ANNUAL TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE …2019 Electric Transmission Annual Availability...

ANNUAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY REPORT: 2019

2019 Electric Transmission Annual Availability Performance Report PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 1

ANNUAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE REPORT

Prepared by PG&E for

CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR (CAISO)

PERFORMANCE YEAR 2019



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1. Availability Performance and CAISO Maintenance Standards 3

2. Performance Year 2019 4

3. How Control Charts Are Created 8

4. How Control Charts Are Used to Monitor Performance 9

5. Discussion Why Performance May Be Outside Control Chart Limits 10

6. Discussion on Improving Performance 25

7. Control Charts 32

8. Summary Outage Data 39

9. Original Control Charts from CAISO 52



1. AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE AND CAISO MAINTENANCE STANDARDS 1

This annual report to the California Independent System Operator (CAISO or ISO) is prepared in accordance with Appendix C of the Transmission Control 2

Agreement (TCA) between each Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) such as Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and CAISO. Section 4.3 of Appendix C 3

(Updated as of January 13, 2013) entitled CAISO TRANSMISSION MAINTENANCE STANDARDS states: 4

“Each PTO shall submit an annual report to the CAISO . . . describing its Availability Measures performance. This annual report shall be based 5

on Forced Outage records. All Forced Outage records shall be submitted by each PTO to the CAISO and shall include the date, s tart time, end 6

time affected Transmission Facility, and the probable cause(s) if known.” 7

The Availability Measure Targets are defined in Appendix C as “The Availability performance goals established by the ISO”, which are essentially the control 8

chart limits described and shown later in this report. 9

The purpose of the ISO Maintenance Standards is to promote safe, reliable and cost-effective electric transmission service consistent with the requirements of 10

California Assembly Bill 1890. A fundamental precept behind these standards is that the adequacy and effectiveness of a PTO’s maintenance of its electric 11

transmission system can be gauged by monitoring transmission availability performance. This performance is characterized by calculating three measures 12

(indices) related to “forced” outages (see Section 3 of this report for what constitutes a forced outage) on all CAISO-controlled circuits within a voltage class. A 13

majority, but not all, of PG&E transmission circuits have been assigned as being under CAISO control. Two indices measure the relative frequency of outages – 14

Annual Average Forced Outage Frequency (FREQUENCY) and Annual Proportion (PROPORTION) of Circuits with No For ced Outages. A third index measures the 15

duration of those outages – Annual Average Accumulated Forced Outage Duration (DURATION) for those Circuits with Forced Outages. As with all processes or 16

systems, variations in annual performances as defined by these three indices are inherent and expected. Control charts can be helpful in indicating whether 17

variation is due to common (i.e., random) causes, or to special (i.e., assignable) causes, and whether the electric transmission system is in a state of statistical 18

control. If the system is in a state of control, then maintenance practices are presumed to be adequate and effective. However, if a control chart indicates a 19

system is not in statistical control, then special cause(s) is likely and maintenance practices by the PTO may need review. 20

This report presents the control charts as calculated by CAISO using outage data submitted by PG&E and then jointly reconciled for any discrepancies through 21

performance year 2019. The report also shows results of applying 48 tests to the 12 charts (4 tests per chart) to help determine whether annual performance 22

for each of four voltage classes is improving, degrading, or in a state of statistical control.23



2. PERFORMANCE YEAR 2019 1

After reconciliation with CAISO and excluding the outages below described under the header “EXCLUDED OUTAGES”, there were 1,179 unplanned forced 2

outages documented in 2019 with an accumulated facility outage duration (capped, see Section 3 below for definition of capped) equal to 555,327 minutes. 3

These 2019 results were more than the corresponding numbers for 2018, i.e., 996 unplanned outages and 482,215 accumulated minutes. 4

There are 905 circuits that were reported as CAISO-controlled for this report. PG&E has approximately 45 more transmission lines defined as “breaker to 5

breaker” that are not considered CAISO-controlled. The PG&E transmission grid also has numerous “tap lines” that are radial extensions of a main transmission 6

line. These tap lines or “taps” typically serve larger customers taking service at a transmission voltage level (i.e., >50,000 volts). If a tap itself has a fault or 7

interruption, then the resulting unplanned outage is credited to the main transmission line. 8

FIGURE 2-1 is a Pareto chart showing the spread of outages over the 905 circuits in 2019. The chart shows 244 transmission lines (27.0%) accounted for 80% of 9

the unplanned forced outages. Additionally, 453 of the 905 circuits (50.1%) had zero unplanned forced outages in 2019. 10

FIGURE 2-2 is a Pareto chart showing the spread of outage durations over the 905 circuits in 2019. It shows that 12.4% of the lines account for 80% of the 11

facility outage minutes. 12

Section 7 of this report has further discussion of performance year 2019, which ended up overall being an excellent year as measured by the control charts. 13

CAPPED OUTAGES: 14

In 2019 there were 37 outages (9 fewer than last year 2018) that exceeded 4,320 minutes in duration and, for the purpose of calculating line availability, had 15

their duration re-set to or capped at 72 hours and classified as “C” as defined on page 6 of the CAISO Maintenance Procedure No. 2 (Outage Data File Format 16

for the ISO). Of these 37 capped outages in 2019, 16 were in the 69kV class, 15 in the 115kV class, 3 in the 230kV class and 3 in the 500kV class. Of the 46 17

capped outages last year 2018, 21 were in the 69kV class, 15 in the 115kV class, 9 in the 230kV class and 1 in the 500kV voltage class. 18

Causes of the capped outages in 2019 included only 1 due to wildfire (Kincade Fire), 6 circuit breaker failures, 6 late notifications (further described later in this 19

report), 4-line equipment failures, 6 substation equipment problems (including relays) and 2 tree failures from outside the right-of-way. 20



2. PERFORMANCE YEAR 2019 (cont’d) 1

FIGURE 2-1 2

3 FIGURE 2-2 4

5




EXCLUDED OUTAGES: 2

Section 4.1.3 of Appendix C of the Transmission Control Agreement between PG&E and CAISO – i.e., “outages which are caused by events outside PG&E’s 3

electric transmission system (e.g., caused by another electric utility system encroaching into our grid, by equipment owned by a transmission-served customer 4

or owned and operated by an independent power producer (IPP), or an emergency request from a California agency such as CAL FIRE) or which can be 5

demonstrated to have been caused by earthquakes” – can be considered “excludable” and not included in calculating transmission line availability results. 6

Transmission Maintenance Procedure No. 5 (Classifying Forced Outages) supplements Appendix C by stating in Section 5.3 that “The ISO and PTOs want to 7

encourage the safe operation of the ISO grid; therefore, it is their intention to encourage safe work practices. The concern of reducing the number of Forced 8

Outages should not affect the safety of personnel or the general public.” Section 5.4 of this maintenance procedure supplements Section 5.3 by providing 9

specific examples in its Table-1 “Examples of Outage Classification for Common Events”. Example 9 in this table states the following: “Late notification on 10

Transmission Line Circuit outage request and the request impacts safety” is considered to be “Not a Forced Outage”. 11

Due to the devastating statewide wildfire season in 2017, PG&E developed Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) protocols as an additional precautionary 12

measure to reduce the risk of wildfire ignition by utility equipment failures. Beginning with the 2019 wildfire season, PG&E expanded its PSPS program to 13

include all electric lines that pass through high fire-threat areas – both distribution and transmission. Because PG&E’s electric grid relies on power lines working 14

together to provide service, any of its more than 5 million customers could have power shut off, and power will remain off un til weather conditions that 15

precipitated the call for PSPS execution subside and de-energized facilities are patrolled to ensure they can be safely restored. Because of the public safety 16

aspect of PSPS and per sections 5.3 and 5.4 in Maintenance Procedure No. 5, all PSPS events in 2019 (essentially 12 days of outages) were excluded for the 17

purpose of calculating the control charts for transmission line availability. 18

In 2019 there were 402 unplanned forced outages classified as “X”, i.e., excludable. Of those 402 events, 353 (87.8%) were PSPS events, hence a net of 49 19

excludable events that were not PSPS related. Of these 49 events, 24 were recorded in the 69kV class, 17 in the 115kV class, 5 in the 230kV class and 3 in the 20

500kV class. 21

By means of comparing 2019 to 2018, in 2018 there were 66 outages considered excludable. Of the 66 excludable events in 2018, 25 were recorded in the 22

69kV class, 21 in the 115kV class, 18 in the 230kV class and 2 in the 500kV class. None of these 66 excludable events were PSPS related. 23




LINES WITH ZERO OUTAGES 2

In 2019 there were 453 transmission circuits that had no unplanned outages. As shown in FIGURE 2-1 these 453 circuits account for just over half (50.1%) of 3

the CAISO controlled circuits. Of these 453 circuits, 111 were in the 69kV class, 210 in the 115kV class, 122 in the 230kV class, and 10 in the 500kV class. 4

By comparison, in 2018 there were 489 transmission circuits that had no unplanned outages, and of these 489 circuits, 133 were in the 69kV class, 215 in the 5

115kV class, 132 in the 230kV class, and 9 in the 500kV class. 6

Outage data – either transmission or distribution – is unusual in statistical analyses in that it always begins at zero. Outage duration equal to zero, frequency of 7

outages equal to zero and time between failures equal to zero. Because it begins at zero, all outage data is highly skewed and zero is often the mode (the most 8

frequently occurring value). 9

FIGURE 2-3 is a histogram showing the characteristics of the 2019 unplanned outage data (905 total circuits and 1,179 unplanned forced outages) . It shows 10

that not only both the outage mode and median for 2019 were zero, but also 70% of all CAISO-controlled circuits had fewer outages than the average circuit! 11

FIGURE 2-3 12

13



3. HOW CONTROL CHARTS ARE CREATED 1

Control charts are a great way to view performance of a process. Such charts account for random variations in processes, especially those with relatively wide 2

tolerances. They illustrate an expected range of performance based on historical data, as well as discrete measures of recent performance stability, 3

improvement or decline. 4

Quality control and improvement are based on assessment of processes. Without methods to quantitatively show how a process is performing, reasonable 5

decisions cannot be made about whether a process is improving, deteriorating, or performing as expected (stable). 6

The process being measured here is the availability of PG&E’s electric transmission (ET) lines – specifically, lines or circuits operating at 60kV & 70kV (combined 7

for this report and reported as “69kV”), 115kV, 230kV and 500kV – that were transferred to CAISO for its operational control. Availability is a measure of time a 8

circuit can provide service, and only unplanned “forced” outages described below are used for calculating line availability. Planned de-energizing of a 9

transmission circuit with approval from the CAISO (i.e., scheduled-approved outage) is not included. What’s especially critical here is the assumption that the 10

adequacy and effectiveness of maintenance by PG&E on its transmission lines is gauged through an availability performance monitoring system using 3 indices: 11

o Index 1: FREQUENCY = Annual average forced outage frequency for all circuits. 12

o Index 2: DURATION = Annual average accumulated forced outage duration for those circuits with forced outages. 13

o Index 3: PROPORTION = Annual proportion of lines with no forced outages. 14

A forced outage occurs whenever there is an unplanned interruption of the flow of electricity in a transmission line between any terminals under ISO 15

operational control and the outage is not a scheduled one, or one caused by events originating outside the PG&E system, or one caused by an earthquake, or 16

one where safety is compromised (e.g., PSPS). There is “screening” applied to any forced outage with a duration exceeding 72 hours – i.e., that outage duration 17

is capped at 4,320 minutes so as not to skew the results related to Index 2 above and potentially compromise meaningful interpretation of Index 2 results. 18

The control charts included in this report are time ordered plots of each index mentioned above for each of four transmissi on voltage classes within PG&E. The 19

four classes are 69kV (includes circuits operating at either 60kV or 70kV), 115kV, 230kV and 500kV. A total of 12 charts—3 indices per voltage class and 4 20

voltage classes—are created by CAISO using outage data provided by PG&E to characterize how circuits within a class are doing on a yearly basis. Separation by 21

voltage class was deemed an appropriate technique for grouping transmission facilities of similar importance to the electric transmission grid. Adequacy of 22

PG&E’s availability performance is gauged against its own historical performance and not against other participating utilities. 23



4. HOW CONTROL CHARTS ARE USED TO MONITOR PERFORMANCE 1

After control charts are updated to include 2019 outage data, four tests are visually applied to each chart to detect performance changes: 2

• Test 1: Control Limit Test—does the data point for the current year fall outside the upper control limit or lower control limit of the chart? 3

• Test 2: Center Line Test—do “v1” consecutive annual data points fall above or “v2” consecutive points fall below the centerline of the chart? 4

• Test 3: Warning Limit Test—do at least 2 out of 3 consecutive annual data points including the most recent performance year fall outside the upper or 5

lower warning limits on the same side of the centerline? 6

• Test 4: Trend Test—do six or more values consecutively increase or consecutively decrease? 7

The first test detects any short-term change in the average performance; tests 2 and 4 are looking for longer-term changes. Test 2 will detect a shift up in 8

averages or a shift to a lower level. Values of v1 and v2 for test 2 are determined from TABLE 4-1 below and the Percentile Value “V” output calculated by 9

statistical software MINITAB. Test 4 shows any trend of continuous increase or decrease in the average values. Test 3 assesses changes in performance during 10

an intermediate (i.e., 3-year) period. The four tests allow PG&E to monitor availability performance by kV class. 11

TABLE 4-1 12

Values of v1 and v2 for Percentiles of the CL in Specified Ranges

Percentile v1 v2

35-39 10 5

40 10 6

41-43 9 6

44-46 8 6

47-48 8 7

49-51 7 7

52-53 7 8

54-56 6 8

57-59 6 9

60 6 10

61-65 5 10

13



5. DISCUSSION WHY PERFORMANCE MAY BE OUTSIDE CONTROL CHART LIMITS 1

All systems and processes and their outputs exhibit variability. Control charts help monitor variability and can be used to differentiate common causes of 2

variability from special causes. Common – or chance – causes are numerous small causes of variability that are inherent to a system and operate randomly. 3

Special – or assignable – causes can have relatively large effects on the process and may lead to a state that is out of statistical control—i.e., outside control 4

chart limits. The probability that a point falls above the upper control limit (for most control chart designs, usually an indicator of significant process 5

degradation) or below the lower control limit (an indicator, usually, of significant process improvement) if only common causes are operating is approximately 6

