APPENDIX G ATTACHMENT 3 PHASE 2 SIGNIFICANCE … · As directed in the SRM to SECY 97-168, the...

Issue Date: 02/28/05 G3-1 0609, App G, Att 3

APPENDIX GATTACHMENT 3

PHASE 2 SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS TEMPLATE FOR BWR DURING SHUTDOWN

0609, App G, Att 3 G3-2 Issue Date: 02/28/05

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS AND APPLICABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-3

2.0 LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-4

3.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-5

4.0 PROCEDURE FOR SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-8Step 4.1 Transition from Phase 1 SDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-8Step 4.2 Determine if the finding is a precursor to an initiating event (a loss

of the DHR function) or a condition finding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-8Step 4.3 Procedure for Assessing SDP Precursor Findings . . . . . . . . . G3-9Step 4.4 Process for Assessing SDP Condition Findings . . . . . . . . . . G3-11Step 4.5 Process for Assessing Events Under MD 8.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-13

5.0 FIGURES, TABLES, WORKSHEETS AND EVENT TREES . . . . . . . . . . . G3-16


1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS AND APPLICABILITY

As directed in the SRM to SECY 97-168, the staff is inspecting and monitoring licenseeperformance at shutdown to ensure that the licensees are maintaining a mitigationcapability (equipment, instrumentation, policies, procedures, and training) consistent withthe staff’s estimate of industry shutdown risk presented to the Commission in SECY 97-168(the proposed shutdown rule). In the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the significanceof inspection findings is assessed using a Risk Informed process, called the SignificanceDetermination Process (SDP). The Shutdown SDP consists of: Phase 1, Definition andInitial Screening of Findings; Phase 2, Initial Risk Significance Approximation and Basis;and Phase 3, Risk Significance Finalization and Justification. Inspection Manual Chapter(IMC) 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process is usedto conduct the phase 1 screening analysis by inspectors. This template is used forperforming phase 2 analyses by SRAs for certain BWR shutdown performance deficienciesdiscussed below.

1.1 Entry Conditions

1.1.1 SDP Related Inspection Finding

This SDP provides a simplified risk-informed framework to estimate the increase in coredamage frequency during shutdown operations due to performance deficiencies that areidentified as requiring quantitative assessment from the Phase 1 Screening Tool.

Concurrent performance deficiencies should be assessed collectively if they resulted froma closely-tied common cause. If causes are independent, each performance deficiencyshould be assigned a color individually. See IMC 0609, Appendix A for more detailedguidance.

1.1.2 Management D 8.3 Entry

Procedures are given in Chapter 4 for using this template to perform quantitativeassessment of shutdown event to satisfy Management Directive 8.3.

1.2 Applicability

The process in this SDP is designed to provide Senior Reactor Analysts a simple scrutableprobabilistic risk framework for use in identifying potentially risk-significant shutdown issueswithin the initiating events, mitigation systems, and barriers cornerstones. The results fromthis SDP tool are intended to facilitate communication on the basis of risk significancebetween the NRC and licensees.


2.0 LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS

2.1 Limits

The template is a simplified tool that generates an order-of-magnitude assessment of therisk significance of inspection findings during shutdown operation.

2.2 Precautions

2.2.1 The analyst should consider each evaluated core damage sequence using the eventtrees to ensure that the scenario makes sense for the deficiency. The variability ofplant configurations at shutdown and timing issues may result in performancedeficiencies which do not directly map on the event trees. Contact risk analyst inNRR/SPSB for assistance if needed.

2.2.2 The analyst must understand: (1) the differences between precursor and conditionfindings, (2) the definitions of the plant operational states (POSs), and (3) thedefinitions of the shutdown initiating events.

2.2.3 The availability of standby RCS injection along with operator error drives shutdownrisk. As long as standby injection is available, in most cases, standby injection buystime for other operator recovery actions such as: leak path termination and RHRrecovery. If there are factors that could render the standby RCS injectionunavailable such as: gas intrusion or support system unavailability, then thesefactors (assumptions) become risk significant and should be assessed carefully.

2.2.4 Findings that involve freeze seals that are installed in systems connected to theRCS where failure could lead to a loss of inventory are not covered by theseworksheets and go directly to Headquarters for Phase 3 analysis.

2.2.5 Findings that involve containment closure are assessed using IMC 0609Appendix H.


3.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

3.1 Abbreviations

CD Core DamageCCW Component Cooling WaterDHR Decay Heat RemovalECCS Emergency Core Cooling SystemIEL Initiating Event LikelihoodINDIC. IndicationIMC Inspection Manual ChapterLOI Loss of Reactor Inventory Initiating EventLER Licensee Event ReportLOOP Loss of Offsite PowerLORHR Loss of RHR Initiating EventOP. OperatorPOS Plant Operational StatePRA Probabilistic Risk AssessmentRCS Reactor Coolant SystemRHR Residual Heat RemovalROP Reactor Oversight ProcessSDP Significance Determination ProcessSRW Site Raw WaterSSW Standby Service WaterTW Time WindowTW-E Early Time Window, before refueling operationTW-L Late Time Window, after refueling operation

3.2 Definitions

Phases of a Significance Determination

Phase 1 - Characterization and Initial Screening of Findings: Precise characterization ofthe finding and an initial screening of very low-significance findings for disposition by thelicensee’s corrective action program.

Phase 2 - Initial Risk Significance Approximation and Basis: Initial approximation of the risksignificance of the finding and development of the basis for this determination for thosefindings that are not screened out in Phase 1 screening.

Phase 3 - Risk Significance Finalization and Justification: Review and as-neededrefinement of the risk significance estimation results from Phase 2, or development of anyrisk analysis outside of this guidance, by an NRC risk analyst (any departure from the


guidance provided in this document or IMC 609 Appendix G for Phase 1 or Phase 2constitutes a Phase 3 analysis and must be performed by an NRC risk analyst).

Types of Shutdown Performance Deficiencies

Precursor Finding - Inspection findings that: (1) have the potential to cause a loss of theoperating train of RHR, (2) increase the likelihood that the operating RHR train could belost, or (3) result in a shutdown event - cause a loss/interruption of the operating train ofRHR.

Condition findings - Inspection findings that only involve a degradation of the licensee’scapability to mitigate an event if an event were to occur. Findings only affecting thestandby train of RHR are condition findings.

Shutdown Initiating Events

Loss of RHR (LORHR) - Includes losses of RHR resulting from failures of the RHR system(such as RHR pump failure) or failures of the RHR support systems other than offsitepower.

Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) - Includes losses of offsite power which cause a loss of theDHR function. LOOP events are not assessed in POS 3.

Loss of Reactor Inventory (LOI) - Includes losses of RCS inventory that lead to a loss ofthe DHR function due to isolation of RHR on Level 3 or loss of RHR due to loss of RHRpump suction.

Plant Operational States (POSs)

POS 1 - This POS starts when the RHR system is put into service. The vessel head is onand the RCS is closed such that an extended loss of the DHR function without operator|intervention could result in a RCS re-pressurization above the shutoff head for the RHR|pumps.|

POS 2 - This POS represents the shutdown condition when (1) the vessel head is removed|and reactor pressure vessel water level is less than the minimum level required formovement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel as defined byTechnical Specifications OR (2) a sufficient RCS vent path exists for decay heat removal.|

|POS 3 - This POS represents the shutdown condition when the reactor pressure vesselwater level is equal or greater than the minimum level required for movement of irradiatedfuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel as define by Technical Specifications.This POS occurs during Mode 5.


Time Windows

Early Time Window (TW-E) - This time window represents the time before POS 3 isentered. The decay heat is relatively high. The reactor is either in POS 1 or 2.

Late Time Window (TW-L) - This time window represents the time after POS group 3. Thedecay heat is relatively low. The reactor is either in POS 1 or 2.

Other Key Shutdown Definitions

Available - A piece of equipment is considered available if: (1) it can be put into servicewithin half the time that is needed for the equipment to perform its function, (2) proceduresor standing orders exist for using the equipment to meet its intended function, (3) allnecessary supporting systems (such as AC power, cooling water, and DC control power)can be put into service within half the time that is needed for the equipment to perform its |function, and (4) operators have been trained for using the equipment for the given |situation.

Core Damage - Core damage corresponds to a peak clad temperature above 1300 degreesFahrenheit. Above 1340 degrees Fahrenheit, phenomena such as clad oxidation andballooning affect core behavior. This definition is consistent with the definition of the onsetof core damage used in NUREG/CR 6144 Vol.2, Part 1A, "Evaluation of Potential SevereAccidents During Low Power and Shutdown Operations at Surry, Unit 1, Analysis of CoreDamage Frequency from Internal Events During Mid-Loop Operations."

