Approaching Counter Terrorism: The Global War on Terror and the Problem of MetricsMichael StohlDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of California, Santa BarbaraMarch 2007

Determining the metrics of successToday, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?Donald Rumsfeld October 16, 2003

NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes

We have significantly degraded the al-Qaida network. Most of those in the al-Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s mastermind Khalid ShaykhMuhammad, have been captured or killed. We also have killed other key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group’s operational commander in Iraq who led a campaignof terror that took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis

State Department Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005April 2006

In 2005, we saw indications of:An increasing AQ emphasis on ideological and propaganda activity to help advance its cause. This led to cooperation with al-Qaida in Iraq, the organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and with AQ affiliates around the globe, as well as with a new generation of Sunni extremists;The proliferation of smaller, looser terrorist networks that are less capable but also less predictable;

An increased capacity for acts of terror by local terrorists with foreign ties (demonstrated in the July 7 London bombings);An increase in suicide bombings. The July 7 London bombing was the first such a ttack in Europe (three of the four terrorists were second-generation British citizensof South Asian descent); we also noted a marked increase in suicide bombings in Afghanistan;The growth of strategically significant networks that support the flow of foreign terrorists to Iraq.

Starting pointsTerrorism is the purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat.

CounterterrorismAt home, counterterrorism policy and actions must respond to the acts or the threats of the act of violence, reduce the risk of future acts, reduce fear in the audience of the risk of future acts and maintain the support and trust of the home audience.

Counterterrorism abroadAbroad, counterterrorism policy and actions must respond to the acts or the threats of the act of violence, reduce the risk of future acts, reduce fear in the audience of the risk of future acts and maintain the support and trust of that audience.

Success in CounterterrorismThe Bush Administration Approach

Bush AdministrationMost popular approach

Body counts, scorecards, events and risksAnnounce the counterterrorism measures taken

Security: AttacksAt home

Since 9/11 no further attacks on U.S. soil

Body Counts and Scorecards

2/3rds of the al Qaeda leadership has been captured3400 arrested$200 million in assets frozenBases in Afghanistan destroyed.

NSCT, September 5, 2006Most of those in the al-Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We also have killed other key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group’s operational commander in Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis.

Disruption and Riskliberty.gov disrupted 150 terrorist plots around the world and at Bush at the National Endowment for Democracy October 2005, ten plots disrupted. Cole (2006) argues that this number is very much in dispute.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 5, 2006

to win the War on Terror, we will:• Prevent attacks by terrorist networks;• Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states

and terrorist allies who seek to use them;• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue

states;• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use

as a base and launching pad for terror; and• Lay the foundations and build the institutions and

structures we need to carry the fight forwardagainst terror and help ensure our ultimate success.

• Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism;

NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes

• There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause.

• Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.

• We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center.

Some alternatives to considerWe are fighting this war on three distinct fronts: the home front, the operational front and the strategic-political front. John Lehman, August 31, 2006

Byman (2003)five “genuine measures of success” by which to evaluate counterterrorist operations:

the freedom terrorists have to operate (their secure geographic zone), a high level of domestic support for counterterrorist operations, the disruption of the adversary’s command and control structure, terrorist recruitment, terrorist attacks.

Morag (2005 :319-310)seven parameters, three categories

human life (reduction in civilian casualties among both Israelis and Palestinians), economic resources (minimization of the negative economic impact on Israel), Political resources (Israeli social cohesion, international and domestic support for the Israeli government, and the extent of weakening of international and domestic support for the Palestinian leadership).

Raphael Perl (2005:11)Measuring trends. 1. Terrorist infrastructure.

Is their leadership being weakened; is their recruitment base,network, or target list growing?

2. Terrorist tactical and strategic goals 3. Capabilities

What are the capabilities of a terrorist group to inflict serious damage? Are they increasing or decreasing?

