An Experimental Test of Information & Decision Markets Robin Hanson, Takashi Ishikida and John...
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Transcript of An Experimental Test of Information & Decision Markets Robin Hanson, Takashi Ishikida and John...
An Experimental Test of Information & Decision Markets
Robin Hanson, Takashi Ishikida and John Ledyard
Caltech
2/4/2005
25 minute presentation!
25 minute presentation!
DIMACS 2
Information Markets• Standard Information Markets seem to work.
– Small but complete set of securities– Many informationally small and unbiased traders.
• Theory and evidence from experiments and applications are all positive.
• But all assume, require, use, …..– Straight-forward behavior
• Price taking, honest revelation, etc.
– Complete set of state dependent contracts – Common knowledge of all priors, …
• Even then we see “failures to fully aggregate information”– Incomplete Bayesian updating– Incompletely revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium
DIMACS 3
Decision vs Prediction
• A policy maker does not just want to know the probability that “terrorist attacks in the US will increase in 2005.”
• They want to know the probability that “terrorist attacks in the US will increase in 2005” if “US troops remain in Iraq for 2005.”
• With N events (attacks, troop size, …) and S outcomes for each (increase from 10-20%, decrease, …), a complete set of state dependent contracts requires N^S - 1 contracts.
S = 2, N = 8 => 255 contracts
DIMACS 4
Remember PAM?
Goal: Collect accurate predictive information on political and economic stability in the middle east.
DIMACS 5
Every nation*quarter:-Political stability-Military activity-Economic growth-US $ aid-US military activity& all combinations& ………8 nations, 5 indices,4 quarters
Remember PAM?
DIMACS 6
Every nation*quarter:-Political stability-Military activity-Economic growth-US $ aid-US military activity& all combinations& ………8 nations, 5 indices,4 quarters (N = 180)
•Even if we only use up-down questions, completeness requires 2^180 =1.5*(10^54) contracts.
Remember PAM?
DIMACS 7
Using Conditional Contracts
• The good news– There may more overall trading.
• Traders may know more about and be more willing to trade on the relatively more precise event {terrorism up | troops up} as opposed to the less precise {terrorism up}.
• The bad news– There may be thinner trading per security.
• Too many markets to pay attention to.
– Thinner trading => bad price discovery and incomplete arbitrage => prices do not aggregate information.
DIMACS 8
Decision Markets
• Markets for Decision Analysis will be thin.– Large and possibly incomplete set of securities– Few informationally large and biased traders
• Theory is unlikely to be a good predictor of behavior.
• Current applications and experiments may not be applicable to the thinner situation.
• How can we know what will actually work?
DIMACS 9
Experimental Test Beds
• Create an environment that”captures” as much of the problem as possible (the econ wind tunnel)– Three traders, three events with 2 outcome each (8 states)
– Common prior with asymmetric information• 10 draws from one urn of 6 equally likely => (1,0,1), (1,1,0),…..
• Each trader sees only two entries of each draw: (1,0,x), (1,1,x),…
• Run different mechanisms and market designs
• Measure performance – How close are final prices to the fully informed posterior?
DIMACS 10
3 Variable CDFs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
KL Distance from Group Posterior
CDF
Prior Distribution
Individual Posterior
Uniform Disribution
Theory Benchmarks - 3 eventsposteriors
priors uniform
DIMACS 11
3 Variable CDFs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.00E+00 5.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.50E-01 2.00E-01 2.50E-01 3.00E-01 3.50E-01 4.00E-01
KL Distance from Group Posterior
CDF
Individual (72)
Prior Distribution
Individual Posterior
Uniform Disribution
Individual Scoring Ruleposteriors
priors uniform
DIMACS 12
3 Variable CDFs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
KL Distance from Group Posterior
CDF
Independent DA (24)
Individual (72)
Prior Distribution
Individual Posterior
Uniform Disribution
Standard Marketsposteriors
priors uniform
DIMACS 13
Design Matters• Asking is not enough.• “Let there be markets” is not enough.• Conjecture: An IM will work better in thin
situations, if we use (to “thicken” trading)– Conditional contracts and – a Combinatoric (package bid) Call Market
• Includes “no arbitrage” pricing but is intermittent• Does not directly address “monopolistic agents”
DIMACS 14
3 Variable CDFs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
KL Distance from Group Posterior
CDF
Independent DA (24)
Combined Value (22)
Individual (72)
Prior Distribution
Individual Posterior
Uniform Disribution
Combinatoric Call Marketposteriors
priors
uniform
DIMACS 15
Design Matters• We are not yet at complete aggregation.• Conjecture: An IM will work even better in
thin situations, if we use (to “thicken” trading)– Conditional contracts and – A Combinatoric Sequentially Shared (Market)
Scoring Rule• Is continuous and directly addresses report
manipulation• But it involves a subsidy to traders.
