ANGLO FATAL RISK GUIDELINE MOLTEN MATERIALS … Estándar... · 2009. 1. 13. · Anglo American...

MOLTEN MATERIALS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINE

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ANGLO FATAL RISK GUIDELINE MOLTEN MATERIALS MANAGEMENT





CONTENTS PAGE

1 SCOPE 3

2 OBJECTIVE 3

3 APPLICATION 3 3.1 DEFINITIONS 4 4 REQUIREMENTS OF THE STANDARD 5

5 PLANT AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 5

6 SYSTEM AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 20

7 PEOPLE REQUIREMENTS 30

REFERENCES 35

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS 35





1 SCOPE

This guideline refers to the implementation of the Anglo Fatal Risk Standard: Molten Materials Management and should be read in conjunction with the respective Standard.

The guidelines contained in this document are considered as "highly recommended" and deviations are to be documented and justified. Full adherence to these guidelines will not be a factor in determining compliance with the Standards, since alternative methods can be available if justified on a risk basis.

In case of conflict with requirements of any other Anglo document or guideline, the following hierarchy will apply:

1. Anglo Safety Way – ASW

2. Anglo Fatal Risk Standards - AFRS

3. Anglo Fatal Risk Guidelines - AFRG

It is important that when implementing Standards the organisation takes cognizance of, and comply with the relevant legal requirements in the country of application.

2 OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this Guideline is to provide guidance and clarity to assist in implementing the requirements of the Molten Materials Management Fatal Risk Standard.

This guideline has been developed to provide more detail and clarification for the implementation of the requirements of the Standard. This should enable sites to be more aligned with each other on what the boundaries are with regards to meeting the requirements.

This guideline is by no means exhaustive and will be updated periodically and supported by good practice sharing. It is not intended as a template for achieving compliance.

3 APPLICATION

This Guideline covers operational activities in and around furnaces and smelters associated with the processes of tapping, handling and transport of molten materials. Also included are any other areas where materials of significantly elevated temperatures are handled and or processed. Included are the processes for:

• Copper

• Nickel

• Molten Steels of various composition. (SCAW Metals)

• PGM containing Nickel and Copper Sulphide

• Molten salts and sulphurs

• Casthouses

• Hot ash/slag products





• Recovered Dusts

• Söderberg electrode paste

Melting and smelting furnaces and processes involving tapping, handling and transporting of molten materials are the main focus of this Guideline. However, other processes in Anglo American also incorporate high temperature process steps that involve hazards similar to molten materials. These processes include dryers, sintering furnaces, roasters, rotary kilns, coke ovens, converters, ladle furnaces, refineries, casthouses etc. It is recommended that relevant aspects of this Guideline also be considered for application to such processes.

3.1 DEFINITIONS

This Standard applies to all Anglo American Group managed businesses and operations, including contractors and visitors when involved in controlled activities.

Controlled Activities / sites are those where the Group Company has the authority to determine how to manage the operation. It does not include monitored or uncontrolled activities.

Monitored Activities are those where Anglo American can exercise some influence but cannot set Policies and/or comprehensive Control Standards and/or directly supervise and enforce their application (i.e. contractor and supplier transporting their goods and/or personnel to or from “controlled sites”).

Uncontrolled Activities are those where Anglo American does not set or influence Policies or Control Standards and does not supervise safety performance. These include services provided by public Companies, activities performed at supplier or manufacturer shops, etc.

Where there is uncertainty over whether the activity is controlled, monitored or uncontrolled, the matter should be referred to the Safety function for determination.

Breakout: uncontrolled release of molten material from the inside of a furnace, ladle, mould or other vessel.

Eruption: a violent release of burning gas from the surface of a vessel, normally accompanied by intense flames and fumes and, in the case of furnaces, may include the displacement of furnace process materials or in the case of ladles molten materials.

Furnace: a vessel within which pyrometallurgical melting or smelting reactions take place, refining or reduction of liquid metal/alloy takes place, or liquid metal is heated and/or held.

Molten materials: materials which are solid at ambient temperature and pressure, but liquid at the elevated temperature of a particular process. This could include metals, alloys, slags, matte and electrolyte (bath) and Söderberg electrode paste.

Operational activities: activities performed by both operational and maintenance personnel.





Operating floors (of furnaces): typically at the furnace roof/cover level, where the control room is also normally situated. The tapping floor for sulphide smelters is the main operating floor, however various other levels of the furnaces are routinely accessed to maintain operations.

Runout: uncontrolled flow of molten material from the taphole area.

Run away: uncontrolled release of matte/molten metals/slags e.g. after failure to close taphole during routine tapping.

Smelter: for the purpose of this document this term has the same meaning as ‘furnace’.

Steam explosion: a steam explosion can be created when liquid water encounters hot, molten metal or slag. As the water rapidly expands into steam, it splashes the burning hot liquid metal along with it, causing an extreme risk of severe burns to anyone located nearby and creating a fire hazard causes a pressure wave causing the major damage. Potential for a secondary hydrogen explosion due to cracking of water Note: cryogenic fluids may be classed in here- similarly to steam explosions these can result in explosions if fluids e.g. oils or water come into contact.

Tap/tapping: the process through which molten materials are removed from a furnace, either through a taphole or by tilting of the furnace.

ALARP: as low as reasonably practicable.

HAZOP: Hazard and Operability Study

4 REQUIREMENTS OF THE STANDARD

This section is structured using exactly the same numbering sequence as the Fatal Risk Standard document. Each requirement is repeated inside a box, followed by a statement of intent. This is followed by discussion and clarification of that particular requirement.

Detail has been added to some, but not all requirements, as some sections were deemed self explanatory.

5 PLANT AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

1. Process Risk Assessment

The basis of design of molten materials facilities shall be reviewed, amended as necessary and documented utilising the HAZOP or other systematic hazard analysis processes. As built design drawings (e.g. process and instrumentation diagrams, process flow diagrams, layout drawings, isometrics, software) shall be updated as a result of these reviews.

Process risk assessments shall be carried out during all phases of the life of a facility. During the design phase the reviews should start as early as possible and use structured hazard analysis techniques. As the design progresses into execution more detailed techniques appropriate to the risk profile should be used. During the operating phase there should be regular reviews at frequencies required by local legislation or as consistent with the risk profile. During operation,





process risk assessments should also be part of the management of change system for modifications to plant and equipment. A variety of process hazard identification and risk assessment tools such as HAZOP are available. Advice should be sought where necessary to select the most appropriate tool.