Peter Probst (2005)Statistical analysis as used by the government to assess terrorism and counterterrorism efforts remains primitive and, too often, dangerously misleading. We measure what can easily be quantified rather than what is truly meaningful. We strive to capture extremely complex phenomena in a simple sound bite, reinforced by seemingly compelling but simplistic statistical comparisons and then wonder why our instant analysis has failed to comport with reality, leaving us embarrassed and scratching our heads. Numbers, as we use them, provide a false sense of objectivity, accuracy and precision, too often leaving the decision makers frustrated and angry. And, too often, leaving the public with the feeling that somehow they have been conned.

How should we approach the establishment of metrics

Theoretically and conceptually basedTied to the concepts that are most meaningful for understanding terrorism and counter terrorismUnderstand the purpose of the metrics

How should we approach the establishment of metrics

Importance of Validity and Reliability of measures

Construct validityConvergent and discriminant validityInternal and External ReliabilityMultiple measures

Key considerationsSecurityThe OpponentThe Counterterrorist OrganizationAudience(s)FearTrust

For each of the concepts we need not only define but operationalize and measure over time

Understanding the components of Terrorism Component Operationalization Violence Number of attacks and trends and

deviations from trend Nature of the attacks- lethality, targets, geographic dispersion, deviations and trends in types of targets, lethality, and geographic dispersion

Targets 1. Victim Demography, Lethality, injury, damage 2. Audience Who is/are the audience(s) for the act, how

attentive are they? Fear How “fearful” are the audience of the next

attack.

Understanding the components of Counterterrorism Component Operationalization Violence Number of attacks and trends and

deviations from trend Nature of the attacks- lethality, types of targets, geographic dispersion, deviations and trends in types of targets, lethality, and geographic dispersion

Victim Number of attacks and trends and deviations from trend Nature of the attacks- demography, lethality, types of targets, geographic dispersion and deviations and trends in types of targets, lethality, and geographic dispersion

Audience Who is the audience for the act, how attentive are they?

Fear Estimated risk of future attack- geographic dispersion, deviations and trends

Trust How confident is/are the audience(s) of the security measures and the capacity of the counterterrorism organization and policies? Do they approve of the methods of the organization? Do they approve of the members of the organization?

Body Counts and ScorecardsIncrease or decrease of terrorist attacksIncrease or decrease of risk of future attacksIncrease or decrease in terrorists, terrorist groups, range of operation, safe havens, state supportIncrease or decrease in the capacity of the organization (s), and networkIncrease or decrease in supporters, sympathizers, acquiescers Or a simple scorecard http://www.angelfire.com/ultra/terroristscorecard/index.html

Rand/ MIPT DataInternational Deaths by Region

Rand/ MIPT DataDeaths by Region, domestic

International terrorism 2001-2005

Incidents up in the Middle East and either flat or down almost everywhere elseDeaths up in the Middle East and Europe pretty flat everywhere else

Domestic terrorism2001-2005

up in the middle eastup in Russia and ChechnyaSouth America :Colombia accounts for 90% of the deaths since 2001Eastern Europe :Russia and Chechnya account for 96% of deaths since 2001 Africa Uganda accounts for 56% of the deaths in Sub Saharan Africa, Darfur, Congo, etc. don’t show up

More or less terrorism?where?National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC http://www.tkb.org/NCTC/Home.jsp), In 2004 there were more than three times as many incidents (651/208) and three times as many persons killed (1907/625) in what they define as significant international terrorism than in 2003Data impossible to assess for 2005 because of change in reporting

More or less terrorism when?Interrupted Time Series

Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT 09/12/1997 - 09/10/2001 

Region Incidents Injuries Fatalities Africa 212 6638 1560 East & Central Asia 36 100 83 Eastern Europe 480 1425 593 Latin America & the Caribbean 636 569 563 Middle East / Persian Gulf 1183 1722 519 North America 43 16 4 South Asia 432 3776 1361 Southeast Asia & Oceania 203 1203 215 Western Europe 1490 460 118 Total 4715 15,909 5016

Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT09/12/2001 - 09/10/2005 

Region Incidents Injuries Fatalities Africa 124 828 711 East & Central Asia 53 61 56 Eastern Europe 626 3352 1232 Latin America & the Caribbean 865 1594 818 Middle East / Persian Gulf 4468 16437 7637 North America 58 49 8 South Asia 2779 8581 3456 Southeast Asia & Oceania 264 2102 751 Western Europe 1322 1261 281 Total 10,559 34,205 14950

do these metrics help us know if:There is a greater or lesser chance of a terrorist attack today in the United States than there was when the baseline point was established?There is a greater or lesser chance of a terrorist attack against American targets abroad than there was at the baseline point?George Tenet’s testimony to the Intelligence committees in February 2004

“Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 9/11 remain within Al Qaeda’s reach.”

Capacity of the OpponentCapability

Size, structure, support, sympathyGeographical scope and rangeTactical and strategic

The OpponentOur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.

George W. Bush September 20, 2001

The Network of Terror: Implications

To study terrorist networks we need to know:

1. What is a network?2. Who is in the network? What are its

boundaries? 3. What relations are encompassed in the

network? How are nodes connected? 4. What are the relevant structural properties? 5. What types of ties are there?6. How are networks embedded within society?7. What network processes are associated with

structure? Stohl and Stohl (2007, forthcoming)

Size and Structure of Al QaedaEstimates of the number of persons who passed through the Al Qaeda training camps have ranged as high as 25,000-30,000 dispersed to cells in more than sixty countries. There is no easy way to determine the size of Al-Qaeda, the number and scale of its affiliates and proxies; or who its donors, active supporters and potential sympathizers are. Local governments often do not know, deliberately conceal, or may at times exaggerate the Al-Qaeda presence in their countries. Trends? -if we don’t know the baseline it is difficult to determine if Al Qaeda or the Global Network of Terror is larger of smaller since a particular point in time.

Size and Structure of Al QaedaIn the aftermath of the Afghanistan war the incentive to demonstrate success led to more conservative descriptions of organizational size, connections and possibilities. For example in June 2002, Johnson, Van Natta and Miller (2002) of the New York Times reported, “that senior officials suggest that although sworn members of Al Qaeda were estimated to number no more than 200 to 300 men, officials say that at its peak this broader Qaeda network operated about a dozen Afghan camps that trained as many as 5000 militants, who in turn created cells in as many as 60 countries.”

Status of Al Qaeda Jenkins (in Fallows) “The Taliban were dispersed, and al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan were dismantled.” Al-Qaeda operatives by the thousands have been arrested, detained, or killed. So have many members of the crucial al-Qaeda leadership circle around bin Laden and his chief strategist, Ayman al-Zawahiri. it has become harder for the remaining al-Qaeda leaders to carry out the organization’s most basic functions: “Because of increased intelligence efforts by the United States and its allies, transactions of any type—communications, travel, money transfers—have become more dangerous for the jihadists. Training and operations have been decentralized, raising the risk of fragmentation and loss of unity. Jihadists everywhere face the threat of capture or martyrdom.”

Status of Al QaedaTheir command structure is gone, their Afghan sanctuary is gone, their ability to move around and hold meetings is gone, their financial and communications networks have been hit hard,” Seth Stodder, a former official in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Status of Al Qaeda“ The al-Qaeda that existed in 2001 simply no longer exists. In 2001 it was a relatively centralized organization, with a planning hub, a propaganda hub, a leadership team, all within a narrow geographic area. All that is gone, because we destroyed it.” Where bin Laden’s central leadership team could once wire money around the world using normal bank networks, it now must rely on couriers with vests full of cash. Kilcullen in Fallows

Status of Al QaedaThe essence of the change is this: because of al-Qaeda’s own mistakes, and because of the things the United States and its allies have done right, al-Qaeda’s ability to inflict direct damage in America or on Americans has been sharply reduced.

Fallows, September 2006How does he know this?Does the preceding tell us this?

The Counterterror OrganizationBuilding Support Amongst Diverse Audiences

Capacities of the CounterTerrorist Organization (and organizational network)Core membershipMembers, geographic dispersion, deviations and trends

Support structures, resources, geographic dispersion, deviations and trends

Zone of operations, geographic dispersion, deviations and trends

Size of counterterrorism coalitionNous sommes tous Américains Le Monde, September 12, 2001

Size of counterterrorism coalitionWhat do these numbers signify?

The members of NATO and the Rio Pact invoked these treaties’ mutual defense clauses for the first time. Subsequently, sixteen of the 19 NATO members engaged in the Afghan theater. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 requiring all UN members to freeze terrorist financing, improve border security, clamp down on the recruitment of terrorists, share information, and deny terrorists any support or safe haven. In September and October of 2001 there was clear international community support for the United States and for a collective response to the problem of terrorism. A total of 136 countries offered a range of military assistance to the United States, including over flight and landing rights and accommodations for U.S. forces.

Size of counterterrorism coalitionThe initial cooperation led to “an aggressive international law enforcement effort [which] had resulted in detention of approximately 3,000 terrorists and their supporters in more than 100 countries and in the freezing of $124 million in assets in some 600 bank accounts around the world, including $36 million in the United States alone.

If these numbers decline … what is this evidence for?

Perceptions of Fear and Security

Hoffman, 2006The tragic loss of innocent life in any attack linked to al Qaeda is calculated by its masterminds to rekindle worldwide the same profound fears and anxieties that the attacks on 9/11 ignited. Al Qaeda’s stature and reception in parts of the world today is a product of the extraordinary success achieved and attention generated by the attacks that day.

Metrics of Counterterrorism

Thus metrics are needed to evaluate if different publics feel more or less secure, have a more or less favorable attitude towards their governments, and have a more or less favorable or unfavorable attitude towards the terrorists or the countries allied against them and so on.

"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. government to protect its citizens from future terrorist attacks: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?" .

A Great Deal A Fair

Amount Not Very

Much None at All Unsure % % % % % 3/9-12/06 17 43 28 10 2 1/5-8/06 21 48 23 6 2 10/3-5/05 16 47 30 7 0 9/6-7/05 19 40 30 10 1 8/29-31/05 18 54 21 5 2 9/02 20 56 18 4 2 7/02 21 53 22 3 1 6/02 16 54 24 5 1 1/5-6/02 23 58 16 2 1 12/7-10/01 17 60 18 4 1 11/13-14/01 22 52 20 4 2 10/25-28/01 18 58 20 4 0 10/8/01 30 55 12 1 2 9/20-23/01 35 53 10 1 1

Attitude towards government

http://cagle.slate.msn.com/caglecards/main.asp?image=/news/IraqPrisonPhotos/prisongifs/best/crowe.jpg

Perceptions of Fear and Security

Perceptions of Fear and Security

U.S. PRESIDENT / NATIONAL ELECTION / EXIT POLL 2004

Defined the most important issue in the election as:

Voted for Bush Voted for Kerry

Iraq (15% of voters) 26 73 Terrorism (19%voters) 86 14

Do you feel we are: Voted for Bush Voted for Kerry Safer From Terrorism (54%)

79 20

Less Safe (41%)

14 85

Measuring the support of publics in friendly (and unfriendly) states

Global Audiences and Global Messages

Multiple message sources

http://cagle.slate.msn.com/caglecards/main.asp?image=/news/IraqPrisonPhotos/prisongifs/best/sack.jpg

Lessons from the Battle of Algiers

As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon screening declared: ''How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film.'‘NYTimes September 7, 2003

“ Will this operation produce more bad guys than it takes off the street by the way it is conducted”Major General David Patreus*, Commanding General 101st Airborne Division, Summer 2003(Quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, Penguin 2006, p. 231)Currently, Lt. General and Commanding General American Forces in Iraq

South China Morning Post March 7,2007

Trigger-happy West risks fostering Taliban or worse

The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other:Europe's Muslims More Moderate ( Pew released: 06.22.06)

Mickolus, Measures for determining support for terrorists by governments

1. permitting safe havens or bases,2. permitting training on local soil.3. general training by the government 4. making large monetary contributions5. provisioning arms6. providing nonlethal operational assistance7. providing direct financing and training for specific operations.8. providing weapons for specific operations.9. adding to terrorist demands during an incident.10. making payment of insurance/bonuses to terrorists after the fact.

The Audience (Public) Support – Opposition Continuum

Active supportPassive supportAcquiescencePassive oppositionActive opposition

Goal- move your audience towards active opposition to the terrorists, hope to obtain acquiescence or passive oppostion

Backlash and BurnoutIncreasing the difficulty of terrorist operations within the communities they purport to representIncreasing the incentives for terrorists to disengage and move activities to the non-violent/ political realm

Support within the Muslim Community (Pew, Summer 06)

Support within the Muslim Community (Pew, Summer 2006)

Larger Strategic Implictionsthree kinds of American reaction—the war in Iraq, the economic consequences of willy-nilly spending on security, and the erosion of America’s moral authority—were responsible for such strength as al-Qaeda now maintained. David Kilcullen in Fallows, September 2006

George W. Bush July 11, 2005 FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia

We're fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan and across the world so we do not have to face them here at home.

Counterterrorism consequencesThe final destructive response helping al-Qaeda has been America’s estrangement from its allies and diminution of its traditionally vast “soft power.” “America’s cause is doomed unless it regains the moral high ground,” Sir Richard Dearlove, the former director of Britain’s secret intelligence agency, MI-6, told me

Consequences of the Counterterrorist Strategy

The jihadist regime in Iran feels no reservation about flaunting its policy to go nuclear, and it unleashed Hezbollah, its client terrorist organization, to attack Israel. In Somalia a jihadist group has seized control of the government. In Pakistan, Islamists are becoming more powerful, and attacks within India are increasing. Governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Algeria and Jordan are under increasing Islamist pressure. In the Pacific, North Korea now feels free to rattle its missile sabers, firing seven on America's Independence Day. China is rapidly building its 600-ship navy to fill the military vacuum that we are creating in the Pacific as our fleet shrinks well below critical mass. Not one of these states believes that we can undertake any credible additional military operations while we are bogged down in Iraq. John Lehman, August 2006

Successful Counterterrorism: Concepts and Measures Required

1. Reduce attacks 2. Reduce the risk of further attack3. Reduce fear4. Increase the confidence of the audience(s) of the act or

threat that they will be protected and the recognition that the multiple audiences must be considered.

5. Decrease the support for the violence by the supporters, sympathizers and potential supporters of the act or threat.

6. Decrease acquiescence of the audience(s)7. Reduce the recruitment of new terrorists8. Increase backlash against the terrorists9. Increase burnout of the terrorists

Thank you

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 5, 2006

to win the War on Terror, we will:• Prevent attacks by terrorist networks;• Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states

and terrorist allies who seek to use them;• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue

states;• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use

as a base and launching pad for terror; and• Lay the foundations and build the institutions and

structures we need to carry the fight forwardagainst terror and help ensure our ultimate success.

• Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism;

NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes

• We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary ruled by the repressive Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on Terror.

• A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the Middle East.

NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes

There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause.

Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.

We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center.

NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes

Overall, the United States and our partners have disrupted several serious plots since September 11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the United States.

Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.

The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties.

Requirements for successful counterterrorism

SecurityThe OpponentThe Counterterrorist OrganizationAudience(s)FearTrustAnd remember that counterterrorism policy must be linked to the larger domestic and international political strategic situations