ANNEXA - BBC Newsnews.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04butler_ann.pdfANNEXA LISTOFWITNESSES...
42
ANNEX A LIST OF WITNESSES Ministers Rt Hon Tony Blair MP - Prime Minister Rt Hon Jack Straw MP - Foreign Secretary Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP - Defence Secretary Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith, QC - Attorney General Officials (i) 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office Jonathan Powell Tim Dowse Sir David Omand John Scarlett Sir Andrew Turnbull (ii) Foreign and Commonwealth Office William Ehrman Sir Jeremy Greenstock Sir David Manning Sir Peter Ricketts Stephen Wright (iii) Ministry of Defence Admiral Lord Michael Boyce Air Marshal Joe French Julian Miller Lieutenant General Andrew Ridgway Sir Kevin Tebbit Simon Webb and four members of the Defence Intelligence Staff (iv) Members of the intelligence community Sir Richard Dearlove Eliza Manningham-Buller Dr David Pepper and one member of GCHQ, and two members of the Secret Intelligence Service International Organisations Dr Hans Blix 161
Transcript of ANNEXA - BBC Newsnews.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04butler_ann.pdfANNEXA LISTOFWITNESSES...
ANNEX A
LIST OF WITNESSES
Ministers
Rt Hon Tony Blair MP - Prime MinisterRt Hon Jack Straw MP - Foreign SecretaryRt Hon Geoff Hoon MP - Defence SecretaryRt Hon Lord Goldsmith, QC - Attorney General
Officials
(i) 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office
Jonathan PowellTim DowseSir David OmandJohn ScarlettSir Andrew Turnbull
(ii) Foreign and Commonwealth Office
William EhrmanSir Jeremy GreenstockSir David ManningSir Peter RickettsStephen Wright
(iii) Ministry of Defence
Admiral Lord Michael BoyceAir Marshal Joe FrenchJulian MillerLieutenant General Andrew RidgwaySir Kevin TebbitSimon Webband four members of the Defence Intelligence Staff
(iv) Members of the intelligence community
Sir Richard DearloveEliza Manningham-BullerDr David Pepperand one member of GCHQ, and two members of the Secret Intelligence Service
International Organisations
Dr Hans Blix
161
Former Chairs of the Joint Intelligence Committee
Sir Roderic BraithwaiteSir Colin BuddRt Hon Sir Percy CradockSir Paul LeverDame Pauline Neville JonesThe Hon Sir Michael Pakenham
Other witnesses
Dr John ChipmanMichael HermanDr Brian JonesJohn KampfnerDr David KayRt Hon Lord OwenDr Gary SamoreElizabeth Wilmshurstand two further witnesses who asked for their identities to be protected.
We also had meetings with Rt Hon Lord Hutton, Rt Hon David Blunkett MP, Rt Hon Michael HowardMP, Rt Hon Robin Cook MP, Rt Hon Clare Short MP, Sir Michael Jay and Sir Nigel Sheinwald.
162
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
AS
SE
SS
ME
NT
AN
D P
RE
SE
NT
AT
ION
: F
RO
M M
AR
CH
TO
SE
PT
EM
BE
R 2
00
2
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
JIC
(02
)059
: T
HE
ST
AT
US
OF
IR
AQ
I W
MD
PR
OG
RA
MM
ES
(1
5 M
arc
h
20
02
) (s
ub
sta
nti
al
ex
tra
cts
)
Ke
y Ju
dge
men
ts
I.Ir
aq r
eta
ins
up
to
20
Al
Hu
ss
ein
b
all
isti
c m
iss
ile
s, p
rod
uced
prio
r to
the
Gu
lf W
ar,
with
a r
an
ge
of
65
0km
an
d c
apa
ble
of
hittin
g I
sra
el.
The
lo
catio
n a
nd
con
diti
on
of
the
se
is
un
kno
wn
, b
ut th
ere
is s
uff
icie
nt
en
gin
ee
rin
g e
xpe
rtis
e to
ma
ke
th
em
o
pe
ratio
na
l.
II.
Ira
q h
as b
egu
n d
eve
lop
men
t of
me
diu
m r
an
ge b
allis
tic
mis
sile
s
ove
r 1
00
0k
m th
at co
uld
ta
rge
t co
un
trie
s th
rou
gho
ut th
e M
idd
le
Ea
st
an
d G
ulf R
eg
ion, b
ut
will
no
tb
e a
ble
to
pro
du
ce
su
ch
a m
iss
ile
b
efo
re 2
00
7 p
rovi
de
d s
an
ction
s
rem
ain
eff
ective
.
III.
Ira
q is p
urs
uin
g a
nu
cle
ar
wea
po
ns
pro
gra
mm
e.
Bu
t it w
ill
no
t b
e a
ble
to
in
dig
en
ou
sly
p
rod
uc
e a
nu
cle
ar
wea
po
n w
hil
e
sa
nc
tio
ns
re
main
in
pla
ce
, un
less
su
ita
ble
fis
sile
ma
teria
l is p
urc
ha
sed
fr
om
ab
road
.
IV.
Ira
q m
ay r
eta
in s
om
e s
toc
ks
of
ch
em
ica
l a
ge
nts
. F
ollo
win
g a
d
ecis
ion
to
do
so,
Ira
q c
ou
ld
pro
du
ce:
sig
nific
ant quantitie
s o
f m
us
tard
w
ith
in w
eek
s;
sig
nific
an
t qu
an
titie
s of
sa
rin
an
d
VX
wit
hin
mo
nth
s, a
nd
in
th
e c
ase
of
VX
ma
y h
ave
alre
ady
do
ne
so.
V.
Ira
q c
urr
en
tly
ha
s a
va
ila
ble
, e
ithe
r fr
om
pre
Gu
lf W
ar
sto
cks o
r m
ore
re
ce
nt p
rod
uct
ion
, a
num
be
r of
bio
log
ica
l a
ge
nts
. Ir
aq c
ou
ld
JIC
(02
)181
: IR
AQ
: S
AD
DA
M'S
D
IPL
OM
AT
IC A
ND
M
ILIT
AR
Y
OP
TIO
NS
(21
A
ug
us
t 2
00
2)
(re
lev
an
t e
xtr
ac
ts)
Ke
y Ju
dge
men
ts
V.
Ea
rly
on
in
an
y
co
nflic
t S
add
am
w
ou
ld o
rde
r m
issile
atta
cks
on
Isra
el,
co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s
an
d r
egio
na
l S
tate
s p
rovi
din
g
the
US
with
b
ase
s.
VI.
S
ad
dam
wo
uld
o
rde
r th
e u
se o
f C
BW
aga
inst
co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s
at
som
e p
oin
t,
pro
bab
ly a
fte
r a
co
alit
ion
att
ack
ha
d b
egu
n. O
nce
S
ad
dam
wa
s
co
nvi
nce
d t
ha
t h
is f
ate
wa
s
se
ale
d,
he w
ou
ld
ord
er
the
u
nre
str
ain
ed
use
of
CB
W a
ga
inst
co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s,
su
ppo
rtin
g
an
d I
sra
el.
...
Se
co
nd
ary
go
als
w
ill b
e t
o p
rese
rve
a
nd
en
ha
nce
his
W
MD
ca
pab
ility
.
… A
s w
e h
ave
JIC
(02
)202
: IR
AQ
I U
SE
OF
C
HE
MIC
AL
AN
D
BIO
LO
GIC
AL
WE
AP
ON
S –
P
OS
SIB
LE
SC
EN
AR
IOS
(9
S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
) (s
ub
sta
nti
al
ex
tra
cts
)
Ke
y Ju
dge
men
ts
I.
Ira
q h
as a
ch
em
ica
l and
b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns
ca
pab
ility
an
d S
ad
dam
is
pre
pa
red
to u
se it.
II
. F
ace
d w
ith
the
lik
elih
oo
d
of
mili
tary
de
fea
t a
nd
b
ein
g r
em
ove
d f
rom
p
ow
er,
Sa
ddam
is u
nlik
ely
to
be
de
terr
ed f
rom
usin
g
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al
we
ap
on
s b
y a
ny
dip
lom
atic o
r m
ilita
ry
me
an
s.
III. T
he
use
of
ch
em
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns p
rio
r to
a
ny
mili
tary
att
ack w
ou
ld
bo
ost su
pp
ort
fo
r U
S-le
d
actio
n a
nd is u
nlik
ely
.
IV. S
ad
dam
is p
rep
are
d t
o
ord
er
mis
sile
str
ike
s
aga
inst
Isra
el,
with
ch
em
ica
l o
r b
iolo
gic
al
wa
rhe
ad
s,
in o
rde
r to
w
ide
n t
he
wa
r o
nce
ho
stilit
ies b
egin
. V
. S
ad
dam
co
uld
ord
er
the
u
se
of
CB
W w
eap
on
s in
o
rde
r to
den
y sp
ace
and
te
rrito
ry t
o C
oa
litio
n
forc
es,
or
to c
au
se
ca
su
altie
s, s
low
an
y a
dva
nce
, a
nd s
ap U
S
mo
rale
. V
I. If
not
pre
vio
usly
e
mp
loye
d,
Sad
da
m w
ill
ord
er
the
in
dis
crim
ina
te
use
of
wh
ate
ver
CB
W
we
ap
on
s r
em
ain
ava
ilab
le
late
in
a g
rou
nd
cam
paig
n
EX
TR
AC
TS
FR
OM
TH
E G
OV
ER
NM
EN
T D
OS
SIE
R (
24
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
)
Ex
ec
uti
ve
Su
mm
ary
1.
Und
er
Sa
dda
m H
uss
ein
Ira
q d
eve
lope
d c
he
mic
al a
nd b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s,
acqu
ire
d m
issile
s a
llow
ing it
to a
tta
ck n
eig
hb
ou
rin
g c
ou
ntr
ies
with
th
ese
we
ap
on
s a
nd
pe
rsis
ten
tly
trie
d t
o d
eve
lop
a n
ucle
ar
bom
b.
Sa
ddam
ha
s u
sed
chem
ica
l w
ea
pon
s,
bo
th a
ga
inst
Ira
n a
nd a
ga
inst h
is
ow
n p
eo
ple
. F
ollo
win
g t
he
Gu
lf W
ar,
Ira
q h
ad
to
ad
mit to
all
this
. A
nd in
th
e c
ea
sefire
of
199
1 S
ad
dam
agre
ed u
nco
nd
itio
na
lly t
o g
ive
up
his
w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass d
estr
uctio
n.
2.
Mu
ch info
rma
tion
ab
ou
t Ir
aq's
we
ap
on
s o
f m
ass d
estr
uctio
n is
alre
ad
y in
the
pu
blic
do
ma
in f
rom
UN
re
po
rts
an
d f
rom
Ira
qi d
efe
cto
rs.
Th
is p
oin
ts c
lea
rly
to I
raq's
co
ntin
uin
g p
osse
ssio
n,
aft
er
19
91
, of
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
an
d w
ea
po
ns p
rod
uce
d b
efo
re t
he
Gu
lf
War.
It
sho
ws t
ha
t Ir
aq h
as r
efu
rbis
hed
site
s fo
rme
rly
asso
cia
ted
with
the
p
rod
uctio
n o
f che
mic
al a
nd b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nts
. A
nd
it
ind
ica
tes th
at Ir
aq
rem
ain
s a
ble
to
ma
nufa
ctu
re th
ese
age
nts
, an
d to
use
bo
mb
s,
she
lls,
art
ille
ry r
ocke
ts a
nd
balli
stic m
issile
s t
o d
eliv
er
them
.
3.
An
in
de
pe
nde
nt a
nd
we
ll-re
se
arc
he
d o
verv
iew
of
this
pub
lic e
vid
en
ce
w
as p
rovi
de
d b
y th
e I
nte
rna
tion
al In
stitu
te fo
r S
tra
tegic
Stu
die
s (
IIS
S)
on
9
Sep
tem
be
r. T
he I
ISS
re
po
rt a
lso
su
gge
ste
d th
at Ir
aq c
ou
ld a
ssem
ble
n
ucle
ar
we
apo
ns w
ith
in m
on
ths o
f o
bta
inin
g fis
sile
ma
teria
l fro
m f
ore
ign
so
urc
es.
4.
As
we
ll a
s t
he
pu
blic
evi
de
nce
, h
ow
eve
r, s
ign
ific
an
t a
dd
itio
na
l in
form
atio
n is a
vaila
ble
to
th
e G
ove
rnm
en
t fr
om
se
cre
t in
telli
ge
nce
so
urc
es, d
escri
be
d in
mo
re d
eta
il in
th
is p
ap
er.
Th
is in
telli
ge
nce
ca
nn
ot
tell
us a
bo
ut
eve
ryth
ing.
Ho
we
ver,
it
pro
vid
es a
fu
ller
pic
ture
of
Ira
qi
pla
ns a
nd
ca
pa
bili
tie
s. It
sh
ow
s t
hat
Sad
da
m H
usse
in a
tta
che
s g
rea
t im
po
rta
nce
to
po
sse
ssin
g w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass d
estr
uctio
n w
hic
h h
e
rega
rds a
s t
he
ba
sis
for
Ira
q's
re
gio
na
l p
ow
er.
It
sho
ws t
ha
t he
do
es n
ot
rega
rd t
hem
on
ly a
s w
ea
po
ns o
f la
st re
so
rt. H
e is r
ea
dy
to u
se
th
em
, in
clu
din
g a
ga
inst h
is o
wn
po
pu
lation
, a
nd is d
ete
rmin
ed t
o r
eta
in th
em
, in
bre
ach
of
Un
ited N
ation
s S
ecu
rity
Council
Re
so
lutions
(UN
SC
R).
5.
In
telli
ge
nce
als
o s
ho
ws t
ha
t Ir
aq is p
repa
rin
g p
lan
s to
co
nce
al
evi
de
nce
of
the
se
we
ap
on
s, in
clu
din
g in
crim
ina
tin
g d
ocu
me
nts
, fr
om
re
ne
we
d in
spe
ctio
ns. A
nd
it
confirm
s t
ha
t d
esp
ite
san
ctio
ns
and
th
e
po
licy
of
con
tain
me
nt,
Sa
ddam
ha
s co
ntin
ue
d t
o m
ake p
rogre
ss w
ith
his
ill
icit w
ea
po
ns p
rogra
mm
es.
6.
As
a r
esu
lt o
f th
e in
telli
ge
nce
we
ju
dge
th
at Ir
aq h
as:
Co
ntin
ue
d to
pro
du
ce c
he
mic
al a
nd
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
;
FO
RE
WO
RD
TO
TH
E
GO
VE
RN
ME
NT
DO
SS
IER
(s
ign
ed
b
y t
he
Pri
me
Min
iste
r)
The
do
cum
ent
pu
blis
he
d to
da
y is
b
ased
, in
la
rge
pa
rt, o
n t
he
wo
rk o
f th
e J
oin
t In
telli
ge
nce
Co
mm
itte
e
(JIC
). T
he J
IC is a
t th
e h
ea
rt o
f th
e
Bri
tish
in
telli
ge
nce
ma
chin
ery
. It
is
ch
aire
d b
y th
e C
ab
ine
t O
ffic
e a
nd
ma
de
up
of
the
he
ad
s o
f th
e U
K's
th
ree
In
telli
ge
nce a
nd
Se
cu
rity
A
ge
ncie
s,
the
Ch
ief
of D
efe
nce
In
telli
ge
nce
, a
nd
se
nio
r o
ffic
ials
fro
m
ke
y go
vern
me
nt d
ep
art
me
nts
. F
or
ove
r 6
0 y
ea
rs t
he
JIC
ha
s p
rovi
de
d
regu
lar
asse
ssm
en
ts to
su
cce
ssiv
e
Pri
me
Min
iste
rs a
nd s
en
ior
co
llea
gu
es o
n a
wid
e r
an
ge
of fo
reig
n
po
licy
an
d in
tern
atio
na
l se
cu
rity
is
su
es.
Its w
ork
, lik
e t
he
mate
ria
l it a
na
lyse
s,
is la
rge
ly s
ecre
t. I
t is
un
pre
ced
ente
d
for
the G
ove
rnm
en
t to
pu
blis
h th
is
kin
d o
f d
ocu
me
nt. B
ut
in lig
ht
of
the
d
eba
te a
bou
t Ir
aq a
nd W
eapon
s o
f M
ass D
estr
uctio
n (
WM
D),
I w
an
ted
to
sh
are
with
th
e B
ritish
pu
blic
the
re
aso
ns w
hy
I b
elie
ve th
is issu
e to
be
a
cu
rre
nt a
nd
se
riou
s th
rea
t to
th
e U
K
na
tion
al in
tere
st.
In r
ecen
t m
on
ths, I
ha
ve b
ee
n
incre
asin
gly
ala
rme
d b
y th
e e
vid
en
ce
fr
om
in
sid
e I
raq th
at d
esp
ite
sa
nction
s,
de
sp
ite t
he
da
ma
ge
do
ne
to h
is c
ap
ab
ility
in
th
e p
ast,
de
spite
th
e U
N S
ecu
rity
Co
un
cil R
eso
lutio
ns
exp
ressly
ou
tla
win
g it,
an
d d
esp
ite h
is
de
nia
ls, S
ad
dam
Hu
sse
in is
co
ntinu
ing t
o d
eve
lop
WM
D, a
nd
with
th
em
the
ab
ility
to
inflic
t re
al da
ma
ge
u
pon
the
re
gio
n, a
nd th
e s
tab
ility
of
the
wo
rld
.
Ga
the
rin
g in
telli
ge
nce
insid
e I
raq is
regio
na
l sta
tes
16
3
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
pro
du
ce m
ore
of
the
se b
iolo
gic
al
age
nts
with
in d
ays
.
VI.
A d
ecis
ion
to
be
gin
CB
W
pro
du
ctio
n w
ou
ld p
roba
bly
go
u
nde
tecte
d.
VII
. Ir
aq c
an
de
live
r C
BW
we
ap
on
s
by
a v
arie
ty o
f m
ea
ns
inclu
din
g
ba
llistic m
issile
s.
Ira
q's
CB
W
pro
du
cti
on
ca
pa
bilit
y i
s d
es
ign
ed
to
su
rviv
e a
mili
tary
att
ack a
nd
UN
in
sp
ection
s.
Inte
llig
en
ce
on
Ira
q’s
we
apo
ns o
f m
ass
de
str
uction
(W
MD
) a
nd
ba
llistic m
issile
p
rogra
mm
es is s
po
rad
ic a
nd p
atc
hy.
Ir
aq is a
lso
we
ll p
ractise
d in
th
e a
rt o
f d
ecep
tio
n, su
ch a
s c
once
alm
en
t a
nd
e
xagge
ratio
n.
A c
om
ple
te p
ictu
re o
f th
e
vario
us p
rogra
mm
es is t
he
refo
re
difficu
lt.
Bu
t it is c
lea
r th
at
Ira
q
co
ntinu
es to
pu
rsu
e a
po
licy
of
acqu
irin
g W
MD
and
the
ir d
eliv
ery
m
ean
s.
Inte
llige
nce in
dic
ate
s th
at
pla
nn
ing to
re
con
stitu
te s
om
e o
f its
pro
gra
mm
es b
ega
n in
19
95
. W
MD
p
rogra
mm
es w
ere
th
en
giv
en
a f
urt
he
r b
oo
st in
19
98 w
ith
th
e w
ith
dra
wa
l o
f U
NS
CO
M in
sp
ecto
rs.
Ba
llis
tic M
issil
es
Ir
aq h
as r
ebu
ilt m
uch
of
the m
ilita
ry
pro
du
ctio
n infr
astr
uctu
re a
sso
cia
ted
with
th
e m
issile
pro
gra
mm
e d
am
age
d
in t
he G
ulf W
ar
an
d t
he
fe
w h
igh
pro
file
site
s t
arg
ete
d in
Op
era
tio
n D
ese
rt F
ox
in 1
99
8.
Ne
w infr
astr
uct
ure
is b
ein
g
bu
ilt,
with
a p
art
icu
lar
focu
s o
n
imp
rovi
ng t
he
sup
po
rt to
the
so
lid
pro
pe
llan
t m
issile
pro
gra
mm
e.
Sin
ce
th
e G
ulf W
ar,
Ira
q h
as b
ee
n
op
en
ly d
eve
lop
ing s
ho
rt-r
an
ge
ba
llis
tic
mis
sile
s (
SR
BM
) u
p t
o a
ra
nge
of
15
0km
, w
hic
h a
re p
erm
itte
d
un
de
r U
N S
ecu
rity
Co
un
cil
Re
so
lutio
n
68
7. In
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s t
ha
t:
pre
viousl
y ju
dged,
eve
n if
insp
ect
ors
w
ere
allo
wed to
retu
rn, Ir
aq w
ould
em
bark
on a
re
new
ed p
olic
y of
frust
ratio
n, in
volv
ing
denia
l, dece
ptio
n,
obst
ruct
ion a
nd
dela
y.
… S
addam
could
:
Thre
ate
n the u
se
of W
MD
again
st
regio
nal s
tate
s.
Mis
sil
es
an
d W
MD
We
jud
ge
th
at
Sa
dd
am
wo
uld
p
rob
ab
ly o
rde
r m
iss
ile
att
ac
ks
on
Is
rae
l a
nd
th
e
co
alit
ion
ea
rly o
n in
a
co
nflic
t in
an
a
tte
mp
t to
att
ract
Isra
eli
reta
liatio
n
an
d t
hu
s w
ide
n t
he
w
ar,
sp
lit t
he
co
alit
ion
an
d
aro
use
po
pu
lar
op
inio
n in
th
e A
rab
S
tate
s.
Su
ch
m
issile
s c
ou
ld b
e
arm
ed
with
ch
em
ica
l o
r b
iolo
gic
al
wa
rfa
re
(CB
W)
ag
en
ts.
Sa
dd
am
mig
ht
be
de
terr
ed
, a
t le
ast
initia
lly,
by t
he
th
rea
t o
f Is
rae
li n
ucle
ar
reta
liatio
n.
Oth
er
facto
rs
wo
uld
be
th
e
limite
d n
um
be
r o
f lo
ng
ra
ng
e m
issile
s
Ira
q w
ou
ld h
ave
a
va
ilab
le(w
e
or
as a
fin
al a
ct
of
ven
ge
an
ce
. B
ut
such
an
o
rde
r w
ou
ld d
ep
en
d o
n
the
ava
ilab
ility
of
de
live
ry
me
an
s a
nd
th
e w
illin
gn
ess
of
com
ma
nd
ers
to
ob
ey.
Re
ce
nt
inte
llig
en
ce
casts
lig
ht
on
Ira
q’s
ho
ldin
gs o
f w
ea
po
ns
of
ma
ss d
estr
uctio
n a
nd
on
its d
octr
ine f
or
usin
g t
he
m.
Inte
llig
en
ce
re
ma
ins lim
ite
d
an
d S
add
am
’s o
wn
u
np
red
icta
bili
ty c
om
plic
ate
s
jud
ge
men
ts a
bou
t Ir
aqi u
se
of
the
se w
ea
po
ns. M
uch o
f th
is
pa
pe
r is
ne
cessa
rily
ba
se
d o
n
jud
ge
men
t a
nd a
sse
ssm
ent.
Ira
q u
se
d c
hem
ica
l w
ea
pon
s
on
a la
rge
sca
le d
urin
g th
e
Ira
n/I
raq W
ar.
Use
on
th
e
sa
me s
ca
le n
ow
wo
uld
re
qu
ire
la
rge
qu
an
titie
s of
ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns a
nd
su
rviv
ab
le d
eliv
ery
mea
ns in
th
e fa
ce
of
ove
rwh
elm
ing U
S
air s
up
erio
rity
. I
raq d
id n
ot
use
che
mic
al w
ea
po
ns
du
rin
g
the
Gu
lf W
ar.
In
telli
ge
nce
su
gge
sts
th
at Ir
aq m
ay
ha
ve
use
d th
e b
iolo
gic
al a
gen
t,
afla
toxi
n,
aga
inst th
e S
hia
p
opu
latio
n in
19
91
. W
e d
o
no
t b
elie
ve t
hat
Ira
q
po
sse
sse
s n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s
an
d th
ere
is n
o in
telli
ge
nce
th
at Ir
aq is c
urr
en
tly
inte
reste
d in
rad
iolo
gic
al
dis
pe
rsa
l de
vice
s.
Ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
log
ica
l c
ap
ab
ilit
ies
B
ase
d o
n in
telli
ge
nce
on
th
e
na
ture
of
Ira
qi C
BW
w
ea
po
ns,
kno
wn
de
live
ry
me
an
s,
con
tinu
ing
pro
cu
rem
ent
activi
ty,
an
d
ex p
erie
nce
fro
m p
revi
ou
s
Mili
tary
pla
ns f
or
the
use
of
chem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns,
inclu
din
g a
ga
inst
its o
wn
Sh
ia p
op
ula
tion
. S
om
e o
f th
ese w
ea
po
ns
are
dep
loya
ble
with
in 4
5 m
inu
tes
of
an
ord
er
to u
se t
he
m;
Co
mm
and
an
d c
on
tro
l arr
an
ge
men
ts in p
lace to
use
che
mic
al a
nd
b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns. A
uth
ority
ultim
ate
ly r
esid
es w
ith
Sa
dd
am
H
usse
in.
(Th
ere
is in
telli
ge
nce
th
at h
e m
ay
have
de
lega
ted
th
is
au
tho
rity
to
his
son
Qusa
i);
De
velo
pe
d m
ob
ile la
bora
tori
es f
or
mili
tary
use,
co
rro
bo
ratin
g e
arl
ier
rep
ort
s a
bo
ut
the
mob
ile p
rodu
ction
of
bio
logic
al w
arf
are
agen
ts;
Pu
rsu
ed
ille
ga
l p
rogra
mm
es to
pro
cure
con
tro
lled
ma
teria
ls o
f p
ote
ntia
l u
se in
th
e p
rod
uction
of
ch
em
ica
l and
bio
logic
al w
ea
pon
s
pro
gra
mm
es;
Trie
d c
ove
rtly
to
acqu
ire
te
chn
olo
gy
an
d m
ate
ria
ls w
hic
h c
ou
ld b
e
use
d in
the
pro
du
ctio
n o
f nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s;
So
ugh
t sig
nific
ant
qu
an
titie
s o
f u
ran
ium
fro
m A
fric
a,
de
sp
ite h
avi
ng
no
act
ive
civ
il n
ucle
ar
po
we
r p
rogra
mm
e t
ha
t co
uld
re
qu
ire
it;
Re
ca
lled
spe
cia
lists
to
wo
rk o
n its
nu
cle
ar
pro
gra
mm
e;
Ille
ga
lly r
eta
ine
d u
p to
20
al-H
usse
in m
issile
s, w
ith
a r
an
ge
of
650
km
, ca
pab
le o
f ca
rryi
ng c
he
mic
al o
r b
iolo
gic
al w
arh
ea
ds;
Sta
rted
de
plo
yin
g its
al-S
am
ou
d liq
uid
pro
pe
llan
t m
issile
, an
d h
as
use
d th
e a
bse
nce o
f w
ea
po
ns in
spe
cto
rs t
o w
ork
on
ext
en
din
g its
ra
nge
to
at
lea
st
20
0km
, w
hic
h is b
eyo
nd
the lim
it o
f 1
50
km
im
po
sed
b
y th
e U
nited
Na
tion
s;
Sta
rted
pro
du
cin
g t
he
so
lid-p
rop
ella
nt
Ab
ab
il-1
00
, a
nd
is m
akin
g
eff
ort
s to
ext
en
d its
range
to
at le
ast 2
00
km
, w
hic
h is b
eyo
nd
the
lim
it
of
15
0km
im
po
sed
by
the
Un
ited
Na
tion
s;
Co
nstr
ucte
d a
ne
w e
ngin
e t
est
sta
nd
fo
r th
e d
eve
lop
me
nt of
mis
sile
s
ca
pab
le o
f re
ach
ing t
he
UK
So
vere
ign
Ba
se
Are
as in
Cyp
rus a
nd
N
AT
O m
em
be
rs (
Gre
ece
and
Tu
rke
y),
as w
ell
as a
ll Ir
aq's
Gu
lf
ne
igh
bo
urs
an
d I
sra
el;
Pu
rsu
ed
ille
ga
l p
rogra
mm
es to
pro
cure
ma
teria
ls f
or
use
in its
ille
ga
l d
eve
lop
me
nt of
lon
g r
an
ge
mis
sile
s;
Le
arn
t le
sson
s f
rom
pre
vio
us U
N w
ea
po
ns insp
ection
s a
nd
ha
s
alre
ad
y b
egu
n to
co
nce
al sen
sitiv
e e
qu
ipm
ent
and
do
cum
enta
tion
in
ad
van
ce
of
the
re
turn
of
inspe
cto
rs.
no
t e
asy.
Sa
dd
am
's is o
ne
of
the
m
ost
secre
tive
and
dic
tato
ria
l re
gim
es
in t
he
wo
rld
. S
o I
be
lieve
pe
op
le w
ill
un
de
rsta
nd
wh
y th
e A
ge
ncie
s c
an
no
t b
e s
pe
cific
abo
ut th
e s
ou
rce
s,
wh
ich
h
ave
fo
rme
d th
e ju
dgem
ents
in
th
is
do
cum
en
t, a
nd w
hy
we
ca
nno
t p
ub
lish
eve
ryth
ing w
e k
no
w. W
e
ca
nno
t, o
f cou
rse
, p
ub
lish
th
e
de
taile
d r
aw
in
telli
ge
nce
. I a
nd
oth
er
Min
iste
rs h
ave
bee
n b
rie
fed
in d
eta
il o
n th
e inte
llige
nce
an
d a
re s
atisf
ied
a
s t
o its
auth
ority
. I
als
o w
an
t to
pa
y tr
ibu
te to
ou
r In
telli
ge
nce
and
Se
cu
rity
S
erv
ice
s f
or
the
oft
en
ext
rao
rdin
ary
w
ork
th
at
the
y d
o.
What I b
elie
ve t
he a
sse
sse
d
inte
llige
nce
ha
s e
sta
blis
he
d b
eyo
nd
d
oub
t is
th
at S
add
am
ha
s c
on
tin
ue
d
to p
rod
uce c
hem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s,
tha
t h
e c
on
tinu
es in
his
eff
ort
s to
de
velo
p n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s,
an
d th
at
he
ha
s b
ee
n a
ble
to e
xte
nd
the
ran
ge
of
his
ba
llistic m
issile
p
rogra
mm
e.
I a
lso
be
lieve
th
at, a
s
sta
ted
in
th
e d
ocum
en
t, S
add
am
will
n
ow
do
his
utm
ost
to t
ry t
o c
on
cea
l h
is w
ea
po
ns f
rom
UN
insp
ecto
rs.
The
pic
ture
pre
sen
ted
to
me
by
the
JIC
in
re
ce
nt m
onth
s h
as b
eco
me
m
ore
no
t le
ss w
orr
yin
g.
It is c
lea
r th
at, d
esp
ite
sa
nction
s, th
e p
olic
y of
co
nta
inm
en
t h
as n
ot w
ork
ed
suff
icie
ntly
we
ll to
pre
ven
t S
add
am
fr
om
de
velo
pin
g t
he
se
we
ap
on
s.
I am
in
no
do
ub
t th
at th
e t
hre
at
is
se
rio
us a
nd
cu
rre
nt,
tha
t he
ha
s
ma
de
pro
gre
ss o
n W
MD
, a
nd t
ha
t he
h
as to
be
sto
pp
ed
.
Sa
ddam
ha
s u
sed
chem
ica
l w
ea
po
ns,
no
t o
nly
aga
inst
an
en
em
y sta
te, b
ut
aga
inst h
is o
wn
pe
op
le.
Inte
llig
en
ce
re
po
rts m
ake
cle
ar
tha
t h
e s
ee
s th
e b
uild
ing u
p o
f h
is W
MD
ca
pab
ility
, a
nd
the
be
lief
ove
rse
as 1
64
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
the
15
0km
ran
ge
liq
uid
pro
pe
llan
t A
l S
am
ou
d m
issile
has b
een
e
xte
nsiv
ely
flig
ht-
teste
d.
Inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s th
at
Ira
q h
as
pro
du
ced
at
lea
st
50
Al S
am
oud
s,
inclu
din
g t
ho
se te
st fire
d,
an
d
pre
pa
ratio
ns a
re u
nd
erw
ay
to
de
plo
y so
me
of
the
se
to
mili
tary
u
nits.
Ira
q h
as r
epo
rted
ly
su
cce
ed
ed
in d
eve
lop
ing a
num
be
r of
20
0km
ra
nge
va
ria
nts
of
Al
Sa
mo
ud
, a
ltho
ugh
it is
un
cle
ar
if
the
se a
re fo
r op
era
tiona
l u
se
or
rese
arc
h a
nd
de
velo
pm
ent fo
r lo
nge
r-ra
nge
sys
tem
s. A
sm
all
nu
mb
er
of
tran
sp
ort
er-
ere
cto
r-la
un
che
rs (
TE
Ls)
ha
ve b
een
see
n,
alth
ou
gh
oth
ers
ma
y e
xist;
the
so
lid p
rop
ella
nt
Ab
ab
il-1
00
ha
s
als
o b
ee
n te
ste
d, a
nd
ha
s r
ea
ched
ra
nge
s u
p to
15
0km
. W
e ju
dge
tha
t th
is s
yste
m is lik
ely
to
be
com
e
op
era
tion
al a
s a
n S
RB
M w
ith
in 2
ye
ars
. It
mig
ht e
nte
r serv
ice
ea
rlie
r a
s a
n a
rtill
ery
ro
cke
t. In
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s th
at
Ira
q h
as p
lan
s to
e
xte
nd
th
e r
an
ge
of
the
Aba
bil-
10
0
to 2
50
km.
Imm
ed
iate
mis
sil
e c
ap
ab
ilit
y
We
jud
ge
tha
t Ir
aq
ha
s t
he
fo
llow
ing
m
issile
s a
va
ilab
le fo
r im
me
dia
te u
se
: S
om
e A
l S
am
ou
d (
up to
150
km
) U
p t
o 2
0 A
l H
usse
in (
65
0km
) T
he
re a
re a
lim
ite
d n
um
be
r o
f la
un
che
rs a
va
ilab
le.
Bo
th m
issile
s c
ou
ld d
eliv
er
ba
sic
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
log
ical w
arh
ea
ds.
We ju
dge
Ira
q h
as
als
o r
eta
ined
som
e
20
Al
Hu
ss
ein
mis
sil
es
(6
50
km r
an
ge
str
etc
hed
SC
UD
), t
he
typ
e f
ire
d a
t Is
rae
l a
nd
Sa
ud
i Ara
bia
du
rin
g t
he
Gu
lf
War.
We d
o n
ot
kno
w t
he
lo
catio
n o
f th
ese m
issile
s o
r th
eir s
tate
of
rea
din
ess,
bu
t ju
dge
tha
t th
e
en
gin
ee
rin
g e
xpe
rtis
e a
vaila
ble
wo
uld
asse
ss h
e h
as
reta
ine
d 1
2-2
0
65
0km
ra
ng
e A
l H
usse
in m
issile
s)
an
d t
he
ne
ed
, in
th
e c
ase
of
att
ackin
g c
oa
litio
n
forc
es in
Ku
wa
it,
to
de
plo
y s
ho
rt
ran
ge
mis
sile
s
(we
asse
sse
d in
M
arc
h t
ha
t a
t le
ast
50
15
0km
ra
ng
e
al-
Sa
mo
ud
mis
sile
s
ha
d b
ee
n
pro
du
ce
d;
mo
re
will
ha
ve
be
en
p
rod
uce
d s
ince
th
en
) in
to t
he
‘n
o
dri
ve
zo
ne
’.
Alth
ou
gh
a p
re-
em
pti
ve
mis
sile
a
tta
ck o
n I
sra
el
wo
uld
off
er
ma
ny
of
the
sa
me
a
dva
nta
ge
s,
we
ju
dg
e t
his
wo
uld
be
le
ss l
ike
ly b
eca
use
it w
ou
ld s
ho
w I
raq
h
ad
be
en
lyin
g
ab
ou
t its r
ete
ntio
n
of
lon
g r
an
ge
m
issile
s p
roh
ibite
d
by t
he
UN
, p
rovid
ing
a
justifica
tio
n f
or
US
a
ctio
n.
Alth
ou
gh
we
ha
ve
lit
tle
in
telli
ge
nce
on
Ir
aq
’s C
BW
d
octr
ine
, a
nd
kn
ow
litt
le a
bo
ut
Ira
q’s
C
BW
wo
rk s
ince
la
te 1
99
8, w
e
jud
ge
it
like
ly t
ha
t S
ad
da
m w
ou
ld
ord
er
the
use
of
CB
W a
ga
inst
co
nflic
ts,
we
ju
dge
th
at:
Ira
q c
urr
en
tly
ha
s
ava
ilab
le,
eithe
r fr
om
pre
G
ulf W
ar
sto
cks o
r m
ore
re
ce
nt p
rod
uct
ion
, a
n
um
be
r of
bio
logic
al
wa
rfa
re (
BW
) a
nd
ch
em
ica
l w
arf
are
(C
W)
age
nts
an
d w
ea
po
ns;
follo
win
g a
de
cis
ion
to
do
so
, Ir
aq c
ou
ld p
rod
uce
sig
nific
an
t qu
an
titie
s of
mu
sta
rd a
ge
nt
with
in
we
eks;
sig
nific
an
t qu
an
titie
s o
f th
e n
erv
e
age
nts
sa
rin
and
VX
w
ith
in m
on
ths (
and
in
th
e
ca
se
of
VX
Ira
q m
ay
ha
ve
alre
ad
y d
one
so
).
Pro
du
ctio
n o
f sa
rin
and
V
X w
ou
ld b
e h
ea
vily
d
epe
nde
nt o
n h
idde
n
sto
cks o
f p
recu
rso
rs,
the
siz
e o
f w
hic
h a
re
un
kno
wn
; Ir
aq c
ou
ld p
rod
uce
more
b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nts
with
in
da
ys.
At
the
tim
e o
f th
e
Gu
lf W
ar
Ira
q h
ad
d
eve
lop
ed t
he
le
tha
l B
W
age
nts
an
thra
x, b
otu
linu
m
toxi
n a
nd
afla
toxi
n.
Ira
q
wa
s a
lso
re
se
arc
hin
g a
n
um
be
r of
oth
er
age
nts
in
clu
din
g s
om
e n
on
-le
tha
l (in
ca
pa
citatin
g)
age
nts
;
eve
n if
sto
cks o
f ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns
are
lim
ited
, th
ey
wo
uld
a
llow
fo
r fo
cused
str
ikes
aga
inst
ke
y m
ilita
ry
targ
ets
or
for
str
ate
gic
p
urp
ose
s (
su
ch
as a
str
ike
a
ga
inst
Isra
el o
r K
uw
ait);
Ir
aq c
ou
ld d
eliv
er
CW
an
d
BW
agen
ts b
y a
va
rie
ty o
f m
ean
s in
clu
din
g f
ree
fa
ll b
om
bs, a
irb
orn
e s
pra
ys,
art
ille
rysh
ells
,m
ort
ar
7.
The
se
ju
dge
me
nts
refle
ct
the
vie
ws o
f th
e J
oin
t In
telli
ge
nce
C
om
mitte
e (
JIC
). M
ore
de
tails
on
th
e ju
dgem
en
ts a
nd o
n t
he
de
velo
pm
en
t of
the J
IC’s
asse
ssm
en
ts s
ince 1
998
are
se
t o
ut in
Part
1
of
this
pap
er.
PA
RT
1
IRA
Q'S
CH
EM
ICA
L,
BIO
LO
GIC
AL
, N
UC
LE
AR
AN
D B
AL
LIS
TIC
M
ISS
ILE
PR
OG
RA
MM
ES
CH
AP
TE
R 1
: T
he
Ro
le o
f In
tell
ige
nc
e (
ex
tra
ct)
1.
Sin
ce U
N in
spe
cto
rs w
ere
with
dra
wn
fro
m I
raq in
199
8, th
ere
has
be
en
little
ove
rt info
rma
tio
n o
n Ira
q’s
ch
em
ica
l, b
iolo
gic
al, n
ucle
ar
an
d
ba
llistic m
issile
pro
gra
mm
es.
Mu
ch o
f th
e p
ub
licly
ava
ilab
le in
form
atio
n
ab
ou
t Ir
aqi ca
pa
bili
tie
s a
nd
inte
ntio
ns is d
ate
d.
Bu
t w
e a
lso
ha
ve
ava
ilab
le a
ran
ge
of
secre
t in
telli
ge
nce
ab
ou
t th
ese p
rogra
mm
es a
nd
S
ad
dam
Hu
sse
in’s
inte
ntio
ns. T
his
com
es
prin
cip
ally
fro
m t
he
Un
ited
K
ingd
om
’s in
telli
ge
nce
an
d a
na
lysis
age
ncie
s –
th
e S
ecre
t In
telli
ge
nce
S
erv
ice
(S
IS),
th
e G
ove
rnm
en
t C
om
mun
ica
tion
s H
ea
dqua
rte
rs (
GC
HQ
),
the
Se
cu
rity
Se
rvic
e,
an
d th
e D
efe
nce
Inte
llige
nce
Sta
ff (
DIS
). W
e a
lso
h
ave
acce
ss to
in
telli
ge
nce
fro
m c
lose
alli
es.
2.
In
telli
ge
nce
ra
rely
off
ers
a c
om
ple
te a
cco
un
t o
f a
ctivi
tie
s w
hic
h a
re
de
sig
ne
d to
rem
ain
con
ce
ale
d. T
he
na
ture
of
Sa
dd
am
’s r
egim
e m
ake
s
Ira
q a
diff
icu
lt ta
rge
t fo
r th
e in
telli
ge
nce
se
rvic
es.
Inte
llig
en
ce
, h
ow
eve
r,
ha
s p
rovi
de
d im
po
rta
nt in
sig
hts
in
to Ira
qi p
rogra
mm
es a
nd
Ira
qi m
ilita
ry
thin
kin
g. T
aken
to
ge
the
r w
ith
wh
at
is a
lre
ad
y kn
ow
n f
rom
oth
er
so
urc
es,
this
in
telli
ge
nce
bu
ilds o
ur
und
ers
tan
din
g o
f Ir
aq’s
ca
pa
bili
tie
s a
nd a
dd
s
sig
nific
an
tly
to th
e a
na
lysis
alr
ea
dy
in t
he
pu
blic
do
ma
in. B
ut in
telli
ge
nce
so
urc
es n
eed
to b
e p
rote
cte
d,
an
d th
is lim
its th
e d
eta
il th
at ca
n b
e m
ad
e
ava
ilab
le.
3.
Ira
q’s
ca
pa
bili
tie
s h
ave
be
en r
egu
larl
y re
vie
we
d b
y th
e J
oin
t In
telli
ge
nce
Com
mitte
e (
JIC
), w
hic
h h
as p
rovi
de
d a
dvi
ce
to
th
e P
rim
e
Min
iste
r a
nd
his
sen
ior
co
llea
gu
es o
n th
e d
eve
lop
ing a
sse
ssm
en
t,
dra
win
g o
n a
ll a
vaila
ble
so
urc
es.
Pa
rt 1
of
this
pa
pe
r in
clu
de
s s
om
e o
f th
e m
ost sig
nific
an
t vi
ew
s r
ea
ch
ed
by
the J
IC b
etw
ee
n 1
999
an
d 2
002
.
CH
AP
TE
R 2
: Ir
aq
’s P
rog
ram
me
s, 1
97
1–
199
8 (
ex
tra
ct)
[Th
is h
isto
rica
l cha
pte
r co
vers
pa
st
Ira
qi re
sea
rch
in
to c
hem
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
al w
arf
are
; w
hat
qu
an
titie
s of
age
nt Ir
aq h
ad
pro
du
ced
by
the
e
arly
19
90
s;
its
use o
f ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns d
urin
g t
he
Ira
n/I
raq w
ar,
tha
t h
e w
ou
ld u
se
th
ese
we
ap
on
s, a
s
vita
l to
his
str
ate
gic
in
tere
sts
, an
d in
p
art
icu
lar
his
go
al o
f re
gio
na
l d
om
ina
tion
. A
nd
th
e d
ocu
me
nt
dis
clo
se
s t
ha
t h
is m
ilita
ry p
lan
nin
g
allo
ws f
or
som
e o
f th
e W
MD
to
be
re
ad
y w
ith
in 4
5 m
inu
tes o
f an
ord
er
to
use
th
em
.
I am
qu
ite
cle
ar
that
Sa
dda
m w
ill g
o
to e
xtre
me
le
ngth
s, in
de
ed
ha
s
alr
ea
dy
do
ne
so,
to h
ide
the
se
w
ea
po
ns a
nd
avo
id g
ivin
g t
he
m u
p.
In t
od
ay'
s in
ter-
dep
ende
nt
wo
rld
, a
m
ajo
r re
gio
na
l co
nflic
t d
oe
s n
ot sta
y co
nfine
d to
th
e r
egio
n in
qu
estio
n.
Fa
ce
d w
ith
som
eon
e w
ho
ha
s s
ho
wn
h
imse
lf c
apa
ble
of
usin
g W
MD
, I
be
lieve
th
e in
tern
atio
na
l co
mm
un
ity
ha
s to
sta
nd
up
fo
r itself a
nd e
nsu
re
its a
uth
ority
is u
ph
eld
.
The
th
rea
t p
ose
d to
in
tern
ation
al
pe
ace
and
se
curity
, w
he
n W
MD
are
in
th
e h
an
ds o
f a b
ruta
l an
d
aggre
ssiv
e r
egim
e lik
e S
ad
dam
's,
is
rea
l. U
nle
ss w
e f
ace
up
to
th
e t
hre
at,
n
ot o
nly
do
we
ris
k u
nde
rmin
ing t
he
a
uth
ority
of
the U
N,
wh
ose
re
so
lutio
ns
he d
efie
s, b
ut m
ore
im
po
rta
ntly
an
d in
the
lon
ge
r te
rm,
we
p
lace
at
risk t
he
liv
es a
nd
pro
spe
rity
of
ou
r o
wn
pe
op
le.
The
ca
se I
ma
ke is th
at
the U
N
Re
so
lutio
ns
dem
an
din
g h
e s
top
s h
is
WM
D p
rogra
mm
e a
re b
ein
g f
lou
ted
; th
at
sin
ce
th
e in
sp
ecto
rs le
ft f
ou
r ye
ars
ago
he
ha
s c
on
tinu
ed
with
th
is
pro
gra
mm
e;
tha
t th
e insp
ecto
rs m
ust
b
e a
llow
ed
ba
ck in
to
do
the
ir jo
b
pro
pe
rly;
an
d th
at
if h
e r
efu
se
s, o
r if
he
ma
ke
s it im
po
ssib
le f
or
the
m t
o d
o
the
ir jo
b, a
s h
e h
as d
on
e in
th
e p
ast
, th
e inte
rnatio
na
l com
mu
nity
will
ha
ve
to a
ct.
I b
elie
ve t
ha
t fa
ce
d w
ith
the
16
5
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
allo
w t
he
se
mis
sile
s t
o b
e e
ffe
ctive
ly
ma
inta
ined
.
Ira
q is s
ee
kin
g t
o d
eve
lop
ne
w,
larg
er
liq
uid
an
d s
oli
d p
rop
ell
an
t m
iss
ile
s,
co
ntr
ary
to
UN
lim
its. R
ece
nt
inte
llige
nce
in
dic
ate
s p
ers
on
ne
l a
sso
cia
ted
with
th
e A
l Sa
mo
ud
p
rogra
mm
e h
ave
no
w b
een
ta
ske
d to
co
ncen
tra
te o
n d
esig
nin
g liq
uid
p
rop
ella
nt
sys
tem
s w
ith
ra
nge
s o
f 2
000
-30
00
km
. N
ew
in
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s th
e m
ain
fo
cus m
ay
be
on
th
e
de
velo
pm
en
t of
a S
CU
D d
eriva
tive
, w
hic
h w
e ju
dge
ha
s a
n in
tend
ed r
an
ge
of
aro
un
d 1
20
0km
. W
ork
on
an
en
gin
e
for
this
sys
tem
be
ga
n in
199
8,
invo
lvin
g p
ers
on
ne
l w
ho
had
be
en
revi
ew
ing t
he
de
tails
of p
revi
ou
s A
l H
usse
in p
rod
uction
sin
ce
199
5,
alth
ou
gh
by
the
en
d o
f th
e y
ea
r 20
00
the
y w
ere
still
exp
eri
en
cin
g t
ech
nic
al
pro
ble
ms.
Ad
ditio
na
l pe
rso
nne
l w
ere
p
rob
ab
ly a
ssig
ne
d t
o o
the
r pa
rts o
f th
e
pro
gra
mm
e d
urin
g 2
000
. A
la
rge
sta
tic
test
sta
nd c
apa
ble
of
testin
g liq
uid
p
rop
ella
nt
en
gin
es b
igge
r th
an
th
e
SC
UD
en
gin
e h
as b
een
und
er
co
nstr
uction
sin
ce m
id-2
000
, p
rob
ab
ly
in s
upp
ort
of
this
pro
gra
mm
e. W
ork
on
la
rge
mo
tor
ca
se
s fo
r lo
nge
r-ra
nge
so
lid p
rope
llan
t sys
tem
s h
as b
een
n
ote
d o
ver
the
la
st 2
-3 y
ea
rs.
Pro
vid
ing
sa
nction
s r
em
ain
eff
ect
ive
, Ir
aq is
un
lik
ely
to
be
ab
le t
o p
rod
uc
e a
lo
ng
er-
ran
ge
mis
sile
be
fore
200
7.
