Apllying General Sign Theory to Testing LANGUAGE Verbal and Nonverbal Abilities

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Language Testing

DOI: 10.1177/026553220001700401 2000; 17; 377 Language Testing

John W. Oller, Jr., Kunok Kim and Yongjae Choe abilities

Applying general sign theory to testing language (verbal) and nonverbal

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Applying general sign theory to testinglanguage (verbal) and nonverbalabilitiesJohn W. Oller, Jr. University of Louisiana at Lafayette,Kunok Kim Chung-Ang University, Seoul and Yongjae ChoeDongguk University, Seoul

A general theory of signs shows a deep logical dependency of nonverbal/performance tests on conventional linguistic signs. Two hypotheses follow• Hypothesis 1: To the extent that nonverbal abilities can be measured, they must

be positively correlated with primary language abilities• Hypothesis 2: (a) In the early stages of acquiring a second or foreign language,

proficiencies in the primary (stronger or native) language should correlate morestrongly with nonverbal abilities than proficiencies in the nonprimary (weaker,second or foreign) language; and(b) As persons approach greater parity between their primary and any non-primary language, correlations between nonverbal scores and proficiencies inthe two languages should both be significantly positive, and should approachequality.

By contrast, the Cattell–Horn theory (Horn and Cattell, 1996; Horn, 1988) predictsabout the same level of correlation throughout the course of development andGardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1993) predicts that distinctintelligences should be uncorrelated. All three theories can be tested by examiningthe simple correlations of language proficiency measures with nonverbal IQ scoresin intermediate and advanced nonprimary language learners.

I Background

Oller, Kim and Choe (2000) show that ‘speakers of minority langu-ages are grossly over-represented in classes for the learning disabled,disordered and educable mentally retarded (Ortiz, 1997), and thatthey are about equally under-represented in classes for the gifted(Oakland and Parmelee, 1985)’. Further, the imbalances documentedare owed to assessment and testing practices that involve languageproficiencies. The ultimate source of the problem is a widespread fail-ure to appreciate the dependence of psychological and educational

Address for correspondence: John W. Oller, Jr., Department of Communicative Disorders,University of Louisiana at Lafayette, P.O. Box 43170 Lafayette, LA 70504–3170, USA;email: [email protected]

Language Testing 2000 17 (4) 377–396 0265-5322(00)LT187OA 2000 Arnold



378 General sign theory and testing abilities

tests on acquired language proficiencies. Here we present in greaterdetail the basis for a general theory of signs showing that the relationbetween acquired language proficiencies and so-called nonverbalabilities must be closer than has been commonly supposed. We showwhy abstract nonverbal reasoning abilities cannot be developed to thenormal human level nor can they be tested without recourse to oneor more particular languages/dialects.

We present a general theory of signs showing why it is impossible,in principle, to make linguistically and culturally unbiased judgementsabout intellectual abilities – including abnormalities, disorders andgiftedness – on the basis of abstract ‘nonverbal’ tasks or ‘perform-ance’ inventories. The difficulty is not merely a matter of giving theinstructions to such tasks. While the instructions cannot be made clearwithout inadvertent appeal to the conventional signs of somelanguage/dialect (as proved by Oller, Kim and Choe, in press), theproblem is deeper still. Abstract nonverbal concepts can neither beaccessed nor can nonverbal reasoning be developed to a distinctlyhuman level without using one or more particular languages/dialects.

It is commonly acknowledged that students ought to be taught andtested in their strongest or primary language. However, in mostsettings across the USA, Ortiz (1997: 325) found that ‘the intelli-gence, achievement, and language tests used to assess Hispanicstudents referred because of suspected learning disabilities wereessentially the same as those used to assess their Anglo peers’.According to Jitendra and Rohena-Diaz (1996: 42) the doubtful prac-tice of using English tests to assess individuals for whom English is anonprimary language extend to virtually all minority language groups:‘%assessment procedures used to diagnose communication disordersvirtually ignored the linguistically diverse nature of these learners’.When challenged, educators usually fall back on the claim that atleast nonverbal/performance tests, like the Raven ProgressiveMatrices (Raven and Court, 1938–83) and Cattell’s Culture Fair Intel-ligence Tests (Cattell and Cattell, 1933–73), or their derivatives, canbe applied to minority language users so as to minimize the biasesowed to any lack of English proficiency. It is commonly supposedthat nonverbal/performance inventories allow subjects to ‘catch onto the requirements of the task without verbal instructions, or withpantomimed instructions by the tester’ (Jensen, 1980: 132). Here weaim to show why abstract nonverbal/performance abilities necessarilydepend on conventional linguistic signs. If our argument is correct,it is not possible to use nonverbal/performance tasks to sidestep theneed for assessment and testing in the stronger language of multi-lingual subjects.

