Appeal Decisions - Planning Jungle · 2016. 10. 8. · Dharam Marg, Hillfield Lane, Aldenham,...

http://www.planning-inspectorate.gov.uk

Appeal Decisions Inquiry held on 15 & 16 February 2011

Site visit made on 17 February 2011

by R O Evans BA(Hons) Solicitor MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Decision date: 29 March 2011

Appeal Ref: APP/N1920/A/10/2133063

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Bhaktivedanta Manor,

Dharam Marg, Hillfield Lane, Aldenham, Watford, WD25 8EZ

• The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990

against a refusal to grant planning permission.

• The appeal is made by Syamasundara Das against the decision of Hertsmere Borough Council.

• The application Ref TP/09/1913, dated 27 October 2009, was refused by notice dated 1 July 2010.

• The development proposed is erection of temporary wedding marquee between 6 June and 22 August 2010 and 22 May and 7 August 2011 and associated car parking

(amended description 29/04/10).

Appeal Ref: APP/N1920/X/10/2133093



• The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 against a refusal to grant a

certificate of lawful use or development (LDC). • The appeal is made by Syamasundara Das against the decision of Hertsmere Borough

Council. • The application Ref TP/09/1885, registered 24 November 2009, was refused by notice

dated 9 July 2010.

• The application was made under section 192(1)(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.

• The development for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is temporary erection of marquee.

Appeal Ref: APP/N1920/C/10/2136252



• The appeal is made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as

amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. • The appeal is made by Syamasundara Das against an enforcement notice issued by

Hertsmere Borough Council on 18 August 2010. • The Council's reference is EN/08/0271.

• The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is without planning permission, the unauthorised development comprising: the erection of a marquee on the land

shown edged red on the attached plan, in excess of the 28 days in total in any calendar

year allowed under Schedule 2, Part 4, Class B of the General Permitted Development Order 1995.

• The requirements of the notice are to: a) Dismantle and remove from the land any marquee and all associated miscellaneous

Appeal Decisions APP/N1920/A/10/2133063, APP/N1920/X/10/2133093, APP/N1920/C/10/2136252

http://www.planning-inspectorate.gov.uk 2

items including but not limited to floorings and fixings within the red edged area

shown on the attached plan. b) No marquee or any moveable structures are to be erected or placed on the land

edged red shown on the attached plan for not (sic) more than 28 days in total in any calendar year as permitted under Schedule 2, Part 4, Class B of the General

Permitted Development Order 1995. c) No marquee or any moveable structures are to be erected or placed on the land

edged red shown on the attached plan without prior notification in writing to the

local Planning Authority of the date of erection or placing on the land of any marquee or any moveable structure.

• The periods for compliance with the requirements are a) 7 days, b) from the date on which this notice takes effect c) from the date on which this notice takes effect.

• The appeal is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(a), (b), (c) and (f) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended. The application for planning

permission deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the Act as amended also falls to be considered.

Decisions

APP/N1920/A/10/2133063

1. I dismiss the appeal.

APP/N1920/X/10/2133093

2. I dismiss the appeal.

APP/N1920/C/10/2136252

3. I direct that the enforcement notice be corrected by:

• Substituting the plan attached to this decision for that attached to the

notice;

• In paragraph 3, by replacing the words “on the land shown edged red” with

the words “in the position shown hatched in blue”.

I further direct that the notice be varied by:

• Deleting the second and third requirements;

• Replacing the first requirement with: “Dismantle and remove from the land

any marquee (and all associated miscellaneous items including but not

limited to floorings and fixings) save as may be permitted under the Town

and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (as

amended) or by other express permission.”

• Replacing the times shown for compliance with a single period of 7 days

from the date on which the notice takes effect.

Subject to these corrections and variations, I dismiss the appeal, uphold the

enforcement notice, and refuse to grant planning permission on the application

deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act as amended.

Reasons – Preliminary Matters

4. These appeals concern the erection of a marquee within the grounds of

Bhaktivedanta Manor, which is owned and occupied by the International

Society for Khrishna Consciousness, or ISKCON. Although the appeals are



brought in the name of an individual, he acts on behalf of ISKCON and for

convenience, my references to ‘the Appellants’ are to ISKCON.

