Analysis of Sieges of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh

7/29/2019 Analysis of Sieges of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh

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AIR COMMANDANDSTAFF COLLEGE

S~STUDENT REPORTSA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OFS~THE SIEGES OF

DIEN BIEN PHU AND KHE SANHkMAJOR ROGER L. PURCELL 86-2060S-~"'insightsnto tomorrow"-

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DISCLAIMERThe views and conclusions expressed in thisdocument are those of the author. They arenot intended and should not be thought torepresent official ideas, attitudes, orpolicies of any agency of th e United StatesGovernment. The author has not had specialaccess to official information or ideas andhas employed only open-source materialavailable to any writer on this subject.This document is th e property of the UnitedStates Government. It is available fordistribution to th e general public. A loancopy of the document may be obtained from theAir University Interlibrary Loan Service(AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112) or theDefense Technical Information Center. Requestmust include the author's name and completetitle of th e study.This document may be reproduced for use inother research reports or educational pursuitscontingent upon the following stipulations:

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2060TITLE A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF TH E SIEGES OFDIEN BIEN PHU AND KHE SANHAUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROGER L. PURCELL, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR JAMES T. WEBB, ACSC/EDCM

SPONSOR MAJOR THOMAS L. THOMPSON, ACSC/EDCJ

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112


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CLASSIVICATION OF TIIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE1* REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGSUNCLASSIFIED":1 Sf C ,AIITY CLASSIFICATION .UTHORITY 3 OISTRIRUT:ONJAVAILABILITY OF R Ppo r

2b OECLASSIFICATION/OOWNGRAOING SCHEOULE STATMET "AApproved for public release:4 PERORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMSER(S) S. MONITORIN tnfi%.T NUMBER(S)86-206060 NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 5b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7I NAME OF PIONITORING ORGANIZATION

(I.appilcable)

ACSC/EDCC6c. A00RESS (Cilty. tatef and ZIP Code) 7b. ADORESS (City. State and ZIP Code)

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542Go. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING Ab. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

ORGANIZATIONI (it appl cable)

lk ADDRESS ICty. State and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNOING NOS.PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT

ELEMENT NO. NO. NO NO

1 TI TLE Include Securaty ClaaificOtion)A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF TH E12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)Purcell , Roger L., Major, USAF13m. TYPE OF REPORT 113. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF R E P O R T 1YV. %fo..Day) 116. PAGE CO U N T1bROM TO 1986 April 2816 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

ITEM 11: SIEGES OF DIEN BIEN PHU AND KHE SANHi COSA F CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS I(,,fllnu, un rvipewro itf nlacesarv ona Identify by block number)SIE0I.D *ROuP SUB. GA.

19. ARISTRACT I OnIJD On .vvojf f neceuesry and identify by block nu'nb.,j>This paper includes a description and analysis of the sieges of Dien BienPhu and Khe Sanh. It begins with a summary of General Vo Nguyen Giap.General Giap was the Vietminh commander at Dien Bien Phu and th e NorthVietnamese commander at Khe Sanh. Chapter Three explains why the siegeof Dien Bien Phu took place. Chapter Four describes the siege and givesreasons fo r the French failure. Chapters Five and Six follow the sameformat in showing why the United States was successful at Khe Sanh.The final uhapter consists of recommendations from lessons learned fromboth sieges.

,TIItIU I"QN/Av ,,LA6ILI1 y OF ABST'RACT ' 21 ABSTRACI SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONF-. SAME AS RPT 9;OTC USERS 0 UNCLASSIFIED

22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INO:VIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE NUMBER 22c OFFICE SYMBOL(Inclu`d7 Ara Code IACSC/EDCC Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542 (205) 293-2483

FORM 1473,83 APR EDITIONOF I JAN73 ISOeSOLETE. UNCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGF


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ABOUT THE AUTHORMajor Purce]I is a 1970 graduate of The Ohio State University.

He received his commission as a distinguished graduate throughthe Reserve Officer Training Corps. In 1976 he earned a Master'sDegree in Business Administration from The University of WestFlorida. Major Purcell has spent most of his career in TacticalAir Command. He served as a Weapon Systems Officer in th e F-4at MacDill AFB, Udorn RTAFB, and Eglin AFB. During his yearat Udorn RTAFB, he accumulated over 350 hours of combat time.In 1978 he graduated first in his pilot training class at ColumbusAFB. Major Purcell has flown the A-7 and F-16 since earning hispilot's wings. His last assignment was as a Senior OperationsDuty Officer, 314th Air Division, Osan AB, Korea.

Accesion Fo r

"TIS CRA&ICDTIC TABtUannoij:-d r-7 Jusbctificbo ..........,": ' .. ................ ... .


