An Examination of the Interdependence Btween Un Peackeeping and Peacemaking

8/12/2019 An Examination of the Interdependence Btween Un Peackeeping and Peacemaking

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International Peace Research Association IPRA)

UN BLUE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN UN PEACEKEEPING ANDPEACEMAKINGAuthor(s): Susan S. AlleeSource: International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2009), pp. 83-107Published by: International Peace Research Association (IPRA)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852986.

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International ournal fPeace Studies,Volume 4,Number ,Spring/Summer009

UN BLUE: AN EXAMINATIONOF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEENUN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

Susan S. Allee

AbstractIn this rticle he uthor xamines ow the nteractionetween hepoliticalnd militarylementsfmulti-trackpproaches o UN peacekeepingnd peacemaking ave playedout in thefield nd atHeadquartersnconflicts here heUN rubrics attached o both asksbutwhere hey re notunitedunder neoperation. he uthor ffersheUnitedNations ffortsnCyprusnd Lebanon s illustrationsto aid in the nterrogationf how well the nstitutionarmonizes eacekeepingnd peacemaking.Drawing n the cademic iteraturend the uthor'sxperiences a practitioner,he nalysis races owpublicdevelopmentss well as considerationsnternal o theUN have nfluencedhe ourse f action.The author xplores heUN Peacekeeping orce n CyprusUNFICYP)and the UN Interimorce nLebanonUNIFIL)toanalyze he ssues,with heobjectivef hedding ight n how bettero tailor heUN structuresomove he rocess o ustainableeace.

IntroductionA critical and insistent heme forthe analyst of United Nations peacekeeping andpeacemaking is that of success and failure. Why else botherreviewing and evaluating ifthe ultimateobjective is not to ascertain how to make these venturessucceed? Certainly,this must be the case for the practitioneranalyst. The Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) when designing an operation, aims for a concept that will bringabout success; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) when strategizing with a

mediator has the same goal. When I make presentationson UN peacekeeping, studentsconsistently ask me to relate the success stories (if indeed I believe there are any).However, judging success or failure- conventionally considered mutuallyexclusive - isa trickybusiness.While in the throes of crises, we in the UN debate among ourselves and with ourcounterparts in the diplomatic corps how best to address an emerging or explodedconflict, nd often differ ointedly f notheatedly on method,approach and mandate. Atthe same time,those outside the UN who are in thebusiness of assessing the outcome of

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84 UN Blue: AnExamination f the nterdependencethe decisions made on these mattersdiffer ubstantiallyon how to go about evaluating theUN's (or internationalcommunity's) efforts. There is obviously no one dispositivefactor, houghevaluation is furthered y focusinga lens on individual elements.In this article I propose to examine a particularframeworkforUN peace effortsthat has not been extensively analyzed: that where the political diplomacy andpeacekeeping undertakenby the UN itself is bifurcated. In this context, I intend toexamine how the interaction interdependence among thepolitical,military nd what Iwould term civilian-operational elements of dual-track pproaches to UN peacekeepingand peacemaking have played out in the field and at UN Headquarters in conflictsituations where the UN rubric is attached to both tasks but where they are not unitedunder one operation. My aim is to shed lighton how betterto tailor these arrangementsto move the process to the end-goal: an exit for the peacekeepers through he attainmentof sustainable peace.Peacekeeping and peacemaking have been, and continue as, evolvingconcepts. To start the discussion, the definitions set out in UN Secretary-GeneralBoutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace are useful. Peacemaking is defined there as actionto bringhostile parties to agreement, essentially throughsuch peaceful means as thoseforeseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. The use of politicaldiplomacy is implicit in this activity. Peacekeeping is set out as the deployment of aUnited Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the partiesconcerned, normally involving UN military ... personnel and frequentlycivilians aswell. The ensuing statementof aims elaborates: Our aims must be . where conflicterupts,to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues thathave led to conflict;through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile,where fightinghasbeen halted and to assist in implementing greementsachieved by thepeacemakers (UNA/4/277,1992).I will offer UN peace efforts n Cyprus and Lebanon, comprised of traditionalpeacekeeping missions and separate UN political tracks, as illustrations to interrogatehow well the institutionharmonizes various aspects of peacekeeping and peacemaking,looking at where the different oles merge, complement, overlap, and/or contradictoneanother. My analysis will trace the process by which strategicdecisions are made andhow public events and developments as well as considerations internal to the UNinfluence the course of action and dynamics in a UN directed multi-track pproach. Iintend to explore theparticularcharacteristicsof theUnited Nations Peacekeeping Forcein Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations InterimForce in Lebanon (UNIFIL), theirmilitary and civilian roles and the inter-connection with the political undertakings.UNFICYP exemplifies a traditional operation, but one which from the outset had adiplomatic process annexed to but not incorporatedwithin t; UNIFIL, also traditional nconcept, constitutes however a departure in certain respects from both the traditionalceasefire maintenance model of peacekeeping and the contemporarymulti-dimensionalUN operation. (In fact, it has evolved from a more or less traditional peacekeeping



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Susan S. Allee 85mission to a large complex mission that,unusually, has a military ead). I will analyzesuch issues as how the militaryeffort an (or sometimes may not) supportthe politicalintent and vice versa, and how the civilian and military operational elements worktogether (or sometimes do not) to make a mission function. At all times, thepeacekeeping missions have been adjunct to but integrally involved in a multi-trackapproach with otherUN actors pursuing the political agenda. These characteristics etthem apart from the newer multi-dimensionalpeacekeeping operation which has directinvolvement n thepolitical process.

Crisis Management and Conflict ResolutionThe history of UN peacekeeping has been extensively detailed in countlessacademic texts,conference papers, books, media outlets, ournal articles and of course,UN documents. For present purposes it is hardlynecessary to reiterate he sum total butit will be useful to summarize some of thehighlights,both chronological and conceptual.Traditional (or classical peacekeeping as it is called in the UN's own Blue Helmets) asconceived and embodied in the earliest operations was almost exclusively a militaryoriented effort ntended to ensure the maintenance of a truce or ceasefire between

belligerentstates UN/DPI-77?e Blue Helmets, 1996). It involves buffer ones, separationof opposing forces,the inter-positioning fUN troops,ceasefire monitoring, nd a degreeof militarymediation, liaison and persuasion. It rests firmlyon the three paramountprinciples of impartiality, onsent of the parties and the non-use of force except in self-defense. It derived from the Security Council's responsibilityto assertively counterthreats to international peace and security, which in the first 40 years of theOrganization's existence were viewed almost exclusively as phenomena of interstateconflict.It is generally accepted that the significantbreak from this framework ook shapeimmediately following the end of the Cold War, when the UN launched one multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation after nother and was forced to overtlybroaden thescope of threats to the peace to encompass civil conflict and large scale violations ofhuman rights.1 Thus a fairlystrict delineation of interstate onflict as the red flag toprompt SecurityCouncil action gave way to a looser framework, ver timetouching uponor eventually embracing concepts such as state denial of self-determination,massivehumanitarian crises whether internal to a state or cross-border, the thwartingof ademocratic process or deposing of democratically elected leaders and civil war. Thisprogression makes manifestthe move from the concept of what scholars have come tocall negative peace to positive peace.The UN General Assembly (GA) has described these concepts. First,the 1984Declaration of the Rights of People to Peace emphasized, consistent with globalthinking/values t the time and historically, negative peace or the notion of peace as