0.00135. It is therefore unlikely to have measures fall beyond the control limits when no special cause is operating. False alarms are possible, but the 7

placement of the control limits at 3 standard deviations (+/-) from the process average is thought to control the number of false alarms adequately in most 8

situations. The simplest rule for detecting presence of a special cause is one or more points that fall beyond upper or lower limits of the chart. The chart can be 9

more sensitive and effective in detecting out of control states if other signals and patterns that are unlikely to occur by c hance alone are considered.[1] Tests 2, 10

3 and 4 described in the previous section of this report are examples of such signals or patterns. 11

Examples of special causes of variability in a manufacturing environment include changes in raw materials, differences in relationships among production 12

equipment, materials, and workers, and changes in manufacturing conditions, which for this discussion could be changes in how planned outages are recorded. 13

For electric overhead transmission—especially facilities in the PG&E service territory designed and operated at 60kV and 70kV—severe storms and other 14

natural disasters such as wildfires can be a special cause. A high number of simultaneous outages during such disasters increases restoration times due to 15

limited or restricted access, resource limitations (e.g., priority to restore customers vs. restoring transmission facilities), and personnel safety concerns (e.g., 16

limited winter daylight hours, limited visibility, insufficient rest periods, and slippery or icy roads). 17

As shown in Section 7 of this report, control charts for performance year 2019 did have data points that fell outside control chart limits, but all such results 18

were indicators of performance improvement. In other words, there were no results that reflected negatively on availability performances nor maintenance 19

practices by PG&E. 20

-------------------------------------------- 21

[1] Levine, Ramsey, Smidt; Applied Statistics for Engineers and Scientists; copyright 2001 by Prentice Hall, Inc., Chapter 622



5. DISCUSSION WHY PERFORMANCE MAY BE OUTSIDE CONTROL CHART LIMITS (cont’d) 1

TABLE 5-1 shows the ten largest outage events in 2019 ranked in descending order by the number of customers as reported to the Californ ia Public Utilities 2

Commission (CPUC). This table helps to correlate the significant transmission outages in 2019 that also affected PG&E’s distribution -served customers. 3

TABLE 5-1 4

Largest 10 Customer Outages in 2019 as Reported to CPUC 5

By Number of Distribution-Served Customers Affected, Descending Order 6

7

*Note: Geysers 9-Lakeville 230kV (not a CAISO-controlled line) accounted for 126,053 of the minutes on October 23, the day of the Kincade Fire 8

TABLE 5-1 shows that four of the ten events were due to the implementation of the Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program. As mentioned earlier in 9

Section 2 of this report under the header “Excuded Events”, all outages due to the implementation of PSPS were excluded for the purpose of calculating 10

transmission line availability. Looking forward to the wildfire season in 2020, PG&E is determined to improve PSPS implementation to minimize impact to its 11

Rank Description Date(s)

Number of

Distribution-Served

Customers Affected

Longest

Customer

Outage (hrs)

Number of Electric

Transmission (ET)

Outages

ET Facility Outage

Minutes

(capped as needed)

IEEE Major

Event?

1

Strong, damaging winds and asssociated critical fire danger resulted in Extreme-Plus fire

potential and the most widespread implementation of PSPS

10/26/19 -

10/27/19 1,258,339 312 175 559,176 Yes

2

A strong offshore wind event developed across northern California resulting in critical fire

potential and the implementation of PSPS

10/09/19 -

10/10/19 799,312 89 115 234,290 Yes

3

Pair of potent storms impacted the territory beginning with an "atmospheric river" event,

which produced gusty winds, heavy rain and significant low snow in Redding, followed by a

colder, dynamic storm that resulted in additional periods of rain and gusty south winds along

with low snow and isolated thunderstorms

02/12/19 -

02/17/19 587,843 625 89 65,681 Yes

4

Series of winter storms resulted in periods of strong, gusty south winds, heavy rain,

thunderstorms and low elevation snowfall

02/02/19 -

02/05/19 378,432 177 42 13,474

Yes

(FEB 2, 4, 5)

5

Potent winter storm impacted the territory with strong south southeast winds, isolated

thunderstorms and heavy rain and mountain snow

11/25/19 -

11/27/19 346,907 120 44 29,739

Yes

(NOV 26, 27)

6

A powerful Pacific storm delivered gusty south winds, heavy rain and mountain snow to the

territory

01/16/19 -

01/17/19 338,546 87 34 13,817 Yes

7

Critical fire weather conditions associated with dry, gusty winds led to Extreme-Plus fire

potential and the implementation of PSPS 10/23/19 209,215 384 33 189,441* Yes

8

Pair of robust winter storms produced adverse weather in the form of strong, gusty winds,

heavy rain and mountain snow

01/05/19 -

01/06/19 197,290 50 29 4,900

Yes

(JAN 06)

9

Strong, high pressure produced triple-digit temperatures away from the coast resulting in

widespread heat-related outage activity

08/14/19 -

08/16/19 179,699 40 21 1,070

Yes

(AUG 15)

10

Breezy to gusty north-northeast winds produced critical fire weather conditions across the

North leading to the implementation of PSPS

10/29/19 -

10/30/19 171,644 72 58 83,455

Yes

(OCT 29)




customers. Also, if a transmission line needs to be de-energized for safety, PG&E will continue to work closely with the CAISO to assess the impacts to 2

availability. 3

TABLE 5-1 further shows all ten events met the daily duration threshold as defined in the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) standard 1366 to 4

qualify as a “major event day”. A declared major event day (MED) usually – but not always – coincides with extreme weather than can exceed design criteria of 5

utility facilities (e.g., lightning storm, high wind events or localized flooding due to heavy rains) or impose stress on a facility that may have weak ened over 6

time. PG&E declared 31 major event days in 2019, which not only far exceeded the 7 declared major event days in 2018, but also was the highest ever 7

recorded in one year. Ironically, despite this record number of declared major event days in 2019, most of the control charts shown in Section 7 of this report 8

show statistically significant availability performance improvement. However, PG&E will continue to balance this apparent improvement with the fact that not 9

only transmission availability, but also customer reliability, was severely compromised with PSPS implementation in 2019. Significant lessons were learned, and 10

there are several planned improvements and initiatives for the 2020 wildfire season that have a goal of keeping customers better informed and restoring 11

service more quickly if and when PSPS is implemented. 12

OCTOBER 23, 2019 – PSPS DAY and KINCADE FIRE: 13

The 7th worst event in TABLE 5-1 was not only a PSPS day, but also the day of the Kincade Fire ignition. Due to dry, gusty winds and “Extreme-Plus” fire 14

potential in the area, PG&E’s officer-in-charge ordered the de-energizing of 25 transmission circuits, primarily in the northern part of the service territory from 15

2:45 p.m. through 4:32 p.m. Of these 25 circuits, 16 were operating at 60kV, 7 at 115kV and 2 at 230kV. All but three lines are CAISO-controlled. 16

Later that evening at 9:19 p.m. the Geysers 9-Lakeville 230kV – not a CAISO-controlled circuit – relayed and did not test due to its automatics being disabled for 17

wildfire risk mitigation. No distribution-served customers were immediately interrupted as a result of this line being unexpectantly out of service. However, 18

Calpine Calistoga Units 1 & 2, Sonoma, Geysers 13, 18, 20, and NCPA Units 1 & 2 did separate from the PG&E grid. A fire (ultimately named the Kincade Fire) 19

was reported by Geysers operator near Geysers units #9 & #10. As of June 2020, the cause of the Kincade Fire remains under investigation by CAL FIRE and the 20

California Public Utilities Commission. PG&E is cooperating with their investigations and continuing to conduct its investigation about the cause of the fire. 21

Moving forward in 2020, PG&E is continually evaluating its protocols and procedures to promote public safety and to address wildfire risk factors, including its 22

PSPS program and related weather and wind modeling. 23




Update: A CAL FIRE news release announcing origin and cause of the Kincade Fire was issued on July 16, 2020. A screen shot of that news release is shown 2

below and was taken directly from CAL FIRE’s web page: https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/11163/kincadefire_2019_cause.pdf 3

4

https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/11163/kincadefire_2019_cause.pdf




HISTORICAL AVERAGE CIRCUIT OUTAGE FREQUENCY / DURATION (ACOF / ACOD): 2

As stated earlier, charts for performance year 2019 had data points that fell outside control chart limits, but all such points were indicative of statistically 3

significant performance improvement. There was no evidence of any degradation of performance, so it follows that maintenance practices by PG&E can be 4

considered adequate and effective. 5

FIGURE 5-1 reinforces this historical performance improvement. It includes all PG&E transmission circuits (not just those under CAISO control). However, it 6

does not include emergency forced outages (EFOs) – i.e., those outages where PG&E manually de-energized a circuit, typically to address an imminent failure 7

discovered in the field and there was insufficient time to garner a scheduled clearance from CAISO. These “EFO” type outages typically account for 8

approximately 20% of all PG&E unplanned outages. The figure below shows that annual actuals for two metrics – i.e., average circuit outage frequency (ACOF) 9

and average circuit outage duration (ACOD) – are trending downward for the thirteen years 2007 through 2019. The metrics shown in the two graphs above 10

include all voltages and all PG&E transmission lines and serve to reinforce and validate the control charts that follow for accumulated outage frequency and 11

duration. 12

FIGURE 5-1 13

PG&E Historical Performances ACOD and ACOF 14

15




FIRE 2019 vs PRIOR YEARS: 2

In 2019 there were only 2 capped outages (Geysers 9-Lakeville 230kV (not a CAISO-controlled line) and Eagle Rock-Fulton-Silverado 115kV) with an assigned 3

outage cause of FIRE, and both occurred on October 23 as previously discussed. A total of 23 outages were due to FIRE for the year, and the accumulated 4

(capped) duration of these 23 outages was 13,667 minutes. The accumulated (capped) duration of outages in 2018 assigned FIRE as a cause was 100,416 5

minutes, which was very close to the accumulated (capped) duration in 2017 of 104,746 minutes. These two annual durations wer e over three times greater 6

than the 29,543 facility outage minutes recorded in 2016. By further comparison, 2015 – a noted bad year for fires in California – had 51 outages with an 7

accumulated (capped) duration of 109,698 outage minutes. Hence, 2018, 2017 and 2015 were all comparable to one another in terms of capped accumulated 8

outage duration. Performance year 2016 had far fewer facility outage minutes, as did last year 2019. 9

In 2018 there were 14 capped outages due to fire. In 2017 there were 18 capped outages due to fire compared to 4 capped outages in 2016 and 18 in 2015. 10

A total of 81 outages in 2018 (8% of the 995 total outages) were assigned an outage cause of FIRE. In comparison, a total of 94 outages in 2017 (7% of the 11

1,353 total outages for the year) were caused by fire. These 94 outages were almost three times greater than the number recorded for 2016 (33, or 3% of the 12

995 total outages in 2016). 13

TABLE 5-2 that follows is taken from CAL FIRE’s website ( https://www.fire.ca.gov/stats-events/ ) and is a list of the “Top 20 Most Destructive California 14

Wildfires”. Two of the most destructive wildfires in California history occurred in 2018 and four occurred in October 2017. Although very devastating, the 15

Kincade Fire in 2019 did not make this list. In 2016 the most consequential fires affectiing transmission availability were the Clayton Fire in Sonoma County, the 16

Soberanes Fire near Monterey and the Oak Fire in Santa Cruz. The most consequential fire outages in 2015 were the Rocky Fire and Valley Fire in the northern 17

part of service territory, the Butte Fire in the central area and the Questa Fire and Rough Fire in the southern area. Eight of these fire events are highlighted in 18

yellow below in TABLE 5-2. 19

https://www.fire.ca.gov/stats-events/




TABLE 5-2 2

3 4




60kV POLE FAILURE AND CATASTROPHIC BREAKER FAILURE AT COTTONWOOD SUBSTATION, 02/13/19: 2

TABLE 5-1 shows that the 3rd ranked event spanned six days, beginning with an “atmospheric river” type storm. One of the more consequential transmission 3

outages during this storm occurred just outside and in Cottonwood substation. Here are the details: 4

02/13/19, 0217 Cottonwood #1 & #2 60kV lines relayed and did not test; due to Cottonwood CB-12 failure Cottonwood 60kV main bus & 5

Cottonwood-Red Bluff 60kV line de-energized; Coleman-Cottonwood, Cottonwood-Benton #1 & #2 60kV lines open-ended at Cottonwood; 6

sustained outages to California Power Holdings, Red Bluff Pump Plant, Rawson, Gerber, Packaging, Red Bank Meter, Louisiana Pacific, Tyler, 7

Red Bluff, Dairyville, Vina & Los Molinos substations; weather storm, ultimately a declared major event day per IEEE Standard 1366; 0449 8

Cottonwood-Red Bluff manually tested OK restoring Red Bluff; 0453 Coleman-Cottonwood tested OK restoring Coleman Hatchery; 0455 9

Coleman-Red Bluff energized restoring Vina, Los Molinos, Dairyville; 0650 Gerber restored; 0457 Cottonwood-Benton #1 tested OK restoring 10

Anderson & Girvan; pole 000/01A on Cottonwood #1 down & tangled with pole 000/02B on Cottonwood #2; 0650 Gerber restored on 11

Coleman-Red Bluff; Protection reports C-G fault on Cottonwood #1; 02/14/19, 0154 & 0236 Cottonwood #2 & #1, respectively, tested NG 12

after crew repaired pole just outside of Cottonwood; no more customers interrupted; found shared tower 001/010 on its side with 13

transmission wire down; 0840 Tyler & LP restored via alternate source; 02/17/19, 1735 & 1806 Cottonwood #2 & #1, respectively, returned 14

to service after installing temporary poles for tower restoring California Power Holdings, Red Bluff Pump Plant, PAC-TIV, Red Bank Meter Stn 15

& LP; tower 001/010 to be rebuilt & lines moved back at later date; Cottonwood CB-12 to be replaced on emergency basis. 16

Hence, multiple facilities and substations were unexpectedly de-energized due to tower failure just outside Cottonwood substation coupled with the 17

coincident failure of a Cottonwood circuit breaker (CB-12). The impact to customers was significant: 26,098 distribution-served customers and several 18

transmission-served customers experienced sustained interruptions that lasted an average of 305 minutes – total customer outage minutes were 7,954,345. 19

Four days later (02/17/19 at 1735 & 1806), Cottonwood #2 & #1, respectively, were returned to service after installing temporary poles. Failed tower 001/010 20

was ultimately rebuilt & lines moved back to normal positions. Cottonwood CB-12 was also replaced on an emergency basis. 21




