Anderson Ward - Barometer Elections

8/11/2019 Anderson Ward - Barometer Elections

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ergamon

Electoral Studies V ol . 15 , N o . 4 , pp . 447 -4 6{)

C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 6 E l s ev i e r S c i e n c e L t d

P r i n t e d i n G r e a t B r i t a i n . A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d

0 2 6 1 - 3 7 9 4 / 9 6 1 5 . 0 0 + 0 . 0 0

0261-3794(95)00056-9

a r o m e t e r E l e c t i o n s i n C o m p a r a t i v e

P e r s p e c t i v e

C H R I S T O P H E R J A N D E R S O N

J L Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University,

Evanston, IL 60208-2001, USA and Depar tment o f Political Science,

Rice University, PO Box 1892, Houston,

TX 77251-1892, USA

DANIEl. S WARD

Department of Political Science, Rice University, PO Box 1892, Houston,

TX 77251-1892, USA

This paper develops a conceptual framework for studying the perfor-

mance of the g overn ment in what we term barometer elections .

Barometer elections are defined as elections that reflect changes in

citizens attitudes toward the gover nment in response to changing politi-

cal and economic conditions, absent the opportunity to install a new

executive. We classify British by-elections and German Land elections as

barometer elections and test a general model that incorporates the

electoral cycle; public opinion toward the government; economic condi-

tions; and previous performance as determinants of election outcomes.

Considering both short-term and long-term changes in public attitudes and

economic performance in the empirical analysis, we find that barometer

election outcomes can be explained with a similar set of independent

variables across systems. Copyright 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

ba.rom.e.ter n. 1 An instr ument for measuring pressure. 2 Anything that indicates changes

(The Doubleday Dictionary, 1975, p. 58)

In any meaningful , ordered system of democratic government, elect ions are

int ende d to carry out dist inct ive functions. Evidence for this is found in the basic

structural diversi ty of voting systems in the democratic world. Whether we consider

the t iming of elect ions, vote cou nti ng methods, bal lot forms, or any other inst itu-

t ional factor for aggregating ci t izens preferences, the designers of democratic

poli t ies incorp orate these eleme nts with forethought. Varying degrees of policy

responsi veness, party responsibil i ty, or voter efficacy, result from the c omb ina tio n

of rules that define the system. In this paper we contend, however, that there are

aspects of democratic pr ocesses that may be essential ly imm un e to structural

reforms. One such co mpo nen t we label the barometer e lec t ion . We do not a rgue

that these elect ions cann ot be ch ange d in form, but instead that their func tion wil l

be served in whatever form they appear. This paper is an effort to explore barom-

eter elect ions across two dist inct electoral systems, Germany and Great Bri tain. If


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a r o m e t e r e l e c t io n s i n c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t iv e

we are correct in our characterization of such elections, a general model, contain-

ing a basic and port able set of variables, should help explain their o utco mes in a

systematic manner.

Both definitions of baro meter quo ted above fit the conceptuali zation that we

propose here. Barometer elections measure pressure on the government by taking

account of changes in the political environment. Though most elections may, in

one way or another, fit this general definition, we are interested particularly in

elections that are viewed by office holders and other political elites as performing

such a role. Put simply, we argue that citizens use these elections to send signals

to key political actors regarding the incumbent gover nment s performance. I

Specifically, we consider elections that reflect changes in public attitudes and

behavior toward the government as a response to political and economic condi-

tions, absent the

d i r e c t

opportunity to reinstall or remove the party in power, as

barometer elections.

For the purposes of this study, we characterize British by-elections and German

Land elections as barometer elections. The study of such elections is not new;

British by-elections have been subject to considerable examination (Cook and

Ramsden, 1973; Mughan, 1986, 1988; Norris, 1990). Less common, but in the same

vein, has been the work on by-elections outside the UK (Norris and Feigert, 1989)

and German Land elections (Dinkel, 1977, 1981). US mid-term congressional

elections have been explored in considerable detail and might be considered the

most frequently studied form of barometer election (Campbell, 1960; Tufte, 1973,

1975, 1978; Erikson, 1988, 1990; Campbell, 1993). Finally, there is an extensive

and growin g body of literature on so-called second -ord er national elections (Reif

and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). These are elections that take

place at the national level within the context of the national party system and

electoral rules, but which have no immediate consequence for the distribution of

power at the national level. The most famous example of such second-order

elections are European Parliament elections.

When treated as independent variables, there is little doubt that barometer

elections such as British by-elections or Ger man Land elections matter, even if they

do not usually lead to shifts in power at the level of the national executive. Thus,

it has been shown that barometer elections have systematic effects on support for

both governing and opposition parties. Clarke and Zuk (1989) demonstrate, for

example, that by-election results affect public opinion toward the British Liberals;

Anderson (1995b) shows that by-elections and Land elections influence governing

party support in Britain and Germany.

Separately, by-elections and Land elections have been studied as barometers of

support for the governing party (or parties). Our interest is in viewing them collec-

tively in this manner. Despite the fact that many similar hypotheses have been

tested in these literatures, they have remained essentially disparate. In this paper,

we seek to explore whether a process of evaluation of the government is common

across different political systems through the means of a barometer election. In the

following sections we first review the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of

previous research; we extract a number of shared assumptions from the literature

and propo se a set of general hypotheses; wc then focus on model specification and

test the pro po sed hypoth eses; we concl ude with a discussion of the statistical

results and their implications for our goal of generating a general theory of baro-

meter elections.