All methods involving hazard identification should be facilitated by someone competent in the technique and involve a review team selected to represent a wide range of disciplines including production, maintenance, technical and safety. The team should be provided with the necessary information on hazards of materials, process technology, up to date design drawings, procedures, equipment data sheets, instrumentation control logic, previous incident reports, previous hazard reviews, etc. At the conclusion of the study a report should be issued with a set of recommended actions and queries concerning the design to eliminate or mitigate the risks identified.

Risks that cannot be eliminated should be documented in the site’s risk register. Current drawings should be available for all process risk assessment reviews. Drawings which may be required are listed in requirement 19. Affected drawings should be updated at the conclusion of any design changes.

2. Risk Assessment of Design Specifications

Design specifications for all new or modified facilities shall be subject to risk assessment and shall detail materials selection, storage, loading and unloading facilities, leading industry practices, applicable regulations and learnings from previous incidents.

The design of an entire facility as well as subsystems and individual items of plant and equipment is critical to effective elimination or minimisation of risks. The selection of appropriate design codes and standards and compliance to them is an integral part of the design process for new or modified plant and equipment. Where necessary designers shall conduct structured hazard identification and risk assessment studies and develop risk mitigation plans to control risks to achieve designs where the risk is ALARP. When conducting risk assessments, previous incidents in similar or related facilities should be reviewed to ensure that the learnings are incorporated. Risks that cannot be eliminated should be documented in the site’s risk register e.g. control room doors must shut on external pressure wave/explosion.

Facility design should allow for pressure relief systems for steam explosions and critical/emergency equipment should be protected from such events.

3. Emergency Response Facilities

All molten materials facilities shall provide for response to emergencies involving molten materials, including the provision for safe refuge and emergency response equipment for spillage containment, fires, explosions, burns, etc. and recovery and disposal of the molten material.

This requirement covers the plant and equipment required for emergency response (the systems for emergency response are covered in requirement 23).





The plant and equipment may be fixed equipment such as fire pumps or portable equipment such as fire extinguishers. The plant and equipment should also be identified as a result of design studies and/or risk assessment in order to be able to respond to credible emergency scenarios and can include: Designated emergency assembly areas and safe refuges.

Emergency escape and evacuation routes.

Emergency sirens and warning systems.

Emergency alert equipment such as break glass alarms.

Communication systems including both fixed systems such as public address and telephones and portable systems such as hand held radios.

Detection systems such as thermal, fire, smoke, flammable and toxic gas and steam detectors.

Passive fire protection equipment such as blast walls and thermal insulation.

Fixed fire fighting equipment including fire water tanks, foam tanks, fire water pumps, fire water and foam monitors, fire hydrants, hoses, deluges and CO2 flooding systems.

Fire fighting equipment and retardation systems and operator deluge systems for vehicles used to transport molten materials.

Fire trucks and trailers equipped for both fires and hazardous material incidents.

Portable equipment including fire extinguishers, breathing apparatus, specific PPE for fires and hazardous materials.

Portable equipment for responding to spills such as absorbent material, oil containment and absorbent booms, neutralising chemicals and appropriate PPE.

Medical and first aid response equipment including medical response centres, first aid rooms, first aid kits and fire blankets.

Safety showers and eye washes to be available on the operating floor or on the control room, tapping floor or wherever inadvertent contact can be made with molten material.

Emergency response command centre including all the required contents of communication equipment, maps, manuals etc.

All fixed and portable equipment should be included in a documented maintenance, inspection and test system to ensure that its technical integrity is maintained (see requirement 22). Such programs should also include the routine inspection and testing of emergency alarms, pumps, safety showers and eye washes and fire extinguishers.

Note: Never use water as an extinguishing agent around molten materials.

4. Modification of Plant and Equipment

Alterations to the layout, risk control and mitigation equipment and systems shall





be covered by the change management procedures.

The Management of Change system detailed in requirement 26 shall be applied to all changes to molten materials facility plant and equipment. Compliance is demonstrated by the application of the system to all changes and also the existence of all the relevant documentation outlined in the site’s management of change system.

5. Fail-to-Safe Systems

Equipment associated with the handling and processing of molten materials shall incorporate fail-to-safe systems in the event of power failures, power dips and surges.

Fail-to-safe means: A device which, if (or when) it fails, fails in a way that will cause no harm, or at

least a minimum of harm to other devices or danger to personnel.

An operation which ensures that a failure of equipment, process, or system does not spread beyond the immediate vicinity of the failing entity.

A control operation or function that prevents improper system functioning or catastrophic degradation in the event of circuit malfunction or operator error.

A system which has been structured such that it cannot fail (or that the probability of such failure is extremely low) to accomplish its assigned duty regardless of environmental factors.

Examples of fail-to-safe systems include: Emergency brakes which close on a hoist drum to prevent a ladle from falling

in the event of a power failure or drop in voltage.

Back-up diesel pumps to enable water to be fed to critical equipment such as pressure rings, contact clamps and shell cooling.

Automatic valving to allow water flow to critical equipment (e.g. transformer water diverted to pressure rings).

Back up generators to power up compressors, pumps, mud guns, cranes etc.

All systems which handle or process molten materials should be reviewed for their failure mode upon loss of power. Attention should be paid not only to the direct consequences of loss of power but also the knock on effects of loss of power to critical utilities such as instrument air, cooling water, hydraulic oil systems, ventilation systems etc.

It is recommended that a Fail-to-Safe Matrix be set up which lists for each of the equipment items and systems associated with handling and processing molten materials: The consequence of loss of power without the benefit of the fail-to-safe

system; and

A brief description of the fail-to-safe system; and

The effect of the fail-to-safe system.





6. Automatic Plant Shutdown

Automatic plant shutdown systems (local and remote to the hazard) shall be in place to eliminate the need for operator intervention to maintain operation within the design envelope.

Automatic plant shutdown systems include what is often referred to as a "trip system" (also referred to as "emergency shutdown system" or “ESD”) and "interlock system" (also referred to as "override system").

Trip and interlock systems are automatic protection systems designed to prevent situations where a hazardous condition could occur in a process. Trip systems shut down an entire process or part of a process or one function if a hazardous condition is detected. An interlock system is slightly different in that it prevents an operator or an automatic control sequence from following a hazardous sequence of control action.

Trip systems can either be single loop (sensor to trip switch to trip valve) or multi loop (sensor to trip processor to switches to trip valves). The logic can be as simple as a single switch, a relay system, PLC or a complex computerised trip system.