2018 OUTAGES BY CAUSE CATEGORY: 2

FIGURE 5-2 shows the number of outages (upper stacked bar chart) and accumulated facility outage minutes (capped) by cause category and voltage class. 3

FIGURE 5-2 4

5

6




2018 OUTAGES BY CAUSE CATEGORY: 2

The upper bar chart in FIGURE 5-2 shows the top three cause codes that contributed to 2019 accumulated outage frequency were LEQP (line equipment 3

problems), UNKN (unknown) and LIGT (lightning). OTHR (other) and WEAT (weather, excluding lightning) were slightly lower contributors than lightning. 4

The lower bar chart, which is aligned with the upper chart in each column for cause code, shows that the top three cause code s that contributed to 5

accumulated outage duration were LEQP, VEGA (vegetation) and LATE (late notification). However, if problems within the substation are consolidated (i.e., CB 6

(circuit breaker), SEQP (substation equipment problems) and PROT (protection, typically failed relays), then they would be the second leading causes for 7

duration. 8

These two bar charts include “momentary” type of events where the line relayed and immediately tested OK and service was restored usually within cycles 9

(i.e., fraction of a second). Hence, although the cause code UNKN had a high number of outages, it had very few associated facility outage minutes, which 10

indicates that many of the outages were momentary type of events. PG&E patrols every such outage where an automatic operation occurs, and many of the 11

momentary outages are ones where a subsequent patrol found no cause or no damage to facilities. Every effort is made to find the cause for an outage that is 12

not a momentary event. It’s noteworthy that even though a patrol may suspect a bird (ANIM) was responsible for a momentary ev ent due to elevated bird 13

activity in the area, a cause code of UNKN is assigned unless proof (i.e., a carcass) is found. Although inclement weather may be present, WEAT (weather) is not 14

assigned unless truly inclement weather (e.g., high winds exceeding design criteria or a declared major event day per IEEE standard 1466) is present. 15

Cause code FIRE was the second highest contributor to facility outage minutes last year in 2018; however, FIGURE 5-2 shows it was not a relatively significant 16

cause for either outage frequency or duration in 2019. 17

Historically, line and substation equipment failures including circuit breakers (i.e., LEQP, SEQP and CB) have been significant contributors to both frequency and 18

duration, and 2019 was no different. However, the number and accumulated duration of these outages due to equipment failure was lower than in prior years. 19

Cause code OTHR primarily includes outages due to external contacts such as Mylar balloons or vandalism, high voltage in the area or an encroachment from a 20

customer-owned or independent power producer (IPP) facility. However, if PG&E can confirm the outage was due to the 3 rd party, it will usually declare it as an 21

excludable event for calculating annual availability. 22

Outages due to vehicle contact (VEH) were only 4.2% of frequency and 4.6% of duration; both these figures are down from previous performance years. 23




LIGHTNING: 2

Lightning has historically been a confirmed cause for about 10% of the unplanned forced outages at PG&E. Confirmation of a lightning induced outage is 3

achieved by correlating outage start time with lightning strike time in the PG&E Lightning Detection Network. If PG&E cannot correlate such data than typically 4

lightning is not assigned as the cause even though lightning may have been reported in the area. As shown in FIGURE 5-2, lightning accounted for 10.6% of the 5

outages, but only 2.4% of the associated accumulated duration. In 2018 PG&E recorded only 3.5% of the total outages as lightning caused. In 2017 lightning 6

caused accounted for 5.8% of the total outages. In 2016 PG&E documented 6.4% of the outages as due to lightning. Finally, 2015 was an unusually high year for 7

lightning with 19% attributable to lightning. 8

Overall, lightning continues as a very small contributor to 2019 control charts results for either accumulated outage frequency or duration, for all voltage 9

classes. 10

LATE NOTIFICATION: 11

Of the 1,179 total transmission unplanned forced outages in 2019, FIGURE 5-2 shows 4.1% were due to either insufficient notice to CAISO from PG&E in 12

obtaining a clearance to perform work on the grid or the approved clearance went beyond the pre -approved end time. These LATE outages accounted for 10.8 13

% of the accumulated outage duration total. 14

In 2018, of the total transmission outages reported, 3.4% were assigned “LATE” as the cause. For accumulated outage duration, LATE accounted for 11.0%. 15

There were more such late notification type events in 2017 – i.e., 13% were assigned a late notification cause. The count for late notification outages in 2016 16

was 16% of all the outages. 17

Timeliness of outage requests and communications between PG&E and CAISO for clearances – although showing improvement over the last three years – 18

could still stand further improvement. It’s recommended that this subject be discussed at a future TMCC (Transmission Maintenance Coordination Committee) 19

meeting between PG&E, CAISO and any other PTOs that may have a similar concern. 20




MONTHLY DRIVERS 2019: 2

FIGURE 5-3 is a monthly tracking of average circuit outage frequency (ACOF) and duration (ACOD) during 2019. The graphs show that the four months (January, 3

February, October and November) were drivers for duration and three months (January, February and May) were drivers for frequency. Significant events in 4

these months are highlighted below. 5

FIGURE 5-3 6

7

Each bar graph of FIGURE 5-3 includes a note about “Six Sigma Days”. Six Sigma refers to a robust outage screening methodology applied separately to 8

frequency and duration. Such screening attempts to account for outlier type of events much like the capped outage process for CAISO reporting. For example, 9

if a day had an outage count that exceeding its six-sigma threshold (>35 outages/day), then data related to ACOF would be excluded for that day. Similarly, if a 10

day had outages that totaled more than the six-sigma threshold for accumulated duration (>14,500 minutes/day), that day would be excluded for ACOD. 11




Here were the most significant outages ranked in descending order of duration during January 2019 associated with FIGURE 5-3 (note: CESO=customers 2

experiencing a sustained outage and CMIN=customer outage minutes, where applicable; MED=major event day). 3

1) NEWARK-AMES DIST 115kV, sleeve failure, ET wire down in Bay, 3,864 facility outage minutes, no customers affected. 4 2) SMYRNA-SEMITROPIC-MIDWAY 115kV, sagging conductor, 3,176 facility outage minutes; CESO=2,117; CMIN=154,297. 5 3) FORT ROSS-GUALALA 60kV, tree failure, transmission wire down, 2,989 minutes, CESO=385, CMIN=256,835 (declared MED). 6 4) COLGATE-ALLEGHANY 60kV, conductor fail, transmission wire down, 2,789 minutes; CESO=2,050, CMIN=1,185,260 (MED). 7 5) ELK-GUALALA 60kV, insulator & jumper failures, 1,619 minutes, CESO=1,108, CMIN=12,143. 8 6) VASONA-METCALF 230kV, arcing jumper at tower 003/017, 1,617 minutes, no customers affected (MED). 9 7) LAYTONVILLE-WILLITS 60kV, tree failure, transmission wire down, 1,409 minutes, no customers affected. 10 8) BURNS-LONE STAR #1 & #2 60kV, unknown cause, 1,209 minutes each (MED). 11 9) KONOCTI-MIDDLETOWN & FULTON-CALISTOGA 60kV, tree failure from outside right-of-way, 1,346 minutes total, CESO=8,022; CMIN=1,885,345. 12

Here were the most significant outages in February 2019 associated with FIGURE 5-3, again ranked in descending order by facility outage minutes. 13

1) 02/13/19 saw 45 outages – including the event described earlier in this report at Cottonwood – leading to a six-sigma day for ACOF. 14 2) DIABLO-MESA & MORRO BAY-MESA 230kV, 3rd Party Tree, Tower & transmission wire down, 4,948 total facility outage minutes. 15 3) HUMBOLDT-TRINITY 115kV, Tree Failure, 2,766 minutes, no customers affected. 16 4) IGNACIO-BOLINAS #2 60kV, Forced Out for Safety to facilitate repairs to distribution wire down, 2,628 minutes, no customers affected. 17 5) SNEATH LANE-HALF MOON BAY 60kV, Pole Failures, including transmission wire down, 2,496 minutes. 18 6) MIDDLE FORK #1 60kV, Tree Failure, 2,281 minutes. 19 7) FORT BRAGG-ELK 60kV, Tree Failure, transmission wire down, 2,249 minutes. 20 8) POTTER VALLEY-WILLITS 60kV, Tree Failure, transmission wire down, 2,203 minutes. 21 9) EL DORADO-MISSOURI FLAT #2 115kV, Tree Failure, 2,024 minutes. 22

Here were the most significant outages in March 2019, again ranked in descending order by facility outage minutes. 23

1) IGNACIO-BOLINAS 60kV, Tree failure into Olema substation; 14,599 total facility outage mins; 2,077 customers out an average of 18.5 h ours. 24 2) CARNERAS-TAFT 70kV, Wood poles & transmission wire down during high winds; 1,489 facility outage minutes; 155 customers out for 77 minutes . 25 3) CARIBOU #2 60kV, Conductor failure, transmission wire down; 1,221 facility outage minutes. 26 4) EXCHEQUER-YOSEMITE 70kV, gunshot conductor, transmission wire down; 691 facility outage minutes; 3,127 customers out for 52 minutes. 27 5) STANISLAUS-MANTECA #2 115kV, Conductor failure & transmission wire down; 621 facility outage minutes; no customers affected. 28 6) NICOLAUS-WILKINS SLOUGH 60kV, Conductor failure & transmission wire down at multiple locations; 586 minutes; no customers affected. 29




Finally, here were the most significant outages in November 2019, again ranked in descending order by facility outage minutes. 2

1) KASSON-BANTA #1 60kV, De-energized out from scheduled work to replace Ohio Brass insulators at Kasson SW-33, 4,320 capped minutes; no customers affected. 3 2) DIXON LANDING-MCKEE 115kV, McKee CB-152 failed compressor & closing coil, 4,320 minutes capped, momentary 18,300 customers. 4 3) ARCO-TWISSELMAN 70kV, Late Notification to reconductor, 4,320 facility outage minutes capped. 5 4) TESLA-SALADO-MANTECA 115kV, Breaker failure relay for Manteca CB-144 & 154 failed, 4,320 facility outage minutes capped, no customers affected. 6 5) DESABLA-CENTERVILLE 60kV, Replaced burnt poles 1/22A, 1/22B & 1/22C, 4,320 capped minutes, CESO=1,042, CMIN=119,830. 7 6) GEYSERS #3-CLOVERDALE 115kV, De-energized for protection setups, 4,320 facility outage minutes (capped), no customers affected. 8 7) MAPLE CREEK-HOOPA 60kV, Repaired damaged conductors, 4,320 minutes (capped). 9 8) VACA-TESLA 500kV, Work Procedure Error, 4,320 capped minutes, no customers affected. 10 9) DRUM-HIGGINS 115kV, Tree branch removed between 020/164-165, 4,247 facility outage minutes, no customer affected. 11

All these outages listed above in the four months were primary drivers in the availability performance results for 2019. 12

TRANSMISSION WIRE DOWN EVENTS: 13

PG&E has been tracking “wire down” events since 2011 for both electric transmission & distribution (T&D). Electric transmission (ET) wire down events 14

typically account for between 1% and 2% of all T&D wire down events each year. By definition, a wire down event is counted only once even if there are 15

multiple wires down at the same time and due to the same cause. 16

The three main causes of ET wire down each year remain line equipment failures (33 in 2019, identical to 2017), vegetation (tree) failures from outside the 17

right-of-way (17, half that of 2017 but just over three times that in 2018) and external contacts from vehicles, vandalism or other foreign objects (13 in 2019). 18

TABLE 5-3 provides a historical summary of annual ET wire down event counts and cause. In 2019 there were 77 ET wire down events. The number of 2017 19

wire down events for ET was relatively higher than preceding years as well primarily due in part to the higher number of wildfires as well as the relatively larger 20

number of equipment failures and tree-related outages during January and February due to numerous “atmospheric river” type storms. The rain and 21

windstorms in 2018 were fewer in number and less severe. Performance year 2019 also had numerous major event days (31) as shown in previous Table 5-1 22

for the ten worst events in 2019 affecting distribution-served customers. 23




TABLE 5-3 2

Electric Transmission Wire-Down Events 3

4

Cause 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Lightning 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 1

Aircraft 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 3 0

Foreign Obj 2 1 1 2 5 3 3 2 0

WPE 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 3

Other 0 4 1 2 3 1 0 2 10

Vandal ism 2 3 2 1 1 3 4 2 4

Disaster 2 8 2 3 5 2 10 7 0

Carpole 5 7 3 8 8 5 8 10 9

Vegetation 14 20 4 7 20 11 35 5 17

Equip Fai l 39 32 28 18 21 19 33 13 33

TOTAL EVENTS 68 77 47 42 65 47 96 44 77

Number of ET Wire Down Events Including MEDs



6. DISCUSSION ON IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 1

To help specifically address transmission and substation availability performance, daily outage review conference calls continued during 2019. During these 2

calls representatives from various stakeholder departments review transmission line and substation outage events, address issues related to any equipment 3

taken out of service due to it no longer performing as originally designed, identify potential projects or opportunities to improve customer reliability and/or 4

facility availability, and work with other departments represented at the meetings to discuss already planned projects and see if further efforts could be 5

coordinated to consolidate work and improve service reliability. The daily call also addresses specific customers at risk when taking scheduled clearances to 6

perform maintenance and/or construction to help ensure that the clearance request will not unduly put facilities and customer s at risk. 7

Reliability improvement projects primarily target these areas: 8

1. Quicker manual and/or automatic restoration of facilities by installation of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) enabled switches. 9

2. Reduction in the number of customers affected due to an outage by the installation of breakers and associated relay devices within substations, in 10

effect “sectionalizing” a single relatively longer transmission circuit into two shorter circuits, thereby lowering the number of customers potentially 11

exposed to an outage. 12

3. Improved operational flexibility by installing new equipment that allows facilities to be taken out of service for maintenance or emergency situations 13

and minimize impact to customers. 14

4. Replacement of existing and less reliable bus configurations with breaker-and-a-half or ring bus configurations; 15

5. Targeted relay replacements, including replacement of electromechanical relays with microprocessor-based ones to help with fault location data; such 16

data is crucial to our patrols in better identifying and documenting outage cause. 17

6. Reducing vegetation caused outages by expanding or trimming beyond defined transmission rights-of-way. 18

7. Targeted mitigation on structures inside substations and those supporting transmission lines to help preclude animal contacts. 19