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86 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependenceabsence of war: the exercise of theright fpeoples to peace demands thatthepolicies ofStates be directed towards the elimination of the threatof war, particularlynuclear war,the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the settlement ofdisputes by peaceful means (UN/GAR A/39/11, 1984). By contrast, n 1991 globalthinkingon the standards for truepeace had developed to the point that when the GApassed a resolution that year entitled Promotion of Peace, it defined the concept,consistent with positive peace, as follows: peace is notmerelythe absence of war, butthat interdependence and cooperation to foster human rights, social and economicdevelopment, disarmament, protection of the environment and ecosystems and theimprovementof the quality of life for all are indispensable elements forthe establishmentofpeaceful societies (UN/GAR A/51/10,1996).Addressing these complex multi-layered aspirations began at this time to bewoven into the fabric of UN peace operations, both of diplomatic and peacekeepingmissions. These in turngave rise to the second generationof peacekeeping, that of themulti-dimensionalpeacekeeping operation. It could be said thatthis evolution describeda shift n emphasis for UN Security Council mandated operations from de facto crisismanagementto full-scale conflictresolution. Immediate peace, or elimination,or at leastsubstantial reduction in conflict was no longer seen as adequate by the internationalcommunity; f the SecurityCouncil was going to launch a UN peace operation, it wouldnow mandate a means toward obtaining a durable and comprehensive peace for a stablesociety. The veritable frenzy of launching peacekeeping operations in the late1980's/early 1990s suggests thatthe SecurityCouncil was at first aught up in a snowballeffectmore than conscientious implementationof a new doctrine. Only over time did thenew positive peace direction come to be a result of design. Be that as it may, theorientation of UN peacemaking and peacekeeping had changed. A not insignificantmanifestation of the shift in Security Council intent was the move from ForceCommanders as heads of peacekeeping operations to civilian Special Representatives ofthe Secretary-General SRSG). The latter,generally speaking (UNFICYP and the UnitedNations Mission for theReferendum n Western Sahara are two exceptions), had a muchbroader set of responsibilities than the former,with overall UN authority n theater andsubstantialpolitical/diplomaticresponsibilities.This change of course did not materialize out of thin air. Withoutrehashingherethe historical analyses of Cold War to post collapse-of-Berlin Wall Security Councildynamics,I will note that the thaw enabled unanimous SecurityCouncil action to addressmanymore conflict situations deemed to pose a threat o international eace and security,and to do so more comprehensively. However, what did not change was the perceptionby the major powers that there were conflicts over which each of them was entitled toexercise theirprerogative; or conflicts which may warrant action but which were notquite as pertinent o their trategic nterests s others. It can also be said, bothhistoricallyand currently,that when there is not a cohesive international,or regional, politicalstrategy o address a conflict,or where powerfulglobal or regional interestsfind the need



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Susan S. Allee 87for a scapegoat or a stopgap or an excuse, pressure is broughtto bear on the SecurityCouncil to establish a peacekeeping operation. Thus there are numerous examples ofpeacekeeping operations thatwere set up after he thaw withgrossly inadequate resourceseven with an expansive mandate, leading to problems on an enormous scale, Bosnia andRwanda being outstanding n thisregard.In Cyprus and the Middle East, UN effortshave been severely handicapped by acombination of several of these factors. In both,key powers have feltexclusively entitledto exercise theirprerogative. In both, UN peace effortshave been used as a scapegoatand an excuse. I would also contend that in neither has there been a cohesiveinternational r regional political strategy o address the conflict;while there s likely tobe little argument on this being true for the Middle East in general and Lebanon inparticular,observersmightdissent in the case of Cyprus. Nevertheless I findpersuasivetheanalysis thatdespite thedesignationof a mediator and the various plans for a solution,an effective solution to the problem has generally been a distantsecondary concern forthekey international ctors (the United Kingdom, the United States,Greece and Turkey),with Turkey and Greece having overridingdomestic agendas and the UK and US firstand foremost wanting to maintain stability and influence in this critical easternMediterranean outpost (See inter alia, Richmond, 1998; O'Malley and Craig, 2004;Hitchens, 1997). The fact that the European Union accepted a divided Cyprus is alsorevealing in this regard. As a consequence, UN peace operations and diplomacy inLebanon and Cyprus have formany years had structures hatwere inadequate to the taskof conflictresolution,though in theirrespective peacekeeping operations theyhave seensuccess in crisis management, or negative peace. And because of these structures, heUN missions have sufferedfrom he institutional hortcomingsof theUN Secretariat.I will detail the operational constructs and give a briefhistoryof the missions injust a moment. It is not thepurpose of thisendeavor, however, to delve into the conflictsthemselves, or to analyze the substance of the peace processes. It is to offer n analysisof the UN's approach and structures n Cyprus and Lebanon in an effort o determinewhere these mighthave contributedto the failure of international nitiatives to obtain alasting solution to the crises. The dynamics and structures hat have hindered the UNhave been of a piece over the duration of these protractedmesses even as events havediffered. Because I have personal familiaritywith the last ten plus years of the UN'sactivity nd forreasons of manageability, I will focus on this recenthistory. While not athoroughchronological overview it is nevertheless emblematic. Regarding Cyprus, I willdiscuss UNFICYP and the Good Offices operations. As to the Middle East, I intend tofocus on Lebanon to make my observations and argumentssince attempting o cover theUN structures and activities in all sectors of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be toounwieldy in an article of this length and scope. Both UNFICYP and UNIFIL arelongstanding peacekeeping operations in the classical mode. However, what sets themapart is that both have been functioning n tandem with UN peacemaking initiatives onthe ground. Both have co-existed with representatives of the Secretary-General who



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88 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependencewere pursuing diplomatic courses of action and were accountable to the Secretariat'spolitical department ather han to thepeacekeeping department. Interestingly, oth haveseen a shift n the past threeyears away from their historic modus operandi: UNFICYPwas headed by an SRSG from 2006 to 2008 who integrated the peacemaking andpeacekeeping roles of the UN in Cyprus, and UNIFIL since August 2006 has seen itsmandate revised to incorporatecertainlimited characteristicsof a complex peacekeepingoperation. Nevertheless,thepeacekeeping/political dichotomyprevails.2

CyprusUpon establishing UNFICYP in 1964 in the wake of inter-communalconflict in

Cyprus, the SecurityCouncil mandated a Force to be headed by a militarycommander,and recommended that the Secretary-General designate a mediator to promote apeaceful solution and an agreed settlementof the problem confrontingCyprus. Thefunctionof the Force was set out to be, in the interest f preserving nternationalpeaceand security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fightingand, asnecessary, to contribute o themaintenance and restoration f law and order and a returnto normal conditions (UN/SCR 186, 1964). UNFICYP, and indeed the mediator,hasbeen operatingunder this same mandate since its inception.Constructive discussion of the structureand operational parameters of a UNpeacekeeping or peacemaking initiative is aided by factoring n the political context inwhich the Security Council acted at the time it established the mission(s) - forpresentpurposes, mytreatmentwill necessarily be perfunctory. n the case of Cyprus,the UnitedKingdom had recently relinquished its colonial rule of the island, but not its militarypresence. Greece and Turkey,both members of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization(NATO) but with a seethinghistorical enmity,had starklyopposing interests n the newcountry,with Athens alternately favoringunion of the island with Greece or a Greekdominated self-government, nd Ankara having a vested interestboth in protectingtheTurkishminority s well as wielding its own influence on Cyprus. The United States hada behind the scenes role and interest,paramount among them in balancing the NATOrelationships, n benefitingfrom Britain's militarypositions on the island, particularly nrelation to the Middle East, and in keeping a hand in its ally's activities so close to thatregion. The UK and theUS in 1964, and ever since, saw the need for UN involvement,knowing that there were limitations on how Britain could act and what it could achievegiven its ambiguous position as recent colonial power. The Soviet Union, on the otherhand, did not have a strategic nterest n Cyprus that would call forobstructingSecurityCouncil action. In brief, hese are the main ingredients hat allowed forthe establishmentof UNFICYP and the Mediator's office. At the same time, however, because of theCypriot constitutionalmandate for Guarantor roles forGreece, Turkey and the UK, the



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Susan S. Allee 89UN role had to be a narrow one and had to meet with the approval of the threepowers aswell as theGovernmentof Cyprus.

Thus a peacekeeping operation was set up with its own military commandstructure, nd a Mediator was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), but with a separate task and no direct operational relationship withUNFICYP. This was to remain the arrangementfor thenext 30 years, thoughthe effortsof both were tied to the same resolution and the same mandate review and renewal. In1974, ten years after these structureswere put in place, a simmeringsituation of civilunrest was catapulted into militaryconfrontation when a Greece backed coup d'etatagainst the Cyprus Governmentprovoked militaryaction by Turkey. When a ceasefirewas brokered,monitoringthat ceasefire and maintaining a demilitarized zone becameUNFICYP tasks, but the original mandate and respective roles for the Force and theMediator did not change.Over time,the Mediators, or SRSGs, consolidated theirauthority o some degree,actingmore and more independentlyof theGuarantorpowers in the exercise of the goodoffices of the Secretary-General, and more closely with the Cypriot leadership.UNFICYP on theother hand has had little uthority r influence and the two facets of theUN peace effort n Cyprus have generallyfunctionedseparately, despite the ties of theirreporting ycle to the Security Council. Until the 1990s, and then only in a confusedfashion,and again in the past two years (thoughwithouta formalgood officesmission),UN peacemaking and peace negotiatingwere not in any concreteway accountable to oneanother. The chronology of UN leadership in Cyprus over the last decade and a halfmakes a statement in and of itself about the oft-times convoluted dynamics of UNpeacekeeping and peacemaking. In the mid-1990s, after the SRSG became a non-residentposition,the SRSG was double-hatted as Chief ofMission forUNFICYP. Theposition of Deputy SRSG, to be resident n Cyprus, was created, and within two years,theDeputy was designated Chief of Mission (COM). Two years later,theDSRSG/COMbecame SRSG for UNFICYP but at the Assistant-Secretary-Generallevel, and theSecretary-General continued to appoint non-resident Special Envoys at the Under-Secretary-General evel to carryon the Good Offices function of the Mediator, distinctfromUNFICYP. Following the failure of the referendum orunificationofCyprus underthe Annan Plan in 2004, the Secretary-General uspended his good offices efforts nd didnot again find conditions conducive to the re-appointment f a Mediator until late 2008,althoughin January 006 he assigned certainpolitical/diplomatictasks to his new SRSGforUNFICYP. One way however that UN peacemaking and peacekeeping initiativeshave been linked fromtime to time has been throughthreats, ither mplicitor explicit,by international layers to withdrawthe Force if no progress was made on negotiations.Reviewing this history one commentator has observed, Even when peacekeepingoperations do include mechanisms for conflict resolution, as was the case withUNFICYP, they are limited and not always a logical extension of the peacekeepingoperation (Diehl, 1993: 104).



