Analyze Unified Land Operations Lesson Plan … · Web viewAnalyze Unified Land Operations (ULO)...

HUMAN RESOURCESSENIOR LEADERS COURSE

42A

Analyze Unified Land Operations

LESSON PLAN

Version 2.0

January 2019

U.S. ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT INSTITUTENoncommissioned Officer Academy

Human Resources Senior Leaders CourseTLO 4.0 - Conduct HR Planning and Operations

ELO 4.2 - Analyze Unified Land Operations

LESSON PLAN

Lesson Author: AG Branch, ITDDate prepared: January 2013Last update: January 2019

1. SCOPE: Analyze Unified Land Operations (ULO) is a 3.5 hour lesson that explores the Army’s operational concept. This lesson examines the current doctrine of ULO, which “describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”

Students will reach the following lesson outcomes by actively participating in class and completing the practical exercise:

Establish a prerequisite understanding of ULO that provides context and raise the student’s entry-level knowledge for the Human Resources (HR) Staff Exercise (STAFFEX)

Enabled to logically defend or challenge the doctrinal concepts found in ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations.

2. LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ELO 5.2:Action: Analyze Unified Land Operations (ULO)

Condition: Senior HR Leaders in a classroom environment working individually and as a member of a small group, using doctrinal and administrative publications, practical exercises, case studies, personal experience, handouts, and discussion with an awareness of the Operational Environment (OE) variables and actors.

Standard: Analysis includes:

1. The Army’s Operational Concept.

2. Foundations and tenets of Unified Land Operations.

3. Components of the Operational Art, Process, and Framework.

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Learning Domain: Cognitive

Level of Learning: Analysis

3. STUDENT PREREQUISITE WORK:

a. Study Requirements:

Study: ADP 3-0 (October 2017) Operations (23 pages)

Read:

(1) ADRP 3-0 (October 2017) Operations, Chapters 1 through 4 (46 pages)

(2) FM 6-0 (22 April 2016) Commander and Staff Officer Guide, paragraph 10-2 (1 page)

(3) Colonel Bill Benson, Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century, Military Review, (March-April 2012), pages 2-12

b. Bring to class: NA

c. Be prepared to answer or discuss the following: (1) The Army’s Operational Concept

(2) Foundations and tenets of Unified Land Operations

(3) The relationship between Operational Art and Tactical Operations

4. INSTRUCTOR ADDITIONAL READING(S)/MATERIAL: JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Chapter II (7 pages)

5. TRAINING AIDS, REFERENCES, AND RESOURCES: This lesson is taught in a small group classroom setting with the ability to project PowerPoint slides and multimedia. The CE works best when whiteboards or butcher paper pads are available with appropriate writing instruments. Additional resources are available digitally for students to reference on their laptops without having the need to print.

Appendix A: Assessment PlanAppendix B: List of SlidesAppendix C: Military Review Article

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http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm

https://train.gordon.army.mil/webapps/ssi/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/fm6_0.pdf

6. CONDUCT OF LESSON:

a. Lesson Timeline:

15 minutes Concrete Experience: HR units / HR Staff Elements / ULO15 minutes Publish and Process25 minutes Generalize New Information – Operational Concept10 minutes Break 30 minutes Generalize New Information – ULO Tenets and Operations15 minutes Develop10 minutes Break120 minutes Apply – ULO Practical Exercise

Instructor Note: Throughout this lesson, solicit from students the challenges they experienced in the operational environment (OE) and what they did to resolve them. Encourage students to apply at least one of the critical variables: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT). Adjust the Lesson Timeline as necessary to facilitate class schedule, your teaching style, and student learning. There are no time constraints during any particular phase of the ELM model.

The 21st Century Soldier Competencies are essential to ensure Soldiers and leaders are fully prepared to prevail in complex, uncertain environments. This lesson reinforces the following 21st Century Soldier Competencies:

Cultural and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational CompetenceTactical and Technical CompetenceDoctrinally SoundTechnically Capable

Throughout the lesson discussion, seek opportunities to link the competencies with the lesson content through the student’s experiences.

NOTE: The purpose of this lesson is not to impart knowledge and move on – it is to get students thinking about the HR professional’s role in support of Unified Land Operations. There are not many slides in the lesson, but there is great potential for discussion. While topic slides do introduce knowledge for consideration, they are designed to start discussions and constantly engage students, even in the GNI portion. The information covered in this lesson is basic, and even students with limited experience can prepare for the lesson by completing the reading assignments.

Your purpose in this block of instruction is to ensure students have a doctrinal understanding of what Unified Land Operations is and to facilitate discussion and critical thought of new information, and then to push students to the next level and have them apply their knowledge in a planning process during the HR STAFFEX. Instructors must be thoroughly familiar with the topics and structure of the lesson to properly

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facilitate a small group. For each topic, ask students “Why is this important – particularly as you prepare for your next assignments?”

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b. Concrete Experience (15 min):

Slide 1: Concrete Experience Focus: The concrete experience serves as a trigger of experience and knowledge, as a focusing mechanism for the lesson that follows, and as a support for teaching new content.

CONCRETE EXPERIENCE

1. Allow students to view the slide.

2. Break the students into four (4) groups and click mouse to display CE question when ready.

3. Allow groups 15 minutes (+/-) to develop their response to the question.

4. Have each group record their responses on a white board, butcher-block paper, or other media that can be easily viewed by the entire class during the Process Phase.

c. Publish and Process (15 min): This phase is student-centered and instructor facilitated.