Shutdown Operations - Shutdown Operation exists during hot shutdown, cold shutdown,and refueling when more than one fuel assembly is in the reactor vessel and the decayheat removal system is in operation.


4.0 PROCEDURE FOR SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION

Step 4.1 Transition from Phase 1 SDP

Step 4.1.1 Use the information gathered in the Phase 1 process to identify the set ofequipment that the licensee planned to achieve the following safety functions:Standby RCS injection and RCS pressure control, if applicable.Caution: Equipment is considered available if: (1) it can be put into

service within half the time that is needed for the equipment toperform its function, (2) procedures or standing orders exist forusing the equipment to meet its intended function, (3) allnecessary supporting systems (such as AC power, coolingwater, and DC control power) can be put into service within half|the time that is needed for the equipment to perform its|function, and (4) operators have been trained for using the|equipment for the given situation.

Caution: The availability of standby RCS injection along with operatorerror drives shutdown risk. As long as standby injection isavailable, in most cases, standby injection allows time for otheroperator recovery actions such as leak path termination andRHR recovery. If there are factors that could render thestandby RCS injection unavailable such as gas intrusion orsupport system unavailability, then these factors (assumptions)become risk significant and should be assessed carefully.

Step 4.2 Determine if the finding is a precursor to an initiating event (a loss ofthe DHR function) or a condition finding.

NOTE: Precursor findings: (1) have the potential to cause a loss of theoperating train of RHR, or (2) increase the likelihood that theoperating RHR train could be lost, or (3) result in a shutdownevent - cause a loss/interruption of the operating train of RHR.Condition findings only involve a degradation of the licensee’scapability to mitigate an event if an event were to occur.Findings only affecting the standby train of RHR are conditionfindings. The templates treats precursor and condition findingsdifferently.

Go To Step 4.3 for Precursor Findings

OR

Go To Step 4.4 for Condition Findings


NOTE: If this tool is being used to assess a shutdown event underManagement Directive 8.3, Go to Step 4.5.

Step 4.3 Procedure for Assessing SDP Precursor Findings

Step 4.3.1 Identify each TW and POS where the finding could have occurred.

Step 4.3.2 Determine the IEL. The IEL is the conditional likelihood of having a loss ofthe RHR function given the occurrence of the performance deficiency.

IF a finding increases the likelihood of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) oractually caused a LOOP, THEN LOOP is the applicable initiating event. UseTable 1 to determine the IEL. Go to Step 4.3.3.

IF a finding increases the likelihood of a loss of reactor inventory (LOI) oractually caused a LOI, THEN LOI is the applicable initiating event. Use Table2 to determine the IEL. Go to Step 4.3.3.

IF a finding increases the likelihood of a loss of the operating train of RHR(LORHR) or actually caused a LORHR (except for LOOP and LOI), THENLORHR is the applicable initiating event. Use Table 3 to determine the IEL.Go to Step 4.3.3.

IF a finding involves the RHR support systems (except for LOOP and LOI),THEN LORHR is the applicable initiating event. Use Table 3 to determinethe IEL. Go to Step 4.3.3.

Step 4.3.3 Use the SDP Worksheet that contains the POSs and initiating events thatwere determined to be applicable in Step 4.3.2.

Step 4.3.4 Enter the time to RCS boiling and an approximate time to core uncovery/coredamage in the first line of the Worksheet.

Step 4.3.5 Label the IEL in each row of the lower section of the worksheet.

Step 4.3.6 Determine Credit for each top event function.

A. Verify that the licensee has the instrumentation referenced for the topevent function.

NOTE: If the licensee does not have the referencedinstrumentation available or the referencedinstrumentation is not reflective of RCS conditions, thenthe default operator credit MUST by decreased by 2.


B. To obtain the Equipment Credit, credit each available system that is(1) capable of maintaining the top event function and (2) is notimpacted by the finding. Use the Event Tree associated with theWorksheet to help understand the successes and failures associatedwith each accident sequence. Use guidance in Tables 6 and 7 todetermine equipment credits. Document key assumptions.

C. To obtain the Operator Credit, Use the default operator credit unlessany of the following four conditions are applicable:

1. If the referenced instrumentation is missing or misleading, thendecrease the operator credit by two.

2. The default time is incorrect and is significantly reduced. If thediagnoses time is less than 20 minutes, OR the time requiredto perform the action is approximately the time available, thendecrease the operator credit by one.

3. If the action is complicated by missing equipment,unaccessible equipment, steam or high radiation, or loop sealsfor pump venting, then decrease the operator credit by two.

4. If the procedures are incomplete for the shutdownconfiguration, then the operator credit is decreased by one.

NOTE: If the default operator credit is changed and results in anegative operator credit, then the operator credit is zero.

D. Determine the Credit for Function for each Top Event Functionneeded. Select the lower of Equipment Credit and Operator Credit,and enter the value in this column.

Step 4.3.7 Quantification of Core Damage Scenarios

Quantify each accident scenario by adding the credits for IEL + MitigationCredit. Enter the sum in the Result column.

NOTE: For phase 2 analyses, the recovery credit is not used.

Step 4.3.8 Identifying the Frequency of Finding Occurrence. Select Between ConditionA or B.

A. If the performance deficiency occurred during an outage (forcedoutage, refueling outage, etc.), the color of the finding is determinedsimilar to the process using the guidance in IMC 0609 Appendix A. The resulting ICCDP associated with the performance deficiency isinterpreted as the addition to the licensee’s total CDF contribution


over the previous year (previous 12 months). Therefore the resultingICCDP becomes the increase in delta CDF.

B. If the deficiency needs a random event to reveal the deficiency (e.g.at Palisades, the digging of a sign revealed underground protectivecabling common to both offsite power sources outside the protectedarea), then the frequency of the random event (1/32 calender yearsof operation) is multiplied by:

The Frequency that the licensee enters an outage (1 outage per 18months) * (12 months/ calender year) *(Number of Days of POS 1operation/ outage) * (1 calender year/365 days) *(CCDP of POS 1operation)

Added to:

The Frequency that the licensee enters an outage (1 outage per 18months) * (12 months/ calender year) *(Number of Days of POS 2operation/ outage) * (1 calender year/365 days) *(CCDP of POS 2operation)

Step 4.4 Process for Assessing SDP Condition Findings

NOTE: Only the core damage scenarios impacted by the finding arequantified.

Step 4.4.1 Select the applicable initiating events (LOOP. LORHR, and/or LOI) byidentifying the equipment or safety functions affected and determine theinitiating event scenarios that must be evaluated (i.e., the affected functionplays some role in mitigating the initiating event scenario).

Step 4.4.2 Determine the exposure times for the degraded condition in the mitigatingsystem. A separate exposure time must be determined for each POS forfindings that span one or more POS. Using Table 5, determine an IEL foreach applicable initiating event in each applicable POS.

Step 4.4.3 Use the SDP Worksheet(s) that contain the POSs and initiating events thatwere determined to be applicable in Step 4.4.2. Perform the following stepson the Worksheet for each applicable POS and initiating event.




Step 4.4.6 Determine Revised Credit for each top event function Impacted by theFinding.

A. Verify that the licensee has the instrumentation referenced for the topevent function.

NOTE: If the licensee does not have the referencedinstrumentation available or the referencedinstrumentation is not reflective of RCS conditions, thenthe default operator credit must be decreased by two.

B. To obtain the Equipment Credit, credit each available system that is:(1) capable of maintaining the top event function and (2) is notimpacted by the finding. Use the Event Tree associated with theWorksheet to help understand the successes and failures associatedwith each accident sequence. Use guidance in Tables 5 and 6 todetermine equipment credits. Document key assumptions.

NOTE: Each top event has a equipment credit and an operatorcredit, only the equipment credit change or the operatorcredit change is propagated through the worksheets.See the following example:

Example: If the licensee has a finding that changes the MINJequipment credit from 5 to 3, then the revised credit forthe MINJ&SRV becomes 3, regardless of the SRVcredit or the operator credit.

C. To obtain the revised Operator Credit, use the following guidance:







Example: If the licensee has a finding that changes the operatorcredit from a 5 to a 3 due to a loss of instrumentation,then the revised credit for the MINJ&SRV becomes 3,regardless of the equipment MINJ&SRV equipmentcredit.



Quantify each accident scenario that is impacted by the finding adding thecredits for IEL + Mitigation Credit. Enter the sum in the Result column.

Note, For phase 2 analyses, the recovery credit is not used.

Step 4.4.8 Go to the next applicable Worksheet and begin at Step 4.4.1 or, if allWorksheets are completed, continue to Step 4.4.9.