5. The history of the Appellants’ occupation of the Manor is well known to the

parties and indeed to many in the community around it. To summarise the

salient background, the site as a whole runs to some 30 ha set between the

village of Letchmore Heath to the east and Hillfield Lane to the west. The main

buildings, including the Manor itself, a Grade II listed Victorian mansion, are

set towards the eastern end of the site. The principal planning permission

affecting it is that granted by the Secretary of State in 1996 for use of the

Manor as a residential and non-residential theological college and religious

community, together with use for public worship. The permission included the

construction of a new driveway and access to Hillfield Lane which is now the

sole active vehicular route into the site.

6. A number of other permissions have since been granted, for example for

agricultural buildings and polytunnels. Differing applications were also made in

relation to the erection of a marquee within the Manor grounds in 2004, 2005,

2007 and 2008. The last (ref TP/08/1595) was a similar application to that in

the present section 78 appeal, for an 11 week period in 2009. An appeal

against its refusal was later withdrawn following an inquiry.

7. There is no dispute that the marquee subject to these appeals was in place

during the first period specified in the section 78 appeal. The Appellants now

seek a certificate of lawfulness and a permission (if needed) only for its

erection for the second period specified. There would be nothing to prevent a

certificate issued under the section 195 appeal from specifying the temporary

period for which the erection would be lawful, should I so conclude. A

permission can be time limited by condition so I shall approach the section 78

appeal and the deemed application in the section 174 appeal accordingly, as

necessary.

8. The appeal on ground (b) was formally withdrawn at the inquiry and I make no

further comment on it. The circumstances in which the 2 applications came to

be determined after the start of the first period for which permission was

sought are known to the parties, and again, I need make no comment on it.

9. The Council accepted a proposed correction to the enforcement notice, to

substitute an amended plan to identify the actual position of the marquee more

accurately. As the parties are agreed on that, I shall amend the notice

accordingly. The allegation however is one of specified operational

development. I see no need therefore for the notice to refer to the purpose to

which the marquee has been or is intended to be put. Apart from a minor

correction to the second requirement indicated above, I shall address the

possible correction or variation of the requirements under the ground (f)

appeal.

The Marquee

10. The marquee was erected in 2010 in a paddock area approximately 100m to

the west of the Manor, beyond both a formal garden area and the north/south

access drive to the staff car park. Though since dismantled and removed, it is

intended that the same or very similar facility be provided in 2011. There is no

significant dispute about its form or composition. It measures some 36m long

by 15m wide, with sides 3m high and a ridge height of 5.5m. It thus has a

floor area of 540m2. It has an aluminium frame, from the application plans,



with 13 uprights along each side. From the Appellants’ single photograph,

these are secured to the ground by means of a plate which in turn is pegged at

least at the outer corners by 2 metal pegs estimated at 0.5m long (expressed

as 18” – 24”) and about 2cm (or 0.75”) thick. The uprights are shown as

connected horizontally just above ground level. Although there was no direct

evidence on the point, it is reasonable to assume they would be connected also

at higher levels to ensure stability and that there would be similar uprights

along the two end elevations, as suggested by the marks on the submitted

plans.

11. Once in place, the frame is covered by white vinyl sheeting, with clear panels

along the eastern elevation and a pair of glazed metal framed doors at each

end. A floor described as thin timber panels is placed on the ground and

slotted together. A silk lining is hung internally and a stage measuring 8m x

4m is erected centrally on one side. Electricity is provided but no other

services. Erection of the marquee is carried out by the suppliers and is said to

take 2 days. The floor is then painted and with furniture installed on the fourth

day, it is ready for use by the fifth day. Dismantling and removal would take a

similar time as erection. There is nothing to contradict the Appellants’

evidence on these matters.