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TABLE OF CONTENTSAbout the Author................................................... iiiCHAPTER ONE--INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1CHAPTER TWO--VO NGUYEN GIAP ............................................ 2CHAPTER THREE--WHY DIEN BIEN PHU? .......................................... 4CHAPTER FOUR--THE SIEGE OF DIEN BIEN PHU ................................... 7

The First Phase .......................................................... 7The Second Phase ............................. ........................... 8The Third Phase .......................................................... 9The Fourth Phase ......................................................... 10Reasons for Failure ...................................................... 10

CHAPTER FIVE--WHY KHE SANH? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13CHAPTER SIX--THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH ......................................... 15Niagara .................................................................. 16

Airlift .................................................................. 16Pegasus .................................................................. 17United States' Public Reaction .......................................... 17Reasons for Success ...................................................... 18

CHAPTER SEVEN--RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 20BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................... 22

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTIONThere have been many sieges that have lasted longer thanthose at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh. The Germans held Stalingradfo r 76 days and the British held Tobruk for 241 days. The long-est siege of World War II took place at Lorient in France wherethe Germans were under siege for 270 days. Many sieges haveinvolved larger numbers of troops on both sides. At Stalingradover 1,000,000 Soviet troops encircled 300,000 German troops.(3:ii) The sieges at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh involved onlya fraction of these numbers. At Dien Bien Phu 13,000 French

troops were encircled by 50,000 Vietminh, while at Khe Sanh6,000 United States ' troops defended against 30,000 North Viet-namese. (3:vii; 12:265) Numbers alone, however, do not signifythe impact these two sieges have had on th e history of Vietnamsince 1953.

The defeat of th e French at Dien Bien Phu marked the endof French influence in th e region. It is highly probable th eUnited States would have been faced with much th e same situationas th e French after the fall of Dien Bien Phu if th e North Viet-namese had been successful at Khe Sanh. The American peoplewould have demanded, as th e French people had in 1953, an endto the conflict. The purpose of this paper is to analyze thesetwo sieges in an attempt to see why the French failed and th eUnited States was successful and to make recommendations con-cerning future sieges.

The starting point in this analysis will be a descript ionof General Vo Nguyen Giap. General Giap is important becausehe was th e Vietminh commander at Dien Bien Phu and th e NorthVietnamese commander at Khe Sanh. (23:18) Chapter Three willconsist of an explanation of why the siege of Dien Bien Phutook place. Chapter Four will describe the siege and give rea-sons fo r the French failure, Chapters Five and Six follow thesame format in showing why th e United States was successfulat Khe Sanh. The final chapter consists of recommendationsfrom lessons learned from both sieges.


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Chapter Tw o

VO NGUYEN GIAPThe purpose of this section is to gain an insight into

the man who was th e opposit ion commander of th e French at DienBien Phu and th e United States at Khe Sanh. Vo Nguyen Giapwas a general , schooled in formal military tactics and par-ticularly guerrilla warfare. It is impossible to dissociateVietnamese Communism from him. For over 30 years he was tn efaithful follower of Ho Chi Minh. If. Ho Chi Minh gave the move-ment its ideology, Giap gave it the military apparatus to makethe Vietnam People 's Army th e strongest native military forcein Southeast Asia. (9:x-xxix) An understanding of th e man,Giap, is essential to any study of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh.

Giap was born in 1912 in the village of An-Xa in QuangBinh Province, one of Vietnam's poorest areas, located justnorth of th e dividing line between North an d South Vietnam.His father was a scholar and a member of a revolutionary na-tionalist group that had participated in anti-French activities.His hate of th e French was transferred to his son. (9:xxix)

Even though he hated th e French, Giap did not initiallytrain as a professional soldier b u t studied law at the Uni-versity of Hanoi and taught history to support his educat ion.It was while attending th e Universi ty of Hanoi that Giap joinedthe Indo-Chinese Communist Party. He became a confirmed Marxistand Vietnamese nationalist. (9:xxx)

Because of this Giap was forced to take refuge in Chinaduring World War II. When he returned from China, Giap wasrecognized as one of the best organizers in th e Vietnamese Com-munist Movement. (9:xxxiii) This reputation resulted in hisbeing chosen by Ho Chi Minh to organize th e communist militaryforce inside Vietnam. The August Revolution of 1945 was th efirst major success of Giap's forces a n d th e initial test ofth e tactics Giap had learned under Mao Tse-Tung while in China.(7:9) He later described these tactics in an article publishedin Rangoon on 14 April 1950:

Mobile warfare is characterized by big concentra t ionsof t roops of th e central units, supported by localmilitary formation and m ili tiam en, who agree on

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uniting their force fo r one fixed battle. After whichthey should disperse immediately in order to avoidbeing followed by the enemy. The victorious outcomeof the battle must in most cases be guaranteed before-hand. With the adoption of mobile tactics, the needfor close cooperation between the troops and thecivil ians is now more transparent than ever before.The people must give a helpful hand to the troopsin the repair of roads and in the transport of foodand eventually of war booties. In order to save timeand labor and to avoid superfluous transport of sup-plies, the people are also asked to build up localreservoirs of padi and cereals and, as a prerequisiteto this, to take part in the nationwide grow morefood campaign. The people can help the Army in otheractivities, too, such as intelligence and l iaison,and with m ilitia units which are formed by civiliansoccasionally fighting alongside the Regular Army.The phrase 'people's war' assumes its full meaningwith this picture now being drawn in Vietnam bothby the Army and the ordinary citizen of the DemocraticRepublic. The first battle fought along th e linesof mobile warfare has been crowned with complete success.Undoubtedly the days to come will record more resoundingvictories which will lead to the final triumph ofthe forces of freedom over colonialism and servitude.(15:356)

The tactics described in this article, having been proven duringth e August Revolution of 1945, became th e cornerstone of strategyand tactics used by th e North Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu andKhe Sann.

