Comment

Apportionment Between Preexisting Conditions and Work-Related Injuries:

Why Wyoming Needs a Second Injury Fund

Timothy R. Hancock*

I. IntroduCtIon.......................................................................................525II. BaCkground..........................................................................................527

A. Preexisting Conditions.....................................................................528B. Wyoming’s Approach: The Full Responsibility Rule.............................530C. Apportioning Part of the Liability to the Employee.............................531D. Second Injury Funds........................................................................532E. How Second Injury Funds Function..................................................535

III. analysIs.................................................................................................539A. Common Criticisms of Second Injury Funds......................................540B. In Defense of Second Injury Funds....................................................541C. Wyoming Should Adopt a Second Injury Fund..................................543

IV. ConClusIon..........................................................................................547

I. IntroduCtIon

Disabledworkershavemoredifficultyobtainingandkeepingtheirjobsthannondisabledworkers.1Intheyear2000,forexample,eightypercentofworker-agedindividualsinWyominghadcurrentemployment,andthirteenpercentofthoseemployedreporteddisabilities.2Ontheotherhand,thedisabledconstitutedthirty-onepercentofemployedindividuals.3Basedonthesenumbers,aboutoneoutofeverythreeunemployedworkersinWyomingisdisabled,whilejustoneoutofeverytenemployedworkersisdisabled.4

* CandidateforJ.D.,UniversityofWyoming,2011.Iammostgratefultomywife,KaraHancock.Icouldnothavewrittenthiscommentwithoutherencouragementandsupport.Thanksalsotomyadvisor,ProfessorMichaelDuff,forhispatienceandinsight.Additionally,IwouldliketorecognizethecontributionsoftheWyoming Law ReviewEditorialBoard.Thankyouverymuchforyourhardworkandguidance!

1 HarryW.Dahl,The Iowa Second Injury Fund—Time for Change,39drake l. rev.101,102(1989).

2 Quick Tables: QT-P21. Disability Status by Sex: 2000,u.s. Census Bureau,http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US56&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP21&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-redoLog=false (lastvisitedApr.29,2011)(compilingthemostrecentcensusdataforWyoming).ThesestatisticsarenotthetraditionalunemploymentnumbersasreportedbytheWyomingDepartmentofEmploymentbutinsteadcomefromthe2000censusstatisticsforpersonsaged21–64intheStateofWyoming.Id.

3 Id.

4 Id.

OnebarrierdisabledworkersfacewhenseekingemploymentinWyomingisthecurrent interpretationof theWyomingWorker’sCompensationAct(Act).5TheWyomingSupremeCourthasinterpretedtheActasdisallowingemployersfrom apportioning benefits between preexisting conditions and work-relatedinjuries.6 If a previously disabled worker is injured on the job, the court’sinterpretationresultsinanemployerpayingforboththework-relatedinjuryandthepreexistinginjury.7Becausethefundingforworkers’compensationissustainedbyemployerssuchthatpremiumsforemployersincreaseifworkersareinjuredonthejob,thisinterpretationleadstoaninequitableresultforemployers.8Asaresult,thisinterpretationdisincentivizesWyomingemployersfromhiringthosewithdisabilities.9Analternativeisnecessarytoencouragethehiringofdisabledworkersandensureequityforemployersofthosewithdisabilities.10

ThebestalternativetoWyoming’scurrentapproachtopreexistingconditionsunderitsworkers’compensationsystemistoadoptasecondinjuryfund(SIF),which would alleviate the burden on employers and encourage the hiring ofdisabledworkers. Inorder tounderstandtheneedforaSIF inWyoming, thiscommentfirstexaminesthecurrentapproachtopreexistingconditionstakenbytheWyomingSupremeCourt.11Next,adiscussionfollowsregardingapportionmentofliabilitybetweenemployerandemployee,analternativeapproachsomestateshavetakeninanefforttobefairertoemployers.12Third,thiscommentdiscusseshow a SIF would operate as a middle ground between these two approachesand help disabled workers secure employment, while simultaneously ensuringfairnesstoemployers.13ThiscommentalsorespondstorecentcriticismofSIFs,particularlythattheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)haseliminatedtheneedforSIFs.14Finally,thiscommentarguesthatWyomingshouldadoptaSIFfollowingsomespecificguidelines.15

5 WyomingWorker’sCompensationAct,Wyo. stat. ann.§§27-14-101to-806(2010);see infra notes46–57andaccompanyingtext(discussingtheWyomingSupremeCourt’sinterpretationoftheAct).

6 Stateex rel.Wyo.Workers’Safety&Comp.Div.v.Faulkner,152P.3d394,401(Wyo.2007).

7 See id. (holdingthatbecausethereisnoexpressstatuteinWyomingadoptingapportionment,Wyomingwillfollowthefullresponsibilityrule).

8 Wyo. stat. ann. § 27-14-201(a);seeinfra notes46–57,69,71andaccompanyingtext.

9 See JasonR.McClitis,Note,Missouri’s Second Injury Fund—Should It Stay or Should It Go?: An Examination of the Question Facing the Missouri State Legislature,74Mo. l. rev. 399,416(2009)(statingthatthegoalofasecondinjuryfundistoencourageemployerstohirethosewithdisabilitiesandwithoutthefundsemployersarediscouragedfromdoingso).

10 Seeinfra notes63–69andaccompanyingtext.

11 Seeinfra notes46–57andaccompanyingtext.

12 Seeinfra notes58–62andaccompanyingtext.

13 Seeinfra notes63–114andaccompanyingtext.

14 42U.S.C.§§12101–12213(2006);seeinfra notes115–54andaccompanyingtext.

15 Seeinfra notes155–85andaccompanyingtext.

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II. BaCkground

There are two methods by which workers receive money under workers’compensationinWyoming.16Thefirstmethodiswhenaworkerreceivesbenefitsintheformofmoneypaidbyanemployerthroughtheworkers’compensationfundtocovermedicalandhospitalexpenses.17Thesebenefitsfollowafeescheduleset by theWyoming Department of Employment to be paid by employers toemployeesforaparticularamountoftime.18Thiscommentfocusesonthesecondmethodknownasemployeeawards.Theseawardsarenotbenefitsbecausetheydo not provide for medical care; instead, they serve to reimburse workers forwork-related injuries.19Awards also follow a fee schedule set by theWyomingDepartmentofEmployment.20

Disabilitiesaredividedintotwomaincategories,temporaryandpermanent,andfurtherdividedeachintotwosubcategories,partialandtotal.21Atemporarydisabilitymayhealor improveover time.22Apermanentdisability,however, isone that has reached the point of “maximum medical improvement,” whichmeansitwillnothealfurtherorimproveovertime.23Totaldisabilitiespreventaworkerfromworkingatallinapositionforwhichheorsheissuitedbytrainingor experience.24 Conversely, a partial disability allows a worker to continueto work, albeit at a lower rate of productivity.25 Disability awards reimburseworkersforlostearningcapacityduetoawork-relatedinjury.26Thesepaymentscompensateworkersfortheirinabilitytoworktothesamedegreeasbeforetheinjury occurred.27 Awards vary depending on which of the four categories a

16 Wyo. stat. ann. §§ 27-14-401, -403(2010).

17 Id. § 27-14-401(a).

18 Id.

19 Seeid. § 27-14-403(a)(listingtheinjuriesforwhichworkersmayreceiveawardsundertheWyomingWorker’sCompensationAct).

20 Id.§§27-14-401,-403.

21 Seemodern Workers CompensatIon §200:28(2010)(listinganddescribingthevariousdisabilitiesforwhichapersonmayreceivebenefits).

22 Id. § 200:8, :28.

23 Wyo. stat. ann. §27-14-102(a)(xvi), (xviii);modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note21,§200:7.

24 modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note21,§200:8.

25 Wyo. stat. ann. §§27-14-102(a)(xv), -405(h) (stating that aworker is eligible for anaward for a permanent partial disability if, because of the injury, he or she is unable to makewagesofatleastninety-fivepercentofwhatheorshemadebeforetheinjury);modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note21,§200:28.

26 steven BaBItsky & James J. mangravItI, Jr., understandIng the ama guIdes In Workers’ CompensatIon § 1.04 (4thed.2008);modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note21,§200:1.

27 modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note21,§200:1.

