Laura LoSciutoJeff Kruse

20 April 2009

Chinua Achebe, “Colonialist Criticism” (pg. 57-61)

Introduction Achebe is Nigerian author & professor Essay written in 1974 Responds to criticism directed at his 1958 novel, Things Fall Apart Things Fall Apart describes the culture clash and power struggle between colonialists and

Africans in the small village that they take over The villagers believe the gods want them to sacrifice a child, but the colonialists then

charge them with murder Novel questions whether or not there is such thing as universal values and morality

Literary Criticism of the Novel Honor Tracy in 1971: “… the peaceful village of their childhood to which [Nigerian

novelists] nostalgically look back was one that had been purged of bloodshed and alcoholism by an ague-ridden district officer and a Scottish mission lassie whose years were cut short by every kind of intestinal parasite.”

Describes pre-colonized Africa as uncivilized, filled with bloodshed, disease, and vice; doesn’t address the fact that many problems that exist in Africa now were actually a result of colonial interference

Colonialist criticism claims “a deeper knowledge and a more reliable appraisal of Africa than the educated African writer has shown himself capable of” (58)

Colonialist thinking believes that the educated native is even worse than the uneducated natives because the educated natives are still not as intelligent and culturally developed as the colonialists, but they have also lost their connection to their own people – like Samba Diallo in Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s novel The Ambiguous Adventure

“Take for instance the black writer who seizes on the theme that Africa’s past is a sadly inglorious one as though it were something new that had not already been ‘proved’ adequately for him. Colonialist critics will, of course, fall all over him in ecstatic and salivating admiration…” (60)

Is African Literature “Universal”? Charles Larson claims that much African literature can be seen as universal Achebe does not believe this, but rather sees it as an attempt by Western scholars to apply

Western culture to everything Points out that scholars never try to make a Western novel “universal” because it is

already considered to be so – “the shining faith that we are all Americans under the skin” (59)

“In the nature of things the work of a Western writer is automatically informed by universality” (59)

Achebe believes in cultural diversity, not universalism – “Let every people bring their gifts to the great festival of the world's cultural festival and mankind will be all the richer for the variety and distinctiveness of the offerings.” (61)

Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Imaginary Strangers” in Cosmopolitanism (pg. 94-99)

Introduction Appiah: raised in Ghana, educated in England, professor in U.S. Cosmopolitanism written in 2006 Proposes another view of globalization Presents heterogeneity as a positive force

“Do We Need Universals?” For Appiah, there is no such thing as a truly humanistic universal Differentiates between “universals” versus “norms” – e.g., we think of vision as a

universal physical aspect of humans, but it is actually just a statistical norm; some people have poor vision, are colorblind, or are completely blind

There are similarities, and basic traits, among all humans, which is why we all produce “practices like music, poetry, dance, marriage, and funerals; values resembling courtesy, hospitality, sexual modesty, generosity, reciprocity, the resolution of social conflict; concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, parent and child, past, present, and future” (96-7)

Fundamentals of human biology and common, extraneous environmental problems become a priori foundations to common, analogous human situations.

However, the specifics of these practices, values, and concepts vary greatly We all want to find similarities with other humans and create “in-groups,” but to do so

we have to also create “out-groups” – e.g., “Loving America has, in part, to be about hating, or anyway disliking, America’s enemies” (98)

“The conclusion is obvious enough: the points of entry to cross-cultural conversations are things that are shared by those who are in the conversation” (97). Appiah claims a fundamental trait: a need to share and to identify points of commonality, as an aspect of basic human curiosity.

No such thing as universal reality; everything is perception, which is not universal “Humanity isn’t, in the relevant sense, an identity at all.” (98) It is not necessary to share an identity, but to share a recognition of mutual curiosity

about one’s own identity and the identity of fellow humans