopulationsneedtodealwithterritoriallydefinedstates.Incontemporary Arabstates, there is a partial return to shariaandanincreasingreferencetoIslamasajustificationforthestatesauthorityoritsrejection,maderespectivelybythe

stateapparatusandbyfundamentalistgroups.Incontemporary Arab states, the relationbetween Islamic umma,ArabnationandtheArabpeopleasawholeisbecomingincreasinglyproblematic.2

Modern constitutions are at the hierarchical apex ofnormativetexts.Theyaredistinguishedfromotherstatutes

bybeingaconstitutionofandinastate.Astateisborninaparticularmomentofhistory,butisalwaysastateofapeople,livingwithinaterritory.Theconstitutioninevitablyreflectsthestatesgeographicalandhistoricaldimensions.Aconstitutioninexorablybelongstothoseentitledtosovereigntysinceitisthehighestexpressionofselfdetermina

tion.Accordingly,

constituent

power

is

delegated

to

apeo

ple,but itsenactmenthasnoexistenceoutsideastate. Itmaybearguedthattheprocessofconstitutionmakingcan

beginbeforetheformationofthestate,buttheadoptionoftheconstitutionisalwayssubsequenttotheestablishmentofastate,althoughitmaycoincide,inchronologicalterms.

Theproblemremainshowtodefinetherelationshipbetween constituent power and the people. In democraticcountries,thepeoplearesovereignandexercisetheirconstituentpowerdirectlyorthroughrepresentatives.Inthisframework,thepeople represent the totalityofallcitizensofthestateandasdifferentfromtheconceptofthe

nation

which

includes

a

multitude

of

individuals

that

haveacommonidentityandareengagedincommonpoliticalactions,notnecessarilywithintheboundariesofagiv

2 AccordingtoIslamiclaw,sovereigntybelongstoGod:nostatehasthe right to exercise authority except in subordination and inaccordancewith theLawrevealedbyGodandhisprophet.ThePakistani,SayyidAbulAlaMaudoodi(thefounderoftheJamaateIslamiinPakistan)inventedanewconcept:alhakemmeyyameaningsovereigntyinreferencetoGod,whileseyyada(alsotranslatedas sovereignty) referring to the peoples power. This is only anapparentsolution,sincethemainquestionremains:whohasthesupreme power? For Maudoodi and his followers, no human

beinghaspowertotransgressGodswill.

enstate.Therelationshipbetweenconstituentpowerandthepeopleisnotapredeterminedone;itdependsinfact,onthemeaninggivento theconceptofnation.Thisrelationshipismuchmorecontentiouswhenthereisnocommon agreement over the concept of We the people, referredtointheconstitution.

Theproblemofwhoisentitledtoconstituentpowerisevenmorecomplicatedasitisrelatedtoanadditionaltwoquestions:thequestionoflimitsandoflegitimacy.Infact,manyauthorsdeterminelimitsinthelightofpreexistingelementssuchasculture,ethnicityandreligion,whichcandeterminetheidentityofthepeople.Thereflectionoftheconstitutiononsuchidentitymaydeterminethelegitimacyofsuchadocument;nevertheless,theremainingproblemistounderstandif,andwithinwhichlimits,thewillofthena

tionshallbeappliedbythestateandreflectedintheconstitution.Infact,all(oratleastthemajorityof)thoseconstituting a segment of the people and living in the territorywheretheconstitutionisenacted,shallconsideritastheirown.

ConstitutionalismwasinventedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.A.)andFranceandwaspossibleonlyfollowingphilosophicalandpoliticalrevolutionsthatresultedinreplacingthemonarchorgodastheholderofsovereigntywiththenation,whichbecamethesourceofalllegitimatepower,derivedfromthesovereigntyofthepeople.Giventhishistory,isitpossibletoreadthetheoryofconstituent

powerin

Arabic

terms?

The

principle

of

popular

sover

eignty is included in most existing Arab Constitutions.Nonetheless,thereisacontradictionintheArabworld:anincreasingpopularattachmenttoterritorialstates,despitediscontent with these Arab regimes; while Arab regimescontinue to legitimize their authority, in some instances

basedonAraborIslamicnationalistdiscourses.

I. PanArabism,IslamismandcontemporaryArabStates

Despite the fact that Arab rulers oftenjustified theirpowerbasedontheconceptsofIslamicandArabnations(ornationalisms),modernArabstatesareundergoingthe

mostseriousanddangerouscrisesintheirhistoriesbasedonthreatsfromwithin.Infact,oneofthesalientquestionsinthestudyofcontemporaryArabstatesistounderstandhowthestatesapparatuscanfeignobediencetotherulerswithoutbeingrejectedforbeingillegitimatebyitscitizens?How can Arab states maintain their existence? How canthoseentitledtoconstituentpower,andthosewhoexerciseit,expressthevolontgnrale?Thelaterbeingnotonlythegeneralwillthatignoreindividuals,neitheristhesumofindividualswillthatactinegoisticandindividualisticwaywithoutanyconsiderationtotherulesofthelivingtogetherthatarenecessaryforthemaintenanceandtheunityof


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anysocialgroup,includingthepoliticalones,butratheracombinationofbothofthem.

1.Arab

States

vs.

Arab

Nation

TheconceptofnationalismhasinvadedtheArabmentalitybutithasnotbeenmetwithacleardefinitionofwhatandwherethenationis.3Differentapproachesarepossible:PanArabismdefenderssubscribetoatheoryoftheArabnation whilst Islamists talk about the Islamic umma;meanwhile,territorialnationalismisdevelopingandterritorialaffiliationisbeingconsolidated.4ThesepositionscoexistintheArabworldbutreconcilingthemisnotaneasytask.ThesituationmaybeexplosiveintermsoftheabilityofdiverselocalcommunitiestocoherewithinArabstates.5

Arabstatescontinuetobeconsideredbycitizensastheir

first

enemy.

a) OriginsofArabStates

Accordingtosomeauthors,theconceptofstateisalientoArabs,sinceoriginallytheywereatribalsociety,notcitizenstheywereonlykinsmenunitedbybloodties.6Thisideaislargelytakenasagivenbyauthors,whobelievethatconceptoftheArabterritorialstatewasaphenomenoncreatedinEurope.7Someothersgoevenfurther,positingthatthose states (mainly in the Fertile Crescent), which werecreatedwiththebreakupoftheOttomanEmpire,areartificial.8Certainly,asfarastheboundariesareconcerned,externalfactorspredominatedintheterritorialdefinitionof

someArabstates;9butthisisacommonexperienceinotherregions,suchasAfricaandLatinAmerica.Besides, ifthe

3 See Ghassan Salam, Introduction, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEARABSTATE4(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

4 Thetermsnation,peopleandstateareoftenconfused.Thesameoccurs in Arabic terminology. The concept umma (translated asnation) is used when it refers to Islamic and/or Arab nation,while shab (translated as people) refers to single Arab peoplesanddawla(translatedasstate)referstotheterritorialArabstates(dawlaqutryya).Thetermdawlaisrelativelymodernandreferstoarulers(ordynastyofrulers)administrationintherecentpast,similar to the concept of Sultanate in the Ottoman Empire. Theconcept of ard or arady (territory or territories) refers to all theArabterritoriesasoneunit,ortotheterritoryofsingleArabstates,whiletheconceptquturrefersonlytotheterritoryofasinglestate.In addition, the adjective of the word nation (translated asnational)isqawmiyyawhenitreferstotheArabnation,whileitiswataniyya(alsotranslatedasnational)whenitisrelatedtoterritorialArabnationalism,alsomeaningpatriotism.Whiletheconceptofmuwatanareferstocitizenship;thisconcepthasitsoriginin watan homeland, although sometimes it is used to refer toArabland,alwatanalarabi!

5 ThereferencetoArabcountriesdoesnotmeanthattheyreflectageneralsituation.WeareconsciousthateveryArabstatereflectsaparticular history developed over a period of time. In fact, thecommonness with other Arab countries in relation to language,culture,history,habitsdidnothinder thegrowthof territorialnationalism;ratheritencouragedandfavoreditsdevelopment.

6 SeeP.JVatikiotis,IslamandtheState,19(CroomandHelm,1987).

foreignoriginexplainsthecontradictionsofArabterritorialstates,howcanforeignoriginalsoexplainitsconsolidationandascendancy?10

Inmoderntimes,thedebateovertheoriginalsintoquoteGhassanSalamehofArabstatecreationhasneverceased.11AccordingtoBurhanGhalioun,thestatebecamethecoreofthedebateovernationalism.12BytracingtheoriginofvariousArabstates,IliyaHarikconcludesthattheyarenotthecreationofcolonialism.Nevertheless,thesameauthor recognizes the fact that colonialism did affect the

bordersofcontemporaryArabstates.13Furthermore,territorialArabstatesarealsonottheembodimentoftheorientalorIslamiststate.AsconfirmedbyGhalioun,theyarethereactiontoorfearofanarchyintheArabworld.Arabsinfactfeltthenecessitytoadaptthemselvestothenewworld

order.14Thosewhodonotsharethisviewshouldatleastassesstheextenttowhichtheseinternationallyrecognizedcountrieshavetakenrootintheheartsandmindsoftheirinhabitants.15Infact,Arabstatesarebecomingincreasinglyentrenched and naturalized. Nevertheless, the growingstrengthoffundamentalistIslamisacontinuousreminderoftheprecariousstatusofthestatesystemandsecularisttrends.16

b) ArabNationalism

The term umma, throughout the Islamic era, has referredtotheuniversalMuslimcommunity.Aroundtheendofthenineteenthcentury,however,thistermbegantobeusedinthepoliticalliteratureofthetime,withreferencetotheuniversalArabcommunity, thusacquiringapreponderantlysecularmeaning.17Notonlythis,ArabnationalistsinsistthattheArabnationistheonlytruenation,eitherinassertivewayorinmoresubtleprose.SomehaveconceivedPanArabismasanoutgrowthofWesternthought;manyothersnowthinkthatitwasengenderedbyattemptstoreformIslam.18

7 SeeBahgatKorany,AlienandBesiegedYetHeretoStay:theContradictionsoftheArabTerritorialState,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE48(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

8 SeeBurhanGhalioun,LeMalaiseArabe.lEtatcontrelaNation24(LaDcouverte/ENAG,1991).

9 Salam,supranote3,at6.10 SeeBahgatKorany,AlienandBesiegedYetHeretoStay:theContradic

tionsoftheArabTerritorialState,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE73(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

11 SeeSalam,supranote3,at3.12 SeeGhalioun,supranote8,at53.13 SeeSalam,supranote3,at56.14 SeeGhalioun,supranote8,at5366.15 SeeSalam,supranote3,at3.16 SeeIliyaHarik,TheOriginsoftheArabStateSystem,inTHEFOUN

DATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 20 (Ghassan Salam ed., CroomHelm,1987).

17 Seeid.at2021.18 SeeEncyclopediaofNationalism1,489(AcademicPress,2001).


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This conceptofnation isbasedon thesameunifyingculturalcharacteristicsthatweregeneratedthroughcommonlanguageandreligionthroughouttheages,whichbequeathedasenseofcollectiveidentity.19Thesecommonelementshavebeenenforcedbyasimilarhistorythroughoutthecenturies.ForMichelAflaq,ummaistheArabnation,sinceanationexistswhen thepopulationbelieves that itconstitutesone,independentlyfromthe increasingordecreasingofnumbers;forAflaqanationisanidea,amatterofwill.20MostArableaderssubscribedtoArabnationalism, a reference to which is made in most constitutionaltexts.21

Nevertheless,panArabismwasnotcapableofdefyinginternational and local forces which protected the Westphaliadivisionofterritoryintointernationallysanctioned

territorialstates.MostArabstatesdonottoleratetheviolationoftheirsovereigntyforthesakeofArabpannationalism.22 Many newly established countries in the region(suchasKuwaitandQatar)retainthewordStateintheirofficialname,asiftheirstatehoodweretoovulnerablenottobesystematicallyreasserted.23

Nowadays,Arabismistakingadifferentcourse:ratherthananappealtoconstructonesinglestate,areferenceisincreasinglymadetoanArabAllianceoranArabunionofstatesavisionthatwasinstitutionalizedwiththeestablishmentoftheArabLeaguein1945.QuestionsremainrelatingtofurtherintegrationofArabstates,inacontextof

increasedregionalization

all

over

the

world.

In

fact,

the

stateislosingpartofitssovereigntyinfavorofsupranationalandinternationalentitiesandorganizations.Historicalandcontemporaryexperiencesshowthatsuchcollaboration between states can be the source of mutualdevelopment.Inthoseterms,theunityofArabstatescanbeenvisionedandencouraged,24alwaysconsideringtheterritorialandculturalparticularitiesandrequirementsofindividualArabpopulations.

2. ReturntoIslaminContemporaryArabStates

AlthoughArabnationalismcontinuestoexertanemotionalappealintheregion,itspowerhasbeensappedby

someoftheveryfactorswhichaideditsearliergains.Today,IslamismseemstoenjoytheappealthatoncemarkedArabnationalism.Infact,oneofthemostsalientfeaturesof

19 SeeHarik,supranote16,at20.20 AcommonbelongingtotheArabnationcontinuestofeedpublic

debatesandofficialdiscourses.SeeSaidBensaid,AlWatanandAlUmma in ContemporaryArab Use, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEARABSTATE166167(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

21 SeeEncyclopedia,supranote18,at385.22 Seeid.at488.23 SeeSalam,supranote3,at2.24 SeeKorany,supranote10,at55.

contemporaryMiddleEasternpoliticsistheresurgenceofpoliticalIslam.25Manycallthisphenomenon Islamicnationalismwhileothersconsider it tobe theantithesis orantinationalism.26SomebelievethatIslamistthinkersacceptthebasicprinciplesofaconstitutionalsystemonthegroundsthatsuchprinciplesnotonlyagreewith,butarealsoderivedfromIslam;forSaidBensaid,theIslamistattitude towards theEuropeanpoliticalmodel ismoreopenandpositivethanthatofthepanArabists.27

Nevertheless,Islamistsdonotrecognizestateborders.As Hasan alBanna, the spiritual father of the MuslimBrothers puts it: Islam does not recognize geographicalfrontiersanddoesnottakeintoaccountracialdifferences.Onthecontrary,itconsidersalltheMuslimsasoneummaandregardsallMuslimcountriesasonewatan,regardless

ofthedistanceandboundarieswhichseparatethem.28Atthesametime,alBannashowsaninterestintheprinciplesthat direct a constitutional government since they correspondwithIslam.29Accordingto AliOumlil:AlBannaadopts the notionsof watan, umma, and constitution,buttriestotranslatethemislamically.ThisiswhythereisnoinconsistencyinalBannasviewwhichconsidersthatoneindividualcanatthesametimebeacitizenofawatanlikeEgypt,forinstance,andamemberofIslamicumma.30

Infact,theproponentsofanIslamicummaovershadowingalltheseterritorially,linguisticallyorethnicallydefinedasabiyyas (group feelings), touse IbnKhaldnsconcept,

tendto

view

these

loyalties

as

pre

Mohammed

(Jahiliyya)

andthusantiIslamicconcepts,whichshouldhavedisappeared when the Islamic Dawa (Call) emerged.31 Moreover,IslamdistinguishesbetweenthelandofMuslimsandthat of nonMuslims, the firstbeing termed DaresSalam(abode of peace), whereas nonMuslim political entitiesrepresentedDaralHarb(abodeofwar).32AccordingtotheIbnManzursLexicon(LisanalArab),the landofIslam istheMuslimcommunitywhichnecessarilyconstitutesoneumma, which includes every country in which Islam isfreelyacceptedasareligionandwhereIslamiclawsreignoverMuslimaswellasovernonMuslimcitizenswhoen

joyprotectionbypayingJizya.33

25 See Eichelman, Changing Perceptions of StateAuthority:Morocco,Egypt and Oman, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 200(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

26 Otherauthorshavedissimilaropinions,andconsiderArabnationalismasanideology,moresothanIslam,whichdenieslegitimacytothestatesystem.SeeHarik,supranote16,at20.

27 SeeBensaid,supranote20,at169170.28 Id.at171.29 Seeid.at170.30 Id.at171.31 SeeSalam,supranote3,at5.32 SeeKorany,supranote10,at57.33 Bensaid,supranote20,at151152.


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a) ReligionandStateinEarlyIslam

TherearedifferentnarrativesregardingthefirstMuslimcommunityandthewaypowerwastransferredtotheKhalifat RasulAllah (normally translated as Vicar of theProphet of God). The appellation was not neutral.34 AlthoughtheProphetleftbehindhimacompletereligionandstate,35therealproblemremainedafterHispassing:thatofmaintainingtherelationbetweenreligionandstatewhich,during his lifetime, he had done through his authority

basedontheWordofGodandonhisconcretecommandoftheMuslimcommunity.36

Thingsweredifferentforhissuccessorwhowascompelled to impose his authority upon the clans who werecontemplatingdissociationfromthestate,astheyconsidered the liaison with theProphetas personaland consequently,dissolvableafterhisdeath.Forthisreason,oneofthemainchallengesof theCaliphwas tocrackdownonapostasy,whichwasnotnecessarilyrelatedtotherejectionoftheIslamicmessagebutrathertothepayingofsadakaorzakat,37which,althoughofareligiousnature,wasthemostvisibleaspectoftheirsubjugation.TheProphetssuccessor,AbuBakr(632634),believedthatthingsshouldremainastheywereleftbytheProphet,andaccordingly,stateandreligionwereoneandthesame.38

Therapid election(mubayaa,actsofalliance)ofAbuBakrcanbeexplainedbyvariousfactors,suchastheroleplayedby thenew religion which unifieddifferentclans

thatwerepreviouslyatconstantwar.Inotherwords,itnotonlydependedonthewayAbuBakrwasableto imposehimself on the various clansbut also on the support ofUmarIbnalKhattab. UmarIbnalKhattabscompellingpersonalitymadehimoneofthemostinfluentialconsultantstotheProphet,whopromotedhimtoatoprankmu

34 AsHichamDjat,aTunisianhistorian,putsit:LappellationdesuccesseurdelEnvoydeDieuestelleseuletoutunprogrammedecontinuitdupouvoirprophtique,nonpasdanssapartsuprahumaineliela Rvlation mais dans sapart transmissible, liaupouvoir temporel

pour lessentiel. Le Calife est le chefde la communaut islamique, il ahritduprophtelecommandement.HishamDjat,LaGrandeDiscorde. Religion et Politiques dans lIslam des Origines, 5253 (Gallimard,1989).

35 For some authors, such as Abdou FilaiAnsary (who took thereflectionsofAliAbdelRaziq),consideringthattheProphethadcreatedinthemedinathefirstnucleusoftheIslamicstateisbasedonaconfusionbetweentwoformsoforganisationthatneedtobedistinguished since their respective natures are totally different:thestateandthereligiouscommunity.Forboth,infact,itisnormallyusedtoreferatwiththetermummathatistranslatedsometimes community and others nation. See Abdou FilaliAnsari,Islam,Lacit,Dmocratie,inPOUVOIRS104,8(2003).

36 SeeDjat,supranote34,at47.37 Zakat:Islamicreligioustax,oneofthefivebasicpillarsofIslam.38 SeeDjat,supranote34,at5354.

hajirun.Theansarandmuhajirungaveallegiance(baya)toAbuBakrandtheCaliphatewasfounded.39

Still,

the

conditions

under

which

Abu

Bakr

was

elected

werealsotheoriginsofanumberofdivisions,whichthefirstcommunitysurpassed,notwithoutdifficulties.40Althoughthecircumstanceswere inAbuBakrs favor,theywerenotsoforhissuccessors.Infact,theotherthreeRightgoingCaliphs(alkhulafaalrashedun)(UmarIbnalKhattab,634644;UthmanIbnAffan,644656;andAliIbnAbiTaleb,656661)wereallkilled,resultinginacivilwarwhichlastedformanyyears.41

WiththedeathofAliIbnAbiTaleb,hisson,alHassan,acceptedthepassingofpowertoMuaweyyaIbnAbiSufian thusendinga longcivilwarwhichhadstartedwhenUthmanwaskilledandreplacedbyAli,signaling,thefirstdivision in the Islamic umma. Those who considered thefirstfourCaliphsaslegitimate,arecalledtheSunnis;theywere(andare)themajorityofMuslims,whoacceptedthe

faitaccompliandthedefeatofAlibyMuaweyya.Sunnism,infact,opposesshiismandkharajisminregardtothepoliticotheological question of Caliphate.42 The Shiites arethosewhotookthesideofAliwhilethekhawarijarethosewholefttheranksofthefollowersofAli(kharaja)afterheacceptedarbitrationwithMuaweyya,during thebattleofSiffn.43

b) WhyEarlyIslamSeemsAttractive

The

Muslim

community

had

already

organized

itself

intoastatelikesystembeforethedeathoftheProphet,andthequestionoftheheadofIslamicummawasnotrelevant

beforehispassingsinceheensuredthatrole.However,after his death, the Islamic umma, similar to other social