It has long been suspected that nonverbal/performance tasks are



John W. Oller, Kunok Kim and Yongjae Choe379

less satisfactory measures of cognitive abilities, of special academicachievements and of reasoning capacities than suitably designed tasksin the primary language of subjects. In the first widely usednonverbal/performance tasks, from 2% to 10% of the native speakerstested scored zeros on the tasks or were observed to ‘sulk’ and donothing (see Yerkes, 1921: 563–564, 573–657; Brigham, 1923: 3–58). Such undesirable outcomes were even more common in individ-uals who could not read and/or speak English. These facts ought tohave raised doubts about the validity of nonverbal/performance tests,but the idea that it ought to be possible to assess reasoning skillsapart from any particular language/dialect has been widely accepted.Today, nonverbal/performance tasks are relied upon in the definitionof ‘language and learning disabilities’ and in the determination of‘giftedness’ (Hunsaker and Callahan, 1995). The relation between‘verbal’ (language/dialect based) scores and ‘nonverbal/performance’scores is generally regarded as diagnostic (see American PsychiatricAssociation, 1994: 60–61).

To what extent can nonverbal/performance abilities be accessed atall without appeal to acquired language proficiencies (i.e., verbalskills)? It has been known since Spearman (1904) that verbal abilitiesaccount for the majority of the ‘general’ (g) factor of intelligence(Carroll, 1993). Horn (1988: 66) speculated that ‘crystallized[intelligence] may be what most people mean by “intelligence”’ andhe defined this construct as word knowledge, following instructions,comprehending a passage, understanding word problems, and knowl-edge of the ‘humanities, social and physical sciences, business andculture’. The fact that verbal tests (language tests) are essential to ‘g’prompted Raven to produce the Mill–Hill Vocabulary Scale (Hayes,1998) to enrich his nonverbal ‘matrices’. Theoreticians from Vygot-sky onwards (Piaget, 1947; Luria and Yudovich, 1959; Bruner, 1975;Thelen and Smith, 1994) have seen verbal abilities as essential tocognitive development.

II Distinguishing three kinds of sign systems

Before considering nonverbal abilities with the aid of a general signtheory, it may be helpful to discuss the three major kinds of signsystems that a general theory must explain. The distinctions can beillustrated through a series of tasks used by Stroop (1935). Task 1required naming aloud a series of 100 colour patches and Task 2 thereading aloud of colour words from a list. Stroop’s college studentsrequired about 63.3 seconds to name 100 colour patches involvingonly green, brown, red, purple and blue (n = 100 subjects), but tookonly 41 seconds to read 100 exemplars of those same colour words




(n = 70). It took 22.3 seconds longer (about 50% more time) to namethe colours than to read the list. Why should anyone be able to readthe words faster than they can use the same words to refer to patchesof colour (all else being equal)?

Cattell (1886) had supposed that practice makes reading aloud eas-ier than naming colours while Woodworth and Wells (1911) specu-lated that multiple colour words were accessed simultaneously andthus, being ‘on the tip of the tongue’, interfered with each other.Stroop supposed that different processes were involved but did notspecify how. In addition to Tasks 1 and 2, he added Tasks 3 and 4.In Task 3, each colour-word was printed in a certain colour of inkdifferent from the one named by the word. For instance, the word‘green’ was printed in red, blue, brown or purple ink, and likewisethe word ‘red’ was printed in green, blue, brown or purple, and soforth. The instruction was to read aloud all 100 words (ignoring theconflicting colour of ink). Adjacent words and colours were alwaysdifferent. Interestingly, Task 3 required only about 2.3 seconds longerthan Task 2 (n = 70), but the difference was not reliable. The con-flicting colour of ink did not interfere much at all with the readingof the words. Why not?