The “publish” portion is a short discussion on how group members felt during their experience of generating data. This phase focuses on the group dynamics during the exercise and is NOT intended to be a discussion of the content generated. This can be kept short; once the group moves to “process” they will likely continue to add to “publishing” type information. Do not let the group jump straight to content. When well facilitated, publishing is a good method to relate a discussion of interpersonal communication and group dynamics to the broader topic of leader competencies described in FM 6-22, Army Leadership.

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Questions the instructor may ask to assist in the publishing phase:

What happened? How did you feel about that?

Who had a similar or different experience, and why? Were there any surprises?

Did anyone have a hard time contributing? Why? (Knowledge, group dynamics, etc.)

Was everyone engaged in actively listening and/or contributing or were some trying to dominate? If a “dominator” personality exists, how can you ensure participation and commitment of everyone towards shared knowledge and understanding?

The “processing” phase now allows the group to talk about the data they generated. Direct the discussion and questions towards making sense of the data. Since the CE question is the same for each group one method is to go “round-robin” type allowing each group to present one item and then move to next group, etc., or allow each group to present their response in its entirety prior to facilitating discussion on the data.

Questions the instructor may ask to assist in publishing: (Intent is to push critical thinking. Push students to defend their answers – allow students to hash out ideas).

Why did you put “item X” in your response? What does it mean to you? (This gets at affective learning and how students find the material relevant from their experiences).

Did you find that once you got one idea down, it triggered related ideas? (If yes, have them show examples. This shows the interrelatedness of the materials in a larger process).

Would you say you saw any themes develop? (e.g., events vs. processes)

Can you prioritize your response to question like this? (There may be no right answer, but the more interesting development would be if there were disagreements between group members. Have them discuss their differences in thought).

After having talked about this, do you think you left anything critical off?

Is this a “tough” question? Why? (Conversation could include doctrinal changes, how doctrine is applied in different situations, experience level, combat arms vs. sustainment, etc.).

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c. Generalize New Information (30 min): Although instructor facilitated, this lesson is designed for student involvement and discussion.

Slide 2: Learning ObjectiveFocus: Review Learning Objective and assessment plan; introduce lesson.

NOTE: Pacing of the GNI phase relies on student interaction. The intent is for the group to discuss the topics presented, and by expressing the importance of these subjects in terms of their own knowledge and experience and attach “relevance” to the material. The goal is not to just get through the slides. “Hard data” content varies from topic to topic, and is mainly to serve as anchor points for discussions requiring more thinking that is critical.

Although there are many questions related to the material that may have “right” answers, facilitators should push students to explain why an answer is “right,” or why one answer may be better than another may. Occasionally, students will disagree with you or one another, which is expected – encourage professional discussion that relies on critical thinking. Learners are more likely to remember these interactions than a bullet on a slide.

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Range of Military OperationsFocus: Range/diversity of operations in which U.S. military forces are employed.

NOTE: Reference JP 3-0, Joint Operations, Chapter 5, page V 1-2.

Chapter V (pg. V 1-2) Students Read

The range of military operations is another fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns (Figure V-1). Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as CS and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But others, as evidenced by Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual major operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., OEF). The nature of the strategic security environment may require US forces to engage in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these missions, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stability operations and activities to achieve objectives. The commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity. Although this publication discusses specific types of operations under the various categories in the range of military operations, each type is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range. For instance, a counterinsurgency operation could escalate from a security cooperation activity into a major operation or campaign.

Unified Land Operations provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army forces must be prepared to operate across the range of military operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as part of a larger effort.

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Role of Unified Land OperationsFocus: Overview and role of Unified Land Operations in military operations.

NOTE: Reference ADP 3-0, page 1

Unified Land Operations (ULO) describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and creates the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, is the Army’s basic warfighting doctrine and is the Army’s contribution to unified action.

ULO is an intellectual outgrowth of both previous operations doctrine and recent combat experience. It recognizes the three-dimensional nature of modern warfare and the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authorities simultaneously.

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, acknowledges that strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners.

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Operational EnvironmentFocus: Defining the operational environment.

NOTE: Reference ADP 3-0, page 2

The Operational Environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations by analyzing the operational environment in terms of the operational variables and mission variables.

The operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (PMESII-PT). The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC).

How these variables interact in a specific situation, domain (land, maritime, air, space, or cyberspace), area of operations, or area of interest describes a commander’s operational environment but does not limit it. No two operational environments are identical, even within the same theater of operations, and every operational environment changes over time. Because of this, Army leaders consider how evolving relevant operational or mission variables affect force employment concepts and tactical actions that contribute to the strategic purpose.

Operational environments are not static. Within an operational environment, an Army leader may conduct major combat, military engagement and humanitarian assistance simultaneously. Army doctrine has always stated that Army forces must be prepared to transition rapidly from one type of operation to another. A decade of sustained combat and deployments has refined that understanding. Army forces simultaneously and continuously combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations through a blend of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

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The homeland is a distinct part of the operational environment for Army forces. Homeland defense requires simultaneous and continuous application of combined arms maneuver and wide area security in coordination with designated civil authorities. Continuous assessment of the mission variables enables Army leaders to adjust the mix of core competencies to gain a position of relative advantage over the threat (whether natural disaster or enemy attack) against populations and infrastructure.

Slide 6: Operational ConceptFocus: The Army’s operational concept and the foundations of ULO.

NOTE: Reference ADP 3-0, page 5, para 19

ULO is the Army’s warfighting doctrine. As previously discussed, ULO is based on the central idea that Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. This is accomplished through simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations that set conditions for favorable conflict resolution.

The Army’s two core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security—provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The integrated application of these two core competencies enables Army forces to defeat or destroy an enemy, seize or occupy key terrain, protect or secure critical assets and populations, and prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage.

The philosophy of mission command—the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent—guides leaders in the execution of unified land operations.

The foundation of ULO is built on initiative, decisive action, and mission command—linked and nested through purposeful and simultaneous execution of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security—to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state.

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Decisive ActionFocus: Explanation of decisive actions

Offense Defense Stability Defense Support of Civil Authorities


Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)) appropriate to the mission and environment. Army forces conduct regular and irregular warfare against both conventional and hybrid threats.

Offensive operations are operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They include movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.

Defensive operations are operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive and stability tasks. These operations include mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde.

Stability operations are military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. They include five tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.

Homeland defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) represent Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. They include the tasks: provide support for domestic disasters; provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents; provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies; and provide other designated support.

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Army Core CompetenciesFocus: Application of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security in Unified Land Operations.


Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security provide the means for balancing the application of the elements of combat power within tactical actions and tasks associated with offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. It exposes enemies to friendly combat power from unexpected directions and prevents an effective enemy response.

Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.

Offensive, defensive, and stability operations each requires a combination of combined arms maneuver and wide area security; neither core competency is adequate in isolation. While an individual tactical action may be predominately characterized as reflecting either combined arms maneuver or wide area security, campaigns and operations invariably combine both core competencies.

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Mission CommandFocus: Philosophy of Mission Command


When applying the Army’s core competencies, Army leaders are guided by the Mission Command philosophy—the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

The ability of Army forces to combine its core competencies into a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations depends on a philosophy of command that emphasizes broad mission-type orders, individual initiative within the commander’s intent, and leaders who can anticipate and adapt quickly to changing conditions .

NOTE: Instructors should leverage their own experiences and ask pertinent questions pertaining to the information presented. Potential questions may include:

What are the fundamental differences between the “Art of Command” and “Science of Control”.

How are “Commander Tasks” and “Staff Tasks” related? Why?

NOTE: Emphasis to the students the term “command and control” is replaced with “mission command” and that “battle command” is no longer an Army term.

BREAK. Providing the training schedule provides and available time permits this is a good point to provide the students a short break before transitioning to Tenets of ULO and Operational topics.

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Generalize New Information (30 min):

Slide 10: Tenets of Unified Land OperationsFocus: Tenets of Unified Land Operations


TENETS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS. Unified land operations describes the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and operations. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). An operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part. Army operations are characterized by flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization.

FLEXIBILITY. To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders seek to demonstrate flexibility in spite of adversity. They employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. Commanders enable adaptive forces through flexibility, collaborative planning, and decentralized execution. They use mission command to achieve maximum flexibility and foster individual initiative. The capability to act quickly enhances flexibility and adaptability across the range of military operations. The Army requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to be successful in unified land operations.

INTEGRATION. Army forces do not operate independently but as a part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. Army leaders are responsible for integrating Army operations within this larger effort. Integration involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept. Army leaders seek to use Army capabilities to complement those of their joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These leaders depend on those partners to provide capabilities that supplement or are not organic to Army forces. Effective integration requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force.

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LETHALITY. The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other military capabilities and the most basic building block for military operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their formations for unmatched lethality under a wide range of conditions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission through nonlethal engagements and activities. The capability for the lawful and expert application of lethal force builds the foundation for effective offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

ADAPTABILITY. Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. Adaptability is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative based on relevant understanding of the specific situation.

DEPTH. Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, or purpose. Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth by arranging activities across the entire operational framework to achieve the most decisive result. They do this to prevent the effective employment of enemy reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities both in and out of direct contact with friendly forces. Unified land operations achieves the best results when the enemy must cope with U.S. actions throughout its entire physical, temporal, and organizational depth.

SYNCHRONIZATION. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. It is the ability to execute multiple, related, and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each task in isolation. It is important to note that Information networks do not guarantee synchronization; however, they provide a powerful tool for leaders to use in synchronizing their efforts. Commanders determine the degree of centralized control necessary to synchronize their operations.

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Operational ArtFocus: Defining the Operational Art


Operational Art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Hypothetically, military forces might accomplish a strategic objective through a single tactical action, eliminating the need for operational art. In reality, the scale of most modern conflicts and the ability of enemy forces to retain their operational capacity—even in the face of significant tactical defeats—make this an exceptionally rare event. Creating the military conditions necessary for the termination of conflict on favorable terms almost always requires many tactical actions. The effective arrangement of military conditions in time, space, and purpose is the task of operational art.

Operational art is not associated with a specific echelon or formation, nor is it exclusive to theater and joint force commanders. Instead, it applies to any formation that must effectively arrange multiple, tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part. In an environment of major combat, a division might be given a series of missions, such as “seize this piece of terrain” or “destroy this enemy formation.” Each mission requires only a single tactical action, and the commander employs tactics to accomplish each. Operational art is how commanders balance risk and opportunity to create and maintain the conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and gain a position of relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a strategic objective. It requires commanders who understand their operational environment, the strategic objectives, and the capabilities of all elements of their force.