DIMACS 16
3 Variable CDFs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
KL Distance from Group Posterior
CDF
Independent DA (24)
Combined Value (22)
Market Maker (8)
Individual (72)
Prior Distribution
Individual Posterior
Uniform Disribution
Shared Scoring Rule - w/CCposteriors
priors
uniform
DIMACS 17
Tentative Conclusions
• Standard markets and surveys do not work will in thin situations.
• Using conditional contracts and assuming some self - selection, either combinatoric call markets or combinatoric sequentially shared scoring rules significantly improve performance over standard markets.
DIMACS 18
Open Questions
• There are many others we did not test– Pari-mutuel mechanisms
• Economides, Lange, and Longitude (some combinatorics)
• Pennock - Dynamic Pari-mutel Market
• Plott - Auction then Pari-mutuel
DIMACS 19
Open Questions
• There are many others we did not test– Pari-mutuel mechanisms
• Economides, Lange, and Longitude (some combinatorics)
• Pennock - Dynamic Pari-mutel Market• Plott - Auction then Pari-mutuel
– Others• HP - • ……….
DIMACS 20
Some Open Questions
• There are many other mechanisms we did not test.– Pari-mutuel mechanisms
• Economides, Lange, and Longitude (some combinatorics)• Pennock - Dynamic Pari-mutel Market• Plott - Auction then Pari-mutuel
– Others• HP - • ……….
• There are many other environments we did not test in.– Information monopolist– External incentives to manipulate internally– And for PAM -- do these results survive in an ultra-thin world?
DIMACS 21
A Force 12 Storm
• Create an environment that really stress-tests the mechanisms– Six traders, 8 events w/ two outcomes each
(256 states)– Common prior with asymmetric information
• 10 draws from one urn of 8! equally likely:– (1,0,1,0,1,1,0,0), (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0),…..
• Each trader sees only 4 different entries: – (1,0,x,0,x,1,x,x), (1,0,x,0,x,1,x,x), …
DIMACS 22
8 Variable CDFs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
KL Distance from Group Posterior
CDF
Independent DA (18)
Combined Value (12)
Market Maker (17)
Individual (144)
Prior Distribution
Individual Posterior
Uniform Distribution
posteriors
uniform
priors
DIMACS 23
Summary of Testing• Thin: 3 traders, 3 events
• 7 independent prices from 3 people in 12 minutes• Markets < Individual Scoring Rule < Call < SSSR• SSSR ~ Call given that the group beats the prior
– With selection, SSSR and Call Market do best.
• Ultra-Thin: 6 traders, 8 events • 255 independent prices from 6 people in 12 min. • Markets ~ Individual Scoring Rule ~ Call < SSSR
– SSSR beats the priors at the top (60%)– Nothing else even beats the priors
– SSSR is only one with any aggregation
DIMACS 24
Final Thoughts
• Information Markets are possible and desirable.– Can improve our ability to identify and deal with uncertainty.
• Many policy applications will be in thin situations. • Traditional market designs do not work in thin
situations. – Information monopolies, adverse decisions, partial updating
• The SSSR (w/conditionals) definitely sharpens the signal/noise ratio in thin and ultra-thin markets over traditional markets.
• Can we do better? Undoubtedly.
DIMACS 25