Apeiron Volume 28 Issue 1 1995 [Doi 10.1515%2FAPEIRON.1995.28.1.1] Rappe, Sara L. -- Socrates and...

Socrates and Self-KnowledgeSara L. Rappe

Introduction: Teaching and the Elenchus

In the sense which he would give to "teaching" — engaging would-belearners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their own igno-rance and enable them to discover for themselves the truth the teacherheld back—in that sense of "teaching" Socrates would want to say thathe is a teacher, the only true teacher: his dialogue with his fellows ismeant to have, and does have, the effect of evoking and assisting theirefforts at moral self-improvement.1

In Gregory Vlastos's account of Socrates's activities as a teacher, at leastone point seems unassailable: Socratic elenchus results in the interlocu-tor's realization that he doesn't know what he thought he knew. Theeffect is felt by willing participants and unwitting victims alike. For someinterlocutors, impasse becomes providence, spurring them on as it doesto turn within for the truth in question.2 But what is this inner truth thatis sought and subsequently discovered?

1 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 32, quoted in Nehamas, 1992,180.

2 At least the young Lysis and Theaetetus seem eager to pursue the answers toSocrates's questions. See however Nehamas 1992b, 181. Nehamas points out thatmany of Socrates's clients appear to be either unmoved by their encounters withSocrates or moral derelicts in their own right.

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2 Sara L. Rappe

Quot homines, tot sententiae: scholars who agree that self-knowledge isthe primary goal of elenctic conversation have found little else on whichthey agree, while candidates advanced for the contents of this self-knowledge proliferate. Among the nominees we find, e.g., innatelycorrect beliefs3, a self-consistent set of beliefs4, the so-called Socraticprecepts5, virtue itself, and even knowledge of knowledge6. Yet with fewexceptions, one candidate is conspicuously absent from the ballots:self-knowledge in the context of the Socratic elenchus is rarely taken tobe knowledge of the self 7

In this essay I discuss the Socratic elenchus as a method wherebySocrates attempts to reacquaint his interlocutors with themselves. Itproves to be a thankless task, as every reader of the Apology knows, notleast because the one person uniquely qualified to perform such a taskis finally the interlocutor. Rather than attempting to explain or to de-scribe it, Socrates, by means of the elenchus, resorts instead to invokingand summoning forth the genuine self that he hopes his interlocutorswill encounter. An encounter with Socrates turns out to be an encounterwith the self.

As stated above, scholarly opinion concerning the meaning of theterm, self-knowledge, varies widely. On a literal reading of certain texts,we might construe self-knowledge as knowledge of what one does ordoes not know:8

Whoever realizes, as Socrates does, that he has in reality no worth withrespect to wisdom is wisest among you. (Apology, 23bl)

Self-knowledge in this passage is presented as a second-rate attainmentthat at most delivers one from that even worse condition, the pretense

3 Vlastosl983

4 Bumyeatl991

5 Brickhouse and Smith 1991

6 Mackenzie 1988b

7 Notable exceptions are Comford, Annas, Gerson, and now Brickhouse and Smith1994.

8 For this approach, see Reeve 1989,179 and Vlastos 1991,269.



Socrates and Self-Knowledge 3

to wisdom.9 In this essay, I interpret self-knowledge to mean not onlyknowledge of one's knowledge, but also knowledge of oneself, quaknower. That is, self-knowledge means not only knowing what youknow, but also and more importantly that you know, i.e., that you are bynature a knowing being, by virtue of being a human being.10 Thisisolation of the epistemic aspect of the self recalls the identification of thewisdom-loving element as the true self, a doctrine that informs Plato'stripartite psychology. However, the elenctic dialogues place greateremphasis upon practice, upon the care of the soul. As Socrates narratesin the Apology:

I tried to persuade each of you not to be concerned with any of thethings that belong to you before you concern yourself with how yourself can be in the best possible and wisest condition. (36el)

Because wisdom is singled out as the exemplary feature of this self thatis to be cultivated before all else, it looks as if Socrates is asking us toregard the self as primarily characterized by the ability to know. Socratesalso tells us here that the elenchus is the way that he persuades peopleto attend primarily (πρότερον) to the self.

As the means by which Socrates directs attention to the epistemic self,the elenchus prescribes a fundamental shift in values.11 It demands fromthe would be disciple an objectivity or even lack of concern with regardto his personal interests12 which seems to be entirely antithetical to

9 Cf. Apology 21d5-6: 'Inasmuch as I do not possess knowledge, neither do I imaginethat I possess it. So I am probably to some small degree wiser than this man, becauseI do not imagine that I know what I do not know.' Moreover Socrates explains hisphilosophical activity as a divine behest in which he sets out to deliver his fellowcitizens from their pretense to knowledge, and so to instill within them this cognitiveself-knowledge: 'Even now, I continue to investigate this very matter on behalf ofthe deity, if I imagine that someone, either citizen or foreigner, is wise. Andwhenever it strikes me that he is not, I come to the assistance of the deity anddemonstrate that he is not wise.' (Ap 23M-7)

10 In this paper, I will henceforth refer to this aspect of the self as 'epistemic self',confining the meaning of that term to this identity of self as a knower.

11 See Vlastos 1992,139.

12 On modem theories of objectivity and its relation to ethics, see Nagel 1985, and Grice1991. One theory which has been used to bolster the claims of moral obligation



4 Sara L. Rappe

traditional Greek values. We shall see that Plato seeks to represent to usa Socrates who personally and concretely embodies these consequences,which become exemplified in his detachment from private affairs and inhis devotion to the well-being of his community.

Since the elenchus is a process of continually refining one's self-in-quiry, Socrates makes sure that any answers obtained during the courseof it do not displace the living reality of the person who makes theinquiry. For this reason, we should emphasize self-knowledge in theelenctic dialogues, even though what Socrates is apparently after aregood definitions of moral terms.13 In the first part of this paper, I arguethat Plato himself represents the elenchus as originating in the pursuitof self-knowledge. Yet whatever the origin of the elenchus may be, myinterpretation also demands that it must aim primarily at the develop-ment of self-knowledge rather than at the production of definitions.14 In

against skeptical attacks upon the objective existence of values is the idea of the'centerless view', whose development Nagel describes as follows:

To arrive at this idea I begin by considering the world as a whole, as if fromnowhere, and in those oceans of space and time TN [i e., Thomas Nagel] is just oneperson among countless others. Taking up that impersonal standpoint produces inme a complete sense of detachment from TN....Essentially I have no particular pointof view at all but view the world as centerless.. .The experiences and the perspectiveof TN with which I am directly presented are not the point of view of the true self,for the true self has no point of view and includes in its conception of the centerlessworld TN and his perspective among the content of that world, (bl)In his book Nagel tries to show that 'ethical thought is the process of bringingobjectivity to bear on the will', so that this expansion beyond the horizons ofexclusive identity with his individuality enables the agent to engage in an objectiveconfrontation wilh value.

13 See Nehamas 1989,294, footnote 38 where he extensively documents that Socrates's'What is xT question refers to virtue.

14 One might choose to argue for this as follows: By asking his interlocutor to producea definition, Socrates engages him in the activity of introspection vis-ä-vis his beliefs.What is of value for Socrates's purposes is not the definition, but the effort that theinterlocutor makes both to articulate and to examine his own beliefs. This explana-tion seems consistent with the elenctic procedure and has been previously sug-gested (Mackenzie 1988b) but it lacks a textual basis. For any reader of the dialogueswill know that the contents of the definitions which Socrates disputes do matter, somuch so that there are interpreters who claim that Socrates is engaging in a positiveethical teaching by means of the elenchus. This is the well known view of the lateProfessor Vlastos, and is shared by a great many of his students and critics.




the second part of this paper, I argue that the practical result of theelenchus (self-knowledge) coincides with the intellectual goal of theelenchus (the answer to the question, 'What is virtue?'). Virtue turns outto be identical with self-knowledge.

In the third part of the paper I make two suggestions as to why thisequivalence prevails. I suggest that Socrates anticipates the Platonicteaching that one is most truly the knowing or intelligent self (as distinctfrom the appetites or emotional self).15 Socrates also leaves open thepossibility that identification with this intelligent self enables one totranscend individual self-interest.16

I Self-Knowledge and the Elenchus

Four dialogues — two elenctic dialogues and two late middle dialogues— provide us with evidence that the elenchus is primarily intended toelicit self-knowledge, and that Plato consciously links the characterSocrates with this theme. Furthermore these same dialogues, Apology,

15 A similar thesis has been developed in another context by Lloyd Gerson (Gereon1987) who uses it to support a theory according to which the denial ofakrasia, moralweakness, is left intact as a cornerstone of Plato's ethics. The basic strategy behindhis analysis of moral choice in the middle dialogues is as follows: People consistentlychoose the good, as Socrates maintains, but they fail to understand the good as aunivocal value. This absolute good, if it exists, is only attainable through theemployment of reason, since it is through reason that we become aware of univer-sals, and it is in reason that there can exist an objective determination of value. Sotrue attainment of the good is dependent upon self-knowledge, in particular, theknowledge that one is most truly the cognitive self, as distinct from the appetitiveor emotional self. Virtue, it turns out, is in fact knowledge, according to thisinterpretation of middle dialogue theory, and so there is a continuity betweenSocratic and Platonic ethics as demonstrated in the viability of the Socratic paradoxwith respect to Plato's theory of psychic conflict. While not presuming to beg thequestion of a Unitarian versus revisionist reading of the dialogues, I cite thistreatment of the theme of self-knowledge as an introduction to the study of theSocratic elenchus.

16 One further note about methodological assumptions is in order at this point. Thisessay considers only the Platonic character of Socrates and makes no claims what-ever about the historical Socrates. My working hypothesis is that Plato ties thischaracter to a method of doing philosophy which is oriented toward the cultivationof self-knowledge.



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Charmides, Theaetetus, and Phaedrus?7 consistently emphasize Socrates'sconnection to Delphi and to the precept, 'Know Thyself!', either throughdirect allusion to Delphi, or through mention of a divine patron whosponsors Socrates's activity. It is important to go through the evidencebriefly but systematically in order to show that these dialogues demon-strate a self-consistent conception of the elenchus.

In the Apology, Socrates's chief witness for the defense is Apollo. Ofcourse, the specific testimony to which he alludes during the trial is theoracular dispensation to the effect that 'no one is wiser than Socrates',but it is clear that Socrates associates this response with the Delphicprecept, 'γνώθι σαυτόν'. Socrates interprets the statement, 'No one iswiser than Socrates', at 23bl to mean: 'Whoever realizes, as Socratesdoes, that he has in reality no worth with respect to wisdom is wisestamong you.' This interpretation amounts to the admission that Socratesin fact possesses self-knowledge in at least this respect, that he knows hehas no wisdom.

It is evident that Socrates's interpretation of the oracle is dependentupon his possessing this self-knowledge, since he falls into a state ofaporia when confronted with the oracle precisely because he knows hehas no wisdom. Thus the aporia marks his own self-admission that he hasno knowledge, but at the same time, it helps him to recognize the valueof his self-knowledge. By means of the oracle, Socrates comes to believethat it is the distinctive mark of one who possesses wisdom to know thathe has no wisdom. That is, Socrates comes to equate wisdom withself-knowledge. Thus Socrates becomes the delegate of the Delphicinjunction, 'Know Thyself!', extending both his own self-inquiry and hispeculiar brand of wisdom to his successive interlocutors. That theelenchus is his recommended method for self-inquiry is supported bythe fact that the most important procedural requirement for the elenchusis that the respondent say what he believes to be true. Thus the elenchusoriginates as an inquiry into knowledge, producing self-knowledge evenas it relies upon self-knowledge for its continued operation.

It might be worth noticing that this analysis of Socrates's opera asrecounted in the digression takes the Socratic disavowal of knowledge

17 In the following discussion, the Phaedrus is mentioned only in footnote 21, below.The theme of self-knowledge and the Delphic tag are sufficiently discussed byGriswold 1988, so as not to warrant a fuller treatment here.




at face value. In rejecting an ironic interpretation of the disavowal,181 amclaiming that the aporia related in the Delphi story is a kind of miniaturerepresentation of Socratic method. Socrates succeeds in transmitting hisown realization to his interlocutors only by provoking a similar experi-ence in them.19

Socrates's interpretation of the oracle's response aligns it with theoriginal precept, 'Know thyself!', although the Socratic exhortation ismore restricted in scope. The kind of self-knowledge which Socratesseeks to elicit in his elenctic encounters is distinctively focused on oneand only one aspect of the individual: the cognitive level of identity. Thisepistemic approach explains why Socrates is so eager to examine thosewho have a reputation for wisdom. Socrates responds to the oracle byapproaching citizens whom he selects because they possess three distincttypes of knowledge: phronesis, moral wisdom, poteisis, mimetic artistry,and techrie, technical expertise. These three kinds of knowledge are onlyfalse contenders for the title, sophia, which turns out to be legitimatelybestowed only upon self-knowledge.

The same division between knowledge as technical expertise and theself-knowledge which is equated with knowledge of one's knowledge isdrawn in the Charmides. At 162c, Socrates and Charmides discuss thedefinition of sophrosune as τα αΰτοΰ πράττειν, whereupon Critias issuddenly called up to defend the thesis. Critias construes One's owndeeds' to mean only those actions which are skillfully performed. NowSocrates challenges this thesis on the grounds that it does not specify thatthe expert must be capable of predicting when he will obtain successfulresults. In short, the expert craftsman can still lack knowledge of his ownknowledge.

At this juncture, Critias introduces the traditional maxim, that thevirtue in question is none other than self-knowledge (164d), 'for this isexactly my definition of temperance, to know oneself.' Next, Socratesasks Critias what the distinctive object of this knowledge is, to whichCritias replies that self-knowledge is knowledge of itself as well as ofother knowledge. Why doesn't Critias just say that as, e.g., iatrike is

18 For an excellent discussion of the difficulties with the ironic interpretation ofSocrates's disavowal of knowledge, see Nehamas 1992b, 187 and ff.

19 Cf. Mackenzie 1988b.



8 Sara L. Rappe

knowledge of what is healthful, so self-knowledge is knowledge of theself? Instead, Critias changes his original definition of sophrosune asself-knowledge, and claims that it is knowledge of knowledge.

Critias had previously attempted to define sophrosune as 'doing one'sown', or performing the task appropriate for oneself. In this case, per-forming one's proper function as a knower is to know oneself as aknower, which means to be aware of one's knowledge and its limitations.Critias in amending his former statement is trying to take into accountSocrates's suggestion that self-awareness, that is, a condition upon theepistemic state of the agent, and not just a condition upon his state ofbehavior, is an essential feature of temperate action.

At this point in the dialogue, Socrates, who had refuted every pre-vious definition by reference to an example fitting the proposed defini-tion but violating the interlocutor's own intuitions about the nature ofsophrosune, shifts his strategy. He proceeds to examine, not the appropri-ateness of the definition, but rather whether there really is such a thingas self-knowledge, and if so, what possible use it might have.

The rather abrupt transition in the Charmides between the two defini-tions of sophrosune, as self-knowledge, and as knowledge of knowledge,can be explained as Plato's attempt to convey the meaning of self-knowl-edge in the special sense of knowledge of what one knows.20 The identitybetween the two ways of describing this knowledge is adduced at167a5-7: 'So this is being temperate, and temperance or knowing oneselfamounts to this, to knowing what one knows, and what one does notknow.' In other words, if the self just insofar as it has knowledge or doesnot have knowledge is the self we are talking about, then it makes senseto call self-knowledge a knowledge of knowledge.

At 164d5, Critias links Socratic knowledge to Delphi:

And I agree with the inscription to this effect set up at Delphi. Becausethis inscription appears to me to have been dedicated for the followingpurpose, as though it were a greeting from the god to those entering.

20 Here I do not claim that mine is the only available explanation for this shift, but onlythat it allows us to understand Plato's inscription of an apparently bad argumentas part of a larger narrative structure.




Just as it is in the Apology, here the approach to self-knowledge in itsspecial cognitive sense is associated with the Delphic injunction. In bothpassages, the god is described as enjoining the duty of examining one'sepistemic health or lack thereof.21

At 166, Plato sign-posts this kind of self-knowledge as distinctivelySocratic: Attention is drawn to that fact sophrosune differs from everyother kind of knowledge (166cl) because it alone brings knowledge ofknowledge in its train. This language exactly parallels the formulationused at Apology 21b, cited above, to describe the distinguishing featureof wisdom. At 166c5, Critias implies that Socrates is already familiar withhis definition. So far from denying this, Socrates agrees that by examin-ing the definition, he is in effect examining one of his own beliefs:'Because of my own ignorance, I am continually investigating in yourcompany whatever is put forward' (165b).

Above I stated that Plato constantly associated the character of Socrateswith the theme of self-knowledge, even in the post-elenctic dialogues.Since Bumyeat22 has recently made this point quite persuasively, it hardlyneeds amplification here. However, by pointing to the features ofBurnyeat's account of Socratic maieusis in the Theaetetus23 that correspondto the above account of Socratic elenchus, I hope to underscore the central-

21 Other than the Apology, the fullest account of Socrates's philosophic activity and itsconnection with his piety is to be found in the Theaetetus (150d7). "The god compelsme to practice midwifery/ he says, speaking this time of Artemis. Earlier in thepassage, he explains that Artemis assigns the office of midwife to those unable tobear, and hence he has been assigned to deliver men of their claims to wisdom. Herethere is evidence for the other half of the equation; this divine office is linked to aninquiry into self-knowledge in its cognitive application. Socrates describes hismaieusis as 'able to test in every way whether the intelligence of the youth hasbrought forth a spurious image or has given birth to truth'.

22 Bumyeat 1992.

23 For another middle dialogue allusion to Socrates and self-knowledge, c.f. Phaedrus,where we encounter Socrates walking barefoot through the Ilissos, and sitting byits banks, talking of his own philosophical activity: Ί myself have certainly noleisure .. and I'll tell you why my friend: I can't as yet "know myself," as theinscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to meridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.' I believe that Plato pointedly portraysSocrates at the beginning of the dialogue in such a way as to remind us of the Socraticmethod which is explicitly linked to self-knowledge and in order to provide a foilagainst which he can introduce the method of collection and division.



10 Sara L. Rappe

ity of our theme. Bumyeat tells us that the figure of midwife (148e-151d)'signals a return to the aporeutic style of those early dialogues and to theSocratic method which is the substance of that style./24 After discussing thedifferences between Sophistic education which involves sowing ideas inthe mind of the student, with Socratic education which involves bringingto light the conceptions which already exist in the student's mind,Bumyeat25 goes on to elaborate upon the benefits of the latter:

.. .the progress that can be made in this way [is] measured not only bythe valuable truths found within oneself and brought to birth (150d-e),but also by the accompanying growth in self-knowledge, the awarenessof what one knows and does not know. (210bc)

Since exposing or revealing the cognitive dimension of a person isprecisely Socrates's skill, this process is usually central to an elencticdialogue. The chief burden of his task lies in overcoming the varioussorts of obstacles which lie in the way of elenctic progress. One obstacleconsists in the refusal to expose one's beliefs for fear of the moraldisapproval which they may invite. Another obstacle, the one to whichmost of Socrates's encounters fall prey, is the refusal to acknowledge theinadequacy of one's opinions concerning the disputed term. The re-moval of these obstacles, even when the subject is a willing participant,can be extremely painful and laborious. This clearing away of resistanceto the elenchus and exposure of the respondent's opinions is exactly themaieutic function described at Theaetetus 150-1.

However Socrates's midwifery is different from the art which isapplied to pregnant women. Not only is he responsible for bringingideas to birth, he must also test whether they are genuine. That is,Socrates wants the interlocutor to discover both what he believes andalso whether he really believes what he says he does. Bumyeat connectsthis psychological dimension of the elenchus with Socrates's doxog-raphic elaboration of Theaetetus's thesis (159-63). He accounts for thiselaboration by suggesting that Socrates's promulgation of the interlocu-tor's self-knowledge includes testing a thesis in the light of its implica-tions: '... to discover the limits of one's knowledge ... it is necessary first

24 Bumyeat 1992,55

25 Bumyeat 1992,56




to find out what one really believes.' Thus an individual belief should fitinto the systemic knowledge constituted by relevant experiences of theinterlocutor; otherwise, the interlocutor may not be said genuinely tohold that belief.

II Self-Knowledge and Virtue

What is the connection between elenctic procedure, the requirement thatthe interlocutor say what he believes to be true, and the final goal of theelenchus, knowledge of virtue?26 The traditional interpretation of theelenchus as the search for moral knowledge fails on this score.27 On the onehand, the claims that Socrates makes for its results seem overly ambitious:how can the elenchus prove or disprove a given thesis? The most it can dois show that within the context of a certain belief-set the thesis must berejected, not because it is false, but because it is inconsistent with a giveninterlocutor's other beliefs. On the other hand, Socrates's reliance uponthe elenchus seems anything but ambitious: how certain can it be that theelenchus will ever advance our moral knowledge?28 It is a purely contin-gent affair as to whether Socrates will stumble upon somebody whoseanswers will provide a solution to the puzzles of his lifetime.

Behind the frequent pattern of search and aporia, another dynamic isunder way. Some stranger bares his soul to Socrates, and what emergesare not hidden secrets. Instead, the very way in which the conversantconfronts the world takes on a verbal shape. Socrates catches the processas it happens. Socrates reflects back to the interlocutor what the inter-

26 As Vlastos (1992,141) himself pointed out with great perspicuity. Cf. Kraut 1983,61.

27 This view is of course that of the late Gregory Vlastos, who powerfully andpersuasively advocates the Aristotelian account of Socrates's interests in moraldefinitions.

28 On the procedural requirement that Socrates is only interested in statements thatthe interlocutor holds to be true, and its relationship to the elenchus as a genuinequest for truth, see Vlastos, 1992,140: 'Since Socrates' real purpose is not merely tosearch out and destroy his interlocutor's conceit of knowledge, but also to advancethe search for truth, if he is to find it by this method, while professing to knownothing, he must worm it out of them.' See also Benson 1990,63-4.



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locutor shows to Socrates. A Socratic encounter is, so to speak, a confron-tation with the self, by the self. Within this dynamic, the goal of theelenchus just is epistemic self-knowledge.

An interview with Socrates forces the interlocutor to submit an ac-count of his life.29 Why is it that Socrates does not examine someone'slife in a straightforward manner, but instead shows more interest in hisinterlocutor's expertise? For example, at Ap. 21c3-5, Socrates representsas his targets those who have gained a reputation for wisdom: 'δοκεΐν ...σοφός.' Nowhere in the text is there any mention of direct moral evalu-ation, nor does the word βίος occur. Likewise, at 23b4-6, also cited above,Socrates says that he tries to demonstrate to people who lack wisdomthat they actually do lack this wisdom. That is, he is concerned with theirdegree of epistemic self-knowledge alone. Once more, he makes nomention of, e.g., searching out those with a reputation for justice, cour-age, or any other moral capacity.

From these remarks, we might better understand the peculiar struc-ture of Socrates's examination, even when the moral character of theinterlocutor is capable of being impugned: Socrates always approachesthe interlocutor only in his capacity as an expert, someone with a claimto knowledge, and proceeds to examine the validity or the scope of thisclaim to know. For example, Euthyphro's action against his father,although undoubtedly morally reprehensible in Socrates's view, is notsubjected by him to investigation on moral grounds, such as violation ofthe stringent Greek prohibitions against patricide. Instead, Euthyphro'sclaim to be an expert in the field of theology comes under Socrates'scritical eye. Likewise, in the Apology, Meletus is cross-examined concern-ing his expertise in the sphere of education, while Lysis and Menexenusmust demonstrate their knowledge of friendship, and Laches and Nicias,their knowledge of what courage is.30

A virtuous life may best come about for one who is willing to undergothis form of inquiry, which offers a kind of training in identifying with

29 This point is made persuasively by Brickhouse and Smith, 1994.

30 This is not to deny that often there is an implicit criticism of the moral characterwhich may be traced back to the inadequate knowledge displayed on the part of therespondent. Clearly the moral status of Euthyphro is implicitly criticized, and thelanguage at the end of the Charmides hints of the violent role which Charmides andCritias were to play during the reign of the Thirty.




the epistemic self. Just as the Republic ends with Glaukos, the encrustedsea-monster whose inner beauty must be uncovered, an image whichdissolves the community of selves within the individual self by identi-fying the person with the cognitive self, so in the Socratic dialogues, theelenchus is used as a method by which the interlocutor may come toidentify with the epistemic self. In this sense, the conclusion of theelenchus will not simply be a proposition descriptive of what the inter-locutor knows or does not know, nor will it simply be a state of belief,whether that state be true or false.

This interpretation of the elenchus does not make of Socrates a dog-made teacher of any kind, nor does it impute to him a set of beliefs thathe either holds to be true or invariably discovers that his successiveinterlocutors hold to be true. In fact, this interpretation does not make ofSocrates a moral teacher, in the sense that he wishes to impart or todiscover moral tenets. If we are to take Socrates at his word when heclaims to have no knowledge of virtue,31 then there is a strong temptationto follow Socrates's own strategy, when he shows that without suchknowledge, moral instruction is mere pretense.

Perhaps we can begin to see why Socrates might have found it worthhis while to engage in the elenchus with others, whether or not theiropinions might assist him in his own search, and whether or not he wasable to extract an admission of ignorance. There is no reason to think thatSocrates cannot promote virtue, even if he lacks definitional knowledgeof virtue. In fact, virtue is not a matter for definition at all: as self-knowl-edge it is simply equivalent to the ability to identify the epistemic dimen-sion of the self as the primary sense of self. Since he is not a dogmaticteacher, Socrates does not trade in opinions or beliefs. Socratic opinionscannot be parroted successfully, and Socrates must, if presented withformulaic (Socratic) answers, continue past them to a seeming impasse.32

31 As Woodruff (1988), Benson (1990 and 1991), and Nehamas (1988) all do.

32 On the topic of Socratic beliefs and their refutation within the elenctic dialogues, seeWoodruff 1988,105, footnote 28. Of course, one could easily claim that the reasonwhy Socrates refutes the belief is because the interlocutor simply does not hold theidentical belief as Socrates, although he uses the same words. Such an argumentmay suggest that we would do well to look for a notion of self-consistency thatconsiders more than the set of beliefs that a person holds, in the sense of a givenbody of propositions.



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For example at Charmides 166c5 (mentioned above), Critias cites whatis evidently a well-known Socratic formula, namely, that saphrosune isself-knowledge. Far from denying that he does indeed hold this belief,Socrates indicates that it is because he holds this belief that he insistsupon investigating its truth. Another text in which Socrates refutes abelief that is attributed to him by the interlocutor is Laches 194dl. Niciassays, Ί have often heard you say that each of us is good at those thingsin which he has wisdom, but bad at those in which he is ignorant.' Tothis Socrates replies, 'You are right, Nicias', and then proceeds to refutethe statement. The answer as such is not the final goal of the search, sincethe elenchus continues even though what is very likely a correct answerhas been obtained by means of it.