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Chapter Three

WHY DIEN BIEN PHU?To fully understand why th e Batt le of Dien Bien Phu took

place, you must have an understanding of th e events leadingup to th e battle. At th e end of 1949 th e war was purely a guer-rilla war. The Vietminh forces were scattered indiscriminatelyover a thousand miles and lacked a main striking force. (15:364)The Chinese Communist arrival on the Kerangsi border in late1949 provided th e Vietminh with outside bases and a source ofsupply. This enabled them to establish th e Vietnam People'sArmy (VPA). The hear t of th e VP A was th e Main Battle Force,which was organized for conventional operations and consistedof five large divisions. These divisions were weak in fire-power and poorly t rained. (24:1)

The French at this time were concentrated in th e Red RiverDelta around Hanoi. The Vietminh controlled everything to th enorth of Hanoi except a series of French posts guarding th eTonghing-China border. The first use of th e Main Battle Forcewas to attack these forts. Giap was successful in completelyrouting th e French forces. (15:365) This success spurred Giapto undertake an attack of Hanoi in January 1951, but his forceswere no match for th e French firepower. In th e next four monthsGiap attacked Hanoi two more t imes with the same results--devasta-tion of his forces. (9:xxxvii) Both sides developed strategiesbased upon th e lessons learned from Giap's attacks of Hanoi.

The French victory had an unfor tunate result. It le d Frenchofficers to believe they could heat th e Vietminh in a set piecebattle anywhere. This philosophy became so pronounced thatth e dominant French strategical theme was centered around drawingthe Vietminh into such a battle. (15:365) Giap, however, recog-nized that his lightly equipped and semi-trained divisions wereno match fo r French firepower. He, therefore, reverted to guer-rilla warfare, employing irregular forces against enemy strengthand his Main Battle Forces against enemy weakness. He wouldcommit h is forces only where there was a high assurance ofsuccess. (24:3) In th e summer of 1953 each adversary developedbattle plans based upon their respective strategies.

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Giap's plan provided fo r operations to cause th e Frenchto disperse their forces so that (1) th e Main Battle Forcemight isolate and destroy a major French force, and (2) theDelta might be so weakened that it could be taken. (24:4) TheFrench commander at this time was General Henry Navarre. (6:30)

When General Navarre took command of th e French forcesin the Far East on 28 May 1953, he found a situation that couldbest be described as a stalemate. (6:30) At that time GeneralNavarre estimated that he was facing a force of 125,000 troopsorganized into 6 divisions, 6 independent regiments, and a fewbattalions. (11:195) His forces consisted of 178,000 of which30,000 were locally enlisted Vietnamese serving with the French.In addit ion, he inherited a nationalistic Vietnamese Army of200,000 t roops. (5:128) His initial estimate was that h is forcescould break the organized body of Communist aggression by th eend of 1955, (6:31) His program to accomplish this was calledthe Navarre Plan.

The Navarre Plan entailed a shift from defensive to offen-sive operations. According to Colonel Revol, General Navarre'sChief of Cab inet, the Navarre Plan was to endow th e French battlecorps "with a mobil i ty and an aggressiveness which it lacks."(6:31) There would be increased guerrilla warfare against theVietminh. To accomplish this several Groupes Commandos Mixtes,or Mixed Native Commando Groups, made up of French trained Thaitribesmen and French cadres, began to operate behind enemy l ines.(6:33) Initially, these forces were used to put pressure uponthe enemy's rear areas using methods similar to the Communistguerri l las. They were too weak to influence the outcome of anymajor operations but did prove valuable fo r long range recon-naissance. It became clear to the French that the two mainobjectives of th e Navarre Plan, destruction of the enemy's mainbattle force and the l iquidation of the guerrilla threat behindFrench lines, could not be accomplished without a change ofstrategy. (6:33) As a result, operation Seagull was launchedon 14 October 1953 in an attempt to lure Giap's Main BattleForces iiLto combat. (4:90)

Under th e personal supervision of General Navarre theoffensive was launched into enemy held territory in the deltaregion south of Hanoi. Six Groupes Mobiles, reinforced bytank and amphibious battalions, and two French Marine unitsused a pincer movement to encircle the VPA's 320th InfantryDivision. Contrary to the French hopes, General Giap did notlet himself be goaded to commit the mass of his Main BattleForce to save the division. The French won the battle bu t failedin their primary obiective. Having failed to force Giap to fighton terrain not of his ow n choosing, all that remained was for

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General Navarre to seek out the enemy in h is own area. (6:34)A message received on 28 November 1953 brought about a decisionas to this area. (11:206)

The message contained informa tion concerning a large move-ment of supplies and t roops by th e Vietminh enroute toward Laos.Laos had gained increased importance with its signing of th eMutual Defense Treaty with France in October of 1953. To inter-dict th e flow of supplies and t roops, General Navarre choseDien Bien Phu as a base of operat ions . Dien Bien Phu had certainstrategic advantages. First, a strong French base would restrictVietminh movement into Northern Laos. (4:111) Second, it couldserve as a strong base for commando raids behind Vietminh lines.(15:367) Third, it could strangle supply flows from China.(4:111) Finally, it might draw Giap's units from th e Red RiverDelta. (15:367)

On 20 November 1953 the French initiated Operation Castor,the airborne assault and seizure of Dien Bien Phu. (4:1) Giapreacted with the dispatch of four divisions to counter theFrench. (24:6) This sets th e stage fo r th e siege of Dien BienPhu.

