AN AGENCY THEORY VIEW OF THE MILITARY ADVISOR

by

GILBERT E. PETRINA, Major, USAF

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

For Completion of the Graduation Requirements

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2005

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About the Author

Major Gil Petrina is currently a student at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB. Major Petrina graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1989. After attending pilot training at Williams AFB and B-52 Combat Crew Training, he was assigned to Griffiss AFB as a B-52 pilot. In 1994, he was assigned to Barksdale AFB as a B-52 pilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot and flight commander. In 1997, Major Petrina was selected to serve as the aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt AFB. In 1999, he was assigned to Whiteman AFB as a B-2 mission commander, instructor pilot, flight commander, and assistant operations officer. In 2003, he deployed and flew in combat in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Upon returning, he was selected to attend the Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. After attending Command and General Staff College, Major Petrina was selected for his current assignment at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Maj Petrina’s next assignment is to the Headquarters, Air Combat Command at Langley AFB where he will serve under the Director of Requirements for Special Programs.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisor, Colonel Tom Griffith, for his insights into the military and civil-military relations and his patience and persistence as I tried to capture those ideas. I also thank Professor Drew as my reader for helping to hone the thoughts into a better text.

I’m grateful to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Retired for permitting an interview. I’m also grateful to Rear Admiral Steve Pietropaoli, USN, Retired and Mr. Denny Klauer for their candid views from their experiences on the Joint Staff. I’m indebted to my instructors and classmates at SAASS for their insights and perspectives especially Dr. James Kiras, Colonel Jim Forsyth, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Gorman, Dr. Gary Schaub, and my good friend, Major Ed Redman.

Finally and most importantly, I thank my wife, Carolyn, and my daughter, Kelley, for their

quiet tolerance and understanding throughout the year when I wasn’t quite there.

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Abstract

An understanding of civil-military relations provides insight for the military strategist into the interplay between politics and military art. A framework of how civilian leadership and the military relate in formulating national security objectives may prove useful in developing military strategies. In Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, political scientist Peter Feaver proposes a theory of civil-military relations based on principal-agent theory called Agency theory which defines civil-military relations as the day-to-day strategic interaction between civilian leaders and the military. According to Agency theory, the civilians set oversight measures to monitor the behavior of the military and the military responds based on the probability of its behavior being discovered and its expectation of punishment from civilian leadership. This paper argues that Agency theory can be extended by examining the intangible aspects of the military that contribute to its decision-making and behavior and separating the civilian principal into the President and Congress to better describe American civil-military relations. The examination of the intangible aspects of the military mind concludes that the professional military ethic espoused by political scientist Samuel Huntington and expressed in the Weinberger Doctrine offers insights into the behavior of the military that the purely rationalist approach of Agency theory does not capture. The examination of the separation of the civilian principal into the executive and legislative branches shows that in times of crisis, the military advisor is drawn to the President and his advisors as a source of immediate information. This change in the nature of the strategic interaction to a more informal, feedback-based monitoring with respect to the President gives more power over the military while Congress maintains a more formal oversight. The study concludes that Agency theory is a valuable theory not only for its descriptive power in analyzing the dynamics of American civil-military relations but also for its flexibility to accept extensions to the basic theory without undermining its validity. For the military strategist, Agency theory proposes one view of civil-military relations and offers insight into how military strategies relate to political objectives.

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Contents

Chapter Page DISCLAIMER ...................................................................................................ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR ....................................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................iv ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1 1 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND PETER FEAVER’S AGENCY THEORY ……………………………………………………………………. 6 2 THE MILITARY MIND, WEINBERGER DOCTRINE, AND THE MILITARY ADVISOR ...........................................................................................................19 3 CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT AS SEPARATE, BUT UNEQUAL, PRINCIPALS.......................................................................................................51 4 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................79 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................83

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INTRODUCTION

Understanding civil-military relations helps the military strategist recognize and

appreciate the dynamics of the interplay between politics and military art. Theorist Carl

von Clausewitz postulated that “war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political

instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”1 If

Clausewitz is correct, then civil-military relations describes how the civilian politician

and the military interact to effectively and efficiently use force in the pursuit of political

objectives.

Military strategy is not developed in a vacuum. While a strategist does not need

to become an expert on civil-military relations, an understanding of how civilian leaders’

actions and decisions affect military strategy may help one to develop better military

strategy. A comprehension of the nature of the interaction between the civilian leaders

and the military helps military strategists appreciate the need to connect military means to

political ends and how that process unfolds in American civil-military relations.

To that end, political scientist and professor Peter Feaver proposes a theory of

civil-military relations called Agency theory based on the well-known principal-agent

theory used by economists to explain contract negotiations. Feaver’s Agency theory

addresses civil-military relations as the strategic interaction between civilians and the

military. His theory answers the question: “How do civil-military relations in the United

States play out on a day-to-day basis?”2

Feaver’s theory is a useful model for examining the interaction between civilians

and the military, but has a weakness in its treatment of the military’s role as an advisor to

the civilian on the use of force. Feaver notes that “under any theory of civil-military

relations the military has an obligation to give advice.”3 The military advisor’s role is to

help the civilian transition from pure politics to incorporating the use of force to achieve

political objectives. The military advisor has experience and expertise that the civilian

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1976), 99. 2 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 3. 3 Feaver, 138.

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leader does not and therefore serves to counsel the civilian on military capabilities and to

recommend courses of military action. Feaver’s difficulty with the military’s advisory

role lies in what he calls the “exceeding blurry line between advising against a course of

action and resisting civilian efforts to purse that course of action.”4 Do military advisors

exaggerate the costs of a course of action or the magnitude of the threat to persuade

civilian leaders to endorse options more in line with military desires? Do civilians

change their minds because of military resistance or because they were “truly persuaded

that it was unwise?”5 Feaver proposes that this “blurry line” challenges the civilian to

evaluate the accuracy or validity of military advice.

Purpose

This thesis argues that Feaver’s theory can be extended to better capture the

military’s role as an advisor by loosening its rationalist approach and expanding its

treatment of the civilian in American civil-military relations as a single entity. The first

extension examines the intangible aspects of the military ethic that Feaver’s rationalist

approach fails to capture. The military’s norms, beliefs, and values affect the advice it

gives to civilian leaders. The second extension separates Feaver’s basis for the civilian

leader into the President and Congress to more accurately portray the context of the

American civil-military relationship.

