Ancient Greek Metaphysics

Particulars

Particulars: can’t have multiple instancesDan Bonevac, Gavrilo Princip

Empire State Building, Perry-Castañeda Library, that beach ball, this grain of sand

Austin, Texas, Sarajevo

November 11, 1918

The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand

Universals

• Universals: can have multiple instances– Properties: red, triangular, large– Relations: between, on, love, friendship– Kinds: tiger, building, pencil, shortstop– Books: the Bible; Edwin Mullhouse– Musical works: Luckenbach, Texas;

Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in D Minor

Are Universals Real?• Realism: yes, and mind-independent• Conceptualism: yes, but mind-dependent• Nominalism: no— everything is particular

• Mind-dependent Mind-independent• Real Conceptualism Realism• Unreal Nominalism

Why Think Forms Exist at All?

• Necessary for knowledge• Without forms, we could

– Perceive– Generalize

• But we couldn’t– Understand why things happen– Know any universal or necessary generalizations, as

in science, mathematics, or philosophy

• There must be something all Fs have in common, by virtue of which they are Fs

Plato’s Enemies: Parmenides

• Parmenides holds that change is impossible

• Say that a thing changes:• a is F at time t, but not F at t’• But then a is both F and not F• That’s a contradiction• So, nothing changes

Plato’s Enemies: Heraclitus

• That doesn’t show that change is impossible

• It just shows that objects don’t persist through change

• There are changes: one object succeeds another

• “You can’t step into the same river twice.”

Plato’s Enemies: Sophists

• The Sophists are relativists• “Man is the measure of all things”• What’s true for me might not be true

for you• Meaning might be relative too• So, maybe you don’t mean by your

words what I mean• Maybe my meaning changes over

time

Plato’s Enemies: Skeptics

• The Skeptics deny the possibility of knowledge

• There is such a thing as truth• We just can’t get access to it• How is it possible for us to

communicate? I can’t know what you mean (or even what I meant)

Forms Explain How We Can

• Think general thoughts• Account for regularities• Account for change• Think the same thought at different times• Think the same thought as each other• Think veridical thoughts

Plato’s Divided Line• “You have to imagine, then, that there are two

ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. . . . Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like. . . .”

Plato’s Divided Line

• “Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.”

The Divided Line

• Visible World Intellectual World

• Shadows, Objects Mathematical Abstract• reflections of perception forms forms

• Perceptions ofOpinion Understanding Reason• shadows, etc.

• Visible world is like a reflection of the intellectual world

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The Cave Allegory• “And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our

nature is enlightened or unenlightened: -- Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.”

The Cave Allegory• “And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all

sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

• You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

• Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

• True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

• And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

• Yes, he said.”

The Cave Allegory• “And if they were able to converse

with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

• Very true.

• And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

• No question, he replied.

• To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.”

The Cave Allegory

• Philosophy tries to turn people away from shadows. It tries to make people see the true nature of the world-- to get beyond appearances to realities

• The prisoner released from the cave will be able to see reflections, then objects, then the moon and stars, and finally, the sun

• The progression: the divided line— from reflections to objects to mathematical forms that reflect the most abstract forms; finally to abstract forms themselves

Meaning of the Allegory• “This entire allegory, I said, you may now

append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed- whether rightly or wrongly God knows.”

The Good

• “But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.”

The Platonic Tradition

• Judgment of perception: ‘This is a triangle’• Mind is turned toward object perceived• But also to the form of a triangle• We perceive the thing as a triangle

because we apprehend the form

Plato’s Philosophy of Mind

Form

Object

This is a triangle

Objects and Abstract Forms

• “You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?”

Objects and Abstract Forms

• “And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on -- the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?”

Plato’s Philosophy of Mind

Form

Object

This is a triangle

Participation

Perception

?

Platonism’s problem

• We don’t perceive the forms• How do we know anything about

them?• Aristotle’s answer: abstraction• Plato’s answers:

– Recollection– The Form of the Good

Plato’s Philosophy of Mind

Form

Object

This is a triangle

Participation

Perception

Recollection

The Good

Plato’s Beard

• How can we,• Limited to the realm of the senses,• Have access to a realm beyond the

senses?• Dilemma:

– Reject possibility of knowing abstract truths, or

– Postulate some special faculty of knowledge

Plato’s Beard

• Our theory of meaning (semantics) makes us postulate objects (metaphysics) that we can’t know anything about (epistemology).

• How do we bring these together?

Plato’s Beard

• ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’

SemanticsEpistemology

• 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31 . . . . Metaphysics

Shaving Plato’s Beard

• Semantics: The sentences don’t really commit us to the troublesome objects

• Metaphysics: The objects are mind-dependent

• Epistemology: We have a faculty of knowing the objects

The Semantic Strategy

• ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’

Semantics

Epistemology

• 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31 . . . . Metaphysics

‘||’, ‘|||’, ‘|||||’, ‘|||||||’, ‘|||||||||||’, . . . .

The Semantic Strategy• Nominalism: There are no universals• Abstract terms stand for nothing

– Socrates has courage —> Socrates is courageous

– Courage is a virtue —> Courageous people are virtuous (ceteris paribus)

– We have something in common —> ?– Green is closer to blue than to red —> ?

