Approches to the Study of Political Power.

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Approaches to the Study of Political PowerAuthor(s): Franz L. NeumannReviewed work(s):Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Jun., 1950), pp. 161-180Published by: The Academy of Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145519 .

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VolumeLXV June 1950 Number 2

POLITICAL SCIENCEQUARTERLY

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL

POWER

I is difficult,erhaps mpossible,o add any newidea to adiscussionof political power. To be sure,there are fewbooks so named; but almost everythingwritten in the

fieldof the political sciencesdeals in one way or anotherwiththe subject. The purposeof thisessay s not to developa newtheoryof political power but ratherto lay bare the approachesto its study,particularly or younger tudents.

I. PoliticalPower nd Psychology

Political power is an elusive concept.' It embraces two

radicallydifferentelations:controlof nature,and controlofman.2 Power over nature is mere ntellectualpower. It con-sists n man'sunderstandingf thelawfulness f externalnaturefortheultimatepurposeof subjectingexternalnatureto man'sneeds.3 It is this accumulated knowledgewhich is the basisofthe productivity f any given society. This poweris powerless.It doesnot involve controlof other men.

1 Concerning overnment,t is a part of knowledge,ecret nd retired,n boththeserespectsn which things re deemed ecret;forsomethings re secretbecausethey are hard to know, and somebecause they are not fit to utter. We see allgovernmentsre obscure nd invisible:

Totamque nfusaper artusmensagitatmolem t magnose corporemiscet.

Such is the descriptionf governments. acon, The Advancementf Learning,Everymandition, . 204.

2 The relation etween he twowill be discussedater.

3 This view is essential o scientificmethod and is classicallyformulated yBacon: Science and powerare identicalbecause gnorance f the cause puts theeffect ut of reach. For nature is conqueredonly by obeyingher; and thatwhich, n contemplation,s the equivalent f a cause is in operationheequivalentof a rule. WorksBoston,1859), vol. I, p. 241.

[1611



162 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXV

Political ower s socialpowerfocused n the state. It in-

volves ontrol fothermenforthepurpose f influencinghebehaviorfthestate,ts egislative,dministrativend judicialactivities.Sincepolitical ower s control f othermen,polit-ical power (as contrasted ith powerover externalnature)is always two-sidedelationship.4Man is notsimply pieceofexternal ature;he is an organismndowedwithreason, l-thoughfrequentlyot capableof, or prevented rom, ctingrationally.Consequently,hosewhowieldpolitical ower recompelled o create motionalnd rational esponsesn thosewhomtheyrule, nducing hemto accept, mplicitlyr ex-plicitly,hecommandsftherulers.Failure oevoke motionalor intellectualesponsesntheruled ompels heruler o resorttosimple iolence, ltimatelyo liquidation.

The two-sided haracter f politicalpoweralreadymarkspoliticalcience ff rom atural cience. It makest mpossible

(even if it weredesirable) o measure owerrelationshipssonemeasureshe behavior f external ature. The variationsof thepowerrelationshipsrenumberless.One mayclassifyanddescribehem, ut onecannotmeasurehem.

Political ower snotcomparableo thecategoryf energyinphysics. Nor ispower he olecategoryfpolitical cience.5Politicss not merelyhe art of gettingomethingn a certain

way regardlessf thewhatand of thehow.6 The trendtoequatepoliticswithpowerpolitics oesbacktoMachiavellindappears ohavebecomehepredominantrait fAmericannd,perhaps, f modernpoliticalscience n general. Politics sviewedas a purelytechnical oncern. Values (the termis usedonly provisionally)rethenmerepersonal references;valid f theywork,nvalid f theyfail. Historys thenquitemeaningless. It is an indifferentepetitionf the endless

strugglef in-groups versus out-groups. It is thusre-ducedto merechronology, fileof illustrative aterials or

4Harold Lasswell, owerand PersonalityNew York, 1948), especiallyntroduc-

tion,p. 10.

5Thus Bertrand ussell,Power,A New SocialAnalysis reprint, ondon,1948),

pp. 10-11.

6Harold D. Lasswell, olitics:WhoGets What,When,How (New York, 1936).



No. 2] POLITICAL POWER 163

so-called ypothesesr,at best,s governedy whatMachiavelli

calledFortuna,he uck oftheparticipantsn the truggle.7The theoreticalasisof this pproach opolitics nd politicalscience s usuallypsychological,s Machiavelli as already e-veloped t. Men are the amethroughoutistory. Theyhavecertain tabletraits, nd all, or almost ll, are equippedwithCpower drive , an uncontrollablend irrationalmpulse orpower. From thisassertionre thenderived uchfacilehalf-true generalizationss the famous tatementf Lord Acton:Power tends o corrupt,bsolute ower orruptsbsolutely.This is not to imply hat the psychologyf powerhas no

placein political cience. Its significances great, ut notde-cisive. Its contributions twofold. First,t leadsto thereali-zation hat he ptimisticheoriesfhumannature reone-sidedand thus alse. Man,although ndowedwithreason, requentlyknowsnot-or is notpermittedo know-whathistrue nterests

are. Thisrediscoveryf ancient ruthss particularlyhemeritof the materialisticsychologyf Freud. Secondly, sycho-logicaltechniques ermit s to describen concrete nd con-vincing ermshepersonalitytructures ost apable f exertingorofsufferingower. Butpsychologyannotgo beyond on-cretizationnd description. It cannotsupplya theory fpolitical ower. The actionofeachman s as muchtheresultof the environments it is themanifestationf a personality