39 Seeid.at51.Muhajirunmeanstheemigrantswhileansarmeanstheauxiliaries.

40 Suchasneglectingtoinvitesomeofthemembersofthebayt,family,totheassemblyofsaqifa.Seeid.at52.

41 The Umayyads governed for 90 years (661750) and the Caliphsofficebecamehereditary.Theywerethendefeatedbytheircousins,theAbbassids (thedescendentsof theProphetsuncleAbbas),whokilledmostofthebayt(family)oftheUmayyads,butAbdelrahmanIescapedtoSpainandwasthefirstUmayyadCaliphofCordoba. There were seventythree Abbasid Caliphs, based inBaghdad,andthedynastyremainedinpowerforalmostfivehundredsyears(7501258)!Nevertheless,itwasundertheirauthoritythat the Islamic Statebegan to lose itsunity, especially after the

beginningofmilitarychaosinwhatthehistorianscallthesecondAbbasid era (8471258). It should be noted that some of theAbbasid firstera Caliphs, and most of the second era, werereplacedbyforceorkilled.WiththeendoftheAbbasiddynasty,theMamelukesseizedpower (12501217).Thedifferencebetweenthem and their predecessors was that they were not Arabs,butrather good soldiers, originally slaves, taken from central Asia.AftertheirreplacementbytheOttomans(12811921),theycontinuedtogovernEgyptuntiltheyweredefeatedbyMuhammadAliin1811.


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groups,requiredaleader,achieftohandletheaffairesdtat,andtheyalsoneededanimamtoguidetheMuslimsintheirprayersandtodefendIslam.Thoseroleswereentrustedtothesamepersoninthebeginning:theCaliph.Thisnecessitatedparticularqualitiesinachiefwhichphilosopherstriedtoenumerate.

Shouldthechiefviolateorinfringehisduties,aproblemoflegitimacywouldarisewhich,inIslamicandArabhistory,sometimesmeanthislossofpower(andhislife).Nevertheless,hecouldcontinueastheleaderbyimposinghisauthority by force. This explains the readily apparentphenomenon in the history of ArabIslamic empires thatmany Caliphs were assassinated and replacedby force.Transferenceofpowerwasaccompaniedbybloodshed,especiallywhenitwastransferredfromonetribeorfamilyto

another.Ofcourse,thismeantthatthenewholderofpowercouldalsobeusurped in the future, for thesamereason.Thismaysuggestthattherealmotivebehindsucheventswas notbeing necessarily the zeal for Islam or faithbutratherforpower.Inotherwords,itwasmostlyastrugglefor powerbetween individuals, families or clans ratherthanaquestionoffaith,moralityorculture.

Butnowadays,isitreallynecessarytorefertoearlyIslaminordertounderstandcontemporaryterritorialArabstates?IsitreallycrucialtomakereferencetotheArabparticularityinacontextofgeneralacceptanceofmodernstatestructure?Itmaybeconsideredawasteoftimeandenergy

toreturn

to

such

aperiod,

but

in

fact

it

is

not,

especially

due

toacertainresurgentnostalgiaforthisperiodofIslambysomegroups.Suchgroupsmaydedicateconcertedpoliticalefforts to restoringan Islamicstatebydemocraticmeans(throughpopularlegitimacyandelections),orclandestinely,byopposingthosegovernmentswhichdonotfollowthetrueteachingsofIslam.

ThisnostalgiamotivatedthefathersofIslamistgroupstostudyandwriteaboutearlyIslam.TheypresentedtheprinciplesthatcanbeconsideredasthebasisofthepoliticaltheoryofearlyIslam.ThiswasthecasewithSayyidAbulAlaMaudoodi.Forhim,theassumptionofpoliticalpower

in

Islam

was

founded

on

certain

clear

cut

principles

such

as: sovereigntybelongs to God; all Muslims have equalrights;shariaisthesupremelaw;thegovernment,itsauthorityandpossessionsareaheldintrustforGod;theheadof state shouldbe appointedby mutual consultation of

42 FortheShiites,theimamat(similartoaCaliph)representsdivinelaw, and his power is simultaneously temporal and spiritual.Accordingly, as confirmed by Ahmad Beydoun, Le ChiismepartagelemalaisequprouventlesdoctrinesreligieusesduPouvoir face au principe dmocratique de souverainet populaire.SlimLaghmani,LescolesjuridiquesduSunnisme,POUVOIRS104,43(2003).

43 Seeid.at2122.

Muslims;andtheCaliphortheEmiristobeobeyedunreservedlyinwhateverisrightandjust(maruf).

Such

a

system

seems

attractive

to

Maudoodi,

especially

in thecaseof the first fourCaliphs,whodidnot imposethemselvesbyforce,butratherwereelectedbythepeople,oftheirownfreewill.44Itisclearthatbehindsuchpresentationthereisahiddenmessage:thecurrentgovernmentsintheMuslimandArabworldarenotfollowingtheexampleoftheearlyCaliphs.Suchauthorsseemtohaveonefootinthepresentandtheotherinthepast.Notonlyisitacontradictionbutdiametricallyopposed.

Manyproblemsarisefromahistoricaldiscoursewhenappliedtocontemporarytimes.First,mostArabandMuslimcountrieshaveadoptedaconstitutionanddeclaredthepeople as sovereign; what Maudoodi invented (alhakemmeyyawhichreferstoGod,whileseyyada,translatedalsoassovereignty,referstothepowerofthepeople)doesnotresolvetherealproblem.

Second,theequalityofallMuslimsdoesnotrecognizeterritoriallimitsorborders.Infact,IslamistgroupsenvisagetheestablishmentofanIslamicstateforallMuslims.ThemembershiptoIslamicummaisbasedonjusreligionisandnotonjussanguinisorjussolis.45Inwhichcase,whataboutthenonMuslimcommunitiespresentinthoseterritories?

Third,anylawthatcontradictsthesharia,includingtheconstitution,isillegitimate,andMuslimsshallnotobeyit.Thisgivesrisetotheproblemoffindingthepoliticalgamerulesnecessaryineverysocialorganization.Whatisthesupremelawoftheland?Shallshariahaveasuperconstitutionalvalue?Ifso,howcantheconstitutionbethesupremelaw?

Fourth,authorityisentrustedbyGod;iftheoneinpower misuses itby contradicting sharia, he loses his raisondtreandmayberemovedfromhisposition,resultingintheinstabilityofthestate.

Fifth, theconsultationdoesnotmeannecessarily freeelectionsortheparticipationofallcitizensinthedecisionmaking process directly or indirectly since consultationmaybelimitedtothewisepeoplethatknowandareabletodistinguishthetruth,asrevealedbytheKoranandtheHadith.

Sixth,thegovernormaypretendobedienceonlyinthecase of right andjust commands (alamr bel maruf); the

44 SeeM.M.Sharif(ed.),AHistoryofModernPhilosophy,659(PakistanPhilosophical Congress, 19631966), published also online at:http://www.muslimphilosophy.com (accessed on 7 February2006).

45 SeeVatikiotis,supranote6,at31.
http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.anci.ch/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/http://www.anci.ch/


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problemhereisthatjusticeorrightnessremainsageneralconceptwhichdoesnothaveaprecisecontent.

There

seems

to

be

a

hidden

message

behind

all

the

writ

ingsofMaudoodithatthecurrentgovernmentsareservingevilandMuslimsshouldnotobeythem.TherealIslamicStateisthepureoneofthefirstfourCaliphsorbetteryet,itistheonewhichI(Maudoodi)decideupon.Therealproblemwith thesegroupsandall religious fundamentalistgroups ingeneral isthat theyclaimtohaveexclusivityoverthetruth.Infact,therealproblemistoknowwhowill

beinchargeofdecidingwhatisrightorjust.Somemaysaythatitisthesharia,butthenanotherquestionarises:Whatissharia?Isthereonesharia?Infact,theKoran,considered

byMuslimsasGodsWorddictatedtohisprophet,cannotbecalledintoquestion.Nevertheless,therearemanysitua

tions thatneedananswer thatmaynotbedirectlymentionedintheKoranorintheHadith.Whatshouldbedone,then?

Thereisnodoubtthattherearedifferentinterpretationsfor thesame text.Thisexplains theexistenceofdifferentschoolsoftheLawofIslam,besidesthedifferentsecessionswithintheIslamiccommunity(SunniandShiitesforexample)andthemultipleIslamicsectsthatdevelopedthroughouthistory,whichfurthercomplicatesthistask.Accordingly,itwouldbepreferabletospeakaboutmultipleIslamicconcepts,andmultiplesharias,ratherthanone,unique,collectionofpreciseandclearprinciples.Somemaythensug

gestleaving

the

task

of

interpreting

the

sharia

to

agroup

of

specialized persons: the Muslimtheologians.Now, thesamefactthatthistaskisgiventocompetentandinformedpersonalitiesmeansthatshariadoesnothaveastableandprecisecontentbutrather,isadaptedtonewandunattended circumstances, related to a specific context (time andspace),andassuchneedsinterpretationandexplanation;

but,thesepeoplearehumanbeings,andassuch,notinfallible.TheirviewsmayreflecttheirownwillandnotnecessarilythatofGod.Whatisthesolution?Notforgettingthat,inthemeantime,thestateneedstobegovernedanddecisionsneedtobetaken.

3.Arab

States

and

Popular

Sovereignty

According to some authors, the European distinctionbetweensecularanddivineruleledtoamoremodern,realistic approach towards politics while a similar rupturewithmedievalphilosophydidnotoccurintheArabtradition.46Thisabsenceled,inCharlesButterworthsview,toaquietistacceptanceofnondemocraticgovernmentsbythecitizensofArabcountries.47

46 See Charles Butterworth, State and Authority in Arabic PoliticalThought,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE9192(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

a) ArabCultureandpopularSovereignty:AnyCompatibility?

Westerncountrieshavehadtworevolutions:theAmericanandtheFrench;thosewereprecededbyanumberoftheoriesthatjustifiedthepowerofthestatebypopularwillratherthanthatofGodortheking.48Thiswaspossibleinacontextof(firstpartialthencomplete)separationbetweenChurchandState.Nevertheless,theconsequencesoftheserevolutionsarenotlimitedtowesterncountries:theestablishmentofmodernstatesandthedispersionofnationalism and theories of popular sovereigntyglobally are theproof.

