An Inside Look at Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

28
AN INSIDE LOOK AT BOTNETS ARO-DHS SPECIAL WORKSHOP ON MALWARE DETECTION, 2005 Written By: Paul Barford and Vinod Yegneswaran University of Wisconsin, Madison Presented By: Jarrod Williams

description

An Inside Look at Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005. Written By: Paul Barford and Vinod Yegneswaran University of Wisconsin, Madison Presented By: Jarrod Williams. Outline. Motivation/Goals Botnets Botnet Attributes Conclusion/Review. Motivation/Goals. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of An Inside Look at Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

Page 1: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

AN INSIDE LOOK AT BOTNETSARO-DHS SPECIAL WORKSHOP ON MALWARE DETECTION, 2005

Written By:Paul Barford and Vinod YegneswaranUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison

Presented By: Jarrod Williams

Page 2: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

OUTLINE Motivation/Goals Botnets Botnet Attributes Conclusion/Review

Page 3: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

MOTIVATION/GOALS Increase in BOTNET usage

Spam, DDOS, Identity theft

The objective of the paper is to understand how Botnets work and find communalities between them

Botnets: Agotbot (4.0 Pre-Release), SDBot (05B), SpyBot (1.4), GT Bot with DCOM

Page 4: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

MOTIVATION/GOALS Architecture Botnet control mechanisms Host control mechanisms Propagation mechanisms Exploits and attack mechanisms Malware delivery mechanisms Obfuscation methods Deception mechanisms

Page 5: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

BOTNETS A collection of compromised computers

running software controlled by a single user

Botnets are controlled by a botmaster

Compromised host machines are called zombies

Zombies communicate using IRC

A botnet can have many different versions of the same bot making botnet families

Page 6: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

BOTNETS

Page 7: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

INTERNET RELAY CHAT is a form of real-time

Internet text messaging. It is mainly designed for group communication, but it also allows one-to-one communication via private message and data transfers via direct client-to-client

Created by Jarkko Oikarinen in August 1988

Page 8: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

BOTNET ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED Architecture Botnet control mechanisms Host control mechanisms Propagation mechanisms Exploits and attack mechanisms Malware delivery mechanisms Obfuscation methods Deception mechanisms

Page 9: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

AGOBOT (4.0 PRE-RELEASE) Most sophisticated Released October, 2002 Hundreds of variants of this bot and it is also

commonly referred to as Phatbot Roughly 20,000 lines of C/C++ The ability to launch different kinds of DoS

attacks The ability to harvest the local host for PayPal

passwords and AOL keys through traffic sniffing, key logging or searching registry entries

Page 10: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

SDBOT (05B) Fairly simple Released October, 2002 Hundreds of variants of this bot Slightly over 2,000 lines of C Does not include any overtly malicious code

modules The code is obviously easy to extend and

patch Patches contain malicious code for attackers

need 80 patches for SDBot were found through

internet web searching

Page 11: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

SPYBOT (1.4) Relatively small like SDBot Released April, 2003 Under 3,000 lines of C The command and control engine appears to

be shared with SDBot, and it is likely, that it evolved from SDBot

Includes NetBIOS/Kuang/Netdevil/KaZaa exploits

Contains modules for launching flooding attacks and has scanning capabilities

Page 12: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

GT BOT WITH DCOM Simple design providing a limited set of

functions Released April, 1998 Global Threat Bot has hundreds of variants

and is also referred to as Aristotle's Easy to modify but there is nothing that

suggests it was designed with extensibility in mind

Capabilities include port scanning, DoS attacks, and exploits for RPC and NetBIOS services

Includes the HideWindow program which keeps the bot hidden on the local system

Page 13: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

BOTNET ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED Architecture Botnet control mechanisms Host control mechanisms Propagation mechanisms Exploits and attack mechanisms Malware delivery mechanisms Obfuscation methods Deception mechanisms

Page 14: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

AGOBOT (4.0 PRE-RELEASE) Simple vertical and horizontal scanning Scanning is based on the network ranges (network

prefixes) that are configured on individual bots

Page 15: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

SDBOT (05B) By virtue of its benign intent, SDBot does not

have scanning or propagation capability in its base distribution

Many variants of SDBot include scanning and propagation capability

Page 16: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

SPYBOT (1.4) Simple command interface for scanning Horizontal and vertical scanning capability Scans are sequential

Command: scan<startIP

address><port><delay><spreaders><logfilename>

Example: scan 127.0.0.1 17300 1 netbios portscan.txt

Page 17: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

GT BOT WITH DCOM Includes support for simple horizontal and

vertical scanning

Page 18: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

BOTNET ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED Architecture Botnet control mechanisms Host control mechanisms Propagation mechanisms Exploits and attack mechanisms Malware delivery mechanisms Obfuscation methods Deception mechanisms

Page 19: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

AGOBOT (4.0 PRE-RELEASE) Has the most elaborate set of exploit modules out of

the four bots analyzed Bagle scanner: scans for back doors left by Bagle

variants on port 2745 Dcom scanner: scans for the well known DCE-RPC

buffer overflow MyDoom scanner: scans for back doors left by

variants of the MyDoom worm on port 3127 Dameware scanner: scans for vulnerable versions of

the Dameware network administration tool NetBIOS scanner: brute force password scanning for

open NetBIOS shares Radmin scanner: scans for the Radmin buffer

overflow

Page 20: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

SDBOT (05B) SDBot does not have any exploits packaged

in its standard distribution

It does include modules for sending both UDP and ICMP packets which could be used for simple flooding attacks

Other variants of SDBot contain exploit more modules

Page 21: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

SPYBOT (1.4) This version of SpyBot only included a

module which attacked NetBIOS open shares

DDoS interface is closely related to SDBot and includes the capabilities for launching simple UDP, ICMP, and TCP SYN floods

Other variants of SpyBot contain more exploit modules

Page 22: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

GT BOT WITH DCOM Developed to include RPC-DCOM exploits

Has the capability to launch simple ICMP floods

Other variants of GT Bot contain DDoS capabilities such as UDP and TCP SYN floods as well as other known exploits

Page 23: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

BOTNET ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED Architecture Botnet control mechanisms Host control mechanisms Propagation mechanisms Exploits and attack mechanisms Malware delivery mechanisms Obfuscation methods Deception mechanisms

Page 24: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

AGOBOT (4.0 PRE-RELEASE) Of the four bots analyzed, only Agobot had

elaborate deception mechanisms Mechanisms included:

Tests for debuggers such as OllyDebug, SoftIce and Procdump

Test for VMWare Killing anti-virus processes Altering DNS entries of anti-virus software

companies to point to the local host

Page 25: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

CONCLUSION Botnets are widely used and communicate

using IRC

The details of this paper include descriptions of the functional components of botnets categorized into eight components

Understand your enemy

Page 26: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

STRENGTHS Presents information in an organized fashion

on the different Bots

Is the first step to codifying Botnet capabilities

Page 27: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

WEAKNESSES Only presents a high-level over view of a

limited number of Bots and only presents one specific Bot version

More detail should be paid to a Bot family and not a specific Bot

Page 28: An Inside Look at  Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

REFERENCES An Inside Look at Botnets

http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~pb/botnets_final.pdf Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRC