Antitrust hs

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WHEN THE GOVERNMENT PLAYS IN THE MARKET Antitrust Actions

Transcript of Antitrust hs

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WHEN THE GOVERNMENT PLAYS IN THE MARKETAntitrust Actions

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Review Markets

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ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

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The Problem with few firms• Interdependent

• Game theory

• Collusion• Relatively formal but illegal agreement

• Tacit Coordination• Informal coordination with uncertain legal implications

• Mainly Price Fixing

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Antitrust Laws• Sherman Act (1890)

• “…restraint of trade… is declared to be illegal”

• Clayton Act (1914)• Made illegal:

• price discrimination, exclusive dealing, tying contracts, acquisition of rival stock, interlocking directorates

• FTC Act (1914)• Declared “unfair methods of competition” illegal

• Hart-Scott-Rodino (1976)• Requires government review of all proposed mergers

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Antitrust Cases• Vertical Mergers

• Merger among suppliers and sellers• Efficiencies• Capacity constraints

• Horizontal Mergers• Merger between two competing firms• Efficiencies• Loss of competition

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Areas of Interest in Review

• Market Definition• Seller Concentration• Ease of Entry• Other Market Characteristics• Cost Savings and Efficiencies

Mainly looking out for the consumer and society: Asking what will be the effects on prices, quantity offered

and potential innovation.

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NotesDefinition FTC Coca Cola

Market Definition

Seller Concentration

Ease of Entry

Cost Savings/ Efficiencies

Other Market Characteristics

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Market Definition

• Asks what are substitutes? And how many are there?

• Narrow vs Broad definition depending on goal

All bottled/canned beverages

Soda

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Seller Concentration• Measure of concentration of market share. How close to

monopoly power?

• Measure with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index:

• = Sum (Market share each firm) 2

For example, two equal firms each half the market

HHI = (50x50) + (50x50) = 5,000

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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

• Another Example:

• HHI can vary from as low as 200 to a max of 10,000

Firms Market Share

Squared

Firm A 30% 30 x 30 = 90

Firm B 60% 60 x 60 = 360

Firm C 10% 10 x 10 = 100

HHI 550

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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index• If pure monopoly: one firm= 100% of market• HHI = 100*100 = 10,000

• What if two equal firms,• HHI = (50*50) + (50*50) = 5000

• What if four equal firms,• HHI = (25*25) + (25*25) + (25*25) + (25*25) = 2500

• What if 10 equal firms = 1000

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So What?

• During the 2000s:• an HHI score of 1,800 or higher was deemed a

concentrated industry, and a merger that increased the score by more than 100 points.

• Since 2010 Concentrated is above 2,500 and 200.

HHI Assessment ExamplesBelow 1,000 Unconcentrated Machine shops,

Footwear, Butter, Milk

1,000-1,800 Moderately Concentrated

Dog/Cat food, Chocolate & candy manuf

Above 1,800 Concentrated Autos, Cereal, Tobacco

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Ease of Entry

• If positive economic profits, how easily can new firms start-up?

• Consider:• Control of resources• Distribution channels• Economies of scale• Advertising needs• Past success/fail rates for new entrants

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Other Market Characteristics

• Will there be savings to the producers that can be passed along to the consumer?

• Will the greater market mean lower ATC? More efficient?

• Is there evidence of past collusion?

• Maverick firms? 4 min radio clip

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1986 COCA-COLA PROPOSES BUYINGDR PEPPERFTC v Coca-Cola

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Carbonated Soft Drink Market

Coca-Cola to buy Dr Pepper

Pepsi to buySeven-Up

Producer Share

Coca-Cola 37.4%

Pepsi Co 28.9

Phillip-Morris (7 Up) 5.7

Dr Pepper 4.6

RJ Reynolds (Sunkist, Canada Dry) 3.0

RC Cola 2.9

Procter&Gamble (Orange Crush, Hines Root Beer) 1.8

Others, generics 15.7

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Market DefinitionAre the firms actually competitors?

FTC

Carbonated Soft Drinks

Coca-Cola

• All potable beverages, including ice teas, milk, juice, etc.

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Seller ConcentrationHow much of the market do the sellers have?HHI = Sum of squared market shares

FTC

Carbonated Soft Drinks, therefore increasing concentration

Coca-Cola

• All potable beverages, including ice teas, milk, juice, etc. and CSD only 25% of the whole market.

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Soda Seller ConcentrationUS Retail Sales 1985 With merger

HHI = 2553 HHI = 2897344 point increase

Producer ShareCoca-Cola 37.4%

Pepsi Co 28.9

Phillip-Morris (7 Up) 5.7

Dr Pepper 4.6

RJ Reynolds (Sunkist, Canada Dry) 3.0

RC Cola 2.9

Procter&Gamble (Orange Crush, Hines Root Beer) 1.8

Others, generics 15.7

Producer ShareCoca-Cola –Dr Pepper 42

Pepsi Co 28.9

Phillip-Morris (7 Up) 5.7

RJ Reynolds (Sunkist, Canada Dry) 3.0

RC Cola 2.9

Procter&Gamble (Orange Crush, Hines Root Beer) 1.8

Others, generics 15.7

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Check-in• If included all potable soft drinks in market share calculation what would happen to the HHI?

• A. Be lower• B. Stay the same• C. Go higher

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Ease of EntryWhat barriers to entry exist? Could market power be challenged?

FTC

- Advertising “$44mil Cherry Coke” “a sunk cost”(4x expenditures other food items)

-Access to bottling plants and distribution-Access to stores and vending machines

Coca-Cola

• Just flavor, water and bottles – no big deal

• Could use beer or dairy distributors

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Flavor Restrictions

Minimum 10-20% market share

Provided access to grocery shelf space Limited fountain and

vending machine access for new brands

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Other Market CharacteristicsAny history of collusive behavior?Global or innovation challenges that may change market?Efficiency gains?

FTC

-Fewer players makes collusion more likely-Coke had tried and failed to market a Dr Pepper-like flavor-Past data showed high and similar rates of return

Coca-Cola

• Only Pepsi-Coke rivalry matters and merger makes it more intense

• Too many different products to coordinate price changes

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THE VERDICT“The acquisition totally lacks any apparent redeeming feature”

Or “No”

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Soda Market Today

Coca-Cola (42.8 %) Fuse, Sprite, Minute Maid, Dasani

Pepsi (31%) Gatorade, Tropicana Mtn Dew, Sierra Mist

Dr Pepper/Snapple (15%) Canada Dry, Welch’s, 7-Up, A&W

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Case Study: GM and Post Merger

• Each group will get a packet with the article, market share data and a merger review table. You may want to put a merger review table in your own notes as well.

• Fill out the table for the proposed merger.

• Use the market share data and the article The Cornflake Cartel to give evidence for each side and each area of review.

• Reach a verdict – Will you allow this merger?

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Cereal Merger

• In groups evaluate a merger between Post and General Mills

• Consider:• Market Definition• Market Share & HHI

• Barriers to Entry• Past non-competitive behaviors• Efficiency Gains

 Firm

Market Share

Kellogs 38 %General Mills 27Post 11Quaker Oats 7Ralston 5Nabisco 3Other (generics) 8