A P P E N D I X : T H E T E X T O F I N F E R N O , C A N T O V

So I descended from the first circleto the second, which rings a smaller spacebut so much pain that it prompts a howl.There stands awful Minos, gauging sins,proclaiming verdicts at the portal,and condemning by the way he winds.

I mean that when each ill-begotten soulcomes before him, it confesses all,and this connoisseur of sin must ruleWhat place is fit for it in hell:he wraps himself once with his tailfor every tier he makes it fall.There’s never a pause at his tribunal;one by one they join the assembly;they speak, listen, and he makes them tumble.

“O you who come to this grim infirmary,”said Minos when he saw me appear(pausing the exercise of his official duty),“Watch how you enter and whom you trust here:don’t be fooled by the width of the entry!”

To this my guide replied, “Why roar?Don’t try to block his irresistible journey;it’s been willed in that place whereany wish can be. So drop your query.”

Now the mournful notes begin to blare,striving to make their weeping heard,

Appendix208

pounding me with a doleful clamor.I’ve come to a place where all light’s suppressed,which bellows just as the sea is rippedin a storm as opposite winds contest.The hellish tempest that has never stoppedwhips the spirits in its passion:a twisting, hounding, mad assault.When they come before Minos’ ruin,they shriek and sorrow and lament;there they curse the power of heaven.I understood that this was the tormentof the damned whose sin was carnal:those who made reason desire’s servant.As in cold weather their wings propelstarlings in full and ample f locks, soin hell strong breaths of wind compelwicked spirits up and down, to and fro.No hope will ever comfort them. No lessersentence, no pause is granted: this they know.

And as cranes will move, chanting lays in the air,ordering themselves into one long file,so I saw coming with a woeful clamorshades that were borne by the stress of the squall.“Master,” I said, “who are those peoplescourged like that by the purple gale?”

“The first whose story you’d have me tell,”he said, “was empress of many tongues.The vice of lust so broke her willthat she wrote her desires into the laws,legalizing her tastes so as to erasethe censure that such conduct merits.She’s Semiramis; she succeeded Ninus(or so we read) and was his wife. She possessedthe land where today the Sultan rules.One who killed herself for love is next,breaking faith with Sichaeus’s ashes,and after her Cleopatra, the oversexed.See Helen, hub of such wicked times,and great Achilles whose last opponentwas invulnerable Love. See Paris;

Appendix 209

there’s Tristan,” and a myriadshades he showed me with his finger.Those whom Love split from Life he named.

After I had listened to my teacheridentify the ancient knights and ladiespity fastened on me and I neared despair.I began, “Poet, gladly would I conversewith that pair who go together and seemto move so buoyantly in the winds.”And he to me: “You will see themwhen they’re closer; then you must entreatthem by the love that drives them. They will come.”

The next time the wind blew them pastI sent forth my voice: “Battered souls, willyou come and talk, if Another permits it?”Just as doves, at desire’s callcoast through the air, wings stiff ly raised,drawn to their nest by sheer force of will,so these two from Dido’s f lock departed,And came toward us through the noxious air,so strongly and affectionately had I shouted.

“O gracious and benevolent creature,moving through mulberry air to visitus, who dyed the world a bloody color,if we had a friend in the universe’s lordwe’d pray to him to grant you peace,since you had pity on our bitter plight.Whatever would please you to hear or express,we’ll listen and speak to you, so long as the windsstill themselves as they do now for us.

“The territory where I was born sitswhere the Po runs to the sea at lastto make a peace with its tributaries.Love soon takes hold in the gentle heart.It seized this man for my graceful being,the body whose loss I still resent.Love excuses none who’re loved from loving.It seized me for his charm and as you seeit will always be my only feeling.

Appendix210

Love steered us to a common death. Heis meant for Caina who extinguished our blazing.”These words were carried from them to me.

Once I’d understood the spirits’ grieving,I lowered my face and looked so gloomythat the poet said, “What are you thinking?”When I could answer, I cried, “How many‘sweet thoughts,’ alas, and how much passionconducted these two to their destiny!”

Then back I turned in their directionand spoke, starting: “Francesca, your sufferingsmake me weep from sadness and compassion.But tell me, at the time of your sweet sighings,how and in what way did Love give leavefor you to know your suspect longings?”

And she to me, “ There’s no worse griefthan to recall happy times’ when onefeels sorrow: that’s your teacher’s plain belief.But if you have so much desire to learnthe first root of our love, I’ll relate itas one who weeps while she spins her yarn.

“It was our pleasure one day to readof Lancelot, by Love abducted.we were alone and had no urge or portent.Breathing as one, we felt our eyes attractedby the reading, and our faces paled;but a definite point was our sure defeat.When we read that ‘the desiredsmile then was kissed by the ardent lover,’he who ‘can never be torn away’ kissedme, all atremble. A Galehaut was the authorof that book, and seductive was his fancy.On that day, we read no farther.”

While one soul told its storythe other wept, and I collapsed.As if I’d died, I swooned from pityand crumpled like a falling corpse.

N O T E S

Introduction

1. Simon Blackburn introduces this analogy but rejects it. See Simon Blackburn, “Securing

the Nots,” in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 97.

2. Jonathan Dancy, “The Particularist’s Progress,” in Brad Hooker and Margaret Little, eds.,

Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 131.

3. John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, no. 3 (March 1995),

pp. 140–141.

4. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1989); Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, Calif.: University

of California Press, 1994); Colin McGinn, Shakespeare’s Philosophy: Discovering the

Meaning Behind the Plays (New York: HarperCollins, 2006); Martha C. Nussbaum,

“Beatrice’s ‘Dante’: Loving the Individual?” Apeiron, vol. 26, nos. 3 and 4 (September/

December 1993), pp. 170–171.

5. Martha C. Nussbaum makes precisely this point. See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum,

Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990),

p. 30.

6. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 16.

7. David Parker observes “the virtual absence of explicit ethical interest in contempo-

rary literary discourse” during the 1970s and early 1980s. David Parker, Ethics, Theory

and the Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3. And Daniel

R. Schwartz asks, “Why did ethics virtually disappear from the universe of literary

studies in the 1970s and 1980s?” Daniel Schwartz, “A Humanistic Ethic in Reading,”

in Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack, eds., Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in

Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory (Charlottesville, Va: University Press of Virginia,

2001), p. 9. However, Michael Eskin criticizes the rhetoric of a “turn,” mainly because

there was always more ethical literary criticism than recent manifestos suggest. Eskin,

“Introduction: The Double ‘Turn’ to Ethics and Literature?” Poetics Today, vol. 25, no 4

(2004), pp. 557–572.

8. An inf luential depiction of critical reading (albeit without a definition) is Michael Warner,

“Uncritical Reading,” in Jane Gallop, ed., Polemic: Critical or Uncritical (New York:

Routledge, 2004), pp. 13–38.

9. Amanda Anderson, The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Cultures of Theory (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 6, 4.

10. Ibid., p. 127.

Notes212

One The Story of Paolo and Francesca

1. Giovanni Boccaccio, Esposizioni sopra la Comedia di Dante, ed., Giorgio Padoan, in Vittore

Branca, ed., Tutte le opere di Giovanni Boccaccio (Verona: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1965), vol. vi,

gloss on Inf. v, 97–99.

2. Paolo Valesio, “Canto V: The Fierce Dove,” in Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn, and

Charles Ross, eds., Lectura Dantis: Inferno (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press,

1998), p. 81. In the terminology of the New Critics, great literary works are “autotelic”:

they have their own purposes and are not well understood as commentaries on the world

outside the text.

3. Dante uses the word “francesca” to mean “the French” at Inf. xxix, 123.

4. The real Francesca had a brother named Francesco who died in infancy. See “Le fonti docu-

mentarie” at www.rimini.com/storia/, which is mostly based on documents assembled by

Luigi Tonini in the nineteenth century. Dante too would have heard the echo of St. Francis

in Francesca’s name, and possibly he wanted to compare her relationship to birds with the

saint’s. The ultimate origin of the name Francesco/Francesca is the Late Latin word Francus,

which means “free” or “freeman.” Dante uses the Italian franco to mean “free” at Inf. ii: 132,

so he may have heard the root meaning in Francesca’s name.

5. Jonathan Usher, “Paolo and Francesca in the Filocolo and the Esposizioni,” Lectura Dantis,

no. 10 (Spring 1992), p. 22.

6. For example, Rev. Henry Boyd provides the whole tale (in English) with his translation of

The Divina Commedia (London, 1802), vol. 1, pp. 134–137, thus bringing a fairly obscure

Boccaccio text to the attention of the English Romantics.

7. See “Le Fonti documentarie,” at the Web page of the Comune di Rimini’s: www.comune.

rimini.it/storia/.

8. Charles S. Singleton, The Divine Comedy, Inferno, 2. Commentary (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1970), p. 84. Whereas the Francesca of the Divine Comedy is prolix and

eloquent in explaining her own private motives and passions, the character in Boccaccio’s

commentary is utterly silent. Whereas Dante’s Francesca acts on blind passion, Boccaccio’s

is rather deliberate (she opens the door “believing that she could come up with some

excuse”). In short, as SunHee Kim Gertz concludes, “Boccaccio’s Francesca is almost an

antithesis to Dante’s.” Dante, “The Readerly Imagination: Boccaccio’s Commentary on

Dante’s Inferno V,” Romanische Forschungen, vol. 105, no. 1 (1993), p. 22.

9. Peter Dronke (“Francesca and Héloïse,” Comparative Literature, vol. 27, no. 2 [Spring 1975],

pp. 113–135, p. 129) notes that a galeotto was also a word for a pilot or steersman, citing

Inf. viii, 17 and Purg. ii, 27.

10. “I Commentatori di Dante e i cronisti, via www.rimini.com.”

11. For Dante’s exile, see Robert Hollander, Dante: A Life in Works (New Haven, Conn.:

Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 5–6; R.W.B. Lewis, Dante (New York: Penguin, 2001),

pp. 77–89.

12. Gerolamo Biscaro, Dante a Ravenna (indagine storiche), Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano, no.

41 (1921), p. 55; Giorgio Petrocchi, Vita di Dante (Rome: Guiseppe Laterza e Figli, 1983),

p. 192.

13. Boccaccio, Tratello in laude di Dante, section i, paragraph 80, in Vittore Branca, ed., Tutte le

opera di Giovanni Boccaccio (Milan: Mandadori, 1974), vol. 3, p. 456.

14. Ignazio Baldelli, Dante e Francesca (Florence: Olschki, 1999), p. 29; John Larner, The Lords

of Romagna: Ramognol Society and the Origins of the Signorie (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University

Press, 1965), p. 257, n. 35.

15. See Corrado Ricci, L’Ultimo rifugio di Dante (revised edition), Ravenna, 1965, pp. 514–5,

520. Italian text with modernized spelling from Francesco Protonotari, ed., Nuova antologia

di lettere, scienze, ed arti (Rome: Nuova Antologia, 1903), p. 582.