Nevertheless, theconceptofpopularsovereigntywaspossibleinEuropeonlyinthecontextofaseparationfromthe Church and the subsequent approaches to the new

bearerofsovereignty,andnotassomemaythinktotheFrenchorAmericanRevolutions.Infact,thosetworevolutionsgavebirthtothenewmodernstates,basedontheseparationandbalancebetweenthethreebranchesofgovernment (legislative, executive andjudicial). However, theconceptof popularsovereignty ismuch older; these tworevolutionschangedonlythewaythatsovereigntymaybeexercisedandbalanced.

BytheendoftheFirstWorldWar,therewasaturningpoint in the Arab worlds modern history, when SheikhHusseinofMeccadeclaredarevoltagainsttheOttomans,

justifyinghisallegiancetoChristianEuropeansagainsttheMuslimOttomanCaliph, through theneed toestablisha

modernstateforArabs.Thisrevolutiondidnothavetheconsequencesof theAmericanandFrench revolutions intermsoffulfillment,buttheideasbehinditareinteresting:whatprevailedforSheikhHusseinwastherealizationofapoliticalunityofArabs(ormostofthem)inonestateratherthanofallegiancetootherMuslims.Todothat,hepledged

47 See id.at9192.Thisposition issomewhatexaggeratedalthoughnottotallyvoidoflogic,aswewillshowinthefollowingsections.

48 Accordingly, power has no more its origin in God than in Hisearthlyrepresentative(thePope).Consequently,itwasnecessaryto find out who were the newly entitled to sovereignty. BODIN(15301596)answeredthatthebearerofthisindivisibleandunlimitedsovereigntywasthemonarch.HOBBES(15881679)saidthatitwasthehighestrepresentativeofthestatewhohadundividedandunlimitedsovereignty,sincethepeopleformedasocialcontract,andeverypersoncedeshis/herfreedomsandpowerstoonepersonandcommunity.WhileJohnLOCKE(16321704)proposedthat itwas therepresentative(s)of the statewho hadundividedpower,but it was not unlimited since it wasboundby naturallaw. Rousseau (17121778)related the sovereignty to thepeople,whichexpressedvolontgnrale;assuch,arationalandjuststatewas governedby direct democracy. Inbrief, the shift in sovereigntycanbeexpressedinthefollowingway:whileBODINstillrelied on the notion of the rule over the people, HOBBES andLOCKEintroducetheruleforthepeopleandRousseauarguedinfavoroftheruleforthepeoplebythepeople.SeeNicoleTpperwien, NationState and Normative Diversity 28 (Helbing & Lichtenhahncoed.,2001).


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loyalty tononMuslimsagainst theMuslimOttomans, inthe name of an Arab nation. This was the revolutionaryconsequenceof thatunsuccessfuland incompleterevolution.

Asaresult,newtheoriesonstatelegitimacyintheArabworld started to appear. Arabs in fact, needed tojustifytheirrevolutionandtheirrighttostatehoodbyreferringtotheconceptofArabnationand/ortotheconceptofpopularsovereignty,basedonthepeoplesrighttoselfdetermination.These twoconceptshelpedArabs ingeneral,andsingle Arab states in particular, tojustify their authoritywithin,andtotheoutsideworld.Thefirstconceptprovidedinternallegitimacyandtheother,internationallegitimacy. Inotherwords,Arabsjustified their rebellionagainstotherMuslimsthrough theconceptofanArabnation,as

opposed to othernations (although they were also Muslims),whileArabterritorialstatesjustifiedtheirterritorialautonomyandindependencethroughtheconceptofpopularsovereignty.

ContemporaryArabsocietiesaremuchmorecomplexthanancientones; for thisreason, theyhaveadapted themethodsandtechniquesofpositive law inordertofunction.Thiswaspossibleaftertheendoftraditionaldoctrineswhichwereattachedtoreligion,andtheirreplacementbyelaborateconceptsbasedonmodernscienceandmodernthinking. Religious law was then confined to a limitedsphere,suchaspersonalstatus.Thiswasthecaseinmost

Arabcountries.

The

problem

is

that

there

is

sometimes

con

fusionbetweenreligiouscommandmentandreligiouslaw,two concepts that need tobe distinguished in order toavoidanamalgamandmisunderstanding.49

Some may advocate then, that ideas such as popularsovereigntyintheArabworldwereassertedmostlyagainstcolonialism;onthewhole,itisperceivedmostlyasagroupselfdeterminationratherthanindividualselfrule.50Thisistrue,butthedebateregardingthecontentofpopularsovereigntyanditsrelationshiptoindividualshasneverended,eveninWesterncountries.Thedifferentconceptsofnation,asdemonstrated in the foregoingsections,determine the

concept

of

constituent

power

which

is

the

expression

of

that

selfdeterminationofacommunityinternally.

b) AReturntoCulturalOrigins

Arabphilosopherstriedtojustifyroyalpower.Theydidthatwithoutnecessarilyreferringtoreligion,thoughitremainedimportantasanelementinhelpingdiversepopulations(orclans)staycohesiveunderonepoliticalsystem.Islam was a necessary unifying element for the variouscommunitiesintheIslamicEmpire.Twodifferentauthors

49 SeeFilaliAnsari,supranote35,at78.50 SeeButterworth,supranote46,at9192.

arepresentedhereascasestudies:AbuNasralFarabiandIbnKhaldn.

Those

authors

do

not

cover

all

possible

theories

and

po

sitions inancientArabandMuslimhistory;nevertheless,theyrepresentthreedifferenthistoricalmoments,withdifferentattemptstoanswerdoctrinalproblems.AbuNasralFrbiwasbornabout870anddiedin950A.D.Hewastheeminent founder of a philosophical system and devotedhimselfentirelytocontemplationandspeculationandkepthimselfaloof frompoliticalandsocialdisorder.He leftaconsiderablebodyofliteratureincludingKitbAra Ahlal

MadinatalFddilah(BookontheViewsofthePeopleoftheExcellent State); Kitb alSiysat alMadaniyyah (Book onCivicAdministration);KitbTahsilalSaddah(BookontheAchievement of Happiness); Kitb alTanbih ala Sabil al

Saddah(BookonCautiononthePathofHappiness);andtheBodleianmanuscriptofhisFuslalMadini(Chaptersonthe Civilian). The second author is Ibn Khaldn whosedeathin1406signaledtheendofArabicpoliticalphilosophy,andwasfollowedbyfivehundredsyearsofpoliticalthought, whose sole exponents werejurists and theologians.51

Wewilldiscusstheirmainideasregardingthestate,thequalitiesoftheheadofstateandtherelationshipbetweentheonewhogovernsandthosewhoaregoverned.52

i) AlFarabi

In

his

famous

book

Opinions

of

People

of

the

Perfect

State,alFarabidedicatedchaptertwentysixtothehumanneedsofsocietyandcooperation,andthetwosuccessivechapterstotheneedforaleader/sandhis/theirqualities.53

Humansocietiesforhimareeitherperfectorimperfect;theperfectsocietymaybelarge,medium,orsmall.Alargehumansociety(mamoura) isoneconsistingofseveralumam(pluralofumma)unitedandmutuallysupportive.Amediumoneisthesocietyofonenation(umma)insomepartoftheworld,andthesmalloneisthesocietyofthepeopleofacity(madina).Itisinterestingtonotethatonlymadinais

51 SeeSharif,supranote44,at96,405,704.52 To avoid misunderstandings, one shall keep in mind that in no

way, does this paper insinuate that problems regarding democracyortherespectofhumanrightsislinkedtotheculturalparticularityof Arabs; nordoes itsuggest that the solution to suchasituation is the return to preIslamic concepts such as asabeyya(social cohesion), to which Ibn Khaldn dedicated some of hisanalyses. The situation in the Arab world is predominantly theresultofitsrecenthistory,beginningwiththefourcenturiesunderthe Ottoman Empire,but also to European colonialism in thetwentiethcentury.

53 SeeAlFarabi,OpinionsofpeopleofthePerfectstate{Arabic: Ara ahlalMidniaalFadilah},112126(Bumelhamed.,AlHelal,1995).Published also online at: http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/farabi/works/fadilah.pdf(accessedon7February2006).


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definedterritorially,sincetheummareferstoacommunityofpeople,54whilemamourareferstotheworldasawhole.

The

madina

is

compared

to

a

human

body,

in

which

dif

ferentorganshavedifferentroles.Thereisadissimilaritythat is outlined: in a humanbeing, the collaborationbetweenorgans isnatural, inamadina,thiscannotbeotherthanvoluntary.55Althoughconsideredasthesmallest(perfect)society,themadinaconstitutesthemostbasicone.Infact,theidealcitystateisthecityinwhichthemembersofthesocietycooperatetoattainhappiness.Thesameappliestoumma,butthecollaborationisnotbetweenimperfectsocieties56,norisitbetweenindividualsbutrather, itisbetweenthemudunthemselves.Theidealmamourathenistheoneinwhichdifferentumma(eachdistinguishedbyitsnaturalcharacter,temperament,habits,andlanguage)cooper

ate to attain happiness. Accordingly, the madina is not aclosed society; itcooperates with other mudun (the sameprincipleofvoluntarywillcanbeappliedbyanalogyhere).Thesameisvalidforumma.

Now, for a similar existence of the almadina alfadelathereisaneedforaleaderwhocannot,bydefinition,besoifhe issubjugatedtosomeoneelse.The leadercannotbe

justanyone,norisanyoneexcludedapriori.Theonlyconditionistohavethequalitiesofaleader(theidealleader,the imam, according to alFarabi, has twelve characteristics57).Itishowever,impossibletohaveallthesequalitiesinoneperson(aman);thereforeitisnecessarytoconsider

thesecond

option:

aleader

who

has

at

least

six

of

the

ideal

qualities.58 AlFarabi calls this ruler the traditional king.Accordingly,itisnotnecessarythatthisroleisensuredbyonephysicalperson;thesequalities,infact,maybedistributedindifferentpersonswhoconstitutethen,perfectlead

54 Seeid.at113.55 Seeid.at113.56 Theimperfectsocietyisthatofthepeopleofavillage,alocality,a

lane,orahouse,thelastbeingthesmallest.57 Soundhealth;Intelligenceandsagacity;Goodmemory;Prudence

and talent; Eloquence; Devotion to education and learning; Nogreedforfood,drink,andsex;Friendlinesstowardstruth;Bignessof heart; Indifference to dirham and dinar and other forms ofwealth;Devotionbynaturetojustice;Strongresolution.SeeSharif,supranote44,at712.

58 (1) He shouldbe wise and philosophical; and (2) learned andabreastwith the laws,customs,rites,andritualsadoptedbyhispredecessor to discharge the function of the ideal State with allperfection. (3) He shouldbe an expert in deriving principles incasehedoesnotfindairy law,and (4) farsighted,possessinganinsighttoframerulesandregulationsinaccordancewiththeconditions and circumstances he finds himself in, and capable ofkeepingupthereformsheintroduces.(5)Heshouldalsobewellexperiencedandeloquentingivingdirectionstourgethepeopleto follow him in accordance with the Sariah. (6) In addition heshouldbeskilful inphysicaldisplayofexercisesneeded inwarfare,andintheuseofarms,ammunition,andotherequipments.Seeid.at713.

ers.59Ifthesecharacteristicsarepresentinmorethanoneperson, together they form ideal heads of state. If thesecharacteristicsarenotpresentinanyone,thentherewould

benosovereignandthestatewouldbeexposedtodestruction.60

ForalFarabi,thesovereignsofanidealstate,whosucceedoneanotherandthegroupofpeoplewhoadministerthatstate,areconsideredasoneandsovereign.Thepeopleofanidealstatehavesomethingincommon,althoughtheymayenjoyhappinessindifferentways.Theidealstate,asexplainedabove,isthestateadministeredbythebestandmosttalented,whoaimatprosperityandhappiness.Ifitsconstitution fails to provide the people with prosperity,andtherulersdonotpossessthequalitiesofidealrulers,thenthestateceases tobe idealand iscalled thestateof

evildoing(almadinatalfsiqah),theignorantstate(almadinataljhilah)orthestatewhichhasgoneastray(almadinataldllah).61

ThissectionwillconcludewiththreecommentsonalFarabisconcept.First,thereisonlyadescriptionaposteriori,ofthequalitiesofaperfectleader,notthewayinwhichheischosenordesignated.Accordingly,theconsequenceofnothavingaperfectleaderfortheperfectmadinawillbethedestructionofthemadinaitself.Perhapsitisakindof

justificationforregimechangesandthedestructionofmonarchies/rulers,andnot theway theyare tobepreserved.Second,thequalitiespresentedareallhumanqualitiesand

notrelated

to

religion,

gender

or

aparticular

dynasty.

Nev

ertheless,itisnoteasytohaveaperfectleader(thesequalitiesarerarelyfoundinoneperson,unlessheisaprophetorphilosopher).62Inthiscase,akingisenoughtoguidetheaffairsoftheperfectmadina.Hisqualitiesareofadifferentorder:hejustneedsthewisdomtofollowinthestepsofhispredecessor.Third,governanceisnotrelatedtotheumma

buttoamadinathatisterritoriallydefined.63Accordingly,whereveraperfectleaderexists,hewillbetheheadofthemadina,andtheummaandalsothemamoura.Nevertheless,thisisoftendifficulttorealize,sotheotherqualitiesmaybeheldbydifferentpersonswhoshallreigncollectivelyastheperfectleadership.

59 SeeAlFarabi,supranote93,at126.60 Seeid.61 SeeSharif,supranote44,at964.62 SeeAlFarabi,supranote93,at14.63 According tosomeauthors, thepostmedieval ideaofa statea

territoriallydefinedentityapartfromaruleroradynastyorganized in accordance with manmade rules was alien to Muslimpolitical theory. Ottoman theories of state andgovernment werederived from the Muslim concept that God is the source of allauthorityandlawandthatgovernmentexiststoenablethecommunityoftruebelievers(Muslims)tofulfilitsobligationstoGod.Thecommunity,notthestate,constitutesthebasicMuslimpolicytranscendingallboundaries.SeeKorany,supranote45,at75.


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ii) IbnKhaldn

It was through the examination of culture that IbnKhaldn investigated the phenomenon of governmentwhichisconsideredtobetheconstituentpartandform(e.g.theorganizingprinciple)ofculture.64ThisparticularandindependentscienceofIbnKhaldn,thatis,thescienceofculture,isnotanartconcernedwithhowmanoughttolive,orhowsocietyshouldberightlygoverned,orhowthemultitudeshouldbeconvinced,butratherascientificinquiryintohowhumanbeingshaveactuallylivedinthepast.Hisstudyincludesanexaminationofthenaturalcausesdeterminingthemodesofhumanassociationwhichnecessitatethoseactivitiesandwaysoflife,pursuedindiversehumansocieties;whichcanbejudgedbyhistory.65

IbnKhaldnpresentedvariouspoliticaltheoriesofhispredecessors,buthedidnotdothatmerelyasahistorian;heseverelycriticizedthem,basinghiscriticismsontheoreticalandpracticalconsiderations.Infact,hedemonstratesthenecessityforsocialorganizationandaruler,butinordertodothat,somephilosophersrefertodivinelaw.ForIbnKhaldn,thisisclearlyfalse,sincearulercanrulebyvirtueofroyalauthorityalone,andevenapoorlyeducatedperson knows that there havebeen innumerable rulerswithoutdivineauthority.66

OftheMuslimphilosophers,itwasIbnRushdwho(likeIbnKhaldn)wasarecognizedreligiousjudge(qdi),andaphilosopherwhocriticizedalFarabiandIbnSinaforimitat

ing thedialectical theologians. IbnRushdwhowrote themost celebrated treaties on religion and philosophy, themainthemeofwhichwasthedefenseofthelegitimacyofreligionandphilosophyintheirproperspheresadevastatingattackuponthecombinationofreligionandphilosophyintheformoftheology.67

AccordingtoIbnKhaldn,humanscannotlivewithoutsocial organization and solidarity, since these are indispensableinprocuringbasicnourishmentandobjectsofprimalnecessity.Thisabsolutehumanneedforsocialorganization is fundamental to civilization (umran).68 For him,asabiyya (social solidarity or group feeling) is a specific

propertyof

the

human

soul,

acombination

of

the

natural

feelingforonesrelativesandfriends,andtheneedfordefenseandmeansofsurvival.Itcementsagrouptogether,dictates theneed foraruler, leads toconflictswithothergroups,andgeneratesthepowerofconquestleadingtovic

64 SeeSharif,supranote44,at962.65 Seeid.at966.66 Seeid.at968.67 Seeidat937.68 SeeIbnKhaldn,TheMuqaddimah,AnIntroductiontoHistory,4548

(FranzRosenthaltrans.,N.J.Dawooded.,BollingenSeries/Princeton,9thprinting1989).

toryoverothers.Itsinitialpowerdeterminestheextentofthisconquest;thefulfillmentofappetitesanddesires;andfinally,weakensitandleadstothedisintegrationofpoliticalpower.69

Political life, as practicedby all human communities,has to take into account the nature of all humans, andshouldbedirectedtothecommongoodofthemultitude.Thisrequiresarulerandalawbasedontherationalunderstandingoftheircommonneedsandinterestsinthisworld,oradivinelawbasedontheircommongoodinthisworldand the next. Accordingly, for every social organization,politicalgovernmentisnecessary;humanbeingsrequireapersonwhowillmakethemdowhatisgoodforthem,andwhowillforbidthembyforce(ifnecessary)todowhatmayharmthem.However,obeisancetoasuperiordependson

hisbeinggoodandfair;heisso,whenhedoesnotoppressthepopulationwithunjustlaws,andtreatseveryoneequally.

Inthecaseofaholderofauthoritydespisinghisownpeople,hewillberejectedbythem,and,afterascertainingthequalitiesofasuccessorinthenameoftheclan,hewill

beremoved,andhisauthoritygiventoanother.Infact,theallegianceoath,albaya,consistsofpayinghomagetoobeisance.Thepersonwhotakestheoath,bindshimselfincontracttohisemir,andindoingso,confersuponhimthegoverningofhisaffairsandthoseofallMuslims;heisboundtorecognizehisemirsauthorityandtoexecutehis instruc

tions,whether

he

is

in

accordance

with

him,

or

not.

Similar

toabuyerbeingboundbyacontractwithaseller,thosewhotaketheoathofallegianceto,andenterintoacontractwith,anemir,puttheirlivesinhishands.70

ThefirstformofgovernmentwastheCaliphate.TheoriginofthewordmeanstoreplacebecausetheCaliphistheonewhorepresentstheProphet,inIslam.TheCaliphislikethevicarofthelawgiver(Mohammed).71IbnKhaldndistinguishesbetween theobjectivesof natural royalpowerandthoseoftheCaliphate:theexerciseofthefirstconsistsinmakingitpossibleforthemassestooperateinharmonywiththeirprojectsanddestinies,thatis,allowingthemto

safeguard

their

material

interests

and

avoid

what

may

harmthem,inaccordancewithreason.Asforthesecond,itistheguidanceofpeopleaccordingtodivinelaw,inordertoensuretheirhappinessinthisworldandthenext.72

WhentheProphetdied,hiscompanionstooktheiroathofallegiancetoAbuBakrandchargedhimwithdirectingtheiraffairs;peoplewereneverleftopentoanarchy.GovernmentalfunctionsdependedontheCaliphate,whichis

69 Seeid.at160f.70 Seeid.at166167.71 Seeid.at170.72 Seeid.at154f.


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12/19



way.78Thedistinctivepointhereistheexistenceorabsenceofaconsensusbythepeoplewhowillbegovernedbytheconstitution.Peopleexercisethissovereigntythroughrepresentatives,aspecialassemblyorreferenda.79Inthecaseofahypotheticaldemocracy, the framingpower iseffectivelyinthehandsoftheautocracy,whichcanbeoneperson,oragroupofpeople.

Thewilloftheconstituentpoweraimsattransformingitselfintoanobjectiveandenduringincarnation:aconstitution;butitcannotsimultaneouslysubmititselftoitsowncreationwithoutlosingitscharacterasthesupreme,secularpower.Theexperienceofthelasttwohundredsyearshasprovedthattheleadingforcesoftherevolutionendeavoredtoconsolidatetheachievementsoftherevolution,particularlythenewdistributionofpoliticalpower,inaconstitu

tiona legaldocumentwhichbears theunequivocalauthority of a written text superior to all other laws of theland.Howeverimportantthecharacteroftheconstitutionasawrittentextmaybe,itslastingauthoritydependsonthepersistenceoftheauthorityofitscreator.Bymakingaconstitution,therevolutionaryforcesarediggingtheirowngraves; the constitution is the final act of the revolution.Constitutionmakingisanactofselfliquidationoftherevolution.80

FirstIwillpresentthedifferentconceptsofconstitutionand its relationship to the nation and/or the people, andthenIwillpresentchallengesofcontemporaryArabstates

inrelation

to

constitutionalism.

1. ModernConstitutions

Thereare twodiverseapproaches to theconstitution:thematerialandtheformal.Tobeginwith,theconstitution,initsmaterialsense,referstothewholesystemofgovernmentofacountry.According to thisdefinition,constitutionallawisthatpartofthelegalsystemwhichregulatesthestructureoftheprincipleorgansofthestate,theirrelationship toeachotherand to thecitizen,anddeterminestheirmainfunctions.Second,theconstitution,initsformalsense,meansadocumenthavingaspeciallegalinviolabili

78 Thefirstcanbeopenlyauthoritarian:thechartersgrantedby(a)Louis XVIII in 1814, and (b)by Nicolas II to Russia in 1905, orveiledsuchaswhenthepeopleapparentlyparticipateinratifyingaconstitution thathasbeenpreparedby anonelectedgroupofpeople appointedby the executive, that continues to exercisepoliticalpressureonthatdesignatedcommittee.Democraticwaysare those which confer the election of the constituent assemblyuponthepopulation,andmayrequesttheirratification.SeePierre

Pactet, InstitutionspolitiquesDroitConstitutionnel,70 (Masson 15e

d.,1996).79 See Shiba, Le Pouvoir Constituant, in MODERN CONSTITUTION 107

(InternationalAssociationofConstitutionalLaw,FirstWorldCongress,BelgradeAugust29thofSeptemeber2nd1983).

80 SeePreuss,supranote1,at144145.

tywhichsetsouttheframeworkandtheprincipalfunctionsof theorgansof the state, and declares theprinciplesbywhichthoseorgansmustoperate.81

Thewider (material)senseofconstitutioncoversalsothenarrower(formal)onebutnotviceversa;besides,everystate,bydefinition,hasaconstitutioninitsmaterialsense(a comprehensive system of government)but it may nothaveaconstitutioninitsformalsense(onedocumentdeclaredtobesupreme).AccordingtoAdhemarEsmein,theeighteenthcenturyconceptofconstitutionasafundamentalandsystematicwrittenlawisbasedonthreeideas:first,thesuperiorityofawrittenlawoveracustomaryonewasgenerallyagreeduponatthetime:thesameshouldapplytoconstitutionallaw;second,thepeopleoftheeighteenthcentury (French and American) revolutions considered a

newconstitution,editedbynationalsovereignty,asatruerenewalofthesocialcontract.Assuch,itwasnecessarytoregistertheclausesofthatcontractinthemostsolemnandcompleteform;third,theythoughtthataclear,systematicpresentationofsuchadocumentinaclearandsystematicwaywouldprovideanexcellentmeansofpoliticaleducation, since itwouldprovide the citizens with theknowledgeanddesirefortheirrights.82

TheAmericanandFrenchmodelofawrittenconstitutionwasadoptedbystatesworldwide;accordingly,constitutionallawsweredistinguishedfromordinaryones.Theconstitution,infact,wasconsideredtheinitialactofnation

alsovereignty,

while

the

other

acts

were

only

its

conse

quence.83Someotherswentfurtherbyconsideringtheconstitution as a limit to the sovereignty of parliamentbysubordinatingittoasuperiorlaw.84Infact,ifsovereigntyresidesinparliament,thenthereisnoneedtoestablishaconstitution,sincethereisnoneedtolimitparliamentbyalawthatdeterminesitspowers.If,onthecontrary,thesovereigntyofthestateissharedbythethreebranchesofgovernment,whichareseparateandnotnecessarilyhierarchically structured, then a constitution is necessary to limitthose powers and establish the relationship betweenthem.85

a) TheConstitutionandthenationAccordingtoSieyes,86theconstitutionisnotbased,nor

is it dependent upon, tradition, historical legacy, or religiousrevelations,butoriginatesfromasecularwillpower.

81 SeeE.C.S.Wade&GodfreyPhillips,ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLaw,15(9thed.,LongmanGroupLtd.,1977).

82 SeeAdhemarEsmein, Elments de Droit Constitutionnelfranais etcompar,603604(Sirey,1927).

83 Seeid.at607.84 SeePierreAvril,LaSparationdesPouvoirsAujourdhui, in1789ET

LINVENTION DE LA CONSTITUTION 299 (Michel Troper & LucienJaumeeds.,Bruylant,1994).


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Theconceptof theconstituentpowerofanation impliesthattheempiricalsubjectofthispoweristhepeople,notamonarchoraristocraticlites.Assuch,thenationswillisapreconstitutionalsourceoftheconstitution,whichinturn,isnothingmorethantheinstitutionalizationofthenationswill.87Atthispoint,thequestionarisesregardingthecontentofthewordnation.

i) TheDefinitionofNation

Thetermnationisacceptedasacentralpoliticalconcept of recent times; sometimes it is synonymous with astate,itsinhabitants,orwithahumangroupboundtogetherbyloyaltyandcommonsolidarity.88Authorsusedtodistinguishbetweendefiningpeopleasdemosorasethnos.Demosrefertothetotalityofcitizenswhileethnosisacom

munity

based

on

the

belief

in

a

common

descent

or

cul

ture.89Whenanationsubstitutesthepeopleasanelementofthestate,wehaveanationstate.

Now,ifthoseentitledtoconstituentpowerarethepeople,then,theywhohavetherighttolimitthemselvesinaconstitutionarethesovereignpeople,consideredasthecitizensintoto.Incasethepeopleasdemosdonotconcurwiththepeopleasethnos,aproblemexists:whatistherelationshipbetween thesegroups?It isclearthatvitaldecisionsneedtobetakenandthoseentitledtosovereigntyneedtomakeakindoflegalfiction,actingasiftheyrepresentthepeopleintheirtotalityincludingthosewhoarenot,ornotyet,citizensofthestate(postWorldWarIIGermany,forexample).90

Definingtheconceptofnationisessentialtostatebuilding(inthecaseofanonexistentstate)ortopreservationofthestate(ifthestateexistsalready);infactthenationprovidesanidentityfortheindividualandlegitimacyforthestate.Thedifferentconceptsofnationdeterminetheinterpretationwegivetotheconstitution.Accordingtotheradicaldemocraticone, we always refer to the people to re

85 Thisiswhy,inacountrylikeEngland,thereisnoneedforaconstitution,whereasincountrieslikeFranceandtheUSA,itisessential. Consequently, it is completely logical that in the Englishsystem the question ofconstituentpower is irrelevant, since thepowertoissuelaws,organizethestateandlimitthepowerofitsorgans,isleftentirelytoparliament.SeeRaymondCarrdeMal

berg,ContributionlaThorieGnraledelEtat,541(TomeII,1922).86 EmmanuelJoseph Sieys, known also as lAbb Sieys (1748

1836)isaFrenchrevolutionaryandstatesman,authorofQuestcequeletierstat?(Whatisthethirdestate?),in1789.

87 SeePreuss,supranote1,at149.88 SeeSeeVatikiotis,supranote6,at31.89 SeeTpperwien,supranote48,at45.90 InthePalestiniancase,thecitizensofthefuturestateofPalestine

wouldexercisetheirconstituentpowerandwouldadaptaconstitution.Thisconstitutionneedstodiscusssomekeyargumentsbywhich the regulation interests all the Palestinian people,not thePalestiniancitizensonly.

solveproblems:aconstitutionisacontinuousrevolution,andassuch,unstable.Theotherinterpretationistheinstitutionalizedone,whichcreatesinstitutionsthatwillallowpeopletoreturntotheirnormallives.91

ii) Wethepeople92andtheConstitution

InquotingHugoGrotius,whocontendedthatapeoplemaysubmit itself to aking,JeanJacques Rousseaucommentedthat,accordingtoGrotius,apeopleissoevenbeforeithassubmitteditselffortheking.Thesubmissionitselfisacivilact;itpresupposespublicdeliberation.Hence,

beforeconsideringtheactbywhichapeoplesubmitstoaking,weoughttoscrutinizetheactbywhichapeoplebecomesapeople,forthatact,beingnecessarilyantecedenttothesubmissiontothekingitself,istherealfoundationof

society.93Somemodernconstitutionsexpress this fact, inthesameconstitutionaldocumentindicatingthatWe,the

peopleofadopttheconstitution.94

Nevertheless,asoutlinedbyHannaLerner,thereisnotalwaysacommonunderstandingofthatWe,especiallyindividedsocieties.95Forher,sincethepeoplearetheauthorsoftheconstitution,itshouldreflecttheirspecificidentityanddelineatetheirsharedvaluesandprinciples.Infact,national identityplayedanecessaryrole intheemergingphaseofthenationstate,bymakingpossibleanewmodeofsecularlegitimizationtothestate,basedonanewformofsocialintegration.This isalsothecasewithcontempo

rarynewstates.Theproblem istounderstandwhetheraconstituent power will necessarily reflect a preexistentidentityorwillitreflectapoliticalorganizationofasociety?96

Theanswerissimple(atleasttheoretically):bothcasesarepossible.Itdependsinfact,onthecountryandtheparticularcontextinwhichaconstitutionisenacted.Nevertheless, thesecondquestion is, then, toknow ifthere isanyconnectionbetweentheconstitutionandthecollectivewhoholds theconstituent power.97Although the constitutiondoesnotalwaysexpressapredefinedidentity,itisneverthelessimportantthattheconstitutionbefeltastheresult

of

the

act

of

all

those

who

compose

the

we

of

the

consti

tution.Otherwiseitwilllacknecessarylegitimacy.Thecon

91 SeePreuss,supranote1,at145.92 QuotingBruceAckermannsreflectioninhisvolumeWethePeople.

Foundations(Cambridge,Mass./London,1991).93 SeePreuss,supranote1,at161.94 Forexamplethepreambleof1996SouthAfricaconstitution.95 SeeHannaLerner,Thepeopleof theConstitution:Constitutionmak

ing, legitimacy and identity 2 (paper presented at the miniAPSA,Department of political science, Columbia university, April 30,2004). Hanna Lerner is Ph.D. candidate in Columbia University.Thepaperwasnotpublishedyet.

