Apocalypse Now March 2014

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Apocalypse Now:

When and Why Fear Increases Consumer Choice

ANDREW EDWARD WHITE

ANDREA C. MORALES

PATTI WILLIAMS


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Author Note

Andrew Edward White ([email protected]) is a PhD candidate in the Department

of Psychology at Arizona State University, 950 S. McAllister, Room 237, Tempe, AZ 85287-

1104. Andrea C. Morales ([email protected]) is $% &'(()*+ , -('./ 0% 1)**'233 4256+)3'26

7*28/992* 28 1)*:/3'6; at Arizona State University, PO Box 874106 Tempe, AZ 85287-4106.

Patti Williams ([email protected]) is Ira A. Lipman Associate Professor of Marketing,

University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, 700 JMHH, Philadelphia, PA 19104.


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CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT

In the current investigation, we explore the role of incidental fear in choice deferral.

Considering the potential relationship between fear and deferral from different theoretical

perspectives yields divergent predictions. Both valence-based explanations and the Appraisal-

Tendency Framework predict that fear will increase deferral. By contrast, the functional

approach links fear to negative expectations of unknown events, “tunnel vision,” and readiness

for action. In doing so, the functional approach predicts that fear should increase consumer

choice and reduce deferral. In a series of five experiments, we find clear and consistent support

for the functional perspective.

Overall, these findings demonstrate when and why fear affects the decision to choose or

defer. By focusing on fear, our research adds to recent work regarding the role of discrete

emotions in consumer choice and deferral. Further, in contrast to research showing that general

negativity increases deferral, our results demonstrate that a discrete negative emotion, fear,

actually reduces deferral and increases choice. Through this research, we also extend the

literature on discrete emotions to a novel consumer process—choice deferral. Although much

research has examined how discrete emotions affect consumer choice more generally,

participants in the typical study are rarely given the opportunity to delay or defer choice. Our

results show that when participants are explicitly given the opportunity to defer, incidental fear

actually increases the likelihood of consumers making a choice. Finally, because these findings

were uniquely predicted by the functional perspective, this research highlights the usefulness of

considering the relationship between emotions and consumer behavior from multiple

perspectives.


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ABSTRACT

Past research finds that general negativity increases deferral. Adopting a functional evolutionary

approach, however, we contend that the negative emotion of fear will increase choice. From a

functional perspective, it is risky to defer choice in fear-inducing conditions—the future is

unknown and you may not have the opportunity to make the same choice again. Further,

because fear is often activated in life-threatening circumstances, it compels immediate action to

overcome threats in the present environment. We suggest that fear differentially biases

perceptions of unknown products outside of one’s current choice set and known products within

the choice set. In five experiments, we find incidental fear: (1) increases choice and reduces

deferral, (2) leads to more negative evaluations of deferral options, (3) creates more positive

evalutaions of known options, and (4) these shifiting evaluations mediate the reltionship between

fear and choice. This pattern of results was not predicted by other theoretical frameworks and, as

such, highlights the usefulness of considering consumer behavior from a functional perspective.


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“Even if your foot is in the door or you bring someone into a conference room, you don’t win

the deal unless you actually get them to sign on the dotted line.” — Donald Trump

Closing the sale is the final and one of the most critical components of any consumer

transaction. As such, marketers have long been interested in finding better and more effective

ways to encourage a purchase on any given shopping occasion. Although prior research has

considered a number of actions that firms and sales teams can employ to close the sale (Boles,

Babin, Brashear and Brooks 2001; Hawes, Strong and Winick 1996; Moe and Fader 2004; Oakes

1990), little work has examined situational factors that increase consumer choice and reduce

choice deferral. In the current investigation, we propose that one such situational factor may be

the incidental emotion of fear.

Researchers have demonstrated that fear influences a range of consumer behaviors:

processing of advertisements and messages, the effectiveness of different persuasion tactics,

preferences for diversity and variety, the role of self-control in consumer choice, and the

usefulness of specific health communications (Block 2005; Block and Williams 2002;

Griskevicius et al. 2009; Keller and Block 1995; Keller and Lehmann 2008; Morales, Wu, and

Fitzsimons 2012; Winterich and Hawes 2011; White et al. 2013). In the present research, we

examine how fear might influence a person’s desire to choose now or defer choice until later. To

do so, we adopt a functional framework that links discrete emotions, such as fear, to mechanisms

adapted to help people overcome recurring sets of threats and opportunities (Griskevicius et al.

2009; Kenrick et al. 2010; Kenrick, Saad, and Griskevicius 2013; Lazarus 1991; Saad and Gill

2000; Saad 2007; 2011). Increasingly, researchers have used this functional approach to


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generate and test unique predictions about consumer behavior, and these studies have produced a

series of novel empirical findings (Durante et al. 2011; 2013; Townsend and Shu 2010;

Townsend and Sood 2012; Sundie et al. 2011; White et al. 2013)

According to previous research, general negativity increases choice deferral (Luce 1998).

Using the functional approach, however, we suggest something different—that under some

circumstances the negative emotion of fear may actually increase choice and reduce deferral.

From a functional perspective, it is risky to defer choice in fear-inducing conditions—the future

is unknown and you may not have the opportunity to make the same choice again. Further,

because fear is often activated in life-threatening circumstances, it compels immediate action to

overcome threats and colors perceptions of objects or events in the surrounding environment. In

a series of five experiments, we examine the effect of incidental fear on consumer’s willingness

to choose now or defer until later. In so doing, we compare hypotheses developed from the

functional evolutionary approach to those from the valence-based perspective and Appraisal-

Tendency Framework, and test the predictions generated by each.