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CHRISTOPHER J NDERSON ND D NIEL S W RD

a r o m e t e r E l e c t i o n s i n G r e at r i ta i n a n d G e r m a n y

449

Midterm elections in the US are almost perfectly structured to perform the role of

a barometer election. Scheduled without fail at the half-way point in a presidential

term, they seem to compel voters to evaluate the performance of the party in

power. British by-elections and German Land elections also fall into the category of

baro meter elections, bu t wit hou t the regularity of the mid-point timing. Similar to

midterm elections in the US, incumbent parties in these countries almost invariably

lose support between general elections.

The factors most commonly employed to study by-elections in Britain and Land

elections in Germany are similar to the ones used in the study of midterm election

results in the US. They include the state of the economy, executive popularity, and

partisan support. However, given that British by-elections and German Land elections

are held at irregular intervals during the course of a legislative period, time also plays

a role in these elections, thus making them attractive candidates for analysis.

Whet her the election is called early in the national gover nmen t s term, in the middle,

or late, may have a systematic impact on the outcome of the election, according to

students of by-elections and Land elections (Norris, 1990; Dinkel, 1977).

In the case of British by-elections, the work by Mughan (1986, 1988), Norris

(1990), and Norris and Feigert (1989) is the most systematic. Mughan identifies a

referendum and an economic model of by-election results, where executive

popularity and incumbent party support are the determinants of by-election results

in the refer endum model, and the state of the eco nom y (measured in tmemploy-

ment and inflation) is the determinant of by-election outcomes in the economic

model. Studying British by-elections over the 1950-1983 period, Mughan finds that

[t]o the limited extent that short term fluctuations in approval ratings do structure

the government vote in by-elections, this type of midterm contest may reasonably

be interpreted as a referendum on the economic and political performance of the

party in office (Mughan, 1988, p. 42).

Norris examines British by-elections from the 1940s to the late 1980s in terms

somew hat similar to Mugh an s analyses. She also examines the effects of the state

of the ec onomy , party support, and executive popularity on by-election outcomes.

In her model, the eco nom y influences party support and executive popularity. Party

and executive support, in turn, affect by-election vote shares. Norris concludes that

local by-elections can be seen, with some legitimacy, as representing a referendum

on gov ern men t perf orma nce (Norris, 1990, pp. 142-1 43).

Although the work on by-election results in Britain and other Anglo-American

democracies like Canada, New Zealand and Australia, is extensive and dates back

over 50 years (see Cook and Ramsden, 1973), it is also largely descriptive in nature.

The opposite is true for research on German Land elections. Although this litera-

ture is very sparse, it is fairly systematic and rigorously empirical. The best example

of this strand of research is the w or k by Dinkel (1977, 1981; see also Fabritius,

1978).

Dinkel examines the fortunes of governing parties in German Land elections

relative to the previous national elections over the 1949-1972 period. He finds that

...the governing parties at the federal level do noticeably worse in Land elections

during the course of the legislative period than the Bundestag-election results in

the same Limder before and after Land elections woul d lead one to believe (Dinkel,

1981, p. 135). 2 The factors exa min ed in Dinkel s wo rk are time and regional


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arometer elections in comparative perspective

strength of a party. He finds that the timing of a Land election is a major factor

predicting the magnit ude o f the gov ern men t s loss. The closer the election date to

the actual midterm, the worse the governing parties do. His results also indicate

that governing parties do less badly in regions where they are usually strong.

Unfortunately and unlike the work on by-elections, this line of research does not

consider the impact of executive popularity, party support, or the state of the

economy.

Overall, we can summarize that the research on by-elections considers the role

of the ec onomy, executive and party support, and concludes that there is evidence

to view by-elections as barometers, while the research on German Land elections

has not systematically considered these factors and has instead relied on the role

of timing and regional strength. Despite this and despite the fact that these elections

take place in tw o different electoral arenas, previ ous res earch pr ovides us with suffi-

cient support to view these two different forms of election as a single type: barom-

eter elections. They reflect systematic changes in public attitudes toward, or

support for, the government. In the ensuing analysis we seek to identify a general

set of explanations for the outcomes of these elections.

Expla in ing Losses in a r o m e t e r E l e c t i o n s

Apart from the analytical linkages among the different approaches to barometer

elections, it is important to recognize a clear empirical linkage as well. Parties in

power regularly, almost invariably, lose support in such elections. Hence, the

purpose of any model of barometer election outcomes must be to understand the

magnitude of that loss. By identifying the factors that are systematically related to

barometer election results, the underlying processes will emerge in sharper relief.

Changes in vote shares for governing parties in by-elections and Land elections

produce an unmistakable pattern: governing parties tend to lose votes in barometer

elections. Of the 323 British by-elections from 1950-1991 we analyze in this paper,

only a small number resulted in a vote gain for the incumbents. The story is

repeated in German Land elections, where the government tends to lose in baro-

meter elections. The average change in vote share for the government in British

by-elections over the period considered here is -9.36 per cent, whereas it is -3.96

per cent in the case of German Land elections (1950-1992).

Clearly, the direction o f barometer election ou tcomes is not in q uestion--p arties

in power lose support. More interesting is the cause of these results and explana-

tions for variation in the magnitude of loss within and across systems. The research

on by-elections and Land elections suggests a number of hypotheses. In order to

enhance our understanding of the barometer phe nom enon , we turn to the exten-

sive literature on US midterm elections as well.

Looking in st at political variables, there is ample evidence to suggest that popular

governments should do better in barometer elections, everything else being equal.