The Section 195 Appeal & Section 174 Appeal on Ground (c)

12. Introduction. As indicated, the section 195 appeal can be considered by

reference to the Appellants’ specified period. The section 174 appeal on

ground (c) however relates to the erection of the marquee (and its retention)

for an unspecified period in excess of 28 days. I shall address the distinction

between the 2 appeals as necessary below. Under both of them however the

issue is similar, whether what is alleged and proposed amounts to development

for which planning permission is required and if so, whether such a permission

exists.

13. The definition of “development” in section 55 of the 1990 Act includes the

“carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over

or under land”. Section 55(1A) provides that “building operations” include

unspecified “other operations normally undertaken by a person carrying on

business as a builder”. The sub-section is not exclusive however so that

particular actions could still amount to “building operations” even if not within

its express provisions. The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted

Development) Order 1995 (“the GPDO”) also forms part of the legal

background, in particular Schedule 2, Part 4 which in certain circumstances

grants permission for temporary buildings and uses.

14. The question thus becomes one of whether the erection – a term incidentally

used by the Appellants themselves – of the marquee amounts to a building

operation. Following the Court of Appeal decision in Skerrits of Nottingham Ltd

v SSETR and LB Harrow 2000 JPL 1025 and earlier decisions, there was no

disagreement on the correct approach to this question being first to ask

whether the resulting ‘item’ was a building (though as noted in the JPL

commentary, it is possible for there to be ‘building operations’ which do not

create a ‘building’). Adopting that approach however, the word ‘building’ is

defined in section 336 as including “any structure or erection”, with three

primary factors identified by the courts as relevant to the question of what is a

building, namely size, permanence and physical attachment.



15. Inspector’s Assessment. It is clear from the Appellants’ own evidence that the

marquee is assembled and erected on site. Though the number of people

involved in that exercise was not stated, given its undisputed dimensions and

its composition, it must at the least involve a small team for it to be completed

within 2 or 3 days. It must also involve the use of hand tools and a degree of

skill and probably experience to ensure its stability. Similarly, to move it

requires its dismantling. Not least because the definition of building includes

any (my emphasis) erection, it might even be argued that one needs to look no

further in deciding that the exercise of erection alone amounted to a “building

operation”.

16. Given the agreed approach however, the marquee is large enough to be used

for weddings attended by up to 500 people seated, with a small stage. It is

larger in floor area alone than a great many dwellings and its height and bulk,

once covered, make it a substantial structure. On any continuum, it is far from

de minimis in size alone. Further, the frame is attached to the ground by at

least 52 steel pegs, with a probable further 10 or so at each end. Though I

cannot be certain of it, the positioning of the pegs on the outer corners of the

plate shown in the Appellants’ photograph suggests that there would be 2 also

in the opposite corners. The point was not taken up at the inquiry but even if

that supposition is wrong, the marquee clearly needs to be securely attached to

the ground by means other than its own weight to ensure it remains in place.

17. The issue of permanence has arisen in a number of the cases cited. The

evidence I accept shows that there has been no permanent physical change in

the character of the land, nor is there likely to be, by the marquee remaining in

place for an 11 week period. That however is not the determining factor.

Permanent does not mean ‘forever and a day’. As Schiemann L.J. put it in

Skerritts, in discussing how long a structure needed to be in place, his answer

was “for a sufficient length of time to be of significance in the planning

context.” Pill L.J. drew attention to the “degree of flexibility” in the approach to

permanence introduced in Barvis Ltd v SSE & Another (1971) 22 P & CR 710,

including the use of the expression “some degree of permanence” and the

concept of removal “by taking to pieces”. Morritt LJ went on to describe it as

“a matter of degree between the temporary and the everlasting.”

18. The case of R (on the application of Hall Hunter Partnership) v FSS [2007] 2 P

& C R 5 concerned the erection of an extensive area of polytunnels for

agricultural purposes which it was found would remain in one particular location

for between three and seven months in any one year. The court held that the

inspector’s conclusion that even the shortest of those periods would be a

sufficient length of time to be of consequence in planning terms could not be

said to be unreasonable. The present case is not directly comparable but that

decision serves to illustrate that a structure can still be of consequence even if

only in place for a relatively short period of time. Further, the Appellants’

evidence is that they have erected a similar if not larger marquee for a similar

period and purpose every year since “at least 1999”, though in earlier years in

a different position to that in these appeals. The present appeals may involve

a specified period of time but against that background, it would be artificial to

see them wholly in isolation.