In Task 4 subjects had to name the conflicting colour of ink(ignoring the word). Task 4 required an average of 110.3 seconds (n= 100) to complete. The colour words interfered with naming theconflicting colour of ink. The average time to complete Task 4 wasgreater than the time for Task 2 (reading the words, 41 seconds) plusTask 3 (naming the colours, 63.3 seconds). That is, 110.3 is a littlegreater than 41+ 63.3= 104.3 seconds. The demonstrations describedhere were repeated as a choral drill with the aid of a laptop and pro-jector (with 15 patches of colour) on 19 May 2000 by the first authorat the Second Annual Meeting of the Midwest Association of Langu-age Testers at the University of Iowa in Iowa City. Subjects perfor-med Task 1 about a third more slowly than Task 2. Task 3 was notperceptibly slower than Task 2, but Task 4 required nearly twice thetime demanded by Task 1 and produced a lot of laughter and amaze-ment.

Now we have two questions:

• Why is naming a colour aloud more difficult than reading aprinted exemplar of that colour word? and

• Why would a conflicting colour word interfere much more (about110.3–63.3= 47) with the naming of the colour of its ink thanthe colour of ink would interfere with the reading of that sameword (43.3–41= 2.3), i.e., a ratio of 20.4/1?

The two questions have the same answer. To show the solution it is




necessary to distinguish three different kinds of sign systems. Stroop’sdesign inadvertently illustrates all three and shows critical relationsbetween them. Each correct performance in Task 1 produces the logi-cal structure in Figure 1. At the basis of each successful naming eventthere is the percept of the bounded patch of colour. Such a perceptis an ‘icon’ produced by the senses in response to physical forces,e.g., light waves reflected from the colour patch. Provided no errorintervenes, this process is based in an actual fact: the colour patch.The problem set by Task 1 is not merely to note the particular patchof colour but also to name it. The production of the colour word alsorequires two additional sign systems.

Naming the colours requires active comparisons of the exemplarsat hand (i.e., the colour patches on the page). Interestingly, the com-parisons of similar and different percepts (i.e., icons) cannot be madewithout invoking multiple indexical acts. These are shown as themiddle element of Figure 1. While the perceptual icons themselvesappear as monadic signs (signs of just one thing at a time), everyindex involves at a minimum some bodily movement of the perceiverthat enables the association of at least a pair of icons. Indexical actsare at least dyadic and are constructed from actions on monadic iconsat their basis. Dyadic comparisons are necessary in order to tell brownfrom red and from purple, and so forth. Therefore, a second kind ofsign system is manifested in the sort of eye movements (or otherbodily movements) that are necessarily involved in forming theneeded comparisons and contrasts. Without such comparisons it isnot possible to securely distinguish a blue patch from a purple one,or purple from red, or to match two similar blue patches, and so forth.

Figure 1 The sign systems involved in naming a patch of colour out loud




It requires analysis to see that access to the symbol at level 3 ofFigure 1 is not provided by reference to the icon at level 1. That is,the colour patch does not come with a label telling us how to referto it in the colour word that is uttered aloud or how it relates to otherpatches of colour. Even if there were a label, it would also requireadditional interpretation. The colour cannot tell us its conceptualvalue, nor can a printed word speak its phonetic value. In fact, theonly conceivable access that we have to the conceptual value of thecolour red, or to its phonetic realization in any particular language,e.g., as [rεd] in English or [roxo] in Spanish, for example, is throughthe conventional acts of other persons who apply the conventionalsign in the usual way. Our knowledge of the concept associated withthe colour red, e.g., including the fact that it is the colour of oxygen-ated blood, that it is the name of the colour of a particular patch ona piece of paper, or that it is realized in English in the phonetic form[rεd], is attained only through the kinds of indexical associations ofexemplars of that colour word with exemplars of the colour in ques-tion. Such conventional associations can only be displayed in socialacts shared with other persons who share a common language/dialect.

It comes out from examination of the latter linguistic acts that theyare at least triadic in their complexity (as shown by the three partsof Figure 1). In fact, each such relation is a triad of triads. The basicsign triad consists of (1) the percept of the colour patch which islinked by (2) an act of the perceiver to (3) the surface form of theword that is uttered to name that colour patch. However, in order toknow that the naming act is correct, it must be checked by anotherperson (the experimenter/observer) who must employ a similar butdistinct triad. The experimenter considers the surface form at (3), theact of utterance at (2) and the object at (1). Thus, a second triadcomes into view. There is also a third, consisting of (1) the exper-imenter, (2) the subject and (3) the physical context of the interaction,thus showing a triad of triads at a minimum.

Peirce (1870) showed mathematically that triadic relations are thesimplest kinds there are and that all monadic signs are doubly incom-plete triads, because in the monadic sign two of its essential elements,the perceiver and the percept itself, are unrepresented; furthermore,he also showed that all dyads are singly incomplete triads, becausethey represent only the icons at their end points and not the movementthat connects them. Moreover, Peirce (1868) showed that all higherpolyadic relations are complexes of triads. However, since neithermonadic (iconic) signs nor dyadic (indexical) ones can adequatelyrepresent any triadic (symbolic) sign, the simplest complete signs –ones that can show abstract sign relations – are the kind found in




conventional linguistic signs, which always have triadic or highercomplexity.

In what follows, we sum up the basis for a number of logico-mathematical demonstrations showing that all abstract concepts with-out any exceptions are accessible only through conventional(linguistic) signs. Stroop’s results demonstrate this fact in a straight-forward way. The reason it is harder to name a colour patch than toread the word that names that colour is that access to percepts mustbe mediated through linguistic concepts, not the reverse. On the otherhand, once the linguistic concepts are established and vested withparticular content, they are quite directly accessible through their ownsurface forms which are manifested either as utterance acts or printedforms. As a result, reading a list of colour words aloud, if you areliterate in the language, is logically simpler than naming a patch ofcolour. Symbols are exclusively linked to meanings and other sym-bols through conventional uses, however, so it is no surprise that theynaturally give access to meanings as well as their own surface forms.

Thus, the accessibility of concepts through words, as contrastedwith their inaccessibility through percepts, accounts for the fact thata colour word interferes more with the recognition of the conflictingcolour of ink it is presented in than vice versa. Concepts suggestedby colour words such as red and purple are not directly accessiblefrom the perception of patches of colour represented as icons. To getto the abstract colour concepts it is essential to appeal to conventionalapplications of colour words (i.e., to conventional, linguisticsymbols). These applications and the conventional generalized associ-ations that they enable can only be attained through particularindexical acts of persons engaged in the cooperative social acts thatwe know as language use. This fact strictly follows from the theory oftrue narrative representations (TNR-Theory) theory discussed below.Interestingly, human beings are guided from early infancy by thekinds of triadic relations evident in conventional linguistic signs; seeBower (1997) and his references.

With all of the foregoing in mind, it is possible to proceed directlyto a summary of a general theory of signs and, more importantly, tocertain theoretical consequences that flow from it. First, we examinethe theory, then we show a solution to the controversy about whetherthe real world enjoys a special logical status among all worlds thatare possible. Finally, we derive two experimentally testable hypoth-eses about the relation between nonverbal and verbal abilities whichconnect the whole discussion back to the problem noted at the outset.




III The need for a general theory of signsBy a ‘general’ theory of signs we mean one that covers all possiblesigns, i.e., sensations and perceptions, meaningful acts (e.g., gesturesand articulations some of which are conventional verbal signs), andall conceptualizations. In developing such a theory, we follow thelogician, Charles Sanders Peirce. While his method logicallyencompasses the traditional ‘scientific method’ (Popper, 1959; Brent,1998) it is more comprehensive, consistent and simpler. Such a theoryaddresses three issues:1) how signs get meanings (Oller, 1993);2) how content is abstracted from the material world (Oller,

1996); and3) what capacities are entailed by distinct sign systems (Oller and

Giardetti, 1999).By ‘abstraction’ we mean the extraction of meaning or material con-tent from things in space and time.

When the research issues are large and unwieldy – as in questionsabout language acquisition, use and testing – empirical research thatcycles back and forth from observation to theory can never get thewhole problem into view. What series of experiments could conclus-ively resolve the controversy over whether or not reference to the realworld is necessary to language acquisition? Chomsky and his fol-lowers have insisted that the real world enjoys no special status, whileothers have insisted that reference to it is crucial to language acqui-sition. To the contrary, Aristotle wrote ‘Nihil est in intellectu quodnon prius fuerit in sensu’ (cited in Hartshorne and Weiss, 1934: 112):‘There is no meaning in the mind that was not first in perception’.This seems to provide support for the latter position, as it implies thatverbal concepts (words, propositions and discourse) must be tied tononverbal perceptions. Peirce (1868: 145) wrote ‘the child learns tounderstand the language [through] a connection between certainsounds and certain facts’. Einstein (1944: 289): said that ‘all thoughtacquires material content only through its relationship with% sensorymaterial’. Chomsky (1957) followed Bloomfield (1933) and Harris(1951) by claiming that ‘extralinguistic context’ is not necessary todiscovery procedures or to the acquisition of language. Reichling(1961) disagreed, as did Uhlenbeck (1967), Rommetveit (1968),Oller et al. (1969), Macnamara (1972), Bruner (1975), Jakobson(1980) and Wolf (1997). Chomsky (1995), however, continued toargue that the ‘real’ world is only one among many possible worldsand is therefore not special.

Which group is correct? Or can both be wrong? Can any series ofexperiments ever be comprehensive enough to resolve the question?




Apart from paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1970), science proceeds in endlesscycles from observation to theory and the reverse. Peirce advocated alogico-mathematical approach which he variously called ‘exact logic’,‘semeiotic’ and ‘pragmaticism’ (Hartshorne and Weiss, 1933, 1934;Ketner, 1992; Brent, 1998). By contrast with mathematics which isabout ‘the relations of concepts to each other without consideration oftheir relation to experience’ (Einstein, 1949: 41), logico-mathematicaltheory deals not only with necessary relations between concepts butalso with their connections to experience. This enables empirical test-ing of the theory along the way. Empirical testing with the assistanceof mathematical models is familiar to language testers (e.g., Bachmanand Clark, 1987; Foulyet al., 1990; Carroll, 1993; Sasaki, 1993; Leeand Schallert, 1997), but exact logic aims for a tighter integrationstill between the facts of experience and the theory.

Exact logic does not use unproved ‘axioms’ or ‘common notions’(Euclid, ca. 300bc) or arbitrarily selected models to serve as thebasis for its proofs. Hunches are allowed but cannot serve as any partof a proof until the hunch itself is shown to be necessary. Euclid fellinto errors by basing ‘proofs’ on unproved axioms. His claim that thewhole must be greater than the part (though a plausible hunch) wasincorrect – the part may be equal to the whole (Peirce, 1899: 57) –and the postulate that parallel lines must remain the same distanceapart was not necessary (Riemann, 1892; Peirce, 1899; Lobacheves-kii, 1914; Einstein, 1949). The Peircean method can be summed upin a simple rule: Accept no premise not proved necessary. The great-est triumph of exact logic, perhaps, was Peirce’s generalization ofBoolean logic from the binary case (0,1) to all possible cases (0%

n) in ‘the logic of relatives’ (Peirce, 1870). Alhough Peircean thoughtled to many scientific achievements (Nagel, 1959), the hope affordedby his method resides in its simplicity, coherence and comprehen-siveness. Einstein (1941: 112) summed it all up by saying, ‘Every-thing depends on the degree to which words and word-combinationscorrespond to the world of impression.’

IV A general theory of signs developed and applied

An exact logical demonstration that the meaning of all signs dependson material objects situated in ordinary space and time relative toactual observers depended on the discovery of certain logical ‘perfec-tions’ (i.e., formal completenesses) in the sign systems now knownas ‘true narrative representations’ (TNRs). The term ‘representation’here is used interchangeably with ‘sign’. The longer term has thevirtue of suggesting an act while the latter is shorter. Either refers toa meaningful form, mark or act that stands for something besides




itself. Figure 1 above gives a simple illustration of the three essentialparts of every TNR. Each TNR must include direct or indirect refer-ence to a sensory element, e.g., a visual, tactile, auditory, gustatory,olfactory or combined impression of some actual arrangement ofthings (including persons, objects, events, states, relations, orsequences of events). That first sensory element (the bottom elementof Figure 1) must be linked to a symbol (the top element of Figure1) through a social act or a complex of such acts (the middle elementof Figure 1).

Sensory signs are ‘nonverbal’ (icons) at their basis. They areabstracted from particular percepts. Similarly, the middle elementconsisting of intentional gestures and movements (indices) thatdevelop prior to speech and language as seen in nonhuman primatesare also ‘nonverbal’ (Povinelli, 1994). An inevitable link betweennonverbal and verbal signs arises at just the point where verbal signs(e.g., syllables, words, etc.) come to be conventionally associatedwith perceptions, and with movements of persons, objects, events inthe world (i.e., they become associated with distinct symbols). Ofcourse, a ‘narrative’ is a story – or a report of a sequence of events –unfolding over time. Because sensations, perceptions and ordinaryexperiences (especially intentional movements) can only occur inspace–time contexts, they must unfold in a sequence in the manner ofa story. They are intrinsically narrative-like signs. A ‘true’ narrative isone that is as appropriate as it purports to be of whatever it is about.If the colour named by a subject in Stroop’s colour naming task isnamed correctly – i.e., say it really is the colour it is said to be, say,red rather than green, or something else – the representation of thatperception at that point in the testing sequence is a TNR.

