An Israeli Strategy in Preparation for September
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Transcript of An Israeli Strategy in Preparation for September
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8/6/2019 An Israeli Strategy in Preparation for September
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Editorials
An Israeli Strategy in Preparation for September
By Meir Kraus
The following article by Mr. Meir Kraus, Director of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, was published in the editorial supplement of the newspaper Israel HaYom. The
article explores potential strategies for Israel in preparation for the possibility that the
United Nations (UN) will recognize a Palestinian state in September:
The recent assertion by former Mossad director Meir Dagan that Israel should not block
Palestinian moves within the UN highlights the need for a serious and substantive
examination of the alternatives available to Israel regarding its position on this
Palestinian process. To date, the Israeli and international political discourse surrounding
potential strategies for Israel in preparation for UN recognition in September has focused
on two possible alternatives: a strategy of opposition and a strategy of initiation. Thestrategy of opposition aims to persuade states friendly to Israel not to support this move
and thereby to minimize Palestinian gains. Towards this end Israel argues that this is a
unilateral move, inconsistent with signed agreements and the need to reach an agreement
at the negotiating table. This strategy received the support of the president of the United
States in his speech last week.
The strategy of initiation, in contrast, calls upon Israel to put together a political initiative
that would counter-balance the process within the UN, an initiative that would entice the
Palestinians to return to the negotiating table and cause them to abandon the political
process within the UN. Such an initiative, it is argued, would generate international
pressure on the Palestinians to pursue their objectives through mutual agreement of bothsides rather than unilaterally.
The following questions should be posed when choosing between these alternatives:
Which alternative minimizes political damage to Israel and prevents it appearing as being
opposed to peace? Which alternative has the potential to influence or thwart the process?
Which alternative makes possible a return to the negotiating table the following day and
reinforces a Palestinian preference for a political process rather than terrorism? Which
alternative can be transformed into an Israeli position within both the Israeli political
system and the timetable available until September?
The strategy of opposition even with the support of the US and others is not enoughto thwart the process or influence its substance. This strategy would increase political
damage to Israel and force it into a very difficult position. Israel would continue to be
portrayed as an occupier and opponent of peace. The resolution would define the borders
of the Palestinian state as the 1967 borders, and continued Israeli rule could result in
measures being taken against it. Regarding the day after the vote: A unilateral Palestinian
gain, achieved in defiance of Israels will, would constitute a political victory and could
affect the willingness of Palestinians to return to the negotiating table or, alternatively,
could harden their position on relevant issues.
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Alternatively, the strategy of initiation has the potential to reduce political pressure on
Israel and to make visible its willingness to advance the process. At the same time, this
strategy probably would not prevent the Palestinians from continuing their own political
initiative. They need a victory and a sense of accomplishment, and they need to achieve
this by themselves for their people. No Israeli initiative is able to entice them to
relinquish their move in light of the expectations that have been generated, particularly in
the time remaining and given the lack of trust between the two sides. Nor is it realistic to
expect the government to formulate a political initiative of real substance addressing the
complex issues on the negotiating agenda in the time remaining. Thus, neither one of the
strategies discussed is able to address the challenge Israel faces.
Another alternative does exist, however. The strategy of containment assumes that there
is no way to prevent the process of recognition of a Palestinian state, nor would it be right
to attempt to do so. Yet there is a way to minimize the negative impact of this process
with regard to the international system and in relation to the Palestinian gain, whilepreventing damage to Israel politically and to Israels image. This strategy posits that
Israel recognize the Palestinian state and call for peace and good neighborly relations
between it and the State of Israel. Israels stance is that a conflict over borders exists
between Israel and the Palestinian state, and a solution will be found only through
negotiations. Israel would take measures among its friends throughout the world to soften
the text of the resolution presented at the UN so as not to define the states borders along
1967 lines but, rather, to offer a more delicate formulation from Israels perspective,
while making clear that the final borders are to be determined through negotiation. The
benefits of such a process would include removal of the sting from the unilateral process
and turning it into a consensual process, presentation of Israel as generous and peace-
loving, significant easing of pressure on Israels friends under these complicatedcircumstances, reinforcement of the Palestinian preference for a political process, and
creation of a positive environment that would allow a return to the negotiating table
afterwards.
The strategy of containment does not deviate from the prime ministers position as
expressed in his speech at Bar-Ilan University and recent speeches in the US regarding
the vision of two states for two peoples. This strategy appears to be the best alternative,
allowing Israel to influence the process and improve its international standing, while
allowing the political process to advance on the day after the vote. Indeed, Meir Dagan
was right in pointing out that it would be a mistake on Israels part to try to thwart the
Palestinian process in the UN. Such an effort would not succeed, and more importantly,the day after the vote would be a very dark day.