19. Once erected, this substantial marquee is undoubtedly a ‘structure’ in the

ordinary meaning of something assembled or constructed. It is an additional

facility which allows for large gatherings to be held while other activities take

place in the main building. The site is in both the Metropolitan Green Belt and



in part within a Conservation Area. Without going further into the planning

merits at this stage, its presence for 11 weeks of the year is at least capable of

being material in planning terms, both as to its physical impact and the

additional level of activity it facilitates. Looking at the evidence collectively,

because of its size, the works necessary to erect and dismantle it, its

attachment to the ground and the length of time it has been and is to be kept

in place, I conclude that the marquee is of significance in planning terms. As a

question of fact and degree therefore, it is, or would be, a building for present

purposes. It follows that its erection required or would require planning

permission. None has been granted for it and the section 195 appeal therefore

fails.

20. The way the enforcement notice is phrased raises another question. It refers

expressly to the erection of the marquee “in excess of the 28 days” allowed

under Schedule 2, Part 4, Class B of the GPDO. Class B is primarily concerned

with the temporary use of land but also permits “the provision on the land of

any moveable structures for the purposes of the permitted use”. The Council

sought no amendment to the notice to exclude the references to Class B. Their

view must therefore be taken to remain that the Appellants are entitled to avail

themselves of the 28 day period with the marquee in its last and proposed

position. Equally, it was not argued for the Appellants that if the marquee was

a “moveable structure” for the purposes of Class B, it was or could not be a

building within section 336 and therefore that its erection could not amount to

operational development. As I have concluded on the evidence that it was a

building however, whether it is a “moveable structure” for the purposes of

Class B might be open to question even allowing for the wide definition in

section 336.

21. That said, the acceptance of the availability of Class B rights does not prevent

the Council arguing that an express permission is required for the marquee to

be erected for a longer period than 28 days nor was there any submission to

that effect. Equally, the GPDO provisions do not mean that it is unnecessary to

carry out the sort of analysis set out above in order to determine whether

permission is required, particularly where permanence is directly material to

that question. Indeed, even if the 28 day provision is thought of as just ‘for

the avoidance of doubt’, the logical implication of it is that a longer period,

even for a “moveable structure”, is likely to be material in planning control

terms. More importantly, if the provision of the marquee is capable of being

permitted development within Class B, there is no doubt it was retained for

longer than the permitted 28 day period. Conversely, if its erection could not

fall within Class B, it still amounted to operational development for the reasons

given above. Either way therefore the breach of control alleged in the notice

has occurred even if the GPDO provisions are not applicable. For these reasons

as well therefore, the ground (c) appeal also fails.

The Section 78 Appeal and Ground (a) & Deemed Application in the

Section 174 Appeal

22. Main Issue & Planning Policy. The main issue is whether the erection of the

marquee amounts to inappropriate development within the Green Belt and if so

whether, very special circumstances nevertheless exist so as to justify it. As

PPG2 advises, such very special circumstances will not exist unless the harm by

reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by

other considerations.



23. Policy C1 of the Borough’s 2003 Local Plan remains in force. It sets out a

general presumption against inappropriate development in the Green Belt and

provides that that question should be assessed in accordance with section 3 of

PPG2. I have had due regard also to the more specific criteria in Policy C4.

The Appellants contended that the marquee’s erection should not be considered

under paragraph 3.4 of PPG2, but under paragraph 3.12.

24. Inappropriateness. Paragraph 3.4 states that “the construction of new

buildings inside a Green Belt is inappropriate” unless for specified purposes

which do not include colleges, places of worship or (if a use in its own right)

the holding of weddings. PPG2 is a statement of government planning policy.