Feaver’s rationalist approach to Agency theory, reducing the military agent to the

subject of simple cost-benefit analysis, neglects the intangible characteristics that make

the military professional an expert in the use of force. The rigid rationalist approach that

Feaver adopts in Agency theory detracts from a clear understanding of the military’s

advisory role. Feaver acknowledges that the “use of the rationalist method cuts across a

trend in the general political science literature to focus on nonmaterial determinants of

behavior, be they identity, norms, beliefs, or ideas.”6 In Agency theory, Feaver proposes

“civil-military theory needs to make room for material factors” to include such factors as

cost and incentives that is lacking from existing civil-military relations theory but, in

4 Feaver, 62. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, 13.

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doing so he neglects the impact of other factors in the civil-military relationship.7 While

it is difficult to capture every aspect of the idea of the military mind, there are some

general themes that embody the notion of the military professional. The development of

the American military professional and the professional military ethic contributes to an

understanding of why the American military thinks and acts as it does. The military

cannot divorce itself from its professional military ethic therefore it becomes a

centerpiece in the military’s behavior and interaction in civil-military relations. By

taking such a rational approach, Agency theory does not consider the intangible aspects

of the military’s advice.

The second extension to Agency theory is the separation of the civilian principal

into its distinct roles of executive and legislative branches sharing control of the military.

An understanding of the civilian government is crucial to understanding civil-military

relations and an accurate depiction of the government clarifies civilian control. Before

one can understand how civilians relate to the military, one should understand how

civilians within the American government relate to each other. The framers of the

Constitution were very deliberate in separating the powers of government between the

executive and legislative branches. The relationship between the two branches affects the

relations between the civilians, as a whole, and the military. To model the civilian as a

single actor undermines an analysis of American civil-military relations built upon the

concept of the separation of powers.

Methodology

This study explains Agency theory and explores the role of the military advisor

through three case studies that Feaver uses to explain Agency theory and the use of force:

the Gulf War, Somalia, and Kosovo. The case studies illustrate the utility of Agency

theory through the use of force after the end of the Cold War and represent not only

significant instances of the use of force but also emphasize degrees of tension in civil-

military relations.

Chapter 1 explains the basic principles and terms of principal-agent theory and

explains Peter Feaver’s Agency Theory. Principal-agent theory has proven to be a useful

7 Feaver, 13-14.

3

tool for economists to explain contracts and political scientists to explain bureaucracies.

This chapter explains the concept of principal-agent theory and the confusing jargon

accompanying the theory. It then explains Feaver’s adaptations and additions used to

develop Agency theory.

Chapter 2 examines the idea of the professional military ethic as laid out by

Samuel Huntington’s landmark work on civil-military relations, The Soldier and the

State. This chapter argues that the Weinberger Doctrine articulates Huntington’s

professional military ethic and the military’s view of how it would like to go to war and

that the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides the institutional framework in articulating a

unified view of the military agent to the civilian principal. The chapter examines the Gulf

War, Somalia, and Kosovo from the perspective of the influence of the professional

military ethic and Weinberger Doctrine on the military advisors and their interaction with

civilian leaders.

Chapter 3 examines the distinct Constitutional responsibilities of the President

and Congress with respect to governance and civilian control of the military. This

chapter argues that separating the civilian principal in Agency theory into the President

and Congress, while complicating the examination of the theory, provides more insight

into the role of the military advisor. The President takes a more active role in foreign

policy especially in war or times of crisis and this role shifts the military advisor closer to

the President and Secretary of Defense as they pursue military action. Congress assumes

a more reactive role with respect to control of the military by receiving reports after

decisions have been made. The Gulf War, Somalia, and Kosovo case studies are again

examined to show how separating the civilian principal illuminates the interaction and its

implications for the civilian-military relationship. Finally, Chapter 4 reviews the findings

of the study and offers concluding thoughts on the validity of Agency theory.

In examining the Gulf War, Somalia, and Kosovo from the perspectives of those

in the highest levels of government, several limitations are obvious. As an unclassified

work, it is difficult to confirm that the most important sources were consulted to depict an

accurate account of interaction between the civilians and the military. While in some

cases sources corroborated what transpired, in other areas, time constraints and the scope

of the thesis prevented a detailed accounting.

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Conclusion

A better understanding of civil-military relations will allow military strategists to

understand how military planning supports the political objectives of civilian leaders.

Peter Feaver’s Agency theory is a useful and practical theory to help explain how

civilians and the military interact on a day-to-day basis. Feaver’s use of the principal-

agent theory addresses some of the most basic and contentious issues in civil-military

relations such as how civilian leadership maintains control despite the military’s expertise

in the use of force, the role and influence of civilian oversight of the military, and how

civilians and the military work together to achieve national security objectives.

Agency theory is a valuable theory and the extensions argued in this thesis are

meant to confirm the utility of its approach. Feaver’s rationalist approach and narrow

scope of the civilian principal allows him to build Agency theory into the construct of

civil-military relations. The extensions argued in this thesis serve to open the aperture of

the view of Agency theory to incorporate the ideas of the intangible aspects of the

military and the separation of powers in American government. If these extensions

stimulate one to take another look at Agency theory, then they will have served a useful

purpose.

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CHAPTER 1

PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND PETER FEAVER’S AGENCY THEORY

Theories and models help us simplify difficult concepts and explain reality. By

simplifying concepts and identifying the core elements, it then becomes easier to explain

events and the implications of those events. Economists developed a theory called

principal-agent theory to explain the dynamics of contract negotiations. This construct

gives a common frame of reference to discuss the relationship between a person hiring

someone to perform a task and the person hired to perform the task. Political scientists

have used principal-agent theory to describe the nature of bureaucracies, public service,

and other areas. Principal-agent theory can also serve as a useful model to describe civil-

military relations and the relationship between civilian leaders and the military “hired” to

protect the nation.

In Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, political

scientist Peter Feaver takes principal-agent theory further and proposes a theory of civil-

military relations called Agency Theory. He argues that a theory of civil-military

relations based on principal-agent framework prevalent in economic theory provides a

more useful tool than Samuel Huntington’s model. Feaver’s Agency theory addresses

civil-military relations at the theoretical level through a deductive approach that specifies

how civilian leaders monitor the military as it serves both the nation and the civilian. In

short, Agency theory seeks to answer the question: “How do civil-military relations in

the United States play out on a day-to-day basis?”8 Before explaining the details of

Feaver’s Agency theory however, it is important to understand principal-agent theory.

Principal-Agent Theory

Economists use the principal-agent model as a way of explaining the interactions

that take place in the development and execution of contracts. Principal-agent theory

addresses the relationship that develops when one party (the principal) delegates work to

8 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 3.

6

another party (the agent).9 The principal hires an agent as an expert or specialist to

perform an assigned task. The principal hopes to choose the most appropriate agent to

complete the task to his satisfaction. The principal offers payment and incentives in the

contract to ensure the agent will complete the task. After selecting the agent, the

principal evaluates the agent to confirm that the agent is performing as expected. When

the agent completes the task to the principal’s satisfaction, the agent receives the payment

and incentives from the contract.

Principal-agent theory spells out the problems that develop between the principal

and the agent upon entering the relationship. Principal-agent theory uses several special

terms to explain the inherent challenges and problems of the principal-agent relationship

that will be explained later in greater detail. Information asymmetry refers to the

information advantage the agent has over the principal with respect to completing the

task. Adverse selection describes the risk the principal faces during the process of

selecting the agent to complete the task. Moral hazard occurs after the principal chooses

the agent and must observe the agent’s behavior. Monitoring refers to the methods the

principal uses to observe the agent’s behavior. Preferences are how both the principal

and the agent would like to perform the task. Working means the agent performs the task

as the principal requests and shirking means the agent performs the task as he desires.10

A major challenge in the principal-agent relationship is that, from the principal’s

perspective, the agent is assumed to have an information advantage over the principal that

creates an information asymmetry. The agent possesses more skill, expertise, or

specialized knowledge to complete the task than the principal. Although the principal

hires the agent because of his expertise, the informational advantage of the agent provides

the agent the opportunity, and possibly incentive, to perform as he wishes rather than as

the principal contracted. The more specialized the agent’s knowledge, skill, or expertise,

the higher the probability that the agent can use the information asymmetry to their

advantage. While true in any principal-agent relationship, this information asymmetry

can be especially prevalent in bureaucracies with high degrees of specialization and a

division of labor. In short, long-service specialized bureaucrats in a government

9 Kathleen Eisenhart, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of Management Review, Vol 14, No. 1 (January 1989): 58. 10 Feaver, 55.

7

organization have a distinct informational and expertise advantages over politicians.11

When the agent has more information than the principal, the agent may be able to control

the agenda in the relationship, but in a hierarchal relationship, like civilian control of the

military, the role of the principal in controlling the agenda and dictating policy is

paramount. Civilian control of the military confronts the military agent with the need to

subordinate his expertise in the application of military force to the will of the civilian

principal.

A second challenge facing the principal is choosing the agent who will complete

the task and evaluating the agent’s behavior after he is hired. Adverse selection generally

refers to how the agent represents, or misrepresents, himself during the hiring process.

The principal’s challenge in the hiring process is to confirm that the agent is qualified to

perform the task and wants to perform the task as the principal desires. The principal

risks making an adverse selection of an agent to perform the task since the principal

cannot completely verify the skills or desire of the agent until he begins the assigned

task.12 Moral hazard refers to the behavior of the agent after entering the contract. Once

in the principal-agent relationship, the principal and the agent may differ in their desires

regarding performance under the contract.

Once in the principal-agent relationship, the principal faces two more challenges.

The first difficulty is determining if the agent’s preferences in completing the task match

the principal’s preferences. The principal tries to determine differences in the agent’s

preferences and confirm that the task is being completed to the principal’s satisfaction.

The second challenge facing the principal is that it is difficult and expensive for the

principal to verify what the agent is actually doing.13 The principal employs monitoring

mechanisms to observe and evaluate the agent’s behavior. Since monitoring the agent

takes time and resources, the principal seeks the most efficient way to accomplish this

task.

As the principal monitors the behavior of the agent, he may find the agent

performing to his satisfaction and to the terms of the contract. This is called working. In

11 B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 22. 12 Eisenhardt, 61. 13 Ibid, 58.

8

the words of Agency theory, working is the “ideal conduct that the agent would perform

if the principal had full knowledge of what the agent could do and was in fact doing.”14

Conversely, shirking means the principal has monitored the agent’s behavior and finds it

unsatisfactory with respect to completing the task.15 Naturally, the principal seeks to

minimize shirking. From the principal’s perspective, shirking is inefficient and costs the

principal time and resources. At the same time, the principal does not get the desired

outcome as the agent has not completed the task required by the principal. In the end,

the principal has invested effort and resources to monitor the task already and the task is

not completed as desired.

As a theory for economics and contracts, “agency theory provides a unique,

realistic, and empirically testable perspective on problems of cooperative effort.”16

Political scientists have also considered principal-agent theory as it might apply to public

policy. Professor Jan-Erik Lane argues that the “principal-agent idea offers a new

perspective upon government” and that it has utility in examining how the government

implements its policies.17 Not surprisingly, some see principal-agent theory as a new

way to understand civil-military relations.

Feaver’s Agency Theory

Using the same construct and terms as principal-agent theory, Feaver describes

American civil-military relations as a strategic interaction within a hierarchal setting with

the civilians assuming the role of the principal and the military acting as the agent. Just

as in principal-agent theory, the civilians employ monitoring mechanisms to oversee the

military, and the information advantage lies with the military. The military calculates

whether it will work or shirk based on the possibility of being caught through the

monitoring mechanisms.18 The distinctive features of strategic interaction in a

14 Feaver, 61. 15 Ibid. 16 Eisenhardt, 72. 17 Jan-Erik Lane. “Relevance of the Principal-Agent Framework to Public Policy and Implementation,” 2003 Research Working Papers, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy [online] Available from http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/wp/wp29.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 May 2005, 12. 18 Feaver, 57. Feaver recognizes that the terms work and shirk are problematic in the civil-military relations context. The jargon of principal-agent theory can be challenging but the concepts represent the general attitude of the military to act under civilian control. At the extreme of shirking is a coup where the

9

hierarchical setting make the principal-agent framework appealing as a new way to view

civil-military relations and capture the essence of the interaction between civilians and

the military on a day-to-day basis. Strategic interaction involves the tension between

what civilians want the military to do and what the military expects the civilians to

desire.19

Feaver’s Agency theory explains the extent to which the preferences of the

civilian principals and military agents diverge, the informational advantage the military

agent possesses as an expert in the use of force, how monitoring and oversight

mechanisms overcome information advantages, and how the military’s behavior is a

function of their expectations of punishment if shirking is discovered.20 In brief, Feaver’s

theory explains how civilians maintain control of the military while achieving political

objectives. It presents the interactive process that occurs in American government to

guarantee the civilian maintains that control. The theory also explains how the American

system of government provides the means to control the military and maintain its

subordination to civilian leaders despite the different preferences between the civilian and

the military.

The preferences of civilians and the military can be difficult to interpret because

civilians and the military share the same desire for national security, but may differ on

how to achieve that goal. Civilians want protection from external enemies and also want

to remain in political control over their destiny and produce good policy.21 The military

also wants to protect the nation, but has its own preferences over policy outcomes, over

how the military’s behavior is interpreted, and how the relationship is monitored.22 Thus,

the preferences for both civilians and the military are multi-dimensional and often

difficult to correlate. This sets the stage for conflict in civil-military relations. Viewing

civil-military relations through the lens of Agency theory provides insight into the

interaction between the civilian leader and as well as how the civilian leadership and the

military acts the way it wants to with no regard for punishment. At the extreme of working is a military that does everything the civilian asks without question. 19 Feaver, 54. 20 Ibid, 56. 21 Ibid, 61. 22 Ibid, 63.

10

military relate to achieve national security objectives. The first requirement is an

understanding of the nature of the civilian’s and military’s preferences.

Feaver divides the civilians’ preferences into functional and relational goals. The

functional goals serve to protect the civilian from external enemies. Functionally, the

civilians want the military to do what it is asked, work to the fullest extent of its duty, and

maintain competency.23 At the same time, the civilian wants to make the key policy

decisions, wants to decide when it should make decisions and when the military may

make decisions, and wants the military to avoid any behavior that undermines civilian

supremacy.24 In other words, these relational goals refer to how the civilians interact

with the military. The degree to which these relational goals are met determines whether

the military is working or shirking. At one extreme, if all of the goals are met, the

military is some ideal-type military which does everything the civilian asks.25 The other

extreme, where none of the goals are met, represents the traditional military coup where

the military is in charge and making all the decisions.26 Not surprisingly, day-to-day

civil-military relations represent a process through which civilians meet the functional

and relational goals and, in doing so, secure the nation and control the military. While

the civilians focus on ensuring their preferences are met, the military acts in light of its

own preferences.

Feaver argues that the military’s preferences revolve around three concerns: how

the military will be used in pursuit of national policy, how the military’s behavior will be

interpreted, and how the relationship is monitored.27 The military is interested in the

policy the civilian pursues and the desired outcomes of the policy. While the military

agent will do what is asked, and is even willing to risk the loss of life in combat, they

would prefer not to die needlessly in a hopeless policy. The military wants a policy that

does not squander its combat power so it has a stake in a well-thought out policy. In

addition, the military would prefer policies that deal with threats from a position of

advantage by controlling the tempo and scope of the conflict through offensive or

preventive operations. Finally, the military agent tends to inflate threats and 23 Feaver, 61. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid, 62. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid, 63.

11

requirements to prevent being taken by surprise thereby ensuring military victory.28 In

short, the military prefers to operate from a favorable position in conflict. It desires a

good policy that it can achieve and the means to guarantee victory making it a viable

protector of the state. Its ability to achieve the civilian policy reflects favorably on the

military which contributes to its next preference.

The second military preference concerns the interpretation of the military’s

behavior. The military expects its behavior will be seen as honorable and, as an

institution, desires respect. Honor plays a central role in the military at all levels from

small-unit cohesion (where individuals are willing to risk their lives) to the enforcement

of the principle of civilian control. In the American civil-military relationship, Feaver

argues, the “military subordinates itself to the civilians because, in a democracy, such

subordination is recognized to be right and it would [be] dishonorable to do otherwise is

countervailing.”29 The desire to be seen as honorable can mute the military’s impulse to

shirk and limit its third preference, the pursuit of autonomy.

The third preference relates to the military’s desire for autonomy. Regardless of

what is asked of the military, it would like to act with minimal civilian oversight and

interference. The military professional desires to fulfill his duty to the state to the best of

his ability. Too much interference or oversight from the civilian detracts from the

military’s efficiency as it does its duty. The military is aware of how it would like to

conduct operations and would like as little meddling as possible from the civilian

leadership. But rather than sacrificing its honor, the military will tolerate meddling and

limited autonomy.

In American civil-military relations, the multidimensional nature of preferences

for both civilians and the military help explain the conflicts in civil-military relations. In

Feaver’s theory, the military agent is said to work perfectly when it does what it has

contracted to do, how the civilian principal asked it to be done, and in a way that

reinforces the civilian principal’s role in deciding policy and making decisions. On the

other hand, the military agent shirks when it deviates from its agreement with the civilian

28 Ibid. 29 Feaver, 64.

12

principal, pursues its own preferences against the wishes of the civilian principal, or

undermines the ability of the civilian authority to make future decisions.30

Feaver argues that shirking by the military usually takes one of three forms. The

first form involves efforts to determine the outcome of a policy by giving inflated

estimates of what military operations would cost. The second form occurs when the

military attempts to influence the outcome of policy calculus with end runs, unauthorized

public protests, leaks, or appeals to other political actors. The final form occurs when the

military attempts to undermine a policy through bureaucratic foot-dragging and slow

rolling so that undesired policy is never implemented.31

In addition to the challenges of divergent preferences of civilians and the military,

four aspects contribute to the information asymmetry between the two that add additional

tension to civil-military relations: technical expertise and specialized knowledge,

political competence, moral competence, and the need for secrecy. Feaver spells out the

information advantage the military has over civilians in the application of military power.

Both civilians and the military share a common history, political memory, and knowledge

of the budget, force structure, and threat but, the military devotes more time and effort to

developing technical expertise in the art of war than the civilian principal. Feaver

concludes that this gives the military “significant informational advantages over

civilians” in the knowledge of how to use the military.32 Combat experience, a

distinctive mark of military expertise, confers a special advantage to the military. While

civilians are experts on a wide variety of defense policy issues, they traditionally leave

combat to the military.33 While the military has technical competence and specialized

knowledge in the application of military force, the civilian typically has a higher level of

political competence.

Political competence refers to an understanding of the stakes and risks in

controlling the use of deadly force. Feaver presents this as private information known

only to the principal. The principal knows how to judge risks and how these judgments

translate into preferences over outcomes. The civilians may convey these preferences to

30 Ibid 68. 31 Feaver, 68. 32 Ibid, 69. 33 Ibid, 70.

13

the military agent in the form of orders, but changes in the nature of the situation may

also cause the civilians to change their preferences. While shifting civilian preferences

may be conveyed to the military, the impetus behind them may remain hidden from the

military agent. In the end, the civilian has the right to be wrong as they make decisions

on the use of military force.34

Both civilians and the military possess moral competence, but the military agent

may be granted a higher status in this regard because he is willing to put his life on the

line to protect the civilian principal. “By virtue of his willingness to sacrifice, the

military agent may be thought of possessing a special moral competence.”35 Feaver notes

that the “belief in moral competence serves to muddy the lines of authority between

civilian and military, particularly when the civilian is directing the military to put itself in

harm’s way.”36 The civilians still retain the right to be wrong, but the “moral ambiguity

of the relationship bolsters the hand of a military agent should he choose to resist civilian

direction.”37

The desire for military secrecy also challenges the information problem for the

civilian principal. Secrecy confers a certain amount of legitimacy on military efforts to

keep civilian principals in the dark or to withhold information that reflects poorly on the

agent. The paradox for the civilian principal is that it must use monitoring mechanisms

to “open the agent’s hidden behavior” while still protecting the viability of the military

mission.38

Feaver concludes that, in general, information asymmetries favor the military

agent especially as the military operation moves closer to combat, but that the civilian

principal can mitigate the effect of information advantage. In principal-agent jargon,

information asymmetry is overcome by employing monitoring systems to update the

principal on the agent’s behavior.39 The use of information systems to monitor the

behavior of the agent curbs the opportunity for the agent to deceive the principal and

pursue his own preferences. In Agency theory, Feaver proposes that attention to civilian

34 Feaver, 69. 35 Ibid, 71. 36 Ibid, 72. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid, 71. 39 Eisenhardt, 60.

14

oversight of the military helps the civilian increase his own knowledge of military

activities to better control the military and ensure civilian preferences prevail.

Oversight of the military requires the military to reveal information to the civilian

principals. Feaver suggests that the “primary claim of principal-agent literature is that

delegation need not be an abdication of responsibility.”40 Civilians delegate the task of

national security to the military, but they are still responsible to the American people for

the security of the nation. Civilians must have the means to monitor and direct the

military, mitigate the dangers to civilian control, and curb divergent preferences.

Civilian oversight of the military balances delegation and control. At one end of

the spectrum is overdelegation to the military. Overdelegation of responsibility to the

military frees the civilians from all decisions relating to the military, but results in a de

facto coup: the military would decide policy and make decisions that, by rights, belong

to the civilian masters. This extreme gives the military complete autonomy and requires

the “greatest trust in the military.”41 The other extreme runs the risk of overcontrolling

the military in a situation where civilians devise strategy, dictate operations, and specify

tactics, basically “giving complete marching orders to the military.”42 In this extreme,

while civilians have indisputable control of the military, incompetent leaders who

jeopardize military lives or the mission could lead the military to revolt. Therefore, the

strategic interaction in civil-military relations balances the civilian leadership’s desire for

civilian control and the military’s desire for autonomy to conduct military operations,

both in the name of national security.

Based on principal-agent theory, Feaver proposes a range of oversight

mechanisms for civilians to monitor and control the military. The civilian can vary the

level of intrusiveness of the oversight to give the military more or less autonomy. If the

military continues its subordination, the civilians do not have to change the level of

intrusiveness in monitoring and the military can continue to operate with a desirable level

of autonomy. Examples of these mechanisms include rules of engagement, standing

orders, mission orders, and contingency plans. These all bound military autonomy and

proscribe certain behavior desired by the principal, but are less intrusive than active

40 Feaver, 55. 41 Ibid, 76. 42 Ibid.

15

participation. They serve as a “leash on the military” and an information source for

civilian leaders to give detailed guidance on how operations should proceed.43

A slightly more intrusive form of monitoring involves screening and selection of

personnel and advisors. The president has a limited number of qualified, senior military

officers from which to select his military advisors and the pool is made smaller as the

president chooses the agent who will be more in harmony with his policies and

preferences.44

The next most intrusive form of oversight involves the use of third parties to

watch the agent and report outputs or misbehavior to the principal. In principal-agent

terms, these are known as fire alarms and institutional checks. Fire alarms function as an

alerting system for the principal while institutional checks block or challenge the

behavior of the agent on a continuous basis. Fire alarms in the civil-military relationship

include the media and defense-oriented think tanks that provide independent information

on military activities to senior policy makers and the public. According to Feaver, the

framers of the Constitution “clearly intended institutional checks to be the bulwark of

civilian control over the armed forces” when they drafted the Constitution.45 The

division of executive and legislative authority in the Constitution prevents the

accumulation of power in any one branch of government. This arrangement ensures

power over the military is shared between the executive and legislative branch.

Police patrols are similar to institutional checks, but are considered a more

intrusive form of monitoring because they report on a specific activity of the military and

increase access to information about the military and its preferences. The annual budget

submitted to Congress offers an example of a police patrol. The size of the civilian

secretariat in the Office of the Secretary of Defense also reflects the civilians’ desire to

monitor the military. The Congressional Budget office and the General Accounting

Office are also examples of organizations that increase the civilian principals’ access to

military information.46

43 Feaver, 76,77. 44 Ibid, 79. 45 Ibid, 81-82. 46 Ibid, 85.

16

At the extreme of intrusive oversight is the decision by the civilian principal to

revisit the original delegation of authority to the military agent.47 The purpose of

revisiting the original contract would invariably be that the military is not performing as

preferred and the civilian wishes to narrow the military’s freedom of action.

In day-to-day civil-military relations, civilians employ all of these levels of

oversight to monitor the activity of the military. Oversight of the military increases the

civilians’ knowledge of the behavior, intentions, and preferences of the military.

Through its oversight of the military the civilian principal decides whether the military is

working or shirking in fulfilling the civilians’ preferences. Principal-agent theory

dictates that the principal withholds incentives in the agent’s contract as a consequence of

shirking. Feaver adds an explicit dimension to Agency theory not found in conventional

principal-agent literature: the unique ability of civilians to punish the military for

shirking or pursuing divergent preferences.

In traditional principal-agent theory, punishment is implicit in the withdrawal of

incentives if the agent fails to act within the principal’s preferences. Agency theory,

however, argues that civilians can, and sometimes do, punish the military directly.

Feaver divides punishment of the military into five broad categories: unwelcome

monitoring arrangements, budget cuts, discharge or retirement, military justice, and

extralegal civilian action to include verbal rebukes.48 Civilians may choose a wide

variety of tools within each category to punish the military. Feaver believes that the

military view of shirking will be based on the likelihood of being caught as a result of the

monitoring system and the probability that shirking will be punished.49 In a non-intrusive

monitoring system with low expectation of punishment, shirking would not be detected

and, even if it was, it would not be punished. In an intrusive monitoring system, on the

other hand, with a high expectation of punishment, the military would surely be caught if

it went against civilian desires and it would certainly be punished. The military bases its

calculus both on shirking being detected and how the principal will respond to shirking.50

47 Feaver, 85. 48 Ibid, 91-92. 49 Ibid, 102. 50 Ibid.

17

Feaver adapts principal-agent theory well to the complex interaction of civilian

principals and military agents in the daily business of ensuring national security. His

Agency theory effectively explains day-to-day civil-military relations through the use of

principal-agent theory. As a model to explain civil-military relations, Agency theory

illuminates the causal mechanisms in the strategic interaction between civilian actors and

military leaders, the means by which the civilian principal monitors the military, the

actions the military pursues to work or shirk, and the consequences they expect. It also

adds the element of punishment that is neglected in traditional civil-military relations

theory and missing from principal-agent theory.

The challenge for Feaver’s Agency theory is the same challenge Lane finds in

applying principal-agent theory to other government agencies: the difficulty of

accounting for nonmaterial factors.51 In Lane’s examination of public policy, the

nonmaterial factors are social ambitions and trust. Feaver’s Agency theory faces the

same challenge of accounting for nonmaterial factors in civil-military relations such as

duty, honor, and trust that are beyond the calculations of cost and benefit. Norms, ideals,

and beliefs influence the military’s behavior and thinking as much as technical expertise.

As the road to war gets closer to employing military force, the budget battles and force

structure issues that govern peacetime civil-military relations give way to the need to

understand the immeasurable human factors that govern the military’s preferences as it

prepares for combat.

Feaver’s rationalist approach to American civil-military relations prevents an

understanding of the impact of nonmaterial factors such as norms, ideals, and beliefs play

in military behavior. The next chapter explores the nonmaterial factors that drive the

military by returning to Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations and his idea of the

professional military ethic. An understanding of the norms, beliefs, and values of the

military applied within Agency theory suggests that the military’s decision to work or

shirk may extend beyond the monitoring mechanisms and the probability of punishment.

51 Lane, 12.

18

CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY MIND, WEINBERGER DOCTRINE, AND THE MILITARY

ADVISOR

This chapter proposes that Feaver’s rationalist approach to civil-military relations

falls short in understanding the norms, beliefs, and values that accompany the military’s

expertise in the use of force. Reintroducing these intangible factors, as conveyed by

political scientist Samuel Huntington, paints a more accurate picture of the military

advisor with which to examine the strategic interaction. This chapter explains the

military agent and its tendency to embody certain characteristics of the professional

military ethic from Huntington’s examination of the military mind in The Soldier and the

State. The professional military ethic, articulated and normalized through the

Weinberger Doctrine, captures contemporary opinions of how the military views the use

of force in national security. If the Weinberger Doctrine indeed conveys certain norms

and beliefs of the military, then the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides the institutional

framework for articulating a unified view of the military agent to the civilian principal.

To understand the impact of the professional military ethic, this chapter examines

the Gulf War, the U.S. mission to Somalia, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. In

examining the Gulf War, Feaver concludes that there is suggestive evidence of shirking

on the part of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell in his presentation of

military options to the President, his initial resistance to an offensive option in favor of

sanctions, and his estimate on the size of the force required to liberate Kuwait. Similarly,

in his Somalia case study Feaver views the military’s reluctant acquiescence to the

peacekeeping and nation-building mission and later reservations over the change in

mission as shirking. In Kosovo, Feaver identifies the debate over the use of ground

forces and the limited nature of the war as evidence of military shirking. In each case,

Feaver’s analysis misconstrues the military’s advice as shirking. A better explanation for

the military’s advice and behavior in these situations requires examining the professional

military ethic. The military expresses its concerns over the use of force and how it

thinks force should be used based on its preferences and knowledge represented by the

professional military ethic. The rationalist view taken in Agency theory prevents the

19

theory from including intangible attributes of the military as part of their calculus when

advising civilian leaders. Senior military officers advising civilian leaders stress the need

for clear objectives, the force necessary to do the job, and a plan to win. Their expression

goes beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis reflected in Agency theory, and reflects the

nature of the military professional. Without an understanding and recognition of the

influence the professional military ethic has on military advice, Agency theory will

consistently classify episodes of the military’s insistence on clear objectives, the

reluctance to use force except as a last resort, and the desire to use overwhelming force

when forces are committed as a level of shirking. Including the professional military

ethic inherent in military advice in an examination of the principal-agent relationship

reduces the incidences labeled as shirking and provides more insight into the actual

relationship between the principal and the agent.

The Professional Military Ethic

In his landmark work on civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State,

Samuel Huntington eloquently defines the concept of the military mind as conservative

realism. Huntington argues that examining the source of military attitudes, values, and

views offers the best insight into the “distinctive and persistent habits of thought” derived

over a long period of time.52 The military mind is formed by the performance of the

military function. Over time these attitudes, values, and views form the habits of the

professional soldier into the “professional military ethic.” This ethic reflects the

military’s basic values and perspectives, its view of national military policy, and the

relation of the military to the state.53

The basic values and perspectives of the professional military ethic draw on the

professional soldier’s view of human conflict and the use of violence to further national

interests. The military ethic sees man as evil and selfish, driven by the desire for power,

wealth, and security: “between the strength and weakness in man, the military ethic

52 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 61. 53 Ibid, 62. Huntington cautions and emphasizes that the accuracy of this definition depends on the extent to which they apply to the performance of the military function. “The sole criterion is relevance to the performance of the military function.”

20

emphasizes the weakness.”54 While man has elements of goodness, strength, and reason,

he is also evil, weak, and irrational, therefore, organization, discipline, and leadership

ensure man’s success in conflict. Discipline and leadership compensate for the limits of

reason for “success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual

to the will of the group.”55 Man exists and defends himself within a group. His welfare

depends on cooperation within the group so he sacrifices his individual interests for the

benefit of the group.

The professional military ethic described by Huntington runs contrary to his

description of liberalism that emphasizes the individual and the goodness of man. The

differences between conservative, military realism and civilian liberalism lay the

foundation for conflicts in civil-military relations. Unlike realism, liberalism emphasizes

reason, moral dignity, and peace as the natural state among men and opposes restraints

upon individual liberty.56 Liberalism emphasizes the release of individual energies while

realism subordinates those energies for the good of the group. Liberalism is more

concerned with economic welfare than large military forces. Peace is achieved through

institutional devices rather than force. According to Huntington, the challenge for

American civil-military relations is, and has been, balancing the liberalism of American

society with the conservative realism of the military which protects and promotes

national policy.

The military’s view of national policy reflects this responsibility to protect the

state. The professional military ethic emphasizes the state as the basic unit of political

organization and stresses the continuing nature, magnitude, and immediacy of military

threats to the state. To deal with this reality the professional military ethic favors the

maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready forces and opposes the extension of state

commitments and the involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain.57 At

the same time, the military professional understands war is ultimately political: “State

policy aimed at continuing political objectives precedes war…dictates the nature of the

war, concludes the war, and continues on after the war. War must be the instrument of

54 Huntington, 63. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid, 91. 57 Ibid, 65.

21

political purpose.”58 The military professional balances political desires and military

necessity.

In the world of nation-states governed by Hobbesian rules, military security is

continuously threatened. Given the inevitability of war, the goal of the military

professional is to estimate the threat as accurately as possible and to stress the dangers to

national security by looking at capabilities rather than intentions. It is the prerogative of

the political leaders to evaluate another state’s intentions. The military professional’s

bias or sense of professional responsibility leads him to conclude that “if he errs in his

estimate, it should be on the side of overestimating the threat.”59

The concern for the threat to national security leads the military professional to

urge the enlarging and strengthening of military forces to protect the state. He seeks

forces in being “capable of meeting virtually every possible contingency.”60 He favors

“maintaining the broadest possible variety of weapons and forces provided that each

weapons system is kept sufficiently strong so that it is capable of dealing with the threat it

is designed to meet.”61

The military professional desires to fight wars that directly affect the security of

the state and those he can win. “War at any time is an intensification of the threats to the

military security of the state, and generally war should not be resorted to except as a final

recourse, and only when the outcome is a virtual certainty.”62 The politician must be

wary of committing the nation beyond its military capabilities and the military

professional must be ready to warn the statesman when the purposes exceed the means.63

The expertise and specialized nature of the military causes it to view the problem of the

security of the state through the conservation of military power.

Huntington outlines three functions of the military professional in fulfilling its

responsibility for the security of the state: representative, advisory, and executive. In the

representative role, the military professional presents the claims of military security and

informs the civilian of the minimum military security required in light of the threat to the

58 Huntington, 65. 59 Ibid, 66. 60 Ibid, 67. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid, 69. 63 Ibid, 68-69.

22

state.64 As an advisor, the military professional analyzes and advises the state on

alternative courses of action from the military point of view. The military professional

then executes the decisions of the state with respect to military security even if the

decision runs contrary to his military judgment. The military professional interacts with

the civilian policymaker through these three functions.65

Huntington offers an exceedingly accurate portrait of the military mind and the

professional military ethic that defines the military professional in American society.

The challenge for the military, as a subordinate to the civilian, is to convey this

conservative realist view of the world, the military structure essential to defend the state,

and the importance of properly using military force to execute the decisions of the state

within a liberal society. As persuasive as his ideas are, Huntington’s treatise on civil-

military relations never reached beyond theory. The military lacked an expression of the

military ethic, other than its behavior and actions, to represent its attitudes, values, and

beliefs on the use of military force. The Weinberger Doctrine provided a close

approximation of the professional military ethic in terms of the desired preferences for

using military force to protect the nation.

Weinberger Doctrine

In November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger addressed the

National Press Club to answer the question “Under what circumstances, and by what

means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of

military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy?”66

Weinberger’s emphasis on the importance of such a question grew out of the experiences

of his professional life, both as a soldier and later as the Secretary of Defense. While

World War II impressed upon him the danger of being “unarmed and unready for war,”

the Vietnam War highlighted the need for the nation to go to war “with all necessary

resources and an unshakable will to win.”67 He said it is a “terrible mistake for a

64 Huntington, 72. 65 Ibid. 66 Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 434. 67 Ibid, 8.

23

government to commit soldiers to battle without any intention of supporting them

sufficiently to enable them to win, and indeed without any intention to win.”68

The desire of officials like National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and

Secretary of State George Schultz to use “our forces almost indiscriminately and as a

regular and customary part of our diplomatic efforts” was, according to Weinberger,

reckless and irresponsible.69 Weinberger claimed that Schultz and McFarlane wanted

American troops just to “add a desirable bit of pressure and leverage to diplomatic

efforts, and that we should be willing to do that freely and virtually without hesitation.”70

For his part, Schultz felt American military power should be used if the stakes justified it

and if other means were not available.71 The deployment of U.S. forces with the

Multinational Force in Lebanon embodied Schultz’s notion that the presence of military

forces could leverage diplomatic efforts. The bombing of the Marine barracks on

October 23, 1983 reinforced Weinberger’s view of committing military forces.

Weinberger internalized the painful lessons from the use of military force in

Vietnam and Beirut as he laid out his assertion of how to commit combat forces in

support of our national interests: “When it is necessary for our troops to be committed to

combat, we must commit them, in sufficient numbers and we must support them, as

effectively and resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops to combat

we must do so with the sole object of winning. Once it is clear our troops are required,

because our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to

commit every ounce of strength necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives.”72

From that assertion, Weinberger articulated six major tests, that became known as

the Weinberger Doctrine, to be applied when weighing the use of U.S. combat forces

abroad.73 First, the U.S. should not commit forces to an engagement unless it is deemed

necessary to the national interest or the interests of its allies. Second, if troops are

68 Weinberger, 9, 31. 69 Remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club 28 November 1984 in Weinberger, 437. 70 Weinberger, 159. 71 “Schultz vs. Weinberger: When to Use U.S. Power,” U.S. News and World Report, 24 December 1984, 20. 72 Remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club 28 November 1984 in Weinberger, 440-441. 73 Ibid, 440.

24

committed to a situation, it must be with the clear intention of winning. If all the forces

and resources necessary to complete the mission will not be committed, then no forces

should be committed at all. Third, military forces committed to combat overseas should

have clearly defined political and military objectives and should know precisely how to

achieve those objectives. Fourth, as conditions change in the course of the operation, the

objectives and forces committed must be reassessed and adjusted as necessary. Fifth,

there must be reasonable assurance of the support of the American people and their

elected representatives in Congress. That support could only be attained by making the

threat and the response to the threat clear. And sixth, the commitment of forces should be

as a last resort. Weinberger put his six tests in negative terms for an expressed purpose:

“they are intended as a note of caution…that we must observe prior to committing forces

to combat overseas.”74

The Weinberger Doctrine reflects many of the inferences that Huntington makes

about the military mind and the professional military ethic. Huntington’s professional

military ethic stresses the military security of the state as vital, advocates the continuing

threat, and emphasizes the magnitude and immediacy of the threat increasing the

likelihood of war. For Huntington, military security of the state must come first.

Weinberger knew the military would be continually called upon to secure the vital

interests of the state. Weinberger wished to define the manner in which the military

should be used to achieve those ends.

Huntington stressed the need for a strong, ready military with the tools to protect

the state. Weinberger reflects this sentiment in asserting that all the military forces and

resources necessary to complete the mission should be committed. Weinberger

connected political objectives to military objectives by insisting on the need for a clearly

defined military objective as a critical tool to determine the force and resources required.

Reassessing the objectives and forces ensures the forces are capable of completing the

mission and prevents the military from exceeding its capabilities.

Huntington’s professional military ethic opposes the state getting extended or

involved where victory is not certain. Similarly, Weinberger echoed this sentiment,

74 Remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club 28 November 1984 in Weinberger, 441-442.

25

arguing that if winning was not the objective then combat forces should not be used: “the

necessity to win requires a clearly defined, achievable objective on which there is clear

agreement.”75

Finally, both the Weinberger Doctrine and Huntington’s professional military

ethic reflect the desire that military forces should be committed only as a last resort. The

Weinberger Doctrine states “the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last

resort—only after diplomatic, political, economic and other efforts have been made to

protect our vital interests.”76 Huntington captures the sentiment as the desire of the

military mind: “War should not be resorted to except as a final recourse…the military

man contributes to a cautious conservative, restraining voice in the formulation of state

policy.”77 Caution, strength, and certainty are the watchwords for both Weinberger and

Huntington.

The Weinberger Doctrine articulated the essence of the professional military

ethic, embodied the desire by the military to win wars with overwhelming force, and

sought to prevent a repetition of the Vietnam War. Weinberger’s ideas offered civilian

leaders insight into how the military would like to go to war if it had the choice. Despite

a civilian’s articulation of the military’s concerns on the use of force, the military

expressed its concerns as a chorus of the service chiefs’ voices with the chairman of the

joint chiefs as an ineffective conductor. The Goldwater-Nichols Act required that the

military have a unified voice to express these concerns.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 vastly strengthened

the military’s ability to provide advice. The Act designated the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council

and the Secretary of Defense. The Act authorized the Chairman to provide the advice he

deemed appropriate rather than simply reporting the opinions of the individual chiefs

within the JCS.78 “Congress envisioned that making the JCS chairman the principal

75 Caspar W. Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, 687. 76 Ibid, 687. 77 Huntington, 69. 78 James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 437. In addition to improving military advice, the Act declared eight other purposes: strengthen civilian authority, place clear responsibility on combatant commanders for accomplishment of assigned missions, ensure the authority of combatant commanders is commensurate with the responsibility, increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning,

26

military advisor would provide the secretary a military ally who shared a department-

wide, non-parochial perspective.”79 While the Chairman presents the service chiefs’

advice when he presents his own, Goldwater-Nichols allows combatant commanders to

provide their advice directly to the Secretary of Defense but, by the virtue of his role as

the principal military advisor, the Chairman enjoys more access to the President and

Secretary of Defense.80 This access looms large as the President decides on the use of

force. Access to civilian leaders provides the chairman a direct channel to civilian

leadership and the ability to present his opinion, rather than the combined opinions of the

service chiefs, to express the professional military ethic. The first chairman to exercise

the power of this advisory role legislated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act was General

Colin