Given that both Britain and Germany are parliamentary democracies with strong polit-

ical parties and executives, we can investigate the effects of both party support and

executive approval on barometer election outcomes. Further, based on the surge and

decline thesis,3 we woul d exp ect that government s which perfor m better in the previ-

ous election do worse in the subsequent one. The inclusion of British by-elections

and German Land elections in our study is an opportunity to consider the effects of

election timing on barome ter election o utcom es as well. Following previous research


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CHRISTOPHER

J

ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WAR[

451

on electoral cycles in second-order national elections, by-elections and Land elections,

we expect a curvilinear relationship between time and government vote share in the

barometer election (Reif, 1984; Norris, 1990; Marsh and Franklin, 1996). In other

words, the closer the election date to the absolute midterm of the electoral cycle,

the worse the ex pect ed magnitude of vote loss for the government.

When it comes to the impact of the economy on election outcomes, scholars

have relied quite successfully on the reward-punishment hypothesis (also often

called the responsibility hypothesis), the best known and most widely tested

hypot hesis to guide scholarly wo rk of this kind (cf. Downs, 1957; Key, 1968;

Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). This hypothesis states that the mass public holds the

incumbent government accountable for the state of the economy. When the

ec on om y perfo rms well, the gove rnm ent can take credit, but w hen there is a slump,

the executive and/or the governing parties are usually the first ones to be blamed

by the mass public.

We can list the hypotheses tested in this paper as follows:

H3pothesis 1

The state of tile national economy is positively associated with

government performance in barometer elections (reward-punish).

HypothesL~ 2 The popularity of the executive is positively ,lSSociated with his/her

party s perf orman ce in barometer elections.

Hypothesis .3. The level of partisan s upport t\)r the gove rni ng party in the

electorate is positively associated with its performance in barometer elections.

Hypothesis 4

The date of the barometer election will exhibit a curvilinear relation-

ship with the electoral performance of the government. That is, the closer the

date of the barometer election to the exact midterm point of the electoral cycle,

the worse the gov ernment s performance.

Hypothesis 5. A party s perf ormance in the previo us election will be negatively

associated with its performance in the barometer election (surge and decline).

M o d e l D a ta a n d M e a s u r e m e n t

Since we seek to make inferences about barometer elections across countries with

quite different political institutions, electoral rules, and party systems, we need to

construct a theoretical model that is comparable across countries. Hence, wc seek

to develop a baseline model of such elections that can be tested using comparable

variables. As a result, the model necessarily will emphasize cross-national similari-

ties at the expense of country-specific factors in order to identify common under-

lying dynamics of barometer election outcomes.

Because the de pen den t variable needs to reflect the perf orm ance of the govern-

ing party, we use changes in the share of the popular vote in both countries. Yet,

the vote share variable differs slightly across the systems in order to be sensitive to

the particular systemic context in which the election takes place. In Britain,

commentators and the public pay attention to the by-election result in a

constituen cy, while in German y peop le pay attention to changes in the govern-

ment s fortunes in a Land. Since the focus of public attention differs across systems,


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arometer elections in comparative perspective

the dependent variable is an indicator of such differences. In the British case it is

the v ote share for the Prime Minister s party in the by-election; in German y it is

the v ote share for the Chancel lor s part y in a Land election.

The general model that is employed to examine barometer elections in the two

countries investigated here looks as follows:

A vote share -- f (previous vote share; executive approval; partisan

support; economy; time).

By including a measure of vote share for the government in the previous election

we can gauge the effects of various explan ator y variables on a relatively stable base

of mass support.4 In addition, this measure captures the possible surge and decline

identif ied in bar omet er el ection results. The coefficient for this variable is expect ed

to be negative given that it is easier to lose an absolute percentage of the electorate

based on a larger vote share. This formulation is also convenient because it means

that only current values of the independent economic variables need be included

in the model instead of a more complex lagged model formulation.

The economic variables that this analysis focuses on are the objective rates of

une mpl oym ent and inflation.5 They are what Nannestad and Paldam call the Big

Two since they are by far the m ost widel y used and most con sistent ly significant

indicators of economic performa nce (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). Unem ploymen t

and inflation are also those variables that constitute the chief targets of post-war

economic management in Europe. Public opinion polls show time and again that

inflation and unemployment are those economic issues of most concern to the

gener al publi c (Alt, 1979; Hibbs, 1987; No rpo th, 1992). Given that citizens can

devote only limited resources to gathering and digesting information about the

economy and politics, unemployment and inflation are those variables that are

easiest to unde rsta nd and about w hic h informat ion is easily and most p ublicl y avail-

able through the mass media.6

Two measures of support for the government are used: executive approval and

governing party support. In the British case we measure execut ive approval by the

perc ent age of resp ond ent s answering Satisfied to the question Are you satisfied

or dissatisfied wi th .. , as Prime Minister? Governing party support is measured by

the responses to the question: If there were a general election tomorrow, which

party would you support ? In the German case, approval for the Chancellor s

handling of his job is gauged by Do yo u- -b y and larg e--ag ree with the policies of

the Chancel lor . . .? , whe reas the questi on word ing for party sup port is: If there

wer e a Bundestag electio n next Sunday, whic h party woul d you vot e for? 7

We test for the effects of time on barometer election outcomes by including a

variable that counts the number of quarters since the general election. Time can

be e mp loy ed in two ways: first, as a linear variable that wou ld indicate whet her

there is a linear trend toward greater losses for the government over time; and

second, we can test whet her there is a curvilinear relationship betw een time and

barometer election outcomes by squaring the time variable.

Changes in goveming party support are expected to be determined by changes in

public opinion and economic conditions, as defined above. We measure change in

two ways: first, as the average change from the general election quarter to each subse-

quent quarter; and second, as the change from the last quarter before the barometer

election to the quarter of the barometer election. The first measurement technique

is intended to capture the effects of long-term trends in economic performance and


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CHRISTOPHER

J

NDERSON ND D NIEL S W RD

453

government popularity since the last general election; the second is designed to deter-

mine whether short-term changes, just prior to the vote choice, have an impact on

barometer election outcomes.

nalysis

We rely on a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations, the results of which

are presented in Tables 1-4. For both nations, two separate sets of models were

tested; the first uses change variables measured as the average change from the

quarter of the general election and each subsequent quarter through the barome-

ter election (Tables 1 and 3); the second set uses simple change from the quarter

prior to the baro meter election (Tables 2 and 4). 8 Perfo rmanc e in the general

election is included in every model, as is the time variable, and change in inflation

and unemployment. In each of the four tables, Model 1 includes executive popular-

ity, while Model 2 substitutes aggregate partisan support. Because these variables

are highly correlated, they are not included in the model together.

Turning first to Germa n Land elections (Tables 1 and 2), we find strong econ omi c

and political effects, although the results do not conform to some of the conven-

tional wisdom. First, we should point out that the general election variable is signif-

icant and in the expected negative direction in every model. In other words, the

better the governing party performed in the previous election, the larger the decline

in the barometer election. Originally developed to describe US midtcrms, thc notion

of surge and decline finds consistent su ppo rt in the case of German Land elections.

Likewise, the time variables work as expect ed. Tho ugh they do not emerge as statis-

tically significant in each model, the t ime variable is always negative and the t ime

variable is always positive, suggesting a curvilinear relationship between time and

change in electoral performance for the governing party.

An interesting finding in the Germ an case is the consistently strong positive effect

of une mpl oym ent -- as un empl oyme nt increases, the govern ing party s electoral

fortunes improve. This finding is not without precedent, or rational explanation, if

we move beyond the simple reward-punishment hypothesis. When the party in

power is taken into consideration, a more complete, and complex picture emerges.

The literature on the so-called issue priorities or issue saliencies of political parties

in the context of economic voting models suggests that governing parties do not

necessarily get punished when economic conditions worsen. According to this

perspective, voters assign different competencies and/or priorities to political

parties for dealing with specific economic outcomes. When it comes to economic

performance generally and unemployment specifically, researchers have found that

German voters believe that the Christian Democrats are better able to handle the

eco no my (Anderson, 1995a; Anderson and Zelle, 1995). The literature on Germ an

vote functions has borne this out by repeatedly finding positive relationships

between unemployment and inflation on the one hand and government support on

the other hand, particularly when the government is led by Christian Democrats

(Rattinger, 1991; Anderson, 1995a). Given that the Christian Democrats were the

governing party for the vast majority of the time period analyzed in this paper, it

is reasonable to co nject ure that the positive coefficient for unem plo yme nt is a result

of the Christian Democr ats pres ence as a gove rning party. ~

Finally, we find that party supp ort, rather t han ex ecutive popularity, has a system-

atic effect on the gover ning party s fortunes in baro mete r elections that take place


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B a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s i n c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e

TABLE 1. Long-term effects on German Land

election results, 1950-1992

Model 1 Model 2

Intercep t 10.762* 9.365t

(4.200) (4.173)

AInflation -0.548 -0.785

(1.830) (1.619)

AUnemplo yment 7.447 9.241,

(3.496) (3.503)

APopularity 0.432

(0.492)

APartisanship 1.548*

(0.622)

General Election -0.255* -0.256*

(0.086) (0.083)

Time - 1.023* -0.696

(0.588) (0.589)

Time2 0.060 0.044

(0.038) (0.038)

R

0.173 0.225

SE 5.9047 5.7927

N 92 89

Standard error in parentheses; *significant at

0.10; *significant at 0.05; $significant at 0.01.

Note: Change variables measured as average

change from general election quarter.

TABLE 2: Short- term effects on German Land

electoral results, 1950-1992

Model 1 Model 2

Intercept 10.626, 10.273,

(3.807) (3.756)

AInflation -0.652 -0.577

(0.550) (0.540)

&Unemployment 5.517** 4.159*

(2.373) (2.360)

APopularity 0.172

0 . 1 5 7 )

APartisanship 0.432 *

0 . 1 7 2 )

General election -0.266* -0.258*

(0.073) (0.072)

Time -0.924 -0.971

(0.576) (0.568)

Time2 0.055 0.057

(0.037) (0.037)

R

0.193 0.239

SE 5.8809 5.7811

N 96 93


0.10; t signi fican t at 0.05; *significant at 0.01.

Note: change variables measured as change

from previous quarter.


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CHRISTOPHERJ NDERSON ND D NIEL S W RD

TABLE 3. Long-term effects on British by-e lect ion

results, 1950-1991

Model 1 Model 2

Intercept 6.883* 2.903

(2.178) (2.020)

AInflation 0.093 -0.668

(0.232) (0.146)

AUn employme nt O. 563 1.134*

(0.434) (0.407)

APopularity O. 010

(0.044)

APart isanship O. 591 *

(0.080)

General Election -0.142 -0.108

(0.030) (0.027)

Time -2.667* - 1.437*

(0.398) (0.358)

Time 2 0.119 0.070

(0.020) (0.018)

R 0.241 0.345

SE 7.2566 6.9946

N 276 308

Standard error in parentheses; *significant at 0.01.

Note: Change variables measured as average

change from general election quarter.

455

TABLE 4. Short -term effect s on British by-election

results, 1950-1991

Model 1 Model 2

Intercept 9.643t 5.500t

(2.082) (2.171 )

&Inflation - 1.417 t - 1.121 t

(0.329) (0.354)

AUnemployment -3.011 -5.885t

(2.023) (2.202)

&Popularity 0.245t

(O.090)

APartisanship 0.578t

0.142)

General Election -0.146t -0.104 t

(0.028) (0.029)

Time -3.096t -2.125t

(0.373) (0.385)

Time2 0.136t 0.087t

(0.018) (0.019)

R 2 0.312 0.207

SE 6.8914 7.6872

N 269 309


0.05; tsignificant at 0.01.

Note: Change variables measured as change

from previous quarter.


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456 B a r o m e t e r e l ec t io n s i n c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e

in a parliamentary system. The consistent pattern of loss in Land elections is dimin-

ished when the party is stronger in the electorate, and the effect holds regardless

of the meas ure ment used. It is interesting that the Chancellor s popularity has no

measurable impact on his own party s baromet er election outcomes, whic h

contrasts with the finding for presidential popularity in US midterm elections.

British by-elections provide us with some of the most intriguing results. Like Land

elections, we fred that previous performance has a consistent and significant

negative impact on performance in the barometer election. Again, we find that the

length of time from the general to the by-election shows a curvilinear relationship

to bar omet er outcom es; bot h coefficients are statistically significant in every model.

Here the effects of time show to be quite dramatic substantively. Vote share is

reduced by nearly eight percentage points when

t i m e

and

t i m e

combined have

their maximum effect.

In contrast to the German case, inflation consistently emerges as statistically

significant and negative using both long and short-term measures of change.

Unemployment, however, produces inconsistent findings. When measured as the

average change from the general election quarter to each subsequent quarter until

the by-election, we find that increased unemployment is positively associated with

governing party performance, similar to our findings for German Land elections.

When we measure unemployment change simply from the quarter prior to the by-

election, a negative effect emerges, whic h is consistent with the rewar d-pu nish-

ment hypothesis. All other findings remain consistent in the face of this sign change

for unemployment, suggesting that the results are not simply sensitive to model

specification, but that the two measures of unemployment change are capturing

different and meaningful patterns.

Finally, both political measures emerge as statistically significant and positive

determinants of by-election outcomes. In the long term change models, however,

only party support has a significant effect, as was the case in Land elections. When

short-term change is measured, both party approval and Prime Minister popularity

have a positive impact on election returns. Generally, we can say that executive

popularity, when it matters at all, appears to be a short-term force in barometer

elections. Party support, on the other hand, may capture more consistent long-term

political effects.

i s c u s s i o n

In this paper we suggest a theory of barometer elections. We defme barometer

elections as those that measure pressure on the government by taking account of

changes in the political and economic environment. In particular, we identify

elections that are viewed by office holders and other political elites as performing

the role of a barometer of the political climate at the time these elections are held.

This means that in principle barometer elections can and do take place in a variety

of countries with different electoral and political systems. Specifically, we examine

elections that reflect changes in public attitudes and behavior toward the govern-

ment as a response to political and economic conditions, but which lack the oppor-

tunity to install a new executive.

This paper also tests a general model of barometer elections. The model includes

the following elements: the state of the economy; executive popularity; partisan

strength in the electorate; previous performance; and time. The test was performed


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CHRISTOPHER J NDERSO N ND D NIEL S W RD

4 S 7

w i t h d a t a o n b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s i n G r e a t B r it a in a n d G e r m a n y , w h e r e w e c la ss i-

f i ed B r i t i s h b y - e l e c t i o n s an d G e r m a n L a n d e l e c t i o n s a s p e r f o r m i n g t h e r o l e o f b a r ( )-

m e t e r e l e c t i o n s i n t h e r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s . G i v e n t h a t t h e s e e l e c t i o n s a r e

v i e w e d a s b a r o m e t e r s , t h e y p r o v i d e e x c e l l e n t t e s t c a s es b e c a u s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t

d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f e l e c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e i n d i s t in c t e l e c t o r a l s t r u c t u r e s .

T h e q u e s t i o n w e s o u g h t t o a n s w e r w a s t h u s : g iv e n t h a t t h e s e e l e c t i o n s a re

t y p i c a l ly v i e w e d a s b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s , h o w d o t h e y r e f l e c t t h e c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l

c l im a t e ? I r o n i c a l ly f o r s t u d e n t s o f A m e r i c a n m i d t e r m e l e c t io n s , t h e s t r o n g e s t

f i n d in g s f r o m o u r a n a ly s i s s u g g e s t t h a t B r it is h a n d G e r m a n b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s

c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l lo w a p a t t e r n o f s u r g e a n d d e c l i n e . T h e s u c c e s s o f g o v e r n m e n t s i n

b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s i s s i g n i fi c a n t l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y h o w w e l l t h e y d i d p r e v i o u s l y . In

o t h e r w o r d s , G e r m a n a n d B r i t i sh g o v e r n m e n t s s u f fe r m o r e i n b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s ,

t h e b e t t e r t h e y p e r f o r m i n t h e p r e v i o u s g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . B a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s a r c

a l so c l e a r l y c r e a t u r e s o f t h e e l e c t o r a l c y c l e . In b o t h c o u n t r i e s w e f i n d t h a t g o v e r n -

m e n t s d o b e t t e r t h e f u r t h e r b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s a re r e m o v e d f r o m t h e m i d p o i n t o f

t h e e l e c t o r a l c y c le . T h u s , t i m e i s u n d o u b t e d l y a n i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t o f ba r o -

m e t e r e l e c t i o n s i n G e r m a n y a n d G r e a t B r i ta in .

O v e r a ll , w e o b t a i n r e s u l t s t h a t a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o u r h y p o t h e s e s ( t a k i n g p o l it -

i c al c o n t e x t i n t o a c c o u n t ) i n t w o c o u n t r i e s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d t i m e -

r e l a t e d v a r i ab l e s . H o w e v e r , w e w e r e n o t t o t a ll y s u c c e s s f u l a t f i n d i n g s y s t e m a t i c a n d

e a s i ly e x p l a i n a b l e e c o n o m i c e f f e ct s o n t h e o u t c o m e s o f b a r o m e t e r e l e c t io n s . N o t e

t h a t t h i s is u n l ik e l y to b e t h e r e s u l t o f m o d e l m i s s - s p e c i f i c a t i o n a s w e t r i e d a w i d e

v a r i e ty o f o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t io n s . T h e m i x e d e v i d e n c e l e a d s u s t o t w o , a l b e i t re l a te d ,

c o n c l u s i o n s . F i rs t , t h e r e s u l t s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e i m p a c t o f t h e s t a t e o f t h e e c o n o m y

o n b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n o u t c o m e s d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e r e l a t io n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e

e c o n o m y a n d p u b l i c s u p p o r t i s l ik e ly t o b e m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n a s s u m e d b y

t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e w a r d - p u n i s h m e n t h y p o t h e s i s b a s e d o n r e s e a r c h o n t h e A m e r i c a n

p r e s i d e n t i a l p o p u l a r i t y a n d e l e c t i o n o u t c o m e s ( L e w i s- B e ck , 1 9 8 8; C l a r k e et aL

1 9 92 ; P o w e l l a n d W h i t t e n , 1 9 93 ; A n d e r s o n , 1 9 9 5 a) . S e c o n d , b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s

m a y n o t b e t h e p l a c e t o l o o k f o r e f fe c t s o f t h e e c o n o m y o n e l e c t i o n o u t c o m e s a s

t h e y a r e - - a c c o r d i n g t o o u r r e s u l t s - - m u c h m o r e p o p u l a r i t y c o n t e s t s a n d r e f l e c t i o n s

o f t h e p o l i t ic a l m o o d o f t h e m o m e n t t h a n o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o r e w a r d a n d p u n i s h

i n c u m b e n t g o v e r n m e n t s f o r e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e . A f t e r a ll , v o t e s in b a r o m e t e r

e l e c t i o n s a r e s o m e w h a t l e ss c o n s e q u e n t i a l t h a n i n g e n e r a l e l e c t io n s .

O u r f i n d i n g s a l so l e a d t o s e v e r a l s u g g e s t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h . W e p r o p o s e t o

e v a l u a t e o t h e r e l e c t i o n s u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s . C a n d i d a t e s t h a t

c o m e t o m i n d a r e l e g is l a t i v e e l e c t i o n s i n F r a n c e a n d m i d t e r m c o n g r e s s i o n a l

e l e c t i o n s i n t h e U S , t h o u g h t h e p r o b l e m o f su f f ic i e n t d a t a p o i n t s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o

p l a g u e s u c h a n a ly s e s . E u r o p e a n e l e c t i o n s a r e a l so a w o n d e r f u l l a b o r a t o r y th a t m a y

l e n d t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e s t u d y o f b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n s ( v a n d c r E i jk a n d F r a n k l i n ,

1 9 9 6) . A u s t r i an L a n d e l e c t i o n s s h o u l d b e s i m i la r t o G e r m a n L a n d e l e c t i o n s , g i v e n

t h e r e l a t iv e s im i l a r i t y o f t h e t w o s y s t em s . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e s u lt s o b t a i n e d f o r

t h e G e r m a n c a s e h o l d i n s im i l a r s y s t e m s c o u l d b e t e s t e d t h e r e . F i n a ll y , c a n d i d a t e s

f o r th e s t u d y o f b y - e l e c t i o n s a r e o t h e r W e s t m i n s t e r - t y p e s y s t e m s l ik e A u s t r a li a o r

N e w Z e a l a n d o r s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n s i n th e U S.

O v e ra l l , w e b e l i e v e t ha t t h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h e b a r o m e t e r e l e c t i o n

p r o v i d e s a c h a n c e t o c o n s i d e r a c l as s o f e l e c t i o n s t h a t w e r e p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d

s e c o n d - o r d e r e l e c t i o n s o r n o t p a r t ic u l a r l y n o t e w o r t h y b e c a u s e o f c r o s s -n a t i o n a l

d i f f e r e n c e s in e l e c t o r a l s t r u c t u r e s ( M i l le r , 1 9 8 8 ) . M t h o u g h a ll e l e c t i o n s m a t t e r , t h e y


12/14

458

B a r o m e t e r e l e c ti o n s in c o m p a r a t i v e p e r sp e c t i v e

matter in different ways. Barometer elections may not instal l a new government,

but they play an imp orta nt and identifiable role in a count ry s poli t ical dynamics.

They provide opportunit ies for ci t izens to send signals to poli t ical leaders, which

are ignored with considerable risk. By unifying the elements that influence the

outc omes of these e lec t ions conceptua l ly and empir ica l ly, we a re able to s tudy

electi ons across space and t ime wit hou t con siderabl e loss of generali ty.

c kn ow l e d g emen t s

This paper was f i rs t presented a t the Workshop on The

E c o n o m y a n d P o l i t ic a l

B e h a v i o r Rice Universi ty, 22-23 April 1995. We would l ike to thank the workshop

participants, Harold Clarke and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful sugges-

t ions and cri t ic isms. Thanks also to Hans Ratt inger for helpful hints and Holly

Teeters Reynolds for research assis tance . The publ ic opin ion da ta were generously

pro vide d by Gallup Britain and the Insti tut fi ir Dem osk opi e Allensbach. The Ge rman

economic and public opinion data are available as ZA-800 from the Zentralarchiv

fi ir Empirische Sozialforschung, Universi ty of Cologne. None of the individuals or

organizations named above are responsible for the results reported here.

