An exploratory study of determinant and indicant beliefs in attitude measurement

2

An exploratory study of determinant and indicant beliefs in attitude measurement

KERRY THOMAS MARY TUCK Cranfield Institute of Technology, Bedford

Abstract

In the central equation of Fishbein’s attitude theory the overall afect attached to an object is equated with the sum of evaluation x belief strength for the salient beliefs held by the individual concerned. Two previous studies have shown equally good prediction of attitude whether the beliefs used are those spontaneously elicited by each individual (ISB) or those most frequently elicited by the population (MSB) . This result is replicated here in the context of an attitude change study. Fishbein’s explanation for the efficiency, and occasional superiority, of modal sets of beliefs relative to individuals’ own sets of beliefs, i.e., that MSB contain less non-salient items than ISB which result from inaccurate, forced elicitation, cannot account jor the results in the present study since it is shown that a large proportion of MSB were non-salient for many of the subjects. Further, certain sets of beliefs known to be inappropriate, i.e., which were neither modally salient nor individually salient, are shown to be good predictors of attitude using the Fishbein equation. The implications of theseJindings for the theory and the practical use of the Fishbein technique are discussed.

Introduction

During the last ten years Fishbein has put forward an attitude theory the importance of which is increasingly evident, not least because of its high degree of denotability. Studies in experimental social psychology (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1969; Ajzen and Fish- bein, 1970; Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1972), in social research (Fishbein and Jaccard, 1973; Jaccard and Davidson, 1972), in marketing (Tuck and Nelson, 1969; Tuck, 1971 ; Bruce, 1971 ; Cowling, 1973) and review articles (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1972; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973) have shown the value of the molecular approach to attitude measurement and its extension into the prediction of behavior; but, as is to be expected,

Eur. J. SOC. Psvchol. 5 12). DD. 167-187

168 Kerry Thomas and Mary Tuck

the early use of such a model in field studies has led to some problems and misunder- standings in the specifics of the techniques. The present paper is concerned first with the practical question of the source of the beliefs used in the molecular estimation of attitude and second with the underlying theoretical relation between determinant beliefs and more general belief items which can serve as indicants of attitude.

Fishbein’s theory proposes that attitude toward an object is the total affect toward that object and is a function of beliefs learned about the object and the implicit evaluative responses associated with these beliefs. The central equation of the theory is expressed as follows:

n A,, = C Btat

i - 1 where A . = the attitude toward some object ‘0’

Bd = belief i about o, that is, the probability that is related to some other object xt. a = the evaluative aspect of Br, that is, the respondent’s attitude toward XI.

n = the number of beliefs. Fishbein has also proposed that the beliefs which contribute toward attitude at a

given time, the determinant beliefs, are those which are salient for the respondent at that time. Salience is conceptualized in behavior theory terms as dominance in a habit- forming hierarchy of responses, and it is suggested that salient beliefs are those most likely to be elicited in a free-response situation. Fishbein and his associates have used as an operational definition of salience those beliefs which a respondent first elicits when asked to list the objects, goals or values which he associates with the attitude object. Clearly each individual will have his own personal set of beliefs about any given attitude object, and these beliefs will be the result of his reinforcement history and will vary over time. Fishbein points out that since for information handling reasons it is unlikely that individuals can deal with more than 7 2 beliefs simultaneously, only 7 f 2 beliefs are likely to be salient, that is determinants of attitude at a given time.

Personal sets of salient beliefs are difficult to obtain and scale in survey situations using standard instruments. Fishbein and his associates have therefore usually worked with sets of what may be called modal salient beliefs, that is, the beliefs most frequently elicited by subjects sampled from the population under investigation or from some other similar group. A standard instrument is constructed based on these most frequently elicited beliefs which measures the belief strength (Ba) and evaluative aspect (as) for each belief item. The products of these values for each item are then summed to arrive at a molecular estimate of attitude (C Btat).

Hackman and Anderson (1969) questioned the use of such modal sets of beliefs. They suggested that, since an estimate of attitude based on each individual’s personal

An exploratory study of determinant and indicant beliefs 169

salient beliefs should, according to the theory, be the best available, if this were shown not to be the case grave doubt would be cast on the theory itself. They tested this suggestion by comparing the correlations between a global estimate of attitude and molecular Z &at estimates based on (1) each individual’s own set of elicited beliefs (ISB) and (2) the eight most frequently elicited beliefs, the modal set of beliefs (MSB). The values they obtained for r were 0.46 and 0.62, respectively. Both of these r values are significantly different from zero but not significantly different from each other. Hackman and Anderson, however, stress that the ‘trend is strikingly in the wrong direction’.

Kaplan and Fishbein (1969) replied by pointing out that the sets of personal beliefs used by Hackman and Anderson probably contained a number of non-salient items since each subject had been allowed to list his beliefs up to a total of ten (mean number of beliefs elicited in Hackman and Anderson’s study was 6.1, SD = 2.2). Kaplan and Fishbein suggested that the modal set of the eight most frequently elicited beliefs probably contained less non-salient items than did each personal set of beliefs, and they tested their hypothesis in the following way. Subjects were asked to elicit beliefs about Negroes and were allowed three minutes to respond. It was found that for the correlation between the global measure of attitude and the molecular estimate based on the six most frequently elicited beliefs, r = 0.37. When the individuals’ own beliefs were used, r = 0.21 (for all beliefs e!icited, ranging from three to 25, mean = 9.72, SD = 4.60); r = 0.36 (for the first nine beliefs elicited); and r = 0.32 (for the first six beliefs elicited). These rather low r values are significantly different from zero but not significantly different from each other. This evidence is far from persuasive. At best it only suggests that forced elicitation leading to use of non-salient beliefs is the source of error which reduces the predicted superiority of the attitude estimate based on the individual’s own beliefs. Kaplan and Fishbein’s conclusion that use of limited individual sets of beliefs gives estimates of attitude ‘at least as good’ as those based on modal sets of beliefs seems poor support for the theory in general.

In the present paper the problems raised by the Hackman and Anderson study and only summarily dealt with by Kaplan and Fishbein are reexamined empirically. The question of forced elicitation (below the threshold of salience) as a source of error in ISB-based attitude estimates is examined: (a) By improving the elicitation instruction; (b) by comparing the effects on the correlation with criterion attitude measure of using

different numbers of beliefs in both the ISB- and MSB-based attitude estimates; (c) by directly assessing the proportion of subjects for whom each item in the modal set

of beliefs was indeed salient. Further, the implications of the apparent equivalence of ISB- and MSB-based attitude estimates for Fishbein’s theory are considered, and the role of determinant and indicant beliefs in attitude measurement is discussed.


Method

The data reported below is taken from an atomistic study of attitude change where the focus of interest was the change in belief system following presentation of either an affectively congruent or an affectively incongruent message to subjects with an initially positive attitude to the attitude object ‘Sweden’.*

The persuasive communications were presented as from an authoritative scientific source. At the end of the experiment the subjects were told that the information about the attitude object had been distorted to produce positive and negative shifts in attitude. The present report discusses only the data which is relevant to the problem of the source of belief items used in the molecular estimation of attitude.

The attitude change data from this study (in preparation) were analyzed by analysis of variance, repeated measures design, as appropriate to the panel design of the study. The problem of repeated measures in the attitude change context can also be asssessed, to some extent, since two control groups (affectively congruent and affectively incongruent persuasion) were included in the design. In these control groups only the global measures of attitude (A,,o; Ao, l ; A0,2) were repeated and no remeasurement of cr; Bt or re-elicitation of beliefs occurred. With respect to the data presented here, however, the errors associated with repeated measurement should effect both the global (A,) and molecular (C BtatMSB; E B ~ u ~ E S B ) estimates of attitude and thus not substantially influence the comparisons made between predictions of attitude based on the different belief sources.

Subjects

The subjects were 128 student teachers (69 males and 59 females) randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions. Forty-nine subjects received each of the persuasive communications, and 30 subjects were in a control condition and received a message irrelevant to the attitude object.

Attitude measarement instruments

The instruments used were basically as described by Fishbein and Raven (1962). The global criterion estimate of attitude (A,) at times 0 , l and 2, was measured using 7-point semantic differential scales (evaluative dimension) comprising seven pairs of adjectives

1. In this study 88 % of the subjects initially had a positive attitude to Sweden.


(clean/dirty, harmful/beneficial, good/bad, valuable/worthless, fair/unfair, pleasant/ unpleasant, kind/cruel). The score was summed over the seven scales giving a range for A . of + 21 to - 21. The evaluative aspect of each related object (ar) was also measured using a semantic differential scale, in this case the single, good/bad adjective pair. Belief strength was measured on a similar 7-point scale using the adjective pair probable/improbable. The product Brat was calculated for each belief item and summed over those beliefs under consideration to give the molecular estimate of attitude. The reliability and validity of these instruments have been demonstrated and discussed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) and Fisbein and Raven (1962).

Beliefs

Beliefs were elicited by asking all subjects to list the characteristics, qualities and attributes of the attitude object. Subjects were asked to write each new idea into one of the nine ‘boxes’ provided, and in an attempt to stop elicitation at the limit of salience the subjects were instructed to list only those ideas which came easily and quickly to mind. Where the individuals’ own beliefs were to be rated for Bt and at, the Bi and at scales were attached to each elicitation ‘box’ and covered by a fold of paper. When elicitation was complete the subjects were instructed to open out the sheet and rate each idea on the two scales alongside each ‘box’. A frequency count of the individually elicited beliefs enabled sets of beliefs to be constructed comprising the nine most frequently elicited items. In this study it was found that use of nine items in the modal set accounted for between 46.0% and 66.1% of all responses. At all stages of the study it was found that of the nine belief items used in modal sets, seven were specific beliefs (e.g., Swedish people have blonde hair; Sweden has rich deposits of iron ore), while two (Sweden is progressive, and Sweden is permissive) covered a wider variety of elicited responses (e.g., progressive society; advanced; forward looking; enlightened education; modem; and permissive society; no censorship; free love; moral freedom; liberal laws; easy abortions).

Persuasive communication

The messages were designed to shift the initially positive attitude either in a more positive direction (affectively congruent message) or in a negative direction (affectively incongruent message). To aid credibility neither message was entirely positive or negative. The two communications were constructed to contain the same number of belief items, some of which were ‘old’ and some ‘new’. In this context ‘old’ and ‘new’ refer to whether or not the item was present amongst the nine most frequently elicited beliefs at the beginning of the experiment, i.e., at time 0, three weeks before the mes-


sage was presented. Each message began with an identical introduction containing seven belief items, four of which were ‘old’ beliefs and three ‘new’.