Both trip and interlock systems (or parts of them) require bypassing (disarming, defeating) at various times such as for start-up, calibration and testing. A system should be in place to assess the risk of bypassing of these safety systems. Usually this is controlled by the site’s permit to work system or similar documented review and approval process.

Both trip and interlock systems require periodic proof testing to ensure their reliability and capability. This is often referred to as Critical Function Testing and should be part of a maintenance inspection and test program on a facility (see requirement 22). The required frequency of proof testing can be determined by techniques such as Safety Integrity Level studies.

Standards for instrumented and electrical/programmable safety systems can be found in: IEC 61508-1: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable

electronic safety-related systems, and

IEC 61511-1: Functional safety – safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector.





7. Transport of Molten Materials

Transport roads and rail systems for molten material carriers should, wherever possible, be dedicated for this purpose and clearly demarcated. Where this is not possible, risk analysis shall be undertaken to identify the additional controls required to manage the activities and potential conditions in the event of a molten material spillage or loss of vehicle control and other hazards associated with transport over non-dedicated routes.

The transportation of molten materials on a site should be part of a site’s overall traffic management plan. That plan should cover the traffic routes and preferably require the separation of the transport of molten materials from other light vehicles, surface mobile equipment and pedestrians.

Where the separation of molten material transport from light vehicles, surface mobile equipment or pedestrians is not possible then the route of molten material transport should be surveyed to identify all possible locations of interaction. A risk assessment should then be carried out which addresses each location of interaction. The consequences of a loss of containment of molten material at each location should be identified (e.g. If there is a break out from a slag pot or ladle that is being transported on a non dedicated road the risk assessment should focus on where molten material will flow to interact with other vehicles and pedestrians but also to water drains, fuel tanks, buildings etc.).

Controls should be identified for each location with reference to the hierarchy of controls. “Redesign” controls should be selected wherever possible.

Emergency response procedures (see requirement 23) should be developed for such incidents involving molten material spillage or other related incidents and the vehicles used to transport molten material should be fitted with appropriate fire fighting equipment and retardation systems (see requirement 3).

8. Emergency Egress

Molten materials processing and handling areas shall have sufficient emergency exits to provide at least two means of egress from any point.

At least two means of egress are required in any area where personnel work and could be exposed to the risk of molten material spills or eruptions, or toxic gases (e.g. CO), fumes or other material which could adversely affect health. All areas where personnel normally work or could be transiting should be reviewed including: Control rooms.

All Operating floors.

Tapping floors.

Crain haul ways.

Elevated walkways and platforms.





The means of egress should: Be clearly demarcated with signs (preferably illuminated), floor markings etc.

Provide quick access to emergency assembly areas.

Provide barriers and blast walls where there is a risk of molten material splash.

Provide quick access to well ventilated areas when there is a risk of toxic gases.

Not be obscured by permanent plant and equipment (e.g. pipes along floors that could create trip hazards).

Not be obscured by temporary trip hazards (e.g. hoses, tools etc.)

If two means of egress can not be provided in some areas then activities in those areas should be controlled.

9. Water Supplies

Water supplies to molten material areas shall be limited to dedicated systems (e.g. jacket cooling) and free access to water tapping points shall be eliminated, as far as practicable.

There are known hazards associated with molten material coming into contact with water e.g. steam explosions. Water supplies and sources of water which could come in contact with molten materials (including those within spill containment areas) must be eliminated as far as practicable. Such sources of water supplies include: Utility water hoses.

Water sumps, drains and low points where water can accumulate.

Piping which transports water through an area where there are molten materials and there is a risk of leakage from the pipe through corrosion failure or failure at flanges, joints and fittings.

Piping which transports water through an area where there are molten materials and there is a risk of molten material leaking onto the pipe if a break out occurs.

Leakage or splashing from shell cooling systems.

Rain ingress from incomplete or leaking roofs.

Water used for cooling metals and/or slag in launders/runners.

Excessive water content in raw materials and recycled scrap.

Recently fabricated refractory lining which has not been properly dried, or been standing uncovered outside in the rain & mistakenly brought into service.

Where total elimination is not practicable, engineering controls should be developed so that water supplies and sources are prevented from contacting molten material by using suitable heat resistant barriers and diversions.

Water must not be allowed to collect in containment areas (see requirement 14).





All dedicated water-cooled furnace equipment and circuits that could create potentially serious leaks should be properly controlled and monitored. This includes equipment associated with the furnace roof, gas handling plant, electrodes, furnace shell and taphole cooling. Control includes the automatic process control of critical parameters such as water flows, temperatures, pressures or levels in the cooling systems (HAZOP as detailed in requirement 1 should cover the adequacy of these controls) as well as the necessary automatic plant shut down systems (see requirement 6). Monitoring includes a system of documented logging and review of direct or indirect measurement of relevant flows, temperatures, pressures and levels and detection of H2 in gas analysis and/or hygrometer measurement of H2O.

Maintenance plans should be developed and implemented for all related instrumentation and control systems (see requirement 22).

Where applicable, roof design should prevent water cooled roof members from falling into furnaces.

Where dedicated cooling systems are required for furnaces, attention should be paid to cooling element designs in critical areas of the furnace to ensure that they are robust and have little likelihood of leaking during their service life. Roof design should be to minimize the ingress of any water into the furnace (both cooling water on cooled panels and water sprayed onto roof). Cooling element designs should be a component of the risk assessment of Design Specifications (see requirement 2). The correct setting and adjustment of all water spray/cooling systems within the smelter area shall form part of daily routine operational and maintenance programs.

10. Automated Tapping and Casting

The tapping, decanting and casting processes should, wherever possible, be mechanised, automated and controlled from a remote location. Where this is not possible, risk analysis shall be undertaken to identify the additional controls required.

This requirement is intended to achieve the physical separation between operating personnel and the high risk activities associated with tapping and casting. The exposure risks are associated with the molten materials themselves and the resultant fumes, toxic gases and respirable dusts. Separation can usually be achieved through mechanisation and automation of manual activities (“redesign”). Once automated, the control of those processes can then be carried out in a control room that is located sufficiently far away from potential consequences of molten material breakout and also suitably ventilated and air conditioned from the effects of fumes, toxic gases such as CO, dusts and heat.

The activities associated with tapping and casting should first be identified and may include but not limited to: Tap hole drilling

Tap hole oxygen lancing

Tap hole poker operation





Mud gun operation

Launder (runner) operations

Crane operations

Granulation

Sampling

Ladle cleaning

Maintenance plans should be developed and implemented for all critical items of related equipment (see requirement 22) to achieve high uptime.