Lakoff (1987: 296) inadvertently illustrated a TNR in writing about‘simple central truths’. He wrote, ‘I am writing this. There are threepens and a telephone on my desk. I am sitting on a green chair%’.Chafe (1994: 9) nearly defined a TNR when he said that ‘understand-ing is the ability to relate a particular, spatio-temporally limited obser-vation to a more encompassing and more stable imagined schema’. Tobe a TNR, however, it is not necessary for a sign system to representeverything about anything. When we say that a tyre is flat, it doesn’thave to be as flat as a pancake. Neither is it necessary to determineeverything that might be determined. Peirce (1906: 301) argued thatit is absurd:

to say ‘C.S. Peirce wrote this article’ is indeterminate because it does not saywhat the colour of the ink used was, who made the ink, how old the father ofthe ink-maker was when his son was born, nor what the aspect of the planetswas when that father was born.




Nothing in TNR theory, however, depends on whether any parti-cular sign is a TNR or not. The theory depends only on the abstractlogical properties of TNRs. It refers to those alone and to those of lesscomplete sign systems derived from TNRs by removing (or makingincomplete) some part of the TNR. The theory relates to all possiblesigns but does not single out any particular TNR, or any other sign,to lean on. TNR theory depends only on the formal completeness ofTNRs relative toall the other signs in the universe of possible signs.TNRs have a three part structure (generalized in Figure 2). That struc-ture is well equilibrated – like the fit of the bite, or a shot that hitsits mark, or a correctly reported colour perception, or a measureappropriate to its construct. In a TNR each part is as consistent withthe other parts as convention requires. Summing up, every TNR con-sists of:

1) particular material facts known to one or more competentobservers through sensations;

2) bodily acts of the observer(s) that put him or her (or them) intouch with those facts; and

3) surface forms of signs applied to the facts by one or moreobservers as determined by habits, rules or conventions of use.

The existence of each of the parts of TNRs, and of TNRs them-selves, cannot logically be denied. A simple proof of this fact is thatany conceivable comprehensible expression of doubt about the exist-ence of TNRs or any of their parts invariably is a TNR, or else isincomprehensible. A person cannot comprehensibly say ‘I doubt X’without referring successfully to himself or herself, to X and to theclaimed doubting. Any statement with such a form is a TNR. Becausesuch doubts (even if pretended) are not incomprehensible, TNRs andall their parts must be admitted to exist. If TNRs exist, their particularcontent is found in the material facts to which they are linked; e.g.,the colour word ‘red’ correctly applied in Stroop’s experiments isdetermined by one or more links with certain patches of colour by

Figure 2 The generalized formal structure of every true narrative representation




the subject in question and by other observers. Thus, TNRs have well-determined material content in just the sense illustrated in theexample. Also, they are well connected through their content to thecontinuum of space and time and thus to other TNRs. The numberof possible TNRs is equal to the number of possible viewpoints inspace and time, which is evidently infinite, but the whole fabric ofsuch structures must be consistent. TNRs cannot contradict each otheror the facts with which they are truly and competently connected (inthe most ordinary senses of truth and competence).

To the extent that the meaning of any TNR is well determined andwell connected to the space–time continuum, it must be generalizableto similar contexts (real or imagined). TNRs must be generalizableexactly to the extent of the similarity of one context to another,because similarity is all that justifies generalization. Generalizationsdepend on nothing but the relation of similarity which at its extremepositive limit comes to sameness or identity. At the opposite extremeof no similarity at all, no generalization is possible. Nothing is notlike anything at all.

Because generalizations have to be based in some particular con-tent, it can be strictly proved that all uses of metaphor, metonymy,sarcasm, irony, etc., and all fictions, errors and lies mustoriginallyget all their particular content from TNRs. In fact, generals arederived from TNRs by extending the application of any instantiatedTNR to all possible similars (e.g., to the extent that Socrates ishuman, then humans will be like Socrates). Fictions are derived fromgenerals by recombining elements generalized from TNRs (e.g., ifthe body of a horse is combined in a certain way with a goat horn,the result will be a fictional unicorn). Errors are derived from fictionsby mistaking them for TNRs (e.g., we think we see a bear in thedistance, but it turns out to be a tree stump). Lies are derived fromerrors by deliberately representing them as TNRs when they areknown to be created fictions.