It is long established but post-dates the 1990 Act. Where a statutory definition

has been given for the purposes of the principal legislation, but none has been

given in the Guidance, and having held that the operational development

carried out resulted in a building, it would be inconsistent at best to hold that

some different definition should be applied for PPG2 purposes. That would be

so even without the wording of paragraph 3.12, the relevant part of which

states that the “statutory definition of development includes engineering and

other operations.” It continues “the carrying out of such (my italics) operations

and the making of material changes in the use of land are inappropriate

development unless they maintain openness and do not conflict with the

purposes of including land in the Green Belt.”

25. It follows from the above that the erection of the marquee falls to be

considered under paragraph 3.4. Even if that were not so, it fails to maintain

openness and represents an encroachment into the countryside at least whilst

it is in place. Where the fundamental aim of Green Belt policy is to prevent

urban sprawl by keeping land permanently open, even a structure in place for

11 weeks will prevent that permanent openness being maintained. The mere

fact that the marquee is intended to be a temporary structure does not prevent

it being inappropriate in Green Belt terms and I hold it to be so. As PPG2

advises, it is thus for the Appellants to show why permission should be

granted.

26. Impact on Openness and Purposes of the Green Belt. The marquee would be

partly screened by hedges around three sides. Its height, length and bulk

however would be readily apparent when seen from viewpoints to the north

and south, and most especially, as I saw, when approaching along the access

drive from the east. It would not be readily visible from public viewpoints

outside the Manor site, though would be fleetingly so from a public footpath to

the south and probably in some views from buildings to the north. Because of

the lie of the land and intervening vegetation and buildings it would not be

visible from outside the site to the east.

27. Partly because of its distance from the Manor itself and the village, but mainly

because of its temporary nature, it would have no lasting consequences for the

setting of the listed building or the Conservation Area. No objections indeed

were made on those counts. Even so, as already indicated, the structure would

detract from the openness of the Green Belt for as long as it was in place.

Further, a relative lack of visibility may mitigate its impact but is not of itself a

reason for permission to be granted; the same could be said of many

developments. The occasional sight of such marquees in the countryside I

accept is not uncommon in the summer months. In probably the vast majority

of cases however they are erected for the sort of short periods envisaged in the

GDPO, if not single events.



28. The level of additional activities the marquee facilitates must also be taken into

account. In summary, the Manor was said generally to be at its busiest in the

summer months. The holding of weddings causes difficulties in the

management of activities within the Temple room and elsewhere, where a

wedding may be seen by other visitors as a private function. Special

arrangements may therefore have to be made for them to visit the Temple

room while weddings are in progress. Even with a maximum of 250 wedding

guests in the main building, not all of them can be accommodated in the

Temple room during the ceremony and some have to observe from outside it or

by video link. Having the facility of the marquee thus enables not only the

normal Temple activities to continue unhindered but also the holding of

weddings for larger numbers of guests than can be catered for satisfactorily in

the main building. No more than 2 weddings per day are held, whether in the

main building or the marquee. I have no reason to doubt the thrust of this

evidence, but it was lacking in details both of day to day and other activities,

and the numbers of residents and visitors at different times of the year.

29. The provision of the marquee inevitably means that greater numbers of people

are likely to visit the site on days when larger weddings are held than when

they are held in the main building. In numbers alone, the Appellants limited

the bookings in 2010 as far as possible to 300 guests, as I understand them to

have done so far for 2011, following the submission of their planning

application. In 2008 however the average number of guests per marquee

wedding was 295, with 15 out of the total of 38 attended by 350 people or

more, and 5 of those with 450 or more. At the same time, 14 of the marquee

weddings were attended by between 50 and 250 guests, where the 2010

average for those in the main building was about 195.

30. It is thus not just the structure of the marquee that encroaches further into the

Green Belt but also the activities associated with it, including additional vehicle

parking sometimes to the west of the marquee site. These applications must

also be seen in the context of the Manor as a whole and the other activities

taking place there, not least the holding of the important festival of

Janmashtami, that occurs very shortly after the marquee’s removal. The

evidence before me however is lacking in depth and detail on those matters.