Socrates, in order to engage in the elenchus, does not have to have anyspecial definitional knowledge of virtue. What is required for its successis knowledge of oneself as knower. But Socrates cannot give this knowl-edge to another in the form of a definition, since it is up to each personto demand a kind of epistemic accountability, above all from himself. Hecan only point to its operation in practice, that is in elenchus, which isjust the practice of self-inquiry.

Socrates shows by his own example that he thinks the elenchus shouldbe constantly practised and that it is beneficial for its own sake. Thecognitive self-knowledge which Socrates advocates has direct ethicalconsequences. However I suggest that we look for its ethical conse-quences precisely where the Athenians would look for them,33 in deeds,not in words. Socrates practices a living wisdom, expressing by meansof his own actions the very orientation that he tried to convey in hiselenctic conversations.

The attitude34 displayed by Socrates is an intense identification withhimself as a knower, before all else. Many of the scenes portraying thebehavior of Socrates show that his life of action is one founded on the

33 Apology, 32a5

34 Gadamer describes it as the quality of being monimos, steadfast in the quest for thegood and able to free oneself from the possible distractions along the path (96). Thisquality of remaining steadfast is, I believe, most successfully captured in thedescription of Socrates's retreat at Delium at Symposium 221. There Plato tells us itis the apotropaic stare, the alert gaze that Socrates delivers to all comers, which inthe end rescues Socrates and his companion.




practice of self-inquiry, whose chief virtue consists in an ability to riseabove the tendency to identify with non-epistemic (i.e., bodily or emo-tional) parts of the person. Expressed as a doctrine, this ability to bedetached is captured in the Socratic precept, that virtue is knowledge,and in his teaching that the intellect is the primary determinant ofvoluntary behavior, given that the person is most truly his epistemic self.

Clearly the greatest demonstration of the ethical dimension of Socra-tes's teaching is the very manner in which he comports himself whiledelivering his apologia. Several sentences in the speech direct our atten-tion to his practice of radical detachment from what might be called thenon-epistemic self. At 31bl, Socrates tells us that his 'complete detach-ment from everything belonging to' him,35 has effected a transformationin his relations with his fellow men. Evidently he feels the same concernfor the well-being of everyone he meets, including foreigners, as hewould if they were members of his own family. He makes no distinctionbetween his own welfare and that of the community. Such lack ofattachment to his own private interests is the very thing that Socratesknows is so offensive to his jurors. After his condemnation he reproachesthem for their stubborn prejudice:

Indeed I have been condemned because of a shortcoming—not inargument, but in cheek, in recklessness, since I refuse to tell you thekind of things which you find so pleasant to hear. (Ap 38d6)

This detachment extends so far into the comportment of Socrates that heconducts his defense upon the premise that he does not know whetherdeath is truly an evil.

At one point in his speech, Socrates makes it clear that the practice ofelenchus does have direct ethical benefits, and that these benefits followupon the ability to identify with the epistemic dimension of the self:36

35 Since the cognitive self is the true self, everything else about a person, including hisbody, might be thought of as 'belonging to the self, rather than as 'the self'.

36 For a confirmation of the relationship between self-knowledge and virtue in thissense, see Bumyeat 1992,58.



16 Sara L. Rappe

I do nothing else besides go around trying to persuade the young andold among you alike, not to be attached to your bodies nor to yourpossessions nor to anything except to the effort to make your soul asvirtuous as possible. (Ap 30A7-B1)

Socrates, again defending his everyday venture, here refers to it as anexhortation to virtue rather than as a form of epistemic inquiry.37

I should note that this equation of the ethical and didactic functionsof the elenchus is utterly at odds with the separation of these functionsrecently advocated by Reeves.38 Reeves distinguishes between severaldifferent stages of the elenchus in the evolution of Socrates's mission. Heholds that the last stage (alluded to at 31bl-5), that of moral evaluation,is clearly segregated from the earlier epistemological phase (alluded toat 23b) by means of the explicitly moral language Socrates employs. ButSocrates does not adhere to such an artificial division in his narrative.For at 23b Socrates says that he 'even today' continues upon his epistemicpath, and at 38a his famous exhortation reminds the jury of his epistemicexploits.

The very effort to know oneself makes a great demand upon itspractitioner, for it necessitates that one adopt a rational approach to life.This process of reawakening to the demands of the intellect is the gadflyin Socrates, whose sting is felt in the admonition to take no thought forthe external possessions to be had in life, but to look into the soul and itsmoral condition. In beginning to receive the benefits of Socratic elenchus,one must undergo a kind of reversal. Rather than looking outward at theobjects of desire or forward to the fruits of action, the learner is asked toredirect his attention inward, toward his own epistemic states. It is thisreadjusted orientation to life rather than any doctrinal system thatSocrates seeks above all to inculcate by means of elenctic practice.

37 For a discussion of the elenchus as exhortation, see Woodruff, and Bnckhouse andSmith.

38 Reeves 1989,122




III Knowledge of the Good and Knowledge of the Self

What still remains to be accounted for is the relationship between thekind of definitional knowledge that Socrates is apparently seeking, andthe self-knowledge which seems to accrue at the expense of the former.If it is self-knowledge and not definitional knowledge that enables oneto become virtuous, then why does Socrates expend so much effort intrying to distill moral definitions? In part, I have already answered thequestion by suggesting that it is just the aporetic realization that virtuecannot be defined but only lived, that the elenchus is designed to bringabout. Nevertheless, as they stand, the texts apparently show that Soc-rates considers a certain kind of objective knowledge to be requisite forvirtue.