The affective tone (evaluation) of these items was estimated by pre-testing message items and other items common in the population. Of the ‘old’ beliefs contained in the introduction to the persuasive message, three were positive in affective tone (e.g. [Sweden] is known as a country of great natural beauty) and one was ambivalent, some subjects evaluating it positively and some negatively (Sweden is commonly ad- mired for the liberality of its laws). Of the three ‘new’ items in the introduction two were positive and one was negative in affective tone (e.g., . . . inhabited by an attrac- tive people; . . . very high suicide rate). The positive message continued with nine new positive items (e.g., . . . leader in iron and steel technology; . . . create a more humane society). The negative messsage continued with seven new negative items (e.g., . . . the unpleasant basis of her prosperity), one new positive item (... industrial efficiency) and a final new negative item.

Procedure

At time 0, three weeks before the message manipulation, each subject’s initial attitude toward Sweden ( A o , ~ ) was measured and initial salient beliefs about Sweden elicited. From these initially salient beliefs the original modal set of nine beliefs (MSBo) was constructed. This original model set accounted for 46.0% of the responses and formed the baseline for the design of the persuasive communications.

At time 1, three weeks later, the items comprising MSBo were rated for Bt and UZ.

The messages were then presented. Immediately following the communications the subjects re-elicited their salient beliefs and rated them for Bi and ar (ISBI). There followed a standard instrument which remeasured A . (Ao,l), Bt and ut for the items in the original modal set (MSBo,l), and measured Bt and ar for the items in both messages.

At time 2, one week after the message, salient beliefs were again elicited and rated (ISBz), and the standard form was re-presented giving a remeasure of A . (A0,*) and of Bt and at for the belief items in MSBO (MSBO,~) and in the messages.

A frequency count of the beliefs individually elicited at time 1 (immediately after the message) and time 2 (one week later) enabled modal belief sets (i.e., the nine most frequently elicited items) to be constructed appropriate to each message condition at each time (MSB1 positive; MSBl negative; MSBl none; and MSB2 positive; MSB2 negative; MSB2 none). The belief items which comprised these six modal belief sets were either ‘old’, that is, in the original modal belief set, or ‘new’, that is, in one of the messages. Therefore, since both MSBo and the message items were rated for Bt and at at times 1 and 2, it was possible to compute molecular estimates of attitude (C Brut)


appropriate to each experimental condition at times 1 and 2. Pearson product-moment correlations were computed for each message condition

between the criterion attitude measure at time 1 (Ao , , ) and molecular estimates of attitude based on: (1) The individuals’ own beliefs elicited at time 1 (Z BaaaIsBl positive; Z B t a ~ ~ ~ ,

negative; Z B ~ u Q ~ ~ ~ none); (21 the nine beliefs most frequently elicited at time 1 in each experimental condition

(Z &aiMsBt positive; C BaaiMsBl negative; Z BtasMsB1 none); (3) the original nine modal beliefs re-scaled at time 1 (Z B i ~ i M s B o , ~ positive:

Z BiaiMSBo,l negative; Z BtaiMsB0,, none). Exactly equivalent correlations were also computed for time 2. All these corre-

lations were, in addition, computed using increasing numbers of belief items from one to nine. For the ISB-based estimates these beliefs were introduced into the sum in the order in which they were elicited, while for the MSC-based estimates they weie introduced in order of decreasing frequency. Where less than nine beliefs were elicited, zero was included in the sum in place of thk missing Brad product values.

Results and discussion

The effects of the persuasive communications were reflected in the composition of the modal belief sets constructed for each experimental condition at times 1 and 2. In the control condition where no message was received the nine most frequently elicited beliefs at times 1 and 2 were identical with MSBo, although there was some small fluctu- ation in order of frequency. Following the affectively congruent message, at both times 1 and 2, two new positive items appeared in MSBl positive and MSBz positive; the other seven items in these sets had been present in MSBo. Following the affectively incongruent message, three new belief items reached MSBI negative. Two of these were negative items, and one was positive. At time 2 the one new positive item and one of the new negative items remained in MSB2 negative together with one further new positive item. At both times 1 and 2 following negative persuasion the remaining six items were ones which had also been present in MSBo.

The r values obtained for correlations between global attitude estimates (Ao) and molecular estimates (Z &ad) based on increasing numbers of beliefs both individually salient (ISBI and ISB2) and most frequently elicited across subjects (MSB1 and MSB2) are shown in Figures 1,2 and 3. In addition, similar r values for the original modal set re-scaled at times 1 and 2 are shown in Figures 1 and 2. (These are omitted from Figure 3 since MSBo, MSBl and MSB2 in this condition were identical.) The figures clearly demonstrate several points:


(1) The general equivalence of the r values whether based on each individual’s own beliefs (ISB1 and ISB2) or on appropriate sets of the most frequently occuring items (MSB1 and MSBz). This result confirms the findings of Hackman and Anderson.

(2) Immediately following the affectively congruent message the MSB-based estimate of the criterion attitude measure was more accurate than that based on the individuals’ own beliefs. There was a significant difference in r values for the correlation between Ao,l/Z BtatMsB, positive and Ao, l /Z BtaiIsB, positive. (Hotelling test: tar = 2.188, N = 49, p < 0.05 using six beliefs; tdr = 1.787, N = 49, p < 0.05 using nine beliefs). This was the only significant difference found between MSB- and ISB-based estimates of Ao.

(3) The figures, in general, show an increase in accuracy of attitude estimate with use of increasing numbers of beliefs, whether these beliefs are the individuals’ own or those most frequently elicited by the population. Fishbein’s theory does not predict that this relationship is linear, only that the best estimate of attitude will be that based on a complete set (probably between six and nine items) of salient beliefs. (It should be noted that in Figures 1 through 3 the order of inclusion of items is different for MSB and ISB and that not all subjects elicited as many as nine beliefs,seeabove.)In 15ofthe 16instancesshowninFigures 1 through3 it was found that use of nine beliefs, compared with four beliefs, gave a better prediction of Ao. For the ISB-based estimates this is in line with Kaplan and Fishbein’s finding of an improved prediction using nine beliefs compared with six. Seven of these 15 differences were significant (p < 0.05, Hottelling test). In the present study the subjects were set to elicit only those beliefs that came easily and quickly to mind and were not allowed to respond with more than nine items. Under these conditions (with the possible exception of ISB2 positive) there is no evidence from the use of increasing numbers of elicited items that the limit of salience had been exceeded.

(4) The MSB-based estimates are similar in accuracy whether the beliefs used are those most frequently elicited at the start of the experiment and re-scaled at times 1 and 2 (MSBO,~ and MSBO,~), or the more appropriate sets which take account of the changes in belief structure following the message (MSBI positive; MSBl negative; MSBl none; MSB2 positive; MSB2 negative; MSB2 none).

In summary, this study confirms the findings of Hackman and Anderson that molecular estimates of attitude based on each individual’s own beliefs are no more accurate predictors of the criterion attitude measure than are estimates based on the beliefs most frequently elicited by the population. In line with the trend observed by Hackman and Anderson, in the single instance where the two estimates are significantly different it is the prediction based on the modal set of beliefs (MSB, positive) which is superior.


Figure 1. Correlations between global estimates of attitude and molecular estimates based on an increasing number of belief items from three sources following aflectiveiy congruent persuasion

I i

O ' * I 0.1

I , , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Number of beliefs

Kaplan and Fishbein suggested that Hackman and Anderson's results were due to the presence of non-salient items in individually elicited sets of beliefs following un- restricted elicitation. They argued that in such cases relatively short sets of modal beliefs would probably contain less non-salient items overall, thus accounting for the equivalence of the attitude estimates based on the two sources of beliefs. In the present study overlong forced elicitation was avoided by instructions to subjects, and the increasing accuracy of ISB-based predictions with the number of items used at least suggests that the limit of salience was not exceeded? Since there is no independent criterion of salience, the exact relation between accuracy of the molecular estimates and the number and source of items used cannot be assessed; but, in terms of the operational definition of salience, it follows from Kaplan and Fishbein's argument that

2. Under the conditions of the present ex- expected 7 f 2 items. If this were the case the periment (i.e., use of a complex attitude object, ISB-based estimate might have been more a persuasive communication and high infor- accurate if more rather than fewer items had mation content of rating scales) it is possible been used. that salience was artificially increased above the


Figure 2. Correlations between global estimates of attitude and molecular estimates based on an increasing number of belief items from three sources following affectively incongruent persuasion

T2 I

, I , , I I I I I

I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Number of beliefs

the success of estimates using modal belief items will be related to the proportion of these items actually elicited by each subject. Evidence to the contrary was found in the present study where inappropriate sets of modal beliefs, i.e., MSBo re-scaled at times 1 and 2, which did not reflect changes in the salient belief hierarchy following persuasive communications, proved to be equally good predictors of the criterion as the appropriate MSB- or ISB-based estimates. In view of this unexpected finding two further checks on the salience of the modal beliefs were made.

First, since in the present study the same subjects elicited beliefs, rated their own beliefs and rated the modal sets of beliefs, it was possible to assess the extent of salience among the modal items. More specifically, a count was made of responses made by subjects to items which were in the modal set andwhich had already been personally elicited. This was expressed as a percentage of the total number of responses (number of items x number of subjects) made to each set of modal beliefs. The distribution of responses to non-salient items across message conditions is shown in Table 1.


Figure 3. Correlations between global estimates of attitude and molecular estimates based on an increasing number of belief items from two sources for the no-message condition

0.3

0.2

0.1

I I I

1 , , , , I , , TI T Z

8 1 I I I I I I I I I

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Number of beliefs

Table 1. Frequency of salience of modal belief items

MeSSage condition

Numbex of Number of Percentage item responses to responses to responses selfelicited selfelicited

items items

Congruent time 1 Congruent time 2 Incongruent time 1 Incongruent time 2 Irrelevant time 1 Irrelevant time 2

441

441

441

441

270

270

205

188

195

208

92

101

46.5

42.6

44.3

47.1

34.1

38.0


Clearly in the present study a large proportion of responses to items in modal belief sets were in fact made to non-salient (not personaily elicited) items; and, further, the distribution of salience of modal belief items across the message conditions does not reflect the comparative accuracy of MSB- and ISB-based predictions of the criterion attitude measure shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Notably the particular success of C BtatMsB, positive is not reflected by a higher proportion of responses to salient items in this condition.

Second, following the success of the inappropriate sets of original modal beliefs when re-scaled at times 1 and 2, the 3i and at ratings of two entirely inappropriate sets of beliefs were used to compute a molecular estimate of attitude. More specifically, the ratings made of message items at times 1 and 2 by subjects in the control condition (no message) only were examined. Fifteen such items for which salience was negligible were used. These items were divided into two sets of beliefs, one comprising six negative items and the other the remaining nine positive items. Five of the negative items were not elicited at any time by any of the 30 subjects. The remaining item was elicited twice. For the positive set five items were never elicited, one was elicited three times, two were elicited twice and one was elicited once. Using the Bi and at ratings of these items at times 1 and 2, molecular estimates of attitude were computed and correlated with Ao,l and Ao,2 for these subjects. The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 2. This table shows that molecular estimates of attitude based on non-salient

Table 2. Correlations between global and molecular estimates of attitude for control subjects using four sources of beliefs

Belief Individuals’ Appropriate Non-salient Non-salient source own beliefs modal set items from items from

of beliefs positive negative message message

Number of items 6 9 6 9 6 9 6 used

Time I r = .480 .523 .454 .550 .582 .512 - .159 ** ** * ** ** ** (n.s.)

Time 2 r = .429 .562 .370 A99 .469 504 .070 * ** ** * ** (ns.)

** Significantly different from zero (p < 0.005) Significantly different from zero (p < 0.05)


(and probably new) items, providing the items are affectively congruent with Ao, are as good predictors of attitude as those based on the appropriate modal sets of beliefs or on the individuals’ own beliefs.

From the evidence presented above it is clear that the presence of salient beliefs in the modal set of beliefs is not crucial to the accuracy of MSB-based molecular estimates, either in absolute terms or in comparison with estimates where the individuals’ own beliefs are used. The modal sets of beliefs in the present study cannot be considered as approximations to sets of determinant beliefs, and their accuracy must derive from some other source. While not determinant beliefs, the items are acting as indicants of attitude. The implications of this for Fishbein’s theory are discussed below.

Determinant and indicant beliefs in attitude measurement

Hackman and Anderson suggested that their demonstration of the equivalence of molecular attitude estimates based on the individuals’ personal sets of beliefs and on the most frequently elicited beliefs is a serious problem for Fishbein’s model. The explanation put forward by Kaplan and Fishbein, that is, the presence of non-salient items in individuals’ personal sets of beliefs and the likelihood of minimizing this source of error with the use of only the most frequently elicited items, may well be true for some situations, but it cannot account for the results in the present study since here the modal sets of beliefs were non-salient for a substantial proportion of subjects, and equally good predictions of A. were achieved with a group of non-salient items whose content was highly specific and designed to change attitude, in other words items which were almost certainly new for most subjects.

The Kaplan and Fishbein explanation, while theoretically justified, is incomplete. While it follows from the central equation of the Fishbein model that, insofar as the concepts are operationalized, the attitude estimate based on personal salient beliefs must be the best possible, any source of error which affects the ISB- and MSB-based estimates differentially (and ‘salience’ is the least well operationalized concept in the model) will change the relative accuracy of the estimates based on the two sources of beliefs. In addition it is possible to derive, within the model, conditions under which non-salient beliefs or belief items from any source will co-vary with attitude while in no way implying causality. If sets of the most frequently elicited beliefs contain sufficient items of this kind an accurate estimate of attitude will result. In theory, then, it is possible for molecular estimates of attitude based on the most frequently elicited items, irrespective of the extent of their salience, to be as good as, although not better, than estimates based on sets of determinant, personally elicited beliefs. The conditions under which non-determinant items best act as indicants of attitude are discussed below.


Belief statements from any source, when rated for belief, belief strength or extent of agreement, can be used to give some indication of attitude. This is the basis of standard attitude measurement instruments. Fishbein (1968) has suggested that non- determinant items will act as good indicants of attitude when their scaling is based on evaluative inference from the attitude itself. He suggests that this will only occur to any extent when an item representing a new concept (that is, a new relationship between the attitude object and some other concept) is rated for belief in the absence of validation; i.e., when the subject has little or no information either from his past experience or from the rating situation as to how he should scale the item he will rate his belief in such an item in accordance with his attitude. Here the rating is caused by the attitude and therefore such ‘new, no-validation’ items will give accurate indication of attitude. This type of item is the basis of most standard attitude-measurement instruments where subjects rate their belief in, or agreement with, a series of items whose source is immaterial. The purification procedures associated with these attitude scales (e.g., Thurstone and Likert scales) ensure that the subjects’ rating of belief/disbelief or extent of agreement is determined by attitude, since the items that survive in the final instrument are those which are universally evaluated but not universally believed, that is, items which have neither objective nor consensual ‘truth’ value.3 The underlying assumption is that the subject with a positive attitude will agree with an item that re- Iates the attitude object to a positively evaluated concept and disagree with a statement that links it to a negatively evaluated concept; and similarly the individual with a negative attitude will disagree with the positive item and agree with the negative one.

On the other hand, Fishbein has also suggested that no prediction for indication of attitude can be made for items which are scaled for belief veridically (i.e., statements which represent beliefs the subject already holds, old beliefs, and which he scales accurately in accordance with those beliefs) or for new items which are scaled for belief by probablistic inference from other beliefs already held or from some aspect of the rating situation (i.e., new concepts rated with some degree of validation, ‘new’ validation’ items). However, it is suggested here that under some, predictable, circumstances such old and ‘new, validation’ items can give some degree of indication of attitude despite veridical scaling of belief and scaling based on probabilistic inference. This type of indication of attitude mzy occur when the item or series of items presented for belief rating is typical of the affective tone of each subject’s belief system about the attitude object in general and his salient belief hierarchy in particular. This kind of

3. Fishbein has suggested that, in general, not correlate with criterion A,,. Such items salient beliefs are based on objective or social are removed from Thurstone and Likert type validation, e.g., descriptive beliefs, and they instruments which therefore, in general, will therefore usually show little variance in comprise non-salient and non-belief items. belief strength, and hence belief ratings will