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worker’sdisabilityfitswithin:(1)temporarypartialdisability;(2)temporarytotaldisability;(3)permanentpartialdisability;or(4)permanenttotaldisability.28Aworker’sfamilymayalsobepaidanawardiftheworkerdies.29

Wyoming does not award compensation to workers for temporary partialdisability.30 However, compensation is available for workers whose disabilityfalls into one of the other three categories.31Temporary total disability occurswhenaworkeristotallyincapacitatedandtemporarilyunabletoworkatajobthatheorshewouldnormallydo.32Permanentpartialdisabilityoccurswhenaworkercanstilldosomeworkbutnotasmuchasheorshewaspreviouslyabletodo.33Permanenttotaldisabilityoccurswhenaworkerisunabletofindsuitableemploymentduetoaninjurywhichhasreachedthepointofmaximummedicalimprovement.34Familiesreceiveawardsfordeathifaworkerdiesduetowork-relatedcauses.35Awards forpermanent totaldisabilityare thehighestawardsaworkercanreceive,andtheworkerreceivesbenefitsforatleasteightymonths,whichmaybeextendedindefinitely.36

A. Preexisting Conditions

Successiveinjuriesposeanumberofproblemsunderworkers’compensationbecauseanytwodisabilitiescombinedusuallyresult inamoreseveredisabilityclassificationthanifeachdisabilitywereclassifiedandtheworkerreceivedbenefitsforeachindividually.37Inotherwords,successiveinjurieshavesynergeticeffectsonworkers’compensationawards.Forexample,a losteyetypicallyresults inapartialpermanentdisability classification and an accompanying award.38For adisabled worker who is already missing an eye (i.e., suffers from a preexistingcondition),however,thelossofanothereye(thesecondinjury)willoftenresultinatotaldisabilityclassification(thecombinedinjury)andahigherawardthan

28 Wyo. stat. ann. § 27-14-403(a).

29 Id. § 27-14-403(a)(v).

30 modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note 21, § 321:11; seeWyo. stat. ann. § 27-14-403.

31 Wyo. stat. ann. § 27-14-403.

32 Id. § 27-14-102(a)(xviii);modern Workers CompensatIon, supranote21, § 200:7.

33 Wyo. stat. ann.§ 27-14-102(a)(xv).

34 Id. § 27-14-102(a)(xvi).Inordertoqualifyforapermanenttotaldisability,aworkermustbeunabletosecureemployment“forwhichheisreasonablysuitedbyexperienceortraining.”Id.

35 Id.§27-14-102(c)(iv).

36 Id.§27-14-403(b).

37 arthur larson & lex k. larson, larson’s Workers’ CompensatIon § 90.01 (2010); see DavidG.McDowell,2004 Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Second Injury Fund: Purpose and Practice,34U.mem. l. rev.389,392(2005);CatherineM.Doud,Comment,Oklahoma’s Special Indemnity Fund: A Fund Without a Function?,30tulsa l.J.745,746(1995).

38 Doud,supra note37,at746.

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foreitherthepreexistingconditionorthesecondinjurybyitself.39Thequestionbecomestowhatextenttheworker’spreviousconditionshouldbeaccountedforinawardingbenefitsunderworkers’compensation.40

Statesusethreeapproachestodeterminewhopaysforpreexistingconditionsin the context of workers’ compensation.41 First, many states choose to applythefullresponsibilityrule,inwhichemployerspayfortheentiredisability(thecombined injury).42 Second, some states apply an apportionment method, inwhich employers only pay for the portion of the disability caused by injuriesrelatedtotheemployment(thesecondinjury)andtheworkerpaystheremainderwhich was caused before employment (the preexisting condition).43 Third,states may use a second injury or subsequent injury fund, in which injuredworkersreceiveall thebenefitstheywouldbeentitledtoforbothinjuries,butemployers are only responsible for compensating the amount they would payunderanapportionmentmethod.44ThecurrentapproachinWyomingisthefullresponsibilityrule.45

39 Doud,supra note37,at746;see larson & larson, supra note37,§90.01(statingthatifanemployeehadonlyoneeye,ear,leg,orhandandsubsequentlylostanother,theemployerwouldbeliableforatotaldisabilityontheremainingeye,ear,leg,orhand).

40 See 82Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation§304(2011)(notingthevariouswaysinwhichstates apportion injuries between preexisting conditions and work-related injuries); larson & larson, supra note37,§90.01(listingmethodsstatesusetodealwithissueswithsuccessiveinjuries).

41 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.01; McDowell,supranote37,at392–93.

42 See 82Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation§304(2011)(notingthatifastatedoesnothaveastatuteprovidingforapportionment,thereisnoneedforthestatetodeterminethecontributionofthepreexistingconditionandwork-relatedinjurytotheresultingdisability).EighteenstatesandtheDistrictofColumbiause the full responsibility rule:Alabama,Arkansas,Colorado,Florida,Georgia,Kansas,Kentucky,Maine,Minnesota,Nebraska,NewMexico,NewYork,RhodeIsland,South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See doug mCCoy, Workers’ CompensatIon: the survIval guIde for BusIness §§ 8.02, .05, .07, .10–.12, .18–.19, .21, .25, .29, .33–.34, .41–.43, .46–.47, .52 (2010) (listing the stances that the above-listed states havetakentowardapportionmentandSIFs);see, e.g.,fla. stat. § 440.15(5) (2010) (statingthatifthepreexistingconditionand thework-related injurymerge tocreateamore seriousdisability thaneitherinjurystandingalone,thecombinedinjuryiscompensable).Allstateslistedasusingthefullresponsibilityrule,exceptWyoming,previouslyphasedouttheirsecondinjuryfunds.See infra note72andaccompanyingtext.

43 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.01; McDowell,supranote37,at392; see infra note58(listingstateswhichhaveusedtheapportionmentmethod).

44 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.03; McDowell,supranote37,at392–93;McClitis,supra note9,at401–03;see infranote72(listingstateswhichcurrentlyuseaSIF).

45 Stateex rel.Wyo.Workers’Safety&Comp.Div.v.Faulkner,152P.3d394,399–400(Wyo.2007) (adopting the full responsibility rule becauseWyoming does not have an express statuteadoptingapportionmentoraSIF).

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B. Wyoming’s Approach: The Full Responsibility Rule

The legislative intent of the Act is to provide efficient delivery of servicesandbenefitstoworkersatlowcosttoemployers.46OnewaytheActdoesthisisbyonlyallowingbenefitsorawardsforaworkerwhosuffersaninjury.47TheActspecificallyprovidesthat injuriesexistingbeforeemploymentbegandonotfallunderthedefinitionof“injury”andawardsarenotgivenforpreexistinginjuries.48However, theWyomingSupremeCourt broadened thedefinitionof injury toallow employees to receive benefits if a later work-related injury aggravated,accelerated,orcombinedwithapreexistingcondition.49TheWyomingSupremeCourt’sdefinitiondoesnotallowanemployeetocollectbenefitstotheextentthecombined injurynaturallyprogresses fromthepreexistingconditionandnotawork-relatedinjury.50Instead,theremustbeasufficientnexusbetweenthework-relatedinjuryandthepreexistingconditionfortheemployertopayforbenefitsforapreexistingconditionunderWyoming’sfullresponsibilityrule.51

TheWyomingSupremeCourtadopted the full responsibility rulebecausecompensationshouldnotdependonwhetheranindividualishealthyatthetimeof injury.52Apersonwhobeganemploymentinjuredshouldbeabletoreceive

46 Wyo.stat. ann.§27-14-101(b)(2010).TheWyomingLegislaturestateditspurposeincreatingtheAct:

It is the intent of the legislature in creating theWyoming worker’s compensationdivision that the laws administered by it to provide a worker’s benefit system beinterpreted to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medicalbenefitstoinjuredanddisabledworkersatareasonablecosttotheemployerswhoaresubjecttotheWorker’sCompensationAct.

Id.

47 Id.§§ 27-14-401, -403.

48 Id.§ 27-14-402(a)(xi)(F).

49 See Lindbloom v. Teton Intl., 684 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Wyo. 1984). In Lindbloom, theworkerhadkneecapsthateasilydislocated.Id.at1388.Helaterinjuredhiskneesinawork-relatedincident. Id.Thecourtadoptedtheformulationthatapreexistingconditioncanqualifyas“arisingoutofemployment”solongasit“aggravated,accelerated,orcombinedwiththediseaseorinfirmitytoproducethedeathordisabilityforwhichcompensationissought.”Id.at1390(quotingarthur larson, 2larson’s Workmen’s CompensatIon§12.20(1984)).Althoughthecourtadoptedthisformulation,itheldthattheworker’spreexistingconditiondidnotaggravatetheinjurytotheextentthatitwascompensableunderworkers’compensation.Id.Thecourtchangedthewordingoftheformulationslightlyinalatercaseallowinganemployeetorecoverfromworkers’compensationif“hisemploymentsubstantiallyormateriallyaggravatesthatcondition.”In reBoyce,105P.3d451,455(Wyo.2005).

50 Lindbloom,684P.2dat1390(citing larson, supranote49,§12.20).

51 SeeStateex rel.Wyo.Workers’Safety&Comp.Div.v.Faulkner,152P.3d394,397(Wyo.2007)(“[A]preexisting injurymaypresentacompensableclaim‘if theemploymentaggravated,accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the . . . disability for whichcompensationissought.’”(quotingLindbloom,684P.2dat1390)).