Although the calling card of Socratic intellectualism, his thesis thatvirtue is knowledge, in the elenctic dialogues usually refers to knowledgeof the good simpliciter,39 in the Charmides we are presented with twocompeting versions of the Socratic formula: virtue is self-knowledge,and virtue is knowledge of the good. A last-ditch effort to reconcile themfails: at 174d5, Crito tries to advance the argument that if sophrosune isknowledge of knowledge, then it will be beneficial by governing otherkinds of knowledge, including knowledge of the good. Socrates countersby asserting that only productive knowledge can be beneficial. ThusSocrates brings his examination of sophrosune to an end by explicitlycriticizing the definition of self-knowledge as knowledge of knowledge,on the grounds that he has discovered it to be useless:40

We granted that [sophrosune] was knowledge of knowledge, althoughthe argument refused to allow it and even denied it. And to thisknowledge we granted the knowledge of the productions governed bythe other knowledges, even though the argument would not allow thiseither, in order that our temperate person might know that he knowswhat he knows, and that he does not know what he does not know.(175b6)

39 Cf. Lysis 210, Charmides 174b, Laches 199b.

40 Thus argument is connected to the Socratic thesis that a virtue must benefit the onewho possesses it Cf. Charmides 172; Crito 47d, (the thesis is that the virtue, justice,benefits the soul, while its opposite, injustice, harms the soul).



18 Sara L. Rappe

I am very sorry on your behalf, Charmides, if you with your looks andyour great modesty will enjoy no benefit from this temperance, nor willits presence in your life assist you. (175el)

Yet the emphatic position that this irresolution occupies at the end of thedialogue suggests that when it comes to obtaining happiness, Socratesdoes think there is some important relationship between knowledge ofthe good and knowledge of the self.

Both the Apology and the Charmides may be read as extended interpre-tations of the Delphic precept, 'Know Thyself!', woven around theparameters of objective self-definition. Thus the traditional teachingmeasures an individual member of the community in terms of his arete,his standing among peers with regard to professional competence.41 Bycontrast, the Socratic method captures the way in which an individualunderstands the role that he plays for the community; it elicits a self-rep-resentation, which may be sorely amiss. In either case, the precept urgesa kind of epistemic responsibility and generates a subtle shift in one'sself-apprehension; it functions as a corrective for personal myopia.

Many of Socrates's examinations play upon the perspectival differ-ence that arises when the traditional precept is pitted against its Socraticrenovation.42 Expert knowledge spills into the brink of uncertaintyprecisely because it does not prepare the expert to tell us what it isthat makes his enterprise not merely successful, but truly beneficial.43

That is, the elenchus points out an incommensurability between thegoals of the individual, who necessarily must choose a good relativeto his own perspective, and the goal of the self qua knower, to whom

41 Cf. Nehamas 1988.

42 On the conflict between expert knowledge, that is, knowledge under the provinceof a specific discipline, and knowledge of the good, or philosophical knowledge,see Woodruff, 1988. See also Gadamer, 1986,80-1, who points out the central conflictin the Republic (e.g., at Republic 601 ff.) between techne and philosophical knowledge.

43 Attention to the conflict between community expectations and philosophic en-deavor is a standard feature of the middle dialogues. Cf. The end of Protagoras'smyth concerning the distribution of justice, which Plato clearly treats as a falla-cious aitiology, since the assumption it supports is that all members of thecommunity are competent transmitters of virtue. Another example is Laches 195d,where the physician is shown to be incompetent to judge whether his patient'srecovery is a blessing.




Socrates makes an appeal for the existence of an absolute good. Anotional confrontation between the limited aim of a particular skill andthe appeal to an absolute good is present not just in such overt textsas laches 196:

But whether the suffering or not-suffering of these things will be bestfor a man is a question which is no more for a soothsayer to decide thanfor anyone else.

It is also implicit when Socrates asks whether virtue can be taught,whether there is a science of human advantage, a knowledge whichcovers this absolute good as distinct from particular goods.

If your sons had been colts or calves, we should have had no difficultyin finding and engaging a trainer to perfect their natural qualities... Butseeing that they are human beings, whom do you intend to get as theirinstructor? Who is the expert in perfecting the human and socialqualities?*1 (Apology 20bl)

Again when Socrates distinguishes a traditionalist, role-specific concep-tion of virtue from what we might call its absolute conception, the sameconfrontation appears

The same with the virtues. Even if they are many and various, yet atleast they all have some common character which makes them virtues.That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone who answers thequestion, What is virtue?45 (Meno 72c5)

The good is never good for me, but bad for you. However, our interestsnecessarily diverge insofar as we are individuals, and ethical conflictconsistently arises precisely when we identify exclusively with ourindividual interests.

If virtue can be construed as knowledge of the good,46 if knowledgeis sufficient for virtue, then the good in question cannot be limited to theinterests of any given individual. Such a good would not be the good,but only a good. Still, Socrates maintains that virtue is beneficial to the

44 Tredennick's translation.

45 Guthrie's translation.

46 Irwin 1986



20 Sara L. Rappe

one who possesses it, and that it is contrary to human nature to choosea lesser good when a greater good is available.47 Somehow the Socraticappeal to self-interest must be integrated with his larger appeal to theunivocal value of the good which is offered as the intelligible terminusof any discussion of virtue.

One solution that we might look to is the idea of an impersonal self,a self in whose interest we are motivated to act, and yet in doing so, canidentify with the intellectual struggle to press on to an absolute standard.This reconstruction of the Socratic self is consonant with the detachmentwe saw operating in Socrates's attitude toward his own personal affairs,as well as with the epistemic distance from the personal self that theelenchus fosters.48 And yet considerable difficulty lurks in the concept ofan impersonal self, especially perhaps in the eyes of modems, for whomthe word 'self can denote what is entirely personal i.e., not shared withanother. After Socrates, Greek philosophers made use of the concept ofthe impersonal self, all the way from Plato's world soul or form of humanbeing, to Plotinus's Nous. But what reason do we have to foist such adoctrine upon Socrates?