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Operations Process Focus: Executing the Operations Process


The operations process is a commander-centric activity, informed by the mission command approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing military operations. These activities may be sequential or simultaneous. In fact, they are rarely discrete and often involve a great deal of overlap. Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future. Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning after determining the appropriate mix based on the scope of the problem, their familiarity with it, and the time available.

(1) The Army Design Methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. While useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems, leaders integrate this methodology with the detailed planning typically associated with the military decision making process to produce executable plans.

(2) The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is an iterative planning methodology. It integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the situation and mission; develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation order or order for execution. The MDMP applies both conceptual and detailed approaches to thinking but is most closely associated with detailed planning.

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(3) Troop Leading Procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. Troop leading procedures are heavily weighted in favor of familiar problems and short time frames and typically not employed in organizations with staffs.

Preparation consists of activities that units perform to improve their ability to execute an operation. Army forces cannot train for every possible mission; they prepare for decisive action with emphasis on the most likely mix of tasks.

Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.

Assessment is continuously monitoring and evaluating the current situation and the progress of an operation.

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Operational Framework Focus: Establishing the Operational Framework


Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established framework and associated vocabulary assist greatly in this task. Any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations does not bind Army leaders, but three have proven valuable in the past. Leaders often use these conceptual frameworks in combination. For example, a commander may use the deep-close-security framework to describe the operation in time and space, the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework to articulate the operation in terms of purpose, and the main and supporting efforts framework to designate the shifting prioritization of resources. These operational frameworks apply equally to tactical actions in the area of operations.

An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Area of operations also refers to areas assigned to Army units by higher headquarters. The Army or land force commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the joint force commander for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders have the authority to designate targeting priorities and timing of fires.

An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.

Deep-Close-Security. The deep-close-security framework has historically been associated with a terrain orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well.

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Deep operations involve efforts to disrupt uncommitted enemy forces. The purpose of deep operations frequently ties to other events distant in time and space. Deep operations might aim to disrupt the movement of operational reserves or prevent the enemy from employing long-range cannon or rocket fires. In an operational environment where an enemy recruits insurgents from within a population, deep operations might focus on interfering with the recruiting process, disrupting the training of new recruits, or eliminating the underlying factors that enable the enemy to recruit.

Close operations involve efforts to have immediate effects with committed friendly forces—potentially in direct contact with enemy forces—to include enemy reserves available for immediate commitment. For example, close operations might aim to destroy an enemy force, seize a piece of terrain, disrupt an insurgent cell, or secure a local population.

Security operations involve efforts to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, provide the force with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, protect the force from surprise, and develop the situation so the commander can effectively use the force. Security operations include necessary actions to retain freedom of action and ensure uninterrupted support or sustainment of all other operations. Security operations may require the commitment of significant combat power.

The main and supporting efforts framework, more simplistic than other organizingframeworks, focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore,commanders can employ it with either the deep-close-security framework or thedecisive-shaping-sustaining framework. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, the main effort shifts one or more times during execution. Supporting efforts are designated subordinate units with missions that support the success of the main effort.

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Elements of Combat PowerFocus: Elements of combat power and the six Warfighting functions.


Elements of Combat Power include the six Warfighting functions and Leadership and Information. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions. The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint functions. They are:

Mission Command. Warfighting function develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control. This fundamental philosophy of command places people, rather than technology or systems, at the center. Under this philosophy, commanders drive the operations process through their activities of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. They develop teams, both within their own organizations and with joint, interagency, and multinational partners. Commanders inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations. The commander leads the staff’s tasks under the science of control. The four primary staff tasks are conduct the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess); conduct knowledge management and information management; conduct inform and influence activities; and conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.

Movement and Maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver.

Intelligence. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. It includes the synchronization of collection requirements with the execution of tactical tasks such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and related intelligence operations. This warfighting function includes specific intelligence and communication structures at each echelon.

Fires. The fires warfighting function is the related task and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process.

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Sustainment. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative.

Protection. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (friendly combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, host-nation, and multinational military and civilian partners.

In order for us to win on the battlefield, we must dominate in space. This learning activity displays how we are dominating in space and how it translates to dominance on the battlefield.

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NOTE TO INSTRUCTOR

This 50-minute lesson discusses the topic of identifying impacts of denied, degraded, disrupted Space

Authoritative Source: This lesson plan is required to be taught per CAC TASKORD 17-027-002

Learning Activity. IDENTIFY IMPACTS OF DENIED, DEGRADED, DISRUPTED SPACE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (D3SOE) ON ARMY OPERATIONS

SECTION II. INTRODUCTION

Method of Instruction: Structured Overview Mode of Delivery: Resident Instruction Instr Type (I:S Ratio): Civilian - ICH (1:16) Time of Instruction: 5 mins

Show Slide 15,

Slide 15: Space impacts on Army OperationsNOTE: Cover Slide

Over the next hour, we will focus on Identify impacts of Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE) on Army Operations.

In order for us to win on the battlefield, we must dominate in space. This final learning activity displays how we are dominating in space and how it translates to dominance on the battlefield.

NOTE TO INSTRUCTOR: Show Slide 16 and play video: The AF “What if?” video (2 min. 39 sec). This video depicts many of the complex issues facing the space community. It helps to illustrate what war with space looks like vs war without space…

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“What if?”NOTE:

Following the video, facilitate a discussion on the importance of winning in space and allow students to share experiences (5-10 min).

Show and summarize slides 17 and 18:

Slide 17: Space FactsNOTE:

The U.S. Army is the largest user of space capabilities. Future conflicts will be conducted in degraded, disrupted, or denied space operational environments (D3SOE).