De
sp
ite
re
tain
ing e
ngin
ee
rs w
ith
exp
ert
ise
in
mis
sile
desig
n a
nd
p
rod
uctio
n,
UN
sa
nc
tio
ns
an
d t
he
w
ork
of
the
in
sp
ec
tors
ha
ve c
au
se
d
sig
nific
an
t p
rob
lem
s for
Ira
q’s
mis
sile
in
du
str
y in
acqu
irin
g c
om
pon
en
ts a
nd
p
rod
uctio
n te
chn
olo
gy,
in
pa
rtic
ula
r fo
r im
pro
vin
g g
uid
an
ce
and
co
ntr
ol
sys
tem
s a
nd
the
refo
re m
issile
a
ccu
racy.
Ira
q is a
ctive
ly s
ee
kin
g t
o
pro
cure
ma
terials
fo
r its
mis
sile
p
rogra
mm
e.
co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s a
t so
me
po
int,
p
rob
ab
ly a
fte
r co
alit
ion
att
acks
ha
d b
eg
un
. Ir
aq
i C
BW
use
wo
uld
b
eco
me
in
cre
asin
gly
lik
ely
th
e c
lose
r co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s c
am
e t
o
Ba
gh
da
d.
Mili
tary
ta
rge
ts m
igh
t in
clu
de
tro
op
co
nce
ntr
atio
ns o
r im
po
rta
nt
fixe
d
targ
ets
in
re
ar
are
as s
uch
as p
ort
s
an
d a
irfie
lds.
Alt
ern
ati
ve
s
ce
na
rio
s a
nd
at
the
de
ath
It
is a
lso
po
ssib
le
tha
t S
ad
da
m m
igh
t p
urs
ue
an
extr
em
e
co
urs
e o
f a
ctio
n a
t a
n e
arl
ier
sta
ge
th
an
we
ha
ve
e
nvis
ag
ed
. .
. I
n
pa
rtic
ula
r,
un
ort
ho
do
x o
ptio
ns
mig
ht
inclu
de
:
The
ea
rly
or
pre
-e
mptive
use
of
CB
W- B
ecau
se
of
the
tim
e la
g
be
twe
en
in
fection
and
in
ca
pa
cita
tio
n,
the
re is s
om
e
ince
ntive
to
use
b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s e
arl
y.
Co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s w
ou
ld a
lso b
e
mo
st
ge
ogra
ph
ica
lly
co
ncen
tra
ted
bo
mb
s a
nd
ba
ttle
fie
ld
rocke
ts;
Ira
q t
old
UN
SC
OM
in
th
e
19
90
s tha
t it
fille
d 2
5
wa
rhe
ad
s w
ith
an
thra
x,
bo
tulin
um
to
xin
and
a
fla
toxi
n f
or
its A
l H
usse
in
ba
llistic m
issile
(ra
nge
6
50
km).
Ira
q a
lso
ad
mitt
ed it
ha
d d
eve
lop
ed
5
0 c
he
mic
al w
arh
ea
ds fo
r A
l H
usse
in. W
e ju
dge
Ira
q
reta
ins u
p to
20
Al
Hu
sse
ins a
nd
a lim
ited
nu
mb
er
of
laun
che
rs;
Ira
q is a
lso
de
velo
pin
g
sh
ort
-ra
nge
sys
tem
s A
l S
am
oud
/Aba
bil
10
0
ba
llistic m
issile
s (
ran
ge
1
50
km p
lus)
– O
ne
in
telli
ge
nce
re
po
rt
su
gge
sts
th
at Ir
aq h
as
“lo
st”
th
e c
ap
ab
ility
to
d
eve
lop
wa
rhe
ad
s
ca
pab
le o
f eff
ective
ly
dis
se
min
atin
g c
hem
ical
an
d b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt an
d
tha
t it
wo
uld
ta
ke s
ix
mo
nth
s to
ove
rcom
e the
“t
ech
nic
al d
iffic
ultie
s”.
H
ow
eve
r, b
oth
th
ese
m
issile
sys
tem
s a
re
cu
rre
ntly
be
ing d
ep
loye
d
with
mili
tary
un
its a
nd
an
e
me
rge
ncy
ope
ratio
na
l ca
pab
ility
with
co
nve
ntio
na
l w
arh
ea
ds
is
pro
bab
ly a
vaila
ble
; Ir
aq m
ay
ha
ve o
the
r to
xin
s,
ch
em
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
th
at w
e
do
no
t kn
ow
ab
out;
th
e e
ffe
ctiv
en
ess o
f a
ny
CB
W a
tta
ck w
ou
ld
de
pe
nd
on
th
e m
eth
od o
f d
eliv
ery
, co
nce
ntr
atio
n o
f th
e ta
rge
t, d
issem
ina
tion
eff
icie
ncy,
me
teo
rolo
gic
al
co
nd
itio
ns
an
dth
e
inclu
din
g a
ga
inst
its o
wn
(K
urd
ish
) citi
zen
s;
the
pro
gre
ss o
f its n
ucle
ar
pro
gra
mm
e b
y 1
99
1;
its b
alli
stic m
issile
pro
gra
mm
es; its u
se o
f su
ch
m
issile
s d
uri
ng t
he
first G
ulf w
ar;
an
d I
raq’s
ad
mis
sio
n t
o U
NS
CO
M o
f h
avi
ng h
ad
che
mic
al a
nd
bio
logic
al w
arh
ea
ds
ava
ilab
le f
or
its b
alli
stic
mis
sile
s.]
13
. B
ased
on
th
e U
NS
CO
M r
ep
ort
to t
he
UN
Se
cu
rity
Co
un
cil
in
Ja
nua
ry 1
99
9 a
nd e
arlie
r U
NS
CO
M r
ep
ort
s, w
e a
sse
ss t
hat
wh
en
th
e
UN
in
sp
ecto
rs left
Ira
q th
ey
we
re u
na
ble
to
acc
ou
nt fo
r:
up
to
36
0 to
nne
s o
f bu
lk c
hem
ica
l w
arf
are
age
nt,
inclu
din
g 1
.5 to
nne
s
of
VX
ne
rve
age
nt;
up
to
3,0
00
ton
ne
s of
pre
cu
rso
r ch
em
ica
ls,
incl
ud
ing a
pp
roxi
ma
tely
3
00
to
nn
es w
hic
h,
in the
Ira
qi ch
em
ica
l w
arf
are
pro
gra
mm
e, w
ere
u
niq
ue
to t
he
pro
du
ction
of
VX
; gro
wth
me
dia
pro
cure
d f
or
bio
logic
al a
ge
nt
pro
du
ctio
n (
en
ou
gh
to
p
rod
uce
ove
r th
ree
tim
es t
he
8,5
00
litre
s o
f an
thra
x sp
ore
s Ira
q
ad
mits
to h
avi
ng m
anufa
ctu
red
);
ove
r 3
0,0
00
spe
cia
l mu
nitio
ns
for
de
live
ry o
f ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al
age
nts
.
14
. T
he
de
pa
rtu
re o
f U
NS
CO
M m
ean
t th
at th
e in
tern
atio
na
l co
mm
un
ity
wa
s u
na
ble
to
est
ab
lish
the
tru
th b
eh
ind
the
se la
rge
dis
cre
pan
cie
s a
nd
gre
atly
dim
inis
he
d its
ab
ility
to
mo
nito
r a
nd
ass
ess I
raq’s
co
ntinu
ing
att
em
pts
to
re
co
nst
itu
te its
pro
gra
mm
es.
CH
AP
TE
R 3
: T
he
Cu
rre
nt
Po
sit
ion
: 1
99
8–
20
02
(ex
tra
ct)
1.
Th
is c
ha
pte
r sets
ou
t w
ha
t w
e k
no
w o
f S
ad
dam
Hu
sse
in’s
ch
em
ica
l,
bio
logic
al, n
ucle
ar
and
ba
llistic m
issile
pro
gra
mm
es, d
raw
ing o
n a
ll th
e
ava
ilab
le e
vid
en
ce
. W
hile
it
take
s a
cco
unt
of th
e r
esu
lts f
rom
UN
in
sp
ection
s a
nd
oth
er
pu
blic
ly a
vaila
ble
info
rma
tion
, it a
lso
dra
ws h
ea
vily
o
n th
e la
test
inte
llig
en
ce a
bo
ut Ir
aqi e
ffo
rts
to d
eve
lop
th
eir
pro
gra
mm
es
an
d c
ap
ab
ilitie
s s
ince 1
998
. T
he
main
co
nc
lus
ion
s a
re t
ha
t:
Ira
q h
as a
usea
ble
ch
em
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns c
ap
ab
ility
, in
b
rea
ch
of
UN
SC
R 6
87
, w
hic
h h
as in
clu
de
d r
ece
nt p
rod
uct
ion
of
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
;
Sa
ddam
co
ntin
ue
s t
o a
tta
ch
gre
at im
po
rtan
ce
to
the
po
sse
ssio
n o
f w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass d
estr
uctio
n a
nd
ba
llistic m
issile
s w
hic
h h
e r
ega
rds
as b
ein
g t
he
ba
sis
fo
r Ir
aq's
re
gio
na
l p
ow
er.
He
is d
ete
rmin
ed
to
re
tain
th
ese c
apa
bili
ties;
Ira
q c
an
de
live
r ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
usin
g a
n e
xte
nsiv
e
ran
ge
of
art
ille
ry s
he
lls, fr
ee
-fa
ll b
om
bs,
spra
yers
an
d b
alli
stic
mis
sile
s;
info
rma
tio
n a
vaila
ble
to
me
, th
e U
K
Go
vern
me
nt
ha
s b
ee
n r
igh
t to
su
ppo
rt t
he
de
ma
nd
s th
at
this
issu
e
be
confr
onte
d a
nd
de
alt
with
. W
e
mu
st e
nsu
re th
at h
e d
oe
s n
ot
ge
t to
u
se
th
e w
ea
pon
s h
e h
as,
or
ge
t h
old
of
the
we
ap
on
s h
e w
an
ts.
H
OU
SE
OF
CO
MM
ON
S,
TU
ES
DA
Y
24
SE
PT
EM
BE
R 2
00
2
The
Prim
e M
inis
ter:
Mr
Sp
ea
ke
r,
tha
nk
you
fo
r re
ca
llin
g P
arl
iam
en
t to
d
eba
te th
e b
est w
ay
to d
ea
l w
ith
the
is
su
e o
f th
e p
rese
nt
lea
de
rsh
ip o
f Ir
aq
an
d w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass d
estr
uction
.
Tod
ay
we
pu
blis
he
d a
50
-pa
ge
d
ossie
r, d
eta
ilin
g t
he
his
tory
of
Ira
q’s
w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass d
estr
uctio
n
pro
gra
mm
e,
its b
rea
ch o
f U
nite
d
Na
tio
ns r
eso
lutio
ns,
and
its
attem
pts
to
re
bu
ild t
ha
t ill
ega
l p
rogra
mm
e.
I h
ave
pla
ced
a c
op
y in
th
e L
ibra
ry.
At
the
en
d o
f th
e G
ulf w
ar,
th
e f
ull
ext
en
t of
Sad
dam
’s c
he
mic
al,
bio
logic
al a
nd n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s
pro
gra
mm
es b
ecam
e c
lea
r. A
s a
re
su
lt,
the
Un
ited
Nation
s p
asse
d a
se
rie
s o
f re
solu
tion
s,
de
man
din
g th
at
Ira
q d
isa
rm its
elf
of
such
we
ap
on
s
an
d e
sta
blis
hin
g a
re
gim
e o
f w
ea
pon
s
insp
ection
s a
nd
mon
itorin
g t
o d
o th
e
task. T
he
in
spe
cto
rs w
ere
to
be
giv
en
u
ncon
ditio
na
l an
d u
nre
str
icte
d a
cce
ss
to a
ll an
d a
ny
Ira
qi site
s.
All
this
is a
ccep
ted
fa
ct. I
n a
dd
itio
n,
it is
fa
ct,
do
cum
en
ted
by
UN
in
sp
ecto
rs,
tha
t Ir
aq a
lmo
st
imm
ed
iate
ly b
ega
n t
o o
bstr
uct th
e
insp
ection
s.
Vis
its w
ere
de
laye
d;
on
occa
sio
ns,
in
spe
cto
rs th
rea
ten
ed
; m
até
rie
l w
as m
ove
d;
spe
cia
l site
s,
sh
ut
to th
e in
spe
cto
rs, w
ere
u
nila
tera
lly d
esig
na
ted
by
Ira
q.
Th
e
wo
rk o
f th
e in
spe
cto
rs c
on
tinu
ed
, b
ut
aga
inst
a b
ackgro
und
of
incre
asin
g
ob
str
uction
an
d n
on
-com
plia
nce
.
16
6
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
Ch
em
ica
l a
nd
Bio
log
ica
l W
arf
are
(C
BW
) W
e c
on
tinu
e to
jud
ge
th
at
Ira
q h
as a
n
off
en
siv
e c
he
mic
al w
arf
are
(C
W)
pro
gra
mm
e,
alth
ou
gh
th
ere
is v
ery
little
in
telli
ge
nce
re
latin
g to
it.
Fro
m t
he
e
vid
en
ce
ava
ilab
le to
us,
we
be
lieve
Ir
aq r
eta
ins s
om
e p
rodu
ctio
n
equ
ipm
en
t, a
nd
som
e s
ma
ll sto
cks
of
CW
age
nt p
recu
rso
rs, a
nd
ma
y h
ave
h
idd
en
sm
all
qu
an
titie
s of
agen
ts a
nd
w
ea
po
ns.
An
om
alie
s in
Ira
qi
de
cla
ration
s to
UN
SC
OM
su
gge
st
sto
cks c
ou
ld b
e m
uch la
rge
r. G
ive
n t
he
siz
e a
nd
sco
pe
of
Ira
q’s
pre
Gu
lf W
ar
pro
gra
mm
e,
little
or
no r
ese
arc
h a
nd
de
velo
pm
en
t w
ork
wo
uld
nee
d to
be
ca
rrie
d o
ut.
In
telli
ge
nce
on p
rodu
ctio
n
facili
tie
s is s
ca
rce
; th
e r
eco
nstr
ucte
d
form
er
pre
cu
rso
r p
rod
uctio
n fa
cili
ty
ne
ar
Ha
bb
an
iya
h in
its
elf is in
su
ffic
ien
t to
sup
po
rt la
rge
-sca
le C
W a
ge
nt
pro
du
ctio
n. O
the
r in
dustr
ial ch
em
ica
l fa
cili
tie
s c
ou
ld b
e u
sed in
su
pp
ort
of
a
ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns p
rogra
mm
e, b
ut
we
h
ave
no
inte
llige
nce
to
su
gge
st
tha
t th
ey
are
cu
rre
ntly
be
ing u
se
d in
th
at
role
. In
telli
ge
nce
ha
s ind
ica
ted
an I
raqi
inte
rest
in t
ran
spo
rtab
le p
rodu
ction
fa
cili
tie
s f
or
ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns, b
ut
the
se c
ou
ld p
rod
uce o
nly
sm
all
am
ou
nts
of
age
nt a
nd
we
ju
dge
it
mo
re
like
ly t
ha
t th
e m
ob
ile u
nits a
re fo
r filli
ng
mu
nitio
ns r
ath
er
than
pro
du
cin
g a
ge
nt.
We a
sse
ss th
at fo
llow
ing a
de
cis
ion
to
do
so,
Ira
q c
ou
ld p
rod
uce
:
Sig
nif
ica
nt
qu
an
titi
es o
f m
us
tard
w
ith
in w
eek
s, u
sin
g h
idd
en
sto
cks
of
pre
curs
ors
and
with
su
ppo
rt f
rom
Ir
aq’s
ch
em
ica
l in
du
str
y;
Sig
nif
ica
nt
qu
an
titi
es o
f n
erv
e
ag
en
t w
ith
in m
on
ths
, m
ain
ly s
arin
a
nd
VX
. T
his
wo
uld
be
hea
vily
d
epe
nde
nt o
n h
idde
n s
tocks o
f p
recu
rso
rs.
Th
ere
ha
s b
een
on
e
un
co
rro
bo
rate
d r
epo
rt th
at
Ira
q f
ille
d
so
me a
rtill
ery
ro
cke
t m
un
itio
ns
with
V
X in
th
e p
erio
d 1
99
6-1
998
, an
d
dire
ctly
be
fore
or
at
the
on
se
t of
a
mili
tary
ca
mpa
ign
. H
e
mig
ht
als
o
co
nsid
er:
CB
W
terro
ris
m:
alth
ou
gh
S
ad
dam
p
rob
ab
ly la
cks
the
ca
pab
ility
to
d
ep
loy
a
so
ph
isticate
d
de
vice
, h
e c
ou
ld
ca
use
wid
esp
rea
d
pa
nic
.
Sh
ou
ld h
e f
ee
l h
is
fate
is s
ea
led
, S
ad
dam
’s
jud
ge
me
nt
mig
ht
ch
an
ge
to
‘b
rin
g t
he
te
mp
le d
ow
n’ on h
is
en
em
ies n
o m
atte
r w
ha
t th
e c
ost
to t
he
co
un
try
as a
wh
ole
, W
e ju
dge
tha
t a
t th
is
sta
ge
, S
ad
da
m
wo
uld
ord
er
the
u
nre
str
ain
ed
use
of
CB
W a
ga
inst
co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s,
su
ppo
rtin
g r
eg
ion
al
sta
tes a
nd
Isra
el,
a
lth
ou
gh
he
wo
uld
fa
ce
pra
cti
ca
l p
rob
lem
s o
f co
mm
an
d a
nd
co
ntr
ol,
th
e lo
yalty
of
his
co
mm
an
de
rs,
logis
tics p
rob
lem
s
an
d th
e a
vaila
bili
ty
of
che
mic
al o
r b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nts
in
su
ffic
ien
t q
ua
nti
tie
s t
o b
e
ava
ilab
ility
of
su
itab
le
defe
nsiv
e c
ou
nte
r m
ea
sure
s.
Oth
er
rece
nt
inte
llig
ence
in
dic
ate
s th
at:
p
rod
uctio
n o
f che
mic
al
an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns is
takin
g p
lace
; S
ad
dam
atta
che
s g
reat
imp
ort
an
ce
to
ha
vin
g
CB
W, is
com
mitte
d to
u
sin
g C
BW
if h
e c
an
an
d
is a
wa
re o
f th
e
imp
lica
tion
s o
f d
oin
g s
o.
S
ad
dam
wa
nts
it
to
do
min
ate
his
ne
igh
bours
a
nd
de
ter
his
en
em
ies
wh
o h
e c
on
sid
ers
are
u
nim
pre
sse
d b
y h
is
we
ake
ne
d c
on
ven
tion
al
mili
tary
ca
pa
bili
ty;
Ir
aq h
as le
arn
ed
fro
m th
e
Gu
lf W
ar
the
im
po
rtance
of
mo
bile
sys
tem
s th
at a
re
mu
ch h
ard
er
to h
it th
an
la
rge
sta
tic s
ite
s.
Co
nse
qu
ently
Ira
q h
as
de
velo
pe
d f
or
the
mili
tary
, fe
rmen
tatio
n s
yste
ms
wh
ich
are
ca
pab
le o
f b
ein
g m
ou
nte
d o
n r
oad
-tr
aile
rs o
r ra
il ca
rs.
These
co
uld
pro
du
ce B
W a
gen
t;
Ira
q h
as p
rob
ab
ly
dis
pe
rse
d its
spe
cia
l w
eapons,
inclu
din
g its
C
BW
we
ap
on
s.
In
telli
ge
nce
als
o in
dic
ate
s
tha
t ch
em
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
al m
un
itio
ns c
ou
ld
be
with
mili
tary
un
its a
nd
re
ad
y fo
r firin
g w
ith
in 2
0-
45
min
ute
s.
Inte
nti
on
s f
or
us
e
Inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s th
at
Sa
ddam
ha
s a
lre
ad
y ta
ke
n
the
de
cis
ion
th
at
all
Ira
q c
on
tin
ue
s to
wo
rk o
n d
eve
lop
ing n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s,
in b
rea
ch o
f its o
blig
atio
ns u
nde
r th
e N
on
-Pro
life
ratio
n T
rea
ty a
nd
in b
rea
ch o
f U
NS
CR
68
7.
Ura
niu
m h
as b
ee
n s
ou
gh
t fr
om
Afr
ica
tha
t ha
s n
o c
ivil
nu
cle
ar
ap
plic
atio
n in Ira
q;
Ira
q p
osse
sse
s e
xte
nde
d-r
an
ge
ve
rsio
ns o
f th
e S
CU
D b
alli
stic
mis
sile
in
bre
ach
of
UN
SC
R 6
87
wh
ich
are
ca
pab
le o
f re
ach
ing
Cyp
rus,
Ea
ste
rn T
urk
ey,
Te
hra
n a
nd
Isra
el. I
t is
als
o d
eve
lop
ing
lon
ge
r-ra
nge
ba
llistic m
issile
s;
Ira
q’s
cu
rre
nt
mili
tary
pla
nn
ing s
pe
cific
ally
en
vis
age
s t
he
use
of
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns;
Ira
q’s
mili
tary
fo
rce
s a
re a
ble
to
use
ch
em
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s,
with
com
man
d,
con
tro
l an
d lo
gis
tica
l a
rra
nge
me
nts
in
p
lace
. T
he
Ira
qi m
ilita
ry a
re a
ble
to
de
plo
y th
ese
we
ap
on
s w
ith
in 4
5
min
ute
s o
f a
de
cis
ion
to
do s
o;
Ira
q h
as le
arn
t le
sson
s fr
om
pre
vio
us U
N w
ea
po
ns in
sp
ectio
ns a
nd is
alre
ad
y ta
kin
g s
tep
s t
o c
on
cea
l a
nd
dis
pe
rse
se
nsitiv
e e
qu
ipm
en
t a
nd
do
cum
en
tatio
n in
ad
van
ce
of
the
re
turn
of
inspe
cto
rs;
Ira
q’s
ch
em
ica
l, b
iolo
gic
al, n
ucle
ar
an
d b
alli
stic m
issile
s p
rog
ram
me
s a
re w
ell-
fun
de
d.
CH
EM
ICA
L A
ND
BIO
LO
GIC
AL
WE
AP
ON
S
4.
In
the
la
st six
mo
nth
s t
he
JIC
ha
s c
onfirm
ed
its
ea
rlie
r ju
dge
me
nts
on
Ir
aqi ch
em
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
arf
are
ca
pa
bili
ties a
nd
asse
sse
d th
at
Ira
q
ha
s th
e m
ea
ns to
de
live
r ch
em
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns.
Re
ce
nt
inte
llig
en
ce
5.
Su
bse
que
ntly,
in
telli
ge
nce
ha
s b
eco
me
ava
ilab
le f
rom
re
liab
le
so
urc
es w
hic
h c
om
ple
me
nts
an
d a
dd
s to
pre
vio
us in
telli
ge
nce
and
co
nfirm
s th
e J
IC a
sse
ssm
ent
tha
t Ir
aq h
as c
he
mic
al a
nd b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s. T
he
in
telli
ge
nce
als
o s
ho
ws t
hat
the
Ira
qi le
ade
rsh
ip h
as b
een
d
iscu
ssin
g a
nu
mb
er
of
issu
es r
ela
ted t
o th
ese
we
ap
on
s. T
his
in
telli
ge
nce
co
vers
:
Co
nfi
rma
tio
n t
ha
t c
he
mic
al
an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns p
lay a
n
imp
ort
an
t ro
le i
n Ira
qi
mil
ita
ry t
hin
kin
g:
inte
llig
en
ce
sh
ow
s t
ha
t S
ad
dam
atta
che
s g
reat
impo
rta
nce
to
the
po
sse
ssio
n o
f che
mic
al
an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns w
hic
h h
e r
ega
rds a
s b
ein
g t
he b
asis
fo
r Ir
aqi
regio
na
l p
ow
er.
He
be
lieve
s t
ha
t re
spe
ct fo
r Ir
aq r
ests
on
its
p
osse
ssio
n o
f th
ese
we
apo
ns a
nd
th
e m
issile
s c
ap
ab
le o
f de
live
rin
g
the
m.
Inte
llig
en
ce
ind
ica
tes th
at S
ad
da
m is d
ete
rmin
ed
to
re
tain
th
is
ca
pab
ility
an
d r
eco
gn
ise
s t
ha
t Ir
aqi p
olit
ica
l w
eig
ht
wo
uld
be
d
imin
ish
ed
if Ira
q's
mili
tary
po
we
r re
ste
d s
ole
ly o
n its
co
nve
ntio
na
l m
ilita
ryfo
rce
s.
Ind
ee
d, Ir
aq d
en
ied
tha
t its b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s p
rogra
mm
e e
xiste
d u
ntil
forc
ed
to
ackn
ow
led
ge
it
aft
er
hig
h-
ran
kin
g d
efe
cto
rs d
isclo
se
d its
e
xiste
nce
in
19
95
.
Eve
ntu
ally
, in
199
7, th
e U
N
insp
ecto
rs d
ecla
red
tha
t th
ey
we
re
un
ab
le t
o f
ulfil
the
ir t
ask
. A
ye
ar
of
ne
go
tia
tion
an
d fu
rth
er
ob
str
uctio
n
occu
rre
d u
ntil f
ina
lly,
in la
te 1
998
, th
e
UN
te
am
wa
s f
orc
ed
to w
ith
dra
w.