Notes

1. Often referred to as referenda , we ch oose the mor e agnostic term barom eter election

for such contests because of the specific individual level assumptions implied by the

notion of a referendum.

2. This is our own translation.

3. The surge and decline hypothesi s was first enunciat ed by Campbell (1960). The basic

premise is that a surge in turnout during high-stimulus general elections brings bonus

votes to the winni ng candidate s party, whic h are subsequently lost in the low-stimulus

midterm election, causing a decline for that party. A related, but competing, explanation

is labelled the exposure thesis (Oppenh eimer

e t a l .

1986; Waterman

e t a l .

1991), which

posits a party equilibrium, or a normal complement of seats. When short term forces push

a party beyond that number, the party is said to be over expo sed and henc e vulnerable

to a fall in the subsequent election. What these two perspectives add to the debate is

consideration of the particular outcomes of the prior general election, an important

element of our notion of elections as barometers.

4. A similar strategy is employed by Powell and Whitten (1993) in a paper on economic

voting, where, in order to control for lagged effects, the level of government vote share

in the previous election is included in the models.

5. The e con omi c data for Germany are taken from the German Statistical Office s

W i r t s c ha f t

u n d S t a ti s ti k

as well as the

M o n t h l y R e p o r t o f t h e D e u ts c h e B u n d e s b a n k

while the British

data wer e taken fr om the British Central Statistical Office s Monthly Diges t o f S ta t i s t i c s .

6. It is assumed that it is sensible and acceptable to use objective indicators of economic

perfo rmanc e (cf. Kramer, 1983). Kramer argues that pe opl e s images of econ omic perfor-

ma nc e- wh il e susceptible to occasional errors at the individual level--a re typically correct

and unbiased in the aggregate, since errors in individual percep tion s are assumed to be

distributed randomly so that aggregate perception s are accurate and reliable (Clarke

e t

al . 1992, p. 54).

7. The Germa n public opinion data were collect ed by the Institute fiir Demoskopie,

Allensbach, whereas the British public opinion data were gathered by the Gallup poll. All

monthly surveys are based on random national samples of about 1000 to 2000 respon-

dents each. There is no reason to assume that the samples are biased in any systematic

fashion. Since the analysis is based on over 40 years of monthly polls, the tests performed

below are as inclusive as possible.

8. Technically, our data are a pooled cross-sectional time-series, with a greater number of

time points than cross-sections. Using the change in vote share as the dependent variable


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CHRISTOPHERJ ANDERSONAND DANIEL S WARD

459

and the level of the previous vote share together with changes in the other independent

variables on the right hand side means that OLS is an appropriate estimation technique

(Beck and Katz, 1995, p. 645). We should poi nt out that t he time periods in our data set

occur at irregular and variable intervals. Such an uneven spacing of time points combined

with the cross-sectional nature of the data makes familiar tests for serial correlation, such

as Durbin-Watson's d or h inappropriate. In accordance with the argument made by Beck

and Katz, and Powell and Wh itten in their cross-national study of econom ic voting (Powell

and Whitten, 1993, p. 411), we contend that concerns over serial correlation are sharply

reduced by constructing our dependent variable as a change variable and including previ-

ous vote level as an independent variable.

9. We can re port that in a separate run of the mo del including interactions b etwe en

economic effects and political party the expected 'issue priority' pattern emerges (see also

Clarke et al. 1992; Anderson, 1995a).

e f e r e n c e s

It, James (1979) The

Politics of Economic Decline.

Cambridge University Press, New York.

Anderson, Christopher (1995a)

Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in

Five European Democracies.

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Anderson, Christ opher (1995b) Party Systems and the Dynamics of Gove rnme nt Support:

Britain and Germany, 1960-1990, European Journal of Political Research 27,

93-118.

Anderson, Christopher and Zelle, Carsten (1995) Helmut Kohl and the CDU Victory.

German

Politics and Society 13(1) 12-35.

Beck, Nathaniel and Katz, Jonathan N. (1995) What To Do (and Not To Do) With Time-series

Cross-Section Data, American Political Science Review 69, 634-647.

Campbell, Angus (1960) Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change.

Public Opinion

Quarterly

24, 397-418.

Campbell, James (1993) The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections. University of

Kentucky Press, Lexington, KY.

Clarke, Harold and Zuk, Gary (1989) The Dynamics of Third Party Support: The British

Liberals, 1951-1979,

American Journal of Political Science

33, 196-221.

Clarke, Harold, Elliott, Euel, Mishler, William, Stewart, Marianne, Whiteley, Paul and Zuk,

Gary (1992) Controversies in Political Economy: Canada Great Britain the United

States. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

Cook, Chris and Ramsden, John (1973)

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nissen, PoHtische Vierteljahresschrift 18(2/3) 348-359.

Dinkel, Reiner (1981) Zur Gesetzm~lgigkeit der Trendverschiebungen zwischen Lantags- und

Bundestagswahlen,

Zeitschrift f~ r Parlamentsfragen

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van der Eijk, Cees and Franklin, Mark (Eds) (1996)

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Erikson, Robert S (1990) Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the

Macrolevel Evidence, American Journal of Political Science 34, 373-399.

Fabritius, Georg (1978) Wechselwirkungen zwischen Landtagswahlen und Bundespolitik.

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University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.