Where the above tasks are currently not mechanised, automated or controlled from a remote location, a task risk assessment should be conducted and documented (see requirement 16).

Where risk of exposure to molten materials, fumes, toxic gases and respirable dusts exists, the hierarchy of controls should be applied with particular emphasis on the “redesign” and “separate” controls. If there are no such practicable controls then emphasis should be placed on “administrate” and PPE controls. The risks should be regularly reviewed to determine if best practice at other locations has developed solutions to these exposures.

The picture below shows a typical tapping floor control room where the remote controls for the drills, mud gun, taphole poker, fume extraction, fines addition and nitrogen controls are located. Some controls can also be used from outside of the control room such as mud gun and taphole poker.





11. Demarcation of Restricted Areas

Restricted areas for handling and processing of molten materials shall be defined and demarcated and compliance shall be managed using a system of access controls. Where this is not possible, risk analysis shall be undertaken to identify the additional controls required.

This applies primarily to areas where there is a significant risk of unintended contact with molten materials but also to areas where there are risks associated with hazardous materials produced as a result of molten materials operations (in particular toxic gases).

Those areas should be defined and identification could be as a result of: Formal consequence analysis studies which has modelled the likely extent of

molten material eruptions and spills or toxic gas cloud dispersion (e.g. CO or SO2).

Previous experience from incidents where loss of containment events have occurred.

Experience gained elsewhere and good practice.

Once the areas have been formally defined, they should be documented in the form of a layout drawing or schematic of the furnace areas, procedure, training material or other such method. This documentation forms the basis of not only physically establishing the demarcation and for communication to potentially affected personnel but also so that any subsequent changes to that area must then go through management of change (see requirement 26).

Demarcation can be achieved by some or all of: Physical barricades with signs on them.

Clearly visible marking on floors.

Signs.

Flashing lights.

Other similar highly visible means.

Examples are shown below:

A system of access control should be set up to restrict entry inside the demarcated areas. Access controls should apply as a minimum to those personnel who want to conduct work inside demarcated areas other than those conducting normal operating duties. Access controls may include systems such as entry permits, checklists, personal tag boards, and visitor log books etc which require accounting for personnel both entering and exiting the restricted areas.

Access controls are not necessary for trained operators when they are undertaking normal operating tasks covered by work instructions and they are wearing appropriate Hot Metal PPE, and for exposure to CO are carrying a CO monitor and where the risk is high have a CO self rescue breathing apparatus with them.





Training programs should be provided to make personnel aware of the requirements of the restriction of access to these areas, the hazards associated with molten materials, CO, SO2 and other hazards (Ni sub-sulphide, CTPV from electrode paste, etc), the access control system and what to do in event of emergency such as a loss of containment of molten materials or toxic gas. Visitors should be accompanied by experienced personnel.

The “Red Zone” concept (see photo above) is an example of good practice for restricting entry into areas where there is a risk of exposure to molten materials.

Examples of good practice for access to areas with CO, handling and transport of molten materials and the operation of the smelter/furnace also include: Fixed position CO monitoring installed and calibrated on all elevated floors of

furnaces with CO in their offgas systems, and where applicable in areas where CO gas can escape (e.g. at gas burners and water traps). There should also be visible signs at the entrances of potential CO risk areas.

Furnaces with CO gas in their offgas systems to be equipped with appropriate emergency breathing apparatus/airlines/self rescuers (see example below) in order to provide immediate support to those affected by CO gas exposure.

This equipment should be provided in areas where CO gas is utilised (e.g. gas burners).





Example of (Oxy bok) self rescuer

Personnel entering any elevated floor of a furnace with CO gas in its offgas system should be equipped with a personal CO monitor, or be accompanied by someone equipped with a personal CO monitor. Good practice is to have a testing station facility to ensure monitor is alarming at calibrated setting (e.g. 30ppm before entering areas with potential for CO).

Examples of (Draeger) personal CO monitors

Personnel entering any elevated floor of a furnace with CO gas in its offgas system should be authorised to do so by a responsible person and they should be trained in the hazards of CO. On all furnaces the following access controls are good practice:

During tapping no personnel are allowed on the operating floor in case of an eruption

Outside tapping times no personnel are allowed on the operating floor unless they are authorised by the person in charge of the furnace and: They are outside an enclosure around the furnace; or

They are performing approved maintenance on auxiliary equipment in designated safe working areas; or





They are performing routine work on furnace floors and are adequately protected; or

They are in machines which are equipped with fully enclosed, fire protected and, ideally, air-conditioned cabs; or

They are casing welders and paste operators and are equipped with the required PPE.

Access permits and PPE requirements for exposure to Ni sub-sulphide.

No access to the hydraulic floor, operating floor (unless outside an enclosure) at any time.

O-Casing welders and paste operators should be equipped with required PPE.

12. Safeguarding

Restricted areas and areas directly exposed to molten materials processing and handling shall be safeguarded to prevent personnel coming into contact with molten material or hot surfaces. Risk analysis shall be undertaken to identify any additional controls required.

This requirement involves the application of the “separate” principle of control.

Examples of safeguarding include suitable barriers, shields, gates and handrails to prevent personnel coming into areas where molten material is being handled or processed.

The requirements of the Equipment Safeguarding Standard should be applied to the design, use and maintenance of such safeguards.

13. Heat Resistant Surfaces

All surfaces in contact with molten materials shall be coated, prepared or be of such a nature or grade that no exothermic reaction will occur when in contact with the molten material.

Loss of containment scenarios for molten materials should be reviewed to determine the extent of molten material flows and whether adjacent structures and equipment could be affected. Previous incidents should be reviewed to assist in this review.

Any surfaces where there is a potential for contact with molten materials such as floor surfaces, structural supports, pipe work and lagging, pipe racks, instrument and electrical cabling and cable racks should be constructed of materials so that they do not combust or otherwise react exothermically due to the direct effect of elevated temperatures or some other chemical reaction. Particular attention needs to be paid to coatings such as those on instrument and electrical cabling which are made of combustible materials such as PVC.

It is preferable to locate electrical and electronic control systems, water, fuel, oxygen and gas systems, hydraulic oil lines and pressurised containers in areas





where contact with molten material is not possible and protected from contact with molten material by suitable heat resistant barriers and diversions.

14. Containment

Molten materials processing and handling areas shall be designed to contain any spillage that may occur and shall provide for safe clean-up and disposal.