FEAR, DECISION MAKING, AND DEFERRAL

The consumer behavior literature has examined a range of factors that can affect choice

among several potential alternatives. In the majority of this research, however, participants are

forced to choose among the alternatives—without an option to defer or delay choice. Because

many decisions involve a tension between making a choice in the present or deferring until some

point in the future, we contend that it is important to understand factors that shape

choice/deferral processes.


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Extant research suggests that deferral is primarily a means of coping with and alleviating

the negativity generated by choice uncertainty and decision-difficulty (Luce 1998). Indeed,

deferral is more common when no single option dominates a choice set and when consumers are

faced with difficult trade-offs (Dhar 1997; Dhar and Simonson 2003; Tversky and Shafir 1992).

More generally, it seems that any factor that affects decision-difficulty also affects the likelihood

of deferral. For example, adding a new product to a choice set can either increase or decrease

deferral, depending on whether it enhances or reduces decision-difficulty (Dhar 1997). When a

new option is similar to existing options, and distinctions between products become less clear,

deferral tends to increase. However, when a new option is inferior to existing options, and

people can easily eliminate it from consideration, deferral tends to decrease. Likewise,

presentation styles that affect decision-difficulty can also affect deferral: using more abstract

attribute ranges, harder to read font, or presenting options with incomplete information each

increases decision-difficulty, and as a consequence, also increases deferral (Dhar and Simonson

2003; Gunasti and Ross Jr. 2008; Novemsky et al. 2007).

Deferral is also influenced by situational factors that have little to do with the actual

products in the choice set. For instance, deferral is more likely, and choice less likely, when

people are asked to consider whether or not each product in a set is acceptable, rather than when

asked to select the best product in the set (Dhar and Nowlis 2004; Parker and Schrift 2011).

Situational time orientation also affects choice by differentially focusing people on the

immediate or future benefits of choice. When under time pressure and focused on the present,

people tend to defer less (Dhar and Nowlis, 1999). Relatedly, when feeling disconnected from

one’s future self, individuals choose today rather than defer consumption for the future (Bartels

and Urminsky 2011).


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As a whole, research on deferral has examined how several factors, from aspects of the

products in a choice set, to presentation style, to unrelated features of the situation, can influence

deferral. Much of this work is grounded in the notion that deferral is a means of coping with and

alleviating the general negativity created by decision-difficulty (Luce 1998). We seek to

advance this work in two important ways. First, previous research on the impact of emotion on

choice has often focused on general negativity, showing that decision difficulty created by the

choice set itself reduces choice. We build on this research by considering when negative

emotions may actually increase the likelihood of making a choice. Second, instead of examining

the relationship between general negative affect and consumer choice, we posit that it may also

be useful to explore how discrete emotions influence choice. Specifically, we contend that there

is an important relationship between incidental fear and choice.

Fear has been shown to influence consumer behavior in a number of ways. For example,

using fear to motivate behavior is a common persuasion technique, and fear appeals have been

used to promote a wide variety of products (e.g., Keller and Block, 1995; Morales, Wu, and

Fitzsimons 2012). Nevertheless, academic research on fear appeals has provided mixed evidence

regarding their effectiveness (e.g., Beck 1984; Hornik et al. 2008; Rogers and Mewborn 1976).

Although the majority of studies find a positive relationship between fear and persuasion (e.g.,

Stainback and Rogers 1983), others suggest that fear can impede message acceptance (e.g.,

Block and Williams, 2002; Janis and Feshbach 1953). Despite inconsistencies, the results of

four independent meta-analyses indicate that, in general, higher levels of fear are associated with

greater persuasion—though this relationship is moderated by a number of factors (Boster and

Mongeau 1984; Mongeau 1998; Sutton 1982; Witte and Allen 2000). For instance, the

persuasiveness of fear appeals can be affected by diverse factors ranging from the perceived


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severity of the threat and perceived response efficacy to self-construal and the message format

(Block 2005; Keller 1999; Rogers 1983; Witte 1992).

In addition to fear appeals, wherein fear is an integral part of the stimulus, several

theoretical perspectives have shown that incidental fear can influence consumer decision-

making. Using a valence-based model of emotion, researchers have found that fear, along with

other negative emotions, leads to more negative evaluations of targets, promotes more complex

thinking, and reduces reliance on mental shortcuts (Gorn, Goldberg, and Basu 1993; Murry and

Dacin 1996; Pham 1998). Researchers adopting the Appraisal-Tendency Framework have linked

incidental fear, through appraisals of uncertainty, to increased risk aversion and systematic

information processing (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001). Finally, the

functional evolutionary approach has shown that incidental fear increases the effectiveness of

social proof heuristics, reduces the effectiveness of scarcity heuristics, and alters preferences for

diversification and variety (Griskevicius et al. 2009; White et al. 2013). In the current

investigation, we propose another way in which incidental fear influences consumer decision-

making—by affecting the likelihood of making a choice vs. deferring.

Valence-Based and Appraisal Tendency Perspectives

As described above, a number of distinct theoretical perspectives have been used to study

the relationship between emotion and consumer behavior. Perhaps the most common of these

perspectives is the valence-based approach, which emphasizes the distinction between positive

affect (e.g., "happiness") and negative affect (e.g., "sadness"). This valence-based perspective

predicts that evaluative judgments about a new target will be congruent with one’s current


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affective state, such that the affect creates a “halo” around the judgment—negative feelings

leading to more negative judgments and positive feelings leading to more positive judgments.