Step 4.4.9 Estimating the Risk Significance of the Inspection Finding

The risk significance of an inspection finding is determined in the samemanner as for at-power findings. Use IMC 0609, Appendix A, Step 2.4,“Estimating the Risk Significance of Inspection Findings,” to determine therisk significance of a finding.

Step 4.5 Process for Assessing Events Under MD 8.3

Step 4.5.1 Identify the TW and POS where the shutdown event occurred.

Step 4.5.2 Identify the appropriate shutdown initiating event.

Use an IEL = 1.0 if the event caused a loss of interruption of the RHR function.

OR

Determine the IEL. Evaluate each question in order. Only one of thefollowing will apply:


IF a finding increases the likelihood of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) oractually caused a LOOP, THEN LOOP is the applicable initiating event. UseTable 1 to determine the IEL. Go to Step 4.5.3.

IF a finding increases the likelihood of a loss of reactor inventory (LOI) oractually caused a LOI, THEN LOI is the applicable initiating event. Use Table2 to determine the IEL. Go to Step 4.5.3.

IF a finding increases the likelihood of a loss of the operating train of RHR(LORHR) or actually caused a LORHR (except for LOOP and LOI), THENLORHR is the applicable initiating event. Use Table 3 to determine the IEL.Go to Step 4.5.3.

IF a finding involves the RHR support systems (except for LOOP and LOI),THEN LORHR is the applicable initiating event. Use Table 3 to determinethe IEL. Go to Step 4.5.3.

Step 4.5.3 Use the SDP Worksheet that contains the POS and initiating event that weredetermined to be applicable in Step 4.5.1.



Step 4.5.6 Determine the revised Credit for each top event function impacted by thefinding for the as found condition during the event.

A. Verify the licensee has the instrumentation referenced for the topevent function.

NOTE: If the licensee does not have the referencedinstrumentation available or the referencedinstrumentation is not reflective of RCS conditions, thenthe default operator credit MUST be reduced by two.

B. To obtain the Equipment Credit, credit each available system that is(1) capable of maintaining the top event function and (2) is notimpacted by the finding. Use the Event Tree associated with theWorksheet to help understand the successes and failures associatedwith each accident sequence. Use guidance in Tables 7 and 8 todetermine equipment credits. Document key assumptions.


C. To obtain the Operator Credit, use the default operator credit unlessany of the following four conditions are applicable:








Quantify each accident scenario by adding the credits for IEL + MitigationCredit. Enter the sum in the Result column.

NOTE: For phase 2 analyses, the recovery credit is not used.

Step 4.5.8 Go to the next applicable Worksheet and begin at Step 4.5.1, or if allWorksheets are completed, continue to Step 4.5.9.

Step 4.5.9 Estimating the Risk Significance of the Inspection Finding

The risk significance of an inspection finding is determined in the samemanner as for at-power findings. Use IMC 0609, Appendix A, Step 2.4 -“Estimating the Risk Significance of Inspection Findings” to determine the risksignificance of a finding.


5.0 FIGURES, TABLES, WORKSHEETS AND EVENT TREES

5.1 Figures

Figure 1 Determination of Applicable POSs and Time Windows-BWRs . . . . G3-18

Figure 2 Event Tree for Loss of Inventory - BWR POS-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-42



Figure 5 Event Tree for Loss of Offsite Power - BWR POS-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-45

Figure 6 Event Tree for Loss of Offsite Power - BWR POS-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-46

Figure 7 Event Tree for Loss of RHR - BWR POS-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-47

Figure 8 Event Tree for Loss of RHR - BWR POS-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-48

5.2 Tables

Table 1 Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for LOOP Precursors . . . . . . . . . G3-19

Table 2 Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for LOI Precursors . . . . . . . . . . . G3-20

Table 3 Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for LORHR Precursors . . . . . . . G3-21

Table 4 Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for Condition Findings - BWRs . G3-22

Table 5 Mitigation Capability Credits for Installed Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . G3-23

Table 6 Credits for Temporary Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-24

5.3 Worksheets and Event Trees

Worksheet 1 Loss of Inventory in POS 1 (Head On) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-25

Worksheet 2 Loss of Inventory in POS 2 (Head Off or RCS Vented) . . . . . . . . . . G3-28

Worksheet 3 Loss of Inventory in POS 3 (Cavity Flooded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-31

Worksheet 4 Loss of the Operating Train of RHR in POS 1 (Head On) . . . . . . . . G3-33


Worksheet 5 Loss of the Operating Train of RHR in POS 2 (Head Off or RCS |Vented) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-36 |

Worksheet 6 Loss of Offsite Power in POS 1 (Head On) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3-38

Worksheet 7 Loss of Offsite Power in POS 2 (Head Off or RCS Vented) . . . . . . G3-40 |

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Type of LOOP precursor Initiating Event Likelihood(IEL)

Actual LOOP occurred 0

Work Activities have the potential toaffect existing power supplies(example: crane operating close to aReserve Auxiliary Transformersupplying power to RHR withoutadequate controls on its movement)

1

0609, App G, Att 3 G3-20 Issue Date:02/28/05

Table 2 - Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for LOI Precursors

Time to RHR lossdue to isolation ofRHR on level 3given no operatoraction

Is RCS LevelIndication areasonablereflection of RCSlevel

Can leak path bereadily identifiedwithin ½ time toloss of RHR

Can drain path beisolated by at leastone functionalvalve such that atrain of RHR canbe re-started(e.g. not RHRsuction valves)

EstimatedIEL

loss of RHRoccurred orX<20 min.

N/A N/A N/A 0

20<X<40 min. YES YES YES 1

20<X<40 min. NO N/A N/A 0

20<X<40 min. YES NO N/A 0

20<X<40 min. YES YES NO 0


40<X<60 min. NO YES YES 0

40<X<60 min. YES NO N/A 0


1<X<2 hours YES YES YES 3

1<X<2 hours NO YES YES 1

1<X<2 hours YES NO N/A 0

1<X<2 hours YES YES NO 0

X>2 hours YES YES YES 4

X>2 hours NO YES YES 1

X>2 hours YES NO N/A 0

X>2 hours YES YES NO 0


Table 3 - Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for LORHR Precursors

Note: For findings affecting Loss of the Operating Train of RHR and RHR Supports SystemIncluding SSW, AC and DC components

Time to RHR lossgiven nosuccessfuloperator action

Trouble AlarmsPresent for Finding

Ex.DHR high temp.DHR low flow

Support System Trouble AlarmsEx. SSW low flow

Can Action toRecover RHR beidentified within ½time to RHR loss?

Eg. RHR recoveryprocedures, SupportSystem Recoveryprocedures,

Can Actionto RecoverRHR beperformedwithin ½time to RHRloss?

EstimatedIEL

Loss of RHRoccurred OR< 20 minutes

N/A N/A N/A 0


20<X<40 min. NO N/A N/A 0

20 <X<40min. Yes NO N/A 0


40<X<60min. YES YES YES 2

40<X<60min. NO N/A N/A 0

40<X<60min. YES NO N/A 0

40>X<60min YES YES NO 0

1<X<2 hours YES YES YES 3

1<X<2 hours NO YES YES 1

1<X<2 hours YES NO N/A 0

1<X<2 hours YES YES NO 0

X>2 hour YES YES YES 4

X>2 hour NO YES YES 1

X>2 hour YES NO N/A 0

X> 2 hour YES YES NO 0


Table 4 - Initiating Event Likelihoods (IELs) for Condition Findings - BWRs

Row ApproximateConditionalFrequency

Example Event Type Estimated IEL(1)

0 > 1 per yr Loss of a Operating Trainof RHR (LORHR)

0 1 2

I 1 per 1-10 yr Loss of offsite power(LOOP)

1 2 3

II 1 per 10-10 2

yrLoss of Inventory (LOI) 2 3 4

> 30days

3-30 days < 3 days

Exposure Time for DegradedCondition

1. The likelihood ratings are presented in terms of 0, 1, 2, etc. A rating of 0 is comparable to a frequencyof 1 per year, a rating of 1 is comparable to a frequency of 1E-1 per year, and similarly, a rating of 2is comparable to a frequency of 1E-2 per year.


Table 5 - Mitigation Capability Credits for Installed Equipment

Type of Remaining CapabilityRemainingCapabilityRating

Recovery of Failed Train

Operator action to recover failed equipment that is capable of being recovered after an initiatingevent occurs. Action may take place either in the control room or outside the control room and isassumed to have a failure probability of approximately 0.1 when credited as “RemainingMitigation Capability.” Credit should be given only if the following criteria are satisfied: (1)sufficient time is available; (2) environmental conditions allow access, where needed; (3)procedures exist; (4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under similar conditions;and (5) any equipment needed to perform these actions is available and ready for use.