Containment refers to secondary containment as a back up to the primary containment of molten materials in furnaces, launders, ladles etc. The purpose of all secondary containment systems is to limit the extent and spread of molten materials when there is a loss of containment from the primary containment.

Containment is usually achieved though bounding around furnaces and under tapping floors so that any loss of containment of molten material is confined and cannot escape to other areas of plant. Particular attention should be paid to where there is an escalation risk associated with water in water sumps, scrubber water lines etc (see requirement 9).

Water and other hazardous liquid materials (e.g. fuel oil) should not be allowed to build-up in the containment areas. Solids should also not be allowed to accumulate as they would reduce the containment area capacity. Routine surveillance and housekeeping should include all containment areas to maintain their integrity.

15. Ventilation

Molten materials processing and handling areas shall have general ventilation services, fume extraction facilities and emergency venting systems to minimise the exposure of people to dust, fume and gases.

Hazardous fumes and gaseous products which could be at concentration levels that result in exposures in excess of the occupational exposure limits in the tapping and work areas should be captured or contained. Only if these cannot be captured or contained should appropriate respiratory protection should be worn as the only control.

Examples of facilities with ventilation systems include: Closed furnaces which should have auxiliary stacks, or the like, that would

open when events such as power failure or trip of scrubber fans occurs to prevent the build up of CO, fumes or dust within the building.

Open furnaces which should have their stacks fail open when power failure or loss of fan occurs to allow release of CO, fumes or dust to atmosphere.

Flash smelting furnaces which operate under a negative draft and where SO2 rich gases are ducted to an acid plant for treatment.

Electric slag cleaning furnaces where gases are removed and treated through a gas treatment plant.





Wherever possible, secondary fume abatement should cover areas such as: Ladle/slag pots.

Launders.

Tapholes.

Potlines.

Casting bays.

Maintenance plans should be developed and implemented for all critical items of related equipment (see requirement 22) to achieve high uptime and continuous containment of furnaces gases within the furnace, offgas systems and secondary fume capture systems.

Note: Particular attention is required to prevent the accumulation of explosive or hazardous gases in restricted or confined spaces.

Example of a typical fume extraction hood over ladle and skimmer

PART B: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

16. Drivers/ Operators Protection

The driver or operator of molten material transporters shall be protected from radiated heat and from accidental spillage by means of a heat-resistant physical barrier.

The design/ lay out of equipment used for the transportation of molten materials (e.g. slag) should protect the operator from harm during normal operations and/ or emergency procedures.





6 SYSTEM AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

17. Risk Assessment

All molten materials processing and handling shall be subjected to risk assessment.

All activities associated with the processing and handling of molten materials should first be identified. This includes activities associated with start up, normal operation, shut down, abnormal and emergency situations (including response to loss of utilities such as power, instrument air, cooling water and loss of containment of molten materials and water ingress into furnaces). Such activities may include but not limited to: Furnace feed.

Electrode management (including casing, paste and carbon additions, electrode blasting, solid and green paste breaks, paste level measurement etc.)

Smelting process (including ore quality, fixed carbon, fines input, fluxes, current control etc.).

Furnace lining management, monitoring and control.

Offgas treatments (wet and dry systems for CO, SO2, dusts etc.)

Tap hole drilling

Tap hole oxygen lancing

Tap hole poker operation

Mud gun operation

Launder operations

Crane operations

Granulation

Sampling

Ladle cleaning

Emergency response to loss of power, cooling water etc.

Abnormal activities such as furnace inspection in response to water ingress

Risk assessment should preferably be undertaken by Risk Assessment Professionals and personnel who may be affected including supervisors, operators and maintainers. Such involvement ensures that the risk assessment is based upon a thorough and practical understanding of what currently happens or will likely occur in new facilities.

For each activity determine what steps are carried out where there is a potential for exposure involving molten materials. This should include identifying who is or might be exposed, how they might be exposed and the nature of that exposure and the effectiveness of control measures currently in place. Review of existing standard operating procedures may provide additional information.





Next, determine the credible consequences and estimate the duration and frequency of exposure and the exposure level. Use incident reports and the results of atmospheric monitoring and health surveillance programs to help quantify consequences and frequency. It is also important to remember that risks may extend to personnel who have no direct involvement in the work activity by incidents involving fires and explosions and widely dispersed toxic releases.

Controls should then be identified and implemented to manage the risk so that it is eliminated or reduced to levels so that after implementation they are ALARP. The hierarchy of controls should be used to determine appropriate controls.

The controls should be communicated to those personnel likely to be exposed via documentation such as standard operating procedures, job safety analyses, permit to work documentation, safety alerts and related training programs.

All risk assessments should be documented and as a minimum should include: Date of the risk assessment and attendees

Which task was assessed (attach or refer to any job safety analyses or standard operating procedures)

The controls already in place

Relevant data such as previous incidents or results of workplace monitoring

The result of the risk assessment

Recommended additional controls and responsibility for implementation

The risk assessment should also be regularly reviewed and revised at a suggested interval of every five years or if significant changes have occurred, including: The process, plant or equipment is significantly modified

New information on the hazardous nature of the activity becomes available

Health surveillance or atmospheric monitoring shows that controls are inadequate

Incidents (actual or near miss) occur which indicate that controls are ineffective

New or improved practicable control measures become available.

18. Procedures

Procedures shall be in place for all molten materials processing, handling and safe disposal activities.

All activities associated with processing and handling of molten materials should be reviewed to determine which are critical. A Critical Activity is defined as an activity which failure to perform to an authorised pre-documented standard could result in the death of or serious harm to the performer of the activity or other individuals within the affected area. Critical activities as a minimum should be documented in standard operating procedures. Such procedures should:





Be prepared, checked and approved by technically competent personnel.

Be subject to risk assessment (see requirement 17).

Be kept up to date and controlled.

Be readily available to personnel who are involved in performing those activities.

Be in a language that is understood by relevant personnel.

Include identification of the hazards and controls associated with the task.

Include information of applicable exposure standards and the PPE to be used.

