An economic case for tenure reform in Indonesia’s...
Transcript of An economic case for tenure reform in Indonesia’s...
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An economic case for tenure reform in Indonesia’s forests
1. Introduction
Countrieswithlargeforestareas,especially
tropicalforests,havebeenunderincreasing
pressuretoreformthewaytheygovernthe
management,exploitationandconservationof
theirestate.Theroleofforestsinregulating
climate(aswellastheircontributiontomany
ecosystemservices)hasbeenidentifiedasa
pressingreasonforrapidlyimprovinggovernance,
oftenincountrieswheretheprocessof
institutionalchangewouldusuallyhavebeen
expectedtotakesometime.Programssuchas
REDD1andFLEGT2mayhavehadsomeinfluencein
bringingchangestoforestpolicyandgovernancein
keycountriessuchasIndonesia,butinmostcases
thefundamentalchallengestoreformremain
daunting.Somecountries,suchasMexico,China,
NepalandVietNamhavebeenquitesuccessfulin
reformingforesttenureandinvariousways
handingtherightstomanageforestsbacktothe
people,alongwithaccompanyingobligationsto
ensureforestsremainhealthyandviable.The
outcomeofthesechanges,inthemain,hasbeena
morerobustforestsector,botheconomicallyand
environmentally.However,Indonesiahasmade
onlytentativestepsonthepathtowardstenure
reform,andthefuturedirectionisuncertain.
Thisbriefsetsoutsomefactsandanalysis
aboutthestateofforestmanagementin
Indonesia.3Itdoesnotaimtorecapitulatethe
manyexistingstudiesoftheextentof
deforestation.Thehardfactsofthediminishing
JULY | 2011 Dominic Elsoni
stateoftheforestarewidelyknown,andthekey
driversofdeforestation(suchasweakgovernance,
corruption,illegallogging,economicdevelopment)
havebeendiscussedatlength.Instead,thispaper
willattempttoexplorethedeeperissuesthatmay
explainthecurrentstateofthelandusesectorby
viewingitinthecontextofthecountry’seconomic
trajectory.Thepoorstateofthecountry’sforest,
therelativedeclineoftheforestindustryandthe
inefficiencyoftheagriculturesectorare
consequencesofapoliticalandeconomicsystem
thatisinformedbycertainattitudestowardsland,
peopleandcommunities.Thisattitudeprevents
realchangeinthesector,andeventhoughsome
progresshasbeenmadeinpolicytermsinthe
recentpast(mostnotablytherecentmoratorium
onprimaryforestconversion),thelikelyeffectof
thesechangesontheoverallsystemislikelytobe
limitedbecausetheunderlyingissuesarenot
beingaddressed.Thisbriefwillattemptto
introducesomeoftheseissues,byexplaininghow
theforestrysectorgotintothecurrentparlous
state,howthistrajectoryspellsbadnewsfor
Indonesia,andhowanalternativescenariocould
beenvisionedandachieved.
2. The current situation
Indonesiastillhasasignificantforestestate,
butithasbeentransformedradicallyoverthepast
thirtyyearsorso.Largeareashavebeencleared,
someconvertedtootheruses-suchasagriculture
orurbandevelopment-buttherearealsolarge
areasoflandinvariousstatesofdegradationthat
i. Dominic Elson is an independent consultant for Trevaylor Consulting (www.trevaylor.org) and can be contacted at [email protected]
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notyieldedeconomicgains.Between2000-2006the
amountofforestinpeatlanddeclinedby2.2million
hectares,ofwhichlessthan10%becamecropland.6
Itappearsthatpeatforestsareconvertedwiththe
statedintentionofdevelopingapalmoil
plantation,butoncethetimberisextractedthe
plantationnevermaterializes,asitdoesnotmake
economicsensetodevelopitatthatlocation.
Afurthercauseofdeforestationisthe
continuedexploitationofnaturalforestfor
industrialprocessing(suchaspulpandplywood).
Forinstance,in2005upto65%ofthetimber
feedingthelargestpulpmillsinSumatracamefrom
clear-cuttingofnaturalforest.7Thisconvertshigh
valuemixedtropicalhardwoodintolowvalue
feedstockforprocessingmills,whichisnot
economicallyrational.Variousattemptshavebeen
madebytheforestministryinthepastdecadeto
imposeamoratoriumontheclear-cuttingof
naturalforestforindustry,butineachcasethe
proposedmoratoriumhasbeendelayed,intheface
ofindustrywarningsthatanyreductioninsupply
willcausejoblossesandeconomicshrinkage.
Degradation
Amorewidespread(andpoorlyrecorded)
problemintheforestestateisthegradual
degradationoftheforestthroughmechanised
logging,andworseover-logging,fires,orother
formsofdisturbance.Itisreckonedthat40million
hectaresarefullyorpartiallydegraded.8Muchof
thisisinprotectedareas,butalsowithinthe
productionforestthereare16.4millionhectaresof
‘openaccess’land.Degradationispartofthe
processofadministrativetransition,whereby
productionforestispoorlymanaged(usuallybya
concessionholder)andwhennolongerviableitis
re-zonedforconversiontoanindustrialtimberor
oilpalmplantation.
inmanycasesarenotcontributingtoeitherthe
localornationaleconomy.Theproblemsintheland
usesectorseemtocompriseofdeforestation,
degradationandpooragriculturalperformance;all
ofwhichhaveeconomicconsequences:
Deforestation
Pastdeforestationhasremovedlowland
forestsfrommuchofSumatraandlargeareasof
Kalimantan.Basedoncurrenttrends,takinginto
accountpredictedpopulationgrowthandplanned
expansionoftheoilpalmestate,afurther28
millionhectaresofforestwillbeclearedby2030.4If
this‘businessasusual’scenarioweretocometo
pass,thenIndonesiawillhaveverylittlenatural
primaryforestremainingoutsidetheconservation
andprotectedareas.
Insomerespectstheeffectofoilpalm
plantationexpansionhasbeenexaggerated,andin
anycasepastrapidgrowthtrendsmaynot
continue.Whilstmuchdeforestationhasoccurred
inthenameofoilpalm,notalloftheclearedland
actuallydevelopedintoplantations,thusthe
impactofoilpalmontheforestestatehasbeen
disproportionate.Forinstance,locationpermits
covering5.3millionhectaresoflandforoilpalm
developmentshavebeenissuedinWest
Kalimantan,whilelessthan1millionhectaresof
landhaveactuallybeenplantedwithoilpalm.5
Thustheproblemseemstobetheallocationof
permitsratherthanthepalmoilindustry’s
relentlesshungerforland.
ItcouldbepointedoutthatEuropeandthe
UnitedStatesclearedtheirforestslongago,and
thusdeforestationisunavoidablepriceofprogress.
ButinIndonesiaitdoesnotseemtobeworkingout
thatway.Forinstance,thedeforestationand
drainageofpeatland,whichreleaseslargeamounts
ofcarbondioxideandthuscontributesto
Indonesia’sdisproportionatelyhighemissions,has
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Poor agriculture sector performance
Intheperiod1995-2005,allcountriesinthe
Asiaregionexperiencedsignificantincreasesin
agriculturalproductivity-by42%onaverage-
exceptforIndonesiawhereproductivitygrewby
only3%.9Asaresultofthesemeagerproductivity
gains,morearablelandhasbeenneededeachyear
inordertofeedthegrowingpopulation,putting
morepressureonforests.Thiscorrelationbetween
populationgrowthandneedformorecroplandis
lessmarkedinotherAsiancountries,whereinmost
casesthegrowthrateinpopulationisnotmetbya
correspondinggrowthincropland,butinstead
seemstoleadtohigheryields.
Evenintherelativelyadvancedpalmoil
industry,wherevertically-integratedcompanies
exertahighdegreeofcontroloverlandand
smallholdersthroughthe‘inti-plasma’system,10
productivityislowcomparedtoothercountries,for
instanceaverageyieldsare25%lowerthanin
Malaysia.11
Lowagriculturalproductivityisconnectedto
deforestationintwoways-itillustrateshowweak
tenureandlimitedaccesstocapitalandtechnology
isinhibitingruraldevelopment,andalsoincreases
pressureonforestforclearanceforoftenlowvalue
activities.
Economy is over-reliant on natural resources
AreportfromHarvardUniversity12notedthat
forsometimeIndonesiahasbeenstuckinan
economicmodelthat‘relies too heavily on
over-exploitation of natural resources, does not
invest sufficiently in people and fails to make the
most of the opportunities presented by
globalisation.’Theflawsandvulnerabilityinherent
inthisunsustainablegrowthpatternhavebeen
disguisedbyhighcommoditypricesandtheone-off
boostthatisprovidedatthepointwherethe
naturalcapitalofforestsisconvertedintofinancial
capital.
Therealizationthatthereisalinkbetween
over-relianceonnaturalresourcesandunder-
developmenthasledeconomiststoseekamore
accuratemeasureofthestateofacountry’scapital
stockthanmerelyassumingthattheannual
increaseinGDPisautomaticallyaddedtonational
wealth.Thismeasureiscalled‘AdjustedNetSaving’
(ANS).13NegativeANSindicatesthecountryis
runningdownassets,andwillthushavelessassets
forfuturegenerationsandadecliningcapacityto
generateeconomicgrowth.Overthepasttwo
decades,Indonesia’sAdjustedNetSavingsratehas
droppedfromplus18%tominus2%.14Thismeans
thatdespiteheadlineGDPgrowth,inrealtermsthe
countryisgettingpoorereachyear.Eventually,this
failuretomaintaintherealvalueofthenation’s
assetswillleadtoeconomicshrinkage.
Thisnegativetrendisalsoreflectedinother
statisticsthatshowthatmostpeoplearetrapped
inlow-incomejobsintheagriculturalsectors.There
isnosignificanttransferfromthesesectorsto
manufacturing,asIndonesia’seconomylargely
sellsrawmaterials,notproducts.Hence,other
countriescapturethejobsandthevalue-added
activities.Asglobalizationhasbecomemore
widespread,Indonesia’seconomicoptionshave
narrowed.Inrelativetermsitisfallingbehind,for
instanceIndonesia’sshareofglobalexportswas
lowerin2007thanin1977.15
Ofcoursethedayofreckoningmaybesome
wayoffasIndonesiahasarichendowmentofland
andnaturalresources.However,italsohasalarge
population,andthusthepercapitaresource
wealthislowerthanMalaysia.Itisrightthatsome
ofthesenaturalresourcesshouldbereallocatedin
thenameoffuturedevelopment,andinsomecases
thatwillmeananeconomicallyefficientlevelof
deforestation.ButinIndonesiathereisanunhappy
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althougheconomicvaluefalls,thevolumeof
extractionfromtheforestactuallyrises.Thisseems
tobethecaseinPapuaprovince,wherethelocal
industryhasdwindledyetexportsofvaluable
merbautimbertoChinafortheflooringindustry
haveremainedhigh.Further,loggedoverforest
thenattractssmallerplayers,supplyingdomestic
needswhilefurtherconvertingtheforest.
3. How did we get here?
ThereareanumberofreasonswhyIndonesia’s
landusesectorisnotmanagedaswellasitcould
be.Someofthemainissuesareasfollows:
Unclear tenure
Weakanduncertaintenure,incomplete
cadastralsystemsandlegalcontradictions
regardingcustomarylandrightscombinetokeep
landpriceslowinIndonesia.Timberconcessions
andplantationcompaniesaregrantedleasesat
valuesthatmayfailtoreflectthetruevalueofthe
land.Theamountspaidincompensationtolocal
peoplebycompaniesdevelopingoilpalm
combinationofindiscriminatedeforestation,low
genuinesavings,lackofinvestmentinpeopleand
grassrootsenterprisesandthusanunsustainable
economictrajectory.
Declining importance of the land use sector
Theforestandagriculturalsectorhas
enormousimportanceaspartofthesocio-political
system,andthelandusesectorrepresentsaround
afifthoftheeconomy,includingdownstream
industrialprocessing.However,somesub-sectors
havebeenthriving(e.g.palmoil)whilstothershave
beeninlong-termdecline(e.g.forestry).Thechart
belowshowshowalllandusesectorshave
declinedasashareoftheeconomysince2004,and
onlythefoodanddrinkindustryhasremained
stable.
Itispossiblethatadecliningforestindustry
willdemandlessoftheforestandthusslowthe
rateofdeforestation.Ontheotherhand,the
declineoftheprocessingsectormayindicatethata
lackofcompetitivenessisleadingtomoreraw
timberbeingexported(forinstancetoChina),so
Source: based on data from BPS (2011)
FIGURE 1: CHANGE IN RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CERTAIN ECONOMIC SECTORS, 2004 - 2009
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anindicationofhowpoliticianspaybacksponsors
oftheircampaignwithforestclearancepermits.
Thespatialplanningprocessusuallyfailsto
coincidewiththelanduseproblemsbecauseitis
itselfapartofthesamepoliticalprocessthat
createtheproblems.Forinstance,landtype
definitionsdonotreflectphysicalorsocialreality,
withillogicaleffects:
• 40millionpeoplearelivinginareaswithno
treesyetofficiallydesignatedasforest.This
limitstheirlivelihoodoptionsastheland
cannotbeusedforagriculture,yetinmost
casestheyalsocannotgetapermitfor
reforestation,anddonothavepoliticalpower
togetaclearancepermitforestatecropssuch
asoilpalmorcocoa.
• Whilsttreelesslandscapeswithintheforest
estatecanbetermed‘non-forestforestestate’,
itsmirrorimageoutsidetheforestzoneis
‘forestnon-forest’,wheresmallholdersand
communitiesmanageforestareasand
agroforestry.LargepartsofJavaislandfalls
intothiscategory.Yetwhenfarmersattempt
tofelltheirowntreesthattheythemselves
haveplanted,theyfacecomplexand
demandingregulationsthatservetodepress
netpricesatthestump.20This,ironically,
createsadisincentiveforfarmerstoplant
trees,yetitisknownthatincorporatingtrees
intofarmsystemsisthemosteffectivewayto
managetropicallandscapesforimproved
yields,resilienceandfinancialreturns.21
• Forestzonestendtobedescribedintermsof
theirofficialdesignation,suchasproduction
orconservationforest.Actuallandscapetypes,
suchasprimaryforest,‘virginforest’,peatland
etc.,arenotdefinedinIndonesianlaw(though
tobefairthesedefinitionsarewidely
contestedglobally).Thiscreatesproblems
plantationshasingeneralbeenverylow-around
oneortwodollarsperhectareinmanycases.16
Despitepastfailures(suchasthenotorious
Kalimantan‘megariceproject’)andlackof
evidencethatlarge-scaleagricultural
developmentshaveanylong-termeconomicor
socialbenefit,17thereseemstobeacontinued
preferenceformegaprojectsamongstpoliticians,
suchasthevastproposedMeraukeIntegratedFood
andEnergyEstate(MIFEE).Thissuggeststhatpolicy
makersseecheaplandandlabourasopportunities
fortheprivatesectortowidenprofitsratherthana
causeforconcern.Thepresenceofalargeamount
ofdegradedland(estimatesvaryfrom7Mhatoover
30Mha)isasignthattheforestfrontieris
undervalued.18Itmeansforestlandiseithervery
cheaporopen-access,soeconomicallyitmakes
moresensetocontinuetoplunderthefrontier
ratherthandevelopexistingopenland.
Poor governance
Rapidpoliticaldecentralizationsince1999has
setdistrictsinoppositiontoprovinces,inhibiting
sensibleplanning.Ithasalsocreatedafree-rider
problem.Districtheads(Bupati)arenotrequiredto
considertheeffectsoflandchangesonthewider
community.Considerablestatepower(the
assumptionofstateownershipofallforestsand
controlofanyunregisteredland)isthushandedto
thedistrictswithoutanycorrespondingobligations
toeitherlocalpeopleorthenationatlarge.
Long-termsustainabilityisthusnotlikelytobe
considered,andstrategiclandscapeplanningis
muchmoredifficult.
Landallocationandconversionisapartofthe
socio-politicalprocess.Arecentstudyfoundthat
issuanceofpermitstoconvertnaturalforestis
correlatedwiththeelectioncycle,inwhichillegal
loggingincreasesdramaticallyintheyearsleading
uptolocalelections,andconversionratesrise
immediatelyafterelections.19Thispatternmaybe
5
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concessions,butthestatehasbeenanegligent
landlord.Thenumberofactivenaturalforest
concessionshasdeclinedoverthepastdecade:
therearecurrentlyaround300concessionsin
Indonesia,ofwhich248arelistedasactive,
covering22millionhectares.23Thishasfallen
sharplyfrom2001,whentherewereover400
concessionscovering42millionhectares.‘Inactive’
concessionsmayincludethosethathaveonly
recentlyreceivedpermits,aswellasthosethat
havehadpermitswithdrawn,orwherethebusiness
hasbeenliquidated.AccordingtotheITTO,only
halfoftheconcessions(13.7millionhectares)have
validmanagementplans,24indicatingthatthereare
manyconcessionsregardedas‘active’thatarefor
allpracticalpurposesdormant.Forinstancethe
MinistryofForestrydatarecognises21concessions
inPapuaasofficially‘active’,butlocalofficials
regardonly6astrulyoperational.25
Companiesthatdonotsubmitvalid
managementplansorprovideevidenceofactive
managementarenotheldtoaccount.Concessions
thereforetakeonthecharacteristicsofprivate
freehold,withownersinvitingoffersforpurchase
oftheleasebutnotbeingobligedtosurrender
theirpermitsuponbreachofcontract.Thisraises
theprivatepriceofeventhemostdormant
concessions,makingitevenharderforthestateto
cancelorreallocateunder-performingpermits,
especiallyiftheholderoftheleaseispolitically
wellconnected.Theneteffectofthisiseconomic
lossesforthestate(throughlowertaxesandfees),
privatecaptureofthevalueofpublicassetsanda
perverseincentivetoconvertforestratherthan
whenofficialpronouncements,suchasthe
recentmoratorium,usethesetermswithout
definingthem,thusleadingtoconfusionover
theofficialpositiontowardssecondaryforest,
whichisnowIndonesia’slargestecosystem
type.
• Thereisalackofcoordinationandpolicy
leadershipamongstvariousgovernment
departments.Thevariousplansforconversion
toplantations,miningandotherpurposes
seemtoindicateatotalof63millionhectares
allocatedfordevelopment,60%ofitinvolving
primaryforestconversion.Manyoftheseplans
overlapandperhapswillnotcometopass,but
theyrevealcontradictionsinthewaythe
countryformulateslanduseplans.
Confusingly,thesamepatchofforestcanbe
awardedtomultiplecompaniesbymultiple
layersofthesamegovernment.22
• Thecombinationofpoormanagementof
forestareasandweaktenureoutsidethe
forestestateleadstoasituationwherelandis
treatedasatemporarysiteforactivityrather
thanalongtermassetdeservingof
investment.Thisismanifestedbyslashand
burnagriculture,wherefiresareusedasa
cheapandquickclearancemethodby
impoverishedlandlessfarmers.
Poor asset management
Largeareasofthecountry’sforesthavebeen
parceledouttoprivatecompaniesintheformof
Total assessed (mha) Sustainably managed (mha)
Evaluation (number of concessions)
Total number of concessionsgood fair bad
very
bad
13.73 3.16 13 63 65 12 152
Source: ITTO, 2011.
TABLE 1: EVALUATION OF QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF NATURAL FOREST CONCESSIONS
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Theprocessingindustrygrewrapidly,boosted
bycheaprawmaterials,andusingvertical
integration(controlofallaspectsofthesupply
chain,fromforesttofactory)managedtoraise
largeamountsofcapitaltobuildhugemills.This
combinationofover-capitalizationandweak
governancecreatedstructuralover-capacity,
inhibitingthepricesignalsthatwouldnormally
occurintheeventofrawmaterialscarcity.Itwas
asiftheforestwouldalwaysyieldupitsbounty,
andnodayofreckoningwouldeverarrive.Until
recently,publicpolicyhasbeenadaptedtosuit
privateinterestsbyensuringthatnaturalforest
hascontinuallybeenmadeavailableforindustryat
farbelowitssocialofeconomicvalue.Thismay
haveappearedtobeapragmaticpolicythat
ensuredcontinuedeconomicgrowthand
employment,butitisinherentlyunsustainableand
ultimatelycounter-productive,asitundermines
investmentinlong-termforestmanagement.
Failure of reforestation schemes
Whenin2006itwaseventuallyacknowledged
thatarawmaterialsupplygapwaslooming,an
effortwasmadetorevitalizethetimberindustry
andsolvethesupplyproblembyencouraging
plantationdevelopment.26Thissetoutaroadmap
toincreaseplantationdevelopmentandthus
relievethepressureonnaturalforests,withno
furthermixedtropicalhardwoodsgoingto
particleboardorpulp.Thiswasfollowedbya
Ministerialdecreethatwarnedpulpcompanies
thatclearfellingofnaturalforestintheir
concessionswouldbeillegalafter2009.27
However,theconsequenceofanaddictionto
cheaprawmaterialislowinvestmentinindustrial
plantations.PlantationdevelopmentinIndonesia
hashistoricallybeenbesetwithdifficulties.Inthe
period1989-2006,permitsforover10million
hectaresofplantationswereissued,butonly3
millionhectareswereactuallyrealised.Inthecase
manageit,asconversionlicensesareinthegiftof
thedistrictheadandthuseasiertoobtainthana
neworexistingnaturalforestconcession.
Eveninconcessionsthatareoperating
normally,thereisofteninefficientforest
management,wasteful,over-extractioninsome
areaswhileotherareasareabandoned.Rulesexist
forselectivecuttingandenrichmentplanting,but
exceptinafewnotablecases(forinstancewhere
themoreresponsiblefirmshaveobtainedFSC
certification),mostoftherulesareignored.Recent
assessmentsofconcessions’performanceshows
thathalfarerated‘bad’or‘verybad’,andlessthan
aquarteraremanagedsustainably(seeTable1).
Reputablecompaniesfacedifficultiesgetting
accesstolandinIndonesia,eitherforoilpalm
plantationsortimberconcessions.Suchcompanies
needtomeetinternationalstandardsof
transparencyandeithercannotlegallyengagein
the‘game’ofobtainingpermitsfromdistrict
governments,ordonotknowhowtonavigatethe
obstaclesofbureaucratichurdles,unofficial
paymentsandbrokers.Thiskeepsgoodcompanies
outofIndonesia,shieldingdomesticcompanies
fromcompetitionforcapital,landandlabour,and
thusperpetuatinganinefficientforestryandpalm
oilindustry.
Subsidizing deforestation
Thewaytheforestestateismanaged,in
particularinrespectofconcessionleasesand
conversionpermits,representsanimplicitsubsidy
ofthetimberandplantationindustry.Publicassets
intheformofstandingforestvalues,future
ecosystemvalueandlong-termlandrentare
capturedbyprivateactorswithlittleorno
compensationtothestate.Likemostsubsidies
andmarketdistortions,thissituationhasledto
inefficientoutcomes.
7
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However,thisdatawasprovidedbytheMinistryof
Forestryandwasnotverifiedorwasperhaps
misconstrued.33InFAO’sownreportitshowedthat
theplantedestatehadactuallyfallenby2010to
3.5mhafrom3.7min2005,soclearlythepreviously
reportedexpansionwasinaccurate,unlessexisting
plantationswerebeingretiredatafasterratethan
newoneswereestablished.Thisperformance
bucksthetrendseeninalmosteveryothercountry
monitoredbyFAO.Acrosstheworldplantations
andreforestationschemeshavebeenexpanding,
mostnotablyinChina(seeFigure2).Intheperiod
2000-2010,65countriesintheworldwithtropical
andsub-tropicalforestssawanincreaseinplanted
forests,whereasjust11countriessawadecrease,
includingIndonesia,Zimbabwe,Bangladeshand
theSolomonIslands.Theshrinkageinplanted
forestsinIndonesia(123,000hectares)almost
exceededalltheotherlossescombined.Thiscould
haveseriousconsequencesforthecompetitiveness
ofIndonesia’sforestindustryinyearstocome,as
theliveliestlocalcompetitors(especiallyChinaand
VietNam)begintoenjoyreliablesuppliesofraw
materialfromtheirownplantations.Forthefirst
timesincetheIndonesianarchipelagostarted
oftheremaining70%,naturalforestswerecleared
tomakewayfortheplantations,oftenfueledby
subsidiesintheformofsoftloansfromthe
ReforestationFund,butnoproductiveinvestment
tookplace,ortheplantationssufferedfromvarious
calamitiessuchasforestfires.28
Evenwhereplantationshavebeenestablished
successfully,theyarenotnecessarilyperformingto
bestpracticestandards.TheWorldBankcalculates
that‘lessthanhalfoftheselandsareperforming
wellinproducingtimber’.29Forinstance,inEast
Kalimantan800,000hectareswasclearedfor
industrialplantation(HTI),butonly165,000
hectareswasactuallyplanted,andtheyieldsfrom
thisestateareverylow,atjust0.7millioncubic
metresperannum,comparedtothepotential
productionof23millionm3ifthewholeareawere
properlymanaged.30
Reliabledataonplantationsarehardtocome
by.31TheITTOrecordstheplantedestateas
standingatonly2.5mhectares,32buttheFAO
reportsthatIndonesiaexpandedtheplantedforest
estateby404,000haperannumfrom2003-2007.
Source: FAO (2010)
FIGURE 2: CHANGE IN PLANTED FORESTS, 2000-2010
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from2015onwards.However,byDecember2010
lessthan45,000hectaresofHTRplantationshad
actuallybeenapproved,althoughlocaldistrict
governmentshaveidentifiedalmost640,000
hectaresofsuitableplotsofland.36
Atthisrateofprogresstheschemewill
achieveonly120,000hectaresofcommunity-
managedplantationby2016,acumulativeshortfall
ofoverfivemillionhectares(seeFigure3).This
under-performancewillhaveseriousimplications
forfuturetimbersupplyandthusforestusageand
tenure.TheForestryMinistryhasbeenworking
fromprojections(inthe2007RoadMap)that
assumetheHTRplantationswillbemeeting30-40%
ofthetotallumberdemandfrom2016.Ifsucha
significantportionofexpectedsupplydoesnot
materializethensomethinghastogive:either
supplymustbefoundelsewhereorindustrial
outputmustdecrease.Thismayleadtomore
pressuretoover-extractorconvertnaturalforest.
The Paradigm problem
Thereisampleevidencethatcommunitiesand
smallholdersarereliablemanagersofnatural
tradingsuchproductswithothernationshundreds
ofyearsago,thecountrycouldloseitscomparative
advantageinprocessedtimber.Thiswouldbea
directconsequenceofpoorgovernance,myopic
policiesandopportunisticbehaviorbytheprivate
sector.
Experiments in community forestry
Afterafewfalsestartsinfacilitating
communityforestry,the2007roadmapfor
revitalizingtheforestsectorproposedthe‘people’s
plantation’scheme(HTR),34wherebyindividuals
andcooperativeswouldbeencouragedtoinvestin
plantingtimberondegradedforestland.Thiswas
animportantpartofthetargetofestablishingan
additional9millionhectaresofplantationsby2016,
5.4mhafromHTRand3.6mfromindustrial
plantations.Thefinancingwouldcomefroma
revolvingfundusingcapitalfromtheReforestation
Fund.35
Todatetheprojecthasbeenfarfrom
successful.Thetargetwastohavealmost2million
hectaresestablishedbytheendof2010,which
wouldthenbeproducingpulpwoodforindustry
Source: Based on data from Ministry of Forestry, 2010
FIGURE 3: PROGRESS OF HTR COMMUNITY PLANTATION SCHEME, 2007 - 2016
9
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JULY | 11
mixedareaofforesttocommunities,including
somestandingstockthatcouldbeexploitedinthe
earlyyearstogeneratecashflow.Butinpractice
theHTRpermitshavebeengrantedondenuded
land.Inonecase,acommunityhasbeengiven14
separatesmallparcelsofscrublandspreadoveran
largearea(60kmbetweenthefurthestblocks),
whichwillmakeittoughtomanageasaviable
business.Onecouldbeforgivenforspeculating
thattheHTRschemewasactuallydesignedtofail.
ForaslongasIndonesiaistrappedinthis
paradigm,itwillbehardtomakemorethantoken
progressonthepressingissuesfacingthelanduse
sector,suchasweaktenure,thegrowingsupply
gapandmisdirectedinvestment.Thiswillnotonly
havepooroutcomesfortheforests,biodiversity
andclimatechange.Itwillalsohaveprofound
implicationsfortheeconomyandlong-termsocial
development.
4. An improved situation
OutsideIndonesia,therehaslongbeena
recognitionthatlocallycontrolledforestrybrings
benefitsfortheeconomy,environmentandsociety.
Inmanydevelopedcountrieswithpowerfulforest
industries(suchasGermany,SwedenandFinland),
itisthepredominantformofforestmanagement.
Fromapro-poordevelopmentperspective,
communityforestrydoeshaveclearattractions:it
implieslocalparticipation,decentralisationand
equity.39Italsoclaimssomelogicalrationaleas
thoseclosesttotheforestaremorelikelytohave
culturalandpracticalknowledgeofthelocal
landscape,andhaveavestedinterestinthe
long-termconservationofitsecologicalservices
andincome-generatingfeatures.Insummary,the
caseforlocallycontrolledforestry(orwhatisalso
termed‘communityforestry’)canbeviewedin
termsofeconomic,socialandenvironmental
impact:
resourcesandforests,andthattheyalreadyarein
anumberoflandscapesinIndonesiaeffective
managersofforestry,agricultureandagroforestry.
YetforsomereasonIndonesia,wherethestatehas
suchapoortrackrecordinforestmanagement,has
yettoembracetheconceptoflocallycontrolled
forestrywithanyseriousness.Althoughforest
tenurereformhasbeenslowinAsia(comparedto
LatinAmerica),aboutaquarteroftheforestis
owned,designatedormanagedbycommunities
andindigenouspeople.37YetinIndonesialessthan
atenthofonepercenthasbeenformallydevolved
tolocalcommunities,whichismarkedlyoutofstep
withtheregionandothermiddle-incomecountries.
Oneexplanationmaybethattheeconomic
structureofIndonesia,especiallyintheforestry
sector,isalegacyoftheNewOrderregime.Itis
characterizedbyverylargecompaniesbenefiting
fromfavorablepoliticaltreatmentandexclusive
accesstonaturalresources,whilstbeneaththema
multitudeofinformalmicroenterprisesattemptto
keepafloat.Therearefewformalenterprisesin
betweenthesetwoextremes,creatingtheso-called
‘missingmiddle’problem.
Eventhoughthereformasierahasbrought
democracytothepoliticalprocess,itisyetto
liberalizetheeconomyoflanduse.Itappearsthat
thestatestillprivilegeslargebusinessesatthe
expenseofsmallerenterprisesandcommunity
organizations,asexemplifiedbythefactthatthere
isnoexemptionforcommunitystewardshipof
forestsinthePresident’smoratorium,38butspecific
exemptionsforlargebusinessesandplantations.
Thisparadigmproblemisinsomerespects
illustratedbythedesignandimplementationofthe
HTRscheme,whichcouldbeseenasawayto
recruitcommunitiestoinvesttheirownresources
intorepairingdamagedonebycompaniesand
state-ownedenterprises.Initsoriginaldesignthis
wouldbeamelioratedsomewhatbyallocatinga
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JULY | 11
Environmental
Itisacommongeneralizationthatforest
dwellingpeoplearenaturallydisposedtobe
carefulstewardsoftheenvironment,andwhere
theydocolludeinthedegradationofforeststhey
dosoforunderstandableeconomicreasons(the
‘povertycausesdeforestation’argument).Thismay
notbeentirelyaccurateforallpeopleinallplaces
(justasgeneralizationsaboutlargecorporations
mayoverlookthebetterexamples),butwidespread
evidencefromaroundtheworlddemonstratesthat
privateproperty
holders,including
thosewith
communally-held
propertyrights,can
anddoprotectpublic
goodsifthe
appropriateincentive
structureisinplace.In
fact,rural
communitiesown,or
administrateunder
license,atleastone
quarterofforestsin
developingcountries;
andtheyinvest$2.6
billioninspecific
conservationactivities
intheirmanaged
forest,exceedingstate
fundingandallforms
ofinternational
conservation
expenditure
combined.43
Low carbon growth
Akeycomponentforbalanced,sustainable
economicgrowthistheshifttoalowcarbon
economy,whichrequiresIndonesiatoreduceits
Economic
Inbothdevelopinganddevelopedcountries,
smallandmediumsizedenterprises(SMEs),suchas
thosesetupandmanagedbyforestrights-holders,
canbetheengineofeconomicdevelopment.
Unliketheverticallyintegratedindustrialmodelof
forestresourcemanagementthathasbeenthe
dominantparadigmforsomanyyears,small-scale
industryhasspecificmicro-economic
characteristicsthatgeneratea‘multipliereffect’in
ruraleconomies.Thistranslatesintomoreskilled
jobs,higherincomes,higherconsumptionand
improvedtermsoftrade.TheLivelihoodsand
ForestryProgramprograminNepal40indicatesthis
effecttobeapproximately10:1,butsomestudies41
calculatethismultipliereffecttobeashighas20:1.
Theeconomicbenefitsareassociatedwiththe
releaseofprivateenterprisethataccompanies
effectivelandreform.Ananalysisofgrowthin73
countriesintheperiod1960–2000foundthat
countrieswithrelativelyequitableinitialland
distributionachievedgrowthrates2–3times
greaterthanthoseinwhichlanddistributionwas
lessequitable.42
Social
Localeconomicdevelopment,whereit
involvestheactiveparticipationoflocalpeople,
haspurportedsocialbenefits.Specializinginsmall
enterprises(e.g.timberprocessing)allows
householdstomakeasmoothtransitionfrom
subsistencelivingtothemarketeconomy.Time
gainedthroughbuyingfoodinthemarketinstead
ofhuntingorgatheringcanbespentparticipating
inlocalinstitutions.Surplusincomeisoften
investedinhealthandeducation,improvingthe
welfareofthenextgenerationthroughbetter
nutritionandbroaderhorizonsforfulfillment.
Communitieswithamosaicoflocally-owned
businessestendtohavemoreself-confidence,
politicalinfluenceandautonomy.
Tenure Shapes Everything
‘Tenure shapes a country’s forest industry
and economy. There is ample evidence in
some developed forested countries—e.g.
the United States, Sweden, and Finland—
and developing countries—such as
Mexico and China—that the recognition
of local rights has a profound effect on
the structure of industry and increases
the potential for forestry to generate jobs
and economic growth and contribute to
good governance. Small-scale and
community initiatives around forests can
also provide invaluable ecosystem
services, including climate change
mitigation—given the necessary tenure
reform.’ (RRI 2011)
‘...There is rarely a better way [than
community forest management] to
balance the interests of poor people and
forests. But to do a good job, communities
need strong property rights...’
(TheEconomist2010)
11
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JULY | 11
carbonemissions.Thelandusesectorcurrently
generates85%ofIndonesia’scarbonemissions.To
enablethecountrytoachieveitsambitious
emissionreductiontarget,44thecurrentplans
assumeforestrywillplayamajorpart,forinstance
throughreforestationschemes,improved
sustainableforestrymanagementpracticesandthe
eliminationofmanmadefiresandpeatland
decomposition.Recentexperiencehasshownthat
thesetargetsaresimplynotachievablewithoutthe
activeeconomicparticipationofsmallholders,
communitiesandsmallenterprises.Statistical
evidencefrom80CFEsin10countriesshowsthat‘…
greaterrule-makingautonomyatthelocallevel[is]
associatedwithhighcarbonstorageandlivelihood
benefits.45Toattracttherequiredinvestmentinto
theseareas,afundamentalreformoftenure,
governanceandinstitutionsisrequired.
5. Steps to improved forest
management
Tenurereformleadingtolocalcontrolof
naturalresourceswillnotsolvealltheproblems
outlinedinthispaper,butitwillgosomewayto
correctingthecurrentunsustainabletrajectoryand
avoidingthechancesofaboom-bustscenario.
Shiftingtheeconomyawayfromanover-reliance
onnaturalresourceextractioncanbeachievedby
buildinganSMEsector,whichinturnisfounded
uponareliableassetbase.Experiencefromother
countries(e.g.JapanandSouthKorea)hasshown
thatthenecessaryconditionforabroadlybased
economyislandreformaccompaniedbygood
qualityinstitutions.Simplyhandingoutland
certificatesisnotsufficient;neitherisallocating
forestpermits(suchasHTR)withoutconsidering
howgovernance,investmentandinfrastructure
willplayapartinfacilitatingeconomic
development.Thecallfortenurereformtherefore
needstobenuancedbyplacingitinthecontextof
broaderinstitutionalreform.
Thereisnodoubtthattacklinginstitutional
reformisachallengingpropositioninIndonesia.
Thisispartlybecausethecurrentstateof
governanceisanartifactoftheover-relianceon
naturalresources.Theevidenceshowsthat
‘institutionalqualityispositivelycorrelatedwith
economicgrowthandnegativelycorrelatedwith
countriesdependentonnaturalresourcerevenue...
becauseitinhibitsnetpositivesaving’.46
Sotenurereform,institutionalquality,andthe
compositionoftheeconomyareinter-related.As
deforestationworsens,institutionsdegradeand
theeconomybecomeshollowedoutbytheabsence
ofasmallandmediumsizedenterprise(SME)
sector.Conversely,iftenurereformleadstobetter
forestmanagement,lessrelianceonextractionand
anemergentSMEsector,thenonemayexpect
institutionstoimprove.Thefirststep,however,is
tochangetheattitudetowardslocalcontrolof
forestassets.
Creating the conditions for sustainable
investment
Evenwithtenurereformanddecent
institutions,locallycontrolledforestrywillrequire
investment.Attractingappropriatemeansof
fundingatthislevelisachallenge.TheG3,a
consortiumorrights-holders47isworkingwiththe
GrowingForestsPartnershipstotacklethisissue,
usingexamplesofbestpracticefromaroundthe
world.Thiswillcreatesomesolidguidancethatcan
bedeployedinIndonesia.
Howeverrightsaredefinedanddelineated,
andconnectedtospecificobligations,theevidence
showsthatafunctioningsystemofrights
protectedbyruleoflaw,particularlyintheland
sector,hasbeenthepre-conditionandcornerstone
forafunctioningfinancesector,thedevelopment
ofmanufacturingindustries,thereductionof
povertyandsocialprogress.Theremaybea
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JULY | 11
temptationtocircumscribeoralienaterightsin
ordertospeedupprogress,butthisisamistake.
Strengtheningrightsdoesnotonlysecurejustice
forthemostvulnerable,italsohasimmediate
socialandeconomicbenefits(seeTable2).
ItisencouragingthataspartoftheREDDplan,
Indonesiaplanstofacilitateaprocesswhereby
communitiesreforest500,000hectaresperannum
andtakeonmanagement(throughthecommunity
forest(HKmandvillageforest(HD)schemes)ofa
further500,000.Butthisneedsaneconomic
rationaleorelseitbecomesjustanothersubsidy
withunpredictableconsequences.Treeplanting,in
mostcases,doeshaveastrongbusinesscase.
Domesticdemandfortimberisgrowing,but
demandvariesacrossdistrictsdependingona
rangeoffactors.Itwouldbehardforcentral
plannerstodeterminethemostappropriateform
offorestry.TheexperienceoftheHTRscheme
bearsthisout-originallyconceivedasameansto
growfastgrowingspeciesdemandedbythepulp
industry,thepermitsissuedareusuallyto
communitiesfarfromthemills,andinmanycases
theyareplanningtoplanthighervaluehardwoods
suchasteakandmahogany.Theprovinceswiththe
largestmillshaverelativelyfewpermitsissuedfor
HTR,whichmayreflectlocalgovernment
reluctancetoissuepermits,butanecdotallyit
seemsthepriceofferedforpulpwoodissolowthat
thebusinesscaseforHTRplantationcannotbe
made.
Itispossiblethatthisisaconsequenceofthe
centralplanningofreforestationschemes.Abetter
solutionmaybetoallowinvestmenttofinditsway
tothemostpromisingpropositions.Inmostforest
areas(outsideconservationareasand
unencumberedbyactiveleases),thepresumption
shouldbethatlocalpeoplehaveaninherentright
tomanagethelocalforestprovidingtheycomply
withgeneralaimsofforestcover,biodiversityand
watershedprotection.Thiswouldbeanoutcome-
basedsystemratherthanaprescriptive
micromanagedinput-basedsystem.Itispossibly
theonlywayinwhichreforestationplans(either
forecosystemrestoration,carbonsequestrationor
rawmaterialsupply)haveanychanceofbeing
successful.Governmentordonorprojectsthat
claimambitiousreforestationtargets,without
addressingtheevidentfailingsofthecurrent
structureandparadigmoflandrights,shouldthus
betreatedwithskepticism.