As t
he d
ossie
r se
ts o
ut, w
e e
stim
ate
o
n th
e b
asis
of
the
UN
’s w
ork
th
at
the
re w
ere
up t
o 3
60
to
nne
s o
f b
ulk
ch
em
ica
l w
arf
are
age
nts
, in
clu
din
g
1.5
to
nn
es o
f V
X n
erv
e a
ge
nt;
up
to
3
,000
to
nne
s o
f p
recu
rso
r ch
em
ica
ls;
gro
wth
me
dia
suff
icie
nt to
pro
du
ce
26
,00
0 litre
s o
f a
nth
rax
sp
ore
s; a
nd
o
ver
30
,000
spe
cia
l mu
nitio
ns
for
de
live
ry o
f ch
em
ica
l and
bio
logic
al
age
nts
. A
ll of
this
wa
s m
issin
g a
nd
un
acco
un
ted
fo
r.
Mili
tary
actio
n b
y th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s
an
d U
nite
d K
ingd
om
follo
we
d a
nd
a
ce
rta
in a
mou
nt of
infr
astr
uctu
re fo
r Ir
aq’s
we
ap
on
s of
ma
ss d
estr
uctio
n
an
d m
issile
ca
pa
bili
ty w
as d
estr
oye
d,
se
ttin
g t
he
Ira
qi p
rogra
mm
e b
ack, b
ut
no
t e
nd
ing it.
Fro
m la
te 1
99
8 o
nw
ard
s,
the
refo
re,
the
so
le in
hib
itio
n o
n S
ad
da
m’s
WM
D
pro
gra
mm
e w
as t
he
san
ctio
ns
regim
e.
Ira
q w
as f
orb
idd
en
to
use
th
e
reve
nu
e f
rom
its
oil
exc
ep
t fo
r ce
rta
in
sp
ecifie
d n
on
-mili
tary
pu
rpo
se
s. T
he
sa
nction
s r
egim
e, h
ow
eve
r, w
as a
lso
su
bje
ct to
ille
ga
l tr
ad
ing
an
d a
bu
se
. B
eca
use
of
con
ce
rns a
bo
ut its
ina
de
qu
acy—
and
the
imp
act
on
the
Ir
aqi p
eo
ple
—w
e m
ade
se
vera
l a
ttem
pts
to
refin
e it,
culm
ina
tin
g in
a
ne
w U
N r
eso
lutio
n in
Ma
y o
f th
is
yea
r. B
ut
it w
as o
nly
pa
rtia
lly
eff
ective
. A
rou
nd
$3 b
illio
n o
f m
on
ey
is ille
ga
lly t
ake
n b
y S
ad
da
m e
very
16
7
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
an
oth
er
tha
t a
te
am
of ch
em
ists
w
as f
orm
ed
in 1
99
8 to
pro
du
ce 5
to
ns o
f V
X. T
he
sou
rce w
as t
old
th
is
ha
d b
een
com
ple
ted
by
the
end
of
19
98
; In
ca
pa
cita
nts
in
clu
din
g t
he
men
tal
inca
pa
cita
nt A
ge
nt 1
5.
Ira
q’s
mili
tary
fo
rce
s u
sed
ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns d
urin
g t
he
Ira
n-I
raq W
ar.
In
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s c
om
ma
nd
, co
ntr
ol an
d lo
gis
tica
l a
rra
nge
men
ts a
re
in p
lace.
Imm
ed
iate
CB
W c
ap
ab
ility
T
he
fo
llow
ing
che
mic
al a
gen
ts c
ou
ld b
e
pro
du
ce
d w
ith
in w
ee
ks,
if n
ot
alre
ad
y:
Mu
sta
rd,
sa
rin
and
VX
; T
he
fo
llow
ing
bio
log
ical a
gen
ts c
ou
ld
be
pro
du
ce
d w
ith
in d
ays,
if n
ot
alre
ad
y:
An
thra
x s
po
res,
bo
tulin
um
to
xin
, a
fla
toxin
and
po
ssib
ly p
lag
ue
T
he
se
co
uld
be
de
live
red
by a
va
rie
ty
of
me
an
s,
inclu
din
g b
alli
stic m
issile
s
an
d s
pe
cia
l fo
rce
s.
Ira
q w
as f
orc
ed b
y U
NS
CO
M
dis
co
verie
s a
nd
th
e d
efe
ctio
n o
f H
usse
in K
am
il to
ad
mit
to h
avi
ng h
ad
a
bio
log
ica
l w
arf
are
(B
W)
pro
gra
mm
e
at
the
tim
e o
f th
e G
ulf W
ar.
B
W w
ork
co
ntinu
ed
th
rou
gh
ou
t th
e p
erio
d o
f U
NS
CO
M in
sp
ectio
ns
an
d in
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s th
at
this
pro
gra
mm
e
co
ntinu
es. K
ey
figu
res f
rom
th
e p
re-
Gu
lf W
ar
pro
gra
mm
e a
re r
ep
ort
ed
to
b
e in
volv
ed
. R
ese
arc
h a
nd
d
eve
lop
me
nt is
asse
sse
d to
con
tin
ue
u
nde
r co
ver
of
a n
um
be
r of
legitim
ate
in
stitu
tes
and
po
ssib
ly in
a n
um
be
r of
co
vert
fa
cili
tie
s.
We ju
dge
tha
t Ir
aq c
ould
pro
du
ce
sig
nific
an
t qu
an
titie
s of
BW
agen
ts
with
in d
ays
of
a d
ecis
ion
to
do
so
. T
he
re is n
o in
telli
ge
nce
on a
ny
BW
a
ge
nt
pro
du
ctio
n fa
cili
tie
s,
bu
t o
ne
so
urc
e ind
ica
tes
tha
t Ir
aq m
ay
ha
ve
eff
ecti
ve
an
d t
he
m
ea
ns t
o d
elive
r th
em
.
reso
urc
es,
inclu
din
g C
BW
, b
e
use
d to
defe
nd
th
e r
egim
e
from
att
ack.
O
ne
rep
ort
sta
tes th
at
Sad
da
m w
ou
ld n
ot
use
CB
W d
urin
g t
he
in
itia
l a
ir
ph
ase
of
an
y m
ilita
ry
ca
mpa
ign
but
wo
uld
use
C
BW
on
ce
a g
rou
nd inva
sio
n
of
Ira
q h
as
be
gun
. F
ace
d w
ith
th
e lik
elih
oo
d o
f m
ilita
ry
defe
at a
nd b
ein
g r
em
ove
d
from
po
we
r, w
e ju
dge
th
at
it
is u
nlik
ely
th
ere
wo
uld
be
an
y w
ay
to d
ete
r S
ad
dam
fro
m
usin
g C
BW
.
We ju
dge
tha
t se
vera
l fa
cto
rs
co
uld
influ
en
ce th
e t
imin
g o
f a
d
ecis
ion
by
Sa
dda
m t
o
au
tho
rise
the
u
se
of
CB
W
we
ap
on
s;
the
ava
ilab
ility
of
sto
cks
of
CW
and
BW
agen
ts;
the
su
rviv
ab
ility
of
his
d
eliv
ery
me
an
s. M
an
y a
re
vuln
era
ble
. O
nce
a
mili
tary
ca
mp
aig
n is
un
de
rwa
y th
e p
ressu
re
will
in
cre
ase
to
use
ce
rta
in
asse
ts b
efo
re t
he
y a
re
de
str
oye
d;
the
su
rviv
ab
ility
of
co
mm
an
d a
nd
co
ntr
ol
me
cha
nis
ms. T
he
me
tho
d
an
d tim
ing o
f su
ch
de
cis
ion
ma
kin
g is
un
kn
ow
n.
Inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s th
at
Sa
dda
m’s
so
n Q
usa
i ma
y a
lre
ad
y h
ave
be
en
giv
en
au
thority
to
ord
er
the
use
of
CB
W.
Au
tho
risin
g f
ron
t lin
e u
nits
to
use
che
mic
al a
nd
b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns c
ou
ld
be
com
e m
ore
diff
icu
lt
on
ce
fig
htin
g b
egin
s.
Sa
ddam
ma
y th
ere
fore
sp
ecify
ina
dva
nce
of
a
Ira
qi
att
em
pts
to
re
tain
its
exis
tin
g b
an
ne
d w
ea
po
ns
sys
tem
s:
Ira
q is a
lre
ad
y ta
kin
g s
tep
s to
pre
ven
t U
N w
ea
pon
s in
spe
cto
rs f
ind
ing
evi
de
nce
of
its c
he
mic
al a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns p
rogra
mm
e.
Inte
llige
nce
ind
ica
tes th
at
Sa
dd
am
ha
s le
arn
t le
sso
ns f
rom
pre
vio
us
we
ap
on
s in
spe
ction
s, h
as ide
ntif
ied
po
ssib
le w
ea
k p
oin
ts in
th
e
insp
ection
s p
roce
ss a
nd
kn
ow
s h
ow
to
exp
loit
them
. S
en
sitiv
e
equ
ipm
en
t a
nd p
ap
ers
ca
n e
asily
be
co
nce
ale
d a
nd
in
so
me
ca
ses
this
is a
lre
ad
y h
ap
pe
nin
g.
The
po
sse
ssio
n o
f m
ob
ile b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt
pro
du
ctio
n fa
cili
tie
s w
ill a
lso
aid
co
nce
alm
ent eff
ort
s. S
ad
dam
is
de
term
ined
no
t to
lo
se th
e c
ap
ab
ilitie
s t
ha
t he
ha
s b
ee
n a
ble
to
de
velo
p f
urt
he
r in
th
e fo
ur
yea
rs s
ince
in
spe
cto
rs left
.
Sa
dd
am
's w
illi
ng
ne
ss
to
us
e c
he
mic
al a
nd
bio
log
ica
l w
ea
po
ns:
inte
llige
nce
in
dic
ate
s th
at a
s p
art
of
Ira
q’s
mili
tary
pla
nn
ing S
add
am
is
will
ing
to
use
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns,
inclu
din
g a
ga
inst
his
ow
n S
hia
po
pu
latio
n.
Inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s t
ha
t th
e I
raq
i m
ilita
ry
are
ab
le t
o d
ep
loy
ch
em
ica
l o
r b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns w
ith
in 4
5 m
inu
tes
of
an
ord
er
to d
o s
o.
Ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
log
ica
l a
ge
nts
: s
urv
ivin
g s
toc
ks
6.
When
confr
onte
d w
ith
qu
estion
s a
bo
ut
the
un
acco
un
ted
sto
cks, Ir
aq
ha
s c
laim
ed r
ep
ea
ted
ly t
ha
t if it
ha
d r
eta
ine
d a
ny
ch
em
ica
l a
ge
nts
fro
m
befo
re t
he
Gu
lf W
ar
the
y w
ou
ld h
ave
de
terio
rate
d s
uff
icie
ntly
to r
end
er
them
ha
rmle
ss. B
ut
Iraq h
as a
dm
itte
d to
UN
SC
OM
to
ha
vin
g t
he
kn
ow
led
ge
an
d c
apa
bili
ty t
o a
dd
sta
bili
se
r to
ne
rve
age
nt
and
oth
er
ch
em
ica
l w
arf
are
age
nts
wh
ich
wo
uld
pre
ven
t su
ch
de
com
po
sitio
n.
In
19
97
UN
SC
OM
als
o e
xam
ine
d s
om
e m
un
itio
ns w
hic
h h
ad
bee
n f
illed
w
ith
mu
sta
rd g
as p
rio
r to
19
91 a
nd
fou
nd
tha
t th
ey
rem
ain
ed v
ery
to
xic
an
d s
ho
we
d little
sig
n o
f de
terio
ration
.
7.
Ira
q h
as c
laim
ed
tha
t a
ll its b
iolo
gic
al a
gen
ts a
nd
we
ap
on
s h
ave
be
en
d
estr
oye
d.
No c
on
vin
cin
g p
roof
of
an
y kin
d h
as b
een
pro
du
ced
to
su
ppo
rt t
his
cla
im. In
pa
rtic
ula
r, I
raq c
ou
ld n
ot e
xpla
in la
rge
d
iscre
pa
ncie
s b
etw
ee
n t
he
am
oun
t of
gro
wth
me
dia
(n
utr
ien
ts r
equ
ire
d
for
the s
pe
cia
lise
d g
row
th o
f a
ge
nt)
it p
rocu
red
befo
re 1
991
an
d th
e
am
ou
nts
of
age
nt
it a
dm
its t
o h
avi
ng m
an
ufa
ctu
red
. T
he
dis
cre
pan
cy is
en
ou
gh
to
pro
du
ce
more
th
an
th
ree
tim
es th
e a
mo
unt
of
anth
rax
alle
ge
dly
ma
nufa
ctu
red
.
Ch
em
ica
l a
ge
nt:
pro
du
cti
on
ca
pa
bilit
ies
8.
In
telli
ge
nce
sh
ow
s t
ha
t Ir
aq h
as c
on
tinu
ed to
pro
du
ce c
hem
ica
l a
ge
nt.
9.
Oth
er
du
al-u
se f
acili
tie
s,
wh
ich
are
cap
ab
le o
f b
ein
g u
sed
to
supp
ort
th
e p
rod
uct
ion
of
chem
ica
l a
ge
nt
an
d p
recu
rso
rs,
ha
ve b
ee
n r
eb
uilt
an
d
re-e
qu
ipp
ed
. N
ew
ch
em
ica
l fa
cili
tie
s h
ave
bee
n b
uilt
, som
e w
ith ille
ga
l
yea
r n
ow
, d
ou
ble
the
fig
ure
fo
r th
e
yea
r 2
00
0. S
elf-e
vid
ently,
th
ere
is n
o
pro
pe
r a
cco
un
tin
g f
or
this
mon
ey.
Be
ca
use
of
con
ce
rns th
at a
co
nta
inm
en
t p
olic
y b
ase
d o
n
sa
nction
s a
lon
e c
ou
ld n
ot
suff
icie
ntly
inh
ibit S
ad
da
m’s
we
apo
ns
pro
gra
mm
e,
ne
go
tia
tion
s c
ontin
ued
, e
ven
aft
er
199
8, to
ga
in r
ea
dm
issio
n
for
the U
N in
sp
ect
ors
. In
199
9, a
ne
w
UN
re
so
lutio
n d
em
an
din
g t
he
ir r
e-
en
try
wa
s p
asse
d a
nd
ign
ore
d.
Fu
rth
er
ne
go
tia
tion
s c
on
tin
ue
d.
Fin
ally
, a
fte
r se
vera
l m
on
ths
of
dis
cu
ssio
n w
ith
Sad
dam
’s r
egim
e,
in
Ju
ly t
his
ye
ar,
Kofi A
nna
n,
the
UN
S
ecre
tary
-Ge
ne
ral, c
on
clu
ded
tha
t S
ad
dam
wa
s n
ot
seriou
s a
bo
ut
rea
dm
ittin
g t
he in
spe
cto
rs a
nd e
nd
ed
th
e n
ego
tia
tion
s.
All
this
is e
sta
blis
hed
fa
ct.
I s
et o
ut
the
his
tory
in
so
me
de
tail
be
cau
se
o
cca
sio
na
lly d
eb
ate
on t
his
issu
e
se
em
s to
tre
at it a
lmo
st a
s it
if h
ad
su
dde
nly
arise
n,
com
ing o
ut
of
no
wh
ere
on a
wh
im in
th
e la
st f
ew
m
onth
s o
f 20
02
. It is a
ctu
ally
an
11
-ye
ar
his
tory
: a
his
tory
of
UN
will
flou
ted
, of
lies to
ld b
y S
ad
dam
abo
ut
the
exi
ste
nce
of
his
che
mic
al,
bio
logic
al a
nd n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s
pro
gra
mm
es,
an
d o
f ob
str
uctio
n,
defian
ce
an
d d
en
ial.
The
re is o
ne
co
mm
on
, co
nsis
ten
t th
em
e, h
ow
eve
r: t
he
tota
l d
ete
rmin
atio
n o
f S
adda
m to
ma
inta
in
tha
t p
rogra
mm
e; to
ris
k w
ar,
in
tern
atio
na
l ostr
acis
m,
sa
nctio
ns a
nd
the
iso
latio
n o
f th
e Ira
qi e
co
no
my
to
ke
ep
it. A
t a
ny
tim
e,
he c
ou
ld h
ave
le
t th
e in
spe
cto
rs b
ack
in a
nd
pu
t th
e
wo
rld
to
pro
of.
At a
ny
tim
e, h
e c
ou
ld
ha
ve c
o-o
pe
rate
d w
ith
th
e U
nite
d
Na
tio
ns. T
en
da
ys a
go
, h
e m
ad
e th
e
off
er
un
con
ditio
na
lly u
nd
er
thre
at of
wa
r. H
eco
uld
ha
ve d
on
e it a
t an
y
16
8
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
de
velo
pe
d m
ob
ile p
rod
uc
tio
n
fac
ilit
ies
. A
lia
iso
n s
ourc
e r
ep
ort
s th
at:
the
tra
nspo
rta
ble
pro
du
ctio
n
pro
gra
mm
e b
ega
n in
19
95
;
6 r
oa
d b
ase
d fa
cili
tie
s, o
n t
raile
rs,
an
d 1
ra
il ba
se
d f
acili
ty,
on
ra
ilwa
y ca
rria
ge
s,
we
re c
on
str
ucte
d a
nd
by
Ma
rch
199
9; th
ree w
ere
o
pe
ratio
na
l;
the
fa
cili
tie
s w
ere
ca
pab
le o
f m
akin
g 5
diff
ere
nt
(un
sp
ecifie
d/u
nkn
ow
n)
bio
logic
al
age
nts
. B
etw
ee
n N
ove
mb
er
199
8
an
d M
arc
h 1
99
9 2
0-3
0 t
on
s o
f B
W
age
nt
wa
s p
rodu
ce
d.
Tho
ugh
no
t co
rro
bo
rate
d,
we
ju
dge
th
e
rep
ort
ing is t
echn
ica
lly c
red
ible
.
We d
o n
ot
kno
w w
hic
h t
ype
s o
f a
ge
nts
a
re p
rod
uce
d b
y th
ese
fa
cili
tie
s,
but
jud
ge
th
at
Ira
q c
urr
en
tly h
as
a
va
ila
ble
, e
ith
er
fro
m p
re G
ulf
Wa
r s
toc
ks
or
mo
re r
ec
en
t p
rod
uc
tio
n,
an
thra
x s
po
res
, b
otu
lin
um
to
xin
, a
fla
tox
in a
nd
po
ss
ibly
pla
gu
e.
Th
e
co
ntinu
ed
ope
ratio
n o
f th
e c
asto
r o
il e
xtra
ctio
n p
lan
t at
the
fo
rme
r H
ab
ban
iya
h c
hem
ica
l we
ap
on
s s
ite
m
ay
pro
vid
e t
he b
ase
fo
r p
rodu
cin
g
ricin
, a
lth
ou
gh
the
re is n
o e
vid
en
ce t
ha
t Ir
aq is c
urr
en
tly
do
ing s
o.
Ira
q’s
d
ecla
ration
s to
UN
SC
OM
a
ckn
ow
led
ge
d t
ha
t it w
ork
ed
on
a
nu
mb
er
of
oth
er
BW
age
nts
in
clu
din
g
age
nts
wh
ich
wo
uld
inca
pa
cita
te,
rath
er
tha
n k
ill, h
um
an
s a
nd o
n a
nti-
cro
p a
nd
an
ti-liv
esto
ck a
ge
nts
. Ir
aq
alm
ost ce
rta
inly
re
tain
s th
e c
ap
ab
ility
to
p
rod
uce
su
ch a
ge
nts
. Ir
aq
is
ju
dg
ed
to
be
se
lf-s
uff
icie
nt
in t
he
p
rod
uc
tio
n o
f b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns.
Ira
q h
as a
va
rie
ty o
f d
eli
ve
ry m
ea
ns
ava
ilab
le f
or
bo
th c
hem
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
alw
ea
po
ns,
som
eof
wh
ich
are
wa
r th
e s
pe
cific
con
ditio
ns
in w
hic
h u
nit c
om
ma
nde
rs
sh
ou
ld u
se
th
ese
w
ea
po
ns e
.g. o
nce
co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s h
ave
cro
sse
d a
pa
rtic
ula
r ge
ogra
ph
ica
l lin
e;
the
re
liab
ility
of
the
un
its
in q
ue
stio
n. L
ate
in a
ny
mili
tary
ca
mp
aig
n
co
mm
an
de
rs m
ay
no
t b
e
pre
pa
red
to u
se C
BW
w
ea
po
ns if
th
ey
jud
ge
th
at
Sa
ddam
is a
bo
ut to
fa
ll.
Po
ss
ible
sc
en
ari
os:
pre
-e
mp
tive
us
e b
efo
re a
c
on
flic
t b
eg
ins
T
he
aim
of
a p
re-e
mp
tive
str
ike
wo
uld
be
to
in
ca
pa
cita
te o
r kill
Co
alit
ion
tr
oo
ps in t
he
ir c
on
cen
tra
tio
n
are
as.
Inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s
tha
t S
add
am
ha
s ide
ntif
ied
B
ah
rain
, Jo
rda
n, Q
ata
r, I
sra
el
an
d K
uw
ait a
s ta
rge
ts.
Tu
rke
y co
uld
als
o b
e a
t risk.
Bo
th c
hem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s c
ou
ld b
e u
sed
; b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nts
co
uld
be
p
art
icu
larly
eff
ective
aga
inst
su
ch
fo
rce
con
ce
ntr
atio
ns.
Bu
t th
e u
se
of
CB
W w
ea
po
ns
ca
rrie
s s
eri
ou
s r
isks a
nd
S
ad
dam
will
we
igh
up
th
eir
mili
tary
utilit
y a
ga
inst
the
p
olit
ica
l co
sts
. U
se
of C
BW
w
ea
po
ns w
ou
ld e
xpo
se t
he
lie
s a
nd d
ece
ption
ab
ou
t Ir
aq’s
WM
D c
ap
ab
ilities,
un
de
rmin
ing I
raqi d
iplo
ma
tic
eff
ort
s a
nd h
elp
ing b
uild
su
ppo
rt f
or
rap
id a
nd
eff
ective
U
S a
ctio
n.
Sa
dd
am
mig
ht
als
o c
on
sid
er
usin
g n
on
-le
tha
l a
ge
nts
in
a d
en
iab
le m
an
ne
r;
wh
ilst
it w
ou
ld b
e d
iffic
ult t
o
qu
ickly
esta
blis
h a
cle
ar
att
rib
ution
of
respo
nsib
ility
,
fore
ign
assis
tan
ce
, a
nd
are
pro
bab
ly f
ully
ope
ratio
na
l o
r re
ad
y fo
r p
rod
uctio
n. T
he
se in
clu
de
th
e I
bn
Sin
a C
om
pa
ny
at T
arm
iya
h,
wh
ich
is a
ch
em
ica
l re
se
arc
h c
entr
e.
It u
nd
ert
ake
s r
esea
rch
, de
velo
pm
en
t a
nd
pro
du
ctio
n o
f che
mic
als
pre
vio
usly
im
po
rte
d b
ut n
ot n
ow
ava
ilab
le a
nd
w
hic
h a
re n
eed
ed f
or
Ira
q's
civ
il in
du
str
y. T
he D
ire
cto
r G
en
era
l of
the
rese
arc
h c
en
tre
is H
ikm
at N
a'im
al-Ja
lu w
ho
prio
r to
th
e G
ulf W
ar
wo
rke
d
in I
raq's
nu
cle
ar
we
apo
ns p
rogra
mm
e a
nd
aft
er
the w
ar
wa
s r
esp
on
sib
le
for
pre
se
rvin
g I
raq's
ch
em
ica
l exp
ert
ise
.
10
. P
art
s o
f th
e a
l-Q
a'q
a' c
he
mic
al co
mp
lex
da
ma
ge
d in t
he
Gu
lf W
ar
ha
ve a
lso
be
en
re
pa
ired
and
are
ope
ration
al. O
f p
art
icu
lar
co
nce
rn a
re
ele
me
nts
of
the
pho
sge
ne
pro
du
ctio
n p
lant
at a
l-Q
a'q
a'.
Th
ese
we
re
se
vere
ly d
am
age
d d
urin
g t
he
Gu
lf W
ar,
an
d d
ism
an
tled
un
de
r U
NS
CO
M
su
pe
rvis
ion
, b
ut
ha
ve s
ince
be
en
re
bu
ilt. W
hile
pho
sge
ne
doe
s h
ave
in
du
str
ial u
ses it
can
als
o b
e u
sed
by
itse
lf a
s a
ch
em
ica
l age
nt o
r a
s a
p
recu
rso
r fo
r n
erv
e a
ge
nt.
11
. Ira
q h
as r
eta
ined
th
e e
xpe
rtis
e fo
r che
mic
al w
arf
are
re
sea
rch
, age
nt
pro
du
ctio
n a
nd w
ea
pon
isa
tio
n.