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90 UN Blue: AnExamination f the nterdependenceCyprus has become firmly mbedded in the category of intractableconflict,andwhen asking the question why, an element that should be taken into account is what

factors internal to the UN, structurally, nstitutionally nd within the Security Councilmay have undermined UN efforts. Taking the last factor first, t has been plausiblyargued that one major shortcomingof all the apparentfanfare t the international evel isthat the true concern of the internationalcommunityhas been to prevent the Cyprusproblem fromignitinga wider conflict,and as explained above, of the key powers tomaintainstability nd influence. Notwithstanding he sincere,painstakingand committedefforts f individual mediators and their taffs, hemeaningfulharmonizedpush fromkeycapitals was never exerted. So long as the active hostilities were contained and indeednearlyeliminated,undue pressurewas notgoing to be broughtto bear on NATO partners,and neitherwas Britain's turf oing to be treadupon (Richmond, 1998: xvi). At the sametime, it has been argued and would indeed seem to be the case frommy own interactionwith the leadership on both sides of the island, that the parties also came to rely on theabsence of violent confrontation ffectively nsured by the peacekeeping operation as afailsafe and were, therefore, less inclined to make the hard choices required bynegotiations. UNFICYP both retards theprogress towards a lasting political settlement... and prevents serious violence, one close observer of UN efforts n Cyprus hasproclaimed (Richmond, 1998:14). FormerUnder-Secretary-Generalfor Political Affairs,Marrack Goulding has noted that n 1986 when he joined the United Nations, the lack ofprogress in peacemaking had underminedsupport n certainquartersforUNFICYP, andadded that in Washington and elsewhere UNFICYP's peacekeeping success hadbecome part of the problem as it minimized consequences for the Cypriot leaders oftheir intransigence (Goulding, 2002: 49). Paradoxically, UNFICYP was created withtheexplicit objective of generatingconditions thatwould facilitatea peace process.Thus the bifurcatedapproach to UN peace efforts rguably allowed for a certaincavalier attitudeon thepartof those it suited at the international nd local levels. But thebifurcated approach also, and significantly, had undermining consequencesinstitutionally, nd these were reinforced in a cyclical manner by structuralfactors.UNFICYP's Force Commander reported throughone line and the SRSG for Cyprusthrough nother. In the 1990s these organs of authoritywould be institutionalized s theDepartmentof Peacekeeping and Political Affairs,butpriorto that under different uisespeacekeeping and political authorityflowed throughdifferentOffices or individuals.)Turning again to Goulding's documentation of thedynamics extantduringhis tenure,hedescribes certaindevelopments in the early90s thatare illustrative. At the time therewasa move to shut down or sharply reduce UNFICYP. Goulding describes the resultingdynamic: within the secretariat his caused a certain tension: [Secretary-GeneralBoutrosBoutros Ghali] and the peacemakers welcomed the imminent collapse of UNFICYPbecause it demonstrated the urgency of the need for a settlement;the peacekeepersworried about how to maintain the ceasefire and buffer one and wanted to discuss withthe troop contributingcountries which of its tasks a smaller UNFICYP could still



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Susan S. Allee 91perform. I was told by Boutros not to do this; let theCypriot partiesfear the worst. Thisillustratedwell the dangers of putting peacemaking and peacekeeping into separatedepartmental oxes; mistakes would be made if thepeacekeepers were not au courantwith whatthepeacemakers were up to (Goulding, 2002: 55).It has not been unheard of for the SecretaryGeneral's Envoy to be dismissive ofthe SRSG of UNFICYP or of UNFICYP itself. My own experience of Cyprus a decadelater corroboratedthis observation; when I arrived as Special Advisor I overlapped forsome weeks withthe outgoing SRSG and Chief of Mission who had been serving in thatposition forsix years, duringwhich time a Special Envoy of the SG had been furiouslymediatingbetween the two parties to the conflict to broker a solution. It was freelyandwidely discussed and acknowledged in UNFICYP thatthe peacekeepers had had littlesubstantive knowledge of the activities of the Envoy's office, as it was also openlymarveled at when the mission became much more privyto UN diplomatic developmentsunder a new SRSG for UNFICYP who was given the political portfolio. There is noquestion that the separation of peacemaking frompeacekeeping in Cyprus has had theeffect f deprivingeach of complete knowledge of the other's activities and prioritiesAnother factor at play in the UN structures n Cyprus was the disparitybetweenthe military (peacekeeping) and civilian (peacemaking) roles and perspectives.UNFICYP was more closely connected with the situation on the ground, while theMediator was closely connected to the political leadership. Functioningas two separateoperationswithout built-inmechanisms forday-to-day nteraction,neitherfullybenefitedfrom what the other learned in its unique sphere of activity. And as alluded to above,their nterests ould diverge; thepeacekeepers saw a need to stay in business so long asthe risk of conflictremained,notwithstanding political view thatmight rgue in favor ofdisbanding the force.3 I would contend too that over time, in accordance with humannature,each actor becomes more attached to its own orientation. Thus the tendencyofthemilitary ctor in a conventional peacekeeping role, particularlywhen operating to alarge extent on its own, to emphasize ceasefires, establishing stability, separating thecombatants becomes more pronounced. Not only was UNFICYP not mandated toaddress the underlying causes of the conflict, but over time the bifurcated UN peacestructure nsured that UNFICYP carried on doing its work while the Good Officesmission pursued its course, and seldom did the two strategize together. Even with themutteringsn the 80s and 90s about the successful peacekeeping operationcontributingto theproblem, there was no systematic oint effort o analyze, firstly,f indeed this wasthe case, and secondly, if so, how better to make UNFICYP work in support of thepolitical objectives. By contrast, when the double-hatted SRSG arrived in 2006,UNFICYP initiated an exercise to thisend, which did take place on the ground- thoughnot at UN Headquarters.



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92 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependenceLebanon

UNIFIL was established in 1978 withpossibly the shortestmandate and greatesthaste of any UN peacekeeping operation. Immediately following Israel's militaryincursion intoLebanon, primarily n pursuitof the Palestine Liberation Organization, theSecurity Council passed resolutions 425 and 426 establishing UNIFIL in southernLebanon for the purpose of confirmingthe withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoringinternational eace and securityand assistingthe Government of Lebanon in ensuringthereturn of its effective authority in the area (UN/SCR 425, 1978). While fewpeacekeeping operations are set up with a long lifespan in mind,UNIFIL was especiallyperceived as a short term arrangement,the interim nature contemplated having beenspelled out in the mandate and the title. Unlike UNFICYP, there was no parallelmechanism set up to pursue a political process, and long tem conflict resolution was notenvisaged.Contextually,the determininggeopolitical factor in the establishment of UNIFILwas that the United States wanted a peacekeeping mission. The American President wasin the midst of the Camp David Peace Accord process and the Israeli invasion ofLebanon stood a great chance of scuttling t. In consequence, the decision to create apeacekeeping force and the drafting f the attendant esolution took only fourdays. As iswell known, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been understood to be anAmerican project. Israel-Egypt (peace accord), Israel-Syria (disengagement agreement),Israel-Jordan peace accord) and Israel-Palestine (peace process) dynamics have all beenmediated by the United States. In essence, the United States being the only brokertrustedby Israel places it in this position. Both countries have historicallyshied awayfrom internationalizing the conflict. Accordingly, American vetoes will stop anySecurity Council action that is deemed unpalatable in Washington or Tel Aviv, but anaction favored by the US can move forward. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union had itsown reasons not to block certain limited initiatives n this region in the SecurityCouncil- as regardsthepeacekeeping operations established, its allies (Egypt, Syria) favoredtheaction and therewas no overridingnational Soviet strategic nterest o counter t.UNIFIL was wholly a traditionalpeacekeeping operation and headed by a ForceCommander not a civilian. UNIFIL was consistentwith thepost-1974 UNFICYP in thatits primary ask was to ensure a ceasefire after unilateral intervention nto a countrybyan external power.4 Unlike UNFICYP however, therewas no parallel political track;indeed as commentator Naomi Weinberger describes, the customary link betweenpeacekeeping and peacemaking was not drawn at the time of the establishment of theForce. She goes on to note that therewas no diplomaticresponse to the situationuntil thelevel of violence exceeded the tolerable in the escalations of 1981, when temporaryefforts were launched by the US and UN (Weinberger, 1995: 163). One hugedisadvantage for UNIFIL was that it was launched into a country with a barelyfunctioningcentral government whose authoritydid not reach into UNIFIL' s area of