Slide 18: Sample BCT Space Enabled Equipment – PNT/SATCOM

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NOTE: The core tactical combat element of the Army has a heavy dependence on space illustrated by a typical Brigade Combat Team having over 2500 pieces of MTOE equipment reliant on GPS and over 250 of MTOE equipment reliant on SATCOM.

Slide 19: Space Operations Requirements: COIN vs. Near Peer

NOTE:

1. What we have been facing for the past 15 years is unchallenged freedom of maneuver in space.

2. A contested operation environment degrading our space-enabled equipment is highly likely in future conflicts.

3. A worst case scenario would be a contested space environment in which we would lose the benefits of space and go back to analog technology, which means “Cold War” era technology.

The U.S. has yet to face a near peer in terms of space. During OIF/OEF the Army operated in an uncontested space operating environment. This low threat environment is reflected on the left portion of the slide by the green color, and depicts how space use was normalized and available in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the right side of the slide (red) reflects what a future conflict might entail, which is a severe degradation in our access and use of space. Many services, that are now taken for granted will either be degraded or denied.

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Additionally, other operational factors such as dispersed CPs that have to displace frequently, and less assigned HQ personnel, will all add to the operational challenge of the next battlefield.

Slide 20: Identify Capabilities of Space Enabled EquipmentNOTE:

· Identify Capabilities of Space Enabled Equipment

· Identify Space Linkages

· Identify Space threat capabilities

The United States Army is dependent on space for successful operations more so now than at any time in its history. Space systems are integral to supporting all Army Warfighting Functions (Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Sustainment, Fires, and Protection).

The Global Positioning Systems (GPS) provides precise position, navigation, and timing; as well as supports accurate targeting. Satellite communications allows for worldwide connectivity for deployed U.S. forces. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites provide a worldwide information collection capability including overflight over otherwise denied geographic areas.

Both communications and GPS provide inputs for our Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) systems, which allow commanders, staff, and operators to clearly see the battlefield. These space capabilities worked with limited enemy disruption during operations in the CENTCOM AOR over the last 15 years; however, todays adversaries have recognized our dependence on space and will likely attempt to deny, degrade, disrupt the armies access and use of space.

1. The United States Armed Forces and its allies are heavily dependent on space capabilities for operational success.

2. The U.S. reliance on space is well known to its adversaries who are continuing to develop means to counter this advantage. As time goes on the threat to U.S. Space capabilities will only grow as the adversary technical capacity increases.

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SECTION III. PRESENTATION

TLO - LSA 1. Learning Step / Activity TLO - LSA 1. Identify Capabilities of Space Enabled Equipment

Method of Instruction: Structured Overview Mode of Delivery: Resident Instruction Instr Type (I:S Ratio): Civilian - ICH (1:30)* Time of Instruction: 15 mins Media Type: Conference/Demonstration / PowerPoint Presentation Other Media: Unassigned Security Classification: This course/lesson will present information that has a Security Classification of: U - Unclassified. Note: Marked as (*) is derived from the parent learning object

We will now discuss three of the key mission capabilities, which Space provides.

Show Slide 21

Slide 21: Position, Navigation, Timing (GPS)NOTE:

The GPS (Global Positioning System) provides military and civilian users with Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). GPS has become a critical capability for our civilian economy (air travel, ground transportation, banking, etc.), as well as for military operations. The Position and Navigation function is what is mostly frequently considered for GPS. However, the timing aspect is critically important for synchronizing communications, and other important functions. Disruption of GPS, mostly by deliberate enemy jamming, could have a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment.

Show the video: GPS Warfighter (5 min. 30 sec.)

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The following five minute video will provide more information on GPS--- the key points to understand in this video have to do with threats to GPS, and the importance of encryption of the GPS receiver.

This GPS/PNT demo video will highlight many of the points discussed on the previous slide. The key point to focus on when watching this video is the importance of using an encrypted military receiver.

Slide 22: GPS Warfighter VideoNOTE:

1. GPS is critical to civilian and military operations.

2. The GPS satellite constellation is positioned to provide worldwide support to the warfighter.

3. The GPS signal is very weak, and susceptible to enemy jamming and other electromagnetic interference.

4. 4 satellites in view are required to receive a GPS ground fix (3 for trilateration and the 4th for timing)

5. Generally 8-11 satellites are in view at any given time

Following the video, facilitate a discussion on the importance of winning in space and allow students to share experiences (5-10 min).

Commercial GPS receivers only receive one portion of the GPS signal and are easily negated by adversary jamming. Encrypted military receivers (e.g. DAGR) acquire the complete (two frequencies and codes) GPS signal. If a military receiver has not been encrypted it functions just as a commercial receiver. The encrypted military receiver is much more jam resistant.

Transition to: GPS Mitigation slide. So what can you do about loss or disruption of

your GPS?

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GPS Mitigation TTPsNOTE:

1. The GPS signal is very weak and vulnerable to enemy jamming.

2. Civilian GPS receivers will cease to work in a degraded environment.

3. Encrypted military GPS receivers (e.g. DAGR) are much more jam resistant than a commercial, or non-encrypted military receiver.

Encrypt your military GPS receiver in order to receive 2 GPS signals and become more jam resistant– this is very important.

Once encrypted, the DAGR (Defense Advanced GPS Receiver) will notify the user if a jamming signal is detected with a pop-up (JAMMING DETECTED).