1

1 Automatic Steam-Driven (ASD) Train

A collection of associated equipment that includes a single turbine-driven component to provide100% of a specified safety function. The probability of such a train being unavailable due tofailure, test, or maintenance is assumed to be approximately 0.1 when credited as “RemainingMitigation Capability.”

1

1 Train

A collection of associated equipment (e.g., pumps, valves, breakers, etc.) that together canprovide 100% of a specified safety function. The probability of this equipment being unavailabledue to failure, test, or maintenance is approximately 1E-2 when credited as “RemainingMitigation Capability.”

2

1 Multi-Train System

A system comprised of two or more trains (as defined above) that are considered susceptible tocommon cause failure modes. The probability of this equipment being unavailable due to failure,test, or maintenance is approximately 1E-3 when credited as “Remaining Mitigation Capability,”regardless of how many trains comprise the system.

3

2 Diverse Trains

A system comprised of two trains (as defined above) that are not considered to be susceptible tocommon cause failure modes. The probability of this equipment being unavailable due to failure,test, or maintenance is approximately 1E-4 when credited as “Remaining Mitigation Capability.”

4 = (2+2)


Table 6 - Credits for Temporary Equipment

Mitigation Capability Credits

Equipment available during poweroperation and available during shutdownoperation

Use credit similar to at-power SDP;manual alignment and actuation may beneeded limiting the credit to the credit foroperator action

Temporary Equipment (e.g., skidmounted diesel generator) that isavailable during shutdown; equipmentand tools needed are staged for quickhookup

Use credit of 1

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BW

R P

lant

- Lo

ss o

f Inv

ento

ry in

PO

S 1

(Hea

d on

)

FILL

IN:

TIM

E T

O B

OIL

ING

___

____

__

TIM

E T

O C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E _

____

____

____

(N

OTE

: lo

sses

of i

nven

tory

sho

rten

time

to c

ore

dam

age)

Safe

ty F

unct

ions

Nee

ded:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

tIn

stru

men

tatio

n:Eq

uip.

Cre

dit

Ope

rato

r Cre

dit

Cre

dit f

or

Func

tion

Isol

atio

n of

the

loss

(ISO

L)D

ownc

omer

loss

es: A

uto

isol

atio

n of

RH

R o

nLo

w V

esse

l Lev

el W

/low

leve

l ala

rm

------

------

------

- ----

------

------

------

---Lo

sses

from

low

er p

lenu

m

Cre

dit =

3

------

------

------

---U

niso

labl

e le

ak(lo

wer

ple

num

) - 0

N/A

------

---- -

------

----

Cre

dit =

0

Early

Aut

omat

ic E

CC

S (A

ECC

S)1

low

pre

ssur

e E

CC

S p

ump

train

in a

utom

atic

N/A

Man

ual L

ow P

ress

ure

Inje

ctio

n - L

eak

isol

ated

(MIN

J)

Rec

onfig

ure

RH

R to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n, o

r LP

CS

, or a

con

dens

ate

pum

p or

ano

ther

low

pres

sure

non

-EC

CS

pum

p ca

pabl

e of

keep

ing

the

core

cov

ered

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dic.

W/lo

w le

vel

alar

ms

Cre

dit =

4

(Ass

umes

tim

e to

RH

Rsh

utof

f hea

d >

1hr).

Man

ual L

ow P

ress

ure

Inje

ctio

n - L

eak

not

isol

ated

(MIN

JX)

Rec

onfig

ure

RH

R to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n or

oth

erhi

gh fl

ow ra

te s

ourc

e es

sent

ially

equ

ival

ent i

nca

pabi

lity

to E

CC

S in

ject

ion.

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dica

tion

w/lo

wle

vel a

larm

s

Cre

dit =

4(A

ssum

ed ti

me

to C

D>2

hour

s w

/o le

ak p

ath

isol

atio

n)

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

26Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

DH

R R

ecov

ery

befo

reR

CS

pres

sure

con

trol

need

ed.

Leak

Isol

ated

.(R

HR

REC

)

Ope

rato

r res

tarts

RH

R b

efor

e R

CS

pre

ssur

eco

ntro

l nee

ded.

OR

Ope

rato

r ini

tiate

s an

alte

rnat

e, d

iver

se, D

HR

path

suc

h as

CR

D a

nd R

WC

U b

efor

e R

CS

pres

sure

con

trol i

s ne

eded

.

Cre

dit =

4(T

ime

to R

HR

shu

toff

head

>1 h

r.)

RC

S Pr

essu

re C

ontr

ol

(SR

V)

Ope

rato

r ope

ns A

RC

S v

ent p

ath

(e.g

. SR

V)

to c

ontro

l RC

S p

ress

ure.

Ope

rato

r nee

ds R

CS

pre

ssur

e in

dica

tion.

Cre

dit =

2

Man

ual H

igh

Pres

sure

Inje

ctio

n at

Pre

ssur

e (M

INJY

)

Ope

rato

r inj

ects

follo

win

g is

olat

ion

of R

HR

on

high

pre

ssur

e or

SR

Vs

liftin

g.us

ing

hig

h pr

essu

re p

umps

suc

h as

Con

trol

Rod

Driv

e pu

mps

or H

PC

I.

Cre

dit =

1

Con

tain

men

t Ven

ting

(CV)

Ope

rato

r ope

ns a

vaila

ble

vent

pat

hs.

Add

ition

ally

, lon

g te

rm m

ake-

up w

ater

mus

tbe

pro

vide

d to

the

inje

ctio

n so

urce

.

Cre

dit =

3

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

(Circ

le A

ffect

ed F

unct

ions

)IE

LM

itiga

tion

Cre

dit

Rec

over

yR

esul

t

LOI -

RH

RR

EC

- CV

(3)

LOI -

RH

RR

EC

- S

RV

(4)

LOI -

MIN

J - C

V (6

)

LOI -

MIN

J - M

INJY

(7)

LOI -

ISO

L - C

V (9

)

LOI -

ISO

L - S

RV

(10)

LOI -

ISO

L - A

EC

CS

- C

V (1

2)

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-27

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

LOI -

ISO

L - A

EC

CS

- S

RV

(13)

LOI-I

SO

L-A

EC

CS

-MIN

JX (1

4)

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ld b

e gi

ven

only

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns,

2) e

nviro

nmen

tal c

ondi

tions

allo

w a

cces

s w

here

nee

ded,

3) p

roce

dure

s ex

ist,

4) t

rain

ing

is c

ondu

cted

on

the

exis

ting

proc

edur

es u

nder

con

ditio

ns s

imila

r to

the

scen

ario

ass

umed

, and

5) a

ny e

quip

men

t nee

ded

to c

ompl

ete

thes

e ac

tions

is a

vaila

ble

and

read

y fo

r use

.

Not

es:

1.D

iffer

ent n

on-E

CC

S s

ourc

es m

ay a

pply

for d

iffer

ent p

lant

s. E

xam

ples

incl

ude:

fire

wat

er a

nd h

igh

pres

sure

ser

vice

wat

er.

2.Fa

ilure

of E

CC

S a

nd a

ltern

ate

inje

ctio

n so

urce

s is

ass

umed

to fa

il th

e ab

ility

of th

e op

erat

or to

reco

ver R

HR

and

is a

ssum

ed to

fail

supp

ress

ion

pool

coo

ling

and

mak

eup.

3.Fa

ilure

to is

olat

e th

e le

ak re

duce

s th

e ab

ility

to re

cove

r RH

R.

4.N

on-E

CC

S s

yste

ms

are

not a

ssum

ed to

be

able

to k

eep

core

cov

ered

if le

ak p

ath

is n

ot is

olat

ed.

5.If

a le

ak is

isol

ated

by

the

oper

ator

, it i

s as

sum

ed th

at E

CC

S w

ill no

t aut

omat

ical

ly b

e ac

tivat

ed.

6.A

ctio

ns to

ste

am th

e co

re a

t hig

h or

low

pre

ssur

e to

pre

vent

cor

e da

mag

e ar

e tre

ated

as

reco

very

act

ions

.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

28Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

Wor

kshe

et 2

SD

P W

orks

heet

for a

BW

R P

lant

—

Loss

of I

nven

tory

in P

OS

2 (H

ead

Off

or R

CS

vent

ed)

FILL

IN:

TIM

E TO

BO

ILIN

G _

____

____

T

IME

TO C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E __

____

____

___

(N

OTE

: lo

sses

of i

nven

tory

sho

rten

tim

e to

cor

e da

mag

e)

Safe

ty F

unct

ions

Nee

ded:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

tIn

stru

men

tatio

n:Eq

uip.

Cre

dit

Ope

rato

r Cre

dit

Cre

dit f

or

Func

tion

Isol

atio

n of

the

loss

(ISO

L)D

ownc

omer

loss

es: A

uto

isol

atio

n of

RH

Ron

Low

Ves

sel L

evel

W/lo

w le

vel a

larm

---

------

------

---- -

------

------

------

------

Loss

es fr

om lo

wer

ple

num

Cre

dit =

3

------

------

------

-----

Uni

sola

ble

leak

(low

er p

lenu

m)

-0

N/A

------

---- -

------

----

Cre

dit =

0

Early

Aut

omat

ic E

CC

S (A

ECC

S)1

low

pre

ssur

e EC

CS

pum

p tr

ain

inau

tom

atic

N/A

Man

ual R

CS

Inje

ctio

nby

ope

rato

r - L

eak

isol

ated

(MIN

J)

Rec

onfig

ure

RH

R to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n, o

rm

anua

l CR

D, o

r HPC

S, o

r LPC

S, o

r LPC

I,or

con

dens

ate

pum

p or

CR

D o

r oth

er n

on-

ECC

S be

fore

Cor

e D

amag

e

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dic.

W/lo

wle

vel a

larm

s

Cre

dit =

4

(Tim

e to

CD

> 3

hrs

.w

/o in

ject

ion)

Man

ual R

CS

Inje

ctio

n -

- Lea

k no

t iso

late

d(M

INJX

)

Rec

onfig

ure

RH

R to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n or

othe

r hig

h flo

w ra

te s

ourc

e es

sent

ially

equi

vale

nt in

cap

abili

ty to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

nbe

fore

cor

e da

mag

e.

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dic.

W/ l

owle

vel a

larm

s

Cre

dit =

4

(Tim

e to

CD

> 3

hrs

w/o

inje

ctio

n.)

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-29

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

DH

R R

ecov

ery

befo

reLo

ng T

erm

Coo

ling

need

edLe

ak I

sola

ted.

(RH

RR

EC)

Ope

rato

r res

tart

s R

HR

bef

ore

Long

Ter

mC

oolin

g ne

eded

OR

Ope

rato

r ini

tiate

s an

alte

rnat

e, d

iver

seD

HR

pat

h su

ch a

s C

RD

and

RW

CU

bef

ore

Long

Ter

m C

oolin

g is

nee

ded.

Cre

dit =

4

Long

Ter

m C

oolin

g(L

CO

OL)

Ope

rato

r mai

ntai

ns lo

ng te

rm in

vent

ory

sour

ceC

redi

t = 4

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

(Circ

le A

ffect

ed F

unct

ions

)IE

LM

itiga

tion

Cre

dit

Rec

over

yR

esul

t

LOI-R

HR

REC

-LC

OO

L (3

)

LOI-A

ECC

S-R

HR

REC

-LC

OO

L (6

)

LOI-A

ECC

S-M

INJ

(7)

LOI -

ISO

L-LC

OO

L (9

)

LOI -

ISO

L-A

ECC

S - L

CO

OL

(11)

LOI-I

SOL-

AEC

CS-

MIN

JX (1

2)

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ld b

e gi

ven

only

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns, 2

) env

ironm

enta

l con

ditio

ns a

llow

acc

ess

whe

rene

eded

, 3)

pro

cedu

res

exis

t, 4

) tra

inin

g is

con

duct

ed o

n th

e ex

istin

g pr

oced

ures

und

er c

ondi

tions

sim

ilar t

o th

e sc

enar

io a

ssum

ed, a

nd5)

any

equ

ipm

ent n

eede

d to

com

plet

e th

ese

actio

ns is

ava

ilabl

e an

d re

ady

for u

se.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

30Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

Not

es:

1.D

iffer

ent n

on-E

CC

S so

urce

s m

ay a

pply

for d

iffer

ent p

lant

s. E

xam

ples

incl

ude:

fire

wat

er a

nd h

igh

pres

sure

ser

vice

wat

er.

2.Fa

ilure

of E

CC

S an

d al

tern

ate

inje

ctio

n so

urce

s is

ass

umed

to fa

il th

e ab

ility

of t

he o

pera

tor t

o re

cove

r RH

R3.

Failu

re to

isol

ate

the

leak

redu

ces

the

abili

ty to

reco

ver R

HR

. 4.

Non

-EC

CS

syst

ems

are

not a

ssum

ed to

be

able

to k

eep

core

cov

ered

if le

ak p

ath

is n

ot is

olat

ed.

5.If

a le

ak is

isol

ated

by

the

oper

ator

, it i

s as

sum

ed th

at E

CC

S w

ill n

ot a

utom

atic

ally

be

activ

ated

.

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-31

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

Wor

kshe

et 3

. SD

P W

orks

heet

for a

BW

R P

lant

- Lo

ss o

f Inv

ento

ry in

PO

S 3

(Cav

ity F

lood

ed)

FILL

IN:

TIM

E TO

BO

ILIN

G _

____

____

T

IME

TO C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E __

____

____

___

(N

OTE

: lo

sses

of i

nven

tory

sho

rten

tim

e to

cor

e da

mag

e)

Safe

ty F

unct

ions

Nee

ded:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

tIn

stru

men

tatio

n:Eq

uip.

Cre

dit

Ope

rato

r Cre

dit

Cre

dit f

or

Func

tion

Isol

atio

n of

the

loss

(ISO

L)D

ownc

omer

loss

es: A

uto

isol

atio

n of

RH

R o

n Lo

w V

esse

l Lev

el W

/low

leve

lal

arm

------

------

------

- ----

------

------

------

---Lo

sses

from

low

er p

lenu

m

Cre

dit =

3

------

------

------

-----

Uni

sola

ble

leak

(low

er p

lenu

m)

- 0

N/A

------

---- -

------

----

Cre

dit =

0

Man

ual R

CS

Inje

ctio

n -

Leak

isol

ated

(MIN

J)

Rec

onfig

ure

RH

R to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n, o

rm

anua

l CR

D, o

r HPC

S, o

r LPC

S, o

rLP

CI,

or c

onde

nsat

e pu

mp

or C

RD

or

othe

r non

-EC

CS

befo

re C

ore

Dam

age

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dic.

W/lo

w le

vel a

larm

s

Cre

dit =

4(T

ime

to C

D >

3

hrs.

w/o

inje

ctio

n)

Man

ual R

CS

Inje

ctio

n - L

eak

not i

sola

ted

(MIN

JX)

Rec

onfig

ure

RH

R to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n or

othe

r hig

h flo

w ra

te s

ourc

e es

sent

ially

equi

vale

nt in

cap

abili

ty to

EC

CS

inje

ctio

n be

fore

Cor

e D

amag

e

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dic.

W/

low

leve

l ala

rms

Cre

dit =

4(T

ime

to C

D >

3 h

rs.

w/o

inje

ctio

n.)

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

32Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

DH

R R

ecov

ery

befo

reLo

ng T

erm

Coo

ling

need

ed.

(RH

RR

EC)

Ope

rato

r res

tart

s R

HR

bef

ore

Long

Term

Coo

ling

is n

eede

d.

OR

Ope

rato

r ini

tiate

s an

alte

rnat

e, d

iver

seD

HR

pat

h su

ch a

s C

RD

and

RW

CU

befo

re L

ong

Term

Coo

ling

is n

eede

d.

Cre

dit =

4

Long

Ter

m C

oolin

gO

pera

tor m

aint

ains

long

term

inve

ntor

yso

urce

Cre

dit =

4

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

(Circ

le A

ffect

ed F

unct

ions

)IE

LM

itiga

tion

Cre

dit

Rec

over

yR

esul

t

LOI-R

HR

REC

-LC

OO

L (3

)

LOI -

MIN

J (4

)

LOI-I

SOL-

LCO

OL

(6)

LOI-I

SOL-

MIN

JX (7

)

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ld b

e gi

ven

only

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns,

2)en

viro

nmen

tal c

ondi

tions

allo

w a

cces

s w

here

nee

ded,

3) p

roce

dure

s ex

ist,

4) t

rain

ing

is c

ondu

cted

on

the

exis

ting

proc

edur

es u

nder

con

ditio

ns s

imila

r to

the

scen

ario

ass

umed

, and

5) a

ny e

quip

men

t nee

ded

to c

ompl

ete

thes

e ac

tions

isav

aila

ble

and

read

y fo

r use

.

Not

es:

1.D

iffer

ent n

on-E

CC

S so

urce

s m

ay a

pply

for d

iffer

ent p

lant

s. E

xam

ples

incl

ude:

fire

wat

er a

nd h

igh

pres

sure

ser

vice

wat

er.

2.Fa

ilure

to is

olat

e th

e le

ak re

duce

s th

e ab

ility

to re

cove

r RH

R.

3.N

on-E

CC

S sy

stem

s ar

e no

t ass

umed

to b

e ab

le to

kee

p co

re c

over

ed if

leak

pat

h is

not

isol

ated

.

1 If pe

rform

ance

def

icie

ncy

is b

eing

tran

sfer

red

from

LO

OP

tree

, ana

lyst

mus

t con

side

r if t

he fr

ont l

ine

syst

ems

and

nece

ssar

ysu

ppor

t sys

tem

s ar

e su

ppor

ted

from

suc

cess

ful E

AC

.

2 If th

is w

orks

heet

is b

eing

use

d to

ass

ess

a R

HR

sup

port

syst

em d

efic

ienc

y th

at c

ould

cau

se a

loss

of t

he o

pera

ting

train

of

RH

R, t

he e

quip

men

t cre

dit a

nd o

pera

tor c

redi

t is

dete

rmin

ed b

y th

e op

erat

or’s

abi

lity

to re

cove

r the

sup

port

syst

em b

efor

e th

e R

HR

shut

off h

ead

is re

ache

d.

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-33

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

Wor

kshe

et 4

. SD

P W

orks

heet

for a

BW

R P

lant

- Lo

ss o

f Ope

ratin

g Tr

ain

of R

HR

(LO

RH

R) i

n PO

S 1

(Hea

d O

n)

FILL

IN:

TIM

E TO

BO

ILIN

G _

____

____

____

____

____

T

IME

TO C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E

____

____

____

_

Safe

tyFu

nctio

nsN

eede

d:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

t Ins

trum

enta

tion:

Equi

p. C

redi

t 1O

pera

tor C

redi

tC

redi

t for

Fu

nctio

n

DH

RR

ecov

ery

(RH

RR

EC)

befo

re R

HR

shut

off h

ead

reac

hed

Ope

rato

r res

tore

s a

trai

n of

RH

R o

r Alte

rnat

e D

HR

path

bef

ore

RH

R s

huto

ff he

ad (T

shut

) is

reac

hed

Ope

rato

r nee

ds R

HR

inle

t/out

let t

emp

indi

c. a

ndR

HR

flow

indi

c. w

ith lo

w fl

ow a

larm

OR

IF A

PPLI

CA

BLE

2

Ope

rato

r rec

over

s fa

iled

RH

R s

uppo

rt s

yste

ms

befo

re R

HR

shu

toff

head

(Tsh

ut) i

s re

ache

d .

Cre

dit =

0 if

Tsh

ut <

20 m

in

If re

cove

ry a

ctio

n ca

n be

iden

tifie

d w

ithin

½ ti

me

toTs

hut A

ND

reco

very

act

ion

can

be p

erfo

rmed

with

in ½

Tsh

ut ,

then

:

Cre

dit =

1, i

f 20<

Tshu

t <40

min

.C

redi

t = 2

, if 4

0min

<Tsh

ut <

1 hr

Cre

dit =

3, i

f Tsh

ut >

1 h

r.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

34Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

Man

ual L

owPr

essu

reIn

ject

ion

&

RC

S Pr

essu

reC

ontr

ol

(MIN

J&SR

V)

Ope

rato

r use

s a

LPC

S pu

mp,

a c

onde

nsat

e pu

mp

or a

noth

er lo

w p

ress

ure

pum

p ca

pabl

e of

kee

ping

the

core

cov

ered

, in

addi

tion

to th

e R

HR

pum

psw

hich

are

ass

umed

to b

e fa

iled.

Ope

rato

r nee

ds R

CS

pres

sure

indi

catio

n an

d R

CS

leve

l ind

icat

ion

with

low

leve

l ala

rm

AN

D

Ope

rato

r ope

ns a

RC

S ve

nt a

pat

h to

con

trol

RC

Spr

essu

re (e

.g S

RV)

.

C

redi

t = 2

Man

ual H

igh

Pres

sure

Inje

ctio

n at

Pres

sure

(MIN

JY)

Follo

win

g is

olat

ion

of R

HR

on

high

pre

ssur

e,op

erat

or in

ject

s us

ing

high

pre

ssur

e pu

mps

suc

has

Con

trol

Rod

Driv

e pu

mps

or H

PCI a

nd s

team

ing

out t

he S

RVs

at t

heir

safe

ty s

etpo

int.

Cre

dit =

1

Con

tain

men

tVe

ntin

g(C

V)

Ope

rato

r ven

ts c

onta

inm

ent a

nd p

rovi

des

long

term

inve

ntor

y fo

r inj

ectio

n sy

stem

Cre

dit =

3

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

(Circ

le A

ffect

ed F

unct

ions

)IE

LM

itiga

tion

Cre

dit

Rec

over

yR

esul

t

LOR

HR

- R

HR

REC

- C

V (3

)

LOR

HR

- R

HR

REC

-M

INJ&

SRV-

CV

(5)

LOR

HR

-RH

RR

EC-

MIN

J&SR

V-M

INJY

(6)

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-35

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ldbe

giv

en o

nly

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns,

2) e

nviro

nmen

tal

cond

ition

s al

low

acc

ess

whe

re n

eede

d,

3) p

roce

dure

s ex

ist,

4)

trai

ning

is c

ondu

cted

on

the

exis

ting

proc

edur

es u

nder

cond

ition

s si

mila

r to

the

scen

ario

ass

umed

, and

5) a

ny e

quip

men

t nee

ded

to c

ompl

ete

thes

e ac

tions

is a

vaila

ble

and

read

yfo

r use

.

Not

es:

1. F

ailu

re to

reco

ver R

HR

bef

ore

RH

R s

huto

ff he

ad is

reac

hed

is a

ssum

ed to

fail

shor

t ter

m in

ject

ion

usin

g LP

CI.

2. A

ctio

ns to

pre

vent

cor

e da

mag

e by

ste

amin

g th

e co

re a

t hig

h or

low

pre

ssur

e ar

e tr

eate

d as

reco

very

act

ions

.

3 If pe

rform

ance

def

icie

ncy

is b

eing

tran

sfer

red

from

LO

OP

tree

, ana

lyst

mus

t con

side

r if t

he fr

ont l

ine

syst

ems

and

nece

ssar

ysu

ppor

t sys

tem

s ar

e su

ppor

ted

from

suc

cess

ful E

AC

.

4 If th

is w

orks

heet

is b

eing

use

d to

ass

ess

a R

HR

sup

port

syst

em d

efic

ienc

y th

at c

ould

cau

se a

loss

of t

he o

pera

ting

train

of

RH

R, t

he e

quip

men

t cre

dit a

nd o

pera

tor c

redi

t is

dete

rmin

ed b

y th

e op

erat

or’s

abi

lity

to re

cove

r the

sup

port

syst

em b

efor

e th

e R

HR

shut

off h

ead

is re

ache

d.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

36Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

Wor

kshe

et 5

. SD

P W

orks

heet

for a

BW

R P

lant

—

Los

s of

Ope

ratin

g Tr

ain

of R

HR

in P

OS

2 (H

ead

Off

or R

CS

|Ve

nted

)|

FILL

IN:

TIM

E TO

BO

ILIN

G _

____

____

____

____

____

T

IME

TO C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E

____

____

____

_

Safe

tyFu

nctio

nsN

eede

d:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

tIn

stru

men

tatio

n:Eq

uip.

Cre

dit 3

Ope

rato

r Cre

dit

Cre

dit f

or

Func

tion

DH

R R

ecov

ery

(RH

RR

EC)

befo

re R

CS

Leve

l 3 re

ache

dan

d R

HR

auto

mat

ical

lyis

olat

es

Ope

rato

r res

tore

s a

trai

n of

RH

R o

r Alte

rnat

eD

HR

pat

h be

fore

RC

S Le

vel 3

(Tis

ol) r

each

ed

Ope

rato

r nee

ds R

HR

inle

t/out

let t

emp

indi

c.an

d R

HR

flow

indi

c. w

ith lo

w fl

ow a

larm

OR

IF A

PPLI

CA

BLE

4

Ope

rato

r rec

over

s fa

iled

RH

R s

uppo

rt s

yste

ms

befo

re R

CS

Leve

l 3 (T

isol

) is

reac

hed

.

Cre

dit =

0 if

Tis

ol <

20 m

in

If re

cove

ry a

ctio

n ca

n be

iden

tifie

d w

ithin

½ ti

me

to T

isol

AN

D re

cove

ry a

ctio

n ca

n be

perf

orm

ed w

ithin

½ T

isol

,th

en:

Cre

dit =

1, i

f 20<

Tiso

l <40

min

.C

redi

t = 2

, if 4

0min

<Tis

ol <

1 hr

Cre

dit =

3, i

f Tis

ol >

1 h

r.

Early

Aut

omat

icEC

CS

(AEC

CS)

1 lo

w p

ress

ure

ECC

S pu

mp

trai

n in

aut

omat

icin

add

ition

to th

e R

HR

pum

ps w

hich

are

assu

med

to b

e fa

iled.

N/A

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-37

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

Man

ual

RC

S In

ject

ion

befo

re C

D

(MIN

J)

Ope

rato

r act

uate

s LP

CS

pum

p, o

r ano

ther

high

pre

ssur

e or

low

pre

ssur

e pu

mp

capa

ble

of k

eepi

ng c

ore

cove

red,

in a

dditi

on to

the

RH

R p

umps

whi

ch a

re a

ssum

ed to

be

faile

d

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dic.

with

low

leve

l ala

rms

C

redi

t = 2

Long

Ter

mC

oolin

g(L

CO

OL)

Ope

rato

r mai

ntai

ns lo

ng te

rm in

vent

ory

sour

ce

Cre

dit =

4

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

IEL

Miti

gatio

n C

redi

tR

ecov

ery

Res

ult

LOR

HR

-RH

RR

EC-L

CO

OL

(3)

LOR

HR

-RH

REC

-AEC

CS-

LCO

OL

(5)

LOR

HR

-RH

RR

EC-A

ECC

S-M

INJ

(6)

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ld b

e gi

ven

only

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns,

2)en

viro

nmen

tal c

ondi

tions

allo

w a

cces

s w

here

nee

ded,

3) p

roce

dure

s ex

ist,

4) t

rain

ing

is c

ondu

cted

on

the

exis

ting

proc

edur

es u

nder

con

ditio

ns s

imila

r to

the

scen

ario

ass

umed

, and

5) a

ny e

quip

men

t nee

ded

to c

ompl

ete

thes

e ac

tions

isav

aila

ble

and

read

y fo

r use

.W

orks

heet

6. S

DP

Wor

kshe

et fo

r a B

WR

Pla

nt -

Loss

of O

ffsite

Pow

er in

PO

S 1

(Hea

d O

n)

5 Alte

rnat

e A

C s

ourc

e ca

n be

cre

dite

d if

can

be ti

ed in

to 4

KV

bus

es a

t lea

st 1

hour

bef

ore

RH

R p

ump

shut

off h

ead

reac

hed.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

38Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

FILL

IN:

TIM

E TO

BO

ILIN

G _

____

____

T

IME

TO C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E

____

____

____

_

Safe

tyFu

nctio

nsN

eede

d:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

tIn

stru

men

tatio

n:Eq

uip.

Cre

dit

Ope

rato

r Cre

dit

Cre

dit f

or

Func

tion

Emer

genc

y A

Cbe

fore

RH

Rpu

mp

shut

off

head

reac

hed

(EA

C)

1 ED

G o

r 1 a

ltern

ate

on-s

ide

AC

pow

er s

ourc

e5

Cre

dit =

3(a

ssum

ed 2

hrs

tosh

utof

f hea

d)

AC

-Inde

pend

ent

inje

ctio

n an

dR

CS

Pres

sure

Con

trol

(AC

I&SR

V)

Ope

rato

r act

uate

s 1

AC

inde

pend

ent p

ump

(.e.g

Fire

wat

er)

Ope

rato

r nee

ds R

CS

pres

sure

indi

catio

n an

dR

CS

leve

l ind

icat

ion

with

low

leve

l ala

rm

AN

D

Ope

rato

r ope

ns a

RC

S ve

nt p

ath

to c

ontr

olR

CS

pres

sure

(e.g

. SR

V)

Cre

dit =

3(T

ime

to C

D w

/oin

ject

ion

> 3h

rs)

Rec

over

y of

LOO

P in

8ho

urs

(RLO

OP8

)

Offs

ite p

ower

reco

vere

d be

fore

cor

e da

mag

ew

ith n

o R

CS

mak

eup

(ass

umed

8 h

ours

)C

redi

t = 1

Rec

over

y of

LOO

P in

20

hour

s(R

LOO

P20)

Offs

ite p

ower

reco

vere

d af

ter b

atte

ry d

eple

tion

but b

efor

e co

re d

amag

e (1

2 ho

urs

to d

eple

tion

+ 8

hour

s to

cor

e da

mag

e)

Cre

dit =

2

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

(Circ

le A

ffect

ed F

unct

ions

)IE

LM

itiga

tion

Cre

dit

Rec

over

yR

esul

t

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-39

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

LOO

P-EA

C-R

LOO

P20

(3)

LOO

P-EA

C-A

CI&

SRV-

RLO

OP8

(5)

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ld b

e gi

ven

only

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns,

2) e

nviro

nmen

tal c

ondi

tions

allo

w a

cces

sw

here

nee

ded,

3) p

roce

dure

s ex

ist,

4) t

rain

ing

is c

ondu

cted

on

the

exis

ting

proc

edur

es u

nder

con

ditio

ns s

imila

r to

the

scen

ario

ass

umed

,an

d 5

) any

equ

ipm

ent n

eede

d to

com

plet

e th

ese

actio

ns is

ava

ilabl

e an

d re

ady

for u

se.

Not

es:

1.D

iffer

ent n

on-E

CC

S so

urce

s m

ay a

pply

for d

iffer

ent p

lant

s. E

xam

ples

incl

ude:

fire

wat

er a

nd h

igh

pres

sure

ser

vice

wat

er.

2.In

seq

uenc

e 1,

LO

OP

follo

wed

by

succ

essf

ul s

tart

of a

ED

G o

r EA

C s

ourc

e, a

naly

ze th

e Lo

ss o

f RH

R s

eque

nces

. Th

e IE

L fo

r the

Loss

of R

HR

ana

lysi

s sh

ould

the

LOO

P IE

L. T

he a

naly

sis

mus

t tak

e in

to a

ccou

nt th

e co

mpl

exiti

es o

f rec

over

ing

RH

R w

ithsp

ecifi

c de

ficie

ncie

s of

the

elec

tric

al s

yste

m.

6 Alte

rnat

e A

C s

ourc

e ca

n be

cre

dite

d if

can

be ti

ed in

to 4

KV

bus

es a

t lea

st 1

hour

bef

ore

RH

R p

ump

shut

off h

ead

reac

hed.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

40Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

Wor

kshe

et 7

. SD

P W

orks

heet

for a

BW

R P

lant

- Lo

ss o

f Offs

ite P

ower

in

POS

2 (H

ead

Off

or R

CS

Vent

ed)

|

FILL

IN:

TIM

E TO

BO

ILIN

G _

____

____

T

IME

TO C

OR

E D

AM

AG

E

____

____

____

_

(NO

TE:

loss

es o

f inv

ento

ry s

hort

en ti

me

to c

ore

dam

age)

Safe

tyFu

nctio

nsN

eede

d:

Succ

ess

Crit

eria

and

Impo

rtan

tIn

stru

men

tatio

n:Eq

uip.

Cre

dit

Ope

rato

r Cre

dit

Cre

dit f

or

Func

tion

Emer

genc

y A

C(E

AC

)1

EDG

or 1

alte

rnat

e on

-sid

e A

C p

ower

sou

rce

6C

redi

t = 3

AC

-Inde

pend

ent

inje

ctio

n be

fore

core

dam

age

(EA

C-A

IC)

Ope

rato

r act

uate

s 1

AC

inde

pend

ent p

ump

(e.g

. fire

wat

er)

Ope

rato

r nee

ds V

esse

l lev

el in

dica

tion

w/lo

wle

vel a

larm

s

Cre

dit =

3(T

ime

to C

D w

/oin

ject

ion

> 3h

rs)

Rec

over

y of

LOO

P in

8ho

urs

(RLO

OP8

)

Offs

ite p

ower

reco

vere

d be

fore

cor

e da

mag

ew

ith n

o R

CS

mak

eup

(ass

umed

8 h

ours

)C

redi

t = 1

Rec

over

y of

LOO

P in

20

hour

s(R

LOO

P20)

Offs

ite p

ower

reco

vere

d af

ter b

atte

ry d

eple

tion

but b

efor

e co

re d

amag

e (1

2 ho

urs

to d

eple

tion

+ 8

hour

s to

cor

e da

mag

e)

Cre

dit =

2

Cor

e D

amag

e Se

quen

ces

(Circ

le A

ffect

ed F

unct

ions

)IE

LM

itiga

tion

Cre

dit

Rec

over

yR

esul

t

LOO

P - E

AC

- RLO

OP2

0 (3

)

LOO

P - E

AC

-AC

I - R

LOO

P8 (5

)

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-41

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

Iden

tify

any

oper

ator

reco

very

act

ions

that

are

cre

dite

d to

dire

ctly

rest

ore

the

degr

aded

equ

ipm

ent o

r ini

tiatin

g ev

ent:

If op

erat

or a

ctio

ns a

re re

quire

d to

cre

dit p

laci

ng m

itiga

tion

equi

pmen

t in

serv

ice

or fo

r rec

over

y ac

tions

, suc

h cr

edit

shou

ld b

e gi

ven

only

if th

e fo

llow

ing

crite

ria a

re m

et:

1) s

uffic

ient

tim

e is

ava

ilabl

e to

impl

emen

t the

se a

ctio

ns, 2

) env

ironm

enta

l con

ditio

ns a

llow

acc

ess

whe

re n

eede

d,

3) p

roce

dure

s ex

ist,

4)

trai

ning

is c

ondu

cted

on

the

exis

ting

proc

edur

es u

nder

con

ditio

ns s

imila

r to

the

sce

nario

assu

med

, and

5) a

ny e

quip

men

t nee

ded

to c

ompl

ete

thes

e ac

tions

is a

vaila

ble

and

read

y fo

r use

.

Not

es:

1.D

iffer

ent n

on-E

CC

S so

urce

s m

ay a

pply

for d

iffer

ent p

lant

s. E

xam

ples

incl

ude:

fire

wat

er a

nd h

igh

pres

sure

ser

vice

wat

er.

2.In

seq

uenc

e 1,

LO

OP

follo

wed

by

succ

essf

ul s

tart

of a

ED

G o

r EA

C s

ourc

e, a

naly

ze th

e Lo

ss o

f RH

R s

eque

nces

. Th

e IE

L fo

r the

Loss

of R

HR

ana

lysi

s sh

ould

the

LOO

P IE

L. T

he a

naly

sis

mus

t tak

e in

to a

ccou

nt th

e co

mpl

exiti

es o

f rec

over

ing

RH

R w

ithsp

ecifi

c de

ficie

ncie

s of

the

elec

tric

al s

yste

m.

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

42Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

CV

Cont

ainm

ent

Vent

ing a

ndM

ake-

upW

ater

MIN

JY

Man

ual

HIgh

Pre

ssur

eIn

jecti

on at

pr

essu

re

SRV

Oper

ator

Cont

rols

RCS

Pres

sure

RHRR

EC

Reco

ver D

HRbe

fore

pres

s.co

ntro

l nee

ded

leak I

solat

ed

MIN

JX

Man

ual

Low

Pres

sure

Inje

ction

NOT

Isol

ated

MIN

J

Man

ual

Low

Pres

sure

Inje

ction

Leak

Isol

ated

AECC

S

Auto

mati

cIn

jecti

on

ISOL

Leak

Isola

tedon

Lev

el III

LOI

POS

I

# E

ND-

STAT

E-N

AMES

1 O

K

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 C

D

5 O

K

6 C

D

7 C

D

8 O

K

9 C

D

10 C

D

11 O

K

12 C

D

13 C

D

14 C

D

Loss

of I

nven

tory

- BW

R PO

S-1

LO

I1 -

20

03/1

0/30

Page

1

Figu

re 2

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

of In

vent

ory

- BW

R P

OS-

1

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-43

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

LC

OO

L

Lo

ngT

erm

Mak

eup

RH

RR

EC

Rec

over

y of

DH

R -

Lea

kIs

olat

ed

MIN

JX

Man

ual

Inje

ctio

nLe

ak N

OT

Isol

ated

MIN

J

Man

ual

Inje

ctio

n(a

ny s

ourc

e)L

eak

Iso

late

d

AE

CC

S

Aut

omat

icIn

ject

ion

ISO

L

Lea

k Is

olat

ed

LO

I

PO

S 2

# E

ND

-ST

AT

E-N

AM

ES

1 O

K

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 O

K

5 O

K

6 C

D

7 C

D

8 O

K

9 C

D

10

OK

11

CD

12

CD

Los

s o

f In

ven

tory

- B

WR

PO

S-2

LO

I2 -

20

04/

12/2

8P

age

2

Figu

re 3

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

Of I

nven

tory

- B

WR

PO

S - 2

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

44Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

LCO

OL

Long

Term

Mak

eup

RHRR

EC

Reco

very

of

DH

R -

Leak

Isol

ated

MIN

JX

Man

ual

Inje

ctio

nLe

ak N

OT

Isol

ated

MIN

J

Man

ual

Inje

ctio

n(a

ny so

urce

)Le

ak Is

olat

ed

ISO

L

Leak

Is

olat

ed

LOI

PO

S 3

# E

ND

-ST

ATE

-NA

MES

1 O

K

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 C

D

5 O

K

6 C

D

7 C

D

Loss

of I

nven

tory

- B

WR

PO

S-3

LO

I3 -

20

03/1

0/30

Page

3

Figu

re 4

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

of In

vent

ory

- BW

R P

OS-

3

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-45

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

RLO

OP2

0

Reco

ver A

C in

20 h

ours

bef

ore

Batte

ry D

eple

tes

and

CD

RLO

OP8

Reco

ver A

Cin

8 h

ours

AC

I&SR

V

AC

-Inde

p.In

ject

ion

& P

ress

ure

Con

trol

EAC

Emer

genc

yA

C

LOOP

POS-

1

# E

ND-S

TATE

-NA

MES

1 L

ORH

R

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 O

K

5 C

D

Loss

of O

ffsi

te P

ower

- B

WR

PO

S-1

LO

OP1

-

2003

/10/

30Pa

ge 4

Figu

re 5

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

of O

ffsite

Pow

er -

BW

R P

OS-

1

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

46Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

RLO

OP2

0

Reco

ver A

C in

20 h

ours

bef

ore

Bat

tery

Dep

lete

san

d C

D

RLO

OP8

Reco

ver A

Cin

8 h

ours

ACI

AC-In

dep.

Inje

ctio

n

EAC

Emer

genc

yA

C

LOO

P

POS-

2

# E

ND

-STA

TE-N

AM

ES

1 L

ORH

R

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 O

K

5 C

D

Loss

of O

ffsi

te P

ower

- B

WR

PO

S-2

LO

OP2

-

2003

/10/

30Pa

ge 5

Figu

re 6

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

of O

ffsite

Pow

er -

BW

R P

OS-

2

Issu

e D

ate:

02/

28/0

5G

3-47

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

CV

Con

tain

men

tV

entin

g an

dM

ake-

upW

ater

MIN

JY

Man

ual

Hig

h P

ress

ure

Inje

ctio

n at

Pr

essu

re

MIN

J&SR

V

Man

ual

Inje

ctio

n a

ndR

CS

Pre

ssur

e C

ontro

l

RH

RRE

C

DH

R R

ecov

ery

befo

re R

HR

shut

off h

ead

reac

hed

LO

RH

R

PO

S 1

# E

ND

-ST

AT

E-N

AM

ES

1 O

K

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 O

K

5 C

D

6 C

D

Los

s of

RH

R -

BW

R P

OS-

1

LO

RH

R1

-

2003

/10/

30Pa

ge 6

Figu

re 7

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

of R

HR

- B

WR

PO

S-1

0609

, App

G, A

tt 3

G3-

48Is

sue

Dat

e:02

/28/

05

LC

OO

L

Lon

gT

erm

Mak

eup

MIN

J

Man

ual

Inje

ctio

n

AE

CC

S

Aut

omat

icIn

ject

ion

RH

RR

EC

DH

R R

ecov

ery

Bef

ore

Lev

el 3

Rea

ched

LO

RH

R

POS

2

# E

ND

-ST

AT

E-N

AM

ES

1 O

K

2 O

K

3 C

D

4 O

K

5 C

D

6 C

D

Los

s of

RH

R -

BW

R P

OS

-2

LO

RH

R2

-

2004

/12/

28Pa

ge 7

Figu

re 8

- Ev

ent T

ree

for L

oss

of R

HR

- B

WR

PO

S -

2|

APPENDIX G ATTACHMENT 3 PHASE 2 SIGNIFICANCE … · As directed in the SRM to SECY 97-168, the...

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Transcript of APPENDIX G ATTACHMENT 3 PHASE 2 SIGNIFICANCE … · As directed in the SRM to SECY 97-168, the...