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Susan S. Allee 93operation. Lebanon was wracked by civil war and, in the south,Lebanese and Palestinianmilitias ruled the day. Nevertheless, UNIFIL was able initiallyto fulfillthe first artofits mandate as key international actors, including the UN, were able to secure awithdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) within three months of the deploymentofUNIFIL - somethingneither the diplomatic nor peacekeeping tracks were able to effectwith the Turkish armyin Cyprus. A hollow success it was however, as the IDF turnedover most of its positions to its proxy Lebanese militia. The year 1982 saw a thoroughdisintegration f the situation when Israel re-invaded Lebanon and stayed put forthe next18 years. Israel next withdrew n 2000, this time definitively, lso putting ts proxies outof business.5

Throughout most of this period the UN was a marginal player in Middle Eastdiplomacy, in any theater. In the mid to late 1990s though,the Secretary-Generaltooksteps to enhance the UN's influence and access, both throughthe commencement of adiplomatic effort o improve relations between Israel and the Organization, and throughthe designation of a UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.Subsequent regional and geopolitical developments affecting he SecurityCouncil led toan enhancement of the UN's diplomatic role in the Israel/Palestine arena when the US,EU, Russia and the UN formed the Quartet, 6 and in Lebanon with the eventualappointmentof a panoply of high-level UN political actors focused on that country.Because of its civil war and Israel's occupation, Lebanon had been unstable, explosive,tragic and headline-grabbing for nearly two decades. For mainly the same reasons,Lebanon had been essentially dormant in terms of its connection to any larger peaceprocess or international nitiative. But after he civil war ended and Israel withdrew, heSecretary-General appointed a Personal Representativefor SouthernLebanon (PRSG) asa political structure elevated to Special Representative status in 2007, now UNSCOL[UnitedNations Special CoordinatorforLebanon]), distinctfrombut meant to coordinatewithUNIFIL. Later, in an effort o force the disarmingof all militias in Lebanon and toeliminate Syrian control and influence in the country,the Security Council passedresolution 1559 and the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for itsimplementation. All of these individuals reportedthroughDPA. In recent years then,UNIFIL has had to carryon its work in the company of no fewer than threehigh-levelUN political representativeswith a Lebanon portfolio, ll of whom operate independentlyand under distinctbut inter-relatedmandates.Do these UN operationswork substantially n harmony? The shortanswer to thatis yes and no. On occasion, it can appear that certain of the actors work at cross-purposes. The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process has had nosubstantive role to play vis-a-vis Lebanon because the Lebanon track has not beentackled seriously in years (even when there was brief momentumon the Syrian track,which has implications forLebanon, at the end of the Clintonpresidency,the UN was nota partyto it). The Special Coordinatorin 2000 was, however, involved in thedrawingofthe UN line to mark and confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and frequently ince



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94 UN Blue: An Examination fthe nterdependencethen has been called upon to make diplomatic overtures n supportof UN and UNIFILefforts o de-escalate crises along the line. But the overwhelming emphasis of that rolehas been on thePalestinian track. The laterdesignated Special Envoy for resolution1559has not worked closely with UNIFIL, nor particularlywith the Special Coordinator forseveral reasons: his mandate is distinct fromboth, that mandate has been deemed sosensitive that much should be undertakenconfidentially,with informationheld closely,and there has been strongsentiment n the other UN missions that the connection shouldbe minimized so as to distinguish the different bjectives. The PRSG/UNSCOL hascoordinated the most directlywith UNIFIL - the mandates are linked and reporting scoordinated; on the whole information s shared. Nevertheless, the two missions havedifferent hains of command, are not integrated, nd at times have had difficultywithinformation haring. It must also be said that at differentunctures, UNIFIL and thePRSG/UNSCOL have agreed that they should act separately and emphasize theiruniqueness when plausible deniabilityhas seemed an astute course of action, either forpolitical or securityreasons.7Asking the same question about Lebanon as about Cyprus,what factors nternal othe UN, structurally, institutionally and within the Security Council may haveunderminedUN efforts o bring about conflict resolution in Lebanon rather than merecrisis management? I recognize that n talking about the Middle East, the catalogue offailures and theirorigins is at thisstage beyond tallying. But thepurpose ofmy inquiry sto isolate particularelements of theUN approach forcautionarybenefit.To dispense with the geopolitical context in a starkly abbreviated fashion,Lebanon is one of those places where one or more of the major powers has not only avital stake,but also exerts a steely control over SecurityCouncil action (or lack thereof).Because Lebanon is a neighbor of and officiallyat war with Israel, the US keeps a closewatch, but because it is a francophoneformer olony, France takes a keen interest. TheCouncil has tended to cede the larger political ground to these two nations. WhileLebanon's civil war and dominationby Syria ensured relegationof pursuitof a Lebanesepeace with Israel to the bottom tier,a substantive UN political role would not in anyevent have been sanctioned. Thus UN peacekeeping has not been tied to a UNpeacemaking effort n Lebanon. The UN political envoys and representatives re not thepeace negotiators, to the extent that there are or have been any focused on Beirut.Reading thereportsof the Secretary-Generalon their activities not to mention the cablesto Headquarters - unfortunatelynot in the public domain) reveals, and my backstageview on these activities confirms, that diplomatic crisis intervention, informationgathering,monitoringand a good deal of hand-ringinghave comprised the roles of thehigh level UN political envoys.8 The 1559 Envoy has been of a different tripe, n placeto push for and monitor compliance by Syria and Lebanon with a resolution meant tonormalize relations between the two countries and erase militias, most particularlyHizbullah from the landscape. Passed in 2004, the resolution was the result of aconcertedeffort y France and theUnited States to bringextraordinary ressureon Syria



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Susan S. Allee 95and Lebanon. Events since thenwould seem to have demonstrated that t was a pressurethat Lebanon could hardlybear.9

UNIFIL has historicallystood verymuch on its own; formany years as far as theUN was concerned, it was the only game in town, and even since the appointmentofthe high-level political representatives, its mission has been largely distinct.Traditionally, UNIFIL by its mandate is separated from the politics ... or is it?Institutionally, he Secretariat has treated it so, with DPKO in charge of the Force andDPA thepoint of entry or the otherUN entities named above. Interestingly,hepassageof resolution 1701 in the summer of 2006, which greatly complicated and enhanced theUN's political role in Lebanon, imposed a whole raft of demands on the parties andsubstantially ncreased the activities and numbers of thepeacekeeping force,did not alterthis approach (UN/SCR 1701, 2006). Indeed the Organization went throughvisiblecontortions to maintain the peacekeeping/political distinction- in part, certainly,at thebehest of member states with a varietyof agendas (some of which did not embrace thenotion of an SRSG) but in partto conformwith nstitutionally uarded turf.As in the case of Cyprus, one result has been thatUNIFIL may not be apprised ofthe activities of thepolitical representatives though this has been far less often the casewith the PRSG), and vice versa, or thatpositions or messages are not harmonized. Myown view is that the institutionhas drawn a false dichotomyand peace and stabilizationactivityhas suffered or t. It is not a controversial assertion thatpeacekeeping is a highlypolitical and politicized endeavor; in addition, a large partof the role of UNIFIL's ForceCommander, also head of mission, is diplomacy - indeed, in a Chapter VI operationwhere use of force is not an option, it is perhaps the job's most central feature. Thedifference is that the military commander engages in diplomacy with the militaryleadership of the parties to the conflict,while the Secretary General's representativesengage with the political leadership. Institutionallythe Force Commander takes hisguidance from DPKO and the political envoys take theirs from DPA. Or, as theempowered implementersof their own mandates, each may take stances according to hisown, certainly egitimate interpretations f or reactions to events. The result has beenthat,for example, where one agent of the institution mphasizes one Security Councilresolution pertaining to Lebanon, another agent prioritizes another, not alwayscompatible resolution. Also, forexample, while UNIFIL must maintain functional non-hostile informal relations with Hizbullah, at the same time a UN political envoy has amandate thatrequires a confrontationalposition puttingthe UN at odds with the group;and, foryet another example, a UN political envoy refers to a disputed piece of landalong the border area as territory f one entitywhile the peacekeepers adhere to theformal position that this remains to be determined. Some of the inconsistencies areminor,but the lack of integrationhas resulted in conflictingmessages on some politicallyloaded issues. I would maintain that the discrepancies that have proliferatedbetweenparallel UN peace supporttracks in Lebanon, thoughnot fatal in and of themselves to apeace process, have weakened the overall effort.