• Fictionalism: abstract language is fictional

The Metaphysical Strategy

• ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’

Semantics

Epistemology

• 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31 . . . . Metaphysics

The Metaphysical Strategy

• Conceptualism: Universals are mind-dependent

• Plato’s Forms —> concepts in the mind

• There are universals, but we construct them

The Epistemological Strategy

• ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’

Semantics

Epistemology

• 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31 . . . . Metaphysics

The Epistemological Strategy

• We have the ability to know universals

• Platonism (Plato, Philo, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes): We know certain universals a priori

• Aristotle: We know universals by abstracting them from particulars

Philo of Alexandria

• Realm of Forms: the Intelligible World

• Forms are ideas in the mind of God

• They are God’s blueprint for creation

• God created Intelligible World, then matter, then world

The Intelligible World

• “For God, being God, assumed that a beautiful copy would never be produced apart from a beautiful pattern, and that no object of perception would be faultless which was not made in the likeness of an original discerned only by the intellect.”

The Intelligible World

• “So when He willed to create this visible world He first fully formed the intelligible world, in order that He might have the use of a pattern wholly God-like and incorporeal in producing the material world, as a later creation, the very image of an earlier, to embrace in itself objects of perception of as many kinds as the other contained objects of intelligence.”

The Word of God• The Word of God contains the intelligible

world• Psalm 33: “By the Word of God were the

heavens made.”• “. . . the world discerned only by the intellect

is nothing else than the Word of God when He was already engaged in the act of creation.”

• The Word is the pattern of creation, the “idea of ideas,” the “Man of God,” the “Second God”

How do We Know the Forms?

• Forms are ideas in the mind of God• We are created in God’s image (Gen 1:27)• Our minds are images of the mind of God• “Our great Moses likened the fashion of the

reasonable soul to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread Spirit, the Divine and Invisible One, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the Eternal Word. . . .”

Knowledge of the World

• Our minds and the world are both stamped with the Word of God

Two Dilemmas

• Universals: we must either– Reject the possibility of knowledge we

seem to have, or– Postulate a faculty of knowledge to

relate us to universals• Universality and Necessity: we must

– Reject our knowledge of universal and necessary truths, or

– Postulate a priori knowledge

Origen (185-253)

• I John 1:5: “God is light.”• Forms as ideas in the mind of God (Philo)• Good —> God• God illumines the intelligible world for us• Augustine (354-430): God illumines our minds

with “inner light of truth”

God is light

• “. . . God is light; as John writes in his Epistle, ‘God is light, and in Him there is no darkness at all.’ Truly He is that light which illuminates the whole understanding of those who are capable of receiving truth, as is said in the Psalms 36, ‘In Thy light we shall see light.’ For what other light of God can be named, ‘in which any one sees light,’ save an influence of God, by which a man, being enlightened, either thoroughly sees the truth of all things, or comes to know God Himself, who is called the truth?”

Origen’s and Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind

Form

Object

This is a triangle

Participation

Perception

Illumination

GodGod

Aristotle

Aristotle’s Categories

• Substance man, the horse, Socrates• Quantity 6 ft tall, 235 square miles• Quality white, tall, angry, wise• Relation double, greater than• Place at the mall, west of Austin• Time today, at noon, for a week• Position lying, sitting, standing• State armed, puzzled, impressed• Action hit, smile, do, walk, thank• Affection to be hit, to be thanked

What are they categories of?

• Kinds of thing• Kinds of basic thing• Kinds of being• Correspond to grammatical functions

Substance

• All the other categories depend on substance

• Qualities, quantities, relations, etc., are always of substances

• There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be

• But all depend on a focal meaning of ‘being’, substance

What is substance?

• A substance is a ‘this’• It answers a question, ‘What is it?’• A substance is always of a kind,

having a species (specific kind) and a genus (a more general kind)

• Substance: a ‘this’ and a ‘such’• Substance exists in a primary sense• ‘What is there?’ ‘Substance.’

Primary/Secondary Substance

• A substance is a ‘this such’• A substance is a subject• We predicate other things of it• Primary substances: things;

individual objects• Secondary substances: kinds

Criteria for Substance

• A substance is a ‘this such’• There are no degrees of substance• Substances admit contrary

qualities• How is that possible?

Essential Properties

• Essential property: without it, the thing wouldn’t be what it is

• Essential properties are necessary• Thing has them by virtue of what it

is• Accidental property: without it, the

thing can remain the same• Accidental properties are contingent

Essential Properties

•The essence of x = –what it is to be x–what x is by virtue of itself–what x is by its very nature–what is expressed by a definition of x (a “formula for the nature of” x)

What is a Substance?

• Matter• Form• Combination of matter and form• Essence• The river can remain the same even

though the water constantly flows

Four Causes

• Formal: relies on essence or definition

• Material: matter• Efficient: chain of

events, production• Final: goal,

purpose, function

Essences and Causes

• St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274)

• Essences as causes• Quiddity: “whatness”,

“what it is”— definition in re

• Nature of x: what makes x what it is; that by virtue of which x is what it is

Aquinas Identifies with Form:

• The essenceessence of x = the properties necessary to x, without which x would not be what it is

• The quiddityquiddity of x = what corresponds to x’s definition in the world

• The naturenature of x = what makes x what it is

The Atomic Theory of Matter

• The atomic theory poses a challenge to this conception of substances

• Atomic theory: things are composed of atoms; properties of things depend on nature and motion of atoms

Dignaga (c. 450), Buddhist

• “Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness of the sense-organs, they are not its actual objects like the sense organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms. The consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it. Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon. Thus both the external things are unfit to be the real objects of consciousness.”

Nature and Quiddity

• We typically define a kind in terms of its perceptual properties—the things corresponding to its definition in the world—its quiddity

• But what makes it what it is—its nature—is its atomic structure

• Nature ≠ quiddity; nature => quiddity