Supporting this thinking, consumer research has found affect-congruency effects for a wide

range of products and services (Gardner and Wilhelm 1987; Goldberg and Gorn 1987; Gorn et

al.1993; Murry and Dacin 1996; Pham 1998).

Considering the relationship between fear and choice, this valence-based perspective

predicts that fear will affect choice in the same way as other negative emotions. Further, existing

research finds that the general negativity created by decision difficulty is associated with reduced

choice (Luce 1998). Thus, if the negativity created by decision-difficulty can increase deferral, it

is possible that specific negative emotions, such as fear, will also increase deferral.

Although valence is an important aspect of emotional experience, a vast and growing

body of research suggests that emotions of the same valence can differentially affect consumer

outcomes if they vary along other key dimensions. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework starts

with the presumption that emotions arise from distinct appraisals of the social environment

(Lazarus 1991), and that emotions vary along several key appraisal themes or dimensions, rather

than just valence. These critical dimensions include: certainty, control, attention, and anticipated

effort (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). The Appraisal-Tendency

Framework emphasizes the motivational carryover effects associated with these dimensions on

subsequent judgments, with research demonstrating that emotions of the same valence can have

substantially different effects on consumer outcomes if they vary on these appraisal dimensions

(Han, Lerner and Keltner 2007). In several studies, researchers have compared emotions that are

negative in valence, but differ in the underlying appraisal of certainty. These studies show that

anger, through appraisals of certainty, facilitates risk-seeking and heuristic processing, but fear,


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through appraisals of uncertainty and situational control, leads people to become risk-averse and

to engage in more systematic processing (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001).

Thus, emotions arise because of appraisals of the environment, but importantly those appraisals

have been shown to carryover persistently beyond the eliciting situation, affecting subsequent

judgments and choices in ways that are consistent with the underlying emotion dimensions,

which are referred to as appraisal tendencies (Han, Lerner and Keltner 2007; Lerner and Keltner

2000).

From the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, one possibility is that the relationship between

emotion and choice deferral will be affected by underlying appraisals of certainty/uncertainty.

Past research has found that situational factors that increase uncertainty tend to reduce consumer

choice. Therefore, emotions associated with appraisals of uncertainty, such as fear and hope,

may reduce choice, but emotions that activate appraisals of certainty, such as disgust and pride,

may increase choice.

A Functional Approach to Fear and Choice Deferral

As discussed above, the valence-based perspective and Appraisal-Tendency Framework

generate specific hypotheses about how emotions will affect choice; regardless of the specific

processes at work, however, both predict that fear will ultimately reduce the likelihood of

making a choice. In the current investigation, we consider the relationship between fear and

choice deferral from a functional evolutionary perspective and propose that fear may actually

increase choice and reduce deferral.


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Increasingly, researchers have found it beneficial to study discrete emotions using a

functional evolutionary approach, and this framework has uncovered a number of novel findings

beyond those suggested by the valence-based perspective and Appraisal-Tendency Framework

(e.g., Ekman, 1992; Griskevicius et al., 2009; Griskevicius, Shiota, and Nowlis, 2010; Lazarus

1991; Saad 2011). According to the functional perspective, emotions serve to coordinate

psychological and behavioral responses to recurring sets of threats and opportunities (Ekman,

1992; Griskevicius et al. 2009; Kenrick and Shiota 2008). Thus, to understand the downstream

consequences of discrete emotions, it is important to recognize the specific threats or

opportunities to which those emotions are functionally-tuned. One way to conceptualize this

approach is to think of emotions as responses to a series of adaptive “if !then” statements.

Lazarus (1991) describes these types of universal “if !then” statements as follows: if a person

evaluates his or her relationship to the environment in a particular way, then a specific emotion,

which is tied to that evaluation, always results. From the functional perspective, the “if” part of

these statements refers to frequent threats and opportunities encountered by people across time,

such as the need to protect oneself from others, avoid disease, find a romantic partner, or acquire

status (Kenrick et al. 2010). The “then” portion of these statements refers to historically

successful responses for overcoming and surviving these threats, or for taking advantage of these

opportunities. Together these “if !then” statements allow for functionally-flexible responses to a

range of environmental conditions.

A useful example of this logic is the human disgust response. According to the functional

evolutionary framework, the emotion of disgust is adapted to help people survive disease threats

(Rozin and Fallon 1987). Thus, a functional “if !then” statement related to disgust is— if I

appraise an object in my environment as a disease threat (e.g., a moldy food or sick person), then


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I will respond with disgust. Once activated, the emotion of disgust coordinates cognitive and

behavioral responses adapted to avoid the potential threat (Mortensen et al. 2010; Schaller and

Murray 2008).

Though the evolutionary framework posits that responses to specific evaluations of the

environment are universal, it does not imply that every person will respond to each threat or

opportunity in the same way. Rather, it maintains that both developmental and sociocultural

factors can influence when a certain evaluation is generated (Kenrick et al. 2010; Lazarus 1991).

For instance, the functional perspective suggests that disgust follows from evaluations of

“disease threat,” but what constitutes a disease threat may vary, to some extent, from person to

person. A developmental event, such as getting sick after eating a certain food, may lead one to

evaluate that food as a disease threat, even though others do not. Likewise, norms that relate

certain foods to concepts of uncleanliness or disease may vary from culture to culture. In this

way, the functional perspective highlights both the universality in emotional responses, and also

provides a means of predicting variation in such responses.

Although the Appraisal-Tendency Framework and functional perspectives both consider

the effects of discrete emotions, they differentially characterize the relationship between

emotions and appraisal dimensions. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework emphasizes how

underlying appraisal dimensions differentiate discrete emotions and focuses on the carryover

effects their discrete appraisal tendencies have on subsequent judgments. The functional

approach suggests that while appraisal dimensions do differentiate among emotions, those

dimensions do not fully determine the consequences of activating discrete emotions

(Griskevicius et al, 2009). From the functional perspective, each emotion is linked to a

coordinated set of appraisals, perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors, and it is this coordinated


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suite of responses that helps people overcome specific adaptive problems (Griskevicius et al.

2010). Thus, whereas the Appraisal-Tendency Framework primarily focuses on the relationship

between emotions and appraisal mechanisms, the functional approach considers emotions more

holistically, with appraisals being just one of several important components.

From the functional perspective, fear is an integral component of the threat management

system that helps humans survive life and death circumstances (Bracha 2004; Wilson 1989;

Ohman and Mineka 2001). As described above, the functional perspective predicts that the

emotion of fear activates a coordinated suite of appraisals, perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors

to help the individual survive the immediate threat. Considering each aspect of this coordinated

response, researchers have uncovered a diverse set of responses to fear-inducing circumstances.

For instance, fear seems to generate negatively-biased appraisals for objects or events outside of

one’s immediate circumstances. In particular, people concerned with fear are more likely to

overestimate the likelihood of aversive future events and to perceive future events as risky (Amin

and Lovibond 1997; de Jong et al. 1995; Hermann, Ofer, and Flow 2004; Lerner and Keltner

2001; Li et al. 2012; Pauli, Wiedemann, and Montoya 1998; Tomarken, Mineka, and Cook 1989;

Tomarken, Sutton, and Mineka, 1995). This overestimation of aversive future events has been

documented for a wide range of outcomes, from anticipating how frequently threatening stimuli

will appear on a computer screen (Tomarken et al. 1989) to estimating the likelihood of negative

events occurring over the course of one’s lifetime (Lerner and Keltner 2001).

In addition to biasing appraisals of the future, fear also influences attention and memory

in the present. Temporally, a person concerned with fear becomes focused on overcoming the

present threat, and concerns about the past or future temporarily vanish (Tooby and Cosmides

2008; Langer, Wapner, and Werner 1961). This shift toward the present is also associated with


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“tunnel vision” and situational vigilance, an intense focus on the source of the threat and

situational strategies for escaping the threat (Blanchard et al. 2011, Blanchard and Blanchard

1989; Izard and Youngstrom 1996). Enhanced situational vigilance helps threatened individuals

take into account important characteristics of the threat (e.g., type and location), and the situation

(e.g., presence of an escape route or hiding place), and use these inputs to determine which

defense will be best (Blanchard et al. 2011; Phelps and LeDoux 2005). One consequence of this

tunnel vision is that a person’s subjective sense of time seems to slow down; participants

exposed to pictures of threatening faces overestimate the amount of time the faces were

displayed to them (Gil and Droit-Volet 2012; Tipples 2008). Moreover, owing to the increased

importance of attending to and tracking potential threats, people concerned with fear, relative to

other emotions, show enhanced memory for people or objects in their immediate environment

(Becker 2009; Phelps et al. 2006).

In addition to affecting cognitive processes, fear also has a number of behavioral

consequences. Complementing enhanced situational vigilance, fear activates a “readiness for

reaction” that can be translated into a number of functional actions, such as fight, flight, freeze,

or seeking safety from others, depending on the unique circumstances associated with the current

threat (Blanchard 2011; Griskevicius et al. 2006; Griskevicius et al. 2009; Ohman and Mineka,

2000; Phelps and LeDoux 2005; White, et al. 2012). For instance, threats tend to elicit flight if an

escape route is available, freezing if a threat is ambiguous, or defensive attack as the distance

between threat and victim decreases DBlanchard et al. 2011).

Considering this coordinated suite of appraisals, perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors,

we propose that fear will affect consumer choice and deferral in several ways. First, past

research shows that fear leads people to have negative expectations for the future (Amin and


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Lovibond 1997; de Jong et al. 1995; Hermann et al. 2004; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Pauli et al.

1998; Tomarken et al. 1989; 1995). Thus, we suggest that fear-biased expectations about

negative future events will lead people to expect deferred options, outside of the current choice

set, to be riskier and to evaluate them more negatively. Second, fear activates a sort of “tunnel

vision” that leads people to focus on objects or events in their present environment (Tooby and

Cosmides 2000; Izard and Youngstrom 1996). In the context of consumer choice, that means that

people will increasingly focus on objects in the immediate choice set. Relative to deferred

options (i.e., options outside of the current choice set), these known products should be evaluated

to be safer and, in general, more positively. Further, for those concerned with fear, the chance to

make a choice among products in a current choice set may seem like a limited or scarce

opportunity—the future is unknown and people may not have the opportunity to make the same

choice again in the future. In line with past research, the perception that a product or choice is

limited may increase its attractiveness and desirability (Cialdini 1993). Finally, the increased

need to take action to escape the current threat may promote a desire to take action in the current

consumer context, in the form of selecting a product from the present choice set.