52 See Lindbloom,684P.2dat1389(“Compensationisnotmadetorestunderourlawupontheconditionofhealthoftheemployeeoruponhisfreedomfromliabilitytoinjury....”(quoting

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benefitsaswellasapersonwhobeganemploymentwithoutinjury.53Thecourthasstatedthepolicybehindthefullresponsibilityruleisthattheemployertakestheworkerastheemployerfindshimandstressedtheimportanceofensuringthatworkersarepaidtheirneededbenefits.54

The Wyoming Supreme Court also adopted the full responsibility rulebecause there is a “general rule disallowing apportionment.”55The court heldthatfullresponsibilityistheruleasthereisnostatuteinWyomingspecifyingamethodforapportionment.56Asaresult,ifonecanshowthatawork-relatedinjuryaggravates,accelerates,orcombineswithapreexistingconditioninamaterialorsubstantialmanner,thenallresultingincapacityforworkiscompensableinjury.57

C. Apportioning Part of the Liability to the Employee

Unlike Wyoming, some states apportion loss between the employee andtheemployerifaworker’spreexistingconditionisexacerbatedbyalaterwork-related injury.58 In these states, the workers’ compensation fund only pays fortheportionof the injurycausedby thework-related incident.59 Ina state thatuses apportionment, if a worker who had lost an eye loses the second eye inawork-related accident, the employeronly compensates theworker forhealth

In reScrogham,73P.2d300,307(Wyo.1937)));ExplorationDrillingCo.v.Guthrie,370P.2d362,364(Wyo.1962)(statingthatcompensationdoesnotdependonwhethertheemployee ishealthyatthetimeofinjury).

53 See Guthrie,370P.2dat364(statingthattheWyomingWorker’sCompensationActdoesnotdistinguishbetweenhealthyandunhealthyemployees).

54 Lindbloom,864P.2dat1388.

55 Faulkner, 152 P.3d at 400. In Faulkner, the Wyoming Supreme Court cited multiplejurisdictionsholdingthatfullresponsibilityistheruleintheabsenceofastatutetothecontrary.Id.(citing Poehlmanv.Leydig,400P.2d724,749(Kan.1965);Wallacev.HansonSiloCo.,235N.W.2d.363,363(Minn.1975);Fieldv.Johns-ManvilleSalesCorp.,507A.2d1209,1209(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1986));see also82Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation§304(2011)(“Intheabsenceofaprovisionforapportionmentofthecompensationbetweenaninjuryandpreexistingdisease,thereisnorequirementtodeterminetherelativecontributionoftheaccidentandthepriordiseasetothefinalresult.”).

56 Faulkner,152P.3dat399–401.

57 See Straubev.Stateex. rel.Workers’Safety&Comp.Div.,208P.3d41,47–48(Wyo.2009).

58 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.03.Twenty-onestateshaveapportionedlosstotheemployee:Arkansas,California,Florida,Hawaii, Idaho,Kentucky,Maine,Maryland,Michigan,Minnesota,Mississippi,NewYork,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,SouthCarolina,Texas,Virginia,Washington,andWestVirginia.Id.California,Hawaii,Idaho,Maryland,Michigan,Mississippi,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Pennsylvania,Virginia,Washington,andWestVirginia(twelvestatestotal)havesecondinjuryfunds.Comparelarson & larson, supra note37,§90.03n.1,withmCCoy, supra note42,§§8.06,.13–.14,.22,.24,.26,.35–.36,.40,.48–.50.

59 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.03;82Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation§304(2011);see, e.g.,Cal. laB. Code§4664(a)(West2011)(statingthatanemployerisonlyliableforthepercentageofpermanentinjuryarisingoutofandoccurringinthecourseofemployment).

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benefitsfortheoneeyelostintheaccident.60Theworkerisresponsibleforanyneededhealthcareresultingfromthelossofthefirsteye,evenifsuchneedswouldnothaveoccurredbutfortheinjurytothesecondeye.61Becauseoftheseverityofapportionmenttoemployees,moststateshavetempereditbyconstrictingitsscopeorbyadoptingsecondinjuryfunds.62

D. Second Injury Funds

State legislatures establish SIFs to provide a middle ground between theapportionmentruleandthefullresponsibilityrule.63Asinstatesthatapportioninjury,states thatuseSIFsalsoapportion liability forwork-related injuriesbutbetweentheemployerandthe fund.64Theemployeedoesnotpaytheportionassigned to thepreexisting injury; insteada speciallycreated fundpays for thepercentageofinjuryduetoapreexistingcondition,andtheemployerpaysforthepercentageduetothework-relatedinjury.65

OnepurposeofSIFsistoencourageemployerstohireandretaindisabledworkersbyabsolvingtheemployerofliabilityforinjuriesthatoccurredbeforetheworkerwashired.66Inthepast,thefullresponsibilityruleresultedinemployersdischarging disabled employees to avoid responsibility for possible futureinjuries.67SIFsprovide an alternative thatmayprevent employers from taking

60 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.03; see supra notes37–40andaccompanyingtext.

61 larson & larson, supra note37, §90.03;Doud, supra note 37, at 746; see, e.g., ky. rev. stat. ann. § 342.730(West2010);Edwardsv.LouisvilleLadder,957S.W.2d290,293–94(Ky.Ct.App.1997)(holdingthateightypercentofanemployee’sinjurytohisbackwasduetoapreexistingconditionandtheemployerwasonlyresponsibleforthetwentypercentofthework-relateddisability).

62 larson & larson, supra note37,§90.03; see, e.g., City&Cnty. ofDenver v. Indus.Comm’n,690P.2d199,202(Colo.1984)(explainingthatthesubsequentinjuryfundismeanttoavoidtheharshnessofthefullresponsibilityruleorapportionment);see infra note 72(listingstatesthathavesecondinjuryfundsinplace).

63 ZacharyD.Schurin,Note,Monkey-Business: Connecticut’s Six Billion Dollar Gorilla and the Insufficiency of the Emergence of the ADA as Justification for Elimination of Second Injury Funds,7Conn. puB. Int. l.J. 135,137(2007).

64 larson & larson, supra note37, §91.01[1].

65 Id.; gary phelan & Janet Bond arterton, 1 DIsaBIlIty dIsCrImInatIon In the WorkplaCe § 16.8 (2010); see lee r. russ & thomas f. segalla, CouCh on InsuranCe § 133.20 (3rded.2010); McDowell,supranote37,at405–06;Doud,supranote37,at746.SIFsusuallyaccomplishthisbypayingthedifferencebetweentheamountpaidbytheemployerforthesecondinjuryandtheamountpaidfortheinitialinjuryalone.Dahl,supranote1,at108–09.

66 Cece v. Felix Indus., 728 A.2d 505, 508 (Conn. 1999); Doud, supra note 37, at 756;Schurin,supranote63,at137.

67 larson & larson, supra note37, §91.01[1];Schurin,supranote63,at139(discussinganOklahomaSupremeCourtcaseinwhichthecourtheldanemployerfullyresponsibleforadisabilityafteraworkerlosthissecondeyeinaworkplaceaccidentandtheresulting7000to8000one-eyed,one-armed,orone-handedworkerswhowerelaidoffbyemployersaroundthestate).

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actionspotentiallyharmfultoemployeessufferingfrompreexistingconditions.68SIFsalsoavoidtheinequitiesthatoccurwhenanemployerisrequiredtopay—throughincreasedworkers’compensationpremiums—foraninjuryforwhichtheemployerwasnotresponsible.69

SIFs began to gain popularity in 1945 and originally were created toincentivizethehiringofdisabledveteranswhohadreturnedfromWorldWarII.70AllstateshadaSIFin1991exceptWyoming,whichhasneveradoptedafund.71However, even thoughSIFswere incredibly popular, their usehas declined inrecentyears.72ThestateswhichhaveeliminatedtheirSIFshavedonesoformanydifferentreasons:employerswerenotawareofthefund,soitspurposewasnotmet;thestatelegislaturebelievedlargeSIFassessmentswoulddiscouragebusinessinthestate;thestatelegislaturebelievedtheSIFdepartedfromtheprinciplethatcostsshouldbeinternalizedbyemployers;orthestatelegislaturewasconcerned

68 Russ & segalla,supranote65,§133.20;Doud,supranote37,at746;Schurin,supranote63,at139.

69 SeeJeffrey v. naCkley, prImer on Workers’ CompensatIon 96 (1989); Schurin, supranote63,at142(notingthatSIFsaremeanttoensurethatemployerspayonlyfortheshareofthecombinedinjuryforwhichtheyarefinanciallyresponsible).

70 Workers’ Comp. guIde § 1:42 (2010); Dahl,supranote1,at104;Employers Must Take Measures Not to Discriminate Against Thousands of Returning, Injured Veterans, fam. & med. leave handBook neWsl., Sept. 2006; David Tobenkin, Don’t Overlook Second-Injury Funds: Special State Funds for Workers with Pre-Existing Conditions Can Help Defray Long-term Costs for Workers’ Compensation,HRmagaZIne,July2009,available athttp://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3495/is_7_54/ai_n32406827/.

71 Doud,supranote37,at745;Schurin,supranote63,at139–40.TheWyomingSupremeCourtinState ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Compensation Division v. Faulkner,152P.3d394,398–99(Wyo.2007),mentionedthatasecondinjuryfundisanalternativetothefullresponsibilityruletakenbymanystatestocombatinequitiescreatedbythefullresponsibilityrule.However,theFaulkner courtstatedthatthealternativewasnotavailableatthetimeofthecasebecausetherewasnolegislationcreatingsuchafund.Faulkner,152P.3dat399–400.