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Chapter Four

TH E SIEGE OF DIEN BIEN PHUA small number of French t roops were already garrisonedat Dien Bien Phu. These troops were reinforced by an airborneoperation, Castor, beginning on 20 November 1953. (4:1) TheFrench troops were dispersed in five camps in th e valley aroundDien Bien Phu: (1) Isabelle, (2) Gabrie l le , (3) Beatrice,

(4) Hugerette , and (5) Claudine. (19:159-161) We now come tothe siege and fall of Dien Bien Phu. This will be divided intofour phases: (1) th e initial attack on th e 13th of March,(2) the second main attack on th e 30th of March, (3) th e periodof encroachment, and (4) th e final attack.

TH E FIRST PHASEConcerning th e first phase, th e 308th Division of theVietnam People 's Army (VPA) was returning to Dien Bien Phu from

Laos during th e first week of March. As th e division advancedthe troops dug in. On th e llth there was an engagement betweenthe defenders and two Vietminh units that had penetrated th eouter perimeter cf French defenses. The French were successfulin repulsing this attack. Later that day, French aircraftdropped napalm on Vietminh gun emplacements. It quickly becameapparent to th e French that th e Vietminh had a surprisinglylarge number of 37mm anti-aircraft guns and field guns. Recon-naissance flights confirmed a large volume of supplies cominginto th e area from th e Chinese border. Th e 12th was a relativelyquiet day with action confined to shelling by both sides. (19:165)On th e 13th th e Vietminh launched th e initial attack. Massinfantry attacks under the cover of intense artillery movedagainst Gabrielle and Beatrice. At th e same time, there wereharassing attacks against th e other French positions to keepthem out of the main battle. (18:22)

The Vietminh were successful in accomplishing this. Thefighting around Beatrice was particularly fierce. The Vietminhattacked this posi t ion five separate t imes arid by 10 o'clockhad overrun the outer defenses of th e posit ion. The fifthattack was launched from these defeated areas, and th e Vietminh

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succeeded in completely overrunning the French. (3:134-141)The French defenders at Gabrielle did not fair much better.(19:165)

The first attack on Gabrielle was repulsed after whichth e Vietminh fell back and regrouped. Sporadic fighting onth e remainder of th e 13th and the day of th e 14th followed.On the evening of the 14th, heavy artillery fire initiated thesecond main assault of Gabriel le. Desparate fighting tookplace th e entire night. The Vietminh succeeded in taking someFrench positions b u t failed in achieving a complete victory.(3:142-147) A French counterat tack was launched on th e 15th.(3:150)

The mission of the counterattack was to reinforce Gabrielle,but the French found it so badly battered that it was abandoned.As the French retreated, th e Vietminh moved into Gabriel le.While th e Vietminh consolidated their gains, artillery continuedto fire from th e hills around Dien Bien Phu on th e other Frenchpositions. (3:151-152)

French aircraft attacked th e artillery positions bu t hadlittle success and sustained heavy losses. These losses werelargely due to the unforeseen presence of so many anti-aircraftguns. Twelve French aircraft were destroyed between the Ilthand 15th of March alone. The 15th marks th e end of the firstphase. (19:166)

During the first phase Beatrice and Gabrielle fell to theVietminh. The Vietminh had closed in around the French towithin a mile of the current French posit ions. Even with theselosses the French were still generally optimistic. (3:160)They felt th e Vietminh frontal attacks had resulted in heavylosses. The opinion was General Giap would think twice beforeinitiating another such attack. (19:167)

THE SECOND PHASEAt first, it seemed the French assessment had been accurate.While the Vietminh regrouped to the north and east, anotherFrench paratrooper battalion was dropped into Dien Bien Phu.No major enemy attacks took place, but the Vietminh were busyin other ways. Shelling of the airfield became so intense thatth e French had to stop using it, and as a result all suppliesand troops had to be dropped in. (18:22) The Vietminh were

slowly, but steadily, moving toward the French positions bydigging trenches. (18:23) By late March the Vietminh had beensuccessful in all but closing the runway and moving to positionswithin a half mile of the French in many locations. The Frenchwere also busy. (16:52-53)

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would allow the reopening of the runway, but this did not occur.It became evident the French prospects were not good. At thistime General Giap was considering two alternative courses ofaction. (19:174)The first called for a continuation of his "nibbling" tac-

tics, while the other was to launch another mass attack. Hechose the latter, and the fourth phase is the final Vietminhattack on the French. (19:174)

THE FOURTH PHASEThe fourth phase began on th e 1st of May with the Vietminhattacking in mass. The usual artillery barrage did not takeplace because the Vietminh were so close to the French. Much

of the fighting was done with bayonet and hand grenades. Inspite of French counterattacks, th e Vietminh were successfulin overrunning part of the forward defense of Isabelle. (19:175)During the next days mass infantry attacks alternated withheavy mortar fire attacking French positions. The Vietminhgained ground through sheer weight of numbers. The French foughtdeterminedly, but forward defense locations were lost one byone. (19:175) By sunrise on the 7th of May, the Vietminh hadreached within 100 yards of the French Command Post. By thistime all th e French artillery had been knocked out, and ammuni-tion was dangerously low. At 11:00 AM Brigadier de Castries,the Commander, sent a wireless report stating, "They are a fewhundred meters away. They have broken through everywhere."

At 1:50 AM on the 8th of May, Isabelle tell and with it theFrench at Dien Bien Phu. (19:176) The majority of the Frenchforces were still in tack, but th e people of France lost thewill to support the conflict with the loss of this battle.There were many reasons fo r the French failure. The followingparagraphs will highlight the major ones.

REASONS FOR FAILUREThe French grossly underestimated Vietminh capabili t iesin three main areas. First, General Navarre and his staff didnot beli.eve the Vietminh could mass more than one division atDien Bien Phu. Second, the French did not believe the Vietminhhad the logist ics capacity to supply their troops. Finally,

the French intelligence estimate oi Vietminh artillery piecesand artillery shells was extremely low. The French compoundedthese errors by overestimating French Air Force capabili t ies.

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The concentration of four Vietminh divisions at Dien BienPhu was regarded by th e French as a "utopian project". (13:17)The French had calculated on th e basis of Western militarydoctrine that th e enemy simply did not have the logistics capa-bilities to supply and maintain such a force so far from itsbases. General Navarre believed he would be faced with onlyone division. (13:18) This assumption did not take into con-sideration General Giap's patience and determination. Takingtheir t ime, the Vietminh cont inued their buildup until fourinfantry divisions and one artillery division were in placebefore attacking. General Giap solved the logistics problemsby enlisting th e entire Vietnamese population. General Giaps tated, "The French could never appreciate th e strength of anation, of a people. This strength is immense. It can overcomeany difficulty, defeat any enemy." (9:183)

General Giap described th e operation in People 's War,People 's Army. The Vietnamese people under the direct leader-ship of the committees of supply for th e front gave proof ofgreat heroism and endurance in serving th e front. Thousandsof bicycles from the towns carried food and munit ions to thefront. Truck convoys valiantly crossed streams, mountains,and forests to bring food and ammunition to the Army. Day andnight, hundreds of thousands of porters and young volunteerscrossed passes and forded rivers in spite of enemy planes anddelayed action bombs. This is the way General Giap solved th eproblems of supply to the front. (9:184) The French also failedin accurately assessing th e Vietminh artillery capabilities.

French intelligence credited General Giap with 40 to 60medium howitzers capable of firing 25,000 rounds. This estimatewas based on Giap's attack of Na-San two years earlier and didnot credit any improvement. The French defenses were predicatedupon these est imates. (15:367) The Vietminh capabilities, how-ever, far exceeded this. In reality there were 144 field pieces,not including thirty 75mm recoilless cannon, and some 36 heavyflak pieces. A more fateful error occurred in intelligenceest imates of artillery ammunition capability. The 25,000 roundsestimated turned into a reality of 103,000 shells of 75mm caliberor larger. (15:451) The French compounded these errors by over-estimating their capabilities in th e air.

French domination of th e air over Indo-China was all promise,but no achievement. Tactical air support was almost absentat Dien Bien Phu. There were to o few aircraft and even thesewere of poor vintage. The idea of placing on aircraft th e onusof breaking a s t ranglehold such as was maintained by th e Vietminhwas a misconcept ion of th e capability of tactical aircraft withconventional armament. (16:60) Using air for resupply was afailure. There were not enough transport aircraft available.Dien Bien Phu needed 400 tons of supplies a day to survive.

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During th e siege an average of 120 tons per day were deliveredby airdrop. Of this, over 20 tons per day fell into enemyhands. (24:11)

This concludes the analysis of the siege of Dien Bien Phuand the reasons why the French were not successfu l . The nextsection will set th e stage for th e siege of Khe Sanh.

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Chapter Five

WHY KHE SANH?North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap was confident th etactics he employed at Dien Bien Phu 14 years earlier wouldwork again at Khe Sanh. Khe Sanh is ringed with mountains whereGiap could dig in his artillery much as he had done at DienBien Phu. After softening Khe Sanh with artillery, Giap felthis human wave tactics would be successful in overrunning theoutpost. When th e Joint Chiefs of Staff solemnly declared toPresident Johnson that Khe Sanh would be held, Giap knew bytaking it he might seriously undermine th e already precarious

level of US support for administrat ion policies in Vietnam.If he could precipitate a US pullout by taking Khe Sanh, hewould clear the way for a swift Communist takeover of SouthVietnam. (12:90) The US position for wanting to maintain KheSanh was centered around three areas.First , militarily it had a strategic location. It islocated in the northwest corner of South Vietnam in close prox-imity to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Laos, and th e major NorthVietnamese supply routes to South Vietnam and Laos. (1:194)Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemyinfiltration from Laos, an airstrip fo r reconnaissance planessurveying th e Ho Chi Minh Trail, a western anchor for defenses

south of the DMZ, and an eventual jump-off point for groundoperations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (12:40; 10:539) KheSanh was, secondly, seen as bait to entice the Vietminh to entera large scale battle.American commanders found it almost impossible to makethe enemy stand still long enough to be destroyed by supportingarms. "The Vietcong," General Westmoreland conceded, "are uncom-monly adept at slithering away." (J2:63) The best place tofind large concentrations of enemy forces, Westmoreland decided,

was in the jungled mountains in the heart of enemy based areas.The place he decided on was Khe Sanh. (12:64) The final reasonfo r Khe Sanh was fo r it to serve as a capstone of GeneralWestmoreland's combat career.General Westmoreland knew he would be leaving Vietnam inth e summer of 1968. Khe Sanh would be th e single, dramatic