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96 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependenceThe structures of UN peacekeeping and political efforts n the Lebanon-Israeltheatergive form to the institutionaldisconnectedness. This is not an awkwardness of

which the Secretariat,both DPA and DPKO, have been unaware. From the inception ofthe designation of a PRSG, thepossibility, advisability and desirabilityof collapsing theoffice of the PRSG and UNIFIL into one another has been a periodic topic of discussion.Conversations have also been known to occur about anointingthe Special Coordinator asan SRSG for the peacekeeping operations. Dealing with the dynamics of multiple UNhigh-level entities in the sector has been a quiet matterof complaint and an occasionalsource of mirth in several quarters: at UN working level, in the offices of localauthorities,withNGOs, in diplomaticcircles. Both peacekeeping leadership and politicalenvoys have been known to devise ways to tryto go around the other to have theirperspective on a particularevent or policy heard (and adopted) by the Secretary-General,and have deployed the same tactic with Member States. Not infrequently,n the draftingprocess formemos to or reportsof the Secretary-General,UN political and peacekeepingleadership dealing with the Lebanon-Israel theater have employed certain ruses to trytoensure thatthe views of theircolleagues were not fullyaired. I do not mean to suggestthat there is not at the same time constructive coordination and collaboration, but themanner and postureof the current tructures ave not fostered n integrated pproach.From a practical point of view, there are admittedlytimes when the flexibility fdistinctsmall missions like UNIFIL and the PRSG can be useful. There are times toowhen in the Secretariat or on the groundwe have believed it advantageous forUNIFIL orthe PRSG to invoke a certain cover in being linked, but responsible only for the actionsof theirown outfit. However, takingthe long view, I would deem these as advantages forexpediency's sake, outweighed by the dangers of lack of informationwhich can becritical,and of the provision ofmultiple openings for thepartiesor spoilers or the mediato exploit - allowing for a type of divide and rule tactic to function,perhaps moreaccurately depicted as divide and outsmart. Time and again I have seen this tacticemployed,bothby partiesto the conflict and other nterested nternational layers.10 In afrequently ited article on civil-military elations in peacekeeping, Michael C. Williamsasserts that peacekeeping missions are fully political-militaryenterprises in whichcivilian leaders and military commanders together contribute to decision-making.Political leaders must thereforeunderstand the military tools at their disposal, andmilitary ommanders must understand the political aims and constraintsof the missionsthat they carry out (Williams, 1998: 68). While Williams is referring o integratedmissions, the claim seems a matter of common sense and an antidote to divide andoutsmart , pplicable to these other structures. My experience of UNIFIL and the UN'spolitical representationdealing with Lebanon - the result to be sure of SecurityCouncilcontortions but reinforced by the dynamics of Secretariat structures- is that thisfundamentalpremise is neglected. I believe that few who are familiarwiththeUN peacestructures concerned with Lebanon would contest that the myriad missions andmessengers extant have hinderedunityofpurpose and message.



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Susan S. Allee 97Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

One hallmark of orthodox assumption about peacemaking and peacekeeping, alsoreflected in common definitions, is the presumption of a sequential relationship.However as shown in the discussion of expectations in Cyprus and Lebanon, at the sametime as peacekeeping is presumed a successor to a peacemaking initiative, it is alsoconsidered and in fact used as a tool to create the conditions forpeace. The relationshiptends in fact to be symbiotic. The UN Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations in 2007published its Capstone Doctrine , wherein the Department reviewed the accepteddefinitions and observed, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking,peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasinglyblurred... While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support theimplementationof a cease-fire or peace agreement, they are oftenrequired to play anactive role in peacemaking efforts UN/DPKO Capstone Doctrine , 2007: 19). Thefiction of bright ine distinctionsarguablyhas served two purposes, one constructive ndone with detrimental ffect. The formerwas to allow forUN action that contributed opeace, the latterwas to allow fora non-integrated pproach.It is a common criticism of classical peacekeeping operations that they do notsolve the conflictor bringtrue/fundamental/sustainedeace. One framework utforwardto explain this failure to promote conflict resolution has been offeredby Paul Diehl.Diehl posits fourpossible explanations: first, raditionalpeacekeeping operations oftenfail to adequately limit armed conflict (UNIFIL would be a prime example); second,traditional peacekeeping underestimates the interconnection of peacekeeping andnegotiation (both UNIFIL and UNFICYP come to mind); third, a traditionalpeacekeeping operation can in fact create a counterproductive environment fornegotiations (UNFICYP would be the example here), and fourth, eacekeeping strategycan be inappropriate o the task (Diehl, 1993: 100). Diehl ultimately nsiststhat imitingarmed conflict and peacemaking are two fundamentallydifferentmissions. SecurityCouncil actions related to peacekeeping over time would seem to corroborateDiehl' sposition; when the Council is unwilling or unable to mandate peacemaking, as in the caseof the Middle East, but has some room in which to act (unlike Chechnya forexample), ithas tended to cobble togetherpeacekeeping operations. Pointing out the contradiction nusing militaryforces as agents of peace dates back at least to Dag Hammarskjold's (1962speech) famous line, peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only a soldier can do it,(and remains alive in current debates on the use of military force in humanitarianintervention nd the responsibilityto protect). Nowadays it is a given that soldiers areintegral to peacekeeping but the fact is that in Cyprus and Lebanon, a militarypeacekeeping operationhas been an agent only of a negative peace. In both situations,and predominantly n the first 50 years of UN peacekeeping, sending a peacekeepingforce in to address a conflict situation often meant that the Council was not going toprovide adequate resources or political muscle to a concomitantpeacemaking effort.



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98 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependenceIn those first 50 years, should a role be carved out for the UN, (civilian)peacemaking would almost always be a separate venture from military) peacekeeping.

In this classical structure the assumption, sometimes explicit as with theUNFICYP/Mediator set up, was that the peacekeeping would facilitate or createconditions for negotiations for a more permanent peace (UN/DPI-77?e Blue Helmets,1996: 4). If we accept Diehl's framework, hisassumptionis, at a minimum,paradoxical;given that history has shown that the Security Council would set up peacekeepingknowing that it could or would not meaningfully follow throughon peacemaking, itbecomes cynical or hypocritical. But accepting for the timebeing that the Council as awhole was not acting cynically even though individual member states mighthave beenacting at the least, expediently,what then got us to thepoint with Cyprus and Lebanonwhere Diehl's frameworkringstrue?In my view, two structuraldynamics played significantsupportingroles to thelarger geopolitical dynamics. First,the institutional eparation of the peacekeeping andpolitical, and second, the non-integrationof the civilian and military. As has beendiscussed, UN political and peacekeeping effortshave long been pursued throughseparate channels in both the Lebanon/Israel and Cyprus conflicts,but it is especially inthe last 20 years that there has been marked institutional division co-extant withmurkiness and competition over what responsibilityresided where. During the past 20years, peacekeeping and other UN peace initiatives- enforcementand peacemaking -really took off,with the attendant xponential expansion of thework, the stakes and thevisibility.11 The christeningof Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and PoliticalAffairsformalised and made morerigidthedistinctions, nd, according to one chronicler,made life more complicated by formally separating [the peacekeepers] from thepeacemakers (the mediators and preventive diplomatists) (Durch, 1995: 157).Complicating mattersfurther,ecretary-GeneralBoutros Ghali determinedto make DPAresponsible for the political aspects of a peacekeeping operation, the idea being looselythat DPA would thereforeresemble a type of foreign ministry,with DPKO as defenseministry. Durch writing n 1994 foresaw thatthis spread of responsibilitieswould makeforoperational and political difficulties nstitutionally; would add that t also made forthatmurkiness and competition to which I referred above. Durch urged that DPKOoversee all aspects of a UN peace operation, reasoning that it was often impossible toseparate neatly and cleanly the political and militaryaspects, and that one SRSG was amore efficientway to get results from UN Headquarters. He did believe, however, thatwhen the UN was engaged in active political mediation in parallel with a peacekeepingoperation, that DPA should be the point of contact for the formerand DPKO for thelatter, provided there s good liaison between the two tracks,both in the ield and inNewYork emphasis added) (Durch, 1995: 164-165).Marrack Goulding, the former and first Under-Secretary-General for theDepartmentof Political Affairs,was much of the same school, thoughwith more ferventviews based on his own experience as an Under-Secretary-General n the Secretariat from