8. Increased attention to line maintenance and more immediate repair of facilities designated by Operations as critical operatin g equipment. 20

9. Continued updates to and execution of transmission (overhead and underground) and substation Asset Management Plans (AMPs) to increase 21

availability of electric transmission lines, reduce the risk of wildfire ignitions, and improve service to customers. 22



6. DISCUSSION ON IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (cont’d) 1

Many improvements incorporate specific reliability projects as well as maintenance upgrades that double as reliability improvements. Improvements include 2

construction of new transmission lines or line sections, installing additional transformers, installing new and fixing existing supervisory control and data 3

acquisition (SCADA) equipment (most helpful in restoration), and reconfiguration of the grid to provide greater redundancy and improved operational 4

flexibility. Over the many years since 1998 when PG&E joined the CAISO, expenditures in targeted improvements have contributed to the improved results 5

demonstrated by the most recent set of control charts (see Section 7 of this report). 6

As mentioned previously, daily outage review conference calls with the aim of improving the availability performances of both the electric transmission and 7

distribution system and minimizing service restoration times to customers who are in an outage condition continue. These regularly scheduled calls began in 8

mid-2008. These calls also help determine what can be done to preclude re-occurrence and/or reduce restore times as needed for any future outage events. 9

Specifically, for electric transmission, there is a call every workday morning to address outages or any other availability or reliability related issues that 10

occurred the prior day on the grid. In terms of this report and transmission line availability, a significant amount of effort continues to be spent conducting 11

ground and/or air patrols for each outage or path interruption event, even if it may have only been a momentary event (i.e., line relayed and automatically 12

tested OK). Recently, PG&E has mandated that full line patrols are to be performed during the wildfire season for lines that experience an unplanned outage in 13

a designated “Tier 2” (elevated) or “Tier 3” (extreme) fire hazard area as defined by the CPUC Fire Map. Over time these patrols to better identify specific 14

causes of outages should continue to help in better identifying trends (i.e., decrease the number of outages with an “unknown” cause) so that better decisions 15

can be made as to where to channel our reliability improvement efforts. It should also enable focused corrective actions to occur that otherwise may not have 16

if the cause had not been identified and documented. 17

As needed corrective and/or preventative action items are identified and taken, usually documented a “CAP” (corrective action program) Event Report. A web-18

based database application, this CAP event reporting process has proven to be very effective at PG&E due in part to action items being tracked and monitored 19

electronically and automatically until completed. CAP event reporting continues as an effective tool in reporting and tracking events. It also helps in responding 20

to data requests from intervenors such as the CPUC (California Public Utilities Commission). 21

https://ia.cpuc.ca.gov/firemap/




Drought, wildfires and excessive fuel sources such as vegetation pose significant risks to electric transmission (and distribution) availability. Sources of ignition 2

include PG&E electric transmission, distribution and substation facilities and the terrain they traverse. PG&E’s Vegetation Management Program patrols and 3

monitors every PG&E overhead electric transmission and distribution line each year, with some locations patrolled multiple times. These patrols identify not 4

only trees that pose a risk to electric facilities, but also ground vegetation that may need attention. PG&E prunes or removes approximately 1.4 million trees 5

annually. During the daily outage review calls it is not unusual for adjustments to be made by the Vegetation Management team when specific transmission 6

lines are identified as having more vegetation-related outages. 7

Following Governor Brown's January 2014 Drought State of Emergency Proclamation and the California Public Utilities Commissio n's Resolution ESRB-4, PG&E 8

has added enhanced measures to address areas particularly affected by drought and bark beetles including: 9

1) Increased foot and aerial patrols along power lines in high fire-risk areas; 10

2) Removed approximately 225,000 dead or dying trees in 2016 and 156,000 dead or dying trees in 2017; these tree removals were in addition to 11

approximately 30,000 trees removed per year prior to the drought; 12

3) Launched daily aerial fire detection patrols during high fire season to improve fire spotting and speed of fire response; 13

4) Since 2014, provided $11.4 million to local Fire Safe Councils (FSCs) for fuel reduction projects in communities; and 14

5) Provided $1.7 million to local FSCs for 28 highly programmable remote-sensing cameras for critical fire lookout towers. 15

After the numerous wildfires in 2017, PG&E began bolstering wildfire prevention and emergency response efforts, putting in place new and enhanced safety 16

measures, and doing more over the long term to “harden” or strengthen our electric transmission, substation and distribution systems to help reduce wildfire 17

risks and keep customers safe. PG&E also meets or exceeds regulatory requirements for pole integrity management, using a comprehensive database to 18

manage multiple patrol and inspection schedules of our more than two million electric transmission and distribution poles. Since December 2018, more than 19

700 contract inspection crews have fanned out across PG&E's service area, focusing on transmission assets in areas designated as Tier 2 and Tier 3. In past 20

inspection efforts, crews would primarily look at lines visually by helicopter or from the ground. Under the new enhanced patrols that started in late 2018, 21

crews are visiting all assets on foot to assess their condition near the ground and climbing towers for close-up looks at components. The Company has been 22

using drones to capture images of cross arms, conductors, switches and other critical transmission components. 23




The aim is to enlist all available tools to gather data and information safely and as quickly as possible. By the 1st quarter 2019 about 150 contract drone 2

personnel conducted more than 9,000 drone flights as part of the new enhanced patrols, which has been named the Wildfire Safety Inspection Program 3

(WSIP). Pictures captured via drone are sent to a centralized-review team inside PG&E's San Ramon Valley Conference Center, where they're reviewed by 4

experts who look for potential issues on equipment. The goal is to conduct inspections using drones across the same number of structures and miles done by 5

the ground crews. Between ground patrols and aerial imaging, crews have worked to further reduce risk across PG&E's electric-transmission system. For 6

example: 7

• Crews identified and repaired a broken conductor on the 60-kV Colgate-Alleghany line in Sierra County. 8

• Through drone imagery, crews spotted and later repaired a cracked insulator, which connects a line to a tower, on the 60 -kV Drum-Grass Valley-9

Weimar line in Placer County. 10

• Crews identified and repaired a pole with a split top on the Spring Gap Tap Line in Tuolumne County. 11

In the end, crews will have inspected more than 5,500 miles of transmission power lines and roughly 50,000 structures. 12

The Wildfire Safety Inspection Program is just one element of PG&E's Community Wildfire Safety Program, an ongoing initiative to harden the company's grid 13

and further reduce the risk of wildfire. Accelerated inspection work is also ramping up to assess all distribution assets in Tier 2 and Tier 3 fire-threat areas. 14

Accelerated inspections of PG&E substations also began in 2019. Other measures in the Community Wildfire Safety Program include installing new weather 15

stations to improve weather forecasting and modeling; enhanced vegetation management; and hardening of the system with stronger poles, covered 16

distribution power lines and targeted undergrounding of distribution lines. 17

PG&E outlined these and other efforts in its 2019 Wildfire Safety Plan, filed with the CPUC in February 2019. As part of its plan, the Company recommended 18

installing 400 new weather stations in 2019 — double the number it installed in 2018 — and expanding its Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program. PG&E 19

filed its updated 2020-Wildfire-Safety-Plan.pdf (2020 WMP) one year later February 7, 2020. The updates to the 2020 WMP have been posted to the PG&E 20

Wildfire Mitigation Plan website PGE.com/2020WMP (WMP Website). 21

https://www.pge.com/en_US/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/community-wildfire-safety.page

http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M263/K673/263673423.PDF

https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/2020-Wildfire-Safety-Plan.pdf

https://www.pge.com/en_US/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan.page?WT.mc_id=Vanity_wildfiremitigationplan




As of May 16, 2020, specific progress toward meeting our 2020 Community Wildfire Safety Program goals include these milestone s as summarized by CEO and 2

President Andy Vessey: 3

o System hardening: Installed stronger poles, covered lines and targeted undergrounding across 100 miles as part of a full -year plan for hardening 241 4

line-miles. 5

o Enhanced vegetation management: Inspected, pruned and removed vegetation that poses a h igher potential for wildfire risk; completed 890 miles out 6

of a 2020 plan of 1,800 total miles. 7

o More weather stations and cameras: Installed 95 advanced weather stations and 27 more high-definition cameras, with a target of 400 and 200 for 8

the year, respectively. 9

o Sectionalizing devices: Separated the distribution grid into smaller sections for operational flexibility; 248 devices out of 592 targeted for the year have 10

been installed. 11

o Transmission line switches: Installed line switches to redirect power and keep communities energized. 27 switches have been installed, exceeding the 12

23 planned to be ready for the 2020 wildfire season. 13

o Substation temporary generation: Created plans to locate temporary generation at up to 48 substations during a Public Safety Power Shutoff event to 14

allow PG&E to safely energize thousands of customers and shrink the footprint of a PSPS event. 15

Several of the milestones above are specific to PG&E distribution facilities. However, many of these facilities are under builds on structures that carry 16

transmission lines. The working theory is that improvements to all aspects of the PG&E “grid” work synergistically with one another to reduce overall wildfire 17

risk, particularly in the higher fire threat districts. PG&E is committed to keeping our customers and the communities we serve safe, reducing the risk of 18

wildfires and making any Public Safety Power Shutoff events smaller, shorter and smarter than last year. The PG&E website ( www.pge.com/wildfiresafety/ ) 19

provides more details. 20

http://www.pge.com/wildfiresafety/




One final point: PG&E was one of the original participants back in the mid-1990s in the annual electric transmission reliability benchmark study sponsored by 2

SGS Statistical Services. Annual participation in this study complemented and supplemented the results of this annual report to CAISO for years and allowed 3

PG&E to better benchmark its transmission availability and reliability performances to that of other study participants. Unfortunately, the principals behind the 4

SGS study decided to retire in 2018. However, results and deliverables of the last study that includes outage data through 2017 are still used as a basis for 5

making decisions about which specific transmission circuits would best warrant remedial actions to improve reliability and availability. 6

The SGS study was unique in the industry, and from PG&E’s perspective the best study. Unlike any other study we know of it included updated circuit-by-circuit 7

analyses, including a “worst circuit” ranking. TABLE 6-1 shows the most recent partial listing of the worst performing electric transmission circuits in PG&E 8

system. In this table, the lower the “GAP” score, the worse the circuit in terms of its availability performance. This GAP score is d erived by coupling a circuit’s 9

most recent 5-year unplanned outage performance (i.e., its availability based on a weighted score with more recent outages given heavier we ighting relative to 10

older outages) with the circuit’s relative importance to the grid, primarily in supporting uninterrupted serv ice to customers. For example, a circuit ranked high 11

in importance with a relatively low availability score would have a low GAP score and be assigned as a worst performer. Such a circuit could be a prime target 12

for capital funding to improve its performance. On the other hand, a circuit with a relatively low importance factor and yet a high availability could be a 13

candidate for reduced maintenance intervals. Over the years this SGS study has been helpful to PG&E in determining where best to spend its money and most 14

likely one reason our performances as shown in section 7 of this report have shown improvement over the years. 15

In early 2020 PG&E received an invitation from SGS to again participate in its annual study. Unfortunately, due in no small p art to ongoing bankruptcy 16

proceedings, funding for renewing our participation was unavailable and the decision was made not to resurrect our participation. 17




TABLE 6-1 2

Worst Performing Circuits – SGS Electric Transmission Benchmark Study (Based on Automatic Type Outages 2013-2017) 3

4 5



7. CONTROL CHARTS 1

FIGURE 7-1, FIGURE 7-2, FIGURE 7-3 and FIGURE 7-4 that follow are reproductions of the control charts for 2019 as calculated by CAISO using outage data 2

provided by PG&E and checked by CAISO with its records. As described earlier in Section 4 of this report, if a test is triggered (i.e., if one can answer in the 3

affirmative to the test question and conclude the test “failed”), it may indicate presence of a “special” cause(s) of variability (rather than a chance or common 4

cause(s) that is inherent to a system or process), and the failure may be indicative of statistically significant performance improvement (FAIL+) or degradation 5

(FAIL-). Conversely, if a test is not triggered (PASS), that generally means there is stable performance and that the electric transmission system is performing as 6

expected relative to its historical performances, and further, that maintenance practices are most likely adequate and effective. 7

Each figure that follows is divided into quadrants. The two upper quadrants and the lower left quadrant show the 3 control charts per class, one for each 8

performance index. The lower right quadrant provides a summary of the four tests applied to each control chart, and whether a specific test passed or failed. 9

Any test failure suggesting degrading performance is shown in red font – there were no such failures in 2019. A test failure indicating improved performance is 10

shown in green font, and there were several such “failures’ in 2019 suggesting statistically significant improvement. 11

• FIGURE 7-1: 69kV Class (322 median number of active CAISO controlled circuits operating at either 60,000 or 70,000 volts) 12

Annual average forced outage FREQUENCY in 2019 (lower is better) ended up at the lower warning limit=2.16. Annual average accumulated forced 13

outage DURATION in 2019 (lower is better) fell between the lower warning limit and the centerline. Annual PROPORTION of circuits with no forced 14

outages index in 2019 (higher is better) ended up between the upper control and warning limits. The lower right quadrant of Figure 7-1 shows 10 of 15

12 tests applied to the three indices in this voltage class passed. The 2 tests that “failed” did so in a way suggesting performance improvement. Hence 16

PG&E’s maintenance practices are considered adequate and effective in the 69kV class. 17

• FIGURE 7-2: 115kV class (349 median number of active CAISO controlled circuits operated at 115,000 volts) 18

Annual average forced outage FREQUENCY in 2019 (lower is better) was significantly below its lower control limit=1.2. Annual average accumulated 19

forced outage DURATION in 2019 (lower is better) ended up slightly below its lower control limit=1,115 minutes. Annual PROPORTION of circuits with 20

no forced outages index in 2019 (higher is better) was significantly above its control chart upper limit=0.486. The lower right quadrant of Figure 7-2 21

shows 3 of 12 tests applied to the 3 indices passed, and the 9 that “failed” suggested overall performance improvement in both accumulated outage 22

frequency and duration in this voltage class. Hence PG&E’s maintenance practices are considered adequate and effective in the 115kV class. 23

24



7. CONTROL CHARTS (cont’d) 1


Annual average forced outage FREQUENCY for 2019 (lower is better) ended up significantly below the lower control limit=0.734. Annual average 3

accumulated forced outage DURATION for 2019 (lower is better) fell below the lower control limit=866 minutes. Annual PROPORTION of circuits for 4

2019 (higher is better) ended up significantly above its upper control limit=0.584. The lower right quadrant of Figure 7-3 shows 4 of 12 tests passed 5

and 8 of 12 failed. However, each test that failed indicated statistically significant improvement for all three indices. Hence, PG&E’s maintenance 6

practices are considered adequate and effective for circuits in the 230kV class. 7


All 2019 data points fell between upper and lower control chart limits suggesting stable availability performance in this voltage class. Specifically, annual 9

average forced outage FREQUENCY for 2019 (lower is better) fell between the centerline=0.964 and the lower warning limit=0.485. Annual average 10

accumulated forced outage DURATION for 2019 (lower is better) ended up between its centerline=1,751 minutes and its upper warning limit=3,456 11

minutes. Annual PROPORTION of circuits with no forced outages index in 2019 (higher is better) ended up below the centerline=0.490 and above the 12

lower warning limit=0.249. The lower right quadrant of Figure 7-4 shows all 12 tests applied to the 3 indices passed, which means that PG&E’s 13

maintenance practices are considered adequate and effective for circuits in the 500kV class. 14

Data points for annual actual in the control charts that follow are shown in TABLE 7-1. 15




TABLE 7-1 2

Historical Actuals (Data Points) for Control Charts 3

4

5

Year

Proportion

No Outages

Mean Outage

Duration

Mean Outage

Frequency

Proportion

No Outages

Mean Outage

Duration

Mean Outage

Frequency

Proportion

No Outages

Mean Outage

Duration

Mean Outage

Frequency

Proportion

No Outages

Mean Outage

Duration

Mean Outage

Frequency

2003 0.290 992.8 2.34 0.521 1,073.6 1.21 0.473 826.0 0.98 0.158 1,684.7 2.00

2004 0.287 1,187.6 2.20 0.510 1,143.1 1.21 0.512 1,386.5 0.82 0.500 1,401.5 0.70

2005 0.274 1,311.6 2.40 0.474 1,309.4 1.17 0.633 1,152.7 0.57 0.500 512.5 0.90

2006 0.242 1,718.6 2.84 0.424 1,384.1 1.49 0.465 927.8 0.90 0.500 1,186.0 0.80

2007 0.245 1,494.6 2.39 0.332 1,727.4 1.72 0.305 1,603.9 1.48 0.500 1,587.7 0.75

2008 0.201 2,697.3 3.78 0.231 2,562.8 2.48 0.376 2,443.2 1.55 0.400 3,451.3 1.50

2009 0.248 1,819.4 2.68 0.313 1,778.2 1.66 0.361 1,873.9 1.36 0.400 2,858.5 1.20

2010 0.286 1,619.2 2.62 0.332 1,209.0 1.52 0.520 1,132.5 0.85 0.500 2,221.7 0.70

2011 0.297 1,897.0 2.34 0.454 1,571.1 1.19 0.520 1,446.4 0.91 0.650 1,977.7 0.50

2012 0.375 1,423.2 1.57 0.492 1,630.9 1.09 0.571 1,380.1 0.72 0.500 1,767.1 1.40

2013 0.511 1,042.7 0.95 0.516 1,253.4 0.81 0.570 1,952.0 0.76 0.565 1,895.6 0.78

2014 0.368 531.4 1.47 0.542 497.6 0.83 0.669 428.5 0.49 0.500 1,318.0 1.00

2015 0.267 1,122.3 2.17 0.450 1,182.2 1.25 0.497 1,852.9 0.94 0.571 908.3 0.57

2016 0.326 974.0 1.65 0.540 1,140.9 0.86 0.620 893.7 0.63 0.556 244.5 0.61

2017 0.292 1,446.3 2.48 0.515 1,104.6 1.01 0.649 1,231.6 0.64 0.579 1,338.6 1.21

2018 0.373 1,255.9 1.59 0.553 866.6 0.94 0.674 980.1 0.56 0.444 1,319.3 0.89

2019 0.340 1,447.3 2.17 0.566 1,097.5 0.93 0.640 708.4 0.60 0.471 2,222.0 0.88

69kV 115kV 230kV 500kV




FIGURE 7-1: 2019 Control Charts – 69kV Class 2

3

Test 1: PASS 2019 performance is within upper & lower control chart limits (UCL & LCL)

Test 2: PASS At least 7 consecutive points since 2008 do not fall above the centerline (CL), and

at least 7 consecutive points do not fall below the CL (V-Value=0.51)

Test 3: PASS 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 don't fall outside UWL/LWL on same side of CL

Test 4: PASS >=6 data points since 2008 not consecutively increasing or decreasing

DURATION--ANNUAL AVE ACCUMULATED FORCED OUTAGE DURATION CONTROL CHART

Test 1: PASS 2019 performance is within upper & lower control chart limits (UCL & LCL)

Test 2: FAIL+ 7 consecutive points since 2008 fall below the CL (V-Value=0.51)



PROPORTION--ANNUAL % OF CIRCUITS WITH NO FORCED OUTAGES CONTROL CHART

Test 1: PASS 2019 performance is just below UCL

Test 2: PASS At least 7 consecutive points since 2008 do not fall above the CL, and


Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 are outside UWL


10 of 12 tests passed; 2 of 12 failed, but each test that failed indicates statistically significant

performance improvement. Maintenance remains adequate.

CONCLUSIONS

AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE: 69kV CLASS

Results of 4 Tests Applied to Each Control Chart Since 2008

FREQUENCY--ANNUAL AVERAGE FORCED OUTAGE FREQUENCY CONTROL CHART




FIGURE 7-2: 2019 Control Charts – 115kV Class 2

3

Test 1: FAIL+ 2019 performance is below control chart lower control limit (LCL)

Test 2: FAIL+ At least 7 consecutive points since 2008 fall below the CL (V-Value=0.51)

Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 are outside LWL

Test 4: PASS >=6 data points since 2008 are not consecutively increasing or decreasing

Test 1: FAIL+ 2019 performance is below control chart lower control limit (LCL)



Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 are outside LWL


PROPORTION -- ANNUAL % OF CIRCUITS WITH NO FORCED OUTAGES CONTROL CHART

Test 1: FAIL+ 2019 performance remains above UCL

Test 2: FAIL+ At least 7 consecutive pts since 2008 fall above the CL (V-Value=0.50)

Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 are outside UWL

Test 4: FAIL+ >=6 data points since 2008 are consecutively increasing (2009-2014)


performance improvement. Maintenance remains adequate


FREQUENCY -- ANNUAL AVERAGE FORCED OUTAGE FREQUENCY CONTROL CHART

DURATION -- ANNUAL AVE ACCUMULATED FORCED OUTAGE DURATION CONTROL CHART

CONCLUSION





FIGURE 7-3: 2019 Control Charts-230kV Class 2

3 4

Test 1: FAIL+ 2019 performance remains below LCL

Test 2: FAIL+ At least 7 consecutive points since 2008 fall below the CL (V-Value=0.51)

Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 fall below LWL


Test 1: FAIL+ 2019 performance is below LCL



Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 fall below LWL


Test 1: FAIL+ 2019 performance remains above UCL

Test 2: FAIL+ At least 7 consecutive points since 2008 fall above the CL (V-Value=0.50)

Test 3: FAIL+ 2 of 3 consecutive pts including 2019 fall above UWL



performance improvement. Maintenance remains adequate.




DURATION -- ANNUAL AVERAGE ACCUMULATED FORCED OUTAGE DURATION CONTROL CHART


CONCLUSIONS




FIGURE 7-4: 2019 Control Charts-500kV Class 2

3

Test 1: PASS 2019 performance is within control chart upper and lower limits















12 of 12 tests passed.

Maintenance remains adequate.

CONCLUSIONS




DURATION -- ANNUAL AVERAGE ACCUMULATED FORCED OUTAGE DURATION CONTROL CHART




8. SUMMARY OUTAGE DATA1

2019 summary outage data for each of the ISO-controlled circuits in each voltage class are shown in the tables below. 2

3

kV Class Line Name Accumulated Outage Frequency Accumulated Outage Duration

69 BRIDGEVILLE-GARBERVILLE 13 4734

69 TRINITY-MAPLE CREEK 13 11958

69 ESSEX JCT-ORICK 11 3149

69 DELTA-MOUNTAIN GATE JCT 10 5344

69 HAT CREEK #1-WESTWOOD 10 782

69 KILARC-CEDAR CREEK 10 4266

69 MAPLE CREEK-HOOPA 10 9382

69 BURNS-LONE STAR #1 9 6002

69 COTTONWOOD-BENTON #1 9 2414

69 FORT ROSS-GUALALA 9 4185

69 IGNACIO-BOLINAS #2 9 7174

69 MIDDLE FORK #1 9 7502

69 SNEATH LANE - HALF MOON BAY 9 11719

69 BURNS-LONE STAR #2 8 5164

69 CARIBOU #2 8 6909

69 COLEMAN-RED BLUFF 8 606

69 CORTINA #2 8 1540

69 DEL MONTE-VIEJO 8 3692

69 IGNACIO-ALTO-SAUSALITO #1 8 3775

69 KILARC-DESCHUTES 8 580

69 MONTA VISTA-BURNS 8 5100

69 WEST POINT-VALLEY SPRINGS 8 2400

69 CARIBOU-PLUMAS JCT 7 3620

69 FRENCH MEADOWS-MIDDLE FORK 7 5396

69 GARBERVILLE-LAYTONVILLE 7 2218

69 KESWICK-TRINITY 7 8795

69 SOLEDAD #1 7 2677

69 CASCADE-BENTON-DESCHUTES 6 2328

69 COLGATE-ALLEGHANY 6 9434

69 DIXON-VACA #2 6 4187

69 HAMILTON BRANCH-CHESTER 6 2231

69 MERCED FALLS-EXCHEQUER 6 1321

69 SPAULDING-SUMMIT 6 6

69 TAFT-CUYAMA #1 6 587

69 BORDEN-COPPERMINE 5 1402

69 CLAY-MARTELL 5 2151

69 CORCORAN-ANGIOLA 5 5

69 CORCORAN-GUERNSEY 5 5



8. SUMMARY OUTAGE DATA (cont’d)1

2

Count kV Class Line Name Accumulated Outage Frequency Accumulated Outage Duration