16. Lewis, Dante, p. 53.

Notes 213

17. So thought Giovanni Pascoli, mentioned in Larner, Lords of Romagna, p. 257, n. 39. Imagine

that Guido read Canto V and recognized his own poem quoted by Francesca. He might

have understood the bond described in line 135 as a private reference to the friendship

between himself and Dante, che non mai fia diviso.

18. Chiarini, “Ravenna” in the Enciclopedia Dantesca, directed by Umberto Bosco (Rome, 1973),

vol. 4, p. 860.

19. See his “Rif lessioni su un vecchio problema: Dante e Ravenna,” in Atti del Convegno Internazionale

di Studi Danteschi (Ravenna, 1971), p. 230. Dante calls Francesca and Paolo “two relatives,”

which may imply that he viewed them as members of his own family (Inf. vi, 2). The birds,

the wind, and the ruins that are prominent in Ravenna also recall the setting of Canto V.

20. Gerolamo Biscaro, Dante a Ravenna: Indagine storiche (Rome, 1921), p. 52, referring to Purg,

xiv, 98 and 107. Dante praises the Traversari family of Ravenna, even though they were

“humiliated and driven into exile by the Polentas.”

21. Benvenuto da Imola, Comentum super Dantis Aldigherij Comoediam, quoted and translated in

Singleton, The Divine Comedy, Inferno, 2. Commentary, pp. 480-481.

22. Baldelli, Dante e Francesca, p. 29.

23. Larner, Lords of Romagna, p. 62: “Romagnol treachery is a recurrent theme in the Inferno.”

24. In 1322, Guido left his brother, the pious and learned Archbishop Rainaldo, to manage

Ravenna. Rainaldo was killed by their cousin, Ostasio, who seized the city and defeated

Guido on the battlefield, driving him into exile. See Larner, Lords of Romagna, p. 68.

25. C.H. Grandgent, ed., Dante Alighieri, La Divina Comedia (Boston, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1909),

p. 44.

26. Quoted in Diego Saglia, “Translation and Cultural Appropriation: Dante, Paolo and

Francesca in British Romanticism,” Quaderns. Revista de traducció, vol. 7 (2002), p. 115.

27. See Chapter 6, below, and Renato Poggioli, “Tragedy or Romance? A Reading of the

Paolo and Francesca Episode in Dante’s Inferno,” PMLA, vol. 72, no. 3 ( June 1957), p. 322.

28. Dante’s source is the church father Orosius (i.4): see Dronke, “Francesca and Héloïse,” p. 114.

29. One possibility is that he had not yet encountered Guido Novello when he wrote Canto V

of the Inferno, and only later did he move into Guido’s household. Still, the fact that he left

the text alone requires an explanation, I think, if he had meant to criticize Francesca.

Two Dante Philosophizes About Francesca’s Case

1. Grandgent, Dante Alighieri, p. 43.

2. Lionel Trilling, “Reality in America” (1940) in The Liberal Imagination (New York: Harcourt

Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 6. (Literally, Trilling refers to V.L. Parrington’s attitude toward

Henry Clay’s alleged “romanticism.”)

3. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, and

Bad Behaviour,” in Hooker and Little, eds., Moral Particularism, pp. 227–255.

4. Cora Diamond, “Having a Rough Story about What Moral Philosophy Is,” New Literary

History, vol. 15, no. 1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 167–168.

5. Nussbaum, “Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory,” pp. 236, 234.

6. Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 175. writes,

“moral philosophers systematically ignore the role of f ictional works in ethical under-

standing.” See Chapter 7 for some important exceptions, of whom McGinn mentions only

Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty.

7. Cf. the first three tercets of Inf. xiii, each beginning with “non.” Dante has just entered the

forest of suicides, that negates, life.

8. Cf. Mark Norris Lance and Maggie Little, “From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics,”

in Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko Strahovnik, eds., Challenging Moral

Particularism (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 54.

Notes214

9. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), edited

by Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), BA ix; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics,

1137b13ff; 1179a19–120.

10. Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 56.

11. Hooker, “Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad,” in Hooker and Little, eds., Moral

Particularism, p. 7.

12. Ibid., p. 8.

13. For example, Republic, 331c ff.

14. I am quoting an argument that Mike W. Martin introduces, only to reject: see his Martin,

“Love’s Constancy,” Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 263 ( January 1993), p. 64.

15. Lewis, Dante, p. 107.

16. In medieval manuscripts, as in today’s editions, the word “Amor” is capitalized in lines

100–106, because it follows periods and begins new lines. Thus Francesca may be thinking

of the god Amor. See Dante Alighieri, Inferno, translated by Robert and Jean Hollander

with introduction and notes by Robert Hollander (New York: Doubleday, 2000), p. 98.

Hereafter cited as Hollander notes.

17. Gianfranco Contini, “Dante come personaggio-poeta sella Commedia,” in Un’idea de

Dante (Turin: Guilio Einaudi, 1976), p. 46. Francesca is also quoting two poems by Guido

Guinizelli and a sonnet by Dante (VN, XX) that alludes to Guido. I discuss these allusions

below, in Chapter 5.

18. Dronke, “Francesca and Héloïse,” p. 126.

19. Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds.,

The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

20. Moral philosophy, John Rawls says, cannot be “simply a list of the judgments on institu-

tions and actions that we are prepared to render . . . .” A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition

(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1999, sec. 9, p. 41).

21. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, section 11 (pp. 53–4). Cf. Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps,”

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1 (1981), pp. 177–212.

22. See, for example, Roger Crisp, “Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue,” Philosophical

Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 167 (April 1992), with a clear statement at p. 160.

23. Utilitarianism (New York, 1987), pp. 9–10. Some readers would claim that Mill was not a

consistent monist, since his commitment to liberty and his distinction between higher and

lower pleasures do not follow from the principle of utility. If he was a pluralist, it was despite

himself.

24. H.W.B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 92, quoted

in David McNaughton, “An Unconnected Heap of Duties?” The Philosophical Quarterly,

vol. 46, no. 185 (October 1996), p. 434.

25. W.D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 190.

26. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II:ii, ed. J.P. Migne (Paris, 1859), Question

LXXVII, Article 1, pp. 586, 587.

27. See Georges Duby, The Knight, The Lady, and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in

Medieval France, 1981, trans. Barbara Bray (New York, 1983), p. 30.

28. The Book of Common Prayer, printed by Robert Barner (London, 1642), section entitled “Of

Matrimony.”

29. Summa Theologica, Supplement, Quest. xli, objection 1, trans. by Fathers of the English

Dominican Province, online edition via www.newadvent.org/summa/ copyright 2008 by

Kevin Knight, retrieved July 5, 2009

30. Ibid.

31. Summa Theologica II-II, Question CLIV, article 8, Migne, pp. 1087–1088 (my translation).

32. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supplement, Quest. xli, objection 1, via www.newadvent.org/

summa.

33. Hollander, Dante: A Life, p. 8.

Notes 215

34. My translation from Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose, edited by Ernest Langlois

(Paris, 1921), vol. iii, lines 8759ff. The passage about love and economic exploitation is

8355–8454.

35. For these arguments, see Dronke, “Francesca and Héloïse,” pp. 130, 132.

36. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), edited

by Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), BA 54, 55.

37. I translate from Eberhard Nestle, Erwin Nestle, Kurt Aland, et al., Novum testamentum graece

(Stuttgart, 1985). Unless otherwise noted, subsequent Biblical passages come from the King

James Version, with my alterations in square brackets.

38. Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World, revised and augmented version translated

by Montgomery Belgion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 85.

39. De Rougemont is wrong about the troubadours as a group, because only about three percent

of their songs seriously extol adultery, and many criticize it. See Paden, “The Troubadour’s

Lady: Her Marital Status and Social Rank,” Studies in Philology, vol. 72 (1975), pp. 28–50.

However, Love and the Western World describes a doctrine that at least a few people have held

since medieval times.

40. Summa Theologica II-II, 8, 154 (my translation).

41. Marcia W. Baron is typical of modern Kantian moral philosophers in that she emphasizes

these two duties rather than the Categorical Imperative as the useful heart of Kant’s ethics.

See Marcia W. Baron, “Kantian Ethics,” in Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, eds.,

Three Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), especially pp. 19, 35–36.

42. Georges Duby, Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages, trans. Jane Dunnett from Mâle moyen

age, 1988 (Chicago, 1994), pp. 3–21; Duby, The Knight, The Lady, and the Priest: The Making

of Modern Marriage in Medieval France, 1981, trans. Barbara Bray (New York, 1983), p. 48.

43. See Eva Cantarella, “Homicides of Honor: The Development of Italian Adultery Law over

Two Millennia,” in David I. Kertzer and Richard P. Saller, eds., The Family in Italy from

Antiquity to the Present (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 229–244.

44. Summa Theologica, Supplement, Q. 60.

45. For example, in the Italian version of the Arthurian romance, La Tavola ritonda, Mark pun-

ishes his wife Iseult and her lover Tristan for adultery, but Arthur then shames and punishes

Mark for his actions. See Aldo D. Scaglione, Nature and Love in the Middle Ages (Berkeley,

Calif.: University of California Press, 1963), p. 21.

Chapter 3

1. I owe this point to my colleague Robert Wachbroit.

2. A mother dove in a high wind appears in Virgil, Aeneid V, 213–217 (Hollander notes, p. 96;

see Infe. V: 82–84). For some negative or even sinister undertones in the dove simile, see

Chapter 5.

3. On seeing-as, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, third

edition (New York, 1958), section IIxi; and Peter Levine, Living Without Philosophy: On

Narrative, Rhetoric, and Morality (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 31–38.

4. Giovambattista Gelli, a sixteenth-century commentator, explains that in the “vocabolo

nostro fiorentino particulore,” “ ‘perso’ propriamente significa un colore azzurro, ma oscu-

rissimo e buio.” See Gelli’s Letture edite e inedite sopra la Commedia di Dante, quoted in Della

Terza, “Inferno V: Tradition and Exegesis,” p. 51.

5. Purg, xxvii, pp. 37–39 and Purg, xxxiii, p. 69.

33. Hollander, Dante: A Life, p. 8.

34. My translation from Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose, edited by Ernest Langlois

(Paris, 1921), vol. iii, lines 8759ff. The passage about love and economic exploitation is

8355–8454.

35. For these arguments, see Dronke, “Francesca and Héloïse,” pp. 130, 132.

36. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), edited

by Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), BA 54, 55.

37. I translate from Eberhard Nestle, Erwin Nestle, Kurt Aland, et al., Novum testamentum graece

(Stuttgart, 1985). Unless otherwise noted, subsequent Biblical passages come from the King

James Version, with my alterations in square brackets.

38. Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World, revised and augmented version translated

by Montgomery Belgion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 85.

39. De Rougemont is wrong about the troubadours as a group, because only about three per-

cent of their songs seriously extol adultery, and many criticize it. See William D. Paden,

“The Troubadour’s Lady: Her Marital Status and Social Rank,” Studies in Philology, vol. 72

(1975), pp. 28–50. However, Love and the Western World describes a doctrine that at least a

few people have held since medieval times.

40. Summa Theologica II-II, 8, 154 (my translation).

41. Marcia W. Baron is typical of modern Kantian moral philosophers in that she emphasizes

these two duties rather than the Categorical Imperative as the useful heart of Kant’s ethics.

See Marcia W. Baron, “Kantian Ethics,” in Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, eds.,

Three Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), especially pp. 19, 35–36.

42. Georges Duby, Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages, trans. Jane Dunnett from Mâle

moyen age, 1988 (Chicago, 1994), pp. 3–21; Duby, The Knight, The Lady, and the Priest:

The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France, 1981, trans. Barbara Bray (New York,

1983), p. 48.

43. See Eva Cantarella, “Homicides of Honor: The Development of Italian Adultery Law

over Two Millennia,” in David I. Kertzer and Richard P. Saller, eds., The Family in

Italy from Antiquity to the Present (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.

229–244.

44. Summa Theologica, Supplement, Q. 60.

45. For example, in the Italian version of the Arthurian romance, La Tavola ritonda, Mark pun-

ishes his wife Iseult and her lover Tristan for adultery, but Arthur then shames and punishes

Mark for his actions. See Aldo D. Scaglione, Nature and Love in the Middle Ages (Berkeley,

Calif.: University of California Press, 1963), p. 21.

Three Poetry and the Emotions in Francesca’s Case

1. I owe this point to my colleague Robert Wachbroit.

2. A mother dove in a high wind appears in Virgil, Aeneid V, 213–217 (Hollander notes, p. 96;

see Infe. V: 82–84). For some negative or even sinister undertones in the dove simile, see

Chapter 5.

3. On seeing-as, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, third

edition (New York, 1958), section IIxi; and Peter Levine, Living Without Philosophy: On

Narrative, Rhetoric, and Morality (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 31–38.

4. Giovambattista Gelli, a sixteenth-century commentator, explains that in the “vocabolo

nostro fiorentino particulore,” “ ‘perso’ propriamente significa un colore azzurro, ma oscu-

rissimo e buio.” See Gelli’s Letture edite e inedite sopra la Commedia di Dante, quoted in Dante

Della Terza, “Inferno V: Tradition and Exegesis,” Dante Studies, vol. 99 (1981), p. 51.

5. Purg, xxvii, pp. 37–39 and Purg, xxxiii, p. 69.

Notes216

6. According to Prudentius, Christ gives the damned a respite annually on the anniversary of

the harrowing of Hell (the same day when he died on the cross, i.e., Good Friday). Dante

descends into Hell on Good Friday. So perhaps the winds still for this reason. See Dronke,

“Francesca and Héloïse,” p. 123.

7. Poggioli, “Tragedy or Romance?” pp. 330, 326.

8. Thomas Goddard Bergin, “Lectura Dantis: Inferno V,” in Lectura Dantis, vol. 1, no. 1

(Fall 1987), p. 17.

9. De Sanctis, “Francesca da Rimini secondo i critici e secondo l’arte” (1869), in Joseph Rossi

and Alfred Galpin, eds., trans., De Sanctis on Dante (Madison: University of Wisconsin

Press, 1957), p. 45.

10. See editorial notes to this verse, which various editions have as either “che al giudicio divin

passion comporta?” or “che al guidicio divin compassion porta?”

11. Étienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, trans. David Moore (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949),

p. 304.

12. “And from these articles of faith it behooves us / to syllogize” (Par. xxiv: 72–73).

13. Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius, Philosophiae consolatio, edited by Ludwig Bieler, Corpus

christianorum, series latina (Turnhout, Belgium, 1957), part II, prose 4.1–4.2.

14. Consolatio, part I, prose 1.8.

15. Contini, “Dante come personaggio-poeta,” in Varianti e altra linguistica (Turin, 1970), p. 344.

16. Convivio, II, 12, trans. Richard Lansing (1998), online through Digital Dante at http://

dante.ilt.columbia.edu/books/convivi/.

17. His son introduced him as “phylosofo poeta Dante Alighieri.” See Jacopo Alighieri, “Proemio

di Jacopo Alighieri al suo comento sopra la Commedia di Dante suo Padre,” in Catherine

Mary Phillimore, ed., Dante at Ravenna: A Study (London: E. Stock, 1898), p. 171.

18. Letter to Can Grande, 16.

19. “Theologus Dantes nullius dogmatis expers, / Quod foveat claro philosophia sinu.”

20. See, for example, De doctrina christiana, in Patrologiae cursus completus, J.P. Migne, ed.

(Paris, 1887), II, vi, 8; IV, xxviii, 64; Summa theol. I, i, ix.

21. Keats to Benjamin Bailey, November 22, 1817, in Hyder Edward Rollins, ed., The Letters of

John Keats, 1814–1821 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958), vol. I, p. 185.

22. For the full text and a commentary, see Chapter 6.

23. In March 1820, Byron wrote two full and two partial translations of Canto V. I quote

from two of these versions. See The Complete Poetical Works, edited by Jerome J. McGann

(Oxford, 1986), vol. iv, pp. 283–284. For Byron’s reading of Dante, see his dairy entry for

January 29, 1821, discussed below.

24. See Erich Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1961), especially pp. 54–59.

25. The biological link between emotion and cognition supports a generally Aristotelian the-

ory of the emotions. See, for example, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and

Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 6, no. 12 (2002),

pp. 517–523; Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel,

and Antonio R. Damasio, “Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early

Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex,” Nature Neuroscience, vol. 2, no. 11 (November

1999), pp. 1032–1037.

26. Roger Crisp writes: “On the most plausible account of the virtues, they cannot conf lict.

Justice, for example, could never come into conf lict with kindness. Conf lict is ruled out

by the idea that what is virtuous in any situation is what the virtuous person would do, that

person being able to do only one thing.” “Particularizing Particularism,” in Hooker and

Little, eds., Moral Particularism, p. 45.

27. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten: I, Metaphysische Unfangsgründe der Rechstlehre (Metaphysics of

Morals, Part One: Metaphysical Elements of Justice), Akademie-Textausgabe (Berlin, 1969), 224.

Notes 217

28. In the Italian version of Tristan, La tavola ritonda, xlvii, when Tristan learns of Isolde’s death,

“e cadde sì come corpo morto” (and he fell like a dead body): almost exactly the same phrase as

the last line of Canto V. See Hollander notes, pp. 100–101.

29. The Romance of Tristan and Isolt, translated from MS 103 of the fonds français of the Bibliothèque

Nationale by Norman B. Spector (Evanston, 1973), p. 28.

30. See Nussbaum, “Beatrice’s ‘Dante’: Loving the Individual?” pp. 170–171.

31. Margaret Urban Walker provides an excellent list of inf luential recent statements in favor of

partiality: Walker, “Partial Consideration,” Ethics, vol. 101, no. 4 ( July 1991), p. 758, n. 1

32. See Susan Wolf, “Morality and Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 6, (1992),

pp. 243–259.

33. For connections among partiality, emotion, and narrative, see Martha C. Nussbaum,

Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1995),

pp. 53–60, 67–70.

34. Editions of the Summa cite Ecclesiasticus 24:21 or 24:31, but the New English Bible has quite

different words in both places.

35. De doctrina christiana, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, J.P. Migne, ed. (Paris, 1887), II, vi, 8;

IV, xxviii, 64.

36. Letter to Can Grande, 9.

37. VN, XXV, pp. 57–58, in Vita Nuova, Rime, ed. Fredi Chiappelli (Milan, 1978).

38. The phrase is Roland Barthes’, from the title of Le Degré zero de l’écriture (Paris, 1953), but

Barthes actually believed that there was writing without metaphor (pp. 108–110).

39. For example, Hollander, Dante: A Life, p. 68.

40. D.H. Green, The Beginnings of Medieval Romance: Fact and Fiction: 1150–1220 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 8.

41. Sidney, An Apology for Poetry or the Defense of Poetry, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd (London:

T. Nelson, 1965), p. 52.

42. Jack Lynch also cites De mendacio, in Saint Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects, ed. Roy

J. Deferrari, vol. 16 of The Fathers of the Church (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1952),

p. 54: “Jocose lies . . . have never been considered as real lies, since both in the verbal

expression and in the attitude of the one joking such lies are accompanied by a very evident

lack of intention to deceive.”

43. See, for example, Peter McCormick, “Moral Knowledge and Fiction,” The Journal of

Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 41, no. 4 (Summer 1983), pp. 399–410.

44. Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear,” in Disowning Knowledge in Six

Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 39–123, especially 94–95. (My own similar

reading of the play is in Living Without Philosophy, pp. 212–235.)

45. Cf. Aristotle, Poetics IX (1451b ff.), discussed below, Chapter 7.

46. “Letter to Can Grande,” 7.

47. Green, Beginnings of Medieval Romance, p. 4.

Four Criticizing Moral Theory

1. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, BA 30.

2. For example, Gregory Keller uses Macbeth to illustrate a general theory of Hannah Arendt’s.

Keller, “The Moral Thinking of Macbeth,” Philosophy & Literature, vol. 29, no. 1 (2005),

p. 56.

3. Blackburn, “Securing the Nots,” p. 97. Blackburn himself thinks that moral judgment does

require assessing general categories (actions) outside of their context. He emphasizes a dif-

ference between artistic judgment and moral judgment that I don’t f ind persuasive.

4. Dancy, Moral Reasons, pp. 64–66.

Notes218

5. Dancy, “The Particularist’s Progress,” p. 131 (italics added, but the implied emphasis is in

the original).

6. Anthony W. Price, “Particularism and Pleasure,” in Lance, Potrč, and Strahovnik, eds.,

Challenging Moral Particularism (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 186.

7. Socrates uses the example of borrowing a weapon from a friend who later goes insane, in

which case returning the object is not just (as it usually would be). Socrates does not con-

clude that all moral concepts are unpredictable, only that “telling the truth” plus “returning

what you have received” cannot define “ justice.” (Republic I, 331c–d.)

8. Blackburn, “Securing the Nots,” p. 97.

9. This was the argument against “Situation Ethics,” a popular in movement in the 1950s and

1960s that charged moral rules with being overly stringent in particular contexts. Indeed, a

book like Joseph Fletcher’s Situation Ethics (Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster Press, 1966) is an

argument for loosening our traditional moral strictures. However, modern particularism is

not a version of “Situation Ethics”; unlike Fletcher and his colleagues, particularists do not

criticize moral rules for being too stringent.

10. See John F. Dedek, “Intrinsically Evil Acts: An Historical Study of the Mind of St. Thomas,”

The Thomist, vol. 43, no. 3 ( July 1979), pp. 385–341, discussing Peter of Poitiers, William

of Auxerre, William of Paris, Philip the Chancellor, Hugh of St. Cher, the Summa fratris

Alexandri, Albertus Magnus, St. Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas.

11. Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis, 1963), p. 229. For the scholastic back-

ground, see Dedek, “Intrinsically Evil Acts,” p. 412.

12. Lance and Little, “From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics.” This chapter is very

similar, but not identical, to Mark Norris Lance and Margaret Olivia Little, “Defending

Moral Particularism,” in James Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Oxford:

Blackwell, 2006).

13. Lance and Little, “From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics,” p. 68.

14. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1985), pp. 129–130.

15. McNaughton and Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,” in Hooker and Little, eds., Moral

Particularism, p. 268.