Fictions are universally incompleterelative to the material parti-culars they purport to be about. Various kinds of fictions can be dis-tinguished, but all of them are deficient with respect to element 1 ofFigure 2 (or else they would not be fictional, rather they would beTNRs). If we imagine a fictional planet orbiting the sun, call it‘Xenon’, the fiction must be (exactly to the extent that it is fictional)incomplete with respect to its purported material element, namely,the missing planet. We must imagine Xenon and cannot land on it orexamine it empirically as we might Mars, Venus, etc. Errors(including illusions and hallucinations as instances) are doublyincomplete, falling short in elements 1 and 3 of Figure 2. If we mis-take a stranger for a friend, the person at hand is not the friend we




represent, nor is the representation appropriate to the stranger. Yet,until we discover our error, we suppose it to be a TNR. Lies are triplyincomplete, i.e., with respect to all the elements of Figure 2. If HueyLong claimed both Catholic and Baptist grandparents but had neither,he represents what he knows to be fiction as fact with the intentionof deceiving others. Again, there are varieties of lies, but all of themhave the deficiencies described.

Besides TNRs, fictions, errors and lies, there are no other sign sys-tems that purport to be about particular facts (Oller, 1996; also Peirce,1870). Nonsense cannot be about anything in particular, and generals(e.g., that humans are mortal, that horses can’t fly, etc.), exactly tothe extent of their generality, do not single out any particulars. How-ever, on account of the formal structure of fictions, errors and lies,only TNRs have well-determined particular material content. As aresult all generalizations must depend for their particular meaningson TNRs. Metaphor, metonymy, etc. are not exempted.

It follows that TNRs are the only signs that are determinate withrespect to particular material content, connected to the space–timecontinuum and, thus, generalizable to similar contexts. The meaningsof all generalizations as well as all fictions, errors and lies are thusparasitically dependent on TNRs. TNR theory necessitates thededuction (unless a fatal flaw is hidden in the reasoning) that langu-age acquisition depends on well-determined and valid references tothe material world. The real world, thus, does enjoy a particular statusthat makes it unique among ‘all possible worlds’. It is the sole sourceof the material content of signs.

We have a solution, then, to the controversy over the role of thereal world in language use and acquisition. The Chomskian paradigmwill remain incomplete until the real world and its objects, events andrelations are brought explicitly into grammatical theory. Lakoff(1987: 266) said: ‘The central question, as we see it, is how linguisticexpressions and the concepts they express can be meaningful.’ Gen-eralizing Lakoff’s question to any signs whatsoever (sensory, behav-ioural and linguistic) we may ask simply: How do any signs get anycontent? This question invariably leads us back to the relationbetween verbal abilities (language proficiencies) and nonverbal ones.How does it come about that nonverbal relations are expressible inverbal forms? How do human infants vest the arbitrary syllables ofany language with particular material content? Why can’t perceptsdirectly inform us of their meanings and relations to all other per-cepts? Why, in short, does nonverbal reasoning depend on verbal con-cepts as seen in the Stroop colour-naming/colour-word tasks?




V Deriving empirical hypotheses from the theory

Sign theory leads to a plethora of testable hypotheses about languageuse, acquisition and testing. Among the ones already examined arethat well-grounded meanings, episodic organization (story-likesequence) and scaffolding of highly abstract schemata will improvediscourse processing and learning, e.g., fluency of production, degreeof comprehension, ease of storage, recall from memory and generaliz-ation to new tasks (Taira, 1992; Al-Fallay, 1994; Jonz, 1994; Oller,1995). In addition, the whole literature on scaffolding from Woodetal. (1976) onwards is implicated (Stone, 1998). General sign theoryshows why nonprimary language acquisition is enhanced to the extentthat perceptual observations are made accessible through activedrama, demonstration, paraphrase, translation and the like. Moreparticularly, general sign theory enables explicit hypotheses about thequestion with which we began.

Verbal abilities, as measured in language tests, are evidently depen-dent developmentally on nonverbal abilities, but nonverbal abilitiescannot advance very far without the assistance of higher sign systemsof particular languages. Evidently nonverbal abilities can only reachbeyond the limited level of indices by adding verbal skills, i.e., alanguage/dialect. Thus, we come to

Hypothesis 1: Nonverbal abilities will be positively correlated with primarylanguage abilities (provided, of course, that the measures are suitable, well-calibrated, etc.).