39 69 CORTINA #3 5 527

40 69 CROW CREEK SW STA-NEWMAN 5 1095

41 69 DRUM-GRASS VALLEY-WEIMAR 5 1365

42 69 EXCHEQUER-INDIAN FLAT 5 957

43 69 FORT BRAGG-ELK 5 5166

44 69 GOLD HILL #1 5 1486

45 69 IGNACIO-ALTO-SAUSALITO #2 5 4346

46 69 LAURELES-OTTER 5 3475

47 69 LAYTONVILLE-WILLITS 5 1880

48 69 PIT #1-HAT CREEK #2-BURNEY 5 487

49 69 RIO DELL JCT-BRIDGEVILLE 5 5368

50 69 WASCO-FAMOSO 5 875

51 69 WILLOW PASS-CONTRA COSTA 5 5

52 69 CARIBOU-WESTWOOD 4 788

53 69 CHRISTIE-WILLOW PASS 4 4

54 69 CLEAR LAKE-KONOCTI 4 127

55 69 CORTINA #4 4 609

56 69 DEL MONTE-MONTEREY 4 121

57 69 ELK-GUALALA 4 1622

58 69 FULTON-CALISTOGA 4 5530

59 69 GLENN #1 4 1036

60 69 GLENN #2 4 132

61 69 HUMBOLDT-MAPLE CREEK 4 151

62 69 IGNACIO-ALTO 4 21

63 69 IGNACIO-BOLINAS #1 4 1027

64 69 MANTECA #1 4 452

65 69 MONTA VISTA-LOS ALTOS 4 1166

66 69 NICOLAUS-WILKINS SLOUGH 4 1705

67 69 ORO LOMA-CANAL #1 4 1315

68 69 PHILO JCT-ELK 4 1333

69 69 SALADO-NEWMAN #2 4 190

70 69 VIEJO-MONTEREY 4 2642

71 69 WEBER-MORMON JCT 4 450

72 69 WISHON-COPPERMINE 4 547

73 69 WISHON-SAN JOAQUIN #3 4 917

74 69 ARCO-TULARE LAKE 3 3

75 69 ATASCADERO-CAYUCOS 3 1173

76 69 COBURN-OIL FIELDS #2 3 739


77 69 COLEMAN-COTTONWOOD 3 410

78 69 COLUSA JCT #1 3 3

79 69 CONTRA COSTA-BALFOUR 3 2060

80 69 COPPERMINE-TIVY VALLEY 3 5939

81 69 COTTONWOOD #2 3 4330

82 69 COTTONWOOD-BENTON #2 3 727

83 69 COTTONWOOD-RED BLUFF 3 436

84 69 DEL MONTE-FORT ORD #1 3 20

85 69 DEL MONTE-FORT ORD #2 3 222

86 69 FULTON-HOPLAND 3 671

87 69 HUMBOLDT BAY-RIO DELL JCT 3 1712

88 69 KESWICK-CASCADE 3 2349

89 69 KONOCTI - MIDDLETOWN 3 140

90 69 LOS BANOS-LIVINGSTON JCT-CANAL 3 685

91 69 MONTE RIO-FORT ROSS 3 456

92 69 NEWARK-VALLECITOS 3 188

93 69 ORO LOMA-MENDOTA 3 8

94 69 SALINAS-FIRESTONE #2 3 2858

95 69 STAGG #1 3 87

96 69 STOCKTON A-WEBER #2 3 339

97 69 TEJON-LEBEC 3 2187

98 69 VACA-PLAINFIELD 3 1752

99 69 VALLEY SPRINGS #1 3 303

100 69 VOLTA-DESCHUTES 3 805

101 69 VOLTA-SOUTH 3 273

102 69 WEIMAR #1 3 866

103 69 WHEELER RIDGE-WEEDPATCH 3 439

104 69 ALMENDRA JCT-NICOLAUS 2 730

105 69 ARCO-CARNERAS 2 5

106 69 ARCO-CHOLAME 2 600

107 69 ARCO-TWISSELMAN 2 4838

108 69 BAIR-COOLEY LANDING #2 2 12

109 69 CARIBOU-TABLE MOUNTAIN 2 399

110 69 CARNERAS-TAFT 2 1490

111 69 CARUTHERS-LEMOORE NAS-CAMDEN 2 2

112 69 CAYUCOS-CAMBRIA 2 31

113 69 CENTERVILLE-TABLE MTN-OROVILLE 2 1662

114 69 COLEMAN-SOUTH 2 126




2


115 69 COLGATE-CHALLENGE 2 2

116 69 COLGATE-PALERMO 2 189

117 69 COLGATE-SMARTVILLE #2 2 9

118 69 COPUS-OLD RIVER 2 472

119 69 CORTINA #1 2 682

120 69 COTTONWOOD #1 2 4321

121 69 CRESCENT SW STA-SCHINDLER 2 61

122 69 DESABLA-CENTERVILLE 2 5079

123 69 ESSEX JCT-ARCATA-FAIRHAVEN 2 3036

124 69 GATES-COALINGA #2 2 2

125 69 GUERNSEY-HENRIETTA 2 668

126 69 HERDLYN-BALFOUR 2 543

127 69 HILLSDALE JCT-HALF MOON BAY 2 1262

128 69 HUMBOLDT BAY-HUMBOLDT #1 2 3522

129 69 KASSON-BANTA #1 2 4463

130 69 KASSON-LOUISE 2 114

131 69 KING CITY-COBURN #2 2 948

132 69 KONOCTI - EAGLE ROCK 2 51

133 69 LAS POSITAS-VASCO 2 398

134 69 LIVINGSTON-LIVINGSTON JCT 2 2

135 69 MENDOCINO-PHILO JCT-HOPLAND 2 560

136 69 MENDOTA-SAN JOAQUIN-HELM 2 2

137 69 MOUNTAIN GATE JCT-CASCADE 2 3893

138 69 NEWARK-LIVERMORE 2 251

139 69 NICOLAUS-PLAINFIELD 2 1001

140 69 PEACHTON-PEASE 2 538

141 69 POTTER VALLEY-WILLITS 2 2204

142 69 RADUM-VALLECITOS 2 15

143 69 REEDLEY-OROSI 2 530

144 69 SALADO-CROW CREEK SW STA 2 200

145 69 SALINAS-LAURELES 2 401

146 69 SCHINDLER-COALINGA #2 2 1648

147 69 SMARTVILLE-CAMP FAR WEST 2 4720

148 69 SOLEDAD #4 2 244

149 69 STOCKTON A #1 2 5136

150 69 STOCKTON A-WEBER #1 2 339

151 69 TAFT-ELK HILLS 2 34

152 69 TEMPLETON-ATASCADERO 2 265


153 69 VALLEY SPRINGS #2 2 672

154 69 VALLEY SPRINGS-MARTELL #1 2 2

155 69 WEBER-FRENCH CAMP #2 2 817

156 69 ATASCADERO-SAN LUIS OBISPO 1 26

157 69 COALINGA #1-COALINGA #2 1 1

158 69 COBURN-BASIC ENERGY 1 226

159 69 CONTRA COSTA-PITTSBURG 1 94

160 69 COOLEY LANDING-LOS ALTOS 1 1

161 69 CRESCENT SW STA-STROUD 1 1

162 69 DINUBA-OROSI 1 50

163 69 DIXON-VACA #1 1 1093

164 69 FAIRHAVEN #1 1 1

165 69 GLENN #3 1 1

166 69 GLENN #4 1 415

167 69 GLENN #5 1 522

168 69 GREEN VALLEY-WATSONVILLE 1 31

169 69 HAT CREEK #1-PIT #1 1 51

170 69 HELM-CRESCENT SW STA 1 1

171 69 HELM-KERMAN 1 1

172 69 HELM-STROUD 1 1

173 69 HUMBOLDT #1 1 4

174 69 HUMBOLDT BAY-EUREKA 1 257

175 69 JEFFERSON #1 1 707

176 69 JEFFERSON-STANFORD 1 2026

177 69 KASSON #1 1 413

178 69 KASSON-CARBONA 1 58

179 69 KEARNEY-BOWLES 1 400

180 69 KERN CANYON-MAGUNDEN-WEEDPATCH 1 1

181 69 KERN-MAGUNDEN 1 1

182 69 KING CITY-COBURN #1 1 1031

183 69 LAKEVILLE #1 1 249

184 69 LAKEVILLE-PETALUMA "C" 1 286

185 69 LAYTONVILLE-COVELO 1 186

186 69 LOCKEFORD-LODI #2 1 1


188 69 LOS BANOS-O'NEILL PGP 1 11

189 69 MANTECA-LOUISE 1 1

190 69 MARICOPA-COPUS 1 261




2


191 69 MENDOCINO-WILLITS 1 332

192 69 MENDOCINO-WILLITS-FORT BRAGG 1 121

193 69 MERCED-MERCED FALLS 1 502

194 69 MONTA VISTA-LOS GATOS 1 1

195 69 MONTE RIO-FULTON 1 592

196 69 NICOLAUS-MARYSVILLE 1 1

197 69 PALERMO-OROVILLE #1 1 687

198 69 PASO ROBLES-TEMPLETON 1 251

199 69 PIT #1-MCARTHUR 1 51

200 69 PLACER-DEL MAR 1 9

201 69 SALINAS-FIRESTONE #1 1 1

202 69 SALINAS-FORT ORD #1 1 1

203 69 SAN LUIS OBISPO-CAYUCOS 1 25

204 69 SAN MATEO-HILLSDALE JCT 1 1186

205 69 SMARTVILLE-NICOLAUS #1 1 593

206 69 SNEATH LANE-PACIFICA 1 34

207 69 SOLEDAD #2 1 1

208 69 STOCKTON "A"-WEBER #3 1 606

209 69 TABLE MTN- PEACHTON 1 1

210 69 TULUCAY-NAPA #2 1 1

211 69 VALLEY SPRINGS-CLAY 1 1

212 69 WATSONVILLE-SALINAS 1 1

213 69 WEEDPATCH-SAN BERNARD 1 510

214 69 WHEELER RIDGE-TEJON 1 13

215 69 WINDSOR -FITCH MOUNTAIN 1 1838

216 69 ALMADEN-LOS GATOS 0 0

217 69 ARCATA-HUMBOLDT 0 0

218 69 ARCO-POLONIO PASS PP 0 0

219 69 BAIR-COOLEY LANDING #1 0 0

220 69 BORDEN-GLASS 0 0

221 69 BORDEN-GLASS-BIOLA 0 0

222 69 BORDEN-MADERA #1 0 0

223 69 BORDEN-MADERA #2 0 0

224 69 BUTTE-CHICO #1 0 0

225 69 BUTTE-CHICO #2 0 0

226 69 BUTTE-ESQUON 0 0

227 69 CALIF AVE-KEARNEY 0 0

228 69 CAMDEN-KINGSBURG 0 0


229 69 CHRISTIE-FRANKLIN #1 0 0

230 69 CHRISTIE-FRANKLIN #2 0 0

231 69 CLEAR LAKE-HOPLAND 0 0

232 69 COALINGA #1-SAN MIGUEL 0 0

233 69 COBURN-OIL FIELDS #1 0 0

234 69 COLGATE PH-COLGATE SW STA 0 0

235 69 COLGATE-GRASS VALLEY 0 0

236 69 COLGATE-SMARTVILLE #1 0 0

237 69 CONTRA COSTA-DU PONT 0 0

238 69 COOLEY LANDING-STANFORD 0 0

239 69 DEL MAR-ATLANTIC #1 0 0

240 69 DEL MAR-ATLANTIC #2 0 0

241 69 DRUM-SPAULDING 0 0

242 69 EUREKA-STA "A" 0 0

243 69 EVERGREEN-ALMADEN 0 0

244 69 EVERGREEN-MABURY 0 0

245 69 EXCHEQUER-MARIPOSA 0 0

246 69 FAIRHAVEN-HUMBOLDT 0 0

247 69 FULTON - WINDSOR 0 0

248 69 FULTON-MOLINO-COTATI 0 0

249 69 GATES-HURON 0 0

250 69 GATES-JAYNE SW STA 0 0

251 69 GATES-TULARE LAKE 0 0

252 69 GLASS-BIOLA-MADERA 0 0

253 69 HAAS-WOODCHUCK 0 0

254 69 HALSEY-PLACER 0 0

255 69 HAMMER-COUNTRY CLUB 0 0

256 69 HARTLEY-CLEAR LAKE 0 0

257 69 HENRIETTA-KENT SW STA 0 0

258 69 HENRIETTA-LEMOORE 0 0

259 69 HENRIETTA-LEMOORE NAS 0 0

260 69 HERDLYN-TRACY 0 0

261 69 HUMBOLDT BAY-HUMBOLDT #2 0 0

262 69 HUMBOLDT-EUREKA 0 0

263 69 HURON-GATES- FIVE POINTS SW STA 0 0

264 69 JAYNE SW STA-COALINGA #1 0 0

265 69 JEFFERSON-HILLSDALE JCT 0 0

266 69 JEFFERSON-LAS PULGAS 0 0




2


267 69 KEARNEY ALTERNATE TIE 0 0

268 69 KEARNEY TIE 0 0

269 69 KEARNEY-BIOLA 0 0

270 69 KEARNEY-CARUTHERS 0 0

271 69 KEARNEY-KERMAN 0 0

272 69 KENT SW STA-TULARE LAKE 0 0

273 69 KERN-FRUITVALE 0 0

274 69 KERN-KERN OIL-FAMOSO 0 0

275 69 KERN-OLD RIVER #1 0 0

276 69 KERN-OLD RIVER #2 0 0

277 69 KILARC-VOLTA TIE 0 0

278 69 KINGSBURG-LEMOORE 0 0

279 69 LAKEVILLE #2 0 0

280 69 LIVERMORE-LAS POSITAS 0 0

281 69 LOCKEFORD #1 0 0

282 69 LOCKEFORD-INDUSTRIAL 0 0


284 69 LODI-INDUSTRIAL 0 0

285 69 LOS BANOS-MERCY SPRINGS SW STA 0 0

286 69 LOS BANOS-PACHECO 0 0

287 69 MARTIN - SNEATH LANE 0 0

288 69 MENDOCINO #1 0 0

289 69 MENDOCINO-HARTLEY 0 0

290 69 MERCED #1 0 0

291 69 MERCY SPRINGS SW STA-CANAL-ORO LOMA 0 0

292 69 MILLBRAE-SNEATH LANE 0 0

293 69 NICOLAUS-CATLETT JCT 0 0

294 69 PALERMO-OROVILLE #2 0 0

295 69 PEASE-HARTER 0 0

296 69 PEASE-MARYSVILLE-HARTER 0 0

297 69 POTTER VALLEY-MENDOCINO 0 0

298 69 RADUM-LIVERMORE 0 0

299 69 REEDLEY-DINUBA #1 0 0

300 69 RIO BRAVO HYDRO 0 0

301 69 SALINAS-FORT ORD #2 0 0

302 69 SALINAS-LAGUNITAS 0 0

303 69 SAN BERNARD-TEJON 0 0

304 69 SAN MATEO-BAIR 0 0


305 69 SAN MIGUEL-PASO ROBLES 0 0

306 69 SAN RAMON-RADUM 0 0

307 69 SCHINDLER-FIVE POINTS SW STA 0 0

308 69 SEMITROPIC-WASCO 0 0

309 69 SMARTVILLE-MARYSVILLE 0 0

310 69 SMARTVILLE-NICOLAUS #2 0 0

311 69 SOLEDAD #3 0 0

312 69 STAGG-COUNTRY CLUB #1 0 0

313 69 STAGG-COUNTRY CLUB #2 0 0

314 69 STAGG-HAMMER 0 0

315 69 TAFT-CUYAMA #2 0 0

316 69 TAFT-MARICOPA 0 0

317 69 TIVY VALLEY-REEDLEY 0 0

318 69 TULE-SPRINGVILLE 0 0

319 69 TULUCAY-NAPA #1 0 0

320 69 VALLEY SPRINGS-CALAVERAS CEMENT 0 0

321 69 VASCO-HERDLYN 0 0

322 69 WEBER-FRENCH CAMP #1 0 0

323 69 WEEDPATCH-WELLFIELD 0 0

324 69 WEIMAR-HALSEY 0 0

325 69 WHEELER RIDGE-LAKEVIEW 0 0

326 69 WHEELER RIDGE-SAN BERNARD 0 0




2


115 MIDWAY-TEMBLOR 10 2487

115 STANISLAUS-MANTECA #2 9 2642

115 OLEUM-"G" #2 7 5019

115 EL DORADO-MISSOURI FLAT #1 7 2758

115 CHOWCHILLA-KERCKHOFF 6 2703

115 WILSON-LE GRAND 6 1481

115 MI-WUK-CURTIS 6 1286