16. Cf. Paul Tillich’s advice to avoid the word “love” in favor of the New Testament agape. Paul

Tillich, Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 39–40.

17. Velleman, “Beyond Price,” Ethics, vol. 118 ( January 2007), p. 196. I f ind it interesting that

Velleman never defines love in this article.

18. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, pp. 281, 283.

19. Margaret Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,” in Hooker and Little, eds., Moral

Particularism (p. 282). The term was introduced in Simon Blackburn, “Reply: Rule-

Following and Moral Realism,” in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich, eds.,

Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 167–70..

20. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rhees and trans. by Anthony

Kenny (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press 1974), p. 66.

21. Cf. Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 84. and

Nenad Miščević, “When the Plot Thickens: Dancy on Thick Concepts,” in Lance, Potrč,

and Strahovnik, eds., Challenging Moral Particularism.

22. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, pp. 121–122: “without a reasonable supply of thick con-

cepts, moral thought and judgment are hamstrung.”

23. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 117.

24. Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1953), pp. 78–79. John McDowell recommends a Neurathian approach

to ethics: John McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” in Rosalind Hursthouse, Philippa

Foot, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1995), p. 169.

Notes 219

25. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 130, quoted in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice

(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 151.

26. Gilbert Harman, “Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy” (unpublished MS),

p. 6: “Some ‘Kantian’ approaches seem to have tried to provide a foundational justif ication

for ethics. But work in ethics increasingly rejects special foundationalism. Perhaps it is bor-

ing for me to mention it; it is so obvious.”

27. Quine himself suggests more pragmatic guidelines for reforming language: “the purpose

of concepts and of language is eff icacy in communication and in prediction. Such is the

ultimate duty of language, science, and philosophy, and it is in relation to that duty that a

conceptual scheme has f inally to be appraised” (p. 79). Useful as Quine’s criteria are, they

will not suffice in morality. Efficacious communications are not beneficial unless what is

communicated is morally right, and prediction is not the point of normative reasoning.

Thus, if we are bent on reforming traditional moral language, we need other criteria.

28. See Don Loeb, “Generality and Moral Justif ication,” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research,

vol. 56, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 79–96. Loeb argues that the demand for generality is very

widespread, but it depends on a metaphysical belief in the moral simplicity of reality that no

one defends.

29. “Each person beyond a certain age and possessed of the requisite intellectual capacity” has a

“skill in judging things to be just and unjust, and in supporting these judgments by reasons”

(sec. 9, p. 41).

30. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University, 1999), sec. 9, pp. 41, 44, 45, 42, 43.

31. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18, 44, 45.

32. Alasdair MacInyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984).

33. Blackburn, “Securing the Nots,” p. 95.

34. Lance and Little, “From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics,” p. 58: “Dancy’s episte-

mology, in turn, is a thoroughly discernment-based account.”

35. McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

36. David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays in

Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980), p. 233.

37. Gilbert Ryle, Collected Papers II (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), pp. 474–475,

480–496, especially 480–481. (The original texts are “The Human Agent” [1966–1967]

and “University Lectures, no. 18” [1968].)

38. See Tzachi Zamir, Double Vision: Moral Philosophy and Shakespearean Drama (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 127.

39. John Mackie, “Causes and Conditions,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2, (1965), p.

245. Here I am following David Luban, Legal Modernism (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of

Michigan Press, 1994), p. 36.

40. I am drawing a distinction between narrative historians and quantitative modelers.

However, some professional historians resemble social scientists in collecting and analyzing

descriptive statistics or even explaining social phenomena by creating quantitative models.

Furthermore, some professors of social science act like classic historians, writing narratives

about (for example) recent political events or Balinese cockfights. So this is not an inductive

distinction (based on what historians are observed to do), but a conceptual one.

41. Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2000), p. 3.

42. Ibid., p. 140: Accountability “is based on the teleological rather than causal relations

between the group members’ intentions and the collective act.”

43. Roger Seamon, “The Story of the Moral: The Function of Thematizing in Literary

Criticism,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 47, no. 3 (Summer 1989), p. 232.

44. Ibid., p. 233.

Notes220

45. Ibid., p. 232.

46. Cf. David Bakhurst, “Ethical Particularism in Context,” in Hooker and Little, eds., Moral

Particularism, p. 174.

47. Dancy, Moral Reasons, p. 113.

48. Brad Hooker, “Moral Particularism and the Real World,” in Lance, Potrč, Strahovnik, eds.

Challenging Moral Particularism, p. 27.

49. Eliot, Middlemarch (1874), Book VI, Chapter LXI, in the edition of Bert G. Hornback (New

York: Norton, 1977), p. 428.

50. This episode does not appear in Greek Gospel manuscripts until around 900 AD, but it

could have ancient origins as an independent story about Jesus. See the Anchor Bible, Gospel

According to John, with notes by Raymond E. Brown (Garden City, N.Y., 1966–1970), p. 335;

and John Marsh, The Gospel of John (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 351. Nestle-Aland call the

passage an “early insertion.” It is considered canonical by most Christians because it has

been included in John (or sometimes in Luke, after 21:38) for so many centuries. There is

no concordant passage in the Synoptic gospels.

51. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil), 164.

52. C.G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, A Rabbinic Anthology (London: Macmillan, 1938), § 745

(Yoma 29a, init); §748 (Tanhuma [ed. Buber], Naso §13 f. 16a).

53. Tony Tanner, Adultery in the Novel: Contract and Transgression (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1979), pp. 22–23.

54. Heaney, “The Government of the Tongue,” in The Government of the Tongue: Selected Prose,

1978–1987 (New York, 1988), pp. 107–108.

55. William Butler Yeats, A Vision (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 35.

56. Cf. Robert E. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol.

29, no. 1 (2000), pp. 95–98.

57. Ibid., p. 12.

58. National Endowment for the Arts, Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America

(research division report #46), June 2004.

59. Noël Carroll, “Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent Directions for Research,”

Ethics, vol. 110 ( January, 2000), pp. 370–371, makes the same point.

60. I summarize the evidence for this reading in “Lolita and Aristotle’s Ethics,” Philosophy and

Literature, vol. 9, no. 1 (April 1995), pp. 32–47.

61. Trilling, Encounter (October 1958) and Davies, “Mania for Green Fruit,” Victoria Daily

Times ( January 17, 1959), both quoted in Levine, Living Without Philosophy, p. 141.

62. Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 50.

Five Good and Bad Stories, and Francesca as a Reader

1. See Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley, Calif.: University

of California Press, 1988), p. 222 and elsewhere.

2. Jennings, A Translation of the Fifth Canto of Dante’s Inferno, and of the Entire Scene

and Narrative of Hugolino (1794), quoted in Werner P. Friedrich, Dante’s Fame Abroad,

1350–1850 (New York, 1950), p. 236.

3. Teodalinda Barolini, Dante’s Poets: Textuality and Truth in the Comedy (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1984), p. 6. The poem by Guinizelli is “Al cor gentil.”

4. See especially Poggioli, “Tragedy or Romance?” p. 350. Poggioli even says, without justi-

fying this remark, “that, although Dante shapes her words and thoughts into the rhythmical

and metrical structure of the Commedia, [Francesca] speaks not in verse but in prose.”

5. See Anna Hatcher and Mark Musa, “The Kiss: Inferno V and the Old French Prose

Lancelot,” Comparative Literature, vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 1968), pp. 97–109. Barbara Vinken

Notes 221

is more emphatic on the same point. See her “Encore: Francesca da Rimini; Rhetoric of

Seduction—Seduction of Rhetoric,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und

Geistesgeschichte, vol. 3 (1988), p. 404.

6. Vinken, “Encore,” p. 405.

7. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, (New York: Free Press,(1925),

pp. 58–59.

8. Compare Dante’s question to Francesca:

But tell me, at the time of your sweet sighings Ma dimmi: al tempo de’ dolci sospiri,

how and in what way did Love give leave a che e come concedette amore

for you to know your suspect longings?” che consceste i dubbiosi disiri?

(Inf. v, 118–120)

9. I translate from H. Oskar Sommer, ed., The Vulgate Version of the Arthurian Romances, vol. iii,

Le Livre de Lancelot del lac (Washington, 1910), part I, p. 261. (See p. 131 for the scene

that Lancelot is recalling.) A similar passage is quoted in Old French in Elspeth Kennedy,

“The Re-writing and Re-reading of a Text: The Evolution of the Prose Lancelot,” in Alison

Adams et al., The Changing Face of Arthurian Romance (Bury St. Edmonds, 1986). The quote

comes originally from Kennedy, ed., Lancelot do Lac: the Non-Cyclic Old French Prose Romance

(Oxford, 1980), 345.31–346.3.

10. See James Douglas Bruce, The Evolution of the Arthurian Romance from the Beginnings Down

to the Year 1300 (Gloucester, Mass, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 399, 410–411. But cf. de Rougemont,

p. 125: “literary historians are at liberty to talk about ‘incredible adventures,’ ‘easily con-

trived marvels,’ ‘touching ingenuousness,’ ‘primitive freshness,’ and so on. A little more

penetration would lead us to see, on the contrary, that the real barbarism is displayed by

our contemporary notion of the novel, which we are quite content to take as a fake photo-

graph of events without significance, whereas Arthurian romance was knit by an intimate

coherence of which we no longer possess so much as an inkling. Actually, in these wonderful

adventures nothing whatever is without meaning; everything is a symbol or delicate alle-

gory; and only the ignorant stop short at the apparent puerility of the tale, this puerility

being intended of course to conceal the underlying meaning from the superficial glances of

the uninformed.”

11. Poggioli, “Tragedy or Romance?” p. 318.

12. Usher, “Paolo and Francesca,” p. 25.

13. Valesio, “Canto V: The Fierce Dove,” pp. 66–67.

14. Roger Dragonetti, “L’episode de Francesca dans le cadre de la convention courtoise,” in Aux fron-

tières du langage poétique: Études sur Dante, Marrarmé, Valéry, Romanica Garensia IX (1961),

quoted in French in Della Terza, p. 63.

15. See N.J. Perella, The Kiss Sacred and Profane (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969),

pp. 140–154, for an argument that (p. 141) “Francesca and Paolo have their truest ties with

Iseult and Tristan.”

16. Béroul, Tristan and Yseut, Old French text edited by Guy R. Mermier, lines 1413–1415

(p. 72).

17. De Rougemont, p. 41.

18. Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary: Moeurs de province (Paris, 1965), Part I, section 6,

pp. 61, 62.

19. Madame Bovary, Part I, section 5, p. 27.

20. Dronke, “Francesca and Héloïse,” p. 125.

21. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and expanded

edition (New York: Penguin, 1992), pp. 22, 53, 48.

22. Ibid., pp. 41, 46, 49, 50.

Notes222

23. Ibid., p. 51.

24. Ibid., p. 48.

25. Ibid., p. 252.

26. Ibid., pp. 87–88.

27. Brian Wilkie, “What Is Sentimentality?” College English, vol. 28, no. 8 (May 1967),

pp. 564–575.