Overall, we suggest that the relationship between fear and choice will be mediated by two

processes. First, we predict that fear will negatively-bias perceptions of options outside of the

current choice set, and that these perceptions will reduce choice deferral. Second, we hypothesize

that fear will simultaneously positively-bias perceptions of known products within the current

choice set, and that such perceptions will also lead to reduced choice deferral. Formally, we

hypothesize:


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H1: Fear increases the likelihood of making a choice and reduces choice

deferral.

H2: The relationship between fear and choice deferral is mediated by (1)

increasingly negative attitudes toward products outside the immediate choice

set and (2) increasingly favorable attitudes toward known products in the

immediate choice set.

It is important to note that the predictions described above were generated when

considering a choice between a known product that is in an immediate choice set and a deferred

product outside of the choice set. Given the functional role of fear, it may be important to

consider how fear would affect choice if none of the products were in the immediate

environment. For instance, when consumers are making decisions for the future, all choice

options lie outside of the immediate environment. According to research outlined above, people

concerned with fear are likely to rate future events as riskier and more aversive (Amin and

Lovibond 1997; de Jong et al. 1995; Hermann et al. 2004; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Pauli et al.

1998; Tomarken et al. 1989; 1995). Likewise, though selecting a product in the current choice

set may satisfy a need to take action in response to threat, selecting a product from a future

choice set may not placate the same need for action. Therefore, when considering future choice

sets, people concerned with fear may evaluate all choice options more negatively. If so, fear

should not increase consumer choice for future choice sets. In fact, if all future choices are

evaluated more negatively, fear may reduce choice. Thus, because fear focuses attention and

increases readiness for action specifically in the current environment, an important boundary

condition on the relationship between fear and deferral is whether the choice involves products in


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the immediate environment or choices of products for the future. More specifically, we

hypothesize:

H3: The relationship between fear and choice deferral will hold for

decisions involving choice between products in the present environment, but

not for decisions involving products in the future.

Summary and Experimental Overview

Considering the potential relationship between fear and choice from different theoretical

perspectives yields different predictions. The valence-based approach suggests that fear, along

with other negative emotions, should reduce choice. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework

predicts that emotions associated with uncertainty appraisals, such as fear and hope, should

reduce choice, but that emotions associated with certainty, such as disgust and pride, should

increase choice. Finally, the functional approach predicts incidental fear should increase

consumer choice and reduce deferral when decisions involve present choice sets.

In a series of five experiments we test this functional approach and consider the

alternative hypotheses suggested by the valence-based perspective and Appraisal-Tendency

Framework. In Experiment 1, we investigate how fear and disgust affect the choice to select a

product now or defer choice. In Experiment 2, we expand our investigation to compare fear with

four other emotions that vary along different appraisal dimensions (disgust, sadness, hope,

pride). In Experiment 3, we explore a boundary condition on the relationship between fear and


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consumer choice by examining choices framed as occurring immediately or in the future.

Finally, in experiments 4a and 4b, we test the proposed mediators of the relationship between

fear and choice—increasingly negative attitudes toward options outside of the immediate choice

set and increasingly positive attitudes toward products within the choice set.

EXPERIMENT 1

In Experiment 1 we sought to test between the competing predictions generated by the

valence-based perspective, Appraisal-Tendency Framework, and functional approaches. To do

so, participants were randomly assigned to one of three emotion conditions (fear, disgust, or a

neutral control) and later made a series of decisions in which they could select among several

products or defer choice. Each perspective generates a different set of hypotheses about how

fear and disgust will influence consumer choice. From a valence-based perspective, both

negative emotions should decrease choice. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework predicts that

fear and disgust will have opposite effects on choice—fear, an emotion associated with

uncertainty, should reduce choice, but disgust, an emotion associated with certainty, should

increase choice. Finally, the functional perspective posits that fear will increase choice because

in threatening circumstances you may not have the opportunity to make the same choice again:

the future is uncertain and the focus is specifically on the present environment in which

immediate action is necessary. The functional approach does not predict that disgust will affect

choice—it is unclear how choosing now or deferring relate to the adaptive functionality of

disgust (to avoid contamination and disease).


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Method

Participants. One hundred twenty-seven participants (44 male, 72 female, 9 not provided;

Mage = 33.03) were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website and paid a small

monetary compensation to complete the study.

Design and procedure. Participants were told they would participate in two separate

studies. In the first study participants were told that they would read a short story (which served

as our experimental manipulation) and later be asked to recall specific details of the story. The

second study was ostensibly on decision-making (actually our dependent variable).

Emotion Manipulation. In the first part of the study, participants were randomly assigned

to read one of three guided visualization stories. The disgust story described a person

volunteering at a geriatric ward who encountered a number of disgusting events—a sickly person

sneezing on him/her, another sickly person with an open wound, and a hair in his/her lunch. The

fear story described a person, home alone during a stormy night, who realizes there is an intruder

in his/her house. The neutral control story described a person organizing his/her office. These

stories have been used in past research on emotion and decision-making and have been shown to

uniquely activate their intended emotional states (Griskevicius et al. 2009; White et al. 2012;

White, Kenrick, and Neuberg 2013).

Dependent Measure. Following the emotion manipulation, participants were told that

they would complete several decision-making tasks for a separate study. The dependent measure

was a modified version of the choice deferral task created by Gunasti and Ross Jr. (2008).


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Specifically, participants were presented with a series of eight choice sets—each displaying five

products that varied along three evaluation dimensions (see Appendix A). Each choice set

presented a different type of product evaluated along various dimensions. For example, in one

choice set, participants were presented with watches that were evaluated on “precision,”

“physical appearance,” and “durability.” In another, participants were shown toasters evaluated

on “quality,” “manufacturer’s warrantee,” and “physical appearance.” In each choice set, three

of the products (labeled A, B, and C) displayed evaluation information for all three dimensions,

but two of the products (labeled D and E) displayed no evaluation information along any of the

dimensions. Participants could select a product from the choice set, by indicating whether they

preferred product A, B, or C, or select one of two deferred options outside of the choice set, by

either indicating “I would wait to get more information about options D and E,” or “I would go

to a different store—that might have a better selection.” Responses were coded such that

participants received a score of “1” every time they made a choice and a score of “0” each time

they selected one of the deferral options. Responses were aggregated across the eight choice sets

and could range from 0 (always deferred) to 8 (always chose).

Results and Discussion

A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the emotion condition on choice

( F (2,124) = 5.76, p = .004, partial !2 = .085, see Figure 1). Follow-up analyses showed that

those in the fear condition ( M = 5.67) chose more and deferred less than those in the disgust ( M

= 4.02, F (1,124) = 10.78, p = .001) and control conditions ( M = 4.48, F (1,124) = 5.48, p =

.021). Choice did not differ between the disgust and control conditions (F < 1.0, p > .30).


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____________________

Insert Figure 1 about here

____________________

Experiment 1 tested alternative predictions generated by three distinct theoretical

approaches to emotion. The valence-based perspective suggested that both fear and disgust

would decrease choice. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework suggested that fear would decrease

choice, but that disgust would increase choice. Relying upon a functional perspective, we

posited that fear would increase choice, but that disgust would not. As a whole, the findings of

experiment 1 are in line with the predictions generated by the functional perspective.

Participants in the fear condition chose more and deferred less than those in the disgust and

control conditions.

EXPERIMENT 2

Although the findings of Experiment 1 support the predictions generated by the

functional approach, the observed effects may have been driven by some other aspect of fear,

rather than its adaptive functionality. For instance, fear is associated with several different

appraisal dimensions and, according to other theories, one of these underlying dimensions

(uncertainty, situational control, attention, negative valence) could lead to the observed reduction

in deferral. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we compared fear to emotions associated with similar

appraisals of uncertainty (hope, sadness), situational control (sadness), attention (pride), and

valence (disgust, sadness). If the effects observed in the first experiment were caused by one of


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conditions (fear, disgust, sadness, pride, hope, and a neutral control). For example, photos in the

fear condition displayed images of a shark attack, a person clinging to the side of a mountain,

and a man with a gun pointed toward the person viewing the picture.

To ensure that the pictures activated the intended emotions, we conducted a separate pre-

test in which we showed a group of 32 participants (15 male, 17 female; Mage = 35.44) all of the

photos and asked them to rate the extent to which each photo made them feel fear, disgust,

sadness, pride, and hope on a scale from 0 = “not at all” to 8 = “more strongly than ever.”

Results confirmed that each of the photos activated the intended emotions: the fear photos (M fear

= 7.01) elicited more fear than any of the other photos (Mothers range from 1.11 to 3.84; ps <

.001), the disgust photos (Mdisgust = 7.76) elicited more disgust than any of the other photos

(Mothers range from 1.07 to 3.38; ps < .001), the sadness photos (Msadness = 6.68) elicited more

sadness than any of the other photos (Mothers range from 1.18 to 3.69; ps < .001), the pride photos

(M pride = 5.80) elicited more pride than any of the other photos (Mothers range from 1.07 to 4.00;

ps < .001), and the hope photos (Mhope = 6.53) elicited more hope than any of the other photos

(Mothers range from 1.28 to 4.89; ps < .001).

Results and Discussion

A planned-contrast comparing fear to all other emotion conditions revealed a significant

main effect of emotion on choice ( F (1,225) = 10.526, p = .002, partial !2 = .044, see figure 2).

Follow-up analyses showed that participants in the fear condition ( M = 5.86) chose significantly

more and deferred less than those in all other conditions (disgust: M = 4.35, F = 2.42, p = .017;

sadness: M = 4.39, F = 2.32, p = .021; pride: M = 4.25, F = 2.68, p = .008; hope: M = 4.32, F =


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2.45, p = .014; no emotion: M = 4.09, F = 2.78, p = .006). There were no significant differences

between any of the other emotion conditions (Fs < .5, ps > .60).

Experiment 2 extended the findings of the first study in two important ways. First, it

replicated the findings of Experiment 1 using a different experimental manipulation of emotion.

Second, it demonstrated that fear uniquely affects choice deferral. Emotions known to activate

similar appraisals of uncertainty (hope, sadness), situational control (sadness), attention (pride),

and negative valence (disgust, sadness) did not reduce deferral in the same way.

____________________

Insert Figure 2 about here ____________________

EXPERIMENT 3

Experiments 1 and 2 showed that people concerned with fear increasingly choose known

products in the current choice set, rather than deferring choice. In Experiment 3 we consider a

potential boundary condition on the relationship between fear and consumer choice. In our

previous experiments, we suggested that fear increases consumer choice because fear negatively-

biases expectations about options outside of the choice set, and, in life-threatening

circumstances, it may seem risky to defer choice. This thinking fits with past research showing

that fear negatively-biases expectations about unknown events and events that occur in the future

(Amin and Lovibond 1997; de Jong et al. 1995; Hermann et al. 2004; Lerner and Keltner 2001;

Pauli et al. 1998; Tomarken et al. 1989; 1995). Because fear shifts focus to the present

environment and increases the uncertainty associated with unknown events, it seems likely that


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the increased choice observed in Experiments 1 and 2 may not hold if all choices are outside of

the choice set, or if all choices occur in the future—under these conditions, fear should

negatively-bias expectations about all choices. Therefore, one possibility is that the relationship

between fear and choice will hold when people consider choices in the present, but not when

they make choices for the future. To test this possibility, in Experiment 3 we manipulated both

emotion and the decision time frame and assessed consumer choice.