An exploratory study of determinant and indicant beliefi 18 1

indication normally requires that the attitude in question is based on consistently positive or consistently negative beliefs (i.e., that the attitude is unambivalent) and that the items to be scaled are affectively congruent with the attitude. For example, where the items to be rated are old, positive beliefs (whether salient or not) which are effectively a representative sample of a consistently positive belief system about a positive attitude object, then one might expect some low degree of co-variation between the ratings of such items, particularly sets of such items, and overall attitude. Similarly in the special case where successful, congruent persuasion occurs through presentation of new items which are affectively congruent with attitude and where there is sufficient validation (either from the message or the existing belief system) for acceptance and rating ofthe new items on the basis of probabilistic inference, then these new items (again irrespective of their salience, that is, whether or not they are determinants of the new at-

Table 3. Correlations between overall attitude (A,,) and belief strength x evaluation (Biai) for single items from modal belief sets using only subjects for whom the item was non-salient (not self-elicited), following the afectively congruent message

Message source r Number of Mean item Mean condition of item Ao/Bjat subjects evaluation A.

Congruent time 1 ‘New’, message items8 .519*** 25 1.80 7.92 .602*** 30 2.26 8.51

‘Old’, message itemsb .785*** 24 1.09 8.83 .656*** 31 2.26 9.03 .670*** 29 2.34 7.27

‘Old‘, non-message items .452* 16 0.56 8.56 ,434. 23 0.48 7.96 .203 26 1.27 8.11 .269 32 0.63 8.87

Congruent time 2 ‘New’, message items .381* 33 0.99 6.33 .291 31 2.39 6.97

,295 31 2.32 6.90

.406* 23 1.17 6.39

.322 27 1.37 6.74 - .232 30 0.23 6.07 .309* 30 0.40 6.37

‘Old‘, message items .305* 34 2.15 3.44

‘Old’, non-message items .622** 14 0.80 7.43

Significaatly different from zero (p c 0.05) ** Significantly different from zero (p < 0.01)

*** Significantly different from zero (p < 0.005) a. ‘New’ in this context refers to items not present in the original modal of set of beliefs b. ‘Old‘ in this context refers to items which were present in the original modal set of beliefs


Table 4. Correlations between overall attitude (A,) and belief strength x evaluation product (Btac) for single items from modal belief sets using only subjects for whom the item was non-salient (not sev-elicited) , following the afectively incongruent message

Message Source condition of item

r Number of Mean item Mean Ao/Blu{ subjects evaluation A.

Incongruent time 1 ‘New’,messageitem+ - .014 23 - 1.87 6.87 - .143 29 0.07 5.55

.324* 36 1.94 4.94 ‘Old’, message itemsb .183 26 1.92 5.23

.333* 26 2.00 5.69

.392** 40 1.67 5.32 ‘Old‘,non-messageitems .701* 10 0.60 4.50

- .011 25 - 0.04 4.72 .210 31 1.19 5 .oo

Incongruent time 2 ‘New’, message items .310 30 0.87 3.77 .012 17 1.03 1.88 .335 25 1 .a 3.88

‘Old’, message items .498*** 38 1.71 4.42 .407* 26 2.00 4.31

‘Old‘, non-message items .209 27 1.11 3.04 .179 27 0.11 3.96 .286 14 0.93 2.07 .323* 29 0.45 5.76

Significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) ** Significantly different from zero 0, < 0.01)

*** Significantly different from zero (p < 0.005) a. ‘New’ in this context refers to items not present in the original modal set of beliefs b. ‘Old’ in this context refers to items which were present in the original modal set of beliefs

titude) may be representative of the new belief system, in which case ratings of these new items may give some indication of the new attitude.

To summarize the discussion above, there are two general situations where items, irrespective of their source or salience, will act as indicants of attitude: (1) The best indication of attitude will be given by new items which are rated by

evaluative inference from overall attitude. (2) Under some specialized circumstances where the attitude is based on consistently

positive or consistently negative beliefs, and the items to be rated, whether established beliefs or new and whether salient or non-salient, are affectively representative of the existent belief hierarchy, then some level of indication of attitude can be expected.4

4. This type of situation commonly occurs in marketing investigations.


In the present study the extent to which the non-determinant items comprising the appropriate modal sets of beliefs (MSBI positive; MSBl negative; MSBl none; MSBz positive; MSBZnegative; MSBz none) were acting as indicants of attitude was examined by computing correlations between criterion attitude measures and single items Brat product values, using only responses to non-salient items (ie., items that were not elicited by that particular subject). The correlations obtained are shown in Tables 3,4 and 5. In all conditions a substantial proportion of the single item ratings co-vary significantly with attitude, showing that these items are acting as indicants of attitude. The suggestion that indication of attitude by modal itemscan account for the accuracy of C BtatMsB estimates in the present study is further supported by the extent of co-variation between A, and single item Btat values in the experimental condition where the C BtafMsB estimate was most accurate (C BlatMsB, positive).s In this condition seven out of the nine belief items were acting as indicants of attitude.

Modal sets of beliefs as indicants of attitude

A molecular estimate of attitude based on modal beliefs (L BtatM,B) may be accurate because the set of beliefs used approximates, across subjects, to the determinant beliefs of that attitude. Kaplan and Fishbein have suggested that where elicitation is forced beyond the threshold of salience, the use of the individual’s own elicited beliefs may produce less accurate estimates of attitude than use of a short modal belief set, but in the present study the MSB-based estimates were as good as, and in one case better than, the ISB-based estimate, despite short elicitation and despite evidence that the items used were non-salient for large proportions of subjects. In this study the accuracy of the MSB-based estimates must have been due to items acting as indicants of attitude, irrespective of their salience.