72 larson & larson, supranote37, §91.03[8];see McClitis,supranote9,at411.EighteenstatesandtheDistrictofColumbiahavesunsettedtheirfundtonewclaimsorhavelegislationphasingthemout:Alabama,Arkansas,Colorado,Connecticut,Florida,Georgia,Kansas,Kentucky,Maine,Minnesota,Nebraska,NewMexico,NewYork,RhodeIsland,SouthCarolina,SouthDakota,Utah,andVermont.mCCoy, supra note42,§§ 8.02, .05, .07, .10–.12, .18–.19, .21, .25, .29, .33–.34, .41–43, .46–.47; BarryLlewellyn,Dramatic Decline—Second Injury Funds in the United States,in2008 NCCIWorkers CompensatIon Issue rep. 32, 32–33, available at http://www.ncci.com/documents/Issues-Rpt-2008-Injury-Funds.pdf;David Tobenkin, supranote70.Thirty-onestatesretain their second injury funds: Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,NewHampshire,Nevada,NewJersey,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Ohio,Oklahoma(repealedandthenreinstatedin2005),Oregon,Pennsylvania,Tennessee,Texas,Virginia,Washington,WestVirginia, andWisconsin. mCCoy, supra note 42, §§ 8.03–.04, .08–.09, .13–.17, .20, .22–.24,.26–.28,.30–.32,.35–.40,.44–.45,.48–.51;see, e.g.,okla. stat. tit.85,§173(2010).

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withthepoorfinancialconditionsofthefund.73EverystatethathasrepealedtheirSIFnowusesthefullresponsibilityruleinitsplace.74

OneofthemostprevalentreasonsstateshaveterminatedtheirSIFsisbecausethestatelegislaturebelievesthatSIFsarenolongernecessaryastheADAprotectsdisabledworkersfromdiscrimination.75BoththeADAandSIFshaveacommongoal:theeliminationofdiscriminationagainstdisabledworkers.76Themethodsusedby theADAandSIFsdiffer,however.77Under theADA, employersmaynotmakeemploymentdecisionsifthedecisionisbasedonspeculationthattheprospectiveemployeemayincreaseworkers’compensationcostsfortheemployerinthefuture.78TheADAalsoprovidesacauseofactionforworkerswhofeeltheyhavebeendiscriminatedagainst.79BothofthesemethodsmaketheADAareactiveapproachforaddressingdiscrimination.80Conversely,themethodusedbySIFsistoproactivelyinduceemployerstohiredisabledworkersbyshieldingemployersfromliability.81CriticsofSIFsrationalizethatthereactivemethodisenoughand,becauseitisillegaltodiscriminateagainstdisabledworkers,thereisnolongeraneedtohaveanincentiveforemployerstohireworkerswithdisabilities.82

73 See larson & larson, supranote37, §91.03[8] (noting thatmanyemployersarenotawareofSIFsandsomestatesviewthemselvesatadisadvantagewhencomparedwithotherstatesbecauseofthelargeSIFassessmentstowhichemployerswithinthestatearesubjected);Llewellyn,supranote72,at33(statingthatSIFsarecriticizedbecausetheydonotallocatecoststoemployersinproportion to the cost of injuries to their own employees);Doud, supra note37, at759–60(noting thefinancial difficulties theOklahomaSIF faces);Christopher J.Boggs,The Decline of Second Injury Funds, myneWmarkets.Com (July 28, 2008), http://www.mynewmarkets.com/articles/92235/the-decline-of-second-injury-funds(notingthefinancialdifficultiesmanySIFsface).

74 See supranote42(listingstatesthatcurrentlyfollowthefullresponsibilityruleandformerlyusedSIFs).

75 SeeDoud,supranote37,at765–66;McClitis,supranote9,at413–16;Second-Injury Funds Under Attack After ADA’s Enactment, 2leave & dIsaBIlIty CoordInatIon handBook neWsl.9(1999),available at2No.4LDCHBK-NWL9(Westlaw);Boggs,supra note73.

76 See 42U.S.C.§12101(b)(1)(2006)(statingthatitisthepurposeoftheADAtoeliminatethediscriminationofthosewhoaredisabled);McClitis,supranote9,at413–14(notingthattheADAandSIFsbothseektopreventdiscriminationagainstthedisabled).ThepurposeoftheADAisfurtherreachingthanmerelyeliminationofdiscriminationagainstdisabledworkersasitismeanttoeliminatediscriminationagainstallthosewithdisabilities.Seegenerally42U.S.C.§12101(b).

77 McClitis,supranote9,at413–16.

78 Doud,supranote37,at764.

79 42U.S.C.§12101(a)(3);McClitis,supranote9,at415–16.

80 See McClitis,supranote9,at415(statingthattheADAismeantto“deteremployersfromdiscriminating”bymakingthemliablefordamages).

81 Id.at416.

82 SeeDoud, supranote37,at766–67(“TheADAno longermakes itnecessary tobribeemployersintohiringandkeepinghandicappedworkers.”).

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EmployerknowledgeornoticeofthepreexistingconditionisoneareawhereSIFsandtheADAespeciallyclash.83SomeSIFsrequireemployerstohavenoticeorknowledgeofthepreexistinginjuryinorderfortheworkertobecompensatedby the SIF, yet the ADA prevents employers from asking prospective workersquestionsregardingtheirdisabilitiesbeforemakingajoboffer.84

E. How Second Injury Funds Function

FundingforSIFscomesfromvarioussources.85Themostcommonfundingmethodisforstatestochargeanassessmentagainstinsurancecarriers,employers,and/or self-insured funds.86 Some states also require insurance carriers andself-insuredemployerstofundtheSIFpro-rata,basedonpaymentsofworkers’compensationfromthepreviousyear.87Thepro-ratamethodhasthebenefitofdistributingthecostsoftheprogramequitablyamongallemployersaroundthestate.88 Another common funding method is to charge insurance carriers partoftheamountofmoneytheywouldretainifapersondiedwithoutdependentsor beneficiaries otherwise entitled to the money.89 There are, however, somecontroversies involved with this method, including confusion regarding whatit means to be without dependents and whether the SIF receives any moneyifadependent isentitledtoapartialbutnot fullpayment fromthe insurancecompany.90 In Oklahoma, the SIF is funded partially by a five percent tax

83 Schurin,supranote63,at146–47.

84 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A); William D. Sheldon & N. Douglas Grimwood, Nobody Wins: Conflicts Between the Apportionment Provisions of the Arizona Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act,arIZ. att’y,Apr.2000,at36;Schurin,supranote63,at145.

85 Seelarson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2].

86 Id.; McClitis, supra note 9, at 416; Christopher J. Boggs, One-Eyed, One-Legged, and One-Armed Men Need Not Apply—The Rise of Second Injury Funds, myneWmarkets.Com (July28,2008),http://www.mynewmarkets.com/articles/92195/one-eyed-one-legged-and-one-armed-men-need-not-apply-the-rise-of-second-injury-funds.InArizona,theSIFisfundedbyaone-and-a-halfpercentassessmentofallworkers’compensationpremiumspaidinthestate.Sheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at35.

87 larson & larson, supra note37,§91.01[2];Boggs, supra note73.Thismethodwaspresentedby theCouncilofStateGovernments in the second injuryportionof theWorkmen’sCompensationandRehabilitationLaw(“ModelSecondInjuryFundAct”).Workmen’s Comp. & rehaB. laW§20(CouncilofStateGov’ts1974);larson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2].TheModelSecondInjuryFundActwasdraftedbytheCouncilofStateGovernmentsin1974basedonrecommendationsmadein1972bytheNationalCommissiononStateWorkmen’sCompensationLaw.Dahl,supranote1,at106.

88 larson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2].

89 Id.;karen a. lerner & nanCy saInt-paul,37tex. praC., Workers’ Comp. laW & praC. § 302 (2011).

90 larson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2].InaTexascase,theidentityofthepersonwasunknownathisdeath,andthecourtheldthemoneywhichwouldnormallybepaidtoanydependents(whowerealsounknown)wasnottobepaidtotheSIFbecausealthoughtherewasno

2011 Comment 535

levied upon employee and employer (or insurance carrier) judgments againsteachother.91Thismethodhasbeencriticizedbecausealthough thebenefit theemployers receive fromSIFs is clear—theyare indemnifiedagainst liability forfuture injuries—the benefits to the employee are less clear.92 Before the stateseliminatedtheirSIFs,ArkansasandColoradofundedtheirSIFsfromfinesandpenalties paid by employers for violating duties the employers have regardingworkers’compensation.93Despitethemanyfundingoptionsavailable,manystateSIFsstillfacefinancialdeficits.94

Statesalsovaryinthemethodstheyusetodistributethefunds.95Somestatesrequire that theSIFpay theworkerdirectly.96This can lead todelays, suchasinOklahomawhereworkers frequentlyhavewaited as long as one and ahalfyearsbeforereceivingcompensation.97Somestatesrequiretheemployertopayupfrontbecauseittypicallyhasmoreassetsthantheworker,andthefundlaterreimburses theemployer.98Some states also require theemployer topayup toacertainamount,orforaparticularlengthoftime,towardthebenefitsforthe

proofthatthedecedentwassurvivedbyanyone,therewasalsonoproofthathewasnot.Indus.AccidentBd.v.TexasEmp’rsIns.Ass’n,336S.W.2d216,218–19(Tex.Ct.App.1960);larson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2].