Above, I have tried to indicate in what direction we might begin asearch for this conception of an impersonal self, by introducing thenotion of the cognitive self. This epistemic self always scrutinizes what-ever state one happens to be in. No matter how firmly convinced onemay be of the truth of his/her beliefs, the epistemic self can alwaysreassess or withdraw assent from any such belief state. I believe that theCharmides tries to sketch a picture of such a self, in its digression on thepossibility of self-reflective knowledge.

Socrates describes self-reflective knowledge at 167blO:

... a single knowledge which is no other than knowledge of itself aswell as of the other knowledges.

When Socrates proceeds to examine the structure of this kind of knowl-edge, he turns for the purpose of comparison to a list of other human

47 Cf. Meno 77e; Lysis, 210d and 219 (but here it is treated as a controversial thesis),Protagoras 358dl.

48 The suggestion that Socrates taught the existence of a true self has been madepreviously by P.M. Comford in the Cambridge Ancient History. More recently,Comford's suggestion has been endorsed by Brickhouse and Smith.




faculties. He begins by discussing vision, hearing, and sensation ingeneral:

Is there any perception of sense-perceptions and of the faculty ofsense-perception, which does not perceive the objects of sense-percep-tion?

The negative answer to this query should not be taken for the end ofthe matter. Indeed the same sequence is repeated three times beforeSocrates turns to the other items on his list: appetite, wish, sexual desire,fear, and opinion. Included on the list are virtually all of the possiblestates that comprise human experience, at least on a Platonic view:epithümia, thumos, doxa, and aisthesis.

If we regard them as faculties, then sensation, appetite, etc. are alwaysassociated with their respective unique objects. But considered as statesof experience, there is a sense in which they in turn may be seen as objectsfor what I have been calling the cognitive self. One way of viewing theelenchus in relation to epistemic self-knowledge is as a method wherebythe interlocutor comes to be aware that he has the desires, opinions, fears,and appetites that he in fact has. But once aware that he has them, he canbegin to exercise his autonomy as an epistemic self, to scrutinize theirvalue, and to begin to free himself of those he deems pernicious. TheCharmides suggests a kind of priority of the epistemic self; this priorityis realized both as self-determination and as self-knowledge.

Elenchus is the technique whereby Socrates tries to make availablethis epistemic dimension of the self to his interlocutor, helping him toisolate or to identify the epistemic criteria for the satisfaction of a par-ticular dilemma, quite part from any initial resolution at the personallevel. When practicing the elenchus, there is scope to pursue a kind ofdetached inquiry into one's values and to take up a stance vis-ä-vis theworld qua knower, thereby pursuing at least temporarily one's epistemicinterests. Moreover Socrates insists that identification with the epistemicinterests of the self has practical consequences.

Conclusion: Philosophical Friendship

It is time to take stock of the initial claims made in this essay. I claimedthat Socrates was more interested in pointing to the epistemic aspect ofthe self, rather than in simply cataloguing what sots of things one knew.Yet Socrates pursues the elenchus as a scrutiny of what his interlocutorsknow or do not know.



22 Sara L. Rappe

How to account for this disparity? Here I would like to glance brieflyat the later philosophical tradition, in which the strong connectionbetween self-awareness and ethics is clearly articulated. At 1170alO andff. of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the contemplative valueof friendship: it is easier to contemplate the fine actions of a friend thanto contemplate one's own fine actions. Nevertheless, this enhancementof one's life flows directly from the essentially contemplative nature ofhuman beings. Human life is characterized by the powers of awarenessand of intelligence (1170al6), and an authentic human life involves theexercise of these powers (1170al9).

Aristotle goes on to illustrate this thesis by discussing the self-reflectiveawareness that typically attends human action. When we see, we areaware that we see, and when we engage in intellectual activity, we areaware of this too. Self-awareness is what makes our lives authenticallyhuman. This same capacity for self-reflection is realized in our relation-ships with friends, whose actions we contemplate. The good person whocultivates this life of self-awareness has the same relationship with himselfthat he has with his friend (1170bl 1). It is a life of mutual contemplation.

The work of a friend, Aristotle says, is to 'συναισθάνεσθαι,' to share inthe human capacity for self-awareness. Precisely this sort of friendship isthe friendship that Socrates offers to his interlocutors. Does it follow thatSocrates improves any of his interlocutors? How can he make them betterthan they are? As Socrates puts the matter (Apology 33b3): If any of [myaudience] turns out to be good or not, I cannot justly bare responsibility.49

Department of Classical StudiesUniversity of Michigan

Ann Arbor, MI 48109U.S.A.

49 This essay was presented in a previous incarnation to the Department of ClassicalStudies at the University of Michigan in the Winter of 1991.

Special thanks go to Professor G.R.F. Ferrari of the University of California atBerkeley and to Professor James I. Porter of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,for their helpful suggestions and continued encouragement. Thanks also to RogerShiner for his editorial suggestions. I am also grateful to the Chairman of theDepartment of Classical Studies at the University of Michigan, Professor LudwigKoenen, for his kindness in reading and commenting upon the manuscript. Allerrors of course remain the responsibility of the author alone.




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Apeiron Volume 28 Issue 1 1995 [Doi 10.1515%2FAPEIRON.1995.28.1.1] Rappe, Sara L. -- Socrates and...

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