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It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as the status of this caseis concerned, the plaintiff who has long been dead, was substitutedby the administrator, now the plaintiff Nelson Jimena, and Atty.Vicente Sabornay, as the receiver. Furthermore, the judgment as tothe annulment of the marriage had already been rendered partially

by then Presiding Judge Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., on February 8,1984. What is being litigated here by the parties affects the propertydivision to dissolve the partnership. However, the plaintiff died andan intestate proceeding is now pending before Branch 43 wherebythe said Nelson Jimena was actually the appointed administrator,and who was substituted as plaintiff in this case.

With all these informations, and considering the nature of theaction, the Court finds the substitution of the original plaintiffimproper, as the defendant herein can pursue her claim over the

properties before the intestate proceedings being instituted. Actionfor intervention in order that the judgment in this particularproceeding can be implemented, can be raised in the intestateCourt. Likewise, the appointment of the receiver conflicts with thatof the judicial administrator considering that with the filing of theintestate case, the properties of the deceased plaintiff are incustodia legis and this Court losses jurisdiction in determining furtherthe distribution of the properties.

In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant's right to file asintervenor in the intestate proceedings with the judgment annulling themarriage, the proceedings becomes moot and academic with the pendencyof the intestate proceeding before Branch 43. This case is therefore deemedTERMINATED. 5

With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the respondentcourt, this special civil action was initiated.

Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a lawfulduty when she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition case (CivilCase No. 1446) and considered the same closed and terminated, due to the

pendency of intestate proceedings over the deceased husband's estate (Sp.Proc. No. 4159). 6 It is likewise erroneous, petitioner contends, to rule thatpetitioner's remedy is a motion for intervention in said intestate proceedings toimplement judgment in the marriage-annulment case, since petitioner hasalready presented all her evidence in the annulment case to prove whichproperties acquired during the marriage pertain to her.

The case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals , 7 where a similar issue wasinvolved — the husband having died after the legal separation of the spouseshad been finally decreed but before the actual liquidation of their communityof properties — is on point. The Court therein said:

WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioneddecision had not become final and executory since the lawexplicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation ofthe conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute community ofproperty as among the effects of the final decree of legalseparation. Article 106 of the Civil Code thus reads:

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have thefollowing effects:

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1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately fromeach other, but the marriage bonds shall not besevered;

2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute

conjugal community of property shall be dissolved andliquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no rightto any share of the profits earned by the partnership orcommunity, without prejudice to the provisions ofArticle 176;

xxx xxx xxx

The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidationof the property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree oflegal separation. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessaryconsequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the decree oflegal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitableincident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation for thepurpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugalassets.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973 decreeingthe legal separation between then spouses Antonio

Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had longbecome final and executory and the division of the conjugalproperty in a "supplemental decision" is a mere incident of thedecree of legal separation.

Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing thespouses' legal separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issuefor Our resolution is the final disposition of their conjugal partnershipof gains which partnership, by reason of the final decree, had beenautomatically dissolved. The law (Article 106, 107 of the Civil Code)

clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation onthe conjugal property.

The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who wasdeclared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidationof the conjugal property is effected, poses a new problem whichcan be resolved simply by the application of the rules on intestatesuccession with respect to the properties of the deceasedpetitioner.

Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugalpartnership of gains under the aforecited provisions of the CivilCode would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decreeof legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation anddistribution conformably with the law governing the effects of thefinal decree of legal separation, the law on intestate successionshould take over in the disposition of whatever remaining propertiesheave been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves detailswhich properly pertain to the lower court.

The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by

virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in

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accordance with the laws of intestate succession in SpecialProceedings No. 134.

The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with equal reason,the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment

which is the situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is directed todecide the partition (liquidation) case (Civil Case No. 1446) within thirty (30) daysfrom receipt of notice of this decision to determine which of the properties ofthe conjugal partnership should be adjudicated to the husband and the wife.This is but a consequence or incident of its decision rendered in the same caseannulling the marriage. Petitioner's letters to the Court indicate that she isseventy (70) years of age and the prolonged action for partition (liquidation)has taken a toll on her resources. Justice and equity demand the disposition ofher case with dispatch. Any properties that may be adjudicated to thedeceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with his last

will and testament in the special proceedings involving his estate (Sp. Proc. No.4159).

ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge's order dated 24 January 1991considering Civil Case No. 1446 closed and terminated for being moot andacademic is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge or whoever may havesucceeded her is ordered to decide said action for partition (liquidation) withinthirty (30) days from receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.