91 okla. stat. tit.85,§173(2010);Doud,supranote37,at757.

92 See Doud,supranote37,at758(notingthataworkerwhocontributestotheSIFfundedwith this method may never have another injury which would be paid for out of the SIF andthereforedoesnotreceiveabenefitfromfundingtheSIF).

93 Id. at761.Arkansas funds itsSIF inpartwithfines received fromemployers found todiscriminateagainstdisabledworkers,orimpedethefilingofworkers’compensationclaims.ark. Code ann. § 11-0-107(a)(1)(2)(2010);Doud,supranote37,at761.Coloradopreviouslyfundedits SIF with fines collected from employers for violations of Colorado’s workers’ compensationprovisions;thefundsnowgointothegeneralfundandtheworkers’compensationfund.Compare Colo. rev. stat. § 8-43-304(1) (1994) (providingthatpaymentsforviolationsoftheColoradolabor lawsare tobedeposited in theColorado subsequent injury fund), withColo. rev. stat. § 8-43-304(1) (2010) (providingthatpaymentsforviolationsoftheColoradolaborlawsaretobeapportionedbetweentheColoradoworkers’compensationfundandtheaggrievedparty).Thesefinesmustcomefromtheemployerandcannotbepaidbytheinsurancecarrierintheemployer’splace.Colo. rev. stat. § 8-43-304(1) (2010).

94 Doud, supranote37,at762.Deficits intheOklahomaSIFareblamedontortreform,liberalizationofinjuriesthatfallundertheSIF,andadditionalresponsibilitiesthattheSIFtakesuponitself.Id.at757.

95 larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.01[6].

96 Dahl,supranote1,at108;Doud,supranote37,at760;see, e.g.,n.y. Workers’ Comp. laW§15(7)(McKinney2010)(statingthatdisbursementsfromtheNewYorkSIFshallbemadebythecommissioneroftaxationandfinance).

97 Doud,supranote37,at760.

98 Dahl, supranote1, at108;Doud, supranote37, at761; see, e.g.,fla. stat. § 440.49 (2010) (statingthatforinjuriesthatoccurredwhentheFloridaSIFwasineffect,theemployerwillpaybenefitsandthenbereimbursedbytheSIF).

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work-relatedinjurybeforetheSIFcompensatesforthepreexistingcondition.99TheModelSecondInjuryFundActonlyholdstheemployerliableforthefirst104weeksofdisabilityawardedaccordingtothefeeschedule,afterwhichtheSIFpaystheremainder.100Kansasusedamixoftheseapproaches,requiringtheSIFtopaytheemployeedirectly;however,ifnomoneywasavailableintheSIF,theemployeecouldreceivetheamountfromtheemployer,whowouldbereimbursedwhentheSIFbecameproperlyfunded.101

StatesemployvariousapproachestodeterminewhichinjuriesarecompensablebySIFs.OnecommonproblemwithSIFfundingisthatifthenumberofdisabilitieseligible for reimbursement is too high, the SIF will deplete too quickly.102 Asa result, some states narrow their approaches to only allow recovery from theSIFforcertain injuries.103Forexample,Californiarequires that thepreexistingconditionbeapermanentpartialdisabilitythataccountsforthirty-fivepercentof the preexisting and work-related injuries combined.104 Although Colorado’sSIFdoesnotapplytoinjuriesafter1993,itsstatuteonlyallowstheSIFtopayforpreexistingwork-related injuries, rather thanpersonal injuries.105Formanyjurisdictions allowing recovery for personal injuries, the SIF will only pay theworkerifthepreexistinginjuryisonethatwouldbecompensableunderworkers’compensationwereittooccuratwork.106IndianaonlyallowsforpaymentfromtheSIFifthesubsequentinjuryrelatestothelossofahand,arm,foot,leg,oreyeresultinginapermanenttotaldisability.107Asinmanyotherstates,theSIFsinOklahoma,Mississippi,andIndianawillonlypaybenefitsifthecombinedinjury

99 Dahl, supranote1, at108;Doud, supranote37, at760; see, e.g., IoWa Code §85.64(2010)(statingthattheemployerwillpayforaperiodoftimebaseduponthescheduledamountfortheinjuryandthentheSIFwillpaytheremainderbenefitstotheemployee).

100 Workmen’s Comp. & rehaB. laW,supranote87,§20;Dahl,supranote1,at118.

101 kan. stat. ann.§44-569(1993);Doud,supranote37,at761.

102 Doud,supranote37,at750–51.

103 larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.02; Dahl,supranote1,at104–08;Doud,supranote37,at750–51.

104 Cal.laB.Code§4751 (West2010);mCCoy, supra note42,§8.06.Arizona’s statuterequiresthataworker’spreexistinginjuryhasrisentoatenpercentimpairmentundertheAMAGuidelinesandhascreatedan impediment to theemploymentbefore the second injuryoccurs.arIZ. rev. stat. ann. § 23-1065(C)(2011);Sheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at35.

105 Colo.rev.stat.§§8-46-101(1)(a),-104(2010)(providingthattheColoradoSIFwillonlypayforinjuriesoccurringafterJuly1,1993,inwhichthepreexistingconditionwasawork-relatedinjury);MCCoy, supranote42,§8.07.

106 larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.02 n.7.

107 Ind. Code § 22-3-3-13 (2010); see mCCoy, supra note 42, § 8.16. Iowa has a similarprovisioninitsSIFandonlyallowstheSIFtopayifaninjuryoccurstospecifiedmembersandtotheeyes.See IoWa Code§85.64(2)(2010);Dahl,supranote1,at109.

2011 Comment 537

isapermanenttotaldisability.108Somestatesonlyallowrecoveryfromthefundfor injuries thathavecausedsymptomsandbeentreated insomeway.109Moststatesrequirethatthesecondinjurycombinewiththepreexistingconditioninsomeway,similartotheWyomingrequirementthatthework-relatedinjurymustaggravate, accelerate,or combinewithapreexisting condition in amaterialorsubstantialmanner.110

Dependingonthejurisdiction,manystateswithSIFsrequireemployerstohaveactualknowledgeornoticeofapreexistingcondition.Dependingonthejurisdiction,thisknowledgeornoticemustbeacquiredeitherbeforetheemployeeis hired or before the work-related injury occurs.111The rationale behind thisrequirementisthatifthefundistoencourageemployerstohireemployeeswithdisabilities,theemployermustfirstbeawareofthedisabilitytohaveanincentive

108 See russ & segalla,supranote65,§133:20(notingsecondinjuryfundprovisionsoftenrequirethatthedisabilityresultingfromsuccessiveinjuriesbetotalandpermanentorbeinexcessofaspecifiedpercentageofdisablementtorenderthefundliableforbenefits);see, e.g.,Ind.Code§22-3-3-13;mIss.Code ann. §71-3-73(2010);okla. stat. tit.85,§ 172 (2010).

109 See 82Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation§304(2011)(providingthatsomestatestatutesdonotallowapportionmentforpreexistingconditionsthatwereasymptomaticbeforethework-relatedinjury);modern Workers CompensatIon, supranote21,§200:25(notingthatthereisadistinctionbetweena“preexistinginjuryandapreexistingsusceptibilitytoinjurywhichhasnotyetproducedaninjury”);see, e.g.,Askewv.Indus.ClaimAppealsOfficeoftheStateofColo.,927P.2d1333, 1337 (Colo. 1996) (holding that because aworker’s back conditionhadnot shownanysymptomspriortothework-relatedinjury,itwasnotadisabilitywithinthedefinitionoftheColoradostatuteandwasnotapportionable).

110 larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.02; doud, supra note37,at754; see supra note51andaccompanyingtext(providingtheWyomingstandardforapersontocollectbenefitsforapreexistingcondition).

111 82Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation§304(2011);John alan appleman,InsuranCe laW and praCtICe§4595(1979);larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.03;phelan&arterton,supranote65,§ 16.8;Doud, supranote37,at748;Schurin, supranote63,at142.Ninestatesareincludedamongthosestateswithknowledgeornoticerequirements:Alaska,Arizona,Florida,Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, and New York. appleman, supra, § 4595(listingcaselawfromstatesthathaveknowledgeornoticerequirements);see, e.g.,Sea-LandServs.v.SecondInjuryFund,737P.2d793,795(Alaska1987)(notingthatAlaskalawrequiresanemployertoestablishknowledgeoftheinjuryinawrittenrecordfiledwiththestate);SpecialDisabilityTrustFund,Fla.v.SpaceCoastPlastering,695So.2d1304,1306(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997)(statingthatFloridalawrequiresactualknowledgeofapreexistingconditionbutallowsaconclusivepresumptionofknowledgeofmentaldisabilityiftheemployee’spreexistingintelligencequotientiswithinthelowesttwopercentofthepopulation);Am.MotoristsIns.v.InjuryBd.,544So.2d595,599(La.Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that although Louisiana law requires knowledge of the preexistingcondition,thatknowledgecanbegainedafteremploymentsolongastherequisiteknowledgeexistsbefore the work-related injury occurs); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Chavez, 805 P.2d 633, 637(N.M.1990)(statingthatacourtinNewMexicocaninferknowledgeofapreexistingconditionif the injury is of such a serious nature that the inference is warranted). Arkansas, California,Connecticut,Hawaii,Kansas,Maryland,andTennesseedonothaveknowledgerequirements.Seeappleman,supra,§4595;larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.03[5]; Doud,supranote37,at748–50.