96 Seeid.at6,11,19.


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stitutionshallbeconsideredbythemajorityofthepolity(asindividualsorasgroupsethnic,religious, linguistic)as

beingtheirownandtheyshallidentifythemselveswiththedocument.98Inotherwords,theimportanceoftheconstitutiondoesnotlieinitsexpressionofpoliticalidentity,butinitsabilitytotransformitintoacivicone.99Thisiswhyconstituentpoweristightlyrelatedtothequestionofconstitutionallegitimacy.Incontemporarytimes,theconstitutionthatisadoptedthroughdemocraticmeansisconsideredlegitimate.100Hereanotherdebatemayarise,butistangentialtoourmain inquiryhere: is itsufficientthatanationwantssomething,forthiswilltobeconsideredgood?Theproblemwithacceptingthisconjectureisthattheguidingpoliticalstatuswillloseallrationality.

b) TheNationandtheConstituentPower

The father of constituent power (EmmanuelJosephSieyesdefinesthenationexclusivelyasdemos;forhim,thenationisabodyofassociateslivingundercommonlawsand representedby thesame legislative assembly.101 Inotherwords,thenationconsistsofthetotalityofitscitizenry.ThisreflectstheFrenchideaofnation.AccordingtotheGermanandEasternEuropeanconcept,thenationisaprepoliticalcommunity,which isconstitutedbycommonalitiesinorigin,race,language,religion,culture,historyandthelike.TheFrenchconceptofnation,basedontheideaofcitizenship,isanexampleofastatenation(thenationisthedemos). In contrast, the German perception includes the

ideaofanethnicnation(thenationistheethnos).Anationbasedoncommoncitizenshipisnecessarilyastatenation,whereastheethnicnationcanbeentirelystatelessandcan

bepoliticallyorganizedinapluralityofstates.102

i) TheConstitutionasaReflectionofapreexistententity

Incontemporarystates,itisveryrareevenimpossiblethatonehomogeneousethnosispoliticallyorganizedinanation;normallytheethnosandthedemosofastatearein

97 Here there are two options: First, there is no connection at allbetweenthetwo.This isthepositionofHansKELSEN;withhislegalpositivism,hesolvestheparadoxofconstitutionallegitimacy

byseparatingthelegalfromthepolitical;secondly,thereisadirectconnectionbetween the constitution and the people. Here therearethreealternatives:a) the identityofWe thepeoplederivesfromthemakingoftheconstitutionitself;b)thepeopleaswellastheirconstitutionemergesimultaneously inagradualand incrementalmanner;orc)theconstitutiondoesnotcreatethecollectivitybut mirrors a prepolitical unity while recognizing the preconstitutionalexerciseofahomogeneousnationsgeneralwill.Seeid.at1314.

98 Seeid.at12.99 Seeid.at26.100 Seeid.at11.101 Preuss,supranote1,at149.102 Seeid.at149150.

congruous.Thishasseriousconsequences,asithasfortheconceptofselfdetermination,forexample,asshownbyUlrich Preuss: In Western Europe it [selfdetermination]meantthatthedemoticnationtookoverthegovernmentofanexisting sovereignstate, therebysafeguarding itsselfdetermination.InthefreedommovementthatspreadfromGermanyeastandsouth,however,thetermselfdeterminationmeanttheliberationofapreestablishedethnicsocietyfromalieninfluenceandforeigndomination.103

Infact,differentconceptsofnationwouldhaveseriousconsequencesontheconceptofconstituentpower;forexample,accordingtotheFrenchconceptofnation,theconstituentpoweristhepowerofacollectivebody,which,bytheveryactofconstitutiongiving,exercisesitsrighttoselfrule.Theconstituentpowerofanationpresupposestheno

tionofademoticentiretyofindividualsthecitizenryanentiretywhichoriginatesfromthisveryactofcreatingcommonlawsandacommonrepresentativebody.Therefore,itwasnotthecommonnessofthelanguagethatconstitutedthenation,but,conversely,itwasthenationthatrequiredandcreatedthecommonnessofthelanguage.104

AccordingtotheGermanconcept,themeaningofnationstate is that a nation (in its ethnic sense, defined intermsofcommonnessoflanguageand/orreligion,culture,origin,etc.)acquiresitspoliticalexistenceinitsownstate.Thenationisprestate,prepolitics,existentialandalmostaneternalentity,whereasthestateisaquasiaccidentaland

ephemeralphenomenon,

which

supports

the

survival

of

thenationinitshistory,butisnotreallytheembodimentoftheessenceofthenation.However,thepoliticalselfdeterminationofanationrequiresstatehood;butitisastatehood

basedonethnichomogeneity.Itistheselfdeterminationofethnos,directedagainstalieninfluence,ratherthanthepolitical selfrule and freedom of demos, which is directedagainstpoliticalpressureandsocialinequality.105

ii) TheConstitutionasaSocialContract

Studyingthefoundationofthelegitimacyoftheconstitution,oneshouldinevitablyconsiderthesocialcontractasthebasisofitslegitimacy.Socialcontractmeansthatpopu

larsovereignty isexpressedby theconstituentassembly.Rousseau wrote: Each one of us puts into the commonstockhispersonandallhispower,underthesupremedirectionofthegeneralwill;andwereceiveasabodyeachmemberofanindivisiblepartofthewhole.106

Yet,therearedifferentsocialcontractapproaches:a)theBritishapproachwhichdidnotneedawrittenconstitutionemphasizesthepoliticalselfgovernmentofsociety

103 Id.at150.104 Seeid.at150,152.105 Seeid.at152.


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throughparliament;b)theFrenchapproachwhichhadfewscruplesinreplacingitsconstitutionsemphasizesthenationasitismanifestedinthestate;c)theAmericansocialcontract approach which reflects the American concernwith a society consisting of a multitude of individualswhosemutualcontractiscontainedintheSupremeConstitution.107

Nevertheless, many authors expressed serious criticismstowardsthesocialcontractasthefoundationofconstitutional legitimacy. For them,justifying lawby socialcontractisfiction;lawhastobejustifiedbysomethingoutside itself.Theconstitution, indeed,hastobeeffective.Itmustbeadoptedandputintooperationwithauthority.Inaconstitutionalstate,authorityischaracterizedbydemocraticlegitimizationtowhichalsothedemocraticminority

acquiesces.Theoriginalsupremacyoftheconstitutionistherefore

foundedintheauthorityoftheconstitutionwritingentity,butthisdoesnotexplaintheperpetuationofitspredominance. In fact,predominanceof theconstitution is maintainedbytheoperationofthelegitimatelyestablisheddevicesoftheconstitutionitself,whichcanremaineffectiveonlyaslongascitizenryandtheauthorityofthestatesorganswhicharegovernedbytheconstitutioncontinuetolendlegitimacytoits institutionsthroughtheproperemploymentofthemechanismsandproceduresprovidedbytheconstitution.Theforceoutsidetheconstitution,which

ensuresits

primacy,

is

its

practical

legitimacy,

since

it

gives

reasonable and realistic expression to the principles andneedsofthelegalcommunitythatitserves.Accordingly,alegitimateconstitutioncanbeconsideredasolemncodificationofbasicrulesfortheoperationofthestate.Ittendstoreflectnationalcustomsandrulesfromwhichthelegalcultureof thestate isstrongly influenced, ifnotdetermined

by.108

106 Nevertheless,oneshalldistinguishbetweenthefoundationofthesocietyandthetheconstituentpower.AsexplainedbyPREUSS:ROUSSEAUspeaksofthefoundationofcivilsociety,notoftheprocessofconstitutionmaking.Wemustdistinguishbothsteps,althoughempiricallytheywillnormallycoincide.Itishardlyconceivablethatinreallifetheformationofagroupoutofmultitudeofindividuals,andthedeterminationofthestructureaccordingtowhichthegroupisenabledtoactasanentity,canbeseparatedfromeachother.However,thedistinctionisanalytically important because thegeneration of a constitutionfor a

grouppresupposes the very existence of thegroup. Hence, before thegroupgives itselfa constitution, it must clarify who is subject to thisconstitutionaldetermination,and who is entitled toparticipate in thisdecision.Inotherwords,whoisamemberofthegroup.Id.at161.

107 See Franois Venter, ConstitutionMaking and the Legitimacy of theConstitution,inNATIONALCONSTITUTIONSINTHEERAOFINTEGRATION1012(AnteroJyrankied.,KluwerLawInternational,1999).

108 Seeid.at12.

2. ModernConstitutionsinContemporaryArabStates

IntheArabworld,constitutionsmaycodifyavarietyofpoliticalstructures:federal,asintheUnitedArabEmiratesandtheSudan;unitary,asinTunisia;aconstitutionalmonarchy,asinJordan;arepublic,asinEgypt;oratraditionalhereditarymonarchy,asinSaudiArabia.WhilemostArabconstitutions are documents with roughly similar provisions,someconstitutionsarenoteworthyproductsofhistoricalandpoliticalcircumstances.InSaudiArabia,forexample, the Koran itself is considered the constitution,accompaniedbyaseriesofroyaldecreescompiledtofunctionasamanualfortheapplicationofitsprinciples.Proceduresforconstitutionalamendmentsvary;sometimesrequiringdirectreferendaorlegislativeaction,whileinsomecountries,theheadofstatemayissueamendmentsbyde

cree.Thecomparisonofconstitutionsindifferentregionsof

theworlduncoversaremarkablevarietyof fundamentaltexts,since theyare the product of theirunique historyandgeography.109ThisisalsothecaseintheArabworld,eventhoughsomestudiestreatArabconstitutionsasiftheywere identical (which they are not). There are of coursecommon features and similarities, since they may haveadapted texts from thesamesources;nevertheless,everyArabstatehasitsownconstitution,anditsownconstitutionalhistory.110

a) NationPeopleinArabConstitutions

ManyConstitutionsintheArabworldrefertothewordArabtoqualifytheState.Forexample,theArabRepublicofEgypt,mentionedintheconstitutionsfirstarticle.ThesameappliestoJordan(Art.1)andtoSyria(Art.1).Specialattention shouldbe drawn to the Tunisian Constitution,where thepeoplemakepartof thegreaterArabMaghreb(Art.2)whiletheLebaneseConstitution,withoutreferringtoitselfasanArabnation,mentionsonlythatArabicistheofficiallanguage(Art.11).ThisisnoteworthysinceitrecursinmanyotherconstitutionsofArabstates:Egypt(Art.2);Syria(Art.4);andTunisia(Art.1).

Now, what makes a state an Arab one? Is it a statewhosepopulationspeaksArabic?TheEnglish,FrenchandSpanishlanguagesarecommonlyspokenindifferentcountries;thisdoesnotmeanthatthosecountriesconstituteor

109 See Eric CanalForgues (ed.), Recueil des Constitutions des PaysArabes,X(Bruylant,2000).

110 Sincethesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury,theconstitutionalmovementbegan,andneverstopped,intheArabworld.TheArabworldwasfamiliarwithevolutioninrelationtoconstitutionalism;thedemocratizationprocessexperiencedarelativelypacifictransformation.There isalsoabrandofcreativity intheArabworld,whereinnew techniquesand institutionsthatareunknownelsewhereareinvented.Seeid.atVII.


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arepartofasinglenation.Althoughimportant,languagethenisnotsufficientbyitself.Ifweconsiderdifferentelements such as history, culture, language and traditions,theysuggesttheexistenceofanArabnation.Tosomeextent,religionisalsorelevant,sincethemajorityofArabsareMuslim (mostly Sunni). Nevertheless, not all Arabs areMuslims,norareallMuslimsArab.

TheexistenceofsuchanArabnationmeansthatitisoneunitdividedintodifferentArabstates(notthefirsttimeithasbeenhistoricallyso);consequently,ArabstateswouldsimplybeatransitoryperiodontheirwaytotheconsolidationofanArabNation.Nevertheless,thisassertioncontradictstherealityofArabpeopleswhoareattachedtotheirstatesandtotheirindividuality,eventhoughtheymaynot

behappywiththeachievementsoftheirrulers.Thiscanbe

oneoftheeffectsoftheexistenceofindividualArabstates.ThedreamofArabunityswitchedtoanewgoal:itdoesnotcall for the establishment of one centralized state whicheliminatesallparticularities;ratheritmeansatendencytowards collaboration and harmonization of the existingstates.UnityinthissensesimilartothatoftheEuropeanUnionbecomesthefuture,whenthefutureisintendedto

beprosperous,secureandprogressive.

ThepreamblesoftheArabconstitutionsmayprovideabriefvisionof theunitaryArabstate, regarding the relationshipbetween the people and the Arab nation. SomesubmitthatthestateispartoftheArabworld,andothersthat

thepeople

of

asingle

Arab

state

are

part

of

the

Arab

nation.

Hereareafewexamples.

The1952JordanianConstitutionwasappliedtotheWestBankwhichwaspartoftheKingdomofJordan,untilitsoccupationby Israel in 1967 and the formal separationbetweentheEastandWestbanksin1987.Initsfirstarticle,the

Jordanian Constitution states thatJordan is a sovereignArabstate.Thesamearticlestatesthatthepeople(shab)of

JordanarepartoftheArabnation(umma).Thesovereigntyof thestateand its independence fromothercountries isemphasized in that constitution, and this canbe understoodinitshistoricalcontextofrivalrybetweenArablead

ers,

especially

in

relation

to

the

Palestinian

territories

that

wereunifiedwith(orannexedto)Transjordan.TheJordanianconstitutionhasaparticularity:itreferstotheJordanianpeopleasumma.ThisisthecaseinArticle24:(i)TheNationisthesourceofallpowers.(ii)TheNationshallexerciseitspowersinthemannerprescribedbythepresentConstitution.Besides,theJordanianconstitutionreferstotheJordanianParliamentasMajlesalumma(Art.29).NormallytheArabparliamentsaretranslatedasNationalAssembly.But infact,theNationalAssemblyisusuallyunderstood to mean almajles alwatanee, where wataneereferstohomeland(watan)andnottonation(umma).This

confusion in terms disappears in theJordanian NationalCharterof1990wherethetermumma(nation)referstotheArabnationandshab(people)referstotheJordanians.

We read in the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 that theEgyptianpeoplearepartoftheArabnation.Theamendmentof1980introducedtheinterestingconceptofcomprehensiveunityintheconstitutionsfirstarticle:TheEgyptianpeoplearepartoftheArabNationandworkfortherealization of its comprehensive unity. What does thiscomprehensiveunitymean?Itmaybeaconstitutionaladaptationto,andharmonywith,theactualterritorialdivisionsofArabstates;fewwouldenvisionaunitedArabstatein thenear future,butmostArabsencourageArabunitythatisbasedontheactualdivisionofArabstates.Thisunitywouldenvisagespecialrelationsbetweenthestatesthat

haveacommonculture,languageandhistory.Infact,sovereigntyofasingleArabpeopleisenhancedinalltheArabconstitutionaldocumentsandnostatewouldcompromiseit; intheEgyptianConstitution,Article3:Sovereigntyisforthepeoplealone,theyarethesourceofauthority.Thepeopleshallexerciseandprotectthissovereignty,andsafeguardnationalunityinthemannerspecifiedintheConstitution.

b) ReligionandStateinArabConstitutions

Indifferentwaystoday,legalsystemsintheArabstateshavebecomepositivesetsofprinciples,withastatuscomparabletothoseofWesterncountries,andIslamiclawhas

becomeabranchofpositivelaw(e.g.personalstatus).Infact,mostcontemporaryArabstatesincludeintheirconstitutionthearticlethatIslamisthestatereligionandshariaisaortheprinciplesourceoflegislation:asymbolicconcession to the ideologyofpolitical Islamaccording tosome,andasteptowardsthereevaluationofitsjudicialsystem,accordingtoothers.

Islam is considered the State religion (alislam din aldawla),inthefirstarticlesoftheconstitutionofmostArabstates(Algeria,Bahrain,Egypt,Emirates,Jordan,Kuwait,Morocco,Sudan, andTunisia). Some constitutions forbidtherevisionofthisarticle,suchasthatofAlgeria(Art.178),

forexample.ItisthisauthorsviewthatdeclaringIslamastheofficial religiondoesnotraiseproblemsassuch.Theonlyquestionthatarisesiswhether,undersuchconstitutionalprovisions,allindividualscanenjoyfreedomofconscienceandreligion.Infact,thereferencetoareligionofstate isnotparticulartotheAraborMuslimworld;untilvery recently,somewesterndemocraciesdeclaredChristianityoraparticularconfessionastheofficialreligionofthe state, without necessarily infringing the sensibilitiesandrightsofothers.Ontheotherhand,ArabstateshaveshowndifferentwaysinassimilatingIslamicprinciples,de


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pending on their particular geographical, historical, andpoliticalcontext.

The

problem,

in

fact,

lies

elsewhere.

In

the

last

few

de

cades,agrowing tendency toreturn to sharia inMuslimandArablegalsystemsisaccompaniedbyaparticularity:itisnotshariaaspresentedbyulama(Muslimexpertsinreligionrelatedaffairs)butasimposedbythestate;accordingly, there are now sharia systems as much as Muslimand/orArabstates.Infact,mostArabstatesrefertoshariaasa/themainsourceoflegislation.Othersreferalso(suchastheAlgerianandtheJordanian)orexclusively(suchasSyria)tothereligionoftheHeadofStateasIslam.111Thesubstanceoftheproblemremainsunresolved:whichisthesupremelaw:theconstitutionorsharia?Inotherwords,inthecaseofacontradiction(inrelationtowomensrights,

forexample),whatshouldprevail,theconstitutionalprovisionsorsharia?112

Themainquestionthatariseshereisthefollowing:isIslamareligion,astateorboth?Apparently,twooptionsarepossible:first,Islamisonlyareligion,aspresentedbyAliAbdalRaziq,KhaledMuhammedKhaled,andIbnBadis;second,Islamisreligionandstate,aspresentedbyShaykhMuhammadBakhitalMutii,HasanalBanna(founderofMuslimBrotherhoodin1928),andAbdalQadirAwdah.The first approach wanted religion tobe free ofpoliticalmanipulation;theseparationbetweenthereligiousandthepoliticalwasintendedtoprotectreligion.Thispositionwas

rejectedby

the

others,

who

considered

Islam

to

be

away

of

life.113

The ideaofIslamasreligionandstatedevelopedfurther,arrivingataradicalpositionofcallingfortheestablishmentofanIslamicstate(AbdalKarimalKhatib,TahaAbdBaqiSuru,MuhammadYusufMusa,MuhammadalMubarakandYusufalQadrawi).ForthemtheIslamicsystem isunique: it isneither theocraticnormonarchic, it ismerelyIslamic.Regardingtheformofgovernment,twopositionsdeveloped:somebelieved that Islamdoesnot impose a form of government that is welldefined and detailed (such as alMubarak); while othersbelieved that

Islam

should

serve

as

the

basis

and

the

pillars

of

such

a

gov

ernment(suchasTaqiadDinanNabhaniandhisHizbalTahriralIslamiorIslamicLiberationParty).114

111 The Constitution of Lebanon,because of the unique relationsbetweenthecommunities,makesnoreferencetoIslam

112 This is in substance whatjustifies such a paper: who has thesupreme powers? Who or what is the source of authority? Thisquestionneeds tobeclarifiedespecially incaseofconstitutionalreview.

113 SeeFahmiJadaane,NotionsoftheStateinContemporaryArabIslamicWritings,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE112148(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).

114 Seeid.at128132.

Maybe there isamiddlegroundbetweenthetwoextremepositionsofAbdalRaziq,whoreducedreligiontotherealmofspirit,pushingpoliticsawayfromitsdomain,andthatofalBanna,whostrivedfortherestorationofanIslamicstateandtheCaliphate.TheformerconsidersIslamasonlyareligionwhilethelatterconsidersitasareligionand state; the latter was the solution presentedby thosewhopredictedalegislativeroleforsharia(AliAbualFutuh, Abd alAzizJawish, Abd alRazzaq asSanhuri).SayyidQutb(19071966)refusedsuchmoderatesolutions.HisradicalpositionisalsoexpressedbyYusufalQardawiwhopresentstheIslamicsolution:theestablishmentofanIslamicstatebasedonpureIslamicrule,whichtakesIslamiclawasitsoneandonlyguideandreferenceforallitsrulings.115

With time, the ideaofa legislativerole forshariabecamefurtherdiffused.In1939,thelawyerAhmadHusayncalledfortherevisionofconstitutionallawsinthelightofIslamicsharia,maintainingthatIslamisthesourceoflegislation. In 1940 the Iraqi Abd alRahman alBazzaz condemnedthosewhodispelshariafromtheconstitutionoftheircountry.HeconfirmedthedoctrinethatIslamiclegislation is open to evolution and does not deny canonicalchange.AllaalFasi,thehistoricleaderoftheIstiqlalPartyinMorocco,agreesingeneraltermswiththethesisofalBazzaz.Hecondemned AbdalRaziq,sincereligioncannot

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