115 MELONES-CURTIS 6 135

115 MELONES-RACETRACK 6 6

115 WILSON-ORO LOMA 5 6479

115 GOLD HILL-BELLOTA-LOCKEFORD 5 5374

115 HUMBOLDT-TRINITY 5 3733

115 PARADISE-TABLE MOUNTAIN 5 2017

115 DRUM-RIO OSO #1 5 2015

115 SAN BENITO-HOLLISTER 5 901

115 TESLA-SALADO-MANTECA 4 4787

115 IGNACIO-SAN RAFAEL #3 4 3148

115 STANISLAUS-MELONES SW STA-RIVERBANK JCT SW STA 4 836

115 BELLOTA-RIVERBANK 4 279

115 CALLENDAR SW STA-MESA 4 185

115 MORGAN HILL-LLAGAS 3 8696

115 SMYRNA-SEMITROPIC-MIDWAY 3 7902

115 GEYSERS #3-CLOVERDALE 3 5070

115 LOWER LAKE-HOMESTAKE 3 4862

115 DIXON LANDING-MCKEE 3 4334

115 EAGLE ROCK-FULTON-SILVERADO 3 4322

115 EL DORADO-MISSOURI FLAT #2 3 4091

115 STOCKTON "A"-LOCKEFORD-BELLOTA #1 3 1696

115 NEWARK-AMES #3 3 1407

115 BRIDGEVILLE-COTTONWOOD 3 829

115 LIVE OAK-KERN OIL 3 608

115 PANOCHE-ORO LOMA 3 524

115 LAWRENCE-MONTA VISTA 3 416

115 HENRIETTA-LEPRINO SW STA 3 382

115 MIDWAY-TUPMAN-RIO BRAVO-RENFRO 3 338

115 OLIVE SW STA-SMYRNA 3 281

115 LLAGAS-GILROY FOODS 3 215

115 GREEN VALLEY-LLAGAS 3 214


115 CORCORAN-OLIVE SW STA 3 32


115 BOGUE-RIO OSO 3 3

115 DRUM-RIO OSO #2 3 3

115 IGNACIO-MARE ISLAND #2 3 3

115 RIO OSO-LINCOLN 3 3

115 STOCKTON A-LOCKEFORD-BELLOTA #2 2 5694

115 DRUM-HIGGINS 2 4735

115 SISQUOC-SANTA YNEZ SW STA 2 4561

115 DRUM-SUMMIT #2 2 4343

115 BRIGHTON-GRAND ISLAND #2 2 4321

115 GEYSERS #3-EAGLE ROCK 2 4321

115 MISSOURI FLAT-GOLD HILL #2 2 3077

115 RAVENSWOOD-BAIR #2 2 2271

115 TRINITY-COTTONWOOD 2 2133

115 VACA-VACAVILLE-JAMESON-NORTH TOWER 2 1719

115 TABLE MTN-BUTTE #1 2 1217

115 MOSS LANDING-DEL MONTE #1 2 1192

115 PITTSBURG-KIRKER-COLUMBIA STEEL 2 990

115 SONOMA-PUEBLO 2 816

115 NEWARK-NUMMI 2 796

115 WEST SACRAMENTO-DAVIS 2 684

115 LAKEVILLE-SONOMA #2 2 656

115 COOLEY LANDING-PALO ALTO 2 620

115 A-Y #1 2 591

115 WEST FRESNO-CALIFORNIA AVE 2 545

115 PITTSBURG-CLAYTON #4 2 493

115 RIPON-MANTECA 2 451

115 CASCADE-COTTONWOOD 2 441

115 LERDO-KERN OIL-7TH STANDARD 2 432

115 KERN-TEVIS-STOCKDALE 2 377

115 BRITTON-MONTA VISTA 2 347

115 EAGLE ROCK-CORTINA 2 344

115 SAN MATEO-MARTIN #6 2 306

115 MIDWAY-TAFT 2 272

115 PALERMO-NICOLAUS 2 154

115 HERNDON-WOODWARD 2 113

115 HERNDON-BULLARD #2 2 92

115 ATLANTIC-PLEASANT GROVE #2 2 88

115 SF AIRPORT-SAN MATEO 2 37

115 SOBRANTE-STANDARD OIL SW STA #2 2 25

115 CONTRA COSTA #1 2 2




2


115 CRAZY HORSE CANYON SW STA-SALINAS-SOLEDAD #1 2 2

115 CRAZY HORSE CANYON SW STA-SALINAS-SOLEDAD #2 2 2

115 EXCHEQUER-LE GRAND 2 2

115 FULTON-PUEBLO 2 2

115 MANCHESTER-AIRWAYS-SANGER 2 2

115 SEMITROPIC-MIDWAY #1 2 2

115 TEMBLOR-SAN LUIS OBISPO 2 2

115 NEWARK-AMES DISTRIBUTION 1 3864

115 STANISLAUS-MELONES SW STA-MANTECA #1 1 3767

115 SWIFT-METCALF 1 3249

115 SAN LUIS OBISPO-OCEANO 1 3081

115 UKIAH-HOPLAND-CLOVERDALE 1 3034

115 METCALF-EDENVALE #2 1 2090

115 BELLOTA-RIVERBANK-MELONES SW STA 1 1700

115 WOODLEAF-PALERMO 1 1407

115 OLEUM-MARTINEZ 1 917

115 KINGS RIVER-SANGER-REEDLEY 1 709

115 PIERCY-METCALF 1 679

115 CRAG VIEW-CASCADE 1 664


115 MARTIN-SF AIRPORT 1 579

115 PITTSBURG-COLUMBIA STEEL 1 549

115 FULTON-SANTA ROSA #1 1 433

115 VACA-SUISUN-JAMESON 1 421

115 VACA-SUISUN 1 417


115 EAGLE ROCK-REDBUD 1 363

115 BRIGHTON-DAVIS 1 353

115 CORTINA-MENDOCINO #1 1 349

115 MORAGA-OAKLAND #1 1 346

115 SOBRANTE-G #2 1 329

115 MORAGA-SAN LEANDRO #3 1 323

115 MISSOURI FLAT-GOLD HILL #1 1 309

115 GRANT-EASTSHORE #1 1 232

115 NEWARK-KIFER 1 218

115 DRUM-SUMMIT #1 1 203

115 LAKEVILLE-SONOMA #1 1 191

115 STELLING-WOLFE 1 138

115 MARTINEZ-SOBRANTE 1 137

115 X-Y #1 1 133


115 STONE-EVERGREEN-METCALF 1 131

115 CABRILLO-SANTA YNEZ SW STA 1 129

115 HERNDON-BULLARD #1 1 91

115 MANTECA-VIERRA 1 86

115 RIO OSO-WOODLAND #1 1 53

115 SHAFTER-RIO BRAVO 1 53

115 MIDWAY-RENFRO-TUPMAN 1 43

115 TESLA-TRACY 1 24

115 OLEUM-"G" #1 1 9

115 OCEANO-CALLENDER SW STA 1 7

115 HUMBOLDT-BRIDGEVILLE 1 4

115 BARTON-AIRWAYS-SANGER 1 1

115 BRIGHTON-GRAND ISLAND #1 1 1

115 CALIFORNIA AVE-MCCALL 1 1

115 DIVIDE-CABRILLO #1 1 1

115 GREEN VALLEY-PAUL SWEET 1 1

115 HERNDON-MANCHESTER 1 1

115 IGNACIO-MARE ISLAND #1 1 1

115 KERCKHOFF-CLOVIS-SANGER #1 1 1

115 KERN-TEVIS-STOCKDALE-LAMONT 1 1

115 KINGSBURG-WAUKENA SW STA 1 1

115 MARTIN-DALY CITY #2 1 1

115 MARTIN-EAST GRAND 1 1

115 MCCALL-REEDLEY 1 1

115 MCCALL-WEST FRESNO #2 1 1

115 MCKEE-PIERCY 1 1

115 MESA-DIVIDE #2 1 1

115 METCALF-EDENVALE #1 1 1

115 METCALF-GREEN VALLEY 1 1


115 MORRO BAY-SAN LUIS OBISPO #2 1 1

115 MOSS LANDING-DEL MONTE #2 1 1

115 OLEUM-NORTH TOWER-CHRISTIE 1 1

115 PANOCHE-EXCELSIOR SW STA #2 1 1

115 PARADISE-BUTTE 1 1

115 PEASE-RIO OSO 1 1

115 RIO OSO-NICOLAUS 1 1

115 RIVERBANK JCT SW STA-RIPON 1 1

115 SANGER-REEDLEY 1 1

115 SYCAMORE CREEK-NOTRE DAME-TABLE MTN 1 1




2


115 TESLA-SALADO #1 1 1

115 7th STANDARD-KERN 0 0

115 ADOBE SW STA-LAMONT 0 0

115 A-H-W #1 0 0

115 A-H-W #2 0 0

115 AMES DISTRIBUTION-AMES 0 0

115 A-P #1 0 0

115 APPLIED MATERIALS-BRITTON 0 0

115 ATLANTIC-PLEASANT GROVE #1 0 0

115 ATWATER-CRESSEY 0 0

115 ATWATER-EL CAPITAN 0 0

115 ATWATER-MERCED 0 0

115 A-X #1 0 0

115 A-Y #2 0 0

115 BAIR-BELMONT 0 0

115 BALCH-SANGER 0 0

115 BELL-PLACER 0 0

115 BUTTE-SYCAMORE CREEK 0 0

115 CAMP EVERS-PAUL SWEET 0 0

115 CHARCA-FAMOSO 0 0

115 CHRISTIE-SOBRANTE 0 0

115 C-L #1 0 0

115 CLAYTON-MEADOW LANE 0 0

115 CONTRA COSTA #2 0 0

115 CORONA-LAKEVILLE 0 0

115 COTTONWOOD-PANORAMA 0 0

115 CRAZY HORSE CANYON SW STA-HOLLISTER 0 0

115 CRAZY HORSE CANYON SW STA-SAN BENITO 0 0

115 CRESSEY-GALLO 0 0

115 C-X #2 0 0

115 C-X #3 0 0

115 DAIRYLAND-MENDOTA 0 0

115 DIVIDE-CABRILLO #2 0 0

115 D-L #1 0 0

115 DUMBARTON-NEWARK 0 0

115 EAST GRAND-SAN MATEO 0 0

115 EASTSHORE-DUMBARTON 0 0

115 EASTSHORE-MT EDEN #1 0 0

115 EASTSHORE-MT EDEN #2 0 0

115 EL CAPITAN-WILSON 0 0


115 EL PATIO-SAN JOSE "A" 0 0

115 EXCELSIOR SW STA-SCHINDLER #1 0 0

115 EXCELSIOR SW STA-SCHINDLER #2 0 0

115 FELLOWS-MIDSUN 0 0

115 FELLOWS-TAFT 0 0

115 FMC-SAN JOSE B 0 0

115 FULTON JCT-VACA 0 0

115 FULTON-SANTA ROSA #2 0 0

115 GOLD HILL-CLARKSVILLE 0 0

115 GRANT-EASTSHORE #2 0 0

115 GREEN VALLEY-CAMP EVERS 0 0

115 GWF-KINGSBURG 0 0

115 HERNDON-BARTON 0 0

115 HIGGINS-BELL 0 0

115 H-P #1 0 0

115 H-P #3 0 0

115 H-P #4 0 0

115 IGNACIO-SAN RAFAEL #1 0 0

115 K-D #1 0 0

115 K-D #2 0 0

115 KERCKHOFF #1-KERCKHOFF #2 0 0

115 KERCKHOFF-CLOVIS-SANGER #2 0 0

115 KERN OIL-WITCO 0 0

115 KERN-LIVE OAK 0 0

115 KERN-MAGUNDEN-WITCO 0 0

115 KERN-ROSEDALE 0 0

115 KERN-WESTPARK #1 0 0

115 KERN-WESTPARK #2 0 0

115 KIFER-FMC 0 0

115 KINGSBURG-CORCORAN #1 0 0

115 LAKEWOOD-CLAYTON 0 0

115 LAKEWOOD-MEADOW LANE-CLAYTON 0 0

115 LAMMERS-KASSON 0 0

115 LAMONT-GRIMMWAY-MALAGA 0 0

115 LE GRAND-CHOWCHILLA 0 0

115 LE GRAND-DAIRYLAND 0 0

115 LEPRINO FOODS-LEPRINO SW STA 0 0

115 LEPRINO SW STA- GWF HANFORD SW STA 0 0

115 LERDO-FAMOSO 0 0

115 LINCOLN-PLEASANT GROVE 0 0




2


115 LOS ESTEROS-MONTAGUE 0 0

115 LOS ESTEROS-NORTECH 0 0

115 LOS ESTEROS-TRIMBLE 0 0

115 MADISON-VACA 0 0

115 MARTIN-DALY CITY #1 0 0

115 MARTIN-MILLBRAE #1 0 0

115 MCCALL-CORCORAN 0 0

115 MCCALL-KINGSBURG #1 0 0

115 MCCALL-KINGSBURG #2 0 0

115 MCCALL-MALAGA 0 0

115 MCCALL-SANGER #1 0 0



115 MENDOCINO-REDBUD 0 0

115 MENDOCINO-UKIAH 0 0

115 MESA-DIVIDE #1 0 0

115 MESA-SANTA MARIA 0 0

115 MESA-SISQUOC 0 0

115 METCALF-EL PATIO #1 0 0

115 METCALF-EL PATIO #2 0 0

115 METCALF-EVERGREEN #1 0 0

115 METCALF-MORGAN HILL 0 0

115 MIDSUN-MIDWAY 0 0

115 MIDWAY-SHAFTER 0 0

115 MILLBRAE-SAN MATEO #1 0 0

115 MILPITAS-SWIFT 0 0

115 MONTA VISTA-WOLFE 0 0

115 MONTAGUE-TRIMBLE 0 0

115 MORAGA-CLAREMONT #1 0 0

115 MORAGA-CLAREMONT #2 0 0

115 MORAGA-LAKEWOOD 0 0




115 MORAGA-OAKLAND J 0 0


115 MORRO BAY-SAN LUIS OBISPO #1 0 0

115 MOSS LANDING-CRAZY HORSE CANYON SW STA #1 0 0

115 MOSS LANDING-CRAZY HORSE CANYON SW STA #2 0 0

115 MOSS LANDING-GREEN VALLEY #1 0 0

115 MOSS LANDING-GREEN VALLEY #2 0 0


115 MOSS LANDING-SALINAS #1 0 0

115 MOSS LANDING-SALINAS #2 0 0

115 MOUNTAIN VIEW-MONTA VISTA 0 0


115 NEWARK-APPLIED MATERIALS 0 0

115 NEWARK-DIXON LANDING 0 0

115 NEWARK-FREMONT #1 0 0

115 NEWARK-FREMONT #2 0 0

115 NEWARK-JARVIS #1 0 0

115 NEWARK-JARVIS #2 0 0

115 NEWARK-LAWRENCE 0 0

115 NEWARK-LAWRENCE LAB 0 0

115 NEWARK-MILPITAS #1 0 0

115 NEWARK-MILPITAS #2 0 0

115 NEWARK-NORTHERN RECEIVING STATION #1 0 0

115 NEWARK-NORTHERN RECEIVING STATION #2 0 0

115 NEWARK-TRIMBLE 0 0

115 NORTECH-NORTHERN RECEIVING STATION 0 0

115 NORTHERN RECEIVING STATION-SCOTT #1 0 0

115 NORTHERN RECEIVING STATION-SCOTT #2 0 0

115 NOTRE DAME-BUTTE 0 0

115 OAKLAND "J"-GRANT 0 0

115 OAKLAND C-MARITIME 0 0

115 PALERMO-BOGUE 0 0

115 PALERMO-PEASE 0 0

115 PALERMO-WYANDOTTE 0 0

115 PANOCHE-EXCELSIOR SW STA #1 0 0

115 PANOCHE-MENDOTA 0 0

115 PITTSBURG-MARTINEZ #1 0 0

115 PITTSBURG-MARTINEZ #2 0 0

115 PLACER-GOLD HILL #1 0 0

115 PLACER-GOLD HILL #2 0 0

115 P-X #1 0 0

115 P-X #2 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-AMES #1 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-AMES #2 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-BAIR #1 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-COOLEY LANDING #1 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-COOLEY LANDING #2 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-PALO ALTO #1 0 0