Experiment 3 also builds on our earlier studies by further testing between predictions

generated by the functional approach and the Appraisal-Tendency Framework. Specifically,

rather than activating an emotion associated with uncertainty, Experiment 3 directly activated

appraisals of uncertainty in order to show that uncertainty alone, apart from the other functional

responses associated with fear, does not increase choice. To this end we predicted that fear, but

not general uncertainty, would increase choice and reduce deferral for present choice sets.

Method

Participants. Two hundred fifty-eight participants (111 male, 142 female, 5 not provided

Mage = 34.24) were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website and paid a small


Design and procedure. Experiment 3 was a 3 (story: fear, uncertainty, control) X 2 (time

frame: present vs. future) between-subjects ANOVA. Participants were randomly assigned to

read one of three stories—fear, general uncertainty, or control. The fear and control stories were

the same as those used in experiment 1. The general uncertainty story described a person


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searching their house for a lost set of keys. This manipulation has been used in past research and

has been shown to arouse feelings of uncertainty and unpredictability (Griskevicius et al. 2011).

Before answering the choice questions, participants in the future time frame condition were

instructed, “We are also interested in how people make decisions in preparing for the future. As

you are responding to these questions, please imagine yourself facing this decision in 3 months

time.” Each choice question was also framed in terms of the future, “If you were faced with this

choice set in 3 months time, which option would you choose?” Participants in the present time

frame condition were not given instructions about preparing for the future and were simply

asked, “If you were faced with this choice set now, which option would you choose?”

Participants completed a modified version of our previous deferral dependent variable.

In it, participants were presented with a series of three choice sets—each displaying three

products that varied along three evaluation dimensions (see Appendix B). Each choice set

presented a different type of product (health clubs, wireless services, and laptop computers) and

varied the evaluation dimensions that were displayed. For instance, participants viewed three

health clubs that were evaluated on “membership fee,” “variety of exercise machines,” and

“commute time to health club.” To increase the likelihood that participants would defer choice,

some information was missing for each product, so that no product received ratings on all three

dimensions. Participants were asked which product they would select and could indicate a

choice, by selecting a specific product, A, B, or C, or defer choice by selecting “none of these.”

Responses were coded such that participants received a score of “1” each time they made a

choice and a score of “0” each time they deferred choice. Responses were aggregated across the

three choice sets and could range from 0 (always deferred) to 3 (always chose).


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EXPERIMENT 4A

In Experiments 1-3 we observed a relationship between fear and consumer choice. In

Experiments 4A and 4B we sought to understand the psychological mechanism driving this

effect. As described earlier, we believe fear affects choice because people concerned with fear

are (1) increasingly biased to view options outside of the choice set as riskier and to evaluate

them more negatively and (2) by contrast, they are increasingly likely to view known products in

the immediate choice set more positively. To test these predictions, in Experiment 4A we

examined how fear affects ratings of deferred options outside of the immediate choice set; in

Experiment 4B, we investigated how fear influences ratings of products inside the choice set.

Finally, to further demonstrate the unique relationship between fear and choice, in Experiment

4A, we again compared the effects of activating fear to those of activating more general

uncertainty.

Method

Participants. One hundred fifty-three participants (68 male, 71 female, 14 not provided

Mage = 34.87) were recruited form the Amazon Mechanical Turk website and paid a small



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uncertainty and control conditions were not significantly different from one another (F < 1, p >

.55).

There was also a significant main effect of story manipulation on deferred product ratings

( F (2,150) = 3.16, p = .045, partial !2 = .040). Follow-up analyses showed that those in the fear

condition ( M = 3.46) expected the deferred products to be relatively worse than those in the

general uncertainty ( M = 3.71, F = 2.41, p = .017) and control conditions ( M = 3.65, F = 1.81, p

= .073). The general uncertainty and control conditions were not significantly different from one

another (F < 1.0, p > .55).

____________________

Insert Figure 4 about here ____________________

Mediation. Following Preacher and Hayes (2008), we examined whether changes in

product ratings mediated the relationship between fear and consumer choice. Analyses showed

the same significant pattern of results when conducting these analyses comparing fear to either

the general uncertainty or control conditions. Therefore, in the analyses reported below the

general uncertainty and control conditions were combined and compared to the fear condition.

We estimated the standard deviation of the indirect effect of our fear manipulation on choice for

5,000 bootstrapped samples. In this analysis the indirect effect was estimated to lie between .007

and .086 with 95% confidence (! = 0.040, SE = 0.021), demonstrating significant mediation.

That is, the fear manipulation altered participants’ perception of deferred products outside of the

choice set, which in turn, predicted choice.

EXPERIMENT 4B


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.55).