The particular mechanism whereby such indication of attitude occurs in this study, and the extent to which it occurs more generally in investigations using the Fishbein methodology, remains to be unravelled. While the best indication of attitude is likely to follow rating of ‘new, no-validation’ items by evaluative inference from attitude, clearly most of the items rated, in all conditions, were not of this kind. Unless the use of evaluative inference as a basis for rating belief is more widespread than the ‘new, no-validation’ category suggests, other mechanisms must also be operating in the present study.

5. The high correlations between A o B ~ ~ M s B , positive were in part due to consistently high Ao/single item ai correlations. These were not found systematically for other items or other conditions and must in part account for the success of the prediction of attitude by Z Biai M S B ~ positive. The explanation of indication by use of evaluative inference does not account

for this finding, which seems more likely to be related to the persuasion process, i.e., the message advocated shifts in evaluation of these related objects, and these shifts, whether or not causative of the new attitude, were representative of the new belief system from which the salient, determinant items were selected.


Table 5 . Correlations between overall attitude ( A o ) and belief strength x evaluation (Btai) for single items from modal belief sets using only subjects for whom the item was non-salient (not serf-elicited) . Control (no-message) condition

Message source condition of item

r Numberof Meanitcm Mean Aol&q subjects evaluation A.

Irrelevant time 1 ‘Old‘,non-messageitemsa .310 .265 .270 226 .469* .398*** .491* .611*** .498*

21 13 20 20 16 19 18 22 19

1.81 0.69 0.00 2.15 0.56 1 .00 1.11 2.14 2.42

8.33 8.30 8.30 7.60 9.00 8.42 8.44 8.50 8.63

Irrelevant time 2 ‘Old’,non-messageitems - .069 - .393 .074 .135 .624* .022 .473* .561** .496*

26 9 16 22 18 19 18 20 19

1.35 0.33

2.95 0.37 1.28 1.72 2.10 2.37

- 0.38

7.34 8.78 6.44 6.73 7.12 6.61 7.94 6.50 7.31

* Significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) ** Significantly different from zero ( p < 0.01)

*** Significantly different from zero (p < 0.005) a. ‘Old’ in this context refers to items which were present in the original modal set of beliefs

It is possible that following the persuasive communications sufficient ‘new, no- validation’ items reached the modal belief sets for indication of attitude to occur in these conditions, at least in part, by scaling in accordance with attitude (although it is difficult to class authoritative persuasion as a ‘no-validation’ situation). This could account in turn for the particularly high correlations between attitude and the single item &at products for the ‘new’ (not present in MSBo) message items immediately following congruent persuasion and for the notable accuracy of the MSB-based estimate in that condition. But equally high correlations were observed in this condition €or ‘old’ message items, i.e., those present in the original modal set of beliefs and reinforced by the message. There is no evidence of rating in accordance with attitude following incongruent persuasion. Here the finding that the ‘new’ negative message items were, in general, rated as ‘strongly believed’ is incompatible with scaling by evaluative inference and implies either some degree of acceptance of the message or veridical scaling of what

An exploratory study of determinant and indicant belie@ 185

n fact were not ‘new’ message items but ‘old’ affectively inconsistent beliefs.6 In summary it is suggested that the accuracy of the MSB-based estimates of attitude in

the present study was largely the result of items (whether or not determinant of attitude) acting as indicants of attitude, and that the extent of indication observed was primarily the result of using an attitude object about which the subjects heldconsistently positive beliefs. In this situation veridical scaling of established but non-salient beliefs indicated attitude since these items, while not determinant, were representative of the consistent affective tone of the belief systems. In addition it is likely that immediately following congruent persuasion the message items which reached the modal belief set were rated by evaluative inference from attitude. It is likely that similar situations, i.e.,unambivalent attitudes and congruent persuasion,will occur in fieldwork, especially in the marketing area.

Conclusions

The data presented in this study support previous evidence that molecular estimates of attitude derived from the Fishbein equation are equally good predictors of the criterion attitude measure whether they are based on personal salient ,beliefs elicited by each subject or on a set of the beliefs most frequently occurring in the population. In practical terms this finding supports the more usual use of modal sets of beliefs, although the choice of belief source must finally rest on the overall purpose of the investigation and the administrative problems associated with large-scale elicitation. Clearly when the determinants of attitude are the focus of interest, use of the individuals’ own beliefs is preferable; but for general attitude measurement (or prediction of behavior using the related techniques) neither the present study nor the two previous ones have indicated that the use of standard instruments based on the most frequent beliefs is significantly inferior to the use of sets of individuals’ own determinant beliefs as currently achieved.

From a theoretical point of view the results are less satisfactory. While Hackman and

6. The apparent use of evaluative inference for rating of congruent items, while incongruent items are rated by probabilistic inference, can account for the relatively high correlation between attitude and 6 Biai which was found when the molecular estimate of attitude was based on demonstrably non-salient and almost certainly new items taken from the congruent message but rated in non-persuasive form by the control (no message) subjects. Other possible explanations for this finding are: (a) That the items taken from the congruent

message were not ‘new’ and as ‘old‘ belief items were affectively representative of the existing belief structure or (b) that fortuitous correlations can arise when positive attitude scores are correlated with 6 Biai based on positive beliefs. Whereas in this situation one might expect a clustering of points on a scatter diagram but not co-variation, it is conceivable that consistent response styles in the scaling of attitude and Bi and at might lead to some low degree of covariation.