Mo
st of
the
pe
rso
nne
l p
revi
ou
sly
in
vo
lve
d
in t
he p
rogra
mm
e r
em
ain
in
co
un
try.
Wh
ile U
NS
CO
M f
ou
nd
a n
um
be
r of
tech
nic
al m
an
ua
ls (
so
ca
lled
‘co
ok
boo
ks’) f
or
the
pro
du
ctio
n o
f ch
em
ica
l a
ge
nts
an
d c
ritica
l pre
cu
rso
rs,
Ira
q’s
cla
im to h
ave
un
ilate
rally
de
str
oye
d
the
bu
lk o
f th
e d
ocum
en
tation
can
not
be
confirm
ed
and
is a
lmo
st
ce
rta
inly
un
tru
e. R
ecen
t in
telli
ge
nce
ind
icate
s t
ha
t Ir
aq is
still
dis
cussin
g
me
tho
ds
of
con
cea
ling s
uch
do
cum
en
tatio
n in
ord
er
to e
nsu
re t
ha
t it
is
no
t d
isco
vere
d b
y a
ny
futu
re U
N in
spe
ctio
ns.
Th
e P
rob
lem
of
Du
al-
Us
e F
acil
itie
s
Alm
ost a
ll com
po
nen
ts a
nd s
upp
lies u
sed
in w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass
de
str
uction
an
d b
alli
stic m
issile
pro
gra
mm
es a
re d
ua
l-u
se
. F
or
exa
mp
le,
an
y m
ajo
r pe
tro
chem
ica
l o
r b
iote
ch
ind
ust
ry,
as w
ell
as p
ub
lic h
ea
lth
org
an
isa
tio
ns, w
ill h
ave
le
gitim
ate
ne
ed f
or
mo
st
ma
teria
ls a
nd
equ
ipm
en
t re
qu
ire
d to
ma
nufa
ctu
re c
hem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns.
W
ithou
t U
N w
ea
pon
s in
sp
ecto
rs it
is v
ery
difficu
lt t
he
refo
re t
o b
e s
ure
a
bou
t th
e t
rue
na
ture
of
ma
ny
of
Ira
q’s
fa
cili
ties.
Fo
r e
xam
ple
, Ir
aq h
as b
uilt
a la
rge
ne
w c
he
mic
al co
mp
lex,
Pro
ject B
aiji
, in
th
e d
ese
rt in
no
rth
we
st
Ira
q a
t a
l-S
ha
rqu
at.
Th
is s
ite
is a
fo
rme
r u
ran
ium
en
rich
me
nt fa
cili
ty w
hic
h w
as d
am
age
d d
urin
g t
he
Gu
lf W
ar
an
d
ren
de
red
ha
rmle
ss u
nd
er
su
pe
rvis
ion
of
the
IA
EA
. P
art
of
the
site
ha
s
be
en
re
bu
ilt,
with
wo
rk s
tart
ing in
199
2, a
s a
ch
em
ica
l p
rodu
ction
co
mp
lex.
D
esp
ite
th
e s
ite
be
ing f
ar
aw
ay
from
po
pu
late
d a
rea
s it
is
su
rro
un
de
d b
y a
hig
h w
all
with
wa
tch
to
we
rs a
nd
gu
ard
ed b
y a
rmed
gu
ard
s.
In
telli
ge
nce
rep
ort
s in
dic
ate
th
at
it w
ill p
rod
uce
nitri
c a
cid
wh
ich
ca
n b
e u
sed
in e
xplo
siv
es,
mis
sile
fu
el a
nd
in t
he
pu
rifica
tion
of
ura
niu
m.
tim
e in t
he
la
st 1
1 y
ea
rs,
bu
t h
e d
id
no
t. W
hy?
The
do
ssie
r th
at
we
pub
lish
giv
es t
he
a
nsw
er.
The
re
aso
n is th
at h
is
ch
em
ica
l, b
iolo
gic
al a
nd
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s p
rogra
mm
e is
no
t a
n
his
toric left
-ove
r fr
om
19
98
. T
he
in
sp
ecto
rs a
re n
ot n
eed
ed
to
cle
an
up
th
e o
ld r
em
ain
s. H
is w
ea
po
ns o
f m
ass d
estr
uct
ion
pro
gra
mm
e is
active
, d
eta
iled
an
d g
row
ing.
Th
e
po
licy
of
con
tain
me
nt
is n
ot
wo
rkin
g.
The
we
ap
on
s o
f m
ass d
estr
uction
p
rogra
mm
e is n
ot
shu
t d
ow
n;
it is u
p
an
d r
un
nin
g n
ow
.
The
do
ssie
r is
ba
sed
on
the
wo
rk o
f th
e B
ritish J
oin
t In
telli
ge
nce
C
om
mitte
e.
Fo
r o
ver
60
ye
ars
, b
egin
nin
g ju
st
befo
re w
orld
wa
r tw
o,
the
JIC
ha
s p
rovi
de
d in
telli
ge
nce
a
sse
ssm
en
ts t
o B
ritish P
rim
e
Min
iste
rs.
No
rma
lly,
its w
ork
is
ob
vio
usly
se
cre
t. U
nu
sua
lly,
be
ca
use
it is im
po
rta
nt th
at
we
exp
lain
ou
r co
nce
rns a
bo
ut S
add
am
to
the
British
p
eop
le,
we
ha
ve d
ecid
ed
to
dis
clo
se
its a
sse
ssm
ents
.
I a
m a
wa
re,
of
co
urs
e, th
at p
eo
ple
will
h
ave
to
ta
ke
ele
me
nts
of
this
on
th
e
go
od
fa
ith o
f o
ur
inte
llige
nce
se
rvic
es,
bu
t th
is is w
ha
t th
ey
are
te
llin
g m
e,
the
British
Prim
e M
inis
ter,
and
my
se
nio
r co
llea
gu
es. T
he in
telli
ge
nce
p
ictu
re th
at th
ey
pa
int
is o
ne
accu
mu
late
d o
ver
the
last fo
ur
yea
rs.
It is e
xte
nsiv
e,
deta
iled a
nd
au
tho
rita
tive
. It
co
nclu
de
s th
at Ir
aq
ha
s c
he
mic
al a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns,
tha
t S
add
am
ha
s c
on
tinu
ed
to
pro
du
ce t
he
m,
tha
t h
e h
as e
xistin
g
an
d a
ctive
mili
tary
pla
ns f
or
the
use
of
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns,
wh
ich
co
uld
be a
ctiva
ted
with
in 4
5
min
ute
s,
inclu
din
g a
ga
inst
his
ow
n
Sh
ia p
opu
latio
n,
an
d tha
t he
is
active
l y t
ryin
g t
o a
cqu
ire
nu
cle
ar
16
9
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
very
ba
sic
. T
he
se in
clu
de
, fr
ee
fa
ll b
om
bs, a
rtill
ery
sh
ells
, h
elic
op
ter
and
a
ircra
ft b
orn
e s
pra
yers
an
d b
alli
stic
mis
sile
wa
rhe
ad
s, a
ltho
ugh
the
exa
ct
nu
mb
ers
are
un
kn
ow
n. Ir
aq is a
lso
co
ntinu
ing w
ith
th
e L
-29
re
mo
tely
p
ilote
d v
eh
icle
pro
gra
mm
e,
wh
ich
co
uld
ha
ve c
hem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s d
eliv
ery
ap
plic
atio
ns. C
ove
rt
de
live
ry a
lso
re
ma
ins a
n o
ptio
n.
Be
ca
use
of
the
sho
rtage
of
som
e
pla
tfo
rms,
such
as a
ircr
aft
and
h
elic
op
ters
, w
e ju
dge
th
at
Ira
q w
ou
ld
no
t b
e a
ble
to
con
du
ct a
su
sta
ine
d
CB
W c
am
pa
ign
in
the
ma
nn
er
of
the
Ir
an
-Ira
q W
ar,
eve
n if
Ira
q c
ou
ld
pro
du
ce e
no
ugh
CB
W a
ge
nts
to
do
so
. B
ut
a s
ingle
ma
jor
attack o
r a
num
be
r of
sm
all
atta
cks w
ou
ld b
e fe
asib
le.
Nu
cle
ar
Wea
po
ns
Pro
gra
mm
e
We ju
dge
tha
t Ir
aq d
oes
no
t p
os
ses
s
a n
uc
lea
r w
ea
po
ns
ca
pa
bil
ity. W
e
pre
vio
usly
asse
sse
d t
ha
t Ir
aq w
as
with
in t
hre
e y
ea
rs o
f p
rod
ucin
g a
w
ea
po
n w
he
n th
e G
ulf W
ar
inte
rve
ne
d.
Its p
rogra
mm
e w
as e
ffe
ctive
ly
dis
man
tle
d b
y th
e IA
EA
and
sub
ject
to
the
mon
ito
rin
g p
roce
ss
su
bse
qu
en
tly
insta
lled
. A
ltho
ugh
th
ere
is v
ery
little
in
telli
ge
nce
we
co
ntinue
to
jud
ge
th
at
Ira
q is p
urs
uin
g a
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s p
rogra
mm
e. W
e a
sse
ss t
he
p
rogra
mm
e t
o b
e b
ase
d o
n g
as
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
ura
niu
m e
nri
ch
me
nt,
wh
ich
w
as t
he
ro
ute
Ira
q w
as f
ollo
win
g f
or
pro
du
cin
g f
issile
ma
teri
al p
rio
r to
th
e
Gu
lf W
ar.
Re
cen
t in
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s
tha
t n
ucle
ar
scie
ntists
we
re r
eca
lled
to
w
ork
on
a n
ucle
ar
pro
gra
mm
e in
th
e
au
tum
n o
f 1
99
8, b
ut w
e d
o n
ot
kno
w if
larg
e s
ca
le d
eve
lopm
en
t w
ork
ha
s y
et
reco
mm
en
ce
d.
Pro
cure
men
t of
du
al-
use
ite
ms o
ver
the
la
st fe
w y
ea
rs c
ou
ld
be
use
d in a
ura
niu
m e
nrich
men
t p
rogra
mm
e. T
he
re h
ave
bee
n
de
term
ined
eff
ort
s to
pu
rch
ase
hig
h
str
en
gth
alu
min
ium
allo
y, p
roh
ibited
u
nde
r th
e N
ucle
ar
Su
pp
liers
Gro
up
Sa
ddam
co
uld
no
t be
su
re o
f th
e U
S r
ea
ction
to a
n
ou
tbre
ak o
f a
non
-le
tha
l d
ise
ase.
The
ea
rly,
wid
esp
rea
d u
se
of
CB
W o
r n
on
-le
tha
l age
nts
w
ou
ld a
ffe
ct C
oa
litio
n m
ilita
ry
pla
nn
ing; d
isru
ption
of th
e
bu
ild-u
p o
f p
ers
onn
el a
nd
m
ate
ria
l co
uld
de
lay
op
era
tion
s. O
n b
ala
nce
h
ow
eve
r w
e ju
dge
th
at th
e
po
litic
al co
st of
usin
g C
BW
w
ea
po
ns w
ou
ld o
utw
eig
h t
he
m
ilita
ry a
dva
nta
ge
s a
nd
th
at
Sa
ddam
wo
uld
pro
ba
bly
no
t u
se
CB
W w
eap
on
s p
re-
em
ptive
ly.
Po
ss
ible
sc
en
ari
os:
us
e
du
rin
g t
he
gro
un
d p
ha
se
of
a c
on
flic
tT
he
re is n
o in
telli
ge
nce
on
sp
ecific
Ira
qi p
lan
s fo
r h
ow
C
BW
wo
uld
be
use
d in a
co
nflic
t. L
arg
e n
um
be
rs o
f ch
em
ica
l m
un
itio
ns w
ou
ld
ne
ed
to b
e u
sed
to m
ake
a
ma
jor
ba
ttle
fie
ld im
pa
ct.
BW
co
uld
als
o b
e u
sed
altho
ugh
it
is le
ss e
ffe
ctive
as a
ta
ctica
l w
ea
po
n a
ga
inst C
oa
litio
n
un
its th
an C
W. B
ut th
e u
se
of
eve
n s
ma
ll qu
an
tities o
f ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns w
ou
ld
ca
use
sig
nific
ant
de
gra
da
tion
in
Co
alit
ion
pro
gre
ss a
nd
m
igh
t co
ntr
ibu
te t
o r
edre
ssin
g
Coalit
ion c
on
ventio
na
l su
pe
rio
rity
on
the
ba
ttle
fie
ld.
Ira
q c
ou
ld m
ake e
ffe
ctiv
e u
se
of
pe
rsis
ten
t ch
em
ica
l age
nts
to
sha
pe t
he
batt
lefie
ld t
o
Ira
q’s
ad
van
tage
by
den
yin
g
sp
ace
an
d t
err
ito
ry t
o
Co
alit
ion
fo
rce
s.
Bo
oby-
tra
ps
an
d im
pro
vise
d e
xplo
siv
e
de
vice
s c
ou
ld b
e u
se
d a
s
12
. W
e k
no
w f
rom
in
telli
ge
nce
th
at Ir
aq h
as c
on
tin
ue
d to
pro
du
ce
b
iolo
gic
al w
arf
are
agen
ts.
As
with
so
me c
hem
ica
l e
qu
ipm
en
t, U
NS
CO
M
on
ly d
estr
oye
d e
qu
ipm
en
t th
at co
uld
be d
ire
ctly
lin
ke
d t
o b
iolo
gic
al
we
ap
on
s p
rod
uction
. Ir
aq a
lso
ha
s its o
wn
engin
ee
rin
g c
ap
ab
ility
to
d
esig
n a
nd
con
str
uct bio
logic
al a
ge
nt
asso
cia
ted
fe
rme
nte
rs,
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
s,
spra
yer
dry
ers
an
d o
the
r e
qu
ipm
en
t a
nd is ju
dge
d to
be s
elf-
suff
icie
nt in
th
e te
ch
no
logy
requ
ire
d t
o p
rod
uce
bio
logic
al w
ea
pon
s. T
he
e
xpe
rie
nce
d p
ers
on
ne
l wh
o w
ere
active
in
th
e p
rogra
mm
e h
ave
larg
ely
re
ma
ine
d in t
he
cou
ntr
y. S
om
e d
ua
l-u
se
equ
ipm
en
t h
as a
lso
be
en
p
urc
ha
sed
, b
ut w
ith
ou
t m
on
ito
rin
g b
y U
N in
sp
ecto
rs I
raq c
ou
ld h
ave
d
ive
rte
d it
to th
eir b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns p
rogra
mm
e. T
his
ne
wly
pu
rch
ased
e
qu
ipm
en
t a
nd o
the
r equ
ipm
ent
pre
vio
usly
su
bje
ct
to m
on
itorin
g c
ould
b
e u
sed
in a
re
surg
en
t b
iolo
gic
al w
arf
are
pro
gra
mm
e.
Fa
cili
tie
s o
f co
nce
rn in
clu
de
:
the
Ca
sto
r O
il P
rod
uctio
n P
lan
t a
t F
allu
jah
: th
is w
as d
am
aged
in
U
K/U
S a
ir a
tta
cks in
19
98
(O
pe
ration
De
sert
Fo
x) b
ut
ha
s b
ee
n
reb
uilt
. T
he
re
sid
ue
fro
m th
e c
ast
or
be
an p
ulp
ca
n b
e u
se
d in
the
p
rod
uctio
n o
f th
e b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt
ricin
;
the
al-D
aw
rah
Fo
ot
and
Mo
uth
Dis
ea
se V
accin
e In
stitu
te:
wh
ich
wa
s
invo
lve
d in
bio
logic
al age
nt
pro
du
ction
an
d r
ese
arc
h b
efo
re t
he
Gu
lf W
ar;
the
Am
ari
yah
Se
ra a
nd V
accin
e P
lant
at
Abu
Gh
raib
: U
NS
CO
M
esta
blis
he
d th
at th
is fa
cili
ty w
as u
sed
to
sto
re b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nts
, se
ed
sto
cks a
nd
co
ndu
ct
bio
logic
al w
arf
are
asso
cia
ted
ge
ne
tic r
esea
rch
p
rio
r to
th
e G
ulf W
ar.
It h
as n
ow
exp
an
ded
its
sto
rage
ca
pa
city.
13
. U
NS
CO
M e
sta
blis
he
d th
at
Ira
q c
on
sid
ere
d t
he
use
of
mo
bile
b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt p
rod
uctio
n fa
cili
tie
s.
In t
he
pa
st
two
ye
ars
evi
de
nce
fro
m
defe
cto
rs h
as in
dic
ate
d t
he
exi
ste
nce o
f su
ch f
acili
tie
s.
Recen
t in
telli
ge
nce
confirm
s tha
t th
e I
raqi m
ilita
ry h
ave
de
velo
pe
d m
ob
ile
facili
tie
s. T
he
se w
ou
ld h
elp
Ira
q c
on
ce
al a
nd
pro
tect b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt
pro
du
ctio
n f
rom
mili
tary
att
ack o
r U
N in
spe
ctio
n.
Ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
log
ica
l a
ge
nts
: d
eli
ve
ry m
ea
ns
14
. Ira
q h
as a
va
rie
ty o
f de
live
ry m
ea
ns a
vaila
ble
fo
r b
oth
ch
em
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
. T
he
se in
clu
de
:
free
-fa
ll bo
mb
s:
Ira
q a
ckn
ow
led
ge
d t
o U
NS
CO
M t
he
de
plo
yme
nt to
tw
o s
ite
s o
f fr
ee
-fa
ll b
om
bs f
ille
d w
ith
bio
log
ica
l a
ge
nt d
uri
ng
19
90
–9
1. T
he
se
bom
bs w
ere
fill
ed
with
an
thra
x, b
otu
linu
m t
oxi
n a
nd
afla
toxi
n.
Ira
q a
lso a
ckn
ow
led
ge
d p
osse
ssio
n o
f fo
ur
typ
es o
f ae
ria
l b
om
b w
ith
va
rio
us c
he
mic
al a
ge
nt fills
in
clu
din
g s
ulp
hu
r m
usta
rd,
tab
un
, sa
rin
and
cyc
losa
rin
;
we
ap
on
s c
ap
ab
ility
.
On
che
mic
al w
ea
po
ns, th
e d
ossie
r sh
ow
s t
ha
t Ir
aq c
on
tinu
es to
pro
du
ce
ch
em
ica
l a
ge
nts
fo
r che
mic
al
we
ap
on
s;
ha
s r
eb
uilt
pre
vio
usly
d
estr
oye
d p
rod
uctio
n p
lan
ts a
cro
ss
Ira
q;
ha
s b
ou
gh
t d
ua
l-u
se
che
mic
al
facili
tie
s;
ha
s re
tain
ed th
e k
ey
pe
rso
nn
el f
orm
erly
en
ga
ge
d in
th
e
ch
em
ica
l w
ea
po
ns p
rogra
mm
e; a
nd
h
as a
se
rio
us o
ngo
ing r
ese
arc
h
pro
gra
mm
e in
to w
ea
pon
s p
rodu
ction
, a
ll of
it w
ell
fun
de
d.
In r
espe
ct
of
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns,
aga
in,
pro
du
ction
of
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
h
as c
on
tin
ue
d; fa
cili
ties f
orm
erly
use
d
for
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns
ha
ve b
een
re
bu
ilt;
equ
ipm
en
t h
as b
een
p
urc
ha
sed
fo
r su
ch a
pro
gra
mm
e;
an
d a
ga
in,
Sa
dd
am
has r
eta
ined
th
e
pe
rso
nn
el w
ho
wo
rke
d o
n it p
rio
r to
1
991
. In
pa
rtic
ula
r, t
he
UN
in
sp
ectio
n
regim
e d
isco
vere
d th
at Ir
aq w
as
tryi
ng t
o a
cqu
ire
mo
bile
bio
logic
al
we
ap
on
s f
acili
tie
s, w
hic
h o
f co
urs
e
are
ea
sie
r to
co
ncea
l. P
rese
nt
inte
llige
nce
confirm
s tha
t it h
as n
ow
g
ot
su
ch
fa
cili
tie
s. T
he
bio
logic
al
age
nts
th
at
we
be
lieve
Ira
q c
an
p
rod
uce
in
clu
de
an
thra
x, b
otu
linum
to
xin
, afla
toxi
n a
nd
ric
in—
all
eve
ntu
ally
re
su
lt in
exc
rucia
tin
gly
p
ain
ful d
ea
th.
As f
or
nu
cle
ar
we
apo
ns,
Sa
dd
am
’s
pre
vio
us n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s
pro
gra
mm
e w
as s
hu
t do
wn
by
the
in
sp
ecto
rs, fo
llow
ing d
isclo
su
re b
y d
efe
cto
rs o
f th
e f
ull,
but
hid
de
n,
na
ture
of
it. T
he
pro
gra
mm
e w
as
ba
sed
on g
as c
entr
ifu
ge
ura
niu
m
en
rich
me
nt. T
he k
no
wn
re
ma
inin
g
sto
cks o
f u
ran
ium
are
no
w h
eld
un
de
r su
pe
rvis
ion
by
the
In
tern
atio
na
l A
tom
ic E
ne
rgy
Age
ncy.
Bu
t w
e n
ow
kn
ow
th
e fo
llow
ing:
sin
ce
Bio
log
ica
l a
ge
nt:
pro
du
cti
on
ca
pa
bilit
ies
17
0
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
be
cau
se
of
its a
pp
lica
tion
in
ura
niu
m
en
rich
me
nt. A
sh
ipm
ent
sto
pp
ed
in
Jo
rda
n w
as in
spe
cte
d b
y th
e I
AE
A,
wh
o a
cce
pte
d th
at, w
ith
som
e
mo
dific
atio
ns,
the
alu
min
ium
wo
uld
be
su
ita
ble
fo
r u
se in
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
s. B
ut
we
h
ave
no
defin
itiv
e in
telli
ge
nce
th
at
the
a
lum
iniu
m w
as d
estin
ed
fo
r a n
ucle
ar
pro
gra
mm
e. W
e c
on
tinu
e to
ju
dge
th
at:
wh
ile s
anctions r
em
ain
eff
ect
ive,
Ira
q c
an
not
ind
ige
no
usl
y d
eve
lop
a
nd
pro
du
ce
nu
cle
ar
we
apo
ns;
if s
an
cti
on
s w
ere
re
mo
ve
d o
r b
ec
am
e i
ne
ffe
cti
ve
, it
wo
uld
ta
ke
at
leas
t fi
ve
ye
ars
to
pro
du
ce
a
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
. T
his
tim
esca
le
wo
uld
sh
ort
en if
fis
sile
ma
teria
l w
as
acqu
ire
d f
rom
ab
roa
d.
Ira
q is c
ap
ab
le o
f p
rodu
cin
g a
n
imp
rovis
ed
nu
cle
ar
de
vic
e,
bu
t it
lacks s
uita
ble
fis
sile
ma
teri
al.
Dis
pe
rsa
l o
f ke
y e
qu
ipm
en
t F
ollo
win
g 1
1 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
001
Ira
q
tem
po
rarily
dis
pe
rse
d k
ey
equ
ipm
ent
fro
m its
mis
sile
pro
du
ctio
n f
acili
tie
s,
an
d is lik
ely
to
do
so a
ga
in if
it b
elie
ves
an
att
ack is im
min
ent.
Re
ce
nt
inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s th
at
Qu
sa
i S
ad
dam
Hu
ssa
in h
as
dire
cte
d th
e
Mili
tary
In
du
str
ialis
ation
Co
mm
issio
n t
o
en
su
re th
at
all
sen
sitiv
e w
ea
po
ns a
nd
ch
em
ica
l te
chn
olo
gy
wa
s w
ell
hid
de
n in
ca
se
of fu
rth
er
UN
in
spe
ctio
ns.
Dis
pe
rsa
l m
ake
s th
e targ
etin
g o
f p
rod
uctio
n e
qu
ipm
en
t ve
ry d
ifficu
lt, b
ut
it a
lso
pre
ven
ts a
ny
surg
e in
pro
du
ctio
n
wh
ile d
isp
ers
ed
.
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al
we
ap
on
s t
o inflic
t lo
cal lo
sse
s
in u
rban
are
as.
It
is a
lso
p
ossib
le th
at S
ad
da
m w
ou
ld
se
ek to
use
che
mic
al a
nd
b
iolo
gic
al m
un
itio
ns a
ga
inst
an
y in
tern
al u
prisin
g;
inte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s th
at h
e
is p
rep
are
d t
o d
elib
era
tely
ta
rge
t th
e S
hia
pop
ula
tion
.
On
e r
ep
ort
ind
ica
tes
tha
t he
w
ou
ld b
e m
ore
lik
ely
to u
se
C
BW
aga
inst W
este
rn fo
rce
s
tha
n o
n A
rab c
oun
trie
s.