Examples of critical activities which require standard operating procedures are:

Furnace operations: Monitoring of water leaks and ingress into the furnace (e.g. via measurement

of hydrogen, oxygen and water vapour levels, cooling water inventory levels, pressure differential, flow measurement and visual inspection)

Furnace rabbling/stoking and raw material charging by charging machine

Bath and electrode measurements

Detection of feed pipe blockages

Electrode management (including casing, paste and carbon additions, electrode blasting, paste level measurement)

Dust recycling (e.g. referring to Zn build-up)

Gas plant operation (e.g. furnace pressure control and exposure to CO)

CO and SO2 detection and control (e.g. explosion risk management)

Handling and transport of dust and sludge (e.g. exposure to fume dam mud)

Furnace lining management, monitoring and control

Furnace liquid level control

Access control during tapping and molten material handling

Adverse metallurgical conditions

Ore size management (e.g. % of fines in furnace)

Shutdowns (planned, unplanned and inspections)

Response to power failure, loss of control systems, instrument air etc. (especially decisions related to when to tap, feed or move electrodes with power off, or on re-start)

Anode change (e.g. open hole, material falling from anode grab, cold anode into hot pot - bath splashing)

De-drossing furnaces

Charging of concentrates, reverts, reductants, fluxes, scrap and alloys (potential for wet material to be charged to furnace)

Induction furnaces for melting cast iron (anode blocks)





Tapping floor and transport operations: Opening furnace using tapping drill

Opening furnace using oxy lancing

Plugging furnace (e.g. mud gun, hand plugging)

Transport of molten material (e.g. slag transporters, forklift)

Crane activities (ladle, skimmer, slag pot operations etc)

Bath tapping - tapping, pot to pot transfer, pot to mould transfer, mould transfer

Sampling (e.g. metal and slag)

Casting of alloy (casting machine, layer casting etc)

Ladle curing/bakeout

Granulation of metal/slag

Launder preparation (e.g. sand/fines in launder are dry to prevent explosion)

The procedures shall be formally reviewed on a periodic basis and/or following an event or incident. Such reviews will be used for continual improvement and discussed with al relevant personnel. The procedures shall be clearly communicated to all relevant personnel.

19. Design Drawings

A system shall be in place to ensure that all process drawings and software are current and easily accessible by operational personnel.

The system should ensure that design documents and drawings associated with molten materials management are controlled and that the latest revisions are available to all relevant personnel (e.g. supervisors, operators and maintainers). This requirement can be part of an overall site document control system for all documents. Relevant documents and drawings may include: Design basis and equipment specifications

Original equipment manufacturer and vendor manuals

Heat and Mass balances

Functional Specifications

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

Process Flow Diagrams

Electrical line diagrams

Instrument data sheets and loop schematics

Cause and effect diagrams and alarm and trip setting schedules

Piping isometrics

Layout, civil and underground drawings





Safety equipment drawings and layout plans

20. Monitoring and Handover

Monitoring systems shall be in place to ensure that the status of operation is shown clearly at all times. These monitoring systems shall include the procedure for a documented hand-over to the next shift recording any relevant information/changes in operating status.

Monitoring includes the activities of surveillance and formal documentation in log sheets of observations of the status of plant and equipment handling molten materials.

Control panel operators should at routine intervals review all the remote data available to them either on computerised screens or discrete panel gauges and instruments. Operators on the furnace floor and those involved in other related activities should also conduct routine and thorough surveillance patrols of the relevant plant and equipment looking for leaks and other defects as well as gathering key operating information (pressures, temperatures, levels etc) from local instrumentation and gauges.

Log sheets or log books should be regularly filled out with the value of critical parameters, changes made to set points and other operating variables and operating and maintenance events that have occurred during the period of work.

Examples of typical monitoring systems include: Monitoring system with furnace graphics or trend displays on process control

systems which provide a snapshot of operating parameters as shown in the diagrams below





Furnace lining condition monitoring systems that are operational to pre-empt

any possible furnace breakout (e.g. integrated thermocouple or heat flow measurement, infrared scanning, etc.)

Monitoring system for water cooling to electrode components, furnace cover, gas cleaning and shell that could include flow, pressure and temperature measurements

Handover is a system that should ensure critical information concerning the status of the plant and equipment handling molten materials is communicated by one group of personnel on one shift to the oncoming personnel so that they have a thorough understanding and are briefed of the status of the plant and equipment. The content of the handover should include a review of the relevant monitoring log sheets covering the critical operating parameters (levels, pressures, temperatures etc), status of permits to work, incidents and events that have occurred, visitors and contractors in the area etc. The personnel involved in handover should include supervisors and operation and maintenance crews who have a key role in determining the status of operation. The handover is normally done by one individual to the counterpart taking over that role. Sufficient time should be allowed for in work routines for this handover to occur.

21. Safe Operating Envelope

The safe operating envelope for molten materials shall be defined and understood by all process personnel. This shall include the indicators (physical, systems or observation based) that demonstrate that the limits of safe operation are being approached or have been breached (e.g. indicators of moisture present in systems containing molten metal).

Safe operating limits are the parameters that define the safe operating envelope and are normally developed by designers of the plant and equipment. These limits are not to be confused with design limits (e.g. the design pressure of a pressure





vessel) but are the safe limits to which the equipment can be operated to during normal operation.

Safe operating limits should be clearly defined and readily available to those personnel who have the ability to adjust and/or monitor these parameters.

Methods that can be used to define these limits for example are: Marked on the side of equipment

Operating manuals

Standard operating procedures

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)

Alarm and trip schedules (which document the set points etc)

Log sheets (usually as a column indicating the maximum/minimum limit)

Operators need to have access to this information so that they know what the safe operating limits are and also so that they know what actions are required to be taken when limits are being approached or breached to ensure the operation stays within the safe operating envelope. An example of a safe operating limit is the minimum refractory thickness of a ladle after which it has to be taken be taken out of service to be repaired or a new lining installed.

Indicators are required to measure these safe operating limit parameters. These indicators may be continuous (e.g. as provided by a process control system which measures and displays flows, temperatures, pressures, levels etc) or discrete measures (e.g. temperature measurement of external surfaces of furnaces, converters and ladles to determine the integrity of internal refractory). These parameters should be monitored and recorded (see requirement 20).

A critical issue that has arisen within the industry which demands specific attention is the protocol surrounding the decision to switch in the furnace following extended uncontrolled stoppages such as power outages. Each operation shall define the procedure for start up following on from such an incident and clearly identify the critical operating parameters to be monitored. How and for what period this information and actual physical operations are reviewed by senior technical and managerial staff at the operation must be clearly defined within the procedure, accountabilities and responsibilities during this sensitive period of operation are non negotiable.

22. Critical Equipment Maintenance

Critical equipment shall be defined and maintenance plans for that equipment shall be documented.

Critical equipment is a piece of equipment or a structure whose failure, or not performing to design specification, has the potential to result in a Major Accident Event.