Anderson suggest that the equivalence of the two sources of beliefs, personal and modal, is a serious problem for Fishbein’s theory, it has been argued there that, although theoretically the determinant beliefs must provide the best estimate of an attitude, this may be equalled, but not surpassed, by use of modal sets of beliefs which act as indicants of attitude, whether they are determinant beliefs or not.

This conclusion, however, leads to a difficulty of adifferent kind for Fishbein’s theory, a problem which arises from the need for a criterion of salience independent of the operational definition.Since it has been shown that the Fishbein formula can(inat least some cases) be used to predict a criterion measure of attitude when the beliefs on which the molecular estimate is based are not salient but acting as indicants of attitude, the use of correlation with criterion as a test of the selection of belief items, or as a test of the theory itself (as opposed to a test of the formula as a technique of attitude measurement), is of little value.

REFERENCES

Ajzen, I. (1971), Attitudinal vs normative measures: An investigation of the differential effects of persuasive communications on behaviour. Sociom., 34,263-280.

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- and Fishbein, M. (1973), Attitudinal and normative variables as predictors of specific behaviours. J. Pers. soc. Psychol.,

Bruce, J. (1971), First experiences with Fishbein theory and survey methods. In Proceedings of ESOMAR (European Society of Market Research) seminar on advertising research. Madrid.

Cowling, T. (1973), Determining and influencing consumer purchase decisions. Eur. Res. (l), 26-31.

Fishbein, M. (1968), Unpublished paper on political behaviour.

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- and Ajzen, I. (1972), Attitudes and opinions. In P. Mussen and M. Rosenzweig (Eds.) Annual review of psychology, 1972. Palo Alto, Annual Reviews Inc. Pp.

- and Jaccard, J.J. (1973), Theoretical and methodological issues in the prediction of family planning intentions and behaviour. Repres. Res. soc. Psychol.,

- and Raven, B.H. (1962), The AB scales: An operational definition of belief and attitude. Hum. Rela., 15, 35-44.

Hackman, J.R., and Anderson, L.R. (1968), The strength, relevance and source of beliefs about an object in Fishbein’s attitude theory. J. soc. Psychol., 76,55-67.

Jaccard, J.J., and Davidson, A.R. (1972), Toward an understanding of family planning behaviours: An initial investigation, J. app. SOC. Psychol., 2, 228-235.

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Rdsume

Dans I'6quation qui est au centre de la theorie des attitudes de Fishbein, I'affect global lie A un objet est &gal A I'evaluation de ce dernier multiplik par I'intensite de la conviction de I'individu concern6 envers ses croyances les plus saillantes. Deux etudes anterieures ont montre des previsions egalement exactes que ce soit en utilisant les croyances spontanement exprimks par chaque individu (ISB) ou en utilisant les croyances les plus frequemment exprimks par la population (MSB). Ce resultat est retrouvC ici dans le contexte d'une etude sur les change- ments d'attitudes. L'explication donnke par Fishbein de I'efficacite et de 1'6ventuelle superiorit6 d'ensembles modaux de croyances par rapport aux ensembles de croyances des individus, A savoir que les MSB contiennent en moins grand nombre que les ISB des elements non-saillants exprimes de maniere forck et inexacte, ne peut rendre compte des resultats de la presente etude puisqu'il y est montre qu'une large proportion des MSB etaient non- saillants pour une gande partie des individus. Qui plus est, certains ensembles de croyances connus comme &ant inappropries, c'est-A-dire comme n'etant ni modalement saillants ni individuellement saillants, se rev&- lent ici etre de bons facteurs de prevision d'attitudes quand on utilise I'tquation de Fishbein. Les implications de ces observations pour la thtorie et I'utilisation pratique de la technique de Fishbein sont envisagks.

Zusammenfassung

In der Hauptgleichung von Fishbeins Atti- tudentheorie ist der Gesamtaffekt einem Objekt gegenuber, gleich dem Betrag von Bewertung x Uberzeugungsgrad (Belief strength) bei prominenten Meinungen, die das betreffende Individuum hat. Zwei friihere Studien haben gleichgute Einstellungsvorhersagen ergeben, unabhangig davon, ob die verwendeten Mei- nungen spontan von jedem Individuum produ- ziert wurden (ISB), oder ob es sich um die am haufigsten in der Bevolkerung geauhrten Meinungen (MSB) handelte. Dieses Ergebnis wird hier im Zusammenhang mit einer Ein- stellungsstudie repliziert. Fishbeins Erklarung fur die Effizienz und zeitweilige Uberlegenheit von Meinungsmittelwerten im Verhaltnis zu den individuellen Meinungswerten, d.h. daB MSB weniger nicht-prominente Items enthal- ten als ISB, die auf Grund fehlerhafter, er- zwungener Produktion resultieren, kann fur die gegenwlrtige Studie nicht gelten, da es sich gezeigt hat, daD ein groI3er Anteil von MSB fur viele Vpn nicht-prominent war. Weiterhin wird dargestellt, daD gewisse, als ungeeignet be- kannte Meinungssysteme, d.h. solche, die weder im Bevolkerungsmittel noch individuell prominent sind, unter Verwendung der Fish- beingleichung gute Vorhersageinstrumente fur Attitiiden sind. Die Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse fur die Theorie und die praktische Anwendung der Fishbein-Technik werden er- ortert.

An exploratory study of determinant and indicant beliefs in attitude measurement

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