6. Conclusion
ThestateofforestsinIndonesiaisthelegacy
ofanowoutmodeddevelopmentmodelthatin
manyforestedcountriesledtothecaptureof
nationalwealthbyaprivilegedfew.Indonesia
neednolongerbetrappedbyanoutdated
paradigmmandatingthatallforestsbeownedby
thestate.Asacomplex,diverseemergingeconomy
Indonesiahasmanychallengesthatneedtobe
addressedtoensurethatsocialdevelopmentkeeps
upwitheconomicdevelopment,whilstalso
Rights Benefits
Propertyrights(e.g.communityland)Assetsinhandsofpeoplearemorevaluabletotheeconomythan
‘zombie’assetsmanagedbythestate
Free,PriorandInformedConsent
Willingconsentofpeoplemeanslessconflictandexpense,morelocal
investment,localexpertise,betterlanduseefficiency,higherproduc-
tivity,cheapermoney(lowerriskforbanksandinvestors)
Oversight,arbitrationandadvocacyMarkettransparencyleadstomorerealisticlandvalues,whichdi-
rectscapitaltomostefficientusage
TABLE 2: THE BENEFITS OF RIGHTS
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JULY | 11
keepinganeyeonenvironmentalsustainability.
However,tenurereformneednotbeseenasan
unwelcomedistractionfromthejobinhand,for
arguablyitistheonlymeansbywhichIndonesia
canamelioratetheratherdisorderedeffectsof
rapidprogress.Tenurereform,aspartofwider
institutionalstrengthening,couldreleasethe
energyandimaginationoflocalpeoplethroughout
thecountry.Thiswouldattractanewkindof
investmenttotheforestrysector,acombinationof
national,internationalandlocalresourcesthat
wouldrevitalizetheforestindustry,restore
landscapes,reducevulnerabilitytobotheconomic
andnaturaldisastersandsetinmotionthekindof
broad-baseddemocraticeconomicdevelopment
thatwillseeIndonesiacomeclosertoachievingits
enormouspotential.
Endnotes
1ReducedEmissionsfromDeforestationandforest
Degradation2ForestLawEnforcement,GovernanceandTrade
–aEuropeanUnionProgram–www.euflegt.efi.int3Thepaperdrawssubstantiallyonareportwritten
bythesameauthorfortheUKClimateChangeUnit
inMarch2011,referencedbelowasElson2011.4DNPI,20105Cassonetal.,20076BAPPENAS,20097PirardandIrland(2006).Theindustryclaimsthat
thisproportionhasfallenoverthepastfiveyears,
andsomefirmshavebeenmakingplanstoimprove
sustainability,butingeneralalargeproportionof
feedstockisstillderivedfromthenaturalforest.
(Greenomics,2010)8JakartaPost,2010(SpeechbyForestryMinister
ZulkifliHasan).9FAOSTAT,2010.10“Inti-plasma”isaplantationarrangementin
whichaprivatecompanyacquiresaplantation
areaincorporatingthepreviousfarmersas
laborers,assigninganucleus‘inti’areatocompany
plantationand‘plasma’areaassmallholdingsto
thefarmer-laborers.11Molenaretal,201012Harvard,2010,p.4
13Alsoknownas‘genuinesaving’or‘netpositive
saving’14WorldBank(2010).Itappearsthatthiscalculation
excludesforestloss,inwhichcasethetrueANS
figureisevenworsethanthefigurequoted15Harvard,201016EIA,200917DeSchutter,201018Mcleish&Hanson,201119Burgessetal,201120IFC,200721Placeetal,201122Purnomo,201023MinistryofForestry2009reportrecords298units,
andthemorerecent2010datashows303units,but
doesnotrevealhowmanyareactive.24ITTO,201125FieldresearchbyauthorinJayapura,201026WorldBank,200727Thisdecreewaslaterrevoked,givingpulp
companiesmoretimetoaccessnaturalforests.Itis
notyetclearhowthelatestpresidential
moratoriumwilleffectthisposition.28Barretal,201029WorldBank,200730DNPIKaltim,201031FAOdatahasbeencriticizedasunreliable
becauseofchangesinmethodologyreflectingthe
problemsofcomparingdefinitionsfromdifferent
countries.Also,Indonesiatendstorecordthe
extentofplantationpermitsratherthantheextent
ofplantedforests,leadingtofurtherconfusion.32Blaseretal.201133FAO,201034HutanTanamanRakyat35DanaReboisasi(DR)36MinistryofForestry,201137RRI,201038INPRES10/201139Brownetal200240LFP,200941GEF,200942Deininger&Byerlee,201143Scherr,20034426%ofbusinessasusualprojectedemissionsby
2020,or41%ifinternationalfundingisforthcoming45Chhatre&Agrawal(2009)46Dietzetal,2007473Grepresentsthethreerightsholders’alliances:
TheInternationalAllianceofIndigenousandTribal
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JULY | 11
PeoplesoftheTropicalForests(IAITPTF),TheGlobal
AllianceofCommunityForestry(GACF)andthe
InternationalFamilyForestryAlliance(IFFA)
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The Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) is a strategic coalition comprised of international, regional, and
community organizations engaged in development, research and conservation to advance forest tenure, policy
and market reforms globally.
The mission of the Rights and Resources Initiative is to support local communities’ and indigenous peoples’
struggles against poverty and marginalization by promoting greater global commitment and action towards
policy, market and legal reforms that secure their rights to own, control, and benefit from natural resources,
especially land and forests. RRI is coordinated by the Rights and Resources Group, a non-profit organization based
in Washington, D.C. For more information, please visit www.rightsandresources.org.
This publication was made possible with the support of the Ford Foundation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland,
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation, and UK Department for International.Development. The views
presented here are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the agencies that have generously
supported this work, nor by all the Partners of the RRI coalition.
MinistryofForestry(2009)DataDanInformasi
PemanfaatanHutan2009,DirektoratWilayah
PengelolaanDanPenyiapanArealPemanfaatan
KawasanHutanDirektoratJenderalPlanologi
Kehutanan,DepartemenKehutanan,Jakarta
MinistryofForestry(2010)DataDanInformasi
PemanfaatanHutan2010,DirektoratWilayah
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