The identification of critical equipment is necessary to ensure that maintenance, inspection and testing is conducted on that equipment to maintain its technical integrity. A system should describe how critical equipment is identified and that equipment should then be documented in and controlled via a Critical Equipment Register.

Once critical equipment is identified, appropriate maintenance, inspection and testing plans for the equipment should be developed and documented in a system taking into consideration: Outputs of risk assessment studies e.g. HAZOP

Statutory compliance requirements

Historical information

Manufacturers’ recommendations

Equipment condition

Examples of critical pieces of equipment would be the mud gun for plugging the furnace, crane for carrying molten material and emergency diesel pumps for back up water in the event of power failure.

23. Emergency Response Plans

Emergency response plans shall be in place and, as a minimum, an annual simulation exercise shall be conducted. Specialist first aid and pre-hospitalisation trauma care for injuries shall be components of the emergency response services and shall be tested during simulation exercises.

The site wide emergency response plan should have procedures covering molten materials on site. It should be aligned to credible scenarios, and consideration should to be given to breakout, runout, eruption or other loss of containment scenarios and where applicable any resulting fire, explosion and toxic release events that may affect personnel on site and also impact beyond the site perimeter. Where adjacent properties and the public may be affected, the plan and procedures should include notification of local authorities.

Specific procedures for loss of containment of molten materials and other related emergency scenarios should be in place for those credible scenarios where the consequences and risk from incidents is significant.

Emergency response procedures for those scenarios should include aspects of: Lessons learnt from previous emergency situations

The experiences and lessons learnt of similar organisations

Warning systems, evacuation routes and where to muster

Immediate actions to be taken to prevent escalation of the incident (e.g. shutdown process)

Measures to be taken to prevent exposure of personnel to hazardous fumes and gases





Measures to be taken to contain and/or divert molten material flows to protect furnace structures, foundations, cooling water systems, cable ducts and other critical auxiliary systems

PPE to be worn by emergency response personnel

Infrastructure and facilities likely to be affected by the incident (on and offsite)

Description of controls which are designed to control or mitigate the consequences of an incident (e.g. fire, smoke and gas detectors, fire fightingequipment, bunding etc.)

Arrangements for obtaining external resources including specialist expertise (this will include the availability and capability of local emergency services)

Procedures for remediation and clean up after an incident

All personnel and visitors shall be appropriately trained to understand their roles and responsibilities regarding the emergency response plan.

Included in the site’s program for simulated exercises and other training for the site wide emergency response plan should be exercises involving molten materials. The frequency of such exercises involving molten materials should be at least annual and include some aspect of testing medical response capability of on site and off site resources to trauma incidents such as thermal burns or inhalation of fumes and toxic gases.

24. Quarantined Store Procedure

A procedure shall be in place to provide a quarantined store for alloys and other material to be recycled into systems containing molten materials so as to prevent explosions, contamination or other uncontrolled reactions.

A procedure is required which describes the systems in place to prevent the inadvertent charging of moist or contaminated materials into systems that contain molten material. That system should include checks such as sampling for moisture content, composition or other physical inspections for tramp material such as aerosol cans or containers.

25. Molten Material Transportation

A procedure that has the approval of the local traffic authorities shall be in place for the vehicle transportation (other than rail) of any molten materials along or crossing public roads, over railway level crossings and past, or through, residential areas.

The transportation route should be formally surveyed to identify hazards such as those associated with road crossings, rail crossings, residential areas and any other specific route hazards. Those hazards should be documented and where possible digital photos taken to be used for conducting the risk assessment and inserting into the transportation procedure.





A risk assessment should be carried out of each of the key steps in the transportation process from pick up of the molten metal ladle, preparations to leave the site, transit and arrival at destination. The risks should be assessed and where necessary controls identified taking consideration of the hierarchy of controls. This risk assessment should be documented and then used to prepare the procedure.

The procedure should take account of the hazards identified and proposed controls and include the aspects of: Pre departure checks to be taken to ensure that the vehicle is fit for purpose

and that the ladle and lid is properly secured. The actual steps to be taken should be documented in the procedure and preferably should be backed up with a check sheet that should have each individual aspect checked and signed off prior to departure by the driver. These check sheets should be filed as a record of compliance.

In transit actions to be taken including speed limits and care to be taken at particular traffic hazards along the route.

Emergency response actions to be taken in event of an incident including who to call.

The procedure should then be taken to relevant stakeholders such as local authorities for their approval. Evidence of that approval should be retained.

26. Management of Change

The management of change process for any operation shall include specific steps to assess the impact of changes on the risk associated with molten materials.

A documented management of change system should be used for the initiation, risk assessment, checking, approval and implementation of changes associated with processes, plant and equipment involving molten materials. The system should ensure that all required engineering checks are completed prior to implementing a modification, and that plant documentation is updated and training conducted prior to the use of a modification in operations. All changes initiated from both an operational and engineering perspective must be included and particular emphasis should be given to the impact on shutdown (normal or emergency) procedures.

This requirement can be part of an overall management of change system that deals with change to all aspects at a site.

“Change” (or “modification”) should be defined and should include any temporary or permanent change or alteration in specification to the process, plant or equipment which could affect safety or the integrity in any foreseeable way. Such changes may be: A change to the existing piping and instrumentation of the plant,

A change in material of construction, size or shape of any component,

A change in the physical support of plant and equipment,





A repair which represents a departure from the existing engineering design,

An alteration to the process flow, temperature, pressure,

A change to alarm, trip or interlock settings,

A change to control system logic, instrument configurations, sequence tables,

Any change in use or alteration in layout of the site, building, or roadways,

A change to the frequency of scheduled checks of safety related systems.

Prior to effecting the modification there should be a check list of actions that must be completed. Examples of such actions are: Is the implementation of change in accordance with the approved proposal?

Are there any potential, previously overlooked, hazard or operability risks?

Has the modified equipment been tested (e.g. hydro testing)?

Have vessels, flanges, valves etc been leak tested?

Have training and operation manuals been updated?

Has sufficient training of affected personnel been completed?

Have the requirements of relevant legislation, codes etc. been met?

Is adequate personal protection, first aid and fire protection equipment available?

Have all relevant drawings (P&IDs, electrical line diagrams etc) been updated?

Has relevant technical integrity documentation such as maintenance inspection and test programs been updated?

Has risk management documentation such as risk registers been updated?

Has the Emergency Response Plan been updated?

Have all process risk assessment risk reduction controls been implemented?

Is the modification approved for use?