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4 6 0 B a r o m e t e r e l e c t io n s i n c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t iv e

M a r s h , M i c h a e l a n d F r a n k l i n , M a r k 1 9 9 5 ) U n d e r s t a n d i n g E u r o p e a n E l e c t io n s , 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 9 4 , i n

C e e s v a n d e r E i jk a n d M a r k F r a n k l i n E d s ) , C h o o s i n g E u r o p e ? T h e E u r o p e a n E l e c t o r a t e

a n d N a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s i n t h e F a c e o f U n i o n . U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s , A n n A r b o r

f o r t h c o m i n g ) .

M i l l er , W i l l i a m L 1 9 8 8 ) I r r e l e v a n t E l ec t io n s ? T h e Q u a l i t y o f L o c a l D e m o c r a c y i n B r i t a i n .

O x f o r d U n i v e r s it y P re s s, N e w Y o r k .

M u g h a n , A n t h o n y 1 9 8 6 ) T o w a r d a P o l i ti c a l E x p l a n a t i o n o f G o v e r n m e n t V o t e L o s se s i n

M i d t e r m B y - E l e c ti o n s , A m e r i c a n P o l it ic a l S c ie n c e R e v i e w , 8 0 3 ) 7 6 1 - 7 7 5 .

M u g h a n , A n t h o n y 1 9 8 8 ) O n t h e B y - E l ec t io n V o t e o f G o v e r n m e n t s i n B r it ai n , L e g i s l a t i v e

S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y ,

1 3 1 ) 2 9 - 4 8 .

N a n n e s t a d , P e t e r a n d P a l d a m , M a r t i n 1 9 9 4 ) T h e V P - F u n c t i o n : a S u r v e y o f t h e L i t e r a t u r e o n

V o t e a n d P o p u l a r i t y F u n c t i o n s a f t e r 2 5 y e a r s, P u b l i c C h o i c e , 7 9 , 2 1 3 - 2 4 5 .

N o r p o t h , H e l m u t 1 9 9 2 ) C o n f i d e n c e R e g ai ne d . E c o n o m i c s , M r s T h a t c h e r a n d t h e B r i ti s h

Voter . U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s , A n n A r b o r .

N o r r i s , P i p p a 1 9 9 0 ) B r i t i s h B y - e l e c ti o n s . O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , N e w Y o r k .

N o r r is , P i p p a a n d F e i g e r t , F r a n k 1 9 8 9 ) G o v e r n m e n t a n d T h i r d - p a r t y P e r f o r m a n c e i n M i d t e r m

B y - e l e c t i o n s : T h e C a n a d i a n , B r i t i sh , a n d A u s t r a l ia n E x p e r i e n c e , E l e c t o r a l S t u d i e s , 8

1 1 7 - 1 3 0 .

O p p e n h e i m e r , B r u c e , S t im s o n , J a m e s a n d W a t e r m a n , R i c h a r d 1 9 8 6 ) I n t e r p r e t i n g U S

C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t io n s : T h e E x p o s u r e T h e s i s , L e g i s l a t i v e S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , 1 1 , 2 2 7 - 2 4 7 .

P o w e l l , G B i n g h a m a n d W h i t t e n , G u y 1 9 9 3 ) A C r o s s - N a ti o n a l A n a l y s is o f E c o n o m i c V o t in g :

T a k i n g A c c o u n t o f t h e P o l i ti c a l C o n t e x t , A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f P o l it ic a l S ci en c e, 37 ,

3 9 1 - 4 1 4 .

R a t t in g e r , H a n s 1 9 9 1 ) U n e m p l o y m e n t a n d E l e c t io n s i n W e s t G e r m a n y , i n H e l m u t N o r p o t h ,

M i c h a e l L e w i s - B e c k a n d J e a n - D o m i n i q u e L a f ay E d s ) , E c o n o m i c a n d P o l it ic s : T h e C a l c u lu s

o f S u p p o r t p p . 4 9 - 6 2 ) . U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s, A n n A r b o r .

R e if , K a r l h e i n z 1 9 8 4 ) N a t i o n a l E l e c t o r a l C y c l e s a n d E u r o p e a n E l e c t i o n s , E l e c t o r a l S t u d i e s ,

3 , 2 4 4 - 2 5 5 .

R e if , K a r l h e i n z a n d S c h m i t t , H e r m a n n 1 9 8 0 ) N i n e S e c o n d - O r d e r N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n s : A

C o n c e p t u a l F r a m e w o r k f o r t h e A n a l y si s o f E u r o p e a n E l e c t io n R e s u lt s, E u r o p e a n J o u r n a l

o f P o l i t i ca l R e s e a r c h , 8 1 ) 3 - 4 4 .

T u f t e, E d w a r d 1 9 7 3 ) T h e R e l a t i o n s h ip B e t w e e n S e a t s a n d V o t e s i n T w o - p a r t y S y s t em s ,

A m e r i c a n P o l i ti c a l Sc i en c e R e v i e w , 6 7 , 5 4 0 - 5 5 4 .

T u f te , E d w a r d 1 9 7 5 ) D e t e r m i n a n t s o f t h e O u t c o m e s o f M i d t e r m C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c ti o n s ,

A m e r i c a n P o l i ti c a l S c ie n c e R e v i e w , 6 9 , 8 1 2 - 8 2 6 .

T u f t e , E d w a r d 1 9 7 8 ) P o l i t i ca l C o n t r o l o f th e E c o n o m y . P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,

P r i n c e t o n .

W a t e r m a n , R i c h ar d , O p p e n h e i m e r , B r u c e a n d S t im s o n , J a m e s 1 9 9 1 ) S e q u e n c e a n d

E q u i l i b ri u m i n C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c ti o n s : A n I n t e g r a t e d A p p r o a c h , J o u r n a l o f P o l it ic s , 53 ,

3 7 2 - 3 9 3 .

Anderson Ward - Barometer Elections

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