An adversary jammer generally has to have line of sight to your receiver to be effective (however, some of the jamming signal may slightly curve around an obstacle).

You can use terrain, buildings, and even your body in order to block most of the jamming effect.

Show Slide 24

Slide 24: Satellite Communications (SATCOM)NOTE:

1. Be prepared to operate in a GPS jammed environment

2. Key your military receiver (DAGR)!

3. Know basic techniques to block the jamming signal

4. Maintain traditional navigation skills

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Satellite communications (SATCOM) are critically important to the U.S. Army. SATCOM provides key connectivity for all Warfighting Functions--providing both voice and data communications.

SATCOM allows Army and Joint Commands located at garrison locations in CONUS to be able to communicate with deployed forces anywhere in the world. In simple terms a

Communications satellite is a relay station roughly 22,300 miles in space, which has a field of view of 1/3 of the Earth’s surface. The signal is sent from the ground to the satellite, and then rebroadcast to the distant recipient.

The top portion of the slide reflects military and commercial satellites which support the army. In today’s contested operational environment, the receiver antenna on the satellites may be vulnerable to enemy jamming (uplink), and the user equipment on the ground is also subject to enemy line of sight (downlink) jamming.

Show Slide 25

Slide 25: Typical BCT Linkage to SATCOMNOTE:

1. Satellite Communications enable timely Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications of Voice, Data, and C2 across all echelons of the formation.

2. Space capable adversaries will seek to interrupt satellite communications using various jamming techniques.

The top of the slide depicts communications satellites on orbit. These satellites are roughly 22300 miles in space, generally in line with the equator (to provide coverage of both the north and south hemisphere), and move at the same speed as the earth’s rotation- thus they appear to be stationary to the user on the ground.

The satellites depicted are a combination of military satellites- referred to as MILSATCOM, and commercially leased satellites. It is DoD Space Policy that the Army will use both commercial and military systems to provide communications.

The lines shown represent the uplink (from the ground terminal) to the satellite, and the downlink to the user. The signal from the user terminal must be transmitted on the

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correct frequency to the right satellite (traveling 22300 miles out in space), and then be re-transmitted from the satellite to the recipient on the ground.

This chart provides examples of the type of satellite communications equipment that supports a typical Stryker Brigade Combat team -- supporting all Warfighting Functions, for example:

-FBCB2 (now Joint Battle Command - Platform) provides key communications and force tracking in support of Mission Command and Movement and Maneuver.

- The Movement Tracking System (MTS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) are important communications and logistics tracking capabilities to support Sustainment.

- The Trojan Spirit, Prophet, and Global Broadcast System (GBS) provide key linkages for S2 operations.

-The TSC-167 provides important SATCOM support at the BN and BDE level for Mission Command and Movement and Maneuver.

Show Slide 26

Slide 26: SATCOM MitigationNOTE:

These systems are critical for mission accomplishment. If the BCT loses access to these capabilities, we will revert to an analog, line of sight (LOS), operational environment.

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Show Slide 27

Slide 27: SATCOM MitigationNOTE:

1. Space based ISR is very important to the U.S. military.

2. For the average soldier, commercial imagery is the easiest ISR capability to access, and the most relevant for operations.

Top portion (3 bullets): ISR satellites helps us gather information about the enemy and operational environment. This information allows us to monitor what the enemy is doing.

Much of the information collected is done by U.S. Government owned and operated satellites. However, commercial companies contribute to Space ISR collection, primarily by providing a variety of imagery related products.

The image scenes on the right side of this slide were collected by commercial imagery satellites. The key individual in your staff for accessing and exploiting ISR satellite data is your unit S2.

Bottom portion of slide (4 bullets): One of the great benefits of satellites is that they can access the entire globe, thus ISR can be collected in areas that would otherwise be denied to aircraft, UAS, or other types of information collection.

Additionally, these ISR satellites can detect a variety of signatures on the battlefield which help us determine enemy technical capabilities. One of the great benefits (3rd bullet) that commercial satellites provide is the image is not classified.

It can be easily shared within the organization, as well as with coalition partners. Finally, satellite ISR contributes to the S2’s efforts to have a complete and detailed picture of the enemy and environment.

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Show Slide 28

Slide 28: Limitations of Space CapabilitiesNOTE:

There are various limitations to space capabilities, but the most prevalent four are displayed here. Objects in space do not simply “float” as seen in most Hollywood movies. Objects in space are subjected to the laws of physics and are constantly in motion around the Earth. How often a satellite revisits the same place on the Earth is a factor of many different things and dictated by physics, its altitude, and its operational mission.

The second limitation is terrestrial weather. Imagery satellites collect information in the same fashion a camera does. Light, clouds, sand storms, etc. can all prevent or degrade the ability of a satellite from doing its mission. Certain types of satellite communications can also be degraded by rain, sleet, or snow. If you subscribe to most types of satellite TV you might have experienced signal disruption in a heavy rain storm as an example.

The third limitation is from the harmful results of the solar environment. The sun and atmosphere can negatively affect lower frequency SATCOM signals. GPS signals reside in this band and are impacted by solar weather.

The fourth and most dangerous limitation is that of enemy actions designed to deny, degrade, or disrupt friendly force access to space.

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Show slide 29; Check on Learning:

Slide 29: Check on LearningNOTE:

Question 1. What is the most critical thing you can do to help mitigate the impacts of an enemy jammer?

Answer 1: Key or encrypt your receiver.

Question 2. Why do adversaries invest in GPS jamming?

Answer 2: Our reliance on GPS, it’s cheap and easy, and it’s weak signal.

TLO - LSA 2. Learning Step / Activity TLO - LSA 2. Identify Space Linkages


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Show Slide 30

Slide 30: Check on LearningNOTE:

LSA 2 Transition Slide

NOTE:

What does space provide? Emphasize again that Space is linked to all army

Warfighting functions, and the following three slides will highlight a typical squad’s

space dependencies.

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Transition to: Satellite and Space Statistics.

LSA 2 Transition Slide

NOTE:

Suggested Narrative:

In order to gain some perspective on the linkages of space-enabled equipment, let’s look at a few statics on satellites in space.

Globally, there are approximately 1,400 satellites that operate in a variety of orbits from about 100 miles above the Earth to over 22,300 miles out in space.

Many of these satellites have multiple packages/sensors onboard, which allow them to do a variety of different missions. Over 60% of operational satellites provide satellite communications all over the world (i.e. voice, internet, TV, etc.) Also in space is a large number of defunct satellites, rocket bodies, and other pieces of space debris which unfortunately remain in orbit.

There are over 21,000 pieces of debris that we can track and continuously track in order to help notify and prevent additional debris being caused if they collide with each other or any of the 1,400 operational satellites.

There are approximately 115 satellites an Infantry squad is enabled by. We’ll see a breakdown of those 115 satellites on the next slide, but also note that a Soldier has thepotential of carrying 2 or more satellite receivers as part of his individual gear. This gear can consist of a GPS receiver, Search And Rescue (SAR) transmitter, and/or a SATCOM capability.

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TLO - LSA 3. Learning Step / Activity TLO - LSA 3. Identify Space threat capabilities


Show Slide 33

NOTE:

This slide reflects the space linkages for an infantry squad. There are a large number of communication and navigation satellites that can potentially support the Soldier on the ground. However, not all of these satellites are used by the squad at the same time. For instance, the slide reflects 66 Iridium satellites– but only one or two of these 66 satellites may be necessary at any one time to support the actual voice transmission. Likewise, only four GPS satellites (out of 31) are necessary for a GPS position fix, and only one imagery satellite is necessary for a picture. However, the bottom line is that even our lowest tactical formation uses a lot of space systems for a variety of purposes. Iridium is a commercial communications satellite constellation. 66 satellites provide global coverage for their customers. Even though the uplink call might be with 1 satellite, multiple satellites are used to link the call from one location to other location on the ground.

Transition to: Any Adversary Can Be Space-Capable.

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Show Slide 34, Instructor Notes:

NOTE:


NOTE:

Suggested Narrative: Any adversary can be space capable because commercially available space can be easily purchased. For instance, communications bandwidth is easily leased. The civilian GPS signal is broadcast to anyone in the possession of a GPS receiver. Space based imagery is available for purchase on the internet. Thus, any adversary can obtain satellite communications, navigation, and imagery.

Transition to: Threats to Space Operations.

Key Slide Takeaways:

1. Use of space is not just inclusive to space capable nations.

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2. While Near Peer adversaries have robust space programs, many smaller countries have easy access to satellite information and can obtain products that are commercially available for purchase.

Key Terms: Satellite Imaging: There are many commercial companies that acquire and disseminate satellite imagery in addition to nations that have their own satellites imagery capabilities for intelligence gathering. Global Communications: Provides voice and video calling, internet, fax, television, and radio channels communication capabilities. This can span long distances, and can operate under circumstances or conditions which are impractical for other forms of communication. Global Weather: Monitors the state of the atmosphere, and the estimated impact on the ground. Conducts current and future analysis of temperature, visibility, wind speed, humidity, etc. Prediction analysis is also important to aid planners in conducting operations Foreign Collection: Information collected and exploited from satellite capabilities owned by foreign governments.


NOTE:

Suggested Narrative: There are many threat “types” that can limit the U.S. Military's full and unrestricted access to space capabilities, services, and products. The main concern for Army tactical units are denoted with a star.

Enemy Threats, Factors: (from upper left to right) include: Anti Satellite Missile (ASAT) – launch from the ground, or air, to space to destroy a satellite in orbit. Ground station attack – physical attack against terrestrial satellite control facility,

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which could impact satellite Command and Control (C2). SATCOM and GPS jamming are the greatest threat to Army ground formations, as these threats directly impact the tactical Army’s ability to communicate beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), navigate, receive critical timing data, and employ precision munitions. CYBER and laser threats can impact space operations, but response and Counter-measures to these threats are executed at higher levels.

Non-Enemy Factors to space systems are primarily related to natural or manmade interference. These include:

Unintentional electromagnetic interference (EMI) caused by friendly or neutral forces operating on the same frequency band, thus inadvertently disrupting operations. Space debris can cause damage to satellites on orbit. Solar (space) weather can potentially temporarily disrupt certain types of SATCOM and GPS.

Terrestrial weather threats that could degrade U.S. satellite capabilities may include heavy rains for certain types of SATCOM, or high winds which would cause SATCOM dishes to be retracted/stored or destroyed.

Terrain and Vegetation refer to natural or man-made terrain (such as buildings/complex terrain/urban canyons/etc.) as well as jungle canopy and it’s effects on GPS and/or SATCOM.

Transition to: D3SOE Issues in the Ukraine.

Relevant background: D3SOE is a condition within the area of operations and area of interest characterized by intentional and unintentional interference on the ability of both friendly and adversary military forces to exploit space capabilities, services, and products. Consequences of this condition require U.S. military forces to employ both defensive and offensive measures to protect our unrestricted access to space while denying the same to the enemy.