As predicted, there was also a significant main effect of emotion on likelihood to buy

products ( F (1,119) = 13.25, p < .001, partial !2 = .10). Follow-up analyses showed that those in

the fear condition ( M = 3.81) were significantly more willing to buy products than those in the

disgust condition ( M = 3.05, F = 3.68 p < .001) and control condition ( M = 3.27, F = 2.67, p =

.009). The disgust and control conditions were not significantly different from one another (F =

1.08, p > .25). Importantly, these results held both for the products participants ultimately


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We began this investigation by examining the role of discrete emotions in the decision to

choose now or defer. Considering this relationship from different theoretical perspectives

generated several alternative predicitons. From the valence-based perspective, incidental fear

and other negative emotions should reduce choice and increase deferral. According to the

Appraisal Tendency Framework, emotions associated with uncertainty, such as fear, hope, and

sadness, should increase deferral, but emotions associated with certainty, such as disgust and

pride, should reduce deferral. Finally, the functional evolutionary approach predicted that fear

should increase choice and reduce deferral, and that this relationship should be unique to fear. In

five experiments we found clear and consistent support for unique predictions made by the

functional evolutionary approach.

In Experiment 1, relative to a neutral condition, fear increased choice and reduced choice

deferral; disgust did not affect consumer choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding, and

showed that emotions matching fear across a number of different appraisal dimensions (sadness,

hope, disgust, and pride) did not affect deferral. Experiment 3 documented an important

boundary condition on the relationship between fear and deferral: fear reduced deferral for

choices in the present, but did not affect deferral for choices occuring in the future. From the

functional perspective, this finding make senses—when facing life threatening conditions,

options outside of the immediate choice set may seem riskier and more uncertain. By contrast,

present choices are likely to be evaluated as safer, and more positive. When all choices exist in

the future, incidental fear may case all choices to be perceived more negatively, and people

should prefer to defer choice. In Experiment 4A we built on this thinking by showing that

increasingly negative evaluations of products outside of the choice set mediated the relationship

between fear and increased choice. In Experiment 4B we found that this relationship was also


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outside of the immediate choice set to be riskier. Nevertheless, we believe it is still possible other

emotions may affect choice and deferral—under more limited and specific circumstances. For

example, in several studies we documented that disgust did not affect deferral. Yet, from a

functional perspective it may make sense for disgust to increase choice under some conditions,

and to reduce choice under others. Because disgust is linked to the motivation to avoid disease

threats, disgust may increase choice among products that would assist in this goal, such as

medicines or cleaning products. Alternatively, disgust may also reduce choice among products

associated with germs and disease, such as laxatives or foods near their expiration date (Morales

and Fitzsimons 2007). Considering these possibilities, we believe it may be beneficial for future

research to more carefully examine the relationship between discrete emotions and choice

deferral among specific product categories.

These findings also have several important managerial implications. As described at the

outset, “closing the sale” is perhaps the most important aspect of any consumer transaction.

Though research has documented a number of actions that firms can employ to close the sale,

less is known about how situational factors might increase choice. Our findings highlight the

role that fear can play in closing the sale. Throughout our studies, we showed that merely

inducing fear, often in circumstances unrelated to the actual consumer choice, can increase the

likelihood of making a choice and reduce deferral. Building on these findings, it is possible that

retailers could increase choice if they present fear-inducing images, such as those used in

Experiment 2, before the consumer has the opportunity to select a product. Indeed, past research

has already shown that subtle fear-inducing images, such as flames in the background of a

website, can influence consumer decision-making (Mandel and Johnson 2002). Relatedly, fear-

inducing marketing material near the checkout aisle (e.g., a magazine cover featuring a


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catastrophic event, national tragedy, or a scary movie) may increase consumers’ willingness to

buy now rather than later. As evidenced in Experiment 3, however, it is important for marketers

to understand that these effects hold for choices in the present, and are less likely to occur for

choices in the future.

CONCLUSION

We began this investigation by questioning the role of affect in consumer choice deferral.

Considering this relationship from three diverse theoretical perspectives generated a series of

alternative hypotheses. Testing among these predictions, we found consistent support for the

functional evolutionary approach. Specifically, we documented that: (1) fear increases choice

and reduces deferral, (2) this relationship holds for choices in the present, but not for choices in

the future, (3) the link between fear and choice is mediated by increasingly negative perceptions

of unknown products, (4) this link is also mediated by increasingly positive evaluations of

known products within the present choice set, and (5) other discrete emotions do not affect

general tendencies to defer in the same way. Taken together, these results show how a fleeting

situational factor, such as the temporary activation of the emotion of fear, can help marketers

increase the likelihood that consumers make a choice and thereby “close the sale.”


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APPENDIX A

EXPERIMENT 1 CHOICE TASK

APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENT 3 CHOICE TASK


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FIGURE 1

EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF EMOTION ON NUMBER OF CONSUMER CHOICES

(VERSUS DEFERRAL)

Cell sizes ranged from 40 to 47 in each condition.


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FIGURE 2

EXPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECT OF EMOTION ON NUMBER OF CONSUMER CHOICES

(VERSUS DEFERRAL)



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FIGURE 3

EXPERIMENT 3: THE EFFECT OF EMOTION AND TIME ON NUMBER OF CONSUMER

CHOICES (VS. DEFERRAL)



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FIGURE 4

EXPERIMENT 4A: THE EFFECT OF EMOTION MANIPULATION ON RATINGS OF

UNKNOWN PRODUCTS



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FIGURE 5

EXPERIMENT 4B: THE EFFECT OF EMOTION MANIPULATION ON WILLINGNESS TO

BUY KNOWN PRODUCTS


Apocalypse Now March 2014

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