The system should require an authorised person to confirm that all actions have been completed or a monitored action plan is in place to complete them and that the modification is safe to use.

7 PEOPLE REQUIREMENTS

27. Roles and Responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities for molten materials processing and handling shall be defined and assigned.

Roles and responsibilities should be defined in documented job profiles or descriptions. Those profiles or descriptions should also include skills and competencies required to safely and effectively carry out the role (see requirement 28).





Each person involved in molten materials processing and handling should have access to and preferably sign off a copy of their job profile or description.

28. Competency Based Training

A competency-based training system shall be implemented for operational and maintenance roles involving molten materials processing and handling.

Competency-based training should develop the knowledge, skills and behaviours required for those involved with molten materials handling to achieve defined standards. This should include competency in carrying out critical activities (see requirement 18).

Competency Based Training Assessment should ensure each trainee is capable of consistent application of the obtained knowledge and skills to the standard of performance required. Assessments can be conducted as a mixture of some or all of written evaluation, oral evaluation and demonstrative evaluation of competency. Training materials should be aligned to the defined competencies.

29. Emergency Response Responsibilities

All personnel shall be trained in their duties and responsibilities under emergency conditions.

All personnel who are actively or passively involved in emergency response as detailed in the Emergency Response Plan and associated procedures (see requirement 23) require training consistent with their responsibilities. This includes: Evacuation and muster for those not actively involved in response,

Operator actions to mitigate the escalation of the emergency,

First response via fire fighting, first aid etc.,

Ongoing response through involvement in the site’s emergency response, fire fighting, medical response teams,

Strategic response through roles associated with overall management of the emergency.

All personnel require access to the site’s Emergency Response Plan and relevant procedures so that they can familiarise themselves with their roles and responsibilities.

Training for individuals is required when they are appointed to new positions with responsibilities for emergency response and also ongoing regular training is required for all personnel. This training can be provided both in the form of desktop scenarios (choose a scenario from those credible significant events that are applicable to the site and should be documented in procedures) and also in the annual emergency response exercise.





30. Health Effects Training

All personnel shall be trained to understand the potentially hazardous effects on health of their working conditions and the materials handled.

Occupational health risk assessment, monitoring, training and awareness should be consistent with and compliant to the standards and guidelines covered by the Anglo Occupational Health Way.

In order to determine the scope of this training, exposure to aspects which can cause adverse health effects should be monitored through atmospheric and/or health surveillance and assessed by properly qualified people.

Exposures associated with the processes in and around furnaces could include hazards such as noise, respirable dust, coal tar pitch volatiles (CTPVs), heat exposure, fumes, toxic gases, nickel (all species), silica, sulphuric acid, glare, magnetic fields, non-ionising radiation (ultraviolet, visible and infrared radiation) and external sources of radioactive material (e.g. from recycled scrap).

Should exposure hazards be detected, appropriate controls should be put in place to control exposures to below the occupational exposure limits including the use of appropriate PPE.

The first step in training is to ensure that all personnel exposed are informed and aware of what they are potentially exposed to, the threshold limits, and the actual workplace exposure levels.

The second step is to ensure that personnel are trained in the controls that are in place.

Reference should be made to the hierarchy of controls. Aspects of training may include: Correct operation of ventilation equipment,

Correct work routines to limit exposure durations,

Correct work methods covered in standard operating procedures,

Appropriate and correct use of PPE.

31. Monitoring of PPE use

The use of effective personal protective equipment shall be monitored and enforced in all areas where this type of control is required.

Monitoring the use of PPE should also be an integral part of a site’s Visible Felt Leadership program (see requirement 33).

Refer to the example below of typical tapping gear PPE being worn on a tapping floor and also the signage to remind those personnel entering that area as to what they have to wear. Such signage assists in compliance.





Specification of appropriate PPE and operating conditions to permit sounding of furnace contents from a furnace roof location, in close proximity to electrodes, is required. Ideally remote level sensing (e.g. radio wave interferometry) should be applied, but the success of such techniques remains unproven in PGM smelting.

32. Fit for Work Policy

A fit-for-work policy shall be in place, incorporating the clearly-defined maximum levels of drugs (including prescribed medication) and alcohol allowed in the system of drivers/operators and a system shall be in place for fatigue management.

All operators should be medically fit for work in hot areas. A monitoring program should be in place to periodically assess and ensure that operators satisfy minimum requirements/ demands imposed by job specifications and conditions.

The Fit for Work - Fit for Life initiative should be implemented which includes guidelines and toolkits to assist sites implement drug and alcohol, and fatigue management plans and programs.

33. Behaviour-based Observation

Behaviour-based observations shall include the operation of equipment and systems handling molten materials. Any need for additional specific retraining shall incorporate the results of these observations.

Behaviour based observation systems minimise risk by reducing the "at risk" behaviours that cause incidents by targeting critical behaviours. Critical behaviours are those behaviours essential for performing jobs safely and can be identified through analysis of incident reports, audits, job safety analyses, standard operating procedures and by discussion with workers on what is safe and at-risk behaviour. Once site specific critical behaviours associated with molten materials handling are identified they should be included in the standard operating procedures and training programs.





Critical behaviours involving molten materials may include: Conducting risk assessments (e.g. job safety analysis) before commencing

work.

Selection and use of correct personal detection equipment and devices

Following the requirements of task specific standard operating procedures

The outcome of behavioural based observations using a discussion-based approach is to: Identify safe behaviours, and reinforce them

Identify “at-risk” behaviours, and why they occurred

Promote a positive change in behaviour

Good practice before conducting behaviour-based safety observations is to inform the operators that they will be observed carrying out a task and how the observation process works. When the observation is completed the observer should share the learnings with individual/crew and talk about any good practices, unsafe acts and ask for feedback on safer ways of conducting the task. If there have been any unsafe acts the observer should let the crew know of what the expectations are and revisit them at a later date to ensure there has been change in the behaviour as this is the most important part for follow up on observation. If there are actions that arise from observation and there will be a change in procedure for example good practice would be to use the Management of Change procedure to ensure no other risks are being introduced.





REFERENCES

The Anglo Safety Way : Safety Management System Standards - Ver.2, Dic. 2007

The Anglo American Golden Rules

Anglo Occupational Health Way

Other Fatal Risk Standards

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

Issue 0 : New document (Pat Lowery – October 2008)

ANGLO FATAL RISK GUIDELINE MOLTEN MATERIALS … Estándar... · 2009. 1. 13. · Anglo American...

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