28. Wendy Lesser, “From Dickens to Conrad: A Sentimental Journey,” ELH, vol. 52, no. 1

(Spring 1985), pp. 196–197.

29. Ray Fleming, “Francesca’s Sweet New Subversive Style,” Lectura Dantis, vol. 3 (Fall

1988), p. 16 (viewed online at the Lectura Dantis site, www.brown.edu/Departments/

Italian_Studies/LD).

30. See, e.g., Sommer, Arthurian Romances, pp. 113–117.

31. Roger Sherman Loomis calls the Romance a “frank glorif ication of idealized adultery.” The

Development of Arthurian Romance (London: Hutchinson, 1963), p. 92. But Susan Noakes

thinks that the “Lancelot text is quite lucid, even overstated, in its condemnation of adul-

tery.” It is, she thinks, “a religious attack on chivalric values.” Susan Noakes, “The Double

Misreading of Paolo and Francesca,” Philological Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 2 (Spring 1983),

p. 226 (italics added).

32. Dronke, “Francesca and Héloïse,” p. 125.

33. Conf., 1.13.20. I owe these citations to Vinken.

34. Conf. 3.2.3.

35. Conf., 8.12.29.

36. Conf. 1.13.20. Like William Watts, I translate Augustine as if he were quoting Psalm 78:39

(cf. James 4:14). In St. Jerome’s translation, Psalm 77:39 (now numbered as 78:39) reads “sed

recordatus est quia caro essent spiritus vadens et non revertus,” whereas Augustine writes,

“qua caro eram et spiritus ambulans et not revertens.”

37. Vinken, “Encore,” p. 403.

38. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, pp. 135–136.

39. See Usher, “Paolo and Francesca,” p. 23.

40. Glauco Cambon, Dante’s Craft: Studies in Language and Style (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 48.

41. Hollander notes, p. 99 (Inferno V, 8 and 118–120).

42. Fleming, “Francesca’s Sweet New Subversive Style,” p. 13.

43. Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 1974), p. 46. For a critique,

see my Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities, pp. 175–181.

44. Fleming, “Francesca’s Sweet New Subversive Style,” p. 21.

45. Barolini, Dante’s Poets, p. 4, 126.

46. Mark Musa first read the Vita Nuova as Dante’s self-critique and self-parody. See Mark

Musa, Dante’s Vita Nuova: A Translation and an Essay (Bloomington: Indiana University

Press, 1973).

47. See Cambon, Dante’s Craft, p. 58.

48. Musa, Dante’s Vita Nuova, p. 100.

49. Ibid., p. 150.

50. Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1961), p. 42.

51. As Dronke notes (“Francesca and Héloïse,” p. 126), the poem that accompanies this prose

passage (VN, xxxix) uses precisely the same rhymes (sospiri, disiri, m[art]iri) that Dante

employs when he addresses Francesca in Hell. But near the end of the Vita Nuova, his

sighs and desires and sufferings are caused by his infidelity to Beatrice and what she

symbolizes.

52. Not everyone believes that the subject at the end of the Vita Nuova is Beatrice. It could

be Lady Philosophy, a purely allegorical female figure who is a major personage in the

Notes 223

Convivio. (See, e.g., Lewis, Dante, pp. 60–61). But I think the final vision continues from

VN xxxix, where Beatrice is clearly its object.

53. Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. by Willard R.

Trask (Princeton, 1974), pp. 200–202.

54. According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, “the story of St.Thomas visiting Bonaventure’s cell

while the latter was writing the life of St.Francis and finding him in an ecstasy is well

known. ‘Let us leave a saint to work for a saint,’ said the Angelic Doctor as he withdrew”

(quoting the online edition, copyright 1999 by Kevin Knight).

Six Modern Versions

1. Ohly, “Vom geistigen Sinn des Wortes im Mettelalter,” in Schriften zur mittelalterlichen

Bedeutungsforschung (Darmstadt, 1977), p. 15. Cf. Walter Lowrie, Art in the Early Church

(New York, 1947), p. 24.

2. Ernst H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 145.

One of the greatest Byzantine symbolic cycles is the interior decoration of San Vitale in

Ravenna.

3. Rachel Jacoff, “Sacrif ice and Empire: Thematic Analogies in San Vitale and the Paradiso,”

in Andrew Morrogh et al., ed., Renaissance Studies in Honor of Craig Hugh Smyth (Florence:

Giunti Barbera, 1985), pp. 317–331.

4. Erwin Panofsky, Idea: A Concept in Art Theory (1924), trans. Joseph S. Peake (New York,

1968), p. 47.

5. Ibid., p. 104, citing G. P. Bellori (1664) and Luigi Scaramuccia (1674).

6. Letter of 1516, in Panofsky, Idea, p. 60.

7. Henry Fuseli, “Aphorisms, Chief ly Relative to the Fine Arts,” in John Knowles, ed., The

Life and Writings of Henry Fuseli, (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831),

vol. III, nos. 101, 102, 36, 82; cf. 103, 139, 144, 151.

8. Peter Tomory, The Life and Art of Henry Fuseli (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1972), p. 121.

9. François Pupil, Le Style troubadour ou la nostalgie du bon vieux temps (Nancy: Presses

Universitaires de Nancy, 1985), pp. 65–67.

10. See Francis Haskell, “The Manufacture of the Past in Nineteenth-Century Painting,” in

Past and Present in Art and Taste (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 79; see

also p. 86.

11. Ibid., p. 79.

12. Fuseli, aphorism number 201.

13. Pupil, Le Style troubadour, pp. 423–424.

14. Leigh Hunt, “The Story of Rimini, Canto III” (“The Fatal Passion”), in Reginald Brimley

Johnson ed., Poems of Leigh Hunt (London: J.M. Dent & Co., 1891), pp. 25, 26.

15. William Weaver, Duse: A Biography (London: Harvest Books, 1984), pp. 234–235; John

Woodhouse, Gabriele D’Annunzio: Defiant Archangel (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1998), p. 211, n. 13.

16. D’Annunzio, Francesca da Rimini, trans. Arthur Symons (New York, 1902), Act. 1, p. 47

17. Woodhouse, Gabriele D’Annunzio, p. 210.

18. Hunt, “Story of Rimini,” Canto I, p. 5.

19. Paolo Valesio, Gabriele D’Annunzio: The Dark Flame, trans. Marilyn Miguel (New Haven,

1992), p. 49.

20. Ruskin to Rossetti, June 15, 1854, in William Michael Rossetti, ed., Ruskin: Rossetti:

Preraphaelitism (London, 1899), p. 13. The letter does not make clear what picture is

involved. But Alison Milbank, Dante and the Victorians (Manchester: Manchester University

Press, 1998), p. 32, explains that Rossetti was working on Paolo and Francesca.

Notes224

21. Stella Bottai suggests that the “burning background and oblique attitude of the couple” in

Rossetti’s picture are borrowed from Botticelli’s illustrations to Paradiso canto VI and VIII

in the Hamilton Codex, Berlin. See “Four Keats Poems and the Pre-Raphaelite Vision of

the Middle Ages,” at www.victorianweb.org/authors/dgr/bottai1.html.

22. Rossetti to Jack Tupper, ca. 1850, in Alicia Craig Faxon, Dante Gabriel Rossetti (New York:

Abbeville/Cross River Press, 1989), p. 24.

23. In Faxon, Rossetti, pp. 46–47.

24. Walter Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus, trans. P. Morton Strand (Cambridge,

Mass., The MIT Press, 1965), p. 44.

25. Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1931), p. 3.

26. Bernard Williams, “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline” (2000), in Philosophy as a

Humanistic Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 189, 192.

27. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University

of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 4.

28. Ibid., pp. 4, 10.

29. Goldsmith, Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe (1759), quoted in

Friedrich, Dante’s Fame Abroad, p. 220.

30. Quoted in Saglia, “Translation and Cultural Appropriation,” p. 103.

31. Isaiah Berlin, “The First and the Last,” The New York Review of Books, vol. 45, no. 8 (May

14, 1998), via http://www.nybooks.com/articles/13853.

32. Schelling, “Über Dante in philosphischer Beziehung,” 1802–1805, trans. Longfellow in 1850

and anthologized in Michael Caesar, Dante: The Critical Heritage, 1314(?)–1870 (London:

Routledge, 1989), pp. 411–420, especially 412–415.

33. Macaulay, “Criticisms on the Principal Italian Writers” from Knight’s Magazine (1824), in

Friedrich, Dante’s Fame Abroad.

34. Hollander, Dante: A Life, p. 105.

35. Friedrich, Dante’s Fame Abroad, p. 243.

36. William Wordsworth, “Tintern Abbey” (1798), in Wordsworth, Poems, edited by Matthew

Arnold (London, Macmillan and Co., 1882), p. 251

37. Hazlitt, “On Mr. Wordsworth’s Poem, ‘The Excursion,’ ” in Lectures on the English Poets

(New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1845), p. 216.

38. “On Mr. Wordsworth’s Poem, ‘The Excursion,’ ” pp. 214–215.

39. Hazlitt, “Mr. Wordsworth,” from The Spirit of the Age, in Lectures on the English Poets and The

Spirit of the Age (New York, 1964), p. 252.

40. Hazlitt, “Lectures on the Living Poets,” in ibid., 155–156.

41. Ibid. (on Scott).

42. Der Wille zur Macht (Will to Power), p. 830.

43. Ibid., I. Der Europaïche Nihilismus: zum Plan (Book One, European Nihilism: Toward a

Design).

44. Simon B. Gaunt, “Marginal Men: Marcabru and Orthodoxy: The Early Troubadours and

Adultery,” MediumÆvum, vol. 59, no. 1 (1990), p. 16.

45. Duby, Love and Marriage, p. 9.

46. Ibid., p. 10.

47. “On Marriage,” in Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, edited by Roger Ingpen and

Walter E. Peck, vol. vii, pp. 149–150.

48. Alfred Lord Tennyson, “Locksley Hall” (published 1842), lines 59–61. Lines 75–76 allude

to Inf. v: 121–123: “Comfort? comfort scorn’d of devils! this is truth the poet sings, / That

a sorrow’s crown of sorrow is remembering happy things.”

49. Shelley’s notes to Queen Mab, in Complete Works, vol. i., p. 141.

50. De Sanctis, “Francesca da Rimini secondo i critici e secondo l’arte,” pp. 48, 50.

51. Milbank, Dante and the Victorians, pp. 157–161.

Notes 225

52. Tanner, Adultery in the Novel, p. 12.

53. De Rougement Love in the Western World, revised and augmented version translated by

Montgomery Belgion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 16–17.

54. De Sanctis, pp. 40–41.

55. Friedrich, Dante’s Fame Abroad, pp. 229–232; Oscar Kuhns’ Preface to The Divine Comedy,

trans. Cary (New York, 1897), pp. vii–viii.

56. Ralph Pite, The Circle of Our Vision: Dante’s Presence in English Romantic Poetry (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 26 (italics added).

57. Leigh Hunt, Stories from the Italian Poets: Dante Alighieri (New York: Putnam, 1888), p. 104.

58. Ibid., p. 107.

59. Sonnet “On Leigh Hunt’s Poem, The Story of Rimini.”

60. Letter of April 16, 1819, in Letters, vol. II, p. 91.

61. “Bereft” does not rhyme with “slept”: an unusual lapse for Keats, but one that we may easily

overlook. By breaking a rule here—and getting away with it—Keats shows that poetry can

beguile.

62. Helen Vendler, The Odes of John Keats (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University, 1983), pp. 50–51.

63. Keats to George and Tom Keats, December, 1817, in Letters, vol. I, p. 194.

64. Keats to J.H. Reynolds, November 22, 1817, in Letters, vol. I, p. 189; Keats to the George

Keatses, February 14–May 3, 1819, in ibid., vol. II, p. 74 (quoting Hazlitt at length);

Walter Jackson Bate, John Keats (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univetsity Press, 1963),

pp. 253–263.

65. Vendler, Odes, pp. 303, 304.

66. Keats to Bailey, November 22, 1817, in Letters, vol. I, p. 185.

67. Keats to George and Tom Keats, December 21, 27 (?) 1817, in Letters, vol. I, p. 193.

68. Hazlitt, “On Shakespeare and Milton,” in Lectures on the English Poets and The Spirit of the

Age, p. 47. For the inf luence of Hazlitt’s lecture on Keats’ development of “negative capabil-

ity,” see Walter Jackson Bate, Negative Capability: The Intuitive Approach in Keats (Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 30; and Bate, John Keats, pp. 255–261.

69. Keats to Richard Woodhouse, October 27, 1818, in Letters, vol. I, p. 387.

70. Keats to J.H. Reynolds, February 3, 1818, in Letters, vol. I, pp. 223–234.

71. Keats to George and Tom Keats, December 21, 27, 1818, in Letters, vol. I, pp. 191–192.

72. These are Bate’s examples of beings whose inner states especially interested Keats. See his

letter to Bailey, November 22, 1817, in Letters, vol. I, p. 186; to Tom Keats, July 3, 5, 7, 9,

1818, in ibid., pp. 321–322; and to Reynolds, May 3, 1818, in ibid., p. 279.

73. Hazlitt, “On Shakespeare and Milton,” p. 47.

74. Schlegel, quoted and translated in Pite, p. 56.

75. The Works of Lord Byron: Letters and Journals, vol. v, pp. 193–194 ( January 29, 1821).

76. Shelley’s note to Queen Mab, in Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 141.

77. Michael J. Sider, The Dialogic Keats: Time and History in the Major Poems (Washington:

Catholic University Press, 1998), p. 51.

78. MacIntyre, After Virtue, second edition (Notre Dame, 1984), pp. 41–42 (italics added).

79. See Sider, The Dialogic Keats.

80. Jessica Smith, “Tyrannical Monuments and Discursive Ruins: the Dialogic Landscape of

Shelley’s Queen Mab,” The Keats-Shelley Journal, vol. 47 (1998), pp. 108–41.

81. Keats to John Taylor, November 17, 1819, in Letters, vol. II, p. 234.

82. Bernice Slote, Keats and the Dramatic Principle (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press,

1958), p. 4.

83. Patience. Milbank, Dante and the Victorians, p. 150.

84. Dictionary of National Biography 1912–1921, ad loc. Cf. The Times of London. October 10,

1915. I quote from Phillips, Paolo & Francesca, (New York and London, 1915).

Notes226

85. William Archer, Poets of the Younger Generation, 1902 (New York: John Lane, the Bodley

Head, 1970), p. 340.

86. Archer, Poets, pp. 344–345.

87. Valesio, Gabriele D’Annunzio, p. 87.

88. Riccardo Zandonai, Francesca da Rimini (Milan: Ricordi, 1945), pp. 173, 227. (This is a

piano redaction, so the key signatures may be different in a full score. However, the rela-

tionships will be the same.)

89. See David Luban, Legal Modernism, pp. 54–59.

90. Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” in The New Art (revised edition, 1973), p. 68.

91. Frances Fleetwood, Concordia: The Story of Francesca da Rimini, Told by her Daughter (New

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1972). Fleetwood said that her favorite authors were Scott,

Stevenson, Kipling, Tolkien, Mary Renault, Mary Stewart, and Lawrence Durrell: writ-

ers who used contemporary forms to tell stories about distant times. None were taken

seriously by modernist critics. (Contemporary Authors Online. The Gale Group, 2001.)

92. See Jennifer Homans, “Geniuses Together,” The New York Review of Books, vol. 49, no. 20

(December 19, 2002), www.nybooks.com/articles/15915 (read July 6, 2009).

93. It is the voice of an ironic historicist that states (in mock Georgian English): “Who claims

Truth, Truth abandons. History is hir’d, or coerc’d, only in Interests that must ever prove

base. She is too innocent, to be left within the reach of anyone in Power—who need but

touch her, and all her Credit is in the instant vanish’d, as if it had never been. She needs

rather to be tended lovingly and honorably by fabulists and counterfeiters, Ballad-Mongers

and Cranks of ev’ry Radius, Masters of Disguise to provide her the Costume, Toilette, and

Bearing, and Speech nimble enough to keep her beyond the Desires, or even the Curiosity, of

Government . . . ” Thomas Pynchon, Mason & Dixon (New York, Macmillan, 2004), p. 350.

94. I draw my interpretation of this painting from Charles Fried, Manet’s Modernism: or, The

Face of Painting in the 1860s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 28–43 and

Luban, pp. 60–63.

95. The copyrighted Italian text can be found in Jonathan Galassi, ed., Collected Poems of

Eugenio Montale, 1920–1954 (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998), p. 268.

96. Montale in 1966, quoted by Galassi, Collected Poems, p. 538. “My poetry is to be read

together, as one single poem. . . . I don’t want to make the comparison to the Divina

Commedia, but I consider my three books as three canticles, three phases of human life.”

The three major works are Ossi di seppia, Le occasioni, and La Bufera e altro.

97. Galassi, Collected Poems, p. 420: “As Gianfranco Contini has observed, Montale’s work is

written at the point of ‘veritable cultural saturation’; it is so heavily layered with allusion

and quotation, especially self-quotation, that at times it seems to approximate the echo

chamber of Walter Benjamin’s ideal works, the collage of borrowings. Yet Montale’s weft

of references and echoes performs a function in his poetry similar to that of his famously

diff icult vocabulary, his odd, seemingly reluctant rhyming, and his shifting metric: all are

evidence of his determination to use every tool at his disposal in the attempt to unburden

himself of something that nevertheless remains virtually impossible to convey.”

98. Roberto Unger, Passion: An Essay on Human Personality (New York: The Free Press/

Macmillan, 1984), p. 38.

99. Chares Rosen, “Mallarmé the Magnificent,” The New York Review of Books (May 20, 1999),

www.nybooks.com/articles/487, read July 6, 2009

100. For instance: “To belong to a generation which can no longer believe in anything may be

a cause of pride for anyone convinced of the ultimate nobility of this emptiness or of some

mysterious need for it, but it does not excuse anyone who wants to transform this empti-

ness into a paradoxical aff irmation of life simply to give himself a style.” Montale, Poet in

Our Time (1972), trans. Alastair Hamilton from Nel nostro tempo, p. 61.

101. Montale, Poet in Our Time, p. 47. (Note that Montale uses the word “storicismo” in a nar-

rower way, to refer to Hegel and Marx.)

Notes 227

102. Italian text from Galassi, Collected Poems, p. 296.

103. Learned Hand, “The Spirit of Liberty,” speech given in Central Park, New York, on May

21, 1944.

104. Consider, for instance, this aphoristic sentence: “Read the poetry of today: you

cannot trust the words since their words are of today, but their meaning must be

sought between the lines.” Montale implies that poetic language is narrow and tran-

sitory—so we cannot believe what any poet says and believes—but we may discover

broader meanings if we trace the history of past thought “between the lines,” in a

poem’s references and allusions to the tradition. Montale, Poet in Our Time, p. 42.

105. Montale, Stile e tradizione, my translation from the appendix of Arshi Pipa, Montale and

Dante (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. 152.

106. Galassi, Collected Poems, p. 417.

107. Ibid., p. 427.

Seven Consequences

1. Immanuel Kant, Was ist Aufklärung?, edited by Ernst Cassirer and Horst D. Brandt

(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999), p. 20.

2. J.L Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 2.

3. Will to Power, 224, in Schechta, ed, vol. II, p. 687.

4. Lionel Trilling, “The Sense of the Past” (1942) in The Liberal Imagination (New York:

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 176.

5. The classic paper is Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis

of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2 (March, 1979), pp. 263–292.

6. Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 38.

7. Letter of Isaiah Berlin to Beata Polanowska-Sygulska (Feb. 24, 1986), reprinted in The

New York Review of Books, Sept. 23, 2004, p. 24.

8. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Also sprach Zarathustra,” in Karl Schelchta, ed., Friedrich

Nietzsche: Werke (Frankfurt: Karl Hanser, 1972), vol. II, p. 332. It is Zarathustra who

speaks here, not Nietzsche. Indeed, every passage in Nietzsche’s mature work is poten-

tially ironic. However, I have argued at some length that Nietzsche understood cultures

as Weltanschauungen. See my Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities, pp. 39–43,

57–62.

9. Montale, Stile e tradizione, p. 153.

10. As noted by Donald Davidson in “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974) in

Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1984), pp. 183–198.

11. Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form (1927), trans. Christopher S. Wood (New

York: Zone Books, 1993).

12. There is also a third form of universalism, which is the belief that we have identical moral

duties toward all human beings and are not permitted to favor members of our own com-

munity over outsiders. The opposite of this universalism is some form of communitari-

anism. Particularism and historicism do not entail any position regarding universalism.

People who believe in general moral rules can argue about whether, in general categories

of situations, one may favor members of one’s own community. People who believe in

particularistic moral judgments can argue about whether person A, in situation X, ought

to favor her own community.

13. Berlin, letter to Beata Polanowska-Sygulska.

14. Cf. Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York:

Knopf, 1991), p.12: “What is clear is that values can clash—that is why civilizations are

incompatible. They can be incompatible between cultures, or groups in the same culture,

or between you and me.”

Notes228

15. Irving Howe, Politics and the Novel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

16. Trilling, “Reality in America,” p. 12.

17. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 52,

72.

18. Hannah Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin,” The Review of Politics ( January 1953), p. 78,

quoted in Samantha Power, “The Lesson of Hannah Arendt,” The New York Review of

Books, vol. 51, no. 7 (April 29, 2004), p. 34. A social scientist who has argued for “phro-

nesis” (moral evaluation of particular situations) over “episteme” (predictive theories) is

Bent Flyvbjerg; see his “Social Science That Matters,” Foresight Europe, no. 2, (October

2005– March 2006), pp. 38–42; and “Making Organization Research Matter: Power,

Values and Phronesis,” in Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón, eds. The Northern Lights:

Organization Theory in Scandinavia (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press), 2003,

pp. 357–381.

19. Hazlitt’s Notes of a Journey Through France and Italy (1826), quoted in Friedrich, Dante’s Fame

Abroad, p. 246; The Works of Lord Byron: Letters and Journals, edited by Rowland E. Prothero

(New York, 1966), vol. v, pp. 193–194 ( January 29, 1821).

20. Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Criticisms on the Principal Italian Writers,” in Friedrich,

Knight’s Magazine (1824), pp. 296–297.

21. Poggioli, “Tragedy or Romance?” p. 313.

22. T.F. Diffey cites a comment of Ruth Saw in 1961 and then several remarks by Malcolm

Bradbury and colleagues in 1970 to substantiate his claim that moral criticism was dominant

in mid-century, and marginal shortly after. See “Morality and Literary Criticism,” Journal

of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.33, no. 4 (Summer 1975), p. 452, n. 1.

23. Parker, Ethics, Theory and the Novel, p. 12: “a rather old-fashioned scientif ic positivism . . . is

still reasonably widespread in the literary academy.”

24. Cleanth Brooks, The Well-Wrought Urn, 1947 (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

Publishers, 1975), p. 199.

25. René Wellek and Austin Warren. Theory of Literature, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, 1962),

p. 239.

26. R.S. Crane The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays Critical and Historical (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1967), vol. 2, p. 12.

27. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, p. 21.

28. Fleming, “Francesca’s Sweet New Subversive Style.”

29. Saglia, “Translation and Cultural Appropriation,” pp. 98, 116.

30. Nussbaum, “Beatrice’s ‘Dante’: Loving the Individual?” p. 168.

31. Or they might argue for their ethical judgments in f lagrant disregard of their own theoreti-

cal rejection of such normative arguments. For examples, see Booth, The Company We Keep,

p. 31.

32. Ibid., p. 29.

33. Carroll, p. 350.

34. Anderson, The Way We Argue Now, pp. 121–123.

35. Warner, Uncritical Reading, pp. 36–37.

36. Jane Tompkins, “ ‘Indians’: Textuality, Morality, and the Problem of History,” Critical

Inquiry, vol. 13, no. 1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 117–119.

37. Anderson, The Way We Argue Now, p. 5.

38. Ibid., pp. 112, 127.

39. Ibid., p. 3.

40. This is also the title of Bernard Williams’ 2008 book, which is a leading example of what I

advocate.

41. Parker, Ethics, Theory and the Novel, p. 3.

42. McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, p. 175.

Notes 229

43. Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” pp. 140–141. Writing in the same issue, Habermas is equally

modest about philosophy: see his “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason:

Remarks on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism,” pp. 128–131.

44. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 117.

45. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, p. 8.

46. Otto Willmann provides a compact summary in “The Seven Liberal Arts,” The Catholic

Encylopedia (1907), Online Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. Knight

47. Donald R. Kelley, Renaissance Humanism (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), p. 5.

48. Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Ralph Robynson, 1551 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895),

p. 26. I have slightly altered the spelling for legibility.

49. Ibid., p. 113.

50. Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. G.D.H. Cole in The Social Contract and Discourses

(London: Everyman, 1993), pp. 244–245.

51. Joseph M. Levine, “Method in the History of Ideas: More, Machiavelli and Quentin

Skinner,” Annals of Scholarship, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 37–60.

52. Republic I, 337a; Thrasymachus is speaking.

53. Burnyeat, “Plato,” The British Academy Review (2000), p. 20.

54. Ibid.

55. Nussbaum, “Love and the Individual: Romantic Rightness and Platonic Aspiration,” in

Love’s Knowledge, pp. 314–334.

56. Ibid., p. 317.

57. S.J.Rom Brison, Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

Press, 2002).

58. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),

pp. 141–168, especially 162–163.

59. Zamir, Double Vision.

60. Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy

and Feminist Theory,” Praxis International (1986), pp. 38–60.

61. Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The

Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 14.

62. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Martha C.

Nussbaum subsequently developed Williams’ view, also by interpreting classical literature.

See her The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1986).

63. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack, Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture,

and Literary Theory (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 2001).

64. Daniel R. Schwartz, “A Humanistic Ethic in Reading,” p. 3.

65. Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), p. 22.