Dra
win
g I
sra
el in
to t
he
c
on
flic
tL
aun
ch
ing a
CB
W a
ttack
aga
inst
Isra
el co
uld
allo
w
Sa
ddam
to p
resen
t Ir
aq a
s
the
ch
am
pio
n o
f th
e
Pa
lestin
ian
cau
se
an
d to
u
nde
rmin
e A
rab s
upp
ort
fo
r th
e C
oa
litio
n b
y so
win
g a
w
ide
r M
idd
le E
ast
conflic
t.
On
e inte
llige
nce
re
po
rt
su
gge
sts
th
at
if S
ad
dam
we
re
to u
se C
BW
, h
is f
irst ta
rge
t w
ou
ld b
e I
sra
el.
An
oth
er
inte
llig
en
ce
re
po
rt s
ugge
sts
th
at Ir
aq b
elie
ves I
sra
el w
ill
resp
ond
with
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s if
att
acke
d w
ith
C
BW
or
con
ven
tio
na
l w
arh
ea
ds.
It is
not
cle
ar
if
Sa
ddam
is d
ete
rre
d b
y th
is
thre
at o
r ju
dge
s it to
be
un
like
ly.
Un
co
nve
nti
on
al
us
e o
f C
BW
A
lth
ou
gh
th
ere
is n
o
inte
llig
en
ce
to
in
dic
ate
th
at
Ira
q h
as c
on
sid
ere
d u
sin
g
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al
age
nts
in
te
rro
rist
atta
cks,
we
ca
nno
t ru
le o
ut th
e p
oss
ibili
ty.
Sa
ddam
co
uld
als
o r
em
ove
h
is e
xistin
g c
on
str
ain
ts o
n
art
ille
ry s
he
lls a
nd
ro
cke
ts:
Ira
q m
ade
ext
en
siv
e u
se
of
art
ille
ry
mu
nitio
ns f
illed
with
ch
em
ica
l age
nts
du
rin
g th
e I
ran-I
raq W
ar.
M
ort
ars
ca
n a
lso
be
use
d fo
r ch
em
ica
l a
gen
t d
eliv
ery
. Ir
aq is k
no
wn
to
ha
ve t
este
d th
e u
se
of
sh
ells
an
d r
ocke
ts f
ille
d w
ith
bio
log
ica
l a
ge
nts
. O
ver
20,0
00
art
ille
ry m
un
itio
ns r
em
ain
un
acco
unte
d f
or
by
UN
SC
OM
;
he
lico
pte
r a
nd
aircra
ft b
orn
e s
pra
yers
: Ir
aq c
arr
ied
out
stu
die
s in
to
ae
roso
l dis
se
min
ation
of
bio
logic
al a
ge
nt
usin
g t
he
se
pla
tfo
rms p
rio
r to
19
91.
UN
SC
OM
wa
s u
nab
le to
acco
unt fo
r m
an
y o
f th
ese
de
vice
s.
It is p
roba
ble
tha
t Ir
aq r
eta
ins a
ca
pa
bili
ty f
or
ae
roso
l dis
pe
rsa
l of
bo
th c
hem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt
ove
r a
la
rge
are
a;
al-
Hu
sse
in b
alli
stic m
issile
s (
ran
ge
65
0km
): I
raq t
old
UN
SC
OM
tha
t it
fille
d 2
5 w
arh
ea
ds w
ith
an
thra
x, b
otu
linu
m t
oxi
n a
nd
aflato
xin
. Ir
aq
als
o d
eve
lop
ed
ch
em
ica
l a
ge
nt
wa
rhe
ad
s fo
r a
l-H
usse
in.
Ira
q
ad
mitt
ed t
o p
rodu
cin
g 5
0 c
he
mic
al w
arh
ea
ds fo
r a
l-H
usse
in w
hic
h
we
re in
ten
ded
fo
r th
e d
eliv
ery
of
a m
ixtu
re o
f sa
rin
and
cyc
losa
rin
. H
ow
eve
r, t
ech
nic
al a
na
lysis
of
wa
rhe
ad r
em
na
nts
ha
s sh
ow
n t
races
of
VX
de
gra
da
tio
n p
rod
uct
wh
ich
in
dic
ate
th
at
so
me
ad
ditio
na
l w
arh
ea
ds w
ere
ma
de
an
d f
illed
with
VX
;
al-S
am
ou
d/A
ba
bil-
10
0 b
alli
stic m
issile
s (
ran
ge
150
km
plu
s):
it is
u
ncle
ar
if c
hem
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
arh
ea
ds h
ave
be
en d
eve
lope
d for
the
se s
yste
ms, b
ut
giv
en
th
e I
raqi e
xpe
rie
nce
on
oth
er
mis
sile
sys
tem
s,
we
ju
dge
tha
t Ir
aq h
as th
e te
chn
ica
l exp
ert
ise
fo
r do
ing s
o;
L-2
9 r
em
ote
ly p
ilote
d v
eh
icle
pro
gra
mm
e (
se
e f
igu
re 3
): w
e k
no
w
from
inte
llige
nce
th
at Ir
aq h
as a
ttem
pte
d to
mo
dify
the
L-2
9 je
t tr
ain
er
to a
llow
it
to b
e u
se
d a
s a
n U
nm
an
ne
d A
eria
l Ve
hic
le (
UA
V)
wh
ich
is
po
ten
tia
lly c
ap
ab
le o
f de
live
rin
g c
he
mic
al a
nd
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
ove
r a
la
rge
are
a.
Ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
log
ica
l w
arf
are
: c
om
ma
nd
an
d c
on
tro
l
15
. T
he
au
tho
rity
to
use
ch
em
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al w
ea
po
ns u
ltim
ate
ly
resid
es w
ith
Sa
dd
am
bu
t in
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ate
s t
ha
t h
e m
ay
ha
ve a
lso
d
ele
ga
ted
th
is a
uth
ority
to
his
so
n Q
usa
i. S
pe
cia
l S
ecu
rity
Org
an
isa
tio
n
(SS
O)
and
Spe
cia
l R
ep
ub
lica
n G
ua
rd (
SR
G)
un
its w
ou
ld b
e in
volv
ed
in
th
e m
ove
me
nt o
f a
ny
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns t
o m
ilita
ry u
nits
. T
he
Ira
qi m
ilita
ry h
old
s a
rtill
ery
an
d m
issile
sys
tem
s a
t C
orp
s le
vel
thro
ugh
ou
t th
e A
rmed
Fo
rce
s a
nd
con
du
cts r
egu
lar
tra
inin
g w
ith
th
em
. T
he
Dire
cto
rate
of
Ro
cke
t F
orc
es h
as o
pe
ratio
na
l co
ntr
ol o
f str
ate
gic
m
issile
sys
tem
s a
nd
so
me M
ultip
le L
aun
che
r R
ocke
t S
yste
ms.
Ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
log
ica
l w
ea
po
ns:
su
mm
ary
16
. In
telli
ge
nce
sh
ow
s t
ha
t Ir
aq h
as c
ove
rt c
he
mic
al a
nd
bio
logic
al
we
ap
on
sp
rogra
mm
es,in
bre
ach
of
UN
Se
curity
Co
un
cil
Re
so
lutio
n6
87
the
de
pa
rtu
re o
f th
e insp
ecto
rs in
19
98
, S
ad
da
m h
as
bou
gh
t o
r a
ttem
pte
d to
bu
y sp
ecia
lise
d v
acu
um
p
um
ps o
f th
e d
esig
n n
ee
de
d fo
r th
e
ga
s c
en
trifu
ge
ca
sca
de
to
en
rich
u
ran
ium
; a
n e
ntire
magn
et
pro
du
ction
lin
e o
f th
e s
pe
cific
atio
n f
or
use in
th
e
mo
tors
and
to
p b
ea
rings o
f ga
s
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
s; d
ua
l-u
se p
rod
ucts
, su
ch
a
s a
nh
ydro
us h
ydro
ge
n f
luo
ride
an
d
fluo
rid
e g
as,
wh
ich
can b
e u
se
d b
oth
in
pe
tro
chem
ica
ls b
ut a
lso
in
ga
s
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
ca
sca
de
s;
a f
ilam
en
t w
ind
ing m
ach
ine
, w
hic
h c
an b
e u
sed
to
ma
nufa
ctu
re c
arb
on f
ibre
ga
s
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
ro
tors
; an
d h
e h
as
att
em
pte
d, co
vert
ly,
to a
cqu
ire
60
,00
0
or
mo
re s
pe
cia
lise
d a
lum
iniu
m tu
be
s,
wh
ich
are
su
bje
ct to
str
ict
co
ntr
ols
o
win
g t
o t
he
ir p
ote
ntia
l u
se
in t
he
co
nstr
uction
of
ga
s c
en
trifu
ge
s.
In a
dd
itio
n,
we
kn
ow
tha
t S
ad
da
m
ha
s b
ee
n t
ryin
g t
o b
uy
sig
nific
an
t qu
an
titie
s o
f u
ran
ium
fro
m A
fric
a,
alth
ou
gh
we
do
no
t kno
w w
he
the
r he
h
as b
ee
n s
ucce
ssf
ul. A
ga
in,
ke
y p
ers
onn
el w
ho
used
to w
ork
on
th
e
nu
cle
ar
we
apo
ns p
rogra
mm
e a
re
ba
ck in
ha
rne
ss.
Ira
q m
ay
cla
im th
at
this
is f
or
a c
ivil
nu
cle
ar
po
we
r p
rogra
mm
e,
bu
t I
wo
uld
po
int
ou
t th
at
it h
as n
o n
ucle
ar
po
we
r p
lan
ts.
So
tha
t is
th
e p
ositio
n in
re
sp
ect
of
the
we
ap
on
s —
bu
t of
cou
rse
, th
e
we
ap
on
s r
equ
ire
ba
llistic
mis
sile
ca
pab
ility
. T
ha
t, a
ga
in, is
su
bje
ct to
U
N r
eso
lutio
ns. Ir
aq is s
up
po
se
d o
nly
to
ha
ve m
issile
cap
ab
ility
up
to
15
0
km
fo
r co
nve
ntion
al w
ea
pon
ry.
Pa
ge
s
27
to
31
of
the
do
ssie
r d
eta
il th
e
evi
de
nce
on
tha
t is
sue
. It
is c
lea
r th
at
a s
ign
ific
an
t num
be
r of lo
nge
r-ra
nge
m
issile
s w
ere
eff
ective
ly c
on
ce
ale
d
from
th
e p
revi
ou
s in
spe
cto
rs a
nd
re
ma
in,
inclu
din
g u
p to 2
0 e
xte
nd
ed
-ra
nge
Scu
d m
issile
s; th
at
in m
id-2
001
th
ere
wa
s a
ste
p c
hange
in
th
e
17
1
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
de
alin
g w
ith
Al Q
aid
a
(ext
rem
ists
are
con
du
ctin
g
low
-le
vel w
ork
on
to
xin
s in
an
are
a o
f no
rth
ern
Ira
q o
uts
ide
S
ad
dam
’s c
on
tro
l).
Al Q
aid
a
co
uld
ca
rry
ou
t p
roxy
att
acks
an
d w
ou
ld r
equ
ire
little
en
cou
rage
men
t to
do
so
.
Sa
dda
m’s
in
telli
ge
nce
a
ge
ncie
s h
ave
so
me
e
xpe
rie
nce
in
th
e u
se o
f p
ois
on
s a
nd
eve
n s
ma
ll-sca
le
att
acks c
ou
ld h
ave
a
sig
nific
an
t p
syc
ho
logic
al
imp
act. I
nte
llig
en
ce
in
dic
ate
s
tha
t S
add
am
ha
s s
pe
cific
ally
co
mm
issio
ned
a t
ea
m o
f scie
ntists
to
de
vise
nove
l m
ean
s o
f de
plo
yin
g C
BW
.
Po
ss
ible
sc
en
ari
os:
at
the
d
ea
th
In t
he
la
st re
so
rt S
adda
m is
like
ly t
o o
rde
r th
e
ind
iscrim
ina
te u
se o
f w
ha
teve
r ch
em
ica
l an
d
bio
logic
al w
ea
po
ns r
em
ain
a
vaila
ble
to
him
, in
a last
att
em
pt to
clin
g o
n to
po
we
r o
r to
cau
se
as m
uch d
am
age
a
s p
ossib
le in
a f
ina
l act
of
ven
ge
an
ce
. If h
e h
as
no
t a
lre
ad
y d
one
so b
y th
is s
tage
S
ad
da
m w
ill la
un
ch
CB
W
att
acks o
n Isra
el.
Imp
lem
en
tatio
n o
f su
ch
ord
ers
wo
uld
dep
en
d o
n t
he
d
eliv
ery
me
an
s still
rem
ain
ing,
the
su
rviv
ab
ility
of
the
co
mm
an
d c
ha
in a
nd
the
w
illin
gn
ess o
f co
mm
and
ers
to
o
be
y.
an
d h
as c
on
tinu
ed
to p
rod
uce
ch
em
ica
l an
d b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nts
. Ir
aq h
as:
ch
em
ica
l a
nd
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
an
d w
ea
po
ns a
vaila
ble
, b
oth
fro
m
pre
-Gu
lf W
ar
sto
cks
and
mo
re r
ecen
t p
rod
uct
ion
;
the
ca
pab
ility
to
pro
du
ce
th
e c
he
mic
al a
ge
nts
mu
sta
rd g
as, ta
bu
n,
sa
rin
, cyc
losa
rin
, a
nd
VX
ca
pa
ble
of
pro
du
cin
g m
ass c
asu
altie
s;
a b
iolo
gic
al a
ge
nt
pro
du
ctio
n c
ap
ab
ility
an
d c
an
pro
du
ce a
t le
ast
an
thra
x, b
otu
linu
m to
xin
, afla
toxi
n a
nd
ric
in.
Ira
q h
as a
lso d
eve
lope
d
mo
bile
fa
cili
tie
s to
pro
du
ce
bio
logic
al a
ge
nts
;
a v
arie
ty o
f de
live
ry m
ea
ns a
vaila
ble
;
mili
tary
fo
rce
s, w
hic
h m
ain
tain
th
e c
ap
ab
ility
to
use
th
ese
we
apo
ns
with
co
mm
an
d, co
ntr
ol a
nd lo
gis
tica
l a
rra
ngem
ents
in
pla
ce
.
NU
CL
EA
R W
EA
PO
NS
Jo
int
Inte
llig
en
ce
Co
mm
itte
e (
JIC
) A
ss
es
sm
en
ts:
19
99
–2
001
17
. S
ince
199
9 th
e J
IC h
as m
on
itore
d Ira
q's
att
em
pts
to r
econ
stitu
te its
n
ucle
ar
we
apo
ns p
rogra
mm
e. In
mid
-20
01 t
he
JIC
asse
sse
d t
hat
Iraq
ha
d c
on
tinu
ed
its
nu
cle
ar
rese
arc
h a
fte
r 1
99
8. T
he
JIC
dre
w a
tte
ntion
to
in
telli
ge
nce
th
at
Ira
q h
ad
re
ca
lled
its
nu
cle
ar
scie
ntists
to
th
e p
rog
ram
me
in
199
8. S
ince
199
8 I
raq h
ad
be
en
try
ing t
o p
rocu
re ite
ms th
at
cou
ld b
e
for
use
in t
he
con
str
uctio
n o
f ce
ntr
ifu
ge
s f
or
the
en
richm
en
t of
ura
niu
m.
Ira
qi
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s e
xp
ert
ise
18
. T
he
IA
EA
dis
ma
ntle
d th
e p
hys
ica
l in
fra
str
uctu
re o
f th
e I
raqi n
ucle
ar
we
ap
on
s p
rogra
mm
e,
inclu
din
g t
he
de
dic
ate
d f
acili
tie
s a
nd
equ
ipm
en
t fo
r u
ran
ium
se
pa
ratio
n a
nd e
nrichm
en
t, a
nd fo
r w
ea
po
n d
eve
lopm
en
t a
nd
pro
du
ctio
n,
an
d r
em
ove
d th
e r
em
ain
ing h
igh
ly e
nrich
ed
ura
niu
m.
Bu
t Ir
aq r
eta
ined
, an
d r
eta
ins, m
an
y of
its e
xpe
rie
nce
d n
ucle
ar
scie
ntists
a
nd
te
chn
icia
ns w
ho
are
sp
ecia
lise
d in
th
e p
rod
uction
of fissile
ma
teria
l a
nd
we
apo
ns d
esig
n.
Inte
llige
nce
ind
ica
tes
tha
t Ir
aq a
lso
re
tain
s th
e
acco
mp
an
yin
g p
rogra
mm
e d
ocum
en
tatio
n a
nd
da
ta.
19
. In
telli
ge
nce
sh
ow
s t
ha
t th
e p
rese
nt Ir
aqi p
rogra
mm
e is a
lmo
st
ce
rta
inly
se
ekin
g a
n in
dig
en
ou
s a
bili
ty t
o e
nrich
ura
niu
m to
th
e le
vel
ne
ed
ed
fo
r a n
ucle
ar
we
apo
n. It
ind
ica
tes th
at th
e a
pp
roa
ch is b
ase
d o
n
ga
s c
en
trifu
ge
ura
niu
m e
nrichm
en
t, o
ne
of
the r
ou
tes Ira
q w
as f
ollo
win
g
for
pro
du
cin
g f
issile
ma
teri
al befo
re th
e G
ulf W
ar.
Bu
t Ir
aq n
eed
s c
ert
ain
ke
y e
qu
ipm
ent,
in
clu
din
g g
as c
en
trifu
ge
com
po
ne
nts
an
d c
om
po
nen
ts
for
the p
rod
uction
of fiss
ile m
ate
ria
l b
efo
re a
nu
cle
ar
bo
mb
cou
ld b
e
de
velo
pe
d.
20
.F
ollo
win
gth
ed
epa
rtu
reof
we
ap
on
sin
spe
cto
rsin
19
98
the
reh
as
pro
gra
mm
e a
nd
, b
y th
is y
ea
r, I
raq’s
d
eve
lop
me
nt of
we
apon
s w
ith
a
ran
ge
of
mo
re t
ha
n 1
,00
0 k
m w
as
we
ll u
nd
er
wa
y; a
nd
tha
t hu
nd
red
s o
f p
eop
le a
re e
mp
loye
d in
tha
t p
rogra
mm
e, fa
cili
ties a
re b
ein
g b
uilt
a
nd
equ
ipm
en
t p
rocu
red
—u
sua
lly
cla
nd
est
ine
ly.
Sa
nct
ions a
nd im
po
rt
co
ntr
ols
ha
ve h
inde
red t
he
p
rogra
mm
e,
bu
t o
nly
slo
we
d its
p
rogre
ss.
Th
e c
ap
ab
ility
be
ing
de
velo
ped,
incid
enta
lly,
is f
or
mu
lti-
pu
rpo
se u
se,
inclu
din
g w
ith
WM
D
wa
rhe
ad
s.
Tha
t is
th
e a
sse
ssm
ent,
giv
en
to
me
, of
the J
oin
t In
telli
ge
nce C
om
mitte
e.
In
ad
ditio
n,
we
ha
ve w
ell
fou
nd
ed
inte
llig
en
ce
to
te
ll u
s th
at
Sad
da
m
se
es h
is W
MD
pro
gra
mm
e a
s vi
tal to
h
is s
urv
iva
l a
nd
as
a d
em
on
str
ation
of
his
po
we
r a
nd influ
en
ce in
th
e r
egio
n.
The
re w
ill b
e s
om
e w
ho
will
dis
mis
s
all
this
. In
telli
ge
nce
is n
ot a
lwa
ys
righ
t. F
or
so
me
of
the
ma
teria
l, t
he
re
mig
ht
be in
no
ce
nt
exp
lan
atio
ns.
The
re w
ill b
e o
the
rs w
ho
sa
y righ
tly
tha
t, f
or
exa
mp
le, o
n p
rese
nt
go
ing,
it
co
uld
be
se
vera
l ye
ars
befo
re
Sa
ddam
acqu
ire
s a
usa
ble
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
—th
ou
gh
if h
e w
ere
ab
le t
o
pu
rch
ase
fis
sile
ma
térie
l ill
ega
lly,
it
wo
uld
be
on
ly a
ye
ar
or
two
. B
ut
let
me
pu
t it
at
its
sim
ple
st: o
n th
is 1
1-
yea
r h
isto
ry,
with
th
is m
an S
ad
dam
; w
ith
th
is a
ccu
mu
late
d, d
eta
iled
in
telli
ge
nce
ava
ilab
le; w
ith
wh
at
we
kn
ow
an
d w
ha
t w
e c
an r
ea
so
na
bly
sp
ecu
late
, w
ou
ld th
e w
orld
be
wis
e t
o
lea
ve t
he
pre
sen
t situatio
n
un
dis
turb
ed
—to
sa
y th
at,
de
sp
ite 1
4
se
pa
rate
UN
de
ma
nd
s o
n th
e issu
e,
all
of
wh
ich
Sad
dam
is in
bre
ach
of,
we
sh
ou
ld d
o n
oth
ing, a
nd
to
co
nclu
de
tha
t w
e s
hou
ld t
rust, n
ot
to
the
go
od
fa
ith
of
the
UN
we
ap
on
s
insp
ecto
rs,
but
to t
he
go
od
fa
ith o
f th
e
cu
rre
nt
Ira
qi re
gim
e? I
do
no
t b
elie
ve
17
2
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
be
en
an a
ccum
ula
tio
n o
f in
telli
ge
nce
in
dic
ating t
ha
t Ir
aq is m
akin
g
co
nce
rted
co
vert
eff
ort
s t
o a
cqu
ire
du
al-u
se te
ch
no
logy
an
d m
ate
rials
w
ith
nu
cle
ar
app
lica
tion
s.
Ira
q’s
kn
ow
n h
old
ings o
f p
roce
sse
d u
ran
ium
a
re u
nd
er
IAE
A s
upe
rvis
ion
. B
ut
the
re is in
telli
ge
nce
tha
t Ir
aq h
as s
ou
gh
t th
e s
up
ply
of
sig
nific
ant
qu
an
titie
s of
ura
niu
m f
rom
Afr
ica
. Ir
aq h
as n
o
active
civ
il n
ucle
ar
po
we
r p
rogra
mm
e o
r n
ucle
ar
po
we
r p
lan
ts a
nd
th
ere
fore
ha
s n
o le
gitim
ate
re
aso
n to
acqu
ire
ura
niu
m.
21
. In
telli
ge
nce
sh
ow
s t
ha
t o
the
r im
po
rta
nt p
rocu
rem
ent
activi
ty s
ince
1
998
ha
s in
clu
de
d a
ttem
pts
to
pu
rcha
se
:
vacu
um
pu
mp
s w
hic
h c
ou
ld b
e u
sed
to
cre
ate
and
ma
inta
in
pre
ssu
res in
a g
as c
entr
ifu
ge
ca
sca
de
ne
ed
ed
to
en
rich
ura
niu
m;
an
en
tire
ma
gn
et p
rodu
ctio
n lin
e o
f th
e c
orr
ect
sp
ecific
atio
n fo
r u
se in
th
e m
oto
rs a
nd
to
p b
ea
rin
gs o
f ga
s c
entr
ifu
ge
s.
It a
pp
ea
rs th
at Ir
aq is
att
em
ptin
g t
o a
cq
uir
e a
ca
pab
ility
to
pro
du
ce
th
em
on its
ow
n r
ath
er
tha
n r
ely
on
fo
reig
n p
rocu
rem
ent;
An
hyd
rou
s H
ydro
ge
n F
luo
rid
e (
AH
F)
and
flu
orin
e g
as.
AH
F is
co
mm
on
ly u
se
d in
th
e p
etr
ochem
ica
l in
du
str
y a
nd I
raq f
requ
en
tly
imp
ort
s s
ign
ific
ant
am
ou
nts
, b
ut it is a
lso u
sed in
the
pro
cess o
f co
nve
rtin
g u
ran
ium
in
to u
ran
ium
he
xaflu
oride f
or
use in
ga
s
ce
ntr
ifu
ge
ca
sca
de
s;
on
e la
rge
fila
men
t w
ind
ing m
ach
ine
wh
ich
cou
ld b
e u
se
d to
m
anufa
ctu
re c
arb
on
fib
re g
as c
en
trifu
ge
roto
rs;
a la
rge
ba
lan
cin
g m
ach
ine
wh
ich
co
uld
be
use
d in
initia
l ce
ntr
ifu
ge
b
ala
ncin
g w
ork
.
22
. Ira
q h
as a
lso
ma
de
re
pea
ted
att
em
pts
cove
rtly
to
acqu
ire
a v
ery
la
rge
qu
an
tity
(6
0,0
00
or
mo
re)
of
spe
cia
lise
d a
lum
iniu
m t
ub
es. T
he
sp
ecia
lise
d a
lum
iniu
m in
qu
estio
n is s
ub
ject
to
in
tern
ation
al e
xpo
rt
co
ntr
ols
be
cau
se
of
its p
ote
ntia
l ap
plic
atio
n in th
e c
on
str
uctio
n o
f ga
s ce
ntr
ifu
ge
s u
sed
to
en
rich
ura
niu
m, a
ltho
ugh
th
ere
is n
o d
efin
itiv
e
inte
llig
en
ce
th
at
it is d
estin
ed
fo
r a
nu
cle
ar
pro
gra
mm
e.
Nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s:
tim
eli
nes
23
. In
ea
rly
20
02
, th
e J
IC a
sse
ssed
th
at
UN
sa
nction
s o
n I
raq w
ere
h
ind
erin
g t
he
im
po
rt o
f cru
cia
l go
od
s fo
r th
e p
rod
uctio
n o
f fissile
ma
teria
l.
The
JIC
jud
ge
d th
at
wh
ile s
an
ctio
ns r
em
ain
eff
ective
Ira
q w
ou
ld n
ot b
e
ab
le to
pro
du
ce a
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on.
If th
ey
we
re r
em
ove
d o
r p
rove
in
eff
ect
ive
, it w
ou
ld t
ake
Ira
q a
t le
ast five
ye
ars
to
pro
du
ce s
uff
icie
nt
fissile
ma
teria
l fo
r a
we
ap
on
in
dig
eno
usly
. H
ow
eve
r, w
e k
no
w t
ha
t Ir
aq
reta
ins e
xpe
rtis
e a
nd
de
sig
n d
ata
re
latin
g to
nu
cle
ar
we
ap
on
s. W
e
the
refo
re ju
dge
th
at
if Ira
q o
bta
ine
d f
issile
mate
ria
l a
nd
oth
er
esse
ntia
l co
mpo
ne
nts
fro
mfo
reig
nso
urc
es
the
time
line
for
pro
du
ctio
nof
anu
cle
ar
tha
t th
at
wo
uld
be a
resp
on
sib
le
co
urs
e to
fo
llow
.
Ou
r ca
se
is s
imp
ly t
his
: n
ot th
at
we
ta
ke
mili
tary
actio
n c
om
e w
ha
t m
ay,
b
ut
tha
t th
e c
ase
fo
r e
nsu
rin
g I
raqi
dis
arm
am
en
t, a
s th
e U
N its
elf h
as
stip
ula
ted
, is
ove
rwh
elm
ing.
I defy
a
nyo
ne
, o
n th
e b
asis
of
this
evi
de
nce
, to
sa
y th
at
tha
t is
an
un
rea
son
ab
le
de
ma
nd
fo
r th
e in
tern
atio
na
l co
mm
un
ity
to m
ake
wh
en
, aft
er
all,
it
is o
nly
th
e s
am
e d
em
an
d th
at
we
h
ave
mad
e fo
r 11
ye
ars
an
d t
ha
t S
ad
dam
ha
s re
jecte
d.
Pe
op
le s
ay,
“B
ut
wh
y S
ad
dam
?”
I d
o
no
t in
the
le
ast
dis
pu
te t
ha
t th
ere
are
o
the
r ca
use
s of
con
cern
on w
ea
po
ns
of
ma
ss d
estr
uctio
n. I sa
id a
s m
uch
in
th
is H
ou
se o
n 1
4 S
ep
tem
be
r la
st
yea
r. H
ow
eve
r, t
wo
th
ings a
bo
ut
Sa
ddam
sta
nd
ou
t. H
e h
as u
sed
th
ese w
ea
po
ns in
Ira
q it
se
lf—
tho
usa
nd
s d
yin
g in
tho
se
che
mic
al
we
ap
on
s a
tta
cks—
an
d in
the
Ira
n-
Ira
q w
ar,
sta
rte
d b
y h
im,
in w
hic
h 1
m
illio
n p
eo
ple
die
d; and
his
is a
re
gim
e w
ith
no
mo
de
rate
ele
men
ts to
a
ppe
al to
.
Re
ad
th
e c
ha
pte
r on
Sa
dda
m a
nd
h
um
an
rig
hts
in
th
is d
ossie
r. R
ea
d n
ot
just
abo
ut th
e 1
mill
ion
de
ad
in
th
e
wa
r w
ith
Ira
n,
not
just a
bou
t th
e
10
0,0
00 K
urd
s b
ruta
lly m
urd
ere
d in
n
ort
he
rn I
raq,
no
t ju
st a
bou
t th
e
20
0,0
00 S
hia
Mu
slim
s d
rive
n f
rom
th
e
ma
rsh
lan
ds in s
outh
ern
Ira
q,
and
no
t ju
st
abo
ut th
e a
ttem
pt to
su
bju
ga
te
an
d b
ruta
lise t
he
Ku
waitis
in
199
0
tha
t le
d to
th
e G
ulf w
ar.
I s
ay,
“R
ea
d
als
o a
bo
ut th
e r
outin
e b
utc
he
rin
g o
f p
olit
ica
l o
pp
on
ents
, th
e p
riso
n
‘cle
an
sin
g’ re
gim
es in
wh
ich
th
ou
san
ds
die
, th
e t
ort
ure
ch
am
be
rs
an
d th
e h
ideo
us p
en
alti
es s
upe
rvis
ed
b
y h
im a
nd
his
fam
ily a
nd
de
taile
d b
y A
mne
sty
In
tern
ation
al.”
Re
ad
it a
ll
17
3
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
we
ap
on
wo
uld
be
sho
rte
ned
an
d Ira
q c
ou
ld p
rod
uce
a n
ucle
ar
we
apo
n in
b
etw
ee
n o
ne
and
tw
o y
ea
rs.
BA
LL
IST
IC M
ISS
ILE
S
Jo
int
Inte
llig
en
ce
Co
mm
itte
e (
JIC
) A
ss
es
sm
en
t: 1
99
9–
20
02
24
. In
mid
-20
01 t
he J
IC d
rew
att
en
tion
to
wh
at
it d
escrib
ed a
s a
"st
ep
-ch
an
ge
" in
pro
gre
ss o
n t
he
Ira
qi m
issile
pro
gra
mm
e o
ver
the
pre
viou
s
two
ye
ars
. It
wa
s c
lea
r fr
om
in
telli
ge
nce
th
at th
e r
an
ge
of
Ira
qi m
issile
s
wh
ich
wa
s p
erm
itte
d b
y th
e U
N a
nd s
upp
osed
ly lim
ite
d t
o 1
50
km
s w
as
be
ing e
xte
nde
d a
nd t
ha
t w
ork
wa
s u
nd
er
wa
y o
n la
rge
r e
ngin
es
for
lon
ge
r-ra
nge
mis
sile
s.
25
. In
ea
rly
20
02
th
e J
IC c
on
clu
de
d th
at
Ira
q h
ad
be
gu
n to
de
velo
p
mis
sile
s w
ith
a r
an
ge
of
ove
r 1
,000
kms. T
he
JIC
asse
ssed
th
at
if sa
nction
s r
em
ain
ed
effe
ctive
th
e I
raqis
wo
uld
no
t b
e a
ble
to
pro
du
ce
su
ch
a m
issile
befo
re 2
00
7. S
an
ctio
ns
and
th
e e
arlie
r w
ork
of
the
insp
ecto
rs h
ad
cau
se
d s
ign
ific
ant
pro
ble
ms
for
Ira
qi m
issile
d
eve
lop
me
nt. I
n t
he
pre
vio
us s
ix m
on
ths Ira
qi fo
reig
n p
rocu
rem
en
t eff
ort
s fo
r th
e m
issile
pro
gra
mm
e h
ad
be
en b
old
er.
The
JIC
als
o
asse
ssed
tha
t Ir
aq r
eta
ine
d u
p to
20
al-H
usse
in m
issile
s f
rom
befo
re th
e
Gu
lf W
ar.
Th
e I
raq
i b
all
isti
c m
iss
ile
pro
gra
mm
e s
ince
199
8
26
. S
ince
th
e G
ulf W
ar,
Ira
q h
as b
een
ope
nly
de
velo
pin
g t
wo
sh
ort
-ra
nge
mis
sile
s u
p to
a r
an
ge
of
15
0km
, w
hic
h a
re p
erm
itte
d u
nde
r U
N
Se
cu
rity
Co
un
cil
Re
so
lutio
n 6
87. T
he
al-S
am
ou
d liq
uid
pro
pe
llan
t m
issile
h
as b
ee
n e
xte
nsiv
ely
te
ste
d a
nd
is
be
ing
de
plo
yed
to
mili
tary
un
its.
Inte
llige
nce
ind
ica
tes th
at a
t le
ast
50
ha
ve b
ee
n p
rod
uce
d. In
telli
ge
nce
a
lso
in
dic
ate
s th
at Ir
aq h
as w
ork
ed
on
ext
endin
g its
ra
nge
to
at
lea
st
20
0km
in
bre
ach
of
UN
Se
cu
rity
Re
so
lution
68
7.
Pro
du
ctio
n o
f th
e s
olid
p
rop
ella
nt
Ab
ab
il-1
00 is a
lso
un
de
rwa
y, p
rob
ab
ly a
s a
n
un
gu
ide
d r
ocke
t a
t th
is s
tage
. T
he
re a
re a
lso
pla
ns to
ext
end
its
range
to
a
t le
ast
20
0km
. C
om
pa
red
to
liq
uid
pro
pe
llant
mis
sile
s,
tho
se p
ow
ere
d
by
so
lid p
rop
ella
nt
off
er
gre
ate
r e
ase o
f st
ora
ge
, h
and
ling a
nd m
ob
ility
. T
he
y a
re a
lso
qu
icke
r to
ta
ke in
to a
nd
ou
t of
actio
n a
nd
ca
n s
tay
at
a
hig
h s
tate
of
rea
din
ess
for
lon
ge
r pe
rio
ds.
27
. A
cco
rdin
g to
in
telli
ge
nce
, Ir
aq h
as r
eta
ined
up t
o 2
0 a
l-H
usse
in
mis
sile
s,
in b
rea
ch
of
UN
Se
cu
rity
Co
un
cil
Re
so
lutio
n 6
87
. T
he
se
m
issile
s w
ere
eith
er
hid
den
fro
m th
e U
N a
s c
om
ple
te s
yste
ms, o
r re
-a
sse
mb
led u
sin
g ille
ga
lly r
eta
ine
d e
ngin
es a
nd
oth
er
com
po
nen
ts. W
e
jud
ge
th
at
the
en
gin
ee
rin
g e
xpe
rtis
e a
vaila
ble
wo
uld
allo
w t
he
se
mis
sile
s
to b
e m
ain
tain
ed
eff
ectiv
ely
, a
lth
ou
gh
the
fa
ct th
at a
t le
ast
som
e r
equire
re
-asse
mb
ly m
ake
s it d
ifficu
lt to
ju
dge
exa
ctly
ho
w m
an
y co
uld
be
a
vaila
ble
fo
r u
se. T
he
y co
uld
be
use
d w
ith
co
nve
ntio
na
l, c
hem
ica
l o
r b
iolo
gic
alw
arh
ea
ds
and
,w
ith
ara
nge
of
up
to6
50
km,a
reca
pab
leof
an
d, a
ga
in, I
defy
an
yon
e to
sa
y th
at
this
cru
el an
d s
ad
istic d
icta
tor
sho
uld
b
e a
llow
ed
an
y p
ossib
ility
of
ge
ttin
g
his
han
ds o
n c
hem
ica
l, b
iolo
gic
al a
nd
n
ucle
ar
we
apo
ns o
f m
ass d
est
ructio
n.
“Wh
y no
w?
” p
eo
ple
ask
. I
agre
e th
at I
ca
nno
t sa
y th
at
this
mo
nth
or
ne
xt,
eve
n t
his
ye
ar
or
ne
xt,
Sa
dda
m w
ill
use
his
we
apo
ns. B
ut I ca
n s
ay
tha
t if
the
inte
rnatio
na
l com
mu
nity,
ha
vin
g
ma
de
th
e c
all
for
dis
arm
am
en
t, n
ow
, a
t th
is m
om
en
t, a
t th
e p
oin
t of
de
cis
ion
, sh
rugs its
sho
uld
ers
an
d
wa
lks a
wa
y, h
e w
ill d
raw
th
e
co
nclu
sio
n t
ha
t d
icta
tors
fa
ced
with
a
we
ake
nin
g w
ill a
lwa
ys d
raw
: th
at
the
in
tern
atio
na
l co
mm
un
ity w
ill t
alk
bu
t n
ot a
ct,
will
use
dip
lom
acy
bu
t n
ot
forc
e. W
e k
no
w,
aga
in f
rom
ou
r h
isto
ry,
tha
t d
iplo
ma
cy
no
t b
acked
by
the
th
rea
t of
forc
e h
as n
eve
r w
ork
ed
w
ith
dic
tato
rs a
nd
ne
ver
will
.
If w
e t
ake
th
is c
ou
rse
an
d if
we
refu
se
to im
ple
me
nt th
e w
ill o
f th
e
inte
rna
tion
al co
mm
un
ity,
Sa
dd
am
will
ca
rry
on
, h
is e
ffo
rts w
ill in
ten
sify,
his
co
nfide
nce
will
gro
w a
nd
, a
t som
e
po
int
in a
fu
ture
no
t to
o d
ista
nt,
th
e
thre
at
will
tu
rn in
to r
ea
lity.
Th
e th
rea
t th
ere
fore
is n
ot
ima
gin
ed
. T
he
his
tory
of
Sad
da
m a
nd
we
ap
on
s o
f m
ass
de
str
uction
is n
ot
Am
erica
n o
r B
ritish
p
rop
aga
nd
a. T
he
his
tory
an
d t
he
p
rese
nt th
rea
t a
re r
ea
l.
If p
eo
ple
sa
y, “
Wh
y sh
ou
ld B
rita
in
ca
re?
”, I
an
sw
er,
“B
eca
use
th
ere
is
no
wa
y th
is m
an,
in th
is r
egio
n a
bo
ve
all
regio
ns,
co
uld
be
gin
a c
onflic
t u
sin
g s
uch
we
ap
on
s a
nd
th
e
co
nse
qu
en
ce
s n
ot e
ngu
lf t
he
wh
ole
w
orl
d,
inclu
din
g t
his
cou
ntr
y.”
Th
at,
aft
er
all,
is th
e r
ea
son
th
e U
N p
asse
d
its r
eso
lutio
ns. T
ha
t is
wh
y it is r
igh
t th
at th
e U
N S
ecu
rity
Co
un
cil
aga
in
ma
ke
s its w
ill a
nd
its
un
ity
cle
ar
an
d
lays
do
wn
astr
on
gn
ew
UN
reso
lutio
n
17
4
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
rea
ch
ing a
num
be
r of
cou
ntr
ies in
the
re
gio
n in
clu
din
g C
ypru
s,
Tu
rke
y,
Sa
ud
i Ara
bia
, Ir
an a
nd
Isra
el.
28
. In
telli
ge
nce
ha
s confirm
ed
tha
t Ir
aq w
an
ts t
o e
xte
nd
th
e r
an
ge
of
its
mis
sile
sys
tem
s to
ove
r 1
00
0km
, e
na
blin
g it
to t
hre
ate
n o
the
r re
gio
na
l n
eig
hb
ou
rs. T
his
wo
rk b
ega
n in
199
8, a
ltho
ugh
eff
ort
s to
re
ge
ne
rate
th
e
lon
g-r
an
ge
ba
llistic m
issile
pro
gra
mm
e p
rob
ab
ly b
eg
an
in
19
95
. Ir
aq’s
m
issile
pro
gra
mm
es
em
plo
y h
un
dre
ds
of
peop
le.
Sa
telli
te im
age
ry h
as
sh
ow
n a
ne
w e
ngin
e test
sta
nd
be
ing c
on
str
ucte
d,
wh
ich
is la
rge
r th
an
th
e c
urr
en
t o
ne u
sed
fo
r a
l-S
am
oud
, an
d th
at fo
rme
rly
use
d f
or
testin
g
SC
UD
en
gin
es
wh
ich
wa
s d
ism
an
tled
un
de
r U
NS
CO
M s
up
erv
isio
n.
Th
is
ne
w s
tan
d w
ill b
e c
apab
le o
f te
stin
g e
ngin
es fo
r m
ed
ium
ra
nge
ba
llistic
mis
sile
s (
MR
BM
s)
with
ra
nge
s o
ver
10
00
km, w
hic
h a
re n
ot p
erm
itte
d
un
de
r U
N S
ecu
rity
Co
un
cil
Re
so
lutio
n 6
87.
Su
ch
a f
acili
ty w
ou
ld n
ot b
e
ne
ed
ed
fo
r sys
tem
s tha
t fa
ll w
ith
in t
he
UN
perm
itte
d r
an
ge
of
15
0km
. T
he
Ira
qis
ha
ve r
ecen
tly t
ake
n m
ea
sure
s t
o c
on
cea
l a
ctivi
tie
s a
t th
is s
ite
. Ir
aq is a
lso
wo
rkin
g t
o o
bta
in im
pro
ved
gu
idan
ce
te
ch
no
logy
to in
cre
ase
m
issile
accu
racy.
29
. T
he
su
cce
ss o
f U
N r
estr
ictio
ns m
ean
s t
he
de
velo
pm
en
t of
ne
w
lon
ge
r-ra
nge
mis
sile
s is
lik
ely
to
be
a s
low
pro
ce
ss. T
he
se
re
str
iction
s
imp
act p
art
icu
larly
on
th
e:
ava
ilab
ility
of
fore
ign
exp
ert
ise
;
co
ndu
ct
of
test
flig
hts
to
ra
nge
s a
bo
ve 1
50
km;
acqu
isitio
n o
f gu
ida
nce
an
d c
ontr
ol te
chn
olo
gy.
30
. S
add
am
rem
ain
s co
mm
itte
d to
de
velo
pin
g lo
nge
r-ra
nge
mis
sile
s.
Eve
n if
san
ctio
ns r
em
ain
eff
ective
, Ir
aq m
igh
t a
ch
ieve
a m
issile
ca
pa
bili
ty
of
ove
r 1
00
0km
with
in 5
ye
ars
.
31
. Ira
q h
as m
an
age
d t
o r
ebu
ild m
uch o
f th
e m
issile
pro
du
ction
in
fra
stru
ctu
re d
est
roye
d in
th
e G
ulf W
ar
an
d in
Ope
ratio
n D
ese
rt F
ox
in
19
98
. N
ew
mis
sile
-re
late
d infr
astr
uctu
re is a
lso
und
er
con
str
uction
. S
om
e a
spe
cts
of
this
, in
clu
din
g r
ocke
t p
rope
llan
t m
ixin
g a
nd
ca
stin
g
facili
tie
s a
t th
e a
l-M
am
ou
n P
lan
t, a
pp
ea
r to
rep
lica
te th
ose lin
ke
d t
o th
e
pro
hib
ited
Ba
dr-
200
0 p
rogra
mm
e (
with
a p
lann
ed
ran
ge
of
700
–1
000
km
) w
hic
h w
ere
de
str
oye
d in
the
Gu
lf W
ar
or
dis
ma
ntled
by
UN
SC
OM
. A
n
ew
pla
nt
at
al-M
am
oun
fo
r in
dig
en
ou
sly
pro
du
cin
g a
mm
on
ium
p
erc
hlo
rate
, w
hic
h is a
ke
y in
gre
die
nt
in th
e p
rod
uctio
n o
f so
lid p
ropella
nt
rocke
t m
oto
rs,
ha
s a
lso
bee
n c
on
str
uct
ed. T
his
ha
s b
ee
n p
rovi
de
d illi
citly
b
y N
EC
En
gin
ee
rs P
riva
te L
imited
, a
n In
dia
n c
he
mic
al e
ngin
ee
rin
g f
irm
w
ith
ext
en
siv
e lin
ks in
Ira
q,
inclu
din
g t
o o
the
r su
sp
ect fa
cili
tie
s s
uch
as
the
Fa
lluja
h 2
ch
lorine
pla
nt. A
fte
r a
n e
xte
nsiv
e in
vestiga
tio
n,
the
In
dia
n
au
tho
ritie
s h
ave
re
ce
ntly
su
sp
en
ded
its
exp
ort
lic
en
ce
, a
lth
ou
gh
oth
er
ind
ivid
ua
ls a
nd c
om
pa
nie
s a
re s
till
illic
itly
pro
cu
rin
g f
or
Ira
q.
an
d m
an
da
te. T
hen
Sad
dam
will
ha
ve
the
ch
oic
e: co
mp
ly w
illin
gly
or
be
fo
rced t
o c
om
ply
. T
hat is
wh
y,
alo
ngsid
e th
e d
iplo
ma
cy,
the
re m
ust
be
ge
nu
ine
pre
pa
red
ne
ss a
nd
p
lan
nin
g to
ta
ke a
ctio
n if
dip
lom
acy
fails
.
Le
t m
e b
e p
lain
abo
ut o
ur
pu
rpo
se
. O
f co
urs
e t
he
re is n
o d
ou
bt th
at
Ira
q,
the
re
gio
n a
nd
the
wh
ole
wo
rld
wo
uld
b
e b
ette
r off
with
out
Sa
dda
m. Ir
aq
de
se
rve
s t
o b
e led
by
so
meo
ne
wh
o
ca
n a
bid
e b
y in
tern
ation
al la
w,
no
t a
m
urd
ero
us d
icta
tor;
by
so
meo
ne
wh
o
ca
n b
rin
g I
raq b
ack
into
the
in
tern
atio
na
l co
mm
un
ity w
he
re it
be
lon
gs,
no
t le
ave
it
lan
gu
ish
ing a
s a
p
aria
h; b
y so
meo
ne
wh
o c
an
ma
ke
the
co
untr
y ri
ch
an
d s
ucce
ssf
ul, n
ot
imp
ove
rish
ed
by
Sa
dda
m’s
pe
rso
na
l gre
ed
; a
nd
by
som
eone
wh
o c
an
lea
d
a G
ove
rnm
en
t m
ore
rep
rese
nta
tive
of
the
co
untr
y a
s a
wh
ole
wh
ile
ma
inta
inin
g a
bso
lute
ly I
raq’s
te
rrito
ria
l in
tegrity
. W
e h
ave
no q
ua
rre
l w
ith
the
Ira
qi
pe
op
le.
Ind
ee
d, lib
era
ted
fro
m
Sa
ddam
, th
ey
co
uld
ma
ke
Ira
q
pro
sp
ero
us a
nd
a f
orc
e f
or
go
od
in
th
e m
idd
le e
ast.
So
th
e e
nd
ing o
f th
is
regim
e w
ou
ld b
e th
e c
au
se
of
regre
t fo
r n
o o
ne
oth
er
tha
n S
ad
da
m. B
ut
ou
r p
urp
ose
is d
isa
rmam
ent.
No
one
w
an
ts m
ilita
ry c
on
flic
t. T
he
wh
ole
p
urp
ose
of
putt
ing t
his
befo
re t
he
UN
is
to
de
mo
nstr
ate
th
e u
nite
d
de
term
inatio
n o
f th
e inte
rna
tion
al
co
mm
un
ity
to r
eso
lve
th
is in
th
e w
ay
it s
ho
uld
ha
ve b
een
reso
lve
d y
ea
rs
ago
: th
rou
gh
a p
rop
er
pro
ce
ss o
f d
isa
rmam
en
t u
nde
r th
e U
N.
Dis
arm
am
en
t of
all
we
ap
on
s o
f m
ass
de
str
uction
is th
e d
em
an
d. O
ne
wa
y o
r a
noth
er,
it
mu
st b
e a
cce
de
d to
.
17
5
AN
NE
X B
NO
TE
: R
ed
acti
on
s a
re n
ot
ind
icate
d
15
Ma
rch
200
2
21
Au
gu
st
20
02
9
Se
pte
mb
er
20
02
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
002
32
. D
esp
ite a
UN
em
ba
rgo
, Ir
aq h
as a
lso
mad
e c
on
ce
rted
eff
ort
s to
a
cqu
ire
ad
ditio
na
l pro
du
ctio
n te
chn
olo
gy,
in
clu
din
g m
ach
ine
too
ls a
nd
ra
w m
ate
ria
ls,
in b
rea
ch o
f U
N S
ecu
rity
Co
uncil
Re
so
lutio
n 1
05
1. T
he
e
mba
rgo
ha
s s
uccee
de
d in
blo
ckin
g m
an
y of
the
se a
tte
mp
ts,
such
as
requ
ests
to
bu
y m
agnesiu
m p
ow
de
r a
nd a
mm
on
ium
ch
lori
de
. B
ut
we
kn
ow
fro
m in
telli
ge
nce
th
at
som
e ite
ms h
ave
fo
und
th
eir
wa
y to
th
e I
raqi
ba
llistic m
issile
pro
gra
mm
e.