115 RAVENSWOOD-PALO ALTO #2 0 0




2

3


115 RAVENSWOOD-SAN MATEO 0 0

115 RIO OSO-WEST SACRAMENTO 0 0

115 RIO OSO-WOODLAND #2 0 0

115 SAN JOSE "A"-SAN JOSE "B" 0 0

115 SAN JOSE "B"-STONE-EVERGREEN 0 0

115 SAN LEANDRO-OAKLAND J #1 0 0

115 SAN LUIS OBISPO-SANTA MARIA 0 0

115 SAN MATEO-BAY MEADOWS #1 0 0

115 SAN MATEO-BAY MEADOWS #2 0 0

115 SAN MATEO-BELMONT 0 0



115 SANGER-CALIFORNIA AVE 0 0

115 SANGER-MALAGA 0 0

115 SANTA MARIA-SISQUOC 0 0

115 SANTA ROSA-CORONA 0 0

115 SCHULTE SW STA-KASSON-MANTECA 0 0

115 SCHULTE SW STA-LAMMERS 0 0

115 SEMITROPIC-CHARCA 0 0

115 SEMITROPIC-MIDWAY #2 0 0

115 SHEPHERD-WOODWARD 0 0

115 SILVERADO-FULTON JCT. 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-G #1 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-GRIZZLY-CLAREMONT #1 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-GRIZZLY-CLAREMONT #2 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-MORAGA 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-R #1 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-R #2 0 0

115 SOBRANTE-STANDARD OIL SW STA #1 0 0

115 STELLING-MONTA VISTA 0 0

115 TABLE MOUNTAIN-BUTTE #2 0 0

115 TEMBLOR-KERNRIDGE 0 0

115 TESLA-SCHULTE SW STA #1 0 0

115 TESLA-SCHULTE SW STA #2 0 0

115 TESLA-STOCKTON COGEN JCT 0 0


115 TRIMBLE-SAN JOSE B 0 0

115 TUPMAN-NORCO TAP 0 0

115 VACA-VACAVILLE-CORDELIA 0 0

115 VIERRA-TRACY-KASSON 0 0

115 WAUKENA SW STA-CORCORAN 0 0

115 WEST SACRAMENTO-BRIGHTON 0 0

115 WESTPARK-MAGUNDEN 0 0

115 WHEELER RIDGE-ADOBE SW STA 0 0

115 WHISMAN-MONTA VISTA 0 0

115 WHISMAN-MOUNTAIN VIEW 0 0

115 WILSON-ATWATER #2 0 0

115 WILSON-MERCED #1 0 0

115 WILSON-MERCED #2 0 0

115 WOODLAND-DAVIS 0 0




2


230 TESLA-NEWARK #2 2 4321

230 GREGG-HERNDON #2 1 4320

230 SARATOGA-VASONA 1 4320

230 DIABLO-MESA 3 3835

230 MORRO BAY-CALIFORNIA FLATS SW STA 2 3273

230 GOLD HILL-LODI STIG 3 2586

230 MORRO BAY-MESA 2 1970

230 COBURN-LAS AGUILAS SW STA 1 1778

230 MIDDLE FORK-GOLD HILL 3 1634

230 VASONA-METCALF 1 1617

230 GATES-PANOCHE #2 1 1535

230 PIT #3-PIT #1 5 1260

230 METCALF-MOSS LANDING #1 2 1247

230 CRESTA-RIO OSO 4 1156

230 PIT #1-COTTONWOOD 5 1138

230 PIT #3-CARBERRY SW STA 3 1113

230 LOS ESTEROS-METCALF 3 1102

230 MONTA VISTA-JEFFERSON #2 2 956

230 PARKWAY-MORAGA 2 765

230 BAHIA-MORAGA 2 698

230 RAVENSWOOD-SAN MATEO #1 1 622

230 GATES-MUSTANG SW STA #2 1 610

230 PITTSBURG-TIDEWATER 1 494

230 MORRO BAY-SOLAR SW STA #2 5 493

230 LONE TREE-CAYETANO 1 478

230 MONTA VISTA-SARATOGA 2 442

230 BUCKS CREEK-ROCK CREEK-CRESTA 3 381

230 CARBERRY SW STA-ROUND MTN 2 381

230 MORRO BAY-SOLAR SW STA #1 3 380

230 POE-RIO OSO 1 375

230 MORRO BAY-DIABLO 1 330

230 CARIBOU-TABLE MTN 2 290

230 PITTSBURG-SAN RAMON 1 255

230 IGNACIO-SOBRANTE 1 239

230 MOSS LANDING-COBURN 1 232

230 NEWARK-RAVENSWOOD 1 210

230 GREGG-HERNDON #1 1 183

230 NEWARK-LOS ESTEROS 1 142

230 PANOCHE-TRANQUILLITY SW STA #1 1 138

230 TESLA-RAVENSWOOD 1 78


230 BELLOTA-TESLA #2 1 25

230 WEBER-TESLA 1 25

230 LODI STIG-EIGHT MILE ROAD 2 9

230 GATES-MIDWAY 1 8

230 MIDWAY-WHEELER RIDGE #1 3 3

230 BALCH-MCCALL 2 2

230 BRIGHTON-BELLOTA 2 2

230 HERNDON-ASHLAN 1 2

230 TABLE MTN-RIO OSO 2 2

230 CONTRA COSTA-MORAGA #1 1 1

230 COTTONWOOD-DELEVAN #1 1 1

230 DELEVAN-CORTINA 1 1

230 DELEVAN-VACA #3 1 1

230 DELTA SWITCHING YARD-TESLA 1 1

230 ELECTRA-BELLOTA 1 1

230 GOLD HILL-EIGHT MILE ROAD 1 1

230 HELM-MCCALL 1 1

230 KERN-BAKERSFIELD 1 1

230 LOS BANOS-PANOCHE #2 1 1

230 MIDWAY-WHEELER RIDGE #2 1 1

230 PALERMO-COLGATE 1 1

230 RIO OSO-LOCKEFORD 1 1

230 ROCK CREEK-POE 1 1

230 TESLA-NEWARK #1 1 1

230 TIDEWATER-SOBRANTE 1 1

230 TRANQUILLITY SW STA-HELM 1 1

230 TRANQUILLITY SW STA-KEARNEY 1 1

230 VALLEY SPRINGS-BELLOTA 1 1

230 ARCO-MIDWAY 0 0

230 ATLANTIC-GOLD HILL 0 0

230 BELLOTA-COTTLE 0 0

230 BELLOTA-WARNERVILLE 0 0

230 BELLOTA-WEBER 0 0

230 BIRDS LANDING SW STA-CONTRA COSTA PP 0 0

230 BIRDS LANDING SW STA-CONTRA COSTA SUB 0 0

230 BORDEN-GREGG #1 0 0

230 BORDEN-GREGG #2 0 0

230 BRENTWOOD-KELSO 0 0

230 CALIENTE SW STA-MIDWAY #1 0 0

230 CALIENTE SW STA-MIDWAY #2 0 0




2


230 CALIFORNIA FLATS SW STA-GATES 0 0

230 CASTRO VALLEY-NEWARK 0 0

230 COLGATE-RIO OSO 0 0

230 CONTRA COSTA PP-CONTRA COSTA SUB 0 0

230 CONTRA COSTA-BRENTWOOD 0 0

230 CONTRA COSTA-DELTA SWITCHING YARD 0 0

230 CONTRA COSTA-LAS POSITAS 0 0

230 CONTRA COSTA-LONE TREE 0 0

230 CONTRA COSTA-MORAGA #2 0 0

230 CORTINA-VACA 0 0

230 COTTLE-MELONES 0 0

230 COTTONWOOD-DELEVAN #2 0 0

230 COTTONWOOD-GLENN 0 0

230 COTTONWOOD-LOGAN CREEK 0 0

230 COYOTE SW STA-METCALF 0 0



230 DOS AMIGOS PUMPING PLANT-PANOCHE 0 0

230 EASTSHORE-SAN MATEO 0 0

230 EIGHT MILE ROAD-STAGG 0 0

230 EIGHT MILE ROAD-TESLA 0 0

230 FULTON-IGNACIO #1 0 0

230 FULTON-LAKEVILLE 0 0

230 GATES-ARCO 0 0

230 GATES-MUSTANG SW STA #1 0 0

230 GATES-PANOCHE #1 0 0

230 GLENN-DELEVAN 0 0

230 GREGG-ASHLAN 0 0

230 HAAS-MCCALL 0 0

230 HERNDON-KEARNEY 0 0

230 HICKS-METCALF 0 0

230 HZ-1 0 0

230 HZ-2 0 0

230 JEFFERSON-MARTIN 0 0

230 KELSO-TESLA 0 0

230 LAKEVILLE-IGNACIO #1 0 0

230 LAKEVILLE-IGNACIO #2 0 0

230 LAKEVILLE-SOBRANTE #2 0 0

230 LAKEVILLE-TULUCAY 0 0

230 LAMBIE SW STA-BIRDS LANDING SW STA 0 0

230 LAS AGUILAS SW STA-PANOCHE #1 0 0

230 LAS AGUILAS SW STA-PANOCHE #2 0 0


230 LAS POSITAS-NEWARK 0 0

230 LOCKEFORD-BELLOTA 0 0

230 LOGAN CREEK-DELEVAN 0 0

230 LOS BANOS-DOS AMIGOS 0 0

230 LOS BANOS-PADRE FLAT SW STA 230kV Line 0 0

230 LOS BANOS-QUINTO SW STA 0 0

230 LOS BANOS-SAN LUIS PUMPS #1 0 0

230 LOS BANOS-SAN LUIS PUMPS #2 0 0

230 MELONES-WILSON 0 0

230 METCALF-MONTA VISTA #3 0 0

230 METCALF-MOSS LANDING #2 0 0

230 MIDWAY-KERN #1 0 0



230 MONTA VISTA-COYOTE SW STA 0 0

230 MONTA VISTA-HICKS 0 0

230 MONTA VISTA-JEFFERSON #1 0 0

230 MORAGA-CASTRO VALLEY 0 0

230 MORRO BAY-TEMPLETON 0 0

230 MOSS LANDING-LAS AGUILAS SW STA 0 0

230 MUSTANG SW STA-GREGG 0 0

230 MUSTANG SW STA-MCCALL 0 0

230 NEWARK E-F BUS TIE 0 0

230 NORTH DUBLIN-CAYETANO 0 0

230 NORTH DUBLIN-VINEYARD 0 0

230 PADRE FLAT SW STA-PANOCHE 230kV Line 0 0

230 PANOCHE-TRANQUILLITY SW STA #2 0 0

230 PEABODY-BIRDS LANDING SW. STA. 0 0

230 PITTSBURG-EASTSHORE 0 0

230 PITTSBURG-SAN MATEO 0 0

230 PITTSBURG-TASSAJARA 0 0

230 PITTSBURG-TESLA #1 0 0

230 PITTSBURG-TESLA #2 0 0

230 PITTSBURG-TESORO 0 0

230 QUINTO SW STA-WESTLEY 0 0

230 RANCHO SECO-BELLOTA #1 0 0

230 RANCHO SECO-BELLOTA #2 0 0

230 RAVENSWOOD-SAN MATEO #2 0 0

230 RIO OSO-ATLANTIC 0 0

230 RIO OSO-BRIGHTON 0 0

230 RIO OSO-GOLD HILL 0 0

230 ROUND MOUNTAIN-COTTONWOOD #2 0 0




2

3


230 ROUND MOUNTAIN-COTTONWOOD #3 0 0

230 SAN MATEO-MARTIN 0 0

230 SAN RAMON-MORAGA 0 0

230 SOLAR SW STA-CALIENTE SW STA #1 0 0

230 SOLAR SW STA-CALIENTE SW STA #2 0 0

230 STAGG-TESLA 0 0

230 TABLE MTN-PALERMO 0 0

230 TASSAJARA-NEWARK 0 0

230 TEMPLETON-GATES 0 0

230 TESLA-TRACY #1 0 0

230 TESLA-TRACY #2 0 0

230 TESLA-WESTLEY 0 0

230 TESORO-SOBRANTE 0 0

230 TIGER CREEK-ELECTRA 0 0

230 TIGER CREEK-VALLEY SPRINGS 0 0

230 TULUCAY-VACA 0 0

230 VACA-BAHIA 0 0

230 VACA-LAKEVILLE #1 0 0

230 VACA-LAMBIE SWITCHING STATION 0 0

230 VACA-PARKWAY 0 0

230 VACA-PEABODY 0 0

230 VINEYARD-NEWARK 0 0

230 WARNERVILLE-WILSON 0 0

230 WILSON-BORDEN #1 0 0

230 WILSON-BORDEN #2 0 0

230 ZA-1 0 0


1 500 ROUND MOUNTAIN-TABLE MOUNTAIN #1 4 2962

2 500 MALIN-ROUND MOUNTAIN #2 2 574

3 500 ROUND MOUNTAIN-TABLE MOUNTAIN #2 2 4996

4 500 VACA-TESLA 2 8640

5 500 LOS BANOS-GATES #1 1 2009

6 500 LOS BANOS-MIDWAY #2 1 65

7 500 MOSS LANDING-LOS BANOS 1 705

8 500 TRACY-LOS BANOS 1 39

9 500 DIABLO-GATES #1 0 0

10 500 DIABLO-MIDWAY #2 0 0

11 500 DIABLO-MIDWAY #3 0 0

12 500 GATES-MIDWAY 0 0

13 500 MOSS LANDING-METCALF 0 0

14 500 TABLE MOUNTAIN-TESLA 0 0

15 500 TABLE MOUNTAIN-VACA 0 0

16 500 TESLA-LOS BANOS #1 0 0

17 500 TESLA-METCALF 0 0

18 500 TESLA-TRACY 0 0



9. ORIGINAL CONTROL CHARTS FROM CAISO1

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9. ORIGINAL CONTROL CHARTS FROM CAISO (cont’d)1

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9. ORIGINAL CONTROL CHARTS FROM CAISO (cont’d)1

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ANNUAL TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE …2019 Electric Transmission Annual Availability...

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Transcript of ANNUAL TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE …2019 Electric Transmission Annual Availability...