31. Residential Amenity. The Council did not pursue any objection on the grounds

of harm to residential amenity, following the obtaining and discussion of noise

evidence at or after the previous inquiry. On that aspect, the site as a whole is

subject to an overriding condition in relation to noise levels emitted from it at 2

points on the eastern boundary. I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the

readings taken by the Appellants’ expert witness. One resident at least

highlighted the fact that on 2 occasions1 the LAeq levels at ‘Point 1’ exceeded

the conditioned limit while a wedding was in progress. That does not

necessarily mean the wedding was the cause. The levels recorded at ‘Point 2’,

which is further away from the road outside, were noticeably lower. So too

were those recorded in the staff car park and close to the boundary of the

nearest residential property, both of them closer to the marquee than ‘Point 1’.

32. The figures recorded are no more than a record of what occurred at the time

the measurements were taken. Residents I do not doubt have on occasion had

cause to notice noise emanating from the site at times when weddings may

have been taking place, whether in the form of general hubbub, noise from

1 5 & 12 June 2009



vehicles, chanting or drum playing. Identifying a wedding as the source would

be difficult however, given the distances involved and lack of visibility from

most directions. More importantly, complaints appear to have tailed off if not

ceased altogether since the installation of sound limiting equipment in 2009,

though coincidentally, as above, the numbers attending were fewer in 2010

than in 2008. Amplified noise emanating from the marquee I consider can be

effectively controlled by condition. It is rather the perception of increased

activity and intermittent noise sources, again set in the context of all the other

activities that take place at the Manor, that could be a source at least of

irritation to some local residents. I do not however consider this so great a

harm that it would justify withholding permission, were it the only objection.

33. Other Matters. There was no objection from the Highways Authority on road

safety grounds. Although some residents complained of excessive traffic

locally, I likewise find no sustainable objection on this ground.

34. The Appellants not surprisingly drew attention to the officers’ recommendations

for approval on both the 2008 and 2009 applications. Different versions of the

first one were submitted but on the Green Belt analysis at least they were

consistent. The officer appears, at paragraph 10.1, to have reached no

conclusion on inappropriateness but concluded that because the marquee

would result in no long term effects on the openness of the Green Belt, that

was sufficient to outweigh any harm it might cause. For that reason alone, her

analysis at that time appears flawed.

35. In her second report however, the officer correctly concluded at paragraph

10.4 that the marquee would be inappropriate development. She then also

concluded that it would not result in a significant increase in activity over and

above that created by weddings at other times of year. As above, I have

reached a different conclusion on that aspect. She also stated that officers

accepted “the need” for the development and because there would be no long

term effects on the openness of the Green Belt, considered that ‘very special

circumstances’ had been made out. The officer concerned did not give

evidence at the inquiry and I am not clear on what basis “need” was assessed.

36. My attention was also drawn to a number of other temporary structures,

including larger marquees, within the Green Belt for which the Council have

granted permission. While consistency in decision making is undoubtedly

desirable, even if I was aware of all the considerations that gave rise to those

permissions, it would not follow that these appeals should necessarily be

allowed. Each case must be considered on its merits. Further, as implied

above, the fact that the Council or its officers reach a particular conclusion in a

given case does not necessarily mean the same conclusions would be reached

by others.

37. Any objections on the planning merits are tempered by the temporary nature

of the proposal. Given the Appellants’ evidence of a continuing if not

increasing demand for the facility however, it is only realistic to expect

repeated similar proposals if these permissions are granted (and assuming no

other provision is made). Be that as it may, limited or temporary harm is still

harm. It may not weigh as heavily against a development as permanent or

serious harm but it does not weigh in favour of it, if for no other reason than

that it cannot outweigh itself. I find that harm would be caused in particular to

the openness of the Green Belt, even if only while the marquee is in place.



38. Other Considerations. Given, as above, that the onus is on the Appellants to

show why permission should be granted, the question of ‘need’ for the

development has to be considered in order to assess whether the harm caused

is outweighed by other considerations. The obvious starting point for that

exercise is to look at the Secretary of State’s reasons for granting permission in

1996. Since he expressly disagreed with the Inspector’s approach on this

aspect, it is the former’s analysis which is relevant rather than the latter’s.