Mo
re w
ill in
evi
tab
ly c
on
tin
ue
to
do
so
. In
telli
ge
nce
ma
kes it
cle
ar
tha
t Ir
aqi p
rocu
rem
en
t a
ge
nts
an
d f
ron
t co
mpa
nie
s in
th
ird
co
un
trie
s a
re s
ee
kin
g illi
citly
to
acqu
ire
pro
pe
llan
t ch
em
ica
ls f
or
Ira
q's
ba
llistic m
issile
s. T
his
in
clu
de
s p
rodu
ctio
n le
vel
qu
an
titie
s o
f ne
ar
com
ple
te s
ets
of
so
lid p
rope
llan
t ro
cke
t m
oto
r in
gre
die
nts
su
ch a
s a
lum
iniu
m p
ow
de
r, a
mm
on
ium
pe
rch
lora
te a
nd
hyd
roxyl
te
rmin
ate
d p
oly
bu
tad
ien
e. T
he
re h
ave
als
o b
een
att
em
pts
to
a
cqu
ire
la
rge
qu
an
tities o
f liq
uid
pro
pe
llan
t che
mic
als
su
ch
as
Un
sym
me
tric
al D
ime
thyl
hyd
razin
e (
UD
MH
) a
nd
die
thyl
en
etr
iam
en
e. W
e
jud
ge
th
ese
are
in
ten
de
d to
sup
po
rt p
rodu
ction
and
de
plo
ymen
t of
the
al-
Sa
mo
ud
and
de
velo
pm
ent
of
lon
ge
r-ra
nge
sys
tem
s.
17
6
ANNEX C
IRAQ: MILITARY CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
1. Our policy objectives were set out in Parliament on 7 January 2003. The prime objectiveremains to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and their associated programmesand means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles, as set out in relevant UnitedNations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).
2. In UNSCR 1441, the Security Council decided that Iraq was in material breach of itsobligations under UNSCR 687 and other relevant resolutions. The Council gave Iraq a finalopportunity to comply by co-operating with the enhanced inspection regime establishedby UNSCR 1441, but warned of the serious consequences of failing to do so. The evidenceshows that Iraq has failed to comply with the terms of UNSCR 1441 and is now in furthermaterial breach of its obligations. In these circumstances, UNSCR 678 authorises the useof force to enforce Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obligations.
3. The obstacle to Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obligations under relevantUNSCRs is the current Iraqi regime, supported by the security forces under its control. TheBritish Government has therefore concluded that military action is necessary to enforceIraqi compliance and that it is therefore necessary that the current Iraqi regime beremoved from power. All military action must be limited to what is necessary to achievethat end. The UK is contributing maritime, land and air forces as part of a US-led coalition.
4. The UK’s overall objective for the military campaign is to create theconditions inwhich Iraq disarms in accordancewith its obligations underUNSCRs and remains so disarmed in the long term. Tasks which flow from thisobjective are set out below.
5. In aiming to achieve this objective as swiftly as possible, every effort will be made tominimise civilian casualties and damage to essential economic infrastructure, and tominimise and address adverse humanitarian consequences. The main tasks of thecoalition are to:
a. overcome the resistance of Iraqi security forces;
b. deny the Iraqi regime the use of weapons of mass destruction now and in thefuture;
c. remove the Iraqi regime, given its clear and unyielding refusal to comply withthe UN Security Council’s demands;
d. identify and secure the sites where weapons of mass destruction and theirmeans of delivery are located;
e. secure essential economic infrastructure, including for utilities and transport,from sabotage and wilful destruction by Iraq; and
f. deter wider conflict both inside Iraq and in the region.
177
Military action will be conducted in conformity with international law, including the UN Charter andinternational humanitarian law.
6. Our wider political objectives in support of the military campaign are to:
a. demonstrate to the Iraqi people that our quarrel is not with them and that theirsecurity and well-being is our concern;
b. work with the United Nations to lift sanctions affecting the supply ofhumanitarian and reconstruction goods, and to enable Iraq’s own resources,including oil, to be available to meet the needs of the Iraqi people;
c. sustain the widest possible international and regional coalition in support ofmilitary action;
d. preserve wider regional security, including by maintaining the territorialintegrity of Iraq and mitigating the humanitarian and other consequences ofconflict for Iraq’s neighbours;
e. help create conditions for a future, stable and law-abiding government ofIraq; and
f. further our policy of eliminating terrorism as a force in international affairs.
7. In the wake of hostilities, the immediate military priorities for the coalition are to:
a. provide for the security of friendly forces;
b. contribute to the creation of a secure environment so that normal life can berestored;
c. work in support of humanitarian organisations to mitigate the consequences ofhostilities and, in the absence of such civilian humanitarian capacity, providerelief where it is needed;
d. work with UNMOVIC/IAEA to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction andtheir means of delivery;
e. facilitate remedial action where environmental damage has occurred;
f. enable the reconstruction and recommissioning of essential infrastructure forthe political and economic development of Iraq, and the immediate benefit ofthe Iraqi people; and
g. lay plans for the reform of Iraq’s security forces.
Wherever possible, these tasks will be carried out in cooperation with the United Nations.
8. British military forces will withdraw as soon as practicable. We hope to see the earlyestablishment of a transitional civilian administration. We will work with the internationalcommunity to build the widest possible international and regional support for thereconstruction of Iraq and the move to representative government.
178
9. It remains our wish to see Iraq become a stable, united and law abiding state, within itspresent borders, cooperating with the international community, no longer posing a threatto its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations andproviding effective representative government for its own people.
March 2003
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17 March 2003 Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office
London SW1A 2AH
from The Foreign Secretary
Iraq: Legal Position Concerning the Use of Force
As you may be aware, the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, has this
morning answered a Question in the Lords setting out his views of the legal
basis for the use of force against Iraq.
I now enclose a copy of his Answer, together with a paper which
gives the legal background in more detail, for the information of your
Committee.
You will also wish to be aware that I am this morning publishing a
Command Paper (CM5785) "Iraq - UN Documents of early March 2003".
This supplements the Command Paper I published last month.
I am placing a copy of this letter and enclosures in the Library.
JACK STRAW
The Rt Hon Donald Anderson MP
D
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ANNEX
Question: To ask HMG what is the Attorney General's view of the legal basis for the use of force against Iraq Answer: The Attorney General (Lord Goldsmith): Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. All of these resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the use of force for the express purpose of restoring international peace and security: 1. In resolution 678 the Security Council authorised force against Iraq, to eject it from
Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area. 2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
In resolution 687, which set out the ceasefire conditions after Operation Desert Storm, the Security Council imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to restore international peace and security in the area. Resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678.
A material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force under resolution 678.
In resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of resolution 687, because it has not fully complied with its obligations to disarm under that resolution.
The Security Council in resolution 1441 gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and warned Iraq of the "serious consequences" if it did not.
The Security Council also decided in resolution 1441 that, if Iraq failed at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of resolution 1441, that would constitute a further material breach.
It is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply and therefore Iraq was at the time of resolution 1441 and continues to be in material breach.
Thus, the authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived and so continues today.
Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security Council to sanction force was required if that had been intended. Thus, all that resolution 1441 requires is reporting to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq's failures, but not an express further decision to authorise force.
I have lodged a copy of this answer, together with resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 in the Library of both Houses.
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IRAQ: LEGAL BASIS FOR THE USE OF FORCE
Summary
1. The legal basis for any military action against Iraq would be the authorisation
which the Security Council, by its resolution 678 (1990), gave to Member States to
use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area. That
authorisation was suspended but not terminated by Security Council resolution
(SCR) 687 (1991), and revived by SCR 1441 (2002). In SCR 1441, the Security
Council has determined -
(1)
(2)
(3)
2.
3.
4.
that Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) constitutes
a threat to international peace and security;
that Iraq has failed - in clear violation of its legal obligations - to disarm;
and
that, in consequence, Iraq is in material breach of the conditions for the
ceasefire laid down by the Council in SCR 687 at the end of the
hostilities in 1991, thus reviving the authorisation in SCR 678.
The extent of the authority to use force contained in SCR 678
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council the power to
authorise States to take such military action as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
In the case of Iraq, the Security Council took such a step following the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. Paragraph 2 of SCR 678 authorised "Member States co-
operating with the Government of Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold
and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and
to restore international peace and security in the area." The phrase "all necessary
means" was understood then (as it is now) as including the use of force.
Following the liberation of Kuwait, the Security Council adopted SCR 687. This
resolution set out the steps which the Council required Iraq to take in order
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to restore international peace and security in the area. Iraq's acceptance of those
requirements was the condition for the declaration of a formal ceasefire. Those
steps included the destruction of all WMD under international supervision and the
requirement that Iraq should not attempt to acquire such weapons or the means of
their manufacture. As a means to achieving the disarmament required by the
Security Council, SCR 687 also required Iraq to submit to extensive weapons
inspection by UNSCOM (now UNMOVIC) and the IAEA. The Security Council
was quite clear that these steps were essential to the restoration of international
peace and security in the area.
5.
6.
SCR 687 did not repeal the authorisation to use force in paragraph 2 of SCR 678.
On the contrary, it confirmed that SCR 678 remained in force. The authorisation
was suspended for so long as Iraq complied with the conditions of the ceasefire.
But the authorisation could be revived if the Council determined that Iraq was
acting in material breach of the requirements of SCR 687. Although almost twelve
years have elapsed since SCR 687 was adopted, Iraq has never taken the steps
required of it by the Council. Throughout that period the Council has repeatedly
condemned Iraq for violations of SCR 687 and has adopted numerous resolutions
on the subject. In 1993 and again in 1998 the coalition took military action under
the revived authority of SCR 678 to deal with the threat to international peace and
security posed by those violations.
In relation to the action in 1993, the Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office wrote: "The Security Council determined in its statements
of 8 and 11 January that Iraq was in material breach of resolutions 687 and its
related resolutions, and warned Iraq that serious consequences would ensue from
continued failure to comply with its obligations. Resolution 687 lays down the
terms for the formal ceasefire between the coalition states and Iraq at the end of
the hostilities mandated by the Security Council in resolution 678. These terms are
binding in themselves but have also been specifically accepted by Iraq as a
condition for the formal ceasefire to come into effect. In the light of Iraq's
continued breaches of Security Council resolution 687 and thus of the ceasefire
terms, and the repeated warnings given by the Security Council and members of
the coalition, their forces were entitled to take
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necessary and proportionate action in order to ensure that Iraq complies with those
terms."
7. On 14 January 1993, in relation to the UK/US military action the previous day, the
then UN Secretary-General said: "The raid yesterday, and the forces which carried
out the raid, have received a mandate from the Security Council, according to
resolution 678, and the cause of the raid was the violation by Iraq of resolution 687
concerning the ceasefire. So, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, I can say
that this action was taken and conforms to the resolutions of the Security Council
and conforms to the Charter of the United Nations."
8. In relation to the military action undertaken in 1998, the then Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State (now Minister of State) at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean stated: "In our previous discussions in
this House some of your Lordships asked about the legality of our action. Any
action involving UK forces would be based on international law. The Charter of
the United Nations allows for the use of force under the authority of the Security
Council. The Security Council resolution adopted before the Gulf conflict
authorised the use of force in order to restore international peace and security in
the region. Iraq is in clear breach of Security Council resolution 687 which laid
down the conditions for the ceasefire at the end of the conflict. Those conditions
included a requirement on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction under
international supervision. Those conditions have been broken."
Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)
9. It is against that legal background that United Kingdom and the United States
brought to the Council the draft resolution which was eventually adopted
unanimously as SCR 1441 on 8 November 2002. The preamble to that resolution
again expressly referred to SCR 678, confirming once more that that resolution
was still in force. It also recognised the threat that Iraq's non-compliance with
Council resolutions posed to international peace and security; and it recalled that
SCR 687 imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for the achievement of its
objective of restoring international peace and security. In paragraph 1 the Council
went on to decide that Iraq "has been and remains in material breach" of its
obligations under SCR 687 and other relevant resolutions. The use of the term
"material breach" is of the utmost importance because the practice of the Security
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Council during the 1990's shows that it was just such a finding of material breach
by Iraq which served to revive the authorisation of force in SCR 678.
10. On this occasion, however, the Council decided (in paragraph 2 of SCR 1441) to
offer Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations." Iraq
was required to produce an accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of
its prohibited programmes (paragraph 3), and to provide immediate and
unrestricted access to UNMOVIC and IAEA (paragraph 5). Failure by Iraq to
comply with the requirements of SCR 1441 was declared to be a further material
breach of Iraq's obligations (paragraph 4), in addition to the continuing breach
already identified in paragraph 1. In the event of a further breach (paragraph 4), or
interference by Iraq with the inspectors or failure to comply with any of the
disarmament obligations under any of the relevant resolutions (paragraph 11), the
matter was to be reported to the Security Council. The Security Council was then
to convene "to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of
the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security"
(paragraph 12). The Council warned Iraq (paragraph 13) that "it will face serious
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations".
11. It is important to stress that SCR 1441 did not revive the 678 authorisation
immediately on its adoption. There was no "automaticity". The resolution afforded
Iraq a final opportunity to comply and it provided for any failure by Iraq to be
"considered" by the Security Council (under paragraph 12 of the resolution). That
paragraph does not, however, mean that no further action can be taken without a
new resolution of the Council. Had that been the intention, it would have provided
that the Council would decide what needed to be done to restore international
peace and security, not that it would consider the matter. The choice of words was
deliberate; a proposal that there should be a requirement for a decision by the
Council, a position maintained by several Council members, was not adopted.
Instead the members of the Council opted for the formula that the Council must
consider the matter before any action is taken.
12. That consideration has taken place regularly since the adoption of SCR 1441. It is
plain, including from UNMOVIC's statements to the Security Council, its Twelfth
Quarterly Report and the so-called "Clusters Document", that Iraq has not
complied as required with its disarmament obligations. Whatever other
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differences there may have been in the Security Council, no member of the
Council has questioned this conclusion. It therefore follows that Iraq has not taken
the final opportunity offered to it and remains in material breach of the
disarmament obligations which, for twelve years, the Council has insisted are
essential for the restoration of peace and security. In these circumstances, the
authorisation to use force contained in SCR 678 revives.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17 March 2003
187
IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1441
15 March 2003
Background
Iraq has failed to comply fully with 14 previous UN resolutions related to WMD.
UNSCR 1441 is unambiguous:
"Recognising the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (PP3)
"Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions" (OP1).
"Decides... to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council" (OP2).
"Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq... and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations" (OP4)
The attached material assesses Iraqi progress in complying with relevant provisions of UNSCR 1441 with illustrative examples.
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The Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems...as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material" (OP3)
Not met. Although a 12,000-page document was submitted on 7 December, it did not contain new information to answer any of the outstanding questions relating to Iraqi disarmament. None of the issues identified in the UN's Butler or Amorim reports (1999) have been resolved.
Dr Blix, 27 January "Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number".
Dr Blix, 14 February "The declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions"
IAEA written report, 27 January "The Declaration contains numerous clarifications. It does not include, however, additional information related to the questions and concerns", outstanding since 1998.
Outstanding issues that were not resolved in Iraq's 7-8 December Declaration include:
Failure to account adequately for SCUD-type missiles and components "suggests that these items may have been retained for a prohibited missile force" (UNMOVIC document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues, 6 March)
Failure to explain why Iraq has built a missile test stand at Al Rafah that can accommodate missiles with over 4 times the thrust of the (prohibited) Al-Samoud 2 missile.
Amount of mustard gas unaccounted for is at least 80 tonnes (in 550 shells and 450 aerial bombs) - but "based on a document recently received from Iraq, this quantity could be substantially higher" (Unresolved Disarmament issues, 6 March)
"Given Iraq's history of concealment with respect to its VX programme, it cannot be excluded that it has retained some capability with regard to VX" that could still be viable today. There are significant discrepancies in accounting for all key VX precursors. Iraq said it never weaponised VX - but UNSCOM found evidence to contradict this. (Unresolved Disarmament Issues, 6 March) It was not until 15 March - over three months after the specified date for the Declaration - that Iraq
189
provided a further document which it claimed contained additional information (although this remains unconfirmed).
-
-
-
"It seems highly probable that destruction of bulk agent, including anthrax, stated by Iraq to be at AI Hakam in July/August 1991, did not occur. Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist". (Unresolved Disarmament Issues, 6 March)
Failure to account for all of the aircraft associated with the L-29/Al-Bai'aa remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) programme. Furthermore, there is no explanation of 27 June 2002 RPV flight of 500kms ( the proscribed limit is 150kms).
Failure to account for material unaccounted for when UNSCOM were forced to withdraw from Iraq in 1998: for example, what happened to up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including 300 tonnes unique (in the Iraqi programme) to the production of VX nerve agent? UNSCOM estimated that quantities of undeclared growth media could have produced: 3-11,000 litres of botulinum toxin; 6-16,000 litres of anthrax, and 5,600 litres of clostridium perfringens. (Amorim and Butler reports, 1999)
According to Dr El-Baradei (IAEA written report, 27 January) the Declaration "does not include, however, additional information related to the questions and concerns" outstanding since 1998. These were:
the uncertainty about the progress made in weapons design and centrifuge development due to the lack of relevant documentation
the extent of external assistance from which Iraq benefited
the lack of evidence that Iraq had abandoned definitively its nuclear programme.
Apart from failing to answer unresolved questions, the Declaration also contained some significant falsehoods:
Dr Blix, 27 January. "Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 Declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered."
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The 7 December Declaration maintains that the Al-Samoud 2 missile has a maximum range of 150kms. UNMOVIC and a panel of international experts have established that the Al-Samoud 2 is a prohibited system, designed to have a range beyond the 150 kms limit imposed by the UN in 1991 - one variant having a range (based on separate Iraqi data) of just under 200kms. In addition, Iraq declared that the missile was still under development - however, as of February 2003 63 missiles had already been deployed with the Iraqi armed forces.
The Declaration admits that 131 Volga missile engines had been imported, in contravention of sanctions. However, according to UNMOVIC Iraq actually imported at least 380 engines.
The Declaration claims that its UAVs and cruise missiles adhere to UN restrictions. However, recent inspections have revealed a type of unmanned drone that was not referred to in the Declaration, and its range easily exceeds the UN proscribed limit of 150kms. There has never been full Iraqi disclosure on any of its UAVs.
The Declaration also fails to account property for work on aircraft fuel drop tanks that were converted to deliver CBW agent. The UN found modified aircraft fuel tanks at the Khan Bani Sa'ad Airfield in December 2002. These tanks were stated to have been part of an indigenously manufactured agricultural spray system that was said to have been produced by the Iraqi Air Force (Unresolved Disarmament Issues, 6 March)
According to an Iraqi document that UNMOVIC obtained separately from the Declaration, "13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for." (Dr Blix, 27 January)
Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA "immediate, unimpeded. unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates" (OP5)
Not met. At first, none of the Iraqi personnel requested for interview by UNMOVIC agreed to be interviewed in private. At a meeting in Baghdad on 19-20 January, the Iraqi side committed itself to "encourage" private interviews. However, it was not until 6-7 February (i.e. just before Dr Blix and Dr El-Baradei's last visit to Baghdad) that three people agreed to be interviewed in private. But these interviews were with personnel volunteered by the Iraqi authorities, not with Scientists requested by UNMOVIC.
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On 28 February, a further two scientists were interviewed in private. As of 14 March, UNMOVIC had asked 41 people to be interviewed, but only 12 had agreed to UNMOVIC's terms. The remainder of the interviews could not be carried out because of unacceptable restrictions (e.g. insistence on the presence of official Iraqi minders, or that the interviews be tape-recorded).
It was not until 26 February that the IAEA carried out its first private interview; as of 14 March, IAEA had only been able to carry out 3 private interviews.
We have reason to believe that the Iraqi authorities have intimidated interviewees; that rooms have been bugged; and that some potential interviewees have been kept away from the inspectors by the Iraqi authorities.
UNMOVIC written report, 28 February.. "the reality is that, so far, no persons not nominated by the Iraqi side have been willing to be interviewed without a tape recorder running or an Iraqi witness present"
Dr El-Baradei, 7 March: "When we first began to request private, unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and keeping the recorded tapes"
"UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government" (OP5)
Not met. No interviews have taken placed outside Iraq.
There is evidence that Iraqi scientists have been intimidated into refusing interviews outside Iraq. They - and their families - have been threatened with execution if they deviate from the official line.
"UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities" (OP7)
Not met. Dr Blix, 27 January. "Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources".
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During February, Iraq supplied some additional names. However, the information provided is still inadequate. For example, according to UNMOVIC's document on Unresolved Disarmament Issues, 6 March, Iraq provided a list of people who worked in the entire chemical weapons programme - but Iraq's 132 names contrast with UNMOVIC's records, which show that "over 325 people were involved in chemical weapons research" at one establishment alone. "UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles" (OP7) Partially met - belatedly, and under pressure. Iraq initially hindered UNMOVIC helicopter flights. Dr Blix, 27 January: "Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of their own to accompany ours. This would have raised a safety problem." The matter was resolved when UNMOVIC agreed to take Iraqi escorts in UNMOVIC's own helicopters.
Iraq also obstructed U2 reconnaissance flights over Iraq, placing unacceptable pre-conditions on the flights. Almost three months after inspections began, just before Dr Blix presented a report on Iraqi co-operation to the Security Council, Iraq finally relented. The first U2 flight took place on 17 February.
"UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove. destroy. or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof" (OP7)
Not yet met. UNMOVIC has determined that the Al-Samoud 2 missile programme, as well as rocket motor casting chambers at Al-Mamoun, are prohibited under SCR687. This assessment has been confirmed by a panel of independent experts, who concluded that the (light) Al-Samoud 2 was designed to fly just under 200kms. In the case of the casting chambers, this equipment was previously destroyed by UNSCOM as being part-of a prohibited weapons programme - but was subsequently rebuilt by Iraq. UNMOVIC gave Iraq a deadline of 1 March to begin the destruction of these prohibited systems (missiles plus associated components/infrastructure, and casting chamber). At first, Iraq said that the Iraqi authorities intended "to study" the demand. Then the Iraqi authorities said that they agreed "in principle" to the destruction of the missiles, "despite our belief that the decision to destroy was unjust... and the timing of this request seems to us to be one with political aims" (letter to Dr Blix from Dr Al-Saadi, 27 January).
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Destruction began on 1 March, but Iraq has threatened that it may stop the destruction process at any time. As of 14 March, Iraq had destroyed: - 65 missiles (Iraq has declared production of 76 missiles, but UNMOVIC estimate there
are around 120 missiles) - 42 warheads (out of 118) - 5 engines (out of an estimated 380) - 2 missile launchers (out of 9)
"Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations" (OP8)
Partially met. Inspections have largely been incident-free. However, UNMOVIC has noted some "friction" during inspections, and occasional harassment. On several occasions inspectors have been met with demonstrations. Dr Blix, 27 January. "Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the authorities."
On several occasions Iraqi authorities have claimed that inspectors were spying.
"Demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately. unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA" (OP9).
Not met. The questions outstanding since UNSCOM was forced to withdraw in 1998 have still not been answered. Nor have those issues raised by the Amorim panel, a group of international experts convened under UN auspices to identify outstanding Iraqi disarmament issues. Although Iraq has provided some documents, it is not answering any substantive questions.
On 6 March, UNMOVIC released a paper on Unresolved Disarmament Issues - Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes. The paper is a 173 page-long catalogue of Iraqi intransigence since 1991, detailing
- Some 29 occasions when Iraq failed, despite repeated requests, to provide credible evidence to substantiate claims
- Some 17 separate instances when UNSCOM/UNMOVIC uncovered information that directly contradicted the official Iraqi account
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- 128 actions Iraq should now take to help resolve the outstanding issues
Dr Blix, 14 January. "Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions."
Dr Blix 27 January "It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of 'catch as catch can'"
UNMOVIC written report, 28 February. ''During the period of time covered by the present report, Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far"
Dr Blix, 7 March. "With such detailed information regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed"
Dr El-Baradei, 27 January. "Iraq's co-operation with the IAEA should be full and active, as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions."
There are a number of examples of Iraqi gestures which have been a pretence of co-operation.
Of papers handed over by the Iraqis in early February:
Dr Blix: "No new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were closed"
Dr EI-Baradei: "Iraq has provided documents on the concerns outstanding since 1998, but no new information was contained"
Of legislation on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
UNSCOM - and now UNMOVIC - requested that the Government of Iraq pass legislation prohibiting the manufacturing or importing of WMD and associated material. Draft legislation was provided. On 14 February - the day of Dr Blix's last update to the Security Council - Iraq announced that it had passed a Presidential Decree to this effect In fact, the decree is totally inadequate: its scope is very limited, and it does not even suggest any penalties for offenders.
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UNMOVIC written report 28 February. "The presidential decree, which was issued on 14 February and which prohibits private Iraqi citizens and mixed companies from engaging in work relating to weapons of mass destruction, standing alone, is not adequate to meet the United Nations requirements. UNMOVIC has enquired whether a comprehensive regulation is being prepared in line with several years of discussions between Iraq and UNSCOM/UNMOVIC"
Of Iraqi excavation of some R-400 bombs and bomb fragments
In February, Iraq notified UNMOVIC that it had uncovered some R-400 bombs (indigenously produced, filled with chemical or biological agent). However, Iraq's declarations on R-400 bombs have been inconsistent and contradictory, leaving UNMOVIC with little confidence in the numbers produced or types of agents filled". Photographic evidence contradicts Iraqi claims that all R-400A bombs (marked as filled with botulinum toxin and anthrax) were destroyed in July or August 2001. It is unlikely that the results of the ongoing Iraqi excavation will resolve this issue.
"UNMOVIC cannot discount the possibility that some CW and BW filled R-400 bombs remain in Iraq" (Unresolved Disarmament Issues, 6 March)
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