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Susan S. Allee 991986 until 1997. As he participated in the transformations f that period, he arguedagainst some of the decisions being taken,pointingout that, peacekeeping is a politicalactivity; it serves a political purpose; it can take place only on the basis of a politicalagreementbetween hostile parties; and those doing it,even at the administrative evel, arein an essentially political relationshipwiththe two sides (Goulding, 2002: 32). He alsobelieved thatdiffusionof responsibilitieswould underminethealready difficult roject ofensuringuniform pplication within theUN and among itspeace operationsof principles,standards and procedures. Goulding was never happy with the division between politicaland operational; in making his point he describes an array of experiences, from theawkwardness and even dangers of a militarycommand being out of the loop of thepolitical initiatives n Lebanon, Western Sahara and Iran/Iraq, hepettydisputes betweenDPKO and DPA over reportdrafting,nd by way of contrast, he successes - El Salvadorbeing theprime example - when even though separate the diplomatic and peacekeepingtracks worked in close coordination, sharing and complementing each other's strategiesand tactics. My internal dealings on the Lebanon and Cyprus files corroborateGoulding' s experiences. Moreover, I would add that I have noticed a phenomenonduring my years with the UN of institutional tructureshaving a tendencyto take on apersonalityof theirown. Thus even the well-intentioned an fall preyto institutionalizeddynamics: I have numerous colleagues who, like me, place a premiumon collaborationand bridging any gaps between the departments,who identify s of theUN more thanany territorywithin it, but, nevertheless,who have found ourselves in the position ofwaging policy battles through competitive memo drafting rather than throughconversation and coordination.

Generally speaking, different nternalcomponents of UN missions and differentUN agencies each have their own organizational culture and approach and runthe risk ofoperating n isolation or even in opposition to one another. Compounding the difficultiesof parallel UN peacekeeping and peacemaking is that this is particularly rue of militaryand civilian cultures and roles. These distinctionshave an impact at the micro level, thatis, in theway the two interact nd in how theystructure nd conduct themselves, and atthe macro level of theoretical and practical approaches to the task at hand. Drawing asample from themultiplicityof studies of the military-civiliandynamic in humanitarianand peacekeeping contexts, certain characteristics have been enumerated as applying toeach: militaries are highly structured and strictlyhierarchical, and the officers aresystematically ducated in the principles of war; theyare also closely controlled,repletewith SOPs [standardoperating procedures], preferprecise tasking and aligned with theestablishment Arbuckle, 2006: chapter 14). Civilian operations have more autonomy,ambiguity,are more consultative, idealistic and, until recently n the UN anyway, havefew SOPs and little familiaritywith them. The militaryofficer will therefore oftenperceive civilian operations as haphazard, ad hoc and undisciplined. It is also still thecase in most armies that t is the exception ratherthanthe rule for soldiers to work withwomen as equals or in positions of authority. Anthropologist Robert Rubinstein



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100 UN Blue: An Examination fthe nterdependenceinterviewed a number of UN peacekeeping militarycommanders and found that theywere often frustrated y mandates and otherpolitical direction craftedby civilians thatwere vague or ambiguous - generally crafted thisway deliberately forpolitical reasonsbut frustratingrom hepointof view of a military rientedtoward order See Rubinstein,2008). Much energy has been expended in DPKO and its multi-dimensionalpeacekeeping operations in tryingto bridge this cultural divide, but where the militaryand political tracks are pursued separately,thisdoes not occur.Oddly perhaps,when themilitary nd political are not integrated,hierarchy ssuescan play out in an inverse fashion,with the more hierarchical institutionhaving a moregrass roots perspective. Lebanon and Cyprus are both places where thepeacekeepers,military and civilian, have had more quotidian contact with the communities in theconflict areas than the UN political envoys. In these situations the peacekeeping forcecan be more tuned in to what is happening on theground. Analyst Tamara Duffeyhasoffered one explanation of this phenomenon: Diplomacy has a state/political eadershipfocus, thus rendering it inherently top-down in its orientation. By contrast, apeacekeeping forceon the ground- one not confined to barracks obviously - may be inmuch closer touch with the local population. The diplomats pursuing the good officesmission interactwithleaders, sometimes almost exclusively, which can be limiting. Thepeacekeepers on the other hand may have first-hand wareness of critical realities on theground. The efforts f both can be substantially mpaired throughfailure to integratethese perspectives (Duffey,2000: 148-153). I found all of these dynamics at play in UNpeace implementation fforts n Lebanon and Cyprus.The consequences of these distinctcultural orientations n the macro level are thatthemilitary nd civilians will approach a conflict ituation fromverydifferentngles andwill bring divergent perspectives to the solution of the problem. With integration, heseperspectives can inform ach other and benefit the entire endeavor. Without t,the resultcan be as negative, forexample, as it was in Bosnia with the United Nations ProtectionForce and the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia - the hybridUN-EUbody with the political mandate - oftentragicallyuncoordinated. It is important lso toremember thata Force Commander, especially of a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation,is called upon to perform diplomatic role more often thannot, dependent on the art ofpersuasion, not the use of force, and political messages, renderinghis connection to thepolitical process even more important.

Judging Success or FailureSome of the dilemmas encountered in endeavors to evaluate peace efforts re setout in an article documenting a conversation among five scholars of peace operations(Druckman and Stern, 1997: 151-165). Among the avenues they identifythat theassessor might pursue are the relative merits of quantitativevs. qualitative assessment;



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Susan S. Allee 101i.e. whether to emphasize transcendant goals like peace and security, ustice and thehuman condition over the simple terms of the mandate, or to give more weight toconcrete indicators such as the number of people fed and housed, how long cease-fireshold, relative social stabilityetc. Alternatively, hey posit, udgment can be reached onthe basis of how accomplishments, if any, were achieved - for example, was theoperation efficient,did it remain impartial, were results produced without coercion?There is also the oft visited question of whether t is enough thata conflict s contained -or in a successful mission must hostilities be completely suppressed? If hostilities aresuppressed, is that enough? Or is true success contingentupon the elimination of theunderlying auses of the violent confrontation?The period of time covered by an assessment is anotherkey component; a short-termpeace operation establishing stability and an apparent political coming-to-termswhich unravelswithin a couple ofyears can be considered a success or a failure,as can along-termpeace operation that forestalls hostile activities formany years but where apeace agreement remains elusive.12 The experts evaluating the peacekeeping andpeacemaking efforts f the UN must also take into account which stakeholder's lens theymay be using. William Durch poses the question, success forwhom, notingin essencethatUN practitioners, roop contributors, ecurityCouncil members,thebelligerents,andI would add, even the UN peace maker vs. the UN peace keeper, may each havedifferent efining erms Druckman and Stern,1997: 159).For success in UN peace efforts, he necessary supplements to UN impartiality,objectivityand universality are leverage and legitimacy. This can be translatedto theSecurity Council making it possible for the UN peacemaker and peacekeeper tosubstantiateand follow through on promises or threats,and the Secretariat ensuringinstitutional nityof purpose toward those ends (Hampson, 2004: 81). Furthermore, sthe UN has itself recognized and implemented through the acceptance of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, it requires that the militaryeffortbe exerted inconformitywith the political strategy. This point is well articulated n an article on UNpeace support operations: [Military effectiveness cannot be had at the expense ofcollective political control, except at the price of undermining collective politicallegitimacy. For the UN, as for its member states, the institutional apacity to integratemilitary effectiveness and political legitimacy is fundamental (Whitman andBartholomew, 1995: 173). To be read, in otherwords, as integration fpeacekeeping andpeacemaking.It is obvious that UN peace implementationeffortsup to 2008 in Lebanon andCyprus have failed. Looking at the last ten years, can thepeacekeeping in these twotheatresbe judged a success? UNFICYP was originallygiven a rather morphous job todo. Cyprus was not a place of raging conflict or clear boundaries between the hostilecommunities. Nor were the communitiesuniformlyhostile. It was logical to emphasizethe role of the Mediator as the situation on the ground was not one that lent itself tomilitarypeacekeeping. Even the UNFICYP police, arguably more appropriate to deal



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102 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependencewith the civil strifethat was plaguing much of the country,were limited in what theycould accomplish with low numbers and no executive authority. But with the failure ofthe early mediation efforts and the ensuing militaryhostilities, a situation developedwhereby the peacekeeping role was made more straightforwardnd more comfortablywithin the bounds of the traditional.Thus, while on the political side Cyprus has been aroller coaster of crescendo and diminuendo replete with drama, for the most part thepeacekeeping since 1974 has been a success - if success is defined as conflictmanagementnot conflictresolution.UNIFIL has had a long and volatile history. Looking back, one is best served byjudging it in segments of time. UNIFIL saw a modicum of success in its earliest years,prior to 1982. From a humanitarianperspective, it has rendered critical humanitariansupport throughout ts tenure,but an honest appraisal of the years 1982 to 2000 wouldunfortunatelyhave to judge the peacekeeping efforton the whole as a failure.13 Theyears 2000 to 2007 are more difficult o categorize. Israel's withdrawalfromLebanon incompliance withresolution425 would have to be judged a success, but how much creditis due to UNIFIL is debatable. Israel's action was unilateral, and widely considered tohave been taken because there was utterlydiminished domestic support in the face ofincessant Hizbullah rocket attacks. However, it can also be fairly safely asserted thatdespite its historic and ongoing ambivalence about UNIFIL, the IDF would not have leftif a UN force had not been there. UNIFIL's subsequent activities running nterferencebetween Hizbullah and the IDF were certainly a significantcontributingfactor to therelative stability nd calm in the south and along the border for six years, both desirabledevelopments. It can be said withcertainty hatwithout UNIFIL's on-the-scene mpartialassessment of incidents and liaison to contain them,thatany number of the violations ofthe ceasefire that did occur in thisperiod would have escalated. But Julyof 2006 arrivedand full-scale hostilities erupted again. Still, a massively reinforcedUNIFIL is therekeeping thatpost-conflict enewed ceasefire today.

ConclusionOne analyst of UNIFIL in an article published in UNIFIL's 17thyear found thatUNIFIL suffered from the paucity of progress in peacemaking (specifically related toLebanon's civil war) both prior to and during its deployment. She proceeds to ask thequestion, Who is best suited to conduct the diplomacy - the sponsors of an internationalforce (providing parallel diplomatic auspices) or an alternatenegotiator? She answers,It seems to me that t is desirable to separate theauspices of peace makingfrom hose ofpeacekeeping. If the identity nd sponsorship of thepeacekeepers is distinct fromthoseof the mediators charged with resolving underlyingdisputes, there is a better chance ofinsulatingthe one from a negative outcome of the other Weinberger, 1995: 162). It isnot entirely lear from he articlewhat in her researchof and exposure to Lebanon led her



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Susan S. Allee 103to this conclusion and I would argue that t has not held true n Lebanon or Cyprus,but Icite this text to make a point. Even on a small scale - and I have been more than once intheposition of advocating that thedistinct dentities of UNIFIL and the PRSG or UNIFILand the Special Coordinator/1559 Envoy served this purpose in an isolated crisis - Iwonder if the protagonists in a conflict or even the general public buy this fiction formore than an instant. Locally, UN agents are fundamentallyviewed as one, or at leastthreads n one fabric. So the false dichotomy is not really believed but is manipulated.More closely capturing my experience is an observation made by former UN SpecialCoordinator's office staffer Bruce Jones, pertaining to civil wars but more widelyapplicable, that nternational ctors' efforts o end . wars sufferfrom n inconsistencyin conflictmanagement strategiesacross different hases of thepeace process; those whomediate agreements sometimes fail to coordinate with those who must implementthem(Jones,2002: 89).To aid reflection, would like briefly o call attention o a theoryof organizationalbehavior developed to explain how organizations like the UN are able to respond toconflictingpressures in their external environment. Organized hypocrisy refers toinconsistent rhetoric and action - hypocrisy - resultingfromconflictingmaterial andnormativepressures, which is 'organized' in the sense that it is a product of formalorganization and results fromsystematiccontradictions n organizational environments(Lipson, 2007: 5-34). Advocate of this theory,Michael Lipson, defends this organizingprinciple as useful in certain contexts, perhaps especially the UN, and in so doingaddresses peacekeeping specifically: Organized hypocrisy, he says, has both positiveand negative effects on peacekeeping. Organized hypocrisy can cause internationalorganizationsto betraytheirmissions, cause reforms o fail,undermine efforts o resolvecritical global problems, and create or exacerbate gaps between organizationalcommitments and the resources needed to meet them ... On the other hand ...[decoupling of talk and action can permitthe UN to satisfycontradictory emands fromits environment, llowing it to act or authorize others to act in ways that are necessary tothe success of peace operations in the field but inconsistentwith the norms to which theUN is expected to conform Lipson, 2007: 23).I see this as an accurate descriptionof some of the UN's actions which does allowthe work to proceed (consider the Human Right Commission); however thequestion mustbe posed of whether this s a good thing n the long termfortheorganization's legitimacyand credibility again, consider the Human Rights Commission). Organized hypocrisymay allow, for example, peacekeeping and its principles to co-exist with peaceenforcement nd its incompatibilitywith those principles- a phenomenon the benefitsofwhich the ury remains out on - but decoupling talk and action (to crudely delimit thefunctions)has not shown itself to be a productive contribution o the formula forpeace inCyprusor Lebanon, or fortheorganizationof DPA and DPKO. The result has oftenbeenthat the aims and objectives of the two interdependent integers of the equation -



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104 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependencepeacekeepers/military and peacemakers/ diplomats - are insufficiently mutuallyunderstood and embraced.14

The flipside of the question I have been posing as to whetherUN peace efforts nLebanon and Cyprus have suffered as a consequence of the bifurcationof peacemakingand peacekeeping is whether UN peace effortswould have been possible at all withoutthe division, and fromthere,one might ogically ask whether these countries would havebeen betteroffwithout t. The answer to the first artof the question is almost certainlythat no, the Security Council would not have been able to agree on an integratedpolitical/peacekeeping mission in either arena. As to the second part of the question,UNFICYP and UNIFIL illustrate that limitingor eliminating armed conflict does notalways lead to peace. Weinberger espouses the view that there is inevitable tensionbetween a static force mission and a dynamic diplomacy. If the presence of peace-keepers engenders a tolerable status quo, the incentive for aggressive diplomacydeclines (Weinberger, 1995: 162). Is this a given? Then why set up peacekeepingoperations? If we embrace the view thatUNFICYP through ts verysuccess in bringingstabilityhas stood in theway of a genuine resolution of the conflict, nd thatUNIFIL byits presence has contributed to stalemate rather than a definitive outcome, have weaccepted thatpersistent ruce but no peace is necessarily a bad thing? I would argue no;that truce is farpreferableto violent confrontation,nd thatstability s preferableto civilchaos. Returning then to the idea that UNIFIL and UNFICYP are peacekeepingoperations intended to establish or facilitate or maintain conditions thatenable progresson a comprehensive peace, one must return o the imperativethat the peacekeeping andpeacemaking proceed hand in glove.

In his studyofmilitary nvolvement n peacekeeping, James Arbuckle (2006: 157)observes: It seems that the surest way to create divisions among the internationalagencies who are supposed to be cooperating,and who must cooperate, is to have similarorganizations pursuing similar goals - we lose no time in runningOccam's Razor downnearly invisible lines, separating from each otherelements more alike than different. Isthe similarity f roles itself a threat,making competitiona perceived imperative, ike theterritorial ehavior of human (as well as otheranimals)? Is it,on the otherhand, a basicdissimilarity n goals, which, despite the similarity n means, is the fundamental onflict?Do we need conflict with otheragencies to maintain the cohesion of our group? Perhapsour most serious differences will indeed arise when we do the same or nearly the samethingsfor different easons (Arbuckle, 2006: 157). Rubinstein describes peacekeepingas an act of intervention hat nvolves claims about legitimacy, standingand authoritywith legitimacy defined as appropriate actions, standing as appropriate status to carrythemout, and authority s thepower to intervene Rubinstein, 2008: 19). Perhaps in partbecause of the syndrome Arbuckle identifies,the unfortunatetruth s that when UNpeacemaking and peacekeeping tracksproceed independently,the different ntities tendto crash into one anotheron all of these fronts. This has demonstrated o me one sourceof the failure of UN effortsto bring to a conclusion the problem of Cyprus and the



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Susan S. Allee 105quagmire of Lebanon. Experience led DPK.0 in 2007 to conclude that conflictprevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement .. should be seen asmutually reinforcing. Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide thecomprehensive approach required to address the root causes of the conflictthat,therebyreduces the risk of conflict recurring (UN/DPKO Capstone Doctrine, 2007: 20).Inescapably, the bottom line in these conflicts is the political will of the parties and thepredisposition(s) or national interests f themajor powers. It is fromthese elements thatthe SecurityCouncil arrives at proposed remedies putting he UN in whateverposition itmust assume. The SecurityCouncil has traveled a long way, accepting the integration fpeacemaking and peacekeeping and even adding peace building to the formula. But inCyprus and Lebanon, as well as other arenas where the missions mandated were notestablished as integrated nitiatives,the duty of the key international actors afterthesemany years is to commit to a cohesive UN political strategy, nd the responsibilityof theSecretariatand its officials s to act seamlessly forthe desired outcome.