Considerable further guidance has since been given by the courts as to the

correct approach to the question of ‘very special circumstances’.

39. First, it was accepted that the Manor, given its history and associations, made

a special contribution to the spiritual and religious needs of the Hindu

community and that they should be given considerable weight. The extent and

nature of that contribution began to be questioned at this inquiry. As I made

clear however, a planning inquiry is not the appropriate forum for a theological

debate. The Manor is listed as a Temple by the Hindu Council UK. It has a

‘congregation’ of visitors and contributors estimated from ISKCON’s database

at 10,000. Up to 1000 people were said to visit on Sundays, with many

thousands more attending its annual festivals. These numbers alone

demonstrate that it continues to make the ‘special contribution’ found by the

Secretary of State. He went on to consider a number of other matters and

gave weight to the low chances of the Appellants finding a suitable alternative

(permanent) site. He had earlier pointed out however that the religious needs

of one section of the community are not of such paramount importance that

they can automatically override national or local planning policies.

40. The holding of weddings is as much a part of the Manor’s ‘public worship’

function as it would be for a Christian church, but in a sense the Appellants

have become the victims of their own success. They may not need to advertise

their wedding facilities but the extracts from their website go beyond simply

the informative to the promotional. Their President’s own evidence indeed is

that the Manor is promoted as a wedding venue2. While I have no reason to

think that the Appellants are motivated by anything other than their spiritual

beliefs and a desire to provide for their congregation, it is clear also that

significant charges are levied over and above any charity, or dakshina, to the

priests. Their case could only be assisted by a detailed financial analysis

demonstrating the use of the funds so generated.

41. That said, I also have no reason to question the Appellants’ evidence on the

importance of marriage in the Hindu tradition nor the value the participants

place on being married at the Manor. However, while it may be the desire or

even custom for some members of their congregation to invite large numbers

of people to weddings, there was no evidence either that this was a religious

necessity or obligation, nor that any weddings would not or could not be held

at the site nor that anyone would be prevented from visiting the Temple room

if these appeals are dismissed. Indeed, by limiting the numbers per booking,

the Appellants have already taken steps to deal with just that eventuality.

That may give rise to some inconvenience, but the function of the Manor as a

religious centre would not be undermined while the number of guests attending

weddings, on the evidence before me, appears to be largely a matter of

personal choice.

2 Para 23 of statement adopted by Srutidharma Das



42. Further, the larger weddings in particular appear to have been concentrated

historically on Fridays and Saturdays. While there may be understandable

reasons for that, it means the marquee has been under-used on other days.

Even with a total of 50 over the 11 week period, it would be possible for a large

proportion to be held within a marquee erected for the GPDO 28 day period.

That may mean some people would be deprived of their first choice of date but

not of the opportunity altogether. While again acknowledging the importance

of the Manor to some, save for a general reference to the number of Hindu

religious buildings nationally, there was little evidence of the availability and

suitability of other facilities within a reasonable distance.

43. Conclusions. The Appellants’ approach to these appeals limits their scope. The

erection of the marquee in 2011 may cause only limited and temporary harm

beyond its inappropriateness but the matters advanced in support of the

appeals I regard, on present evidence, as essentially personal and managerial

considerations to which I cannot attach great weight and which can very

largely be addressed in other ways. I am not therefore satisfied that the harm

by reason of inappropriateness and the other albeit limited harm I have

identified is outweighed by them. It follows that the very special circumstances

necessary to justify the development have not been made out.

44. Further, if not already clear, I do not consider it realistic to look at these

appeals in isolation in the light of the case history. There is every reason to

suppose that similar if not larger numbers of people will want to be married at

the Manor next year, the year after that and so on. I understand indeed that

the Appellants are considering the possibility of a year round facility but no

application for one has yet been made. To hold that this 11 week period will

result in no permanent harm may be true of itself but the same could be said

each year afterwards, so that the temporary harm becomes all but

institutionalised, or permanent for a particular if not growing number of weeks

per year. While future proposals and practice cannot be predicted with

certainty, this only adds further weight to the above conclusions.