Abelard, Pierre, 39–40, 110, 144

abstraction, 137, 156, 162

adultery, 25, 34–45, 75–6, 81–3, 91–2,

95–102, 145–8

Albigensianism, 41–2, 144

Alcmaeon (mythical character), 60

Anderson, Amanda, 11–12, 188,

190–1, 206

Andreas Capellanus, 29, 49, 145, 191

Aquinas, St. Thomas

adultery, theory of, 36–9, 42, 45

Dante, inf luence on, 6, 33, 56–7

metaphor, theory of, 65

methods of, 33, 65, 125, 171–2

Archer, William, 156–7

Arendt, Hannah, 113–15, 181, 183, 206

Aristotle

emotion, theory of, 59, 71, 216n25

marriage, theory of, 38,

particularism and, 1, 26, 33, 85, 88

Romanticism and, 153–4

tragedy, theory of 62–3, 71

Aristotelianism, 24, 128

art, 9, 101, 128–37, 180–3. See also

representation

Arthurian romance, 16, 18, 61, 62, 108,

111–12, 157, 160

Auerbach, Erich, 6, 66, 122, 124–5, 153,

216n24

Augustus Caesar, 44

Austen, Jane, 155

Austin, J. L. ( John Langshaw), 77, 84, 170

Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 189

Bakhurst, David, 220n46

Balanchine, George, 162

Baldelli, Ignazio, 212n14, 213n22

Barolini, Teodalinda, 120–1

Baron, Marcia W., 215n41

Barthes, Roland, 66, 217n38

Bate, Walter Jackson, 225n68, 225n72

Beatrice (Beatrice Portinari), 14, 53,

121–4, 144, 166

Bellini, Giovanni, 75

Benhabib, Seyla, 205

Bentham, Jeremy, 23

Benvenuto da Imola, 19, 44, 50, 158

Bergin, Thomas Goddard, 50

Berlin, Isaiah, 140, 171, 179, 205, 227n14

Berman, Howard, 175–6

Bernhardt, Sandra, 133

Bettagli, Marco, 16

Biscaro, Gerolomo, 212n12, 213n20

Blackburn, Simon, 73, 75, 87, 211n1, 217n3

Boccaccio, Giovanni, 13–14, 15–17, 35,

37–8, 44, 59, 96

Boethius (Anicius Manlius Severinus

Boethius), 49, 55–6, 117

Booth, Wayne C., 188, 228n31, 229n1

Bottai, Stella, 224n21

Brancusi, Constanin, 101

Brandeis, Irma, 165–6

Brecht, Berthold, 182

Brison, Susan, 204

Brooks, Cleanth, 184

I N D E X

Index232

Bruce, James Douglas, 221n10

Burnyeat, Miles, 201

Byron, George Gordon, Lord Byron, 6,

20, 58, 140, 153, 183, 186–7

Byzantine art, 129–30, 134, 136

Cambon, Glauco, 222n40

Cantarella, Eva, 215n43

Capellanus, see Andreas Capellanus

Caravaggio (Michelangelo Merisi da

Caravaggio), 130

Carroll, Noël, 220n59, 228n33

Cary, Henry Francis, 148–50

Castiglione, Baldassare, 131

Cathars, see Albigensianism

Cato (Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis,

known as Cato the Younger), 64

Cavalcanti, Guido, 18

Cavell, Stanley, 68

Chaucer, Geoffrey, 139, 152, 155

Chiarini, Eugenio, 18

Cicero (Marcus Tullius Cicero), 63, 201

Cimabue (Cenni di Pepo), 129–30, 136

cliché, 6–7, 109–10, 113–15

coherence theories, 84–5

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 140–1, 149,

153–4

Contini, Gianfranco, 214n17,

216n15, 226n97

Convivio (The Banquet), 53, 56

Coupin de la Couperie,

Phillipe-Marie, 132–4

Crisp, Roger, 214n22, 216n26

critical reading, 11

culture, concept of, 7–8, 136, 171–6

Cunizza da Romano, 30, 62

Dancy, Jonathan, 1, 73–5, 95, 211n2,

214n10, 218n21–2

Daniel, Arnault, 120

d’Annunzio, Gabrielle, 8, 133–4, 158–60

Dante Alighieri

biography, 17–20, 54, 56, 63, 95

and the law, 176

as philosopher, 5–6, 24–34, 56–7

as poet, 5–6, 51, 58–9

reception of, 139–42

see also Convivio, Divine Comedy,

Letter to Can Grande, Vita Nuova,

De vulgari eloquentia

Davidson, Donald, 227n10

Davies, Robertson, 104

Davis, Todd F., 229n63

deconstruction, 12

Dedek, John F., 218n10–11

Della Terza, Dante, 215n4

democracy, 10

Demus, Otto, 130

Derrida, Jacques, 119, 190

Dewey, John, 137–8

Diamond, Cora, 24, 213n4

Dickens, Charles, 96–7, 102

Diffey, Terry J., 228n22

Divine Comedy, The

autobiography in, 17, 69

Boccaccio’s lectures on, 13–14, 15–16

structure of, 5, 34, 53–5, 95

dolce stil nuovo, 18, 108, 113, 120, 134, 155

Dragonetti, Roger, 111

Dreiser, Theodore, 181

Dronke, Peter, 113, 117, 212n9, 214n18,

215n35, 216n6, 222n51

Duby, Georges, 143, 214n27, 215n42

Duse, Eleanora, 133, 158

Dyce, William, 134

Eichmann, Adolf, 113–15

Eliot, George, 97–8

Eliot, T. S. (Thomas Stearns), 162, 182

emotion, 29, 47, 57–9, 128, 130. See also

love, pity

Eskin, Michael, 211n7

ethical criticism, 11–12, 185–92

euphemism, 7, 114–15

faith, 35–6, 53

fiction, 65–9

Fish, Stanley, 191

Fitzgerald, Penelope, 182–3

Flaubert, Gustave, 89, 112–13, 147

Index 233

Flaxman, John, 132–3

Fleetwood, Frances, 161, 226n91

Fletcher, Joseph, 218n9

Fleming, Ray, 119, 186, 222n29, 222n42

Flyvbjerg, Bent, 228n18

Fokine, Michel, 161

Foscolo, Ugo, 20

Foucault, Michel, 138, 185

Francesca da Rimini

biography, 3, 13–21

reader, 6–7, 107–13, 116–23, 191

rhetoric of, 25, 47–51

Fried, Charles, 226n94

Fuseli, Henry, 131–3

Galahad, 116

Galassi, Jonathan, 168, 226n97

Galehaut, 16, 108

Gaunt, Simon B., 143

Geertz, Clifford, 205

generalization, 97–102

Gertz, SunHee Kim, 212n8

Giotto (Giotto di Bondone), 129, 131–3,

135–6, 173–4

Gilbert, W. S., 156

Gilson, Étienne, 53

Goldsmith, Oliver, 139–40

Goldstein, Rebecca, 203

Gombrich, Ernst, 130

Goodin, Robert E., 220n56

Grandgent, C. H., 20–1

Green, Dennis Howard, 217n40

Greenberg, Clement, 161

Guido da Montefeltro, 19

Guido Novello (Count Guido Novello

da Polenta), 17–20, 23, 157

Guinevere, 93, 108–10, 116, 144

Guinizelli, Guido, 49, 107–8,

111, 120–3

Habermas, Jürgen, 190–1, 229n43

Hamlet, 14, 110, 153

Hand, Learned, 167

Harman, Gilbert, 219n26

Haskell, Francis, 132, 223n10

Hatcher, Ann, 220n5

Hazlitt, William, 141, 152, 183, 189

Heaney, Seamus, 101

Heidegger, Martin, 102, 138

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 138,

172, 205

Héloïse (Héloïse d’Argenteuil), 39–40,

110, 144

Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 172

Herodotus, 7, 144

historicism, 7–9, 127–9, 131–45, 161,

167–8, 170–80, 197

history, 14–17, 68, 183, 219n40

Hollander, Robert, 141, 212n11, 214n16,

214n33, 215n2, 217n28, 222n41

Homer, 91, 102, 140, 142

Hooker, Brad, 27, 97–8, 214n11

Howe, Irving, 228n15

humanism, 195, 201

Hume, David, 63, 71

Hunt, Leigh, 8–9, 133–4, 146–7, 149, 154

impartiality, see partiality

Ingres, Jean Auguste Dominique, 132–3

intuitions, 2, 9–10, 85–7, 138–9, 198

irony, 10

Iseult, 3, 18, 61, 89, 108, 111–12, 158

Jacoff, Rachel, 223n3

James, Henry, 102, 180–1

Jameson, Fredric, 194

Jennings, Henry C., 106–7

Jesus, 72, 98–102

Joseph, Horace William Brindley, 214n24

Joyce, James Augustine Aloysius, 147,

163–4, 169, 172

Kahneman, Daniel, 227n5

Kant, Immanuel, 197

enlightenment, definition of, 169

ethics, 26, 30, 40–3, 60, 73, 76

judgment, theory of, 26

method of, 9, 137

narrative, theory of, 71–2

Kantianism, 24, 193, 195, 205

Index234

Keats, John, 8, 58, 106, 140, 146–7, 149–55

Keller, Gregory, 217n2

Kelley, Donald R., 229n47

King Lear, 59, 67–8, 91

Kooning, Willem de, 4

Kristeva, Julia, 194

Kutz, Christopher, 90–1

Lance, Mark Norris, 76–7, 213n8

Lancelot, 16, 49, 61–2, 93, 108–11,

116–17, 144–5

Larner, John, 212n14, 213n17,

213n23, 213n24

Latini, Brunetto, 63

law, 44–5, 98–102, 176, 194

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 197

Lesser, Wendy, 115, 222n28

Letter to Can Grande, 65–6

Levine, Joseph M., 229n51

Lewis, Richard Warrington Baldwin,

18, 212n11, 214n15, 222n52

Lewis, Wyndham, 101

literary criticism, 11–12, 183–92

Little, Margaret Olivia, 76, 213n8

Loeb, Don, 219n28

Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 58

Loomis, Roger Sherman, 222n31

love

artistic representation of, 127

definition of, 4–5, 77–80, 83–4, 86,

112, 120

Francesca’s view of, 25, 28–9, 120–1

free will and, 28–30, 154

Romantics’ view of, 147, 154–5

Luban, David, 219n39, 226n89

Lynch, Jack, 217n42

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, 141,

184, 189

Macbeth, 217n2

Machiavelli (Niccolò di Bernardo dei

Machiavelli), 200–1

MacIntyre, Alasdair, 154, 205

Mackie, John, 219n39

Madame Bovary, see Flaubert, Gustave

Mallarmé, Stéphane, 156, 166–7

Malatesta the Elder, 19

Malatesta, Gianciotto, 15–16, 25, 39,

44, 95–6

Malatesta, Malatestino, 19, 158–9

Malatesta, Paolo, 13, 15–16

Manet, Édouard, 163–4, 169, 172, 174

Manicheanism, see Albigensianism

marriage, 34–46, 73–4, 94–61, 127,

143–5. See also adultery

Martin, Mike W., 29, 214n14

Mascagni, Pietro, 161

McCormick, Peter, 217n43

McDowell, John, 88, 218n24

McGinn, Colin, 11, 194–5, 202–3,

213n6

McNaughton, David, 77

Meun, Jean de, 39

metaphor, 59, 64–6, 68–9

Milbank, Alison, 146, 223n20

Mill, John Stuart, 32

Milton, John, 139

Modernism, 155, 160–74, 181–3

Montale, Eugenio, 8, 164–9, 172, 180

morality, see ethics

More, Thomas, 199–201

Murdoch, Iris, 203

Musa, Mark, 121–2, 220n5, 222n46

Nabokov, Vladimir, 11, 104, 204

Nafisi, Azar, 104

narrative, 25, 88–99, 125, 180–3

Neoclassicism, 132, 136

Neoplatonism, 130–1

Neurath, Otto, 84

New Testament, 72, 98–102, 117

Newton, Isaac, 136

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 106, 206

on Christianity, 99

on historicism, 138, 142, 169, 227n8

on modernism, 155, 169–70, 172

on tragedy, 62

Noakes, Susan, 222n31

Nozick, Robert, 30, 202

Nussbaum, Martha

Index 235

Dante and, 203–4, 211n4, 217n30

literary criticism and, 11–12, 185, 187–8

love, theory of, 79

moral philosophy of, 24, 198, 206,

211n5, 217n33, 229n45

Ohly, Friedrich, 129

Old Testament, 98

Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso), 16, 48–9,

67, 110, 151

paganism, 87, 144, 151

Panofsky, Erwin, 130, 173, 227n11

Paolo, see Malatesta, Paolo

Parker, David, 194, 211n7

partiality, 2, 62–4, 227n12

particularism, 1–2, 4–5, 73–83, 97, 167,

177–80

Paton, Joseph Noel, 99

Peacock, Thomas Love, 140

Perella, N. J., 221n15

perspective, 129–32, 135

Petrocchi, Giorgio, 212n12

Phillimore, Catherine Mary, 216n17

Phillips, Stephen, 156–8, 160

philosophy

analytical, 9–11, 86, 194–8

Dante on, 56–7

moral, 24–34, 192–206

Pia (La Pia de’ Tolomei), 116, 124–5,

148, 153

Pite, Ralph, 149

pity, 51–3, 115, 146, 148–9

Plato, 3, 28, 59–60, 65, 199, 201, 206

pleasure, 27, 73–4

Plutarch, 67, 201

Poggioli, Renato, 49, 110, 184, 213n27,

220n4, 228n21

Posner, Richard, 102–3

postmodernism, 12, 119–20

pre-Raphaelite Movement, 136–7

Price, Anthony W., 74

Proust, Marcel, 11

Pupil, François, 132–3, 223n9

Pynchon, Thomas, 162, 226n93

Pyramus and Thisbe, 16, 48–9, 89, 110–12

Quine, Willard Van Orman, 84, 219n27

rape, 4, 77, 84

Raphael (Raffaello Sanzio), 130–1

Ravenna, 13, 17–20, 49, 55, 130

Rawling, Piers, 77

Rawls, John, 10, 30, 85–6, 97, 196, 199,

214n20

reason, 36, 51–3, 57–9

ref lective equilibrium, 85–6

religion, see faith

representation

abstraction and, 156

crisis of, 7–8, 127–37, 161, 173

relation to ethics, 72, 101–2, 167,

Romanticism, 8–9, 128–9, 134,

140–55, 183–6

Roncaglia, Emilio, 50

Rorty, Richard, 11, 191, 204

Rosen, Charles, 166–7

Ross, W. D., 32–3, 35

Rossetti, Dante Gabriel, 8, 134–7, 223n20

Rougement, Denis de, 41–2, 112, 147,

215n39, 221n10

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 200

Rubio, Louis, 147

Ruskin, John, 135

Ryle, Gilbert, 88–9, 92

Saglia, Diego, 186–7, 213n26, 224n30

Said, Edward, 186

Sanctis, Francesco de, 6, 50, 145–8

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 62

Scaglione, Aldo D., 215n45

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph,

140–1

Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich

von, 138

Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 6, 66, 153

scholasticism, 195, 197

Schwartz, Daniel R., 206, 211n7

Scott, Walter, 141–2, 170

Seamon, Roger, 91, 94–5

Index236

Semiramis, 21, 48

Sen, Amartya, 30

sentimentality, 7, 115, 155–6

Shakespeare, William, 140

anti-Semitism in, 102

ethical readings of, 11

love in, 89

Negative Capability of, 152–3, 155,

181, 206

See also Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth

shapelessness, 79–80

Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 140, 144–5, 154–5

Sider, Michael J., 225n77

Sidney, Sir Philip, 67

Singer, Peter, 195, 202

Singleton, Charles, 16

skepticism, 9, 11

Slote, Bernice, 155

Smith, Jessica, 154

Socrates, 28, 60, 65, 67, 201, 218n7

St. Augustine, 49, 57, 65, 116–18, 142

St. Bernard, 53

St. Bonaventure, 125, 223n54

St. Francis of Assisi, 14, 125

St. Paul, 41–2, 117

St. Thomas Aquinas, see Aquinas, St.

Thomas

Strauss, Richard, 161–2

Stravinsky, Igor, 161–2

Strawson, Galen, 196

Sullivan, Arthur, 156

Tanner, Tony, 100, 147

Tennyson, Alfred Lord, 145, 157

themes, 5, 15, 68, 91–2, 120

Thomism, see Aquinas, St. Thomas

Thompson, Judith Jarvis, 202

Tillich, Paul, 218n16

Tomory, Peter, 131

Tompkins, Jane, 190

tragedy, 11, 59–62

Tristan, 18, 61–2, 89, 105, 108, 111–12,

132, 144–5, 158

Trilling, Lionel, 23, 104, 170, 181

Tversky, Amos, 227n5

Unger, Roberto, 166

Unsworth, Barry, 182–3

Usher, Jonathan, 14

utilitarianism, 10, 32, 37–9, 43, 62–3,

195, 205

Valesio, Paolo, 111, 134, 212n2

van Eyck, Jan, 4

Velleman, David, 79

Vendler, Helen, 151

Verdi, Guiseppe, 146, 160

Verlaine, Paul, 156

Vinken, Barbara, 108, 118, 220n5

Vita Nuova, 51, 121–3

De vulgari eloquentia, 67

Walker, Margaret Urban, 217n31

Walzer, Michael, 138–9

Warhol, Andy, 75

Warner, Michael, 190, 211n8

Warren, Austin, 185

Weaver, William, 223n15

Wellek, René, 185

Whitehead, Alfred North, 109

Wiggins, David, 88

Wilde, Oscar, 184–5

Wilkie, Brian, 222n27

Williams, Bernard

ethical theory of, 77, 83, 89,

190, 228n40

on historicism, 138

on tragedy, 11, 205–6

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 79–81, 179, 215n2

Wolf, Susan, 217n32

Womack, Kenneth, 229n63

Woodhouse, John, 133–4

Woolf, Virginia, 91, 206

Wordsworth, William, 141–2, 149, 152–4

Wright, Robert, 171

Zamir, Tzachi, 89, 204

Zandonai, Riccardo, 159, 161