Notes1. However,he rogressionn he ollectivehinkingf he ecurityouncil as nfactmore uancedhanhat,as isrevealedy ookingack nto hehistoryfUN treatmentftheCongo ndCyprusnthe arly 960s ndSouth frican he 970stheatterhoughot eneratingpeacekeepingentureas n nternalonflicteemedthreato he eace y he ounciln 1977 nd nwhichhe ouncil id ct). eeWhite,002: 9-51. n ddition,foreshadowingf he xpandedole fUNpeace perationseen ommonlyfterhe oldWarCambodia,asternSlavonia,astTimor, osovo)was affordedythe ittle nown nited ationsperationn WestNewGuinea(UNSF/UNTEA)stablishedy he ounciln1962.2. Thepersonalxperiencenwhich amdrawingorhis apers service ith he nited ationsepartmentfPeacekeepingperationsrom 995until hepresent,nparticularyrole s Senior olitical ffairsfficerleadingheOffice fOperations' iddle astdesk nthe ecretariat000-2005nd2006-2007,nd s SeniorAdvisoro he nited ationsorcenCyprus,ostedoNicosia 005-2006. heviewsxpressedn hisrticleremy wn nd onot ecessarilyeflecthosef heUnited ations.3. My wn arlyssessmenthortlyfterrrivingnCyprusowork orhe eacekeepingperation,as hat hemarcho solution,hetherfunificationrdivision,ouldwell eexpeditedf he ntirenternationalpparatuswere obe loaded na plane nd hippedut n themiddlef he ight.Whenmorningame, he arties ouldhave nly ne notherodealwith ndmighthereforeave odo o.4. Perhapss a sign fthe ifferentras nwhich NFICYP ndUNIFILwere stablished,r ofthe ifferentstaturefTurkeynd sraeln he ecurityouncil,esolution25 ndirectlynvokedaragraphofArticleof heUNCharter;hereasesolution86quotedtdirectly. rticle can be called he sovereigntyrticlef theCharter,ndparagraph.sets ut nepremiseponwhich ecurityouncilctionanbe based: Allmembersshall efrainntheirnternationalelationsromhe hreatruseofforcegainsthe erritorialntegrityfpoliticalindependencef ny tate,r n ny ther mannernconsistentith he urposesf he nited ations.5. Notwithstandinglaims ut orwardytheGovernmentfLebanon hat small reaknowns the bhabfarms emainedccupied ebanese erritory,heSecurityouncil eemed he DF to havewithdrawnnaccordanceith esolution25.See UN/SCR310, 000.6. TheQuartets a quasi-officialffiliation,ecognizedy he ecurityouncil,ocoordinatendharmonizeheMiddle astpeacemakingffortsfthese our ey ntitiesnvolvednmediatingheMiddle astPeaceProcess.Launchedn2002, he irstnklingsf thisnitiativeanifestedta dinnern 2001atthe esidenceftheUNSpecial oordinator,erjeRoed-Larson.ighevel epresentativesromheUN, heUS and he Uwere resent,and n onversationomeone otedhe nusualompatibilityt he imen heMiddle ast oreignolicyositions



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106 UN Blue: An Examination f the nterdependenceof hese ntitiesndRussia.Speculationolloweds toprospectsor nifiedction oharnesshe oodwill ndexertffectiveiplomaticressure.7. Departingpecial oordinatorlvaro eSoto nhis nd fmissioneportf2006 an nternalN documentthateverthelesseceivedome ublicity)amented,nd riticized,he ack f oordinationnd heUNpolicieshatprogressivelyver he oursefhis enure eakenedis ole.8. Seeespeciallyeportsf he ecretaryeneralo he ecurityouncil n he ituationn heMiddle ast rom1999 hrough006.9. It is notwithinhe copeofthis rticle odocumentranalyzehe ecurityndpoliticaleteriorationnLebanon rom005untilhe resent,ut ncidentsfnote ncludehe ssassinationfPrime inisterafiqHaririin2005, hewar etween izbollahnd sraeln2006 nd he aralysisf heGovernmentp throughhe ime fwritingn2008.10. Allpartiesave akendvantagefthis ut he sraelis ave rovenhemselvesspeciallydepttexploitinggapsn nformationr oordinationmong Nplayers.11. I would ote hathe ecurityouncil idnot uthorizesingle ewUNpeacekeepingperationetween978and 988 nd, rioro1988, ad uthorizedpproximately3operationshileince 988 as uthorized0.12. TheUnited ationsmergencyorceUNEF) nthe inai nd heUnited ationsisengagementbserverForceUNDOF) n heGolan re xamplesf perationshatanbe abeled s such.13. AnalyzingNIFIL's ifficulties,ouldingositshatesolution25 waspremisedncertainssumptionshatall turnedut obefalse: thatsraelwould ntrusttsborderecurityo theUN,that he LOwould cceptheSecurityouncilecisionnd topts ttacks,nd hatheGovernmentfLebanon ad ome uthorityorestore .(Goulding,002: 0)14.Williams akes similareneralbservation.Williams,998: 2)

ReferencesArbuckle, James V. 2006. MilitaryForces in 21s' CenturyPeace Operations: No Jobfora Soldier? London: Routledge.Diehl, Paul. 1993. International Peacekeeping. Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins UniversityPress.Druckman, Daniel and Paul C. Stern. 1997. Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions.Mers hon International Studies Review, 41, pp. 151-165. (This articlereproduces aforum sponsored by the National Research Council's Committee on ConflictResolution involving commentators Paul Diehl, William Durch, Betts Fetherston,RobertJohansen and Steven Ratner.)Duffey, Tamara. 2000. Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping. In TomWoodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds., Peacekeeping and ConflictResolution.London: Frank Cass Publishers.Durch, William. 1995. Structural Issues and the Future of United Nations Peace

Operations. In Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., Beyond TraditionalPeacekeeping. New York: St. Martins Press.Goulding, Marrack. 2002. Peacemonger. London: JohnMurrayLtd.Hampson, Fen Osier. 2004. Can theUnited Nations Still Mediate? In Richard M. Priceand Mark W. Zacher, eds., The UnitedNations and Global Security. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.



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Susan S. Allee 107Hitchens,Christopher.1997. Hostage toHistory: Cyprusfromthe OttomanstoKissinger.London: Verso.Jones,Bruce. 2002. The Challenges of StrategicCoordination. In Stephen J. Stedman,Donald Rothchild, Elisabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: TheImplementation fPeace Agreements.Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Lipson, Michael. 2007. Peacekeeping: Organised Hypocrisy? European Journal ofInternational Relations, Vol. 13, pp. 5-34 (SAGE Journals Online).ccessed 1 1/2007.O'Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig. 2004. The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionageand Turkish nvasion. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.Richmond, Oliver P. 1998. Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and theUnited Nations. London: Frank Cass Publishers.Rubinstein, Robert A. 2008. Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention.Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.UnitedNations (UN) documents:UnitedNations (UN). 1992. AnAgenda for Peace. General Assembly A/4/277.United Nations Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations (UN/DPKO). 2007. CapstoneDoctrine . Accessed 02/2008.United Nations, Departmentof Public Information UN/DPI). 1996. The Blue Helmets.New York: UnitedNations.UN General Assembly Resolutions (UN/GAR). A/39/11, 1984; A/51/10,1996.UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions (UN/SCR). 186, 1964; 425, 1978; 1310, 2000; 1701,

2006.Weinbeger, Naomi. 1995. How Peacekeeping

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