Because nonverbal abilities must progress and continue to developalong with the advances made in the primary language, it follows thatwhen a nonprimary language is brought into the picture, there is noreason during the early stages of the developing knowledge of thatsecondary system for the already developed nonverbal abilities to cor-relate with it. Thus, we can deduce part (a) of Hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2(a): For persons in the early stages of acquiring a second orforeign language, proficiencies in the primary (stronger or native) languageshould correlate more strongly with nonverbal abilities than proficiencies inthe nonprimary (weaker, second or foreign) language.

But, suppose that the nonprimary system continues to develop untilproficiency in that secondary system begins to approximate that inthe primary language. In the latter case, we may deduce part (b) ofHypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2(b): As persons approach greater parity between their primaryand any nonprimary language, correlations between nonverbal scores and pro-ficiencies in the two languages should both be significantly positive, and shouldapproach equality.




Hypothesis 1 and 2(b) can also be inferred from the Cattell–Horntheory (Horn and Cattell, 1996; Horn, 1988), but not Hypothesis 2(a).Let us see why. Widamanet al. (1993: 206) suggest that ‘Gc[crystallized intelligence, i.e., knowledge typically measured by ver-bal tasks] reflects individual differences in the mental structures fordealing with particular types of content built up during investment ofGf [fluid intelligence, i.e., reasoning typically measured by nonverbaltasks].’ Gf is presumably in place from birth onwards and benefitslittle from development, while Gc is not present at birth but growswith maturation. Gc ought to be correlated with Gf from the begin-ning and more or less throughout the process of maturation and learn-ing. Therefore, if nonprimary language acquisition depends on Gf,and is itself an acquired form of knowledge (a component of Gc)then, according to the Cattell–Horn theory, nonprimary verbal abili-ties ought to correlate with Gf (as measured by nonverbal tasks) fromthe time that there is sufficient variance in the nonprimary languageto register the correlation. Therefore, the Cattell–Horn theory, predictsno (or very little) change in the correlation between Gc (verbal) andGf (nonverbal) scores over time (Caruso and Cliff, 1999).

While sign theory and the Cattell–Horn theory agree in part, theydiffer with respect to Hypothesis 2(a) and in the details of Hypothesis1. According to general sign theory, there is no phase of reasoningthat can be executed without signs (e.g., by Gf alone), and there areno determinate nonverbal signs except those assisted by triadic (andhigher polyadic) structures that involve arbitrarily chosen symbols(Oller and Rasco´n, 1999). Sign theory suggests that it will be imposs-ible for nonverbal intelligence to advance to a distinctly human levelwithout the assistance of conventional linguistic symbols (as illus-trated in Povinelli, 1994). Conventional symbols by the same tokenare dependent on social interactions as argued by Vygotsky (1978,first published 1930–35) and by Peirce (1868: 145–46). Peirce con-tended that a child’s notion of self is brought about by errors and bydisagreements with others. It has been strictly proved (Peirce, 1870;Oller, 1996) that concepts of truth and falsehood, goodness of fit,social appropriateness, causation and the like are utterly dependenton abstract linguistic concepts. If Gf is in place before any learningoccurs, it ought to remain more or less constant until (and unless)old age causes deterioration (Horn, 1988; Carroll, 1993; Vigil-Coletet al., 1997). The Cattell–Horn model requires that primary and non-primary languages ought to look alike with respect to their relationsto Gf (as measured by nonverbal scores) throughout the course ofdevelopment.

It almost goes without saying that general sign theory also producesdifferent hypotheses about verbal and nonverbal abilities than does




Gardner’s (1993) theory of ‘multiple intelligences’. The latter theorypredicts that the distinct intelligences should be essentially uncorre-lated.

With all the foregoing in mind, in the sequel (Oller, Kim, Choeand Jarvis, in press) we propose to test Hypotheses 1, 2(a) and 2(b).Here we have shown how these hypotheses (and other consequences)are deduced from a general theory of signs. In the sequel we willreport studies of beginning and advanced nonprimary language lear-ners tested on nonverbal/performance tasks and in their primary andnonprimary languages. The hypotheses in hand can be assessed bysimple correlations of the nonverbal tasks with the two languages andshould enable a sharp discrimination between the predictions of thetheories of Gardner, Cattell–Horn and general sign theory.

Acknowledgements

We are especially grateful for a grant in 1996 from the KoreanResearch Foundation’s Non-Directed Research Fund that partiallysupported the work reported here. We regret that, owing to our ownediting, this acknowledgement was inadvertently omitted from Oller,Kim and Choe, 2000.

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Apllying General Sign Theory to Testing LANGUAGE Verbal and Nonverbal Abilities

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