Andre Beaufre Intro summary.docx

5/20/2018 Andre Beaufre Intro summary.docx

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In order to achieve policy objectives early military strategists, bound by traditions and

rules of war, paid attention to theories of strategy, such as annihilation, exhaustion and

subversion. The unorthodox strategists challenged the old rules and customs of war. New

technologies as pointed by Machiavelli could affect strategy.1 Traditional build up of strategic

theory did not take advantage of new technologies and their futures. The challengers with fresh,

creative approaches delivered unrestricted possibilities.

Andr Beaufre was a French military general and veteran of World War II, strategic

thinker with vast experience in military operations and planning. Having published three books,

An Introduction to Strategy, Strategy and Deterrence, and Strategy of ActionBeaufe managed to

gain the respect of other important strategists like Liddel Hart. For Beaufre strategy was a

method of thought, the object which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then

choose the most effective course of action2. Furthermore, the general argued that strategic

thinking needed an analysis of both psychological and material data from which the best one

could be chosen.

Beaufre defined strategy as the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of

the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute3.He believed that

strategy had to be specially developed for each situation, as a given strategy that might work best

in some situations would be the worst in others. The aim of strategy was to fulfill the objectives

laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available (23). According to Beaufre,The outcome desired is to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him. In

this dialectic of wills, a decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect has been

produced on the enemy: when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to

continue the struggle. (23)Like Clausewitz and others before him, Beaufre placed great

emphasis on psychological factors in war and felt that they were fundamental to any theory of

strategy (13). For example, he argued that Lenins oft-quoted deviation from Clausewitz that

thesoundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the

enemy renders a mortal blow both possible and easy was perhaps appropriate forrevolutions (as

a sort of psychological artillery preparation), but wrong in the instance of defeating a military

1Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to

the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret,11-32 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).2Andre Beaufre,An Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy

in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1965), 13.3Beaufre, 22.


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(23). Beaufre sided with Clausewitz, stating his view in the form of a guiding strategic rule, that

the decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting asituation resulting in sufficient moral

disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose upon

him (24).

Beaufre was an advocate for total strategythat is, in addition to the use of the military

to achieve ends, political, economic and diplomatic means also needed to be included (13). The

means of strategy also included both material and moral capabilities, combined to produce the

psychological pressure needed to achieve the desired moral effect. Beginning with the decisive

moral effect to be achieved, ones own capabilitieswere set against an adversarys vulnerabilities

until the means available were isolated to those adequate to achieve the desired end state. Given

the dialectical nature of strategic planning, possible enemy reactions to the strategy were then

calculated with provisions developed to guard against them. Just as ones own side employed

diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological means, enemy counteractions had to be

assessed for their efficacy in these arenas, also. (24-25) Beaufre illustrated his conception of how

strategy was formulated through five patterns of strategy, shown in Table 8.1. These five

courses of action were not meant to be an exhaustive categorization. Rather, they showed that


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many formulations of strategy were not only possible, contrary to the one-strategy-fits-all

theories proposed by other strategists, but also necessary in order to accommodate unique

situations faced (29).

His direct threatpattern was suitable when a state with limited freedom of action sought to

achieve moderate interests with threats backed up by superiority in resources. The pattern of

indirect pressure referred to limited freedom of action situations where moderate interests were

at stake but the resources were inadequate to constitute a decisive threat. In this case, more

insidious methods were required, whether political, economic or diplomatic. A series of

successive actions might be required for restricted freedom of action situations involving high

stakes and limited resources. The successive actions would combine direct threats and indirect

pressure with a limited application of force (26). Another pattern wasprotracted struggle at a

low level of military intensity (more popularly known as Protracted Popular War), developed by

Mao Tse-Tung, useful when freedom of action was large but resources inadequate to achieve a

military decision. This pattern required considerable moral endurance and was very effective in

wars of liberation (27). Beaufre described his final pattern as violent conflict aiming at military

victory, for situations where a state had sufficient military strength to seek a quick, decisive

military victory best conducted when the opponents interests were notcompletely vital. Beaufre

noted that if this Clausewitzian-Napoleonic strategy did not end quickly, it had a tendency to

devolve into a war of attrition out of proportion to the interests at stake, such as World War I(28).

Total strategy was hierarchical in nature, under the control of the government, which dictated

how it was to be conducted (30). It was subdivided into political, economic, diplomatic and

military categories, each of which had its own overall strategy,with tasks unique to each field

assigned and coordinated. Beaufre lamented that in the past, the fields of political, economic and

diplomatic strategy had not been effectively coordinated, but needed to be under the guidance of

the appropriate minister (30). The hierarchy descended downward below each field to the

operational level where conceptand implementation meet, when the optimum must be adjusted

to the possible in the light of technical limitations (31). For example, in the case of military

operational strategy, tactical and logistical factors had to be taken into account, which dictated

the form of warfare (static or maneuver, annihilation or attrition) that could be pursued.


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Beaufre conducted an evaluation of the principles of strategy by the best-known theorists of the

past (shown in Table 1.2 Beaufres interpretations of rules in strategy) against his own theory of

total strategy. He determined that only the rules of Foch (economy of force and freedom ofaction) constituted real strategic rules. The rest were merely general guidelines for particular

situations rather than universal principles (34). This was a result of the dialectic nature of conflict

in which two opposing wills used force to resolve their dispute. According to Beaufre (34): In

this battle of wills two broadly similar systems will confront each other; each will try to reach the

others vitals by a preparatory process, the object of which will be to strike terror, to paralyze

and to surpriseall these objects are

psychological. In any strategy, therefore, there are two distinct but equally

important vital components: 1) Selection of the decisive point to be attacked (this

depends on the enemys vulnerable points), and, 2) Selection of the preparatory

maneuver, which will enable this decisive point to be reached. Victory will go to

the side that which succeeds in blocking his enemys maneuver and carrying his

own to its objective.


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Beaufre concluded that this was the essence of Fochs notion of preservation of freedom

of action. Battle was simply a struggle for this freedom of action with each side

attempting to preserve its own and deny it to the enemy. Allocating ones resources to

accomplish this efficiently comprised economy of force. In the end, attainment of the

objective broke down to reaching the decisive point through freedom of action gained

by sound economy of force(35).

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Continuing down the strategy hierarchy, Beaufre went on to describe the methods

by which economy of force and freedom of action were achieved. He noted that a

strategic decision was made within the confines of not only time, space, and the size and

morale of forces available, but also through the factor of maneuver, which governed

the order of and inter-relationship of successive situations (36). He described

maneuver as the direct product of the dialectic of the conflict (36). He likened the

forms of action and reaction of combat to the postures and decisions of fencing, to

include eight offensive postures (attack, which may be preceded or followed by threat,

surprise, feint, deceive, thrust, wear down and follow-up), six defensive postures (on

guard, parry, riposte, disengage, retire, and break-off), with five possible types of

decisions (concentrate, disperse, economize, increase, and reduce). Beaufre associated all

of these actions and reactions with freedom of action, intended to either gain, regain ordeprive the enemy of it. Additionally, these actions illustrated that freedom of action was

essential to maintain the initiative, another fundamental factor in maneuver.

Beaufre contended that doctrines governed the choices of action and reaction

available for maneuver. The doctrine of the rational application of forceprovided

guidance for choosing a course of action that would permit forces to exert their maximum

effect against an enemys main force in decisive battle, given stronger forces available as

the entering argument (42). Alternately, the doctrine of guile guided the choice of a

course of action that would best throw the enemy off balance, disorientate, and deceive

him through psychological effect. This meant attacking an enemys weak points with

strength, as opposed to attacking an enemys strong points in the doctrine of the rational

application of force. Neither doctrine was universally valid. The doctrine of the rational

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application of force was better suited for situations in which one held a relative strength

advantage or when an enemy of superior strength was dangerously dispersed. The

doctrine of guile was best used when one was inferior in strength. The situation dictated

which doctrine was best to employ (43).

Modes of strategy referred to general postures that emerged from either of these

doctrines. The direct strategy mode utilized military force as the principal weapon to

achieve victory. The indirect strategy modeprimarily used less direct methods through

the use of political, economic or diplomatic means. Military means could also be used,

but they were subservient to political negotiations. Beaufre considered these two modes

to be complementary, particularly in the Cold War era. The nuclear dialectic represented

the direct strategy mode, which sought to neutralize the great economic and industrial

potentials on each side (44). The indirect strategy mode was manifested in the political

dialectic that ran concomitant to the system of nuclear deterrence.

Beaufre recognized that strategy had to be dynamic. He encapsulated this need for

changes in strategy in his variability factor, which he described as resulting from the

variability of resources available and the circumstances surrounding their employment.

This factor necessitated the discarding of rigid and dangerous hypotheses like some

recent theories, mostly of American origin, which are based on a mathematical evaluation

of probabilities. Instead, Beaufre offered that they needed to be based on a wholegamut ofpossibilities (45), meaning that periodic forecasts were required in order to

guard against surprise and keep up with changes. The variability factor was of such

import that Beaufre declared that preparation is now of more consequence than

execution (45).

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Implementation of strategy required a close linkage with tactics, with tactics

subservient to strategy (47). Beaufre noted that many writers on strategy had turned this

relationship upside-down, with tactics driving strategy, based upon technical innovations.

However, Beuafre observed that the advantage of technical and tactical superiority could

be rendered ineffective if used under the umbrella of an erroneous strategy. Indeed, the

choice of tactics is in fact strategy (48). According to Beaufre (48):

It is strategy which decides the form in which the conflict is to be waged,


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whether it is to be offensive or defensive, whether it will use force or subversion,

whether force is to be used directly or indirectly or in stages, whether the main

battle is to be political or military, whether atomic weapons are to be used, etc.,

etc.

... The choice of tactics is not however the only task of strategy. It must

also direct the evolution of tactics so that they can play their proper part in

reaching a decision. Strategy must therefore lay down the aim which the

inventions of the technicians and the research of the tacticians should strive to

achieve. Only then shall we be able to direct evolution into profitable channels,

channels which lead towards the objective of any conflicta decision.

Beaufre summed up his theoretical discussion of strategy by closing the loop

between strategy, tactics, policy and ideological philosophy:

[S]trategy is no more than a means to an ends. It is for policy to lay

down the aims to be achieved by strategy, and policy is basically governed by the

philosophy which we wish to see prevail. The destiny of the human race depends

upon the philosophy which it chooses and upon the strategy by which it tries to

ensure that the philosophy will prevail.

The previous discussion summarized Beaufres original theory of strategy,

published inIntroduction to Strategy in 1962. After a decade, Beaufre returned to histheory of total strategy, discussed in his 1972 book, Strategy for Tomorrow, with some

additional ideas on strategy.

Beaufre came to realize that two changes forced a renaissance towards limited

war. First, the haunting specter of pyrrhic nuclear annihilation pushed politicians to avoid

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escalation towards unlimited war (Beaufre 1974, 2). Second, the development of mass

media delivered a capability to sway public opinion either for or against war, depending

upon the political orientation of those who wielded it. News programs that focused on

the horrors of war were inevitably pacifist and defeatist (1974, 4). On the other hand,

news media that provoked nationalistic sentiment stirred a hawkish influence upon the

public. According to Beaufre, the media intensified the effects of public opinion on

policy (4):


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This domestic involvement of the mass media is crucial because it molds

public opinion to the point where war is acceptable to the public and it also

demoralizes the public and makes compromise possible. Compromises are the

only type of result possible in limited war.

However, Beaufre also realized that the increased efficacy of the media was

subject for use as a propaganda tool. Not only was it used for garnering domestic support,

it was also used to push governments to intervene in other conflicts through moral

suasion or to restrain governments from certain actions (5). Beaufre referred to this

ability of public opinion to restrain government as moral deterrence (5). In the case of

world opinion, this effect was only crucial if it undermined an antagonists will to fight.

While Beaufre is more known for his theories on deterrence, he should be credited

for his contributions to total strategy and his attempt to tie together what others had

considered to be disparate styles of warfare (such as guerilla, nuclear and conventional

warfare) under one rubric. Additionally, with his five patterns of strategies, dependent

upon the strategic situation, laid the groundwork for a strategy theoretical framework,

discussed later.

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