Show Slide 37

NOTE:

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Suggested Narrative: Recent Russian military operations, such as their incursion into the Ukraine, have demonstrated what impact a technically sophisticated adversary can have on the battlefield. If the U.S. Army was to face such a threat, we would need to be prepared to execute operations in a Denied, Degraded, or Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE). The application of the basic SATCOM and PNT mitigation techniques discussed in earlier slides will be necessary if we are to have success against a high-tech threat. (comments on each bullet):

1. Russians demonstrated a capability to attack the “electromagnetic spectrum” and especially jam the use of GPS.

2. They intercepted and disrupted friendly communications, located the friendly force, and subsequently targeted within minutes.

3. The Russians effectively employed UAS for both collection and targeting.

4. All potential adversaries the U.S. Army faces in a future fight– will likely employ UAS against us, some UAS will be technically simple and easy to employ.

5. CYBER attacks, and disruption of networks, are a common practice employed by the Russians.

6. There is a rapid growth in the number of imagery satellites which makes even rear areas of the battlefield susceptible to collection and targeting.

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NOTE:

Key Slide Takeaways

1. A peer or near peer adversary can be expected to attack with the purpose to deny, degrade, and disrupt U.S. space advantages.

2. The most recent example of what to expect in a near peer conflict was illustrated in recent years during the Ukrainian Conflict.

3. PNT/GPS will be manipulated or interrupted by a peer or near peer.

4. Communication signals will be vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare, and/or signals collection. Key Term:

Jamming: Frequency jamming is the disruption of radio signals through use of an over-powered signal in the same frequency range. When most people think of frequency jamming, what comes to mind are radio, radar and cell phone jamming.

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NOTE:

Instructor Notes: This slide should be used to summarize the key learning objectives from this lesson. We depend on satellites, and the ground terminal equipment that links to these satellites, to support army operations. In a Denied, Degraded, Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE)– our Army tactical operations may be severely disrupted. We must train for and be prepared to operate in a D3SOE.

Suggested Narrative:

As our reliance on space and the support we receive through that medium is contested – or jammed – ALL WfF are affected.

- We see an INCREASE in (implied by Red arrow pointing up):- The possibility of Collateral Damage (which could include civilian causalities),

and Fratricide (friendly force inflicted) as high precision munitions (EXCALIBUR, JDAM) become less reliable, and we have a less clear picture (poor and less accurate Common Operating Picture (COP) of the battle space.

- Ammo Expenditure increases as “dumb rounds” must replace precision rounds (which means transportation and associated fuel requirements rise substantially)

- Paper maps must be obtained in sufficient quantities to meet tactical force requirements.

- Your unit must be prepared to revert to “Analog” methods. This means manually (map, acetate, unit symbols, phase lines, check points, etc.) tracking the battle. Increased communication limitations with dispersed elements around the battlefield. Additionally, all units must be prepared to conduct manual land navigation (thus the need for maps, and compass).

: At the same time – our loss of access to space capabilities will impact (Red arrow down):

- Operational tempo (OPTEMPO) will slow, and situational awareness will decrease. This will be a normal result of having to operate in an “Analog” fashion. Units will experience disrupted communications, get disoriented, cross unit boundaries, and have decreased clarity of the battlefield.

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- If we lose SATCOM and tracking we will lose the ability to provide effective sustainment. Logistics planners may need to estimate and “push” supplies instead of a more efficient and effective “pull” system (which requires good communications and PNT).

- Fires lethality decreases as dumb rounds replace precision fires. Additionally, collateral damage, civilian losses, and friendly force fratricide all go up – as described earlier when discussion the “Red Up” arrows.

- ISR collection goes down, as both our ability to collect on the enemy (ISR satellites), as well as intelligence dissemination (SATCOM) decreases. Our overall ability to see deep into enemy territory becomes limited.

Key Slide Takeaways:

1. Operations in a Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE) increases hazards to friendly forces and endangers friendly force objectives.

2. For planning purposes operations in a D3SOE environment must take into consideration the potential for an increase in civilian casualties, fratricide, collateral damage, ammunition expenditure, and decreases in operational tempo and situational awareness.

Slide 40: Learning Objective

d. Develop (15 min): This phase is student-centered and instructor facilitated.

NOTE: Instructors now initiate a student discussion of how material in the lesson plan will be used in their future assignments. Although instructors can guide students in the discussion, the answers ultimately belong to the students. Instructors should leverage their own experiences and ask pertinent questions pertaining to the information presented. Potential questions may include:

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The concrete exercise should have identified many of the primary or related topics brought up in the lesson. Has this lesson helped them see linkages between all the topics?

Could you teach/train your subordinates how HR supports Unified Land Operations and what the HR professional role is?

Did this lesson increase your knowledge of the Role of Unified Land Operations in support of national security objectives?

Some Unified Land Operation concepts/actions are conducted sequentially while others are simply related and may occur before, after, or at the same time as others. Do students see how the relationships between different events?

e. Assessment Plan: See Appendix A.

BREAK. Providing the training schedule provides and available time permits this is a good point to provide the students a short break before transitioning to the Apply Phase Practical Exercise.

f. Apply (120 minutes). Administer Unified Land Operations Information Briefing Practical Exercise.

Slide 41: Learning ObjectiveFocus: Review learning objective, summarize lesson, poll for questions and transition to Develop Phase.

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