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tohireorretainthepersonaftergainingknowledgeornoticeofthecondition.112Forstateswithknowledgerequirements,knowledgeoftheinjurydoesnotneedtobedetailed:knowingthattheworkerhasinjurieswithoutknowingexactlythenatureof those injurieshasbeenheld tobe sufficient.113However, some stateshavemore stringent requirementsandmandate thatafilingbemadewith thestatebeforethesecondinjuryoccurs.114

III. analysIs

Wyoming’scurrentapproachtothefullresponsibilityruleleavesemployerspaying for injuries unrelated to their workers’ employment.115 If a workerexperiencesapermanenttotaldisability,heorsheiseligibletoreceiveamonthlypayment for up to eighty months, which the Wyoming Workers’ Safety andCompensation Division may extend.116 In addition, each child of a workerwithapermanenttotaldisabilityiseligibletoreceive$250permonth.117Aftereightymonths,theamountanemployerwouldhavepaidtoadisabledworkerwith no children who makes the average statewide monthly wage would total$183,280.118Thesehighworkers’compensationpremiumsdiscourageemployersfromhiringorretainingindividualswhomightbecomefurtherdisabledonthejob.119Tobetteraccordwithequitableprinciplesandtominimizethepossibilityofdiscrimination,anemployershouldonlyberesponsiblefortheportionoftheinjurysustainedinthecourseofemployment.120

112 McDowell,supra note37,at398;Doud,supranote37,at748–49.

113 larson & larson, supra note37,§ 91.03[3].

114 appleman, supranote111,§4595;Doud, supranote37,at749; see, e.g.,alaskastat. §23.30.205(c)(2010).

115 Seesupra notes37–57andaccompanyingtext.

116 Wyo. stat. ann. §27-14-403(c)(2010).Theamountofthemonthlypaymentdependsontheworker’swagesandtheaveragestatewidemonthlywage,asadjustedquarterlybytheWyomingWorkers’SafetyandCompensationDivision.Id. Apermanenttotaldisabilityoccurswhenapersoncannotfindsuitableemploymentbecauseofaninjuryforwhichthereisnoascertainableend.See supranote35andaccompanyingtext.

117 Wyo. stat. ann. §27-14-403(b).Thisamountmustbeadjustedforinflation.Id.

118 See id. § 27-14-403(c)(iii) (stating that an employee whose wage is equal to or greaterthanthestatewidemonthlywageiseligibletoreceivetwo-thirdsofhismonthlywageasbenefitsforthepermanenttotaldisability);Wyo. dIv. of Workers’ safety & Comp.,stateWIde average monthly Wage (2011) (providingthattheaveragestatewidemonthlywageforthesecondquarterof2011is$3463.33).

119 SeeMcClitis,supranote9,at401(statingthatbeforetheMissouriSIFwasadoptedemployerswerehesitanttohirethosewithdisabilities);Schurin,supra note63,at137–39(notingthemanythousandsofworkerslaidoffinOklahomaaftertheOklahomaSupremeCourtheldanemployerresponsibleforthefullinjuryofanemployeewholosthissecondeyeinaworkplaceaccident).

120 Seesupra notes37–40,69andaccompanyingtext.

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Both the full responsibility rule and the apportionment rule producedissatisfying results.121The full responsibility rule is unfair because it requiresemployers to pay for the combined injury when they are only responsible fortheportionof the injury thatoccurredduringemployment.122Apportionmentis harsh because the worker only receives the amount allocated to the work-relatedconditionalone.123Theworkerreceiveslessmoneythanifthedisabilityhad resulted from one work-related injury.124Therefore, if a state apportions,employeesreceivelessthantheamountneededtocompensatefortheirinjury.125Ifastatedoesnotapportionandchoosesthefullresponsibilityrule,employersarediscouragedfromhiringworkerswithdisabilitiesbecausetheyareliableforthecombinedinjury.126

ThesolutionforminimizingsuchharshresultsistouseaSIF,whichfunctionsasacompromisebetweenthetwoapproaches.127Itallowsanemployertoavoidtheinequitiesinthefullresponsibilityruleandapportionment.128Despitethesepositiveconsequences,criticismshavebeenleviedagainstSIFs.129

A. Common Criticisms of Second Injury Funds

TherearethreeprimarycriticismsofSIFs.Broadlystated,thefirstcriticismis thatSIFsdonot encourage employers to employdisabledworkers.130Thereareno studies regarding the efficacy of SIFs and so this criticism is not easilyaddressed.InherentinthecriticismisthebeliefthatSIFsonlyoperatetoremovethedisincentivetohiredisabledworkers,ratherthantrulyencourageemployers

121 Seelarson & larson, supranote37, §91.01[1](notingthatboththefullresponsibilityruleandapportionmentare“evils”fromthestandpointofadisabledworker);McDowell,supranote37,at391–92(explainingthatbothemployersandemployeessufferadetrimentwhenthereisasuccessiveinjuryifastateuseseitheranapportionmentsystemorthefullresponsibilityrule).

122 See Stateex rel.Wyo.Workers’Safety&Comp.Div.v.Faulkner,152P.3d394,398–99(Wyo. 2007) (noting that states adopt SIFs or apportionment to eliminate inequities in theapplicationofthefullresponsibilityrule).

123 See larson & larson,supranote37,§91.01[1].

124 Schurin,supranote63,at139.

125 See larson & larson, supra note 37, § 91.01[1] (“Under apportionment, [workers]receivedfarlessthantheiractualconditionrequiredtopreventdestitution....”);McDowell,supranote37,at392(notingthatapportionmentleavesworkerswithouttherequisitefundstolive).

126 McDowell,supranote37,at392;Schurin,supranote63,at139.

127 Schurin, supra note 63, at 138–39; see larson & larson, supra note 37, § 91.01[1](notingthatbothapportionmentandthefullresponsibilityruleoperateunsatisfactorilyandthatSIFsofferasolutionbyholdingtheemployerliableforonlytheamountofinjurythatoccurredduringemployment).

128 larson & larson, supranote37,§90.01;Dahl,supranote1,at103–04.

129 Doud,supranote37,at766–67;Schurin,supra note63,at135–36.

130 Dahl,supranote1,at120;Doud,supranote37,at746–47.

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tohiredisabledworkers.131AnotherpartofthiscriticismisthebeliefthatSIFsare under-inclusive in their listed compensable injuries and therefore assist sofewworkersthattheSIFdoesnotperformitsintendedfunction.132Thesecondcriticism posits that SIFs are over-inclusive and compensate workers for sucha large list of disabilities that the SIF depletes too quickly.133The final majorcriticismofSIFs,whichmanystateshaveusedasanexcusetoeliminatethefunds,isthatthepassageoftheADAhasmadetheneedforSIFsobsolete.134

B. In Defense of Second Injury Funds

Despite the criticism leveled against them, SIFs are currently used in themajorityof states.135Suchstateshave likelyrealizedthatmostof thecriticismsagainstSIFscanberemediedwithcarefulplanningandlegislation.136InresponsetotheclaimthatSIFsdonotencourageemployerstohiredisabledworkers,onesolutionistoadjusttheSIFtobemoreinclusiveinitscompensableinjuries.137IfaSIFpaysformoreinjuries,agreaternumberofworkerswillqualifyforbenefits,resulting in more employers making use of the fund.138 As employers see thebenefitsSIFscanoffer, theymaybemore likely tohire thosewithdisabilities.

131 See davId g. evans, 1 federal and state guIde to employee medICal leave, BenefIts and dIsaBIlItIes laWs§7:18(2010)(“Moststateshaveestablishedsecond-injuryfundstoremovethefinancialdisincentives tohireemployeeswithdisabilities.”);Russ & segalla, supranote65,§133:20 (stating that second injury fundsaremeant to relieve employers from liability for thepreexisting condition of the disabled workers); McClitis, supra note 9, at 416 (stating that thepurpose of the Missouri SIF is to provide incentive for employers to hire disabled workers byeliminatingthefinancialdisadvantageofdoingso).

132 See larson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2](statingthatsomejurisdictionswithhigh-accessthresholdsfortheirSIFsquestionwhetherthepurposeoftheSIFisbeingmetwhensofewworkerscanrecover);Dahl,supranote1,at120(statingthattheIowaSIFonlyappliestothelossofahand,foot,eye,orlegandisthereforetoonarrowtohelpmostdisabledworkersortheiremployers);Doud, supranote37,at752,758(statingthatOklahoma’sSIFdefinitionofpreexistinginjuriesistoonarrowtomeetthepurposeofthefund).TheNationalCommissiononStateWorkmen’sCompensationLawsrecommendsthatSIFsbegiven“broadcoverageofpre-existingimpairments”sothatthepurposeofthefundscanbemet.Nat’lComm’nonStateWorkmen’sComp.Laws, Major Conclusions and Recommendations, 1 Workmen’s Comp. l. rev.657,663–64(1974).However,theCommissionalsonotedthatcoveragebroadenoughtocoveralmostanydisabilitywoulddefeatthefund’spurpose.Id.at663.

133 larson & larson, supranote37,§91.01;Nat’lComm’nonStateWorkmen’sComp.Law, supranote132,at663;Doud,supranote37,at750–51,766.

134 larson & larson, supra note 37, § 91.03[8]; Second-Injury Funds Under Attack After ADA’s Enactment, supranote75;Doud,supranote37,at765.

135 McClitis,supranote9,at411;see supranote72(listingstateswithaSIFinforce).

136 SeeMcClitis,supranote9,at416–21(listingideasforimprovingtheMissouriSIF).

137 Workmen’s Comp. & rehaB. laW,supranote87,§20;larson & larson, supranote37, §91.01[2].

138 See Workmen’s Comp. & rehaB. laW,supranote87,§20.

2011 Comment 541

Asaresult,evenifaSIFdoesnotactuallyencourageemployerstohiredisabledworkers, it may succeed in minimizing the chance that employers will denyemploymenttothedisabled.139Eventhoughnostatisticaldataexiststoshowanincreaseinthenumberofhiredorretaineddisabledworkers,thefactthatmanycomplainabouttheoveruseordepletionofSIFsevidencesademandforthem.140Finally, a SIF that doesnotmeet its primarypurposemay satisfy a secondarypurposeofpreventingemployersfrompayingforinjuriesthatemploymentdidnotcause,therebypreventingworkers’compensationpremiumincreases.141

RegardingthecriticismthatSIFsarepoorlyfunded,thesolutionistocraftthe setofcompensable injuries toensure that it isneither toonarrownor toobroad.142 Some common restrictions include only allowing injuries that havebecomepermanenttobepaidoutofthefundbecausetheyrepresentthegreatestdetrimenttoemployers,onlyallowingrecoveryforinjuriesthataresymptomatic,andhavingarequirementthatthepreexistingconditionandthelaterwork-relatedinjurycombineinsuchawayastocreatealargerinjurythaneitherinjuryitself.143

As noted above, the ADA is often cited as a reason to eliminate SIFs.144However,theexistenceoftheADAisnotcompellingjustificationforeliminatingSIFs for several reasons.First,SIFsand theADAoperatedifferently fromoneanother.145TheADAismeanttodeteremployersfromdiscriminating,whereasSIFsaremeanttoencouragethehiringandretentionofdisabledworkers.146SIFsapply not only to pre-employment activity that the ADA covers, by deterring

139 McClitis,supranote9,at421;Second-Injury Funds Under Attack After ADA’s Enactment,supranote75.

140 See Doud, supra note 37, at 766 (citing Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers’ Compensation and the Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 hous. l. rev. 119, 201 (1994) (assertingthatemployers“dumpclaimsintothefund”becauseitdoesnotaffecttheirpremiums);Second-Injury Funds Under Attack After ADA’s Enactment, supra note 75 (noting that employersmakeSIFshandlethetoughcasestheydonotwanthandledunderregularworkers’compensation).

141 larson & larson, supranote37,§90.01;seeDahl,supranote1,at103–04(describinghowSIFsarecreatedtopreventincreasedcostsforemployersrelatedtopreexistingconditions).

142 larson & larson,supranote37, § 91.03[1]; Nat’lComm’nonStateWorkmen’sComp.Laws, supranote132,at663.

143 Doud, supranote37, at750–53; see modern Workers CompensatIon, supra note21,§200:25.

144 Second-Injury Funds Under Attack After ADA’s Enactment, supranote75;see supra notes76,136andaccompanyingtext.

145 Sheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at37;Schurin,supranote63,at146–47.

146 Sheldon & Grimwood, supra note 84, at 36–37; McClitis, supra note 9, at 415–16(concludingthatdespitethepressuretoeliminatetheMissouriSIF,thefundshouldcontinue).SIFsfunctionasa“carrot”tocompaniestoencouragethemtohiredisabledworkers,whereastheADAactsasa“stick”topunishemployerswhodonotdoso.SeeWorkmen’s Comp. & rehaB. laW,supranote87,§20.

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discriminationinthehiringprocess,butalsototheperiodofemployment,byencouraging the retention of disabled workers.147 In addition, between SIFsandtheADA,SIFsaretheonlywaytopreventemployersfrombearingthefullcost for combined injuries.148 Furthermore, some studies show discriminationintheworkplacehasactually increasedundertheADA,while therehavebeennocomparablefindings regardingSIFs.149For stateswith employerknowledgerequirements,theADAmayappeartopreventtheemployerfromobtainingtheknowledge or notice regarding previous injuries.150 However, the ADA allowsinquirybyanemployerintopreviousinjuriesaftermakingaconditionalofferofemployment,whichwouldensureanemployercangaintherequisiteknowledgeornotice.151Finally,theADAonlyappliestoemployerswithmorethanfifteenemployees.152This requirement does not apply to SIFs.153Therefore, SIFs aremore inclusive thantheADAandshouldberetaineddespite thepossibilityofsomeoverlap.154

C. Wyoming Should Adopt a Second Injury Fund

SIFswereoriginallycreatedinresponsetothereturnofveteransfromWorldWarII.155JustasSIFsbenefitedveteransimmediatelyafterWWII,ifWyomingadopts a SIF now it could benefit disabledWyoming veterans returning from

147 McClitis,supranote9,at415–16.

148 Id. at 416.

149 Schurin, supra note 63, at 151–52.The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’sNational Health Interview Study, the Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CurrentPopulationSurvey,andtheSurveyonIncomeandProgramParticipationhaveallshownasharpdecreaseindisabledemploymentsincetheADAwaspassed.Id.at151.SomecommentatorsclaimtheADAcreatesdisincentivesforemployerstohirethosewithdisabilitiesandthatemployersarebetter off financially to illegally discriminate against hiring people with disabilities rather thandiscriminating upon termination. Id. at 152–53. Some have even called for the repeal of theADAduetotheseresults.Id.at152.ItisalsoarguablylessexpensivetodiscriminateuponhiringthantomakethereasonableaccommodationsmandatedbytheADAuponthehireofthosewithdisabilities.Id.at153.

150 42U.S.C.§12112(d)(2)(A)(2006);Sheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at36;Schurin,supranote63,at145.

151 mICheal faIllaCe, dIsaBIlIty laW deskBook: the amerICans WIth dIsaBIlItIes aCt In the WorkplaCe § 13:2.4 (2009) (statingthatonceanemployermakesaconditionaljoboffer,heorshecaninquireregardingmentalorphysicaldisabilities);Phelan & arterton,supranote65,§ 16.8 (statingthatanemployermaymakeinquiriesregardinganapplicant’smedicalhistoryorrequire aphysical examinationonly after conditionally offering aposition if that employer alsorequirestheexaminationorinquiryofallapplicants);7employee dIsCrImInatIon CoordInator forms, pleadIngs and praCtICe aIds § 4.2 (2010).

152 42U.S.C.§1211(5)(A);Sheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at36;Schurin,supranote63,at148.

153 See sourcescitedsupra note152.

154 McClitis,supranote9,at416.

155 See supranote70andaccompanyingtext.

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conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to other disabled workers.156Furthermore,Wyominghasthehighestrateofworkplacefatalitiesinthenation,partly due to the risks of oil-and-gas-related employment.157 Employers andworkersinthemineralindustrycouldbenefitfromaSIFbecausemanyworkershavebeeninjuredonthejobandstillneedtoworktosupporttheirfamilies.158

Wyoming can learn from the experience of other states, and their reasonsfor terminationof their funds, inorder to ensure theWyomingSIF fulfills itspurpose.159Inordertodevelopaworkingfundthatwillaccomplishitsgoals,thestateneedstolookatfourmainareasbeforeitadoptsafund:(1)howtofundtheSIF;(2)themethodusedtodistributebenefitstoworkers; (3)the injuriestobe included in the fund;and(4)whether to includeaknowledgeornoticerequirement.Wyomingshouldconsidereachoftheseareasandimplementthefollowingsuggestionsinapilotprogramthatthestatecanreassessinanumberofyears.

In order to avoid funding difficulties, multiple funding sources should beused toestablishaSIF.160Onepossible sourceof fundingunique toWyominginvolvesmoniesfromtheWyomingPermanentMineralTrustFund(WPMTF),the market value of which is approximately $5,000,000,000.161 Although thefund corpus cannot be used, the income from theWPMTF goes to the stategeneralfund.162Wyomingalsohasapproximately$1,000,000,000initsWorkersCompensationFund,theincomeofwhichmaybeusedinalikemanner.163Inaddition, the funds for the Wyoming SIF would probably be placed in theirowninvestmentfundthattheWyomingStateTreasurerwouldhandle,holdingthe corpus inviolate and only using the income to provide for SIF needs.164

156 Employers Must Take Measures Not to Discriminate Against Thousands of Returning, Injured Veterans,supranote70;Tobenkin,supranote70.

157 John R. Vincent & Jessica Rutzick, Reinstating Wyoming’s Joint and Several Liability Paradigm: Protecting Wyoming’s Workforce, Their Families, and the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Fund from Uncompensated Injuries and Deaths,8Wyo. l. rev.87,87(2008).

158 Id.

159 See supranotes73–84andaccompanyingtext.

160 See McClitis,supranote9,at421(explainingthatotherstatessimultaneouslyusemultiplefundingmethodsfortheirSIFs).

161 See Wyo. state treasurer’s offICe, WyomIng state Investment portfolIo (2011),available at http://treasurer.state.wy.us/pdf/portfoliostatus0111.pdf (listing the market value forfundsforwhichtheWyomingStateTreasurer’sOfficehandlestheinvestment).

162 Id.;TelephoneInterviewwithMichaelWalden-Newman,ChiefInv.Officer,Wyo.StateTreasurer’sOffice(Mar.11,2011).

163 Wyo. state treasurer’s offICe, supra note 161; Telephone Interview with MichaelWalden-Newman,supranote162.

164 TelephoneInterviewwithMichaelWalden-Newman,supranote162.

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Additionally, using money from the WPMTF would not preclude additionalfunding sources, andWyomingwouldbewell advised tousemultiple sourcessimultaneouslytoensureadequatefunding.165

Wyominghasthebenefitoflearningfromotherstate’sfundingattemptstocreatemore solid funding.For example, ifWyomingusedmonies retainedbyinsurancecompaniesinthecaseofdeathwithoutdependents,itcouldlearnfromTexas’sexperience.166Texasusesthedeathwithoutdependentssurchargeas thesole funding source for its SIF,which remains in force.167AlthoughWyominghasasmallerpopulationthanTexas,thismethodmaynonethelessbesuccessfulforpartiallyfundingaSIFinWyoming.DespitecontroversieswithfundingSIFsfrommoneyretainedincasesofdeathwithoutdependents,thelonghistoryofSIFs using such monies means there is jurisprudence in other states to whichWyomingcouldlookforguidance.168Moreover,theWyominglegislaturecouldclarify the definition of dependents as well as the parameters of this fundingwhenitadoptsaSIF.169Tosimplifymattersevenfurther,Wyomingcouldusethedefinitionof“heir”andsurroundingcaselawregardingintestatesuccessionintheWyomingProbateCode.170

Requiringinsurancecarriersandself-insuredemployerstofundtheSIFpro-rata isalsoaviableoptionbecause itdistributes thecostsof theSIFequitablyamongemployers.171IfWyomingchoosesthisoption,itcouldlooktoMissouri’sresponsewhenitfounditssurchargerateofassessablepremiumsforself-insurersandinsurancecompanieswastoolowindeterminingasuccessfulrate.172

ThenextissueWyomingwouldneedtoaddressisthemethodofdistributingawards to workers. Wyoming should choose a method of compensation thatensuresworkersreceivetheirbenefitswhentheyneedthem,insteadofmakingthemwaitforbureaucraticprocesses.173TheapproachformerlytakenbyKansascouldbeasuccessfulwaytoaccomplishthis.174InKansas,theSIFstartedwiththeassumptionthatdistributionswouldbemadefromthefunddirectlytothe

165 See McClitis, supranote9,at421(indicatinghowotherstatesusemultiplemethodstofundtheirSIFs).

166 See supranotes89–90andaccompanyingtext.

167 tex. laB. Code ann. § 403.007(a)(West2010);Tobenkin,supranote70.

168 See supra notes89–90andaccompanyingtext.

169 Seelarson & larson, supranote37,§91.01[2](describingsomeofthedifficultiesstatesusingdeathwithoutdependentsfundinghaveexperiencedinimplementingSIFs).

170 SeeWyo. stat. ann.§§2-4-101(c),2-16-102(a)(iii)(2010).

171 See supranotes87–88andaccompanyingtext.

172 See McClitis,supranote9,at416–17.

173 Seesupranotes95–101andaccompanyingtext.

174 See supra note101andaccompanyingtext.

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employee.175However, if the fundswerenot available in a timelymanner, theemployerdistributedthefundstotheworkersandwaslaterreimbursed.176Thismethodpreventedemployersfrombearingtheentireburdenofpayingworkersdirectly every time and also ensured workers were paid quickly.This methodwouldbenefit themany smallbusinesses inWyoming thatdonothavemuchworkingcapitalandisthemostfairtobothemployersandworkers.

In crafting its list of compensable injuries, Wyoming should create a listbroadenoughtoensurethatthepurposeoftheSIFismet,butnarrowenoughtopreventthefundfromdepletingtooquickly.177OnewayWyomingmaylimitits injuries is to only allow reimbursement for combined injuries resulting inpermanentdisability.178Wyomingshouldnot,however,limitpaymentsfromthefund to situations in which the preexisting condition is a work-related injury.Wyoming should instead accept both work-related and personal injuries aspreexistinginjuries.179Adoptingsuchabroaddefinitionofcompensable injurywillensurethatthosewhoareinjuredonthejobandseeklateremploymentwillbereimbursed,aswellasthosewhoareinjuredinapersonalaccident.InordertokeeptheSIFconsistentwiththeworkers’compensationstatute,theWyomingSIF should only compensate for injuries that would be the equivalent of acompensabledisabilityunder the existingworkers’ compensation statute.180Toavoiddifficultyprovingthatthepreexistinginjuryexistedbeforethework-relatedinjury,Wyomingshouldonlyallowrecoveryforinjuriesthatweresymptomaticbefore the work-related injury occurred.181 Wyoming could retain its currentrequirementthattheinjuryaggravate,accelerate,orcombinewithapreexistingcondition in a material or substantial manner before it will apportion fromthefund.182

175 See supra note101andaccompanyingtext.

176 See supra note101andaccompanyingtext.

177 Doud,supranote37,at750–51;seesupranotes142–43andaccompanyingtext.

178 See larson & larson, supra note 37, § 91.01[4] (stating the typical second injuryfundonlyappliestosituationswherethecombinedinjuryresultsinapermanenttotaldisabilityclassification);Dahl,supranote1,at106–07(statingthatinorderforthepurposeofaSIFtobemet,thecombineddisabilityshouldbesevereenoughthatitimpedeseffortstofindemployment).

179 But seeColo.rev.stat.§8-46-101(1)(a)(2010)(requiringthatthenowdefunctColoradoSIFonlypaybenefitswherethepreexistingconditionwasawork-relatedinjury).

180 larson & larson, supranote37, § 91.02[4].

181 Seesupranote109andaccompanyingtext.

182 Straubev.Stateex. rel.Workers’Safety&Comp.Div.,208P.3d394,401(Wyo.2009).

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Finally,Wyomingshouldnotadoptaknowledgerequirement.183Althougharequirementthatanemployerhavenoticeorknowledgeoftheinjurymayappeartohelpmeetthepurposeofthefund, itwouldonlyconflictwiththeADA.184Wyomingmayalsoavoidlitigationbynotadoptingaknowledgerequirement.185

Iv. ConClusIon

Wyoming is theonly state thathasnotpassed a second injury fund sincetheir inception in the 1940s.186 Some states may have subsequently abolishedtheirSIFs,butamajorityofstatesrecognizetheimportanceofSIFstoencourageemploymentofthedisabled,asevidencedbythecontinuationoftheirfunds.187The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act mandates that injured workersreceivebenefits asquickly aspossible andat a reasonable cost to employers.188The current system isnot consistentwith thismandatebecause employers areresponsible for the entire injury when employees with preexisting conditionsare injuredon the job.189Theonlyother alternative to aSIF—apportionmentbetweenemployerandemployee—istooharsh.190Thetimeforthestatetofollowitsownlegislativemandateisnow,andtheonlyreasonablewayitcandosoisbypassinglegislationcreatingaSIF.BecauseWyomingisthelaststatetoinitiatea fund, ithas thebenefitof learning fromothers’mistakes and avoiding theirrepetition.ItcanchooseoptionsforSIFfundingandcompensatinginjuriesthatwillmosteffectivelyserveemployersandemployeesandensurethatthesystemisfairtoallstakeholders.

183 SeeSheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at37–38(statingthatArizonashouldeliminatetheknowledgerequirementforitsSIFbecauseitclasheswiththeADA).Eliminatingtheknowledgerequirement for stateSIFshasbeencriticizedbecause itwouldcreatea“windfall” for insurancecarriers. Id. at 38. However, doing so would not create a windfall but would only help ensurerecoveryforthosewhodeserveitwithoutcreatingunnecessarybarriers.Id.

184 SeeSheldon&Grimwood,supranote84,at37–38(statingthatknowledgerequirementsdonotharmonizewiththeADA);supranotes83–84andaccompanyingtext.

185 See larson & larson, supra note 37,§ 91.03[5] (statingthataknowledgerequirementcausesmorelitigationcostandtimethanitisworth).

186 See supranote71andaccompanyingtext.

187 See supra notes 72,135andaccompanyingtext.

188 See supra note46andaccompanyingtext.

189 See supranotes115–20andaccompanyingtext.

190 See supranote62andaccompanyingtext.

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