Section 174 Appeal on Ground (f)

45. The relevant statutory provisions relating to requirements are set out in section

173. Having considered the planning merits fully under the ground (a) appeal,

and given the nature of the allegation, the only issue under this ground is

whether the requirements go beyond what is necessary to remedy the breach

of control. The requirements as they currently stand need to be looked at

collectively.

46. Firstly, the notice alleges operational development. Not to require the

marquee’s removal would be to under-enforce and thus defeat the purpose of

the notice. The fact that the marquee has already been removed means only

that the first requirement has been met, not that its removal need not be

included in the notice. Further, the notice plan may require amendment to

identify the precise location of the marquee but the planning unit remains the

Manor grounds as a whole. The requirement therefore needs to attach to the

whole of the unit.

47. Secondly, section 173(9) provides that a notice shall “specify the period at the

end of which any steps are required to have been taken”. The second and third

requirements seek to impose continuing obligations in breach of that provision,

where part of the purpose of a notice is to bring finality to the matter. Thirdly,

the second requirement is unnecessary in any event where section 181(1)



provides that compliance with a notice shall not discharge it and section 181(3)

specifically affords continuing protection against the “reinstating or restoring

(of) buildings or works” so removed. Fourthly, the third requirement seeks to

impose an obligation that is not only unrelated to the remedying of the breach

but which goes beyond any condition imposed under the GPDO. It is thus

excessive also for that reason.

48. Fifthly, a notice cannot prevent development that is otherwise lawful. As

indicated, the Council’s acceptance of the availability of rights under Class B is

reflected in the allegation and in the second requirement. The reference to it

should thus be retained in the requirements as to remove it would be to risk

causing an injustice to the Appellants. That can be done with the addition of

suitable wording to the first requirement. The second and third requirements

should however be deleted. The appeal on this ground therefore succeeds to

that extent.

R O Evans



APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Mr D Altaras of Counsel, instructed by Mr P Trevelyan, ABT

Planning & Highways Consultancy

He called:

Srutidharma Das Temple President, Bhaktivedanta Manor

Syamasundara Das Former Wedding Manager, Bhaktivedanta Manor

Mr M Sawyer DipAN

MIOA

Senior Consultant, Acoustical Investigation &

Research Organisation Ltd

Mr P Trevelyan MA MSc

DipTP MRTPI FIHT

MCILT

Principal, ABT Planning & Highways Consultancy

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Mr R Walton of Counsel, instructed by the Head of Legal

Services

He called:

Mr P Smith BA(Hons)

DipTP MRTPI

Director, Brian Barber Associates, Chartered

Town Planning Consultants

INTERESTED PERSONS:

Mr D Lambert Chairman, Letchmore Heath Village Trust

Mr M Jeffries Resident, Hillfield Lane

Mr M Powell Former community member, Bhaktivedanta

Manor

Mr I Southern Resident, Letchmore Heath

Mr M Shaw Resident, Letchmore Heath

DOCUMENTS PRESENTED AT THE INQUIRY

1 Statement of Common Ground

2 Marquee Wedding Attendance Figures 2003-2008

3 Location plan re other permissions

4 Colour copy Appellants’ photograph of marquee

5 Committee reports re TP/08/1595

6 Minutes of Committee meeting 3/6/10

7 Additional extracts, Appellants website (Mr I Southern)

8 Extract, Hindu Council UK website (Mr M Jeffries)

9 Appellants’ “Strawberry festival” leaflet (Mr M Jeffries)

http://www.planning-inspectorate.gov.uk

Plan This is the plan referred to in my decision dated: 29 March 2011

by R O Evans BA(Hons) Solicitor MRTPI

Land at: Bhaktivedanta Manor, Dharam Marg, Hillfield Lane, Aldenham,

Watford, WD25 8EZ

Reference: APP/N1920/C/10/2136252

Appeal Decisions - Planning Jungle · 2016. 10. 8. · Dharam Marg, Hillfield Lane, Aldenham,...

Documents

Transcript of Appeal Decisions - Planning Jungle · 2016. 10. 8. · Dharam Marg, Hillfield Lane, Aldenham,...