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blow that would cripple th e North Vietnamese beyond any doubt.It would be th e definite victory, th e perfect finishing touchfor his tour in Vietnam. (12:36)

This sets th e stage for th e siege of Khe Sanh. The siegewas declared on 20 January 1968 and lasted until 8 Apri l 1968.(23:107-109) It pitted 6,000 US Marines and South VietnameseRangers against an enemy force roughly five t imes as large.(23:ijii) Even with this great numerical advantage, the humanwave tactics that Giap intended to use never took place. Thenext section will explain why and show th e significance of airpower in th e siege of Khe Sanh.

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Chapter Six

THE SIEGE OF KH E SANHThe siege of Khe Sanh will be looked at in four different

areas. The areas wil l be intelligence, ground operations, airoperations, and United States' public reaction. Major emphasiswill be placed on air operat ions because of its major signifi-cance in the outcome of the siege. Intelligence support wasgood before and during th e siege.

The main reason for this was th e defection of FirstLieutenant La Than Tonc, a North Vietnamese artillery officer,on th e 20th of January. His interrogation confirmed and rein-forced previous beliefs. For 14 years Tonc had served in anarmy at war. He had constant ly distinguished himself in battle,but his superiors had chosen an officer junior to him for promo-tion to captain. Bitterly disappointed, he had decided todefect . (12:108-109) His information turned out to be a detaileddescription of the forthcoming Communist offensive. The defectordescribed in detail th e assembly areas and attack routes oftwo regiments of th e 325th Division. He gave the battle planof th e 304th Division, especially its role in the attack o-Khe Sanh. The 320th Division was poised to attack Camp Catrollto silence th e big guns that supported Khe Sanh. The firstenemy assaults would begin precisely at 0030 on 21 January.The plan was to quickly overrun Khe Sanh and move on to QuangTri and Hue. (12:108-110) Armed with this intelligence th eUS forces made final preparat ions for th e battle. At exactly30 minutes past midnight, North Vietnamese gunners fired onKhe Sanh. (12:113)

Mortar bombardment was followed by enemy sappers tryingto blast passages through th e barbed wire perimeter for th einfantry to pass through. The initial attackers were containedand killed. The Vietcong resumed th e attack at 0530 with mortarand artillery fire. The barrage started numerous fires andcaused an explosion in th e main ammunition dump, but th e Marineswere again successfu l in negating th e attack. (23:23-25) Theshelling of Khe Sanh continued throughout th e siege, but th elarge scale battle never took place. The remainder of thischapter wil l focus on specific operat ions that took place duringth e siege. The operations to be covered are Niagara, Airlift,and Pegasus.

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NIAGARAOperation Niagara was divided into parts I and II. Niagara Iwas an extensive reconnaissance program to obtain as much informa-tion as possible about th e enemy. All sources available includingaircraft, sensors, and reconnaissance teams were used. The fire-power phase, Niagara II, was initiated in mid-January and lastedu.til late March. (25:163) The bombardment continued day andright.Involved in this application of airpower were units from

the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. Aircraft used included F-4s,F-1OOs, A-4s, B-57s, A-is, and B-52s. The heart of th e operationwas th e use of th e B-52s. The B-52s dropped bombs within 100yards of th e M arine's outside defense perimeter. They flewin cells of three with each aircraft carrying approximatelyone hundred 500 pound bombs. Total strike sorties averaged330 a day, and nearly 200,000 tons of bombs were dropped bythe B-52s and th e fighter-bombers during the siege in an areaof approximately five square miles. (22:22-27) Airlift wasanother major achievement.

AIRLIFTC-130s and C-123s combined to fly 668 airdrop and 460 air-land sorties. This accounted for 12,430 tons of supplies forKhe Sanh. (17:5) This tonage, plus supplies flown in by Armyand Marine helicopters, assured Khe Sanh of needed supplies.

(12:222) The actual resupply task was a difficult and danger-ous one.The transport crews could usually count on several thingshappening during a mission. First, there was almost always

an instrument descent through cloud cover with a 600 foot ceil ing.Sometimes there would be a rapid climb back up because of heavymortar fire. The ground time was kept to a minimum. From touch-down to takeoff averaged three minutes and sometimes that wastoo long. (22:27) The Vietcong had every inch of the runwayzeroed in, and when an airplane tr ied to land th e enemy walked.artillery rounds up th e center l ine. (14:48) Enemy fire becameso intense that airdrop became th e primary means of resupplyafter the 1st of February. (17:4) Nearly every aircraft thatflew over Khe Sanh was shot at. About a fourth were hit, butdespite th e hosti le fire and th e bad weather th e resupply wassuccessful. (22:27) The successes of Operation Niagara andAirlift paved the way for Operation Pegasus on 1 April. (23:96)

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PEGASUSMore than 30,000 men would be involved in th e relief opera-t ion, Pegasus, of Khe Sanh. (12:240) Pegasus entailed thereopening of Highway 9 into Khe Sanh and offensive air operationsin the vicinity of Khe Sanh. Ca Lu was chosen as the jumping-off point fo r the relief forces. (23:98)Tw o United States ' Marine battalions had already securedthe road to Ca Lu, clearing th e way for convoys of resupply.Three battalions of engineers were leveling ground for a newairfield, building parking ramps, digging artillery pits, andbunker complexes for a powerful forward base. From Ca Lu toKhe Sanh was only 12 miles. (12:241)Nothing was left to chance. Heavy bombing would softenup enemy positions, then the Air Cavalry would surprise enemydefenders with vert ical envelopment tactics. (12:241) On 1 Apriltwo infantry battalions advanced along Route 9 screening th eengineers who repaired th e cratered highway. (23:99) The 3rd

Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force followed th e UnitedStates ' troops. This point of th e operations was coordinatedwith th e first offensive operation of th e Marines at Khe Sanhsince th e start of the siege. (12:241)On 8 April th e relief forces arrived at Khe Sanh. Thismarked th e official end to th e siege that had lasted 80 days.During that time Khe Sanh was under constant fire, but th e humanwave infantry attacks never took place.

UNITED STATES' PUBLIC REACTIONMany historians believe a defeat at Khe Sanh would havehad the same affect on th e United States' policy in Indo-Chinaas th e French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. They base this beliefon social and political factors in the United States in th elate 1960s. Factors that became so signif icant that President

Johnson told th e nation he was stopping th e bombing of NorthVietnam, he was ready to bring th e war to an end, and he wouldnot seek reelection for another term. (12:242) This statementwas made approximately one week before th e siege of Khe Sanhended.

Prior to this General Westmoreland had told an audienceof news correspondents,The only reason th e Vietcong continue to f ight isth e delusion that political pressure in th e United

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States combined with a tactical defeat of a majorAmerican unit might force th e United States towithdrawal. (i2:76)

Political pressure from the United States was strong. OnOctober 31, 1967 Rober t McNamara, Defense Secretary, resignedtelling President Johnson th e Vietnamese War was dangerous,costly, and unsatisfactory to our people. American casualtieshad risen from 2,500 in 1965, to 33,000 in 1966, to 80,000 in1967. (12:76) The will to support th e war was waning. Anythingthat even resembled a defeat at Khe Sanh would have had th esame results as Dien Bien Phu.

REASONS FO R SUCCESSThere were three main reasons for th e United States' success

at Khe Sanh. First, the forces at Khe Sanh had knowledge ofth e Vietcong plans before th e siege began. This knowledge wasgained through intelligence efforts that were re inforced andaugmented through th e interrogation of a North Vietnamese defec-tor. Second, offensive air power was successful in deterringany major attack by th e enemy. Third, th e United States wasable to resupply Khe Sanh by air. A summary of each of theseareas will follow starting with intelligence.

American commanders realized the importance of knowledgeof enemy plans. Niagara I was an extensive reconnaissance pro-gram implemented to gain as much information about th e enemyas possible. This information pointed to an attack on Khe Sanhby a large number of North Vietnamese forces. (25:163) Thiswas confirmed by th e interrogation of a North Vietnamese defec-tor, Lieutenant La Than Tonc. The defector's revelations wereso extraordinary th e Marines doubted him at first. Luckily,th e Marines decided they had nothing to lose in bel ieving him.The information turned out to be a description of th e entireforthcoming Communist offensive . (12:108-110) With this informa-tion Niagara II was initiated.

Niagara II was th e offensive air operation that took placein support of Khe Sanh. The Air Force made 9,691 fighter-bomberattacks at Khe Sanh, the Marines 7,078, and th e Navy 5,337.These airplanes delivered 39,178 tons of bombs, rockets, andnapalm. (12:246) "The key to success," Westmoreland asserted,"was th e tremendous tonage of bombs dropped by B-52s." (12:247)The B-52s dropped 75,000 tons in 2,602 sorties. (22:25) Underthis intense air attack th e enemy was never able to use th emass infantry attacks it had planned. Even though th e Vietcong

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were not successful in initiating a mass infantry attack, theywere successful in encircling Khe Sanh. The only means ofresupply became by air.

The United States' forces were successful in resupplyingKhe Sanh by air. A ir Force transports accounted for 12,.430tons of supplies for Khe Sanh. This was augmented by suppliesf lown in by the Army and Marine helicopters. The resupply taskwas difficult and dangerous but a prerequisite for survivalof the Marines at Khe Sanh. (12:222)

These three factors for success at Khe Sanh all have onething in common. The French at Dien Bien Phu failed at allthree. The next chapter will list recommendat ions for survivinga siege based upon lessons learned from Dien Bien Phu an d KheSanh .

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Chapter Seven

RECOMMENDATIONSThe sieges of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh had many common

aspects . They both took place in Indo-China. The forces undersiege had a common enemy, the Communist North Vietnamese. TheCommander of the North Vietnamese forces was in both casesVo Nguyen Giap. The French and Americans invited attack inorder to draw Giap 's forces into battle. As has been seen,these many similarities le d to very different outcomes. Thefollowing quest ions and their answers help explain why.1. Did th e forces under siege have good intelligence on enemystrengths and intentions?

French - No United States - Yes2. Was offensive air support a factor in negat ing operationsby th e enemy?

French - No United States - Yes3. Was resupply by air successful?

French - No United States - YesThree recommendations for electing to hold territory under siegecan be supported from these questions and answers.

First, you must know your enemy's capabilities and intentions.An intensive intelligence gathering effort is a must in determin-in g if success is possible . The French failed to do this. Inpreparing for th e siege they grossly underest imated th e Vietminhtroop strength and th e Vietminh ability to iasupply their troopsat Dien Bien Phu. The French also planned their defenses uponprojected enemy artillery capabilities based upon data froman engagement that occurred two years earlier. The data wasnot accurate and th e defenses proved inadequate. The UnitedStates did not make these mistakes. Prior to th e siege at KheSanh an intensive intelligence gathering operation, Niagara I,took place. As a result North Vietnamese troop strengths andintentions were known prior to th e siege. Therefore, UnitedStates' preparations and assessments were based upon accurate

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information, which greatly aided the defense of Khe Sanh. Thisemphasizes th e need to know your enemy's strengths and intentions.

Second, in deciding to hold territory significant airresources should be available for offensive air support. TheFrench used what offensive air support was available to them,but it was not enough. They did not have th e air assets avail-able to impair th e Vietminh efforts. The United States flewa 24 hour-a-day bombing operation, Niagara II, in support ofKhe Sanh. Because of this th e North Vietnamese were never ableto gain momentum for a full scale attack.

Third, you must have th e ability to resupply your troopsin th e worst possible situation. The French did not have thisability. They found themselves in a situation in which allsuppl ies had to be airdropped. They had not foreseen thisrequirement and were unable to meet it. The United Statesfound themselves in much th e same circumstances at Khe Sanhbut had th e ability to meet resupply requirements.

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hi'"_'BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCES CITED

Books1. Bowman, John S. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: World

Almanac Publications, 1985.2. Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam; A Political History. New York:Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968.3. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place. New York:J. B. Lippincott Company, 1967.4. Street Without Joy. Harrisburg: The StackpoleCompany, 1963.5. and Raskin, Marcus G. The Vietnam Reader. New York:Vintage Books, 1967.6. --.... Vietnam Witness. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,Publishers, 1966.7. Giap, Vo Nguyen. Banner of People's War, The Party's M ilitaryLine. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,

1968.8. Big Victory, Great Task. New York: Frederick A.Praeger, Publishers, 1968.9. People's War, People's Army. New York: FrederickA. Praeger, Publishers, 1962.

10. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam, A History. Ne w York: The VikingPress, 1983.11 . O'Ballance, Edgar. The Indo-China War 1945-1954, A Studyin Guerrilla Warfare. London: Farber and Farber, 1964.12. Pisor, Robert. The End of the Line. New York and London:W. W. Norton and Company, 1962.

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CONTINUED13. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Harper

and Row, 1965.

Articles and Periodicals14. Althoff, David L., Lt Col, USMC. "Helicopter Operations

at Khe Sanh." Marine Corps Gazette, May 1968, pp. 47-49.15. "Defeat in the East." Royal United Services Institute Journal,

Vol. 106 (August 1961), pp. 355-371.16. Harrison, M. "Dien Bien Phu." Canadian Army Journal,

October 1964, pp. 45-62.17. Kashiwahara, Ken, Capt, USAF. "Lifeline to Khe Sanh."

The Airman Mapazine, Vol. XII (July 1968), pp. 4-8.18. Martin, Norman E., Lt Col, USA. "Dien Bien Phu and the

Future of Airborne Operations." Military Review,June 1956, pp. 19-26.

19. O'Ballance, Edgar. "Dien Bien Phu." United Services Insti-tute of India Journal, Vol. 86 (April-June 1986),pp. 157-178.

20. Scholin, Allan R. "An Airpower Lesson for Giap." AirForce and Space Digest, June 1968, pp. 90-94.

21. Simcock, William. "Dien Bien Phu - Yesterday's Battlefield."Canadian Army Journal, July 1958, pp. 35-46.

2'.. Sturm, T. R. "Khe Sanh's Peadly Deluge." The Airm3nMagazine, Vul. XII (July 1968), pp. 4-8.

Of f icial Documents23. Nalty, Bernard C. Airpower and th- Fight for Khe Sanh.

Washington D. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1973.

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CONTINUED24. United States Military Assistance Command. The Battleof Dien Bien Phu. Saigon, Vietnam: Military HistoryBranch, 11 February 1968.25. Westmoreland, W. C., General, USA. Report on Operat ionsin South Vietnam. Washington D. C .: US GovernmentPrinting Office, 1968.

B. RELATED SOURCESBooks

Amter, Jos-ph A. Vietnam Verdict. New York: The ContinuumPublishing Company, 1982.

Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. M artin'sPress, 1985.

Graulvin, Paul. Doctor at Dien Bien Phu. New York: The JohnDay Company, 1955.

Millett, Alan R. A Short History of th e Vietnam War. Bloomingtonand London: Indiana Universi ty Press, 1978.

Ray, Sibnarayan. Vietnam Seen from East and West. New Yorkand London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers , 1966.

Analysis of Sieges of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh

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