7 The implicationsf this conception f history s the ebb and flowof luckcome out clearly in the following tatement y Machiavelli: Reflectingnowupon the course of humanaffairs, thinkthat, as a whole,the world remainsverymuch in the same condition, nd the good in it alwaysbalancesthe evil;

but the good and the evil changefromone country o another.... The Dis-courses,Book II, Introduction.Fortune s no arbitratorf history, owever-audessusde la melee. God and naturehave thrown ll humanfortunesnto themidst f mankind; nd they re thusattainable ather y rapine hanby industry,by wickedactioiisrather han by good. Hence it is that men feed upon each

other.... Historyof Florence UniversalClassics Library Edition,Washingtonand London,1901), Book3, chap. 3, p. 129.

8 It wouldbe quite interestingo show the falsity f thestatement: eisistratus'rule being a case of absolutepowerwithinfinitelyess corruptionhanthatof aconstitutional onarchof the eighteenthentury;Augustus tarting s a totallycorruptyouthand becomingmore enlightened ith the growthof his personalpower; the Papacy,quite corrupt n the sixteenth entury when its powerwaslimited), and incorrupt fter the Vatican Council which formalized bsolutepersonal ule in theologicalmatters.




structure. ndeed, ersonalitytselfs historicallyonditioned.

To thepsychologist,heenvironments a mere stimulus ofthe ndividualct.9 To thepolitical cientist,t is one elementin thetotalsettingf political ower.

The presentrientationf psychology,esides,ends omakeit simply techniquef rule, f maintainingnd strengtheningpower relationships,n instrumentf manipulation f themasses ytheelite.10

The rejection f thepsychologicalpproachnvolvesn its

positive spect heviewthatpolitics and thushistory) s notsimply strugglef powergroups orpower,but an attemptto moldthe worldaccording o one's image, o impress ne'sviewupon t. Thehistoricalrocess as a meaning.Provision-ally,wemay acceptthetraditionalre-positivisticormulationthatpoliticss thestrugglef ideas s well as of force.

II. Attitudes owardPower

Consciously,runconsciously,very tudent f politics asaspecific ttitude owardpoliticalpower. It is this attitudewhichdeterminesne's approach o all problems f politicalscience. The valuativepremisesmustbe made clear so thatobjective nalysesmaybe possible. The soulsearchingf thepolitical cientistmaybe facilitatedy a classificationf thevarious ttitudes xhibitedn the history f political heory.

The classificationresented ere s onlysuggestednd is notmeant o imply hatthere reno better nd moreconvincingclassifications.

1. For Plato and Aristotle, oliticalpower s more thanaseparate unctionf theorganizedommunity. t is thecom-munity. Political ower s the totalpower f thecommunity,distinguishedrom ther elationshipserely yitstechniques.There s, n thisview,no distinctionetweentate ndsociety,economicsndpolitics,morals ndpolitics,eligionndpolitics,

9Harold Lasswell,The Analysis f PoliticalPower London,1948), pp. 195-237.

10Thesetrends reparticularlymarkedn thewritingsf industrial sychologistslike Elton Mayo. See ReinhardBendis and Lloyd Fisher, The Perspective f

Elton Mayo , in The Reviewof Economicsand Statistics, ol. XXXI, No. 4,

November 1949, p. 312.




culture nd politics. Man and citizen are equated. Every

activity f thecommunitynd of itscitizenss political. Onlythrough olitical ctioncan the citizen ttainhis fulfillment;onlythrough olitics oes he becomeman.

2. To this, here s radically pposedwhat shall call theAugustinian osition. Politicss evil; political ower s coercion,evil in origin nd purpose. It is unnatural thatman ruleoverman. Onlyat the endofhistory ith he advent f theKingdomof God can and will coercionbe dispensedwith.Fromthisphilosophy erivetwo radically ifferent,nd yetinherentlyelated, ttitudes: hatof total onformismnd thatof totaloppositionopolitical ower. If politicss evil,with-drawal s mandatory.Forms f governmentndobjectivesfpoliticalpowerbecome rrelevant.Salvation an be attainedthrough aith, ndthe arthlyife hould e a mere reparationfor it. Monasticisms the first onsequence.By the same

token,however, he demand for the immediate estructionof politics nd the establishmentf a Kingdom f God mayequallybe supported y theAugustinian remise. The Ana-baptistmovement asperhaps hemost trikingmanifestationof thetotalrejectionf society.

3. The radicalismf St. Augustine s, of course, imprac-tical . St. Thomas ntroduces hatmaybe calleda common-sense ttitude oward olitical ower. Power snotunnatural

sincehierarchicelationshipslready xisted mong heangels.Yet the attitude owardpoliticalpower s notunambiguouslypositive. It is notonlyhedgednby manyrestraintsutalso,in somerather nclearway, subordinatedo spiritual oweroperatingndirectlyhrough ariousevels flaw.

4. It is thisclimatewhichpreparedhewayforthe iberalattitude.Itssoleconcerns the erectionffencesround olit-

ical powerwhich s, allegedly, istrusted. ts aim is the dis-solution f power ntolegal relationships,he eliminationftheelement fpersonal ule, ndthe ubstitutionftheruleoflaw in which ll relationshipsreto become urposive-rational,that s, predictablendcalculable. In reality,fcourse,his sin largemeasuren ideology ending often nintentionally)opreventhe earch or he ocusofpolitical ower ndtorender




more ecure ts actual holders. Powercannotbe dissolvedn

law. '5. Not to be confusedwith iberalisms theEpicurean tti-

tudetoward olitics. In contrasto thePlatonic-Aristotelianconception, oliticss a separate usinessf society,learly is-tinguishednd distinguishableromall other ctivities.Butit is a completematter f indifferenceow t is organized, hoexertst, forwhat purposest is used. Any power s justified

whichmaintainshatminimumxternal rder f societywhichpermitshe ndividual o go on withhis life.6. In its psychologicalonsequences,picureanisms some-

times closelyrelatedto the anarchisticpproach. To theanarchist, oliticalpower is evil, societygood; hence it ispossible o organize societywithout olitics. As in Augus-tinism, onformismr putschismmay follow. Conformism:one shouldnot dirty ne's hands by participationn politics;

putschism:ne can establishn associativeociety t anytimethatmanwills t.

7. Marxism hareswithanarchismndAugustinismhe be-lief that politicalpower is not a naturalbut an historicalphenomenon. n contrastoanarchism,ndwithAugustinism,however,t believest to be a necessaryistoricalhenomenon,but thenecessitys limited in contrast o Augustinism) o

one historical hasethroughwhichmankindmustpassbefore

theclassless ociety a societywithout olitics)can be estab-lished. The remedy gainst olitical ower again against heanarchists) s more and highly oncentrated oliticalpower,skillfully sed to smashpoliticalpower (dictatorshipf theproletariat).TheMarxisthushasa positivepproachopolit-ical powerup to theestablishmentf a classlessociety.

8. Marxshares hispositive pproachwithRousseau. For

the latter, oliticalpower s at once comprehensivend non-existent. It is all-encompassingecause the organized om-munity as in Plato and Aristotle) mbraces ll activities f

11 Although the laws be never more than mere declarations of anterior rights,

nevertheless t is of utmost importance that all is written which can be written:

indeed, in every constitution there is always something which cannot be written

down, and which must be left in a dark and venerable cloud under pain of over-

throwing the state. Josephde Maistre, Conside'rationssur la France, ch. vi.




man,economics,ulture, eligion;nonexistentecauseof the

alleged dentity f rulers nd ruled n thegeneralwill. It ispreciselyhisdualattitudeoward olitical owerwhichmakesRobespierre'sheorynd actions nderstandable.

9. The liberaldemocrathareswiththe total democratpositive ttitude owardpoliticalpowerwhichappears ssen-tially s a rationalnstrumentobe usedfordesirednddesir-ableends. Yet thefear fthe iberal reventsimfromccept-ingthe totalpoliticizingf life ndcauseshimto insist n theseparateharacterfpolitical ower. Buttheconsistentiberaldemocrats not, nd cannotbe,solely oncerned ith he erec-tion of fencesaroundpoliticalpower. He is increasinglyconcernedwith thepotentialitiesf a rational se of politicalpower.

This (or any other) typology f the attitudes owardpolitical ower nables s to discoverontradictorytatements

often f a hypocriticalr demagogic ature nd to arrive t aconsistentpproach o the studyof the powerphenomenon.If a scholar rpolitician emands,n the samebreath,he ex-clusionof dissentersrompoliticalparticipationnd the in-violability f privateproperty romgovernmentalntrusion,we havebefore s a mixture f two attitudes: hat of Plato-Rousseau,nd thatofliberalism.

The result s not a new attitude owardpowerbut apropagandistictatement.Our typology f attitudes eadilyreveals hat t contains ontradictoryositions.It is thedutyof thecritical tudent o removeuch nconsistenciesromhisown thinking,o expose hemwhenthey ppear n thestate-ments f others,nd to become wareof thepremisesf hisown position.

III. TheSignificancefPolitical ower

Once thisself-examinations completed,he significancefpoliticalpower should be squarelyfaced. No society nrecorded istory as ever beenable to dispensewithpoliticalpower. This is as trueof liberalisms of absolutism,s trueof laissezfaire s of an interventionisttate. No greater is-service as beenrenderedopolitical cience hanthestatementthatthe iberal tatewas a weak state. It waspreciselys




strong s it neededto be in the circumstances.t acquired

substantialolonialempires,waged wars,held down internaldisorders,nd stabilizedtself ver ongperiodsftime.

But the methodsppliedbythosewhowieldpower nd thescopeof its application ary,of course. And it is preciselythisproblemhat sofmajor ignificanceor hepolitical cien-tist. Formally,hemethods angefrom he marginal aseofkillingto the marginalcase of education.'2 Three basicmethods re at the disposal f thepowergroup:persuasion,material enefits,iolence. Violences probablymost ffectiveas a short-range ethod, ut littleeffectives the principalmethod f maintainingowerover ongperiods ince t com-pellsthe group particularlyndermodern onditions) o in-tensify he methods f violence nd to extend t to largersections f the ruled. The mostefficientthat is, cheapestform) is, of course,persuasion. Yet all three,persuasion,

benefits,iolence, re alwayspresentn all forms f govern-ment.13 And it is preciselyhe mixture f the three lementswhich constitutesnothermajor problemfor the politicalscientist. shallattempt o clarify hemeaning y thefor-mulation f some ociological eneralizations.

Sociological eneralizationThe significancefpersuasionrowswith hegrowingom-

plexityof society. It is, perhaps, egitimate o considerpersuasion, s a rule, to be merelya form of violence,violence ommittedgainst hesoul as the Frenchhistorian

of Catholic England under Henry VIII formulatedt.14

Throughpersuasion,he rulers chievea markeddegreeofhabituationftheruled o that heir eactionsssumen almostautomaticharacter.The success f persuasion ill,however,

12 This is not to imply hat educations to be consideredolely s an instrument

of maintainingower;but it must lso be considereds a techniquen thestrugglefor power.

13Cf. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation , Essays n Sociology, ditedby

H. H. Gerth nd C. WrightMills (New York,1946), pp. 80-81. Specifically,ne

maynotethatthe ruling roup, venwhenrelyingmainly n physical iolence,may

owe its own cohesion o material enefitsnd persuasion.

14PierreJanelle, 'Angleterreatholique la veille du schisme Paris, 1935),

p. 185.




dependupon the scopeand duration f the propaganda nd

the skillsby whichstereotypesre produced. There s littledoubtthat persuasions a moreefficientnd cheaper xerciseof political ower han the employmentf largepolice forces,armies ndmilitias.

Sociological eneralizationThe increasingomplexityf society equires hatthe rulers

increasinglytilize arcana,secrettechniques f rule. The

struggle orpower s a realstruggleiming t the control fthestatemachine. In any struggle,owever, actical ecisionscan be effectivelyade only n secret. Secrecy,n turn, anbe preservednly by smallnumbers. It is thisveryfactthatnecessitateshe rise of oligarchieswithin mass movements.Max Weber 5 and Robert Michels6 (and probablymanyothers)have drawnattention o this phenomenon,nd MaxWeber,besides,orrectlytressedhesuperiorityf smallover

largenumbers ecauseof the significancef secrecy oranyruledesignedo bemore hantemporary.'7t is preciselyorthis eason hat heruleofthefewbecomes articularly arkedin thosemass rganizationshich,mcre hanothermovements,areessentiallyevoted o democracy:he tradeunions nd thesocialdemocraticlabor) parties. The reason s obvious. Theopponents f thesemovements re usuallynumericallyew,

but individually owerful,ubjectswhoarethus able to keeptheir trategicnd tacticaldecisionsecret. The massorgani-zation,facedwith uchopposition, ust,n turn, esort o theconstructionfforms f rulewhich lsopermitecrecy.Aristo-craticrulethusbecomes sociologicallyecessarymplementa-tion of democraticmovements.18t is,therefore,o accidentthatthe growthfoligarchies ithinmassmovements as firststudiedntheexample ftheGerman ocialDemocratic arty.

Leninmadea virtue f thisnecessity.His vanguard heory15Loc. cit.,pp. 102-103.

16PoliticalParties Glencoe, ll., 1949).

17 Wirtschaft nd Gesellschaft,ritterTeil, Typen der Herrschaft, Kapitel1, ?3.

18That it may become,not its implementation,ut its negation hould be keptin mind.




of leadershiprankly eplaces hetraditional emocraticon-

ception fsocialdemocracyyan aristocraticne.Sociological eneralization

Thehigherhe tate ftechnologicalevelopment,hegreatertheconcentrationfpolitical ower. The legalconceptionfownerships quite rrelevantor nanalysisf this henomenon.It matters otwhoownsa technical nit:an individual, cor-poration, state, nyotherorganized ociety. The socialor-

ganizationflarge echnical nitsmay, fcourse, e a cooper-ativeone. In every ocialgroupwhich s basedon struggle,however,heorganization ill, fnecessity,e hierarchic.Thelargerthe size, the morehierarchict becomes. Growinghierarchicrends ead to concentrationf powerat the top.Therelation etweenocial nd political owerwill be analyzedat a later lace.

Sociological eneralizationWith thegrowing omplexityf society nd its increasingindustrialization,he ignificancefpolitical owern the ocialprocessgrows. Concentrationf power (in theeconomy,nsociety,n culture)makesformore rigidity. A process fsocialpetrifactionets n andpreventshe systemrom chiev-inga semiautomaticalance. The equilibrium,ncedisturbed,canberestorednly hroughctive nterventionfthepolitical

power. Control f thestate henbecomesmoreprecioushanever before.19

Sociological eneralization

The sametrendalso producesa greater eparation f political

power from social power-a phenomenonthat shall concern

us later.Some or all of thesegeneralizations re subject to challenge.

They are not meant to be exhaustive,but merelypoint thedirection o a properstudyof politicalpower. That theypro-duce uneasiness s to be expected. At first ight t seemsdiffi-

cult to reconcilethem with the theoryof democracy. If by

democracy s understoodthat mixtureof diverseelements, f

19For a more detailed analysisof this phenomenonee my Behemoth:The

Structurend Practiceof NationalSocialism New York, 1942), pp. 255-361.




Locke and Rousseau, t. Augustine nd St. Thomas,which s

usually alled democraticheory, a reconciliationf thoserealistic rendswiththe doctrines, indeed, mpossible.Wearenotnowconcerned ith heproblem fdemocraticheory.For the presentt sufficeso say thatan adequatedemocratictheorywill haveto deal with hese roblems.

IV. Rootsof Political ower

Threequestions ave to be faced n the analysis fthe roots

of political ower:the conceptual rameworkas to be estab-lished; he nstitutionalettingo beclarified;nd thehistoricalprocesso be understood hich eadsto a changen institutionsand differentttitudesoward ower nd to a differentoliticalbehavior. For the ancienthistorians,hiswas no problem.Politicalpowerderived quarelyfromeconomicpower,par-ticularlyrom he control fland. Changesnownership,he

emergencef newmodes fproduction,nd soon,created ewsourcesfpolitical ower nd thusmadefor onflicts.Modernhistoriansealingwith hisperiod f history ave not hesitatedto restateheproblemn the amewayasthe ncientstatedt.20

As we shall directlyhow,modern apitalist conomyhasrenderedhiswholesubjectproblematical.And, despite hefactthattheissue s so crucial, nalysis as been hindered ysenselessaboos. The older nsights ave beenlostor hidden

andarerarely rought ully ntotheopen. Thus,theclassicalapproachhas beenrestatedn modern imesbyMarx's nter-pretationfhistorythatthisdidnotoriginate ithhim-andis not Marxist -he himself dmitted). Yet since it isfashionableo rejectMarxismoot ndbranch-sight nseen oto speak-the student recludes imself rom clearunder-standingof the relationshipetweeneconomicpower andpolitical ower.

The approach s facilitatedy theestablishmentf certaincategoriesfrelationships.

1. The ancient onception.Here-and thisfollows lreadyfromwhathasbeen aid-although he ource fpolitical ower

20 Modelsare: GustaveGlotz,The GreekCity (New York, 1929) and Ancient

Greece t Work (New York,1926); RonaldSyme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford,

1939); and, of course, Rostovzeff'sworks.




is economic ower, olitical owerpermeatesll social ctivities

and all spheresf life. The economic owerpositionmerelyprovideshemotor f political owerwhichthen ncludes llpower elationships.

2. The feudal onception. n the deal-typicalorm, olit-ical powerdoes not exist. It is merely function f aneconomic owerposition: heownershipf land. From tflowjudicial,military,eligious,egislativendadministrativeowers.

3. The capitalistonception. t is only n thisperiod hata

realproblemrises: he ndependencefpolitical ower ndyetits nterconnectionith conomic ower. Political ower thetheoreticalonstructionas beenperfected y Hobbes) is aseparatectivity,arried utin a separatenstitution:hestate.The statehas themonopoly f coercive owerwhich t exer-cises n a separatenstitutionalramework.At thesametime,however,his eparatenstitutions intrinsicallyonnected ith

societynthe ervice f whichtoperates. It isthis onceptionof politicalpowerthatunitesLocke and Hobbes,and distin-guishesboth fromRousseau. Both separatepoliticalpowerfromsocialpower; both connect hem. Hobbes believes tnecessaryo maximize olitical ower n order o serve ociety;Lockemaintainshatonlyby its minimizationan society eserved. Both,however, dmitof exceptions. In Hobbes'stheory,olitical owerwillbe destroyedf it failsto serve ts

socialfunctionthesocialcontractapses); Locke,throughheinstitutionftheprerogativend federativeower,maximizespolitical ower f it is necessaryor thegoodof thecommon-wealth. What Hobbesand Lockedidnotclearly tate s thatthe two are not onlyfunctionallyut geneticallyonnected;thatis, economic ower s the rootof politicalpower. Thefirst ystematicnalysisof this relationshiptemsfromSt.

Simon'sanalysisf the FrenchRevolution nd thenspreads

rapidlyntoFrench ndEnglish istoriographyndsociology.Fromthisgeneral iewofHobbesand Lockeit followshat

whatever reedomociety,nd particularlyconomic ctivity,is to have, t has forthesakeof maintaining stablepoliticalorder. There is thusno pure economicpower and nopure political ctivity.Economicss as much n instrument




of politicsas politics s a tool of economics. The mythological

conceptionof the aissez-fairetateought finally o be destroyed.If this general view is accepted,the translation f economic

powerinto social powerand thence nto politicalpower becomesthe crucial concernof the politicalscientist.

ThePolitical artyThe single most important nstrumentfor the translation

of social power into political power is the politicalparty. The

reason for the supremeposition of the party lies in the verynature of democracy. The party permits the presentation fparticularand, quite frequently, ery egoisticinterests s na-tional interests. At the same time, however, t prevents thetotal dominationof national interestsby particular interests.The functionof thepolitical party n democracy s thus ambig-uous. The democraticprocess compels each social group tostriveformass support. Each group, therefore,must present

its egoistic nterests s universal. Politics in a democracy, hestruggleforpoliticalpower,thus becomesfar more ideologicalthan in any previousperiodin history. What was obvious forthe ancients, nd clear to the feudalsystem, ecomes hiddeninthe democraticprocess. But the valuable side of this processmust equally not be forgotten. The very need to appeal tosocial groups larger than the immediate interest group

compels adjustment f various nterests. Politicsbecomesmoredemocratic.2'

Private roperty

Social power, n turn,either s derivedfromprivate propertyor is against it. The legal meaningof privatepropertycom-prisestwo radically different onceptions: power over an ex-ternalpiece of nature (or an absoluteright) and power over

othermen derivedfrompower over nature.22 It is only thesecond meaning of private propertywith which the politicalscientists concerned:withproprietorshipn themeans of pro-

21 It is thisfact thatMarxists suallyoverlook.

22 The mostsignificantnalysis:Karl Renner,The Institutionsf PrivateLaw

and TheirSocialFunctions,irst ublishedn Germany,911, ed. by0. Kahn-Freund

(London,1949).




duction. This typeof property ives power-power in the

labormarket, n the commoditymarket,nd in thepoliticalmarket f thestate.

The threepowerfunctions f propertyre usually (andparticularlyn Europewherepolitical nd social ifeis morepetrifiedhanin theUnitedStates) institutionalizedn threetypesof organization: or the labormarket, he employer'sassociation; or the commoditymarket, he cartel; for thepoliticalmarket,heterritorialorm f the chambersf com-merce ndthefunctionalorm fthetrade ssociations.

As against roperty,hetradeunions in Europe) attemptto organize he abormarketsnd thepoliticalmarkets y thecollective owerof organizedabor, ometimesn one organi-zation,sometimesn several. Consumers'nd producers' o-operatives,owever,ffectnly slightlyhe powerof propertyin thecommoditymarket.

Studies f these rganizationsnd the devices ywhich heirpower s translatedntopolitical ower revitalto thepoliticalscientist. 3 arge numbers f individual tudiesof pressuregroups xist,but a really ophisticated,omparativenalysissstill acking. The translationf these conomic ower ositionsdiffersrom ountry o countrynd fromhistoricalituationtohistoricalituation. The relativetrengthf thecompetingeconomic roupss farmoremportantor he nalysisfpolit-

ical powerthanthestudyof thepoliticalnstitutionsroper.Thereare countries like Germanynd England) wheretheagents ndmanagersf theeconomic rganizationsnter ar-liamentsdirectly; hereare others like the UnitedStates)where he nfluences more ndirect.There re countrieslikeGermanyndEngland)where radeunions repolitical swellas industrialodies; here reotherslikeFrance nd theUnited

Statesin certain ituations)wherethey apparentlybstainfrompolitics.The devices ndforms or hetranslationf economic ower

intopoliticalpowerthusvaryconsiderablynd yetpatternsare discernible hichoughtto be moresharply efined n a

23 R. A. Brady, Business as a System of Power (New York, 1943), is a first

attempt, but a rather crude and mechanistic one. TNEC Monograph No. 26,

Economic Power and Political Pressures, hould be mentionedhere.




comparativeasis. A highdegree f knowledgef problemsf

socialstratificationnd economic rganiza-tions thus indis-pensable orthepolitical cientist.

TheAscendancef Politicsnd ofBureaucracies

The classicalrelationship etweeneconomics nd politicschanges. It now appears s if politicalpowerhas beguntoemancipatetselffrom ts economic ootsand, indeed, endsto becomea base for the acquisition f economicpower.

In general, ureaucratizations believed o be the manifesta-tion of thattrendwhich ulminatesn doctrinesfmanagerialrule:private ndpublicmanagersliminatingropertywnersand parliaments.The trend oward ureaucratizationasun-questionablywo roots: the transformationf parliamentarydemocracyntomassdemocracy;nd thetransitionf a pre-dominantlyompetitiveconomyntoa predominantlyrgan-ized economy. While these trends re knownand progressunderour veryeyes,theydo not necessarilynvolvean as-sumptionfpolitical owerbybureaucracies.The growth fthescopeand number f bureaucratictructures aymerelyindicate hatthesocialgroupswhichrule now needmore ndmore ureaucraciesn order o copewith he xercise,f politicalpower. But theequationof a largernumber f bureaucratswith ncrease f theirpower s due to the inability or un-

willingness)o distinguishharplyhreedifferentroblemsn-volved n what s called bureaucratization ;amely, ureau-craticbehavior,ureaucratictructure,ndbureaucraticower.

Bureaucratic ehavior roughly quatedhere withroutineperformances against nitiativer creative erformance)s,of course,preading.No sphere f activitys exempted romit. Whethert is beneficialrnot shallnotbe discussed ere.We shouldmerely ememberhe tremendousxtent o which

our comforts ependon routine erformances.Moreover,tis untruethat the decisions f the bureaucratspublic orprivate)are exclusivelyoutine ecisions.Many, ndeed, recreativenes,notderived rom recedentrstandingules, uthighly iscretionarynd thus ssentiallyawmakingn charac-ter. Finally,bureaucratic rganization,hat is, hierarchieswhere ommandsre channeled rom boveto belowand re-




sponsibilityoesfrom elow oabove, snotconfinedopublic

life. The facts reobvious.Thoughthegrowth f bureaucraticehavior,withthein-crease n thenumber f bureaucratictructures,s a continu-ous process,t doesnot therebyollow hatpower private rpublic) has shiftedo thebureaucracies.No abstract nswercan be given;onlyempiricalnvestigationsan revealwhethershiftsn powerhavetakenplace. Such nvestigationsre,un-fortunately,are.

The SovietUnion presents clear-cutmarginal asewherepolitical ower otonlyhasmade tselfupremeuthasbecomethefountof whateverconomic owerpositionsxist. NaziGermany,n theotherhand,exhibited transitionalase. Itisundisputedhat heNazi party ose opowerwith hefinan-cial andpolitical ssistancefGerman ig-businesseaderswhodoubtless opedto use thepartyforthepromotionf their

own interests.But the party,once havingachievedpower,emancipatedtself rom usinessontrol,nditspolitical owerbecameautonomous. The partythenwentfurthernd at-temptedo create conomic owerpositionsor tself. Clearlythenewpolitical owerwas seekingo give tself n economicpowerbase. This, indeed, s the significancef theGoeringcombine,heexpandingnterprisesf theLaborFront ndtheS.S., and the acquisitions esulting romAryanizationnd

Germanization.The war,whichmade t inadvisableo carryout sweepingnstitutionalhanges, nterruptedhe process.But it is quitesafeto assume hat,had therebeenno warorhad theNazis beenvictorious,heSovietpatternwouldhave

prevailed.The reactionso the ascendantoleof political ower re, s

a rule,hostile. Most notable s the attempt o ascribe his

phenomenono democracy.Thisis,of course, ssentiallyor-

rect. For, as we have indicated, he attitude f democracytowardpoliticalpower s undoubtedlyositive. Yet more smeantby thatstatement hichbyno means s a mere cien-tificone but has definite oliticalundertonesnd overtones.It is implied hatthegrowing olitical owerwill,byits nner

dynamics,e abusedandwill ultimatelyead to a totalitariansystem. In this,modern riticism esumes he traditionalist




critique not of political powerbut of democracy. Maistreand

Bonald are resurrected. Proceedingfromthe shaky psychologyof the essential vilness f man, they assert he inevitabletrans-formation f democracy ntomob rule, which, n conjunctionwith themoderntrend of state nterventionism, ust culminatein totalitarianism. The remedyis some kind of aristocraticrule. A second reaction believesbureaucracy o be inimicaltoliberty and attempts to protect democracy by identifying twith individual libertyagainst the state.

Both reactionsbase themselves n what theycall the traditionof Westerncivilization, hekernelof which is allegedlyhostilityto political power as expressed n constitutionalism. This isonly a partial truth and, therefore, alse. The traditionofWestern civilization s more complex. Its richnesswas hintedat when we attempted o classifythe various attitudestowardpolitical power. Certainly,one may say thatRousseauisrms a

more important lement n thepoliticaltraditionof democracythan the essentially elf-contradictorynd arbitrarydoctrinesof Locke andof the natural law. Thatpolitical power (whetherdemocratic, ristocratic, r monarchic) can be abused is beyonddoubt; but it is doubtful that abusescan be effectivelyheckedby constitutionalism.24The problemof moderndemocracy smuch less the fencingof politicalpower than its rationalutili-zation and provision for effectivemass participation in its

exercise.

V. IdentificationfPolitical ower

In the Soviet Union, there is little doubt where politicalpower resides. In Nazi Germany, after June 1934, it wasequally -clear that the monopolistic party concentrated allpolitical power. In a liberaldemocracy (and in constitutional

systemsgenerally) the identification f political power is ex-tremelydifficult. Our contention hat political power has itsroots in economic power can merely provide a frame withinwhichthe analyseshave to be made; forwe deliberatelytated:

Social power .. is derivedfromprivate property r is againstit. Since the distribution f the for and against varies,

24 Edward S. Corwin, Liberty against Government (Baton Rouge, 1948).




the empirical ociologicalnalyses f this nterrelationshipre

thecrucial oncern f thepolitical cientist.Constitutionalaw helps but little. The formof govern-mentmay or may nottruly xpress he distributionf power.The doctrine f separate owersmayor maynot express hefact that social forces re as balanced s are thepolitical n-stitutions. As a rule, they are not.25 Constitutionalawmerely upplies he framefor the exercise f politicalpowerbut doesnot ndicatetsholder r ts functions.All traditionallegal conceptionsre negative nes. They limit ctivities utdo not shapethem. It is thisverycharacter f law whichgrants o the citizen minimum f protection.This appliesspecificallyo the conceptionf external overeignty, termwhichwe have so faravoided. It doesnot indicate heownerofsovereignowernor theuse to which hispowermayorcanbeput; itmerely elimitshepower f one territorialnitfrom

any other. The conceptionfpropertysfashionednexactlythe ameway. It doesnotreveal heobject fpropertyor tssocial function; t merely rotectsman's control f an ex-ternalpiece of nature. Constitutionalaw, secondly,ndicatestheformnwhich olitical owermaybe legitimatelyxercised.While he ignificancefboth spects f constitutionalawmaynotbeunderestimated,mpiricalociologicaltudies f the ocusofpolitical ower re ndispensable.

Thereare, however,ituations hichmayreveal n a flash,so tospeak,where olitical ower esides. There reemergencysituations uch as stagesof siege,martial aw, and so on. It isfor thisreasonthat Carl Schmitt, he famousNazi constitutionallawyer, stated in his pre-Nazi period: Sovereignis he whodecides the emergency ituation. 6 While not acceptingtheimplicationsf Schmitt's octrine f sovereignty,t is clear

that the study of such emergency ituationswill yieldvaluablehints as to wherepoliticalpower actually resides n normalperiods. Such a marginalsituation existed in Nazi Germanyon June 30, 1934. Up to thatdate, t could be verydoubtfulwhetherpolitical power restedwith the partyalone, or with a

25 See my Introductiono Montesquieu, he Spirit f the Laws (New York,1949).

26 Carl Schmitt, Politische heologie Leipzig, 1934), p. 11.




combinationfparty, rmy, usiness,nd so on. The liquida-

tionof theRohmgroup, f thegenerals,nd of othersmade t,however, bundantly lear that the party had succeeded nmonopolizing olitical ower.

Such studieshave been neglected. They are carried utmostlyn terms f constitutionalaw,but rarelyn political-sociological ategories.

VI. Political ower ndFreedom

I stressednitiallyhatpolitical ower s neither omparableto theconcept f energyn physics orthe sole conceptionfpolitical cience. Yet theoriginal ormulation,owervs. idea,is too ideological. If historywerea conflict etween owergroups ndideas, deas wouldbe invariably efeated. Politicsis certainly he conflict etween owergroups, nd the con-flictsmaybe resolvedy victorynd defeat r by conciliation,that

s, compromise.But one

groupmay,n its

struggle orpower, epresent ore hana particularnterest;tmay ndeedrepresenthe deaof freedom,he deacrucial o politicalheory.If,for xample, ou analyze mmigrationegislationnd come othe onclusionhatbusinessroups ressuredor ts iberalizationin order o secure heaperaborpower,youhaveindeeddonepartofyour ask spolitical cientists,utonlypartofit. Ofequal importances the analysis f the role of immigration

legislationn thehistorical evelopmentf theUnitedStates.The task of political heorys thusthedeterminationf thedegree o which powergroup ranscendstsparticularnter-est and advocatesin Hegelian erms)universalnterests.

This determinations by no means asy. In fact,the dis-tinction between deologyand truth becomes ncreasinglydifficult. omeof thedifficultyies n the deologicalharacterof politicsn a democracy discussed bove), but, n the lastresort,tresults rom hetremendouseight fpower n whatis calledpublic opinion. Everypolitical ystemmpresseshemores f therulinggroupuponthepopulation. The greaterthetensions,he more tringenthe mpositionsecome. Theindividualhenresortsomanyforms fdissimulation;nd, ncertain eriods fhistory,t is the iar whobecomes hehero.27

27 This is very trikingn Stendhal's ovels.




The lie (in its many forms)becomes he protection f the

individual gainsta universalizedystem f propaganda. Itis for hisreason hat amskepticalfthevalue of thevarioushighlydeveloped echniques f measuring ttitudes, articu-larly ttitudes hichmay challenge he basic foundation f acontemporaryociety. GeorgeOrwell,n hisotherwiserilliantperformance,948, overlookshe factthatcompulsion per-ates wherever olitical ower xists.

This realizationwas strikingly ormulatedby one ofAmerica'smost nterestinghilosophers,harlesS. Peirce, nhisarticle. The Fixation fBelief .

The methodfauthorityillalways overnhemass fman-kind; nd thosewhowield hevariousormsf organizedorcein thestatewill never e convincedhatdangerouseasoningought otto be suppressedn someway. If libertyfspeechis to be untrammelledromhegrosserormsfconstraint,hen

uniformityf opinion illbe securedya moral errorismowhich herespectabilityf society illgive ts thoroughp-proval. Followinghemethodfauthoritys thepath fpeace.Certain on-conformitiesre permitted;ertain therscon-sidered nsafe) re forbidden. hese redifferentn differentcountriesnd n differentges;but,whereverou re, et t beknownhatyou eriouslyold tabooedelief,ndyoumaybeperfectlyure fbeingreatedith crueltyess rutalutmore

refinedhanhunting ou ike wolf. Thus, hegreatestntel-lectual enefactorsfmankindavenever ared,nddarenotnow, o utter hewhole f theirhoughts;nd thus shade fprima aciedoubt s castupon very ropositionhichs con-sideredssentialo thesecurityf society.Singularlynough,thepersecutionoesnot ll come rom ithout;ut man or-ments imselfnd s oftentimesost istressedt findingim-self elievingropositionshich ehasbeen roughtptoregard

with version. hepeacefulnd ympatheticanwill, herefore,find t hard o resisthetemptationo submit is opinionsoauthority.28

FRANZ L. NEUMANN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

28 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Fixation of Belief , in The Philosophy fPeirce, dited by JustusBuchler New York, 1940), p. 20. The articlewas firstpublishedn the PopularScienceMonthly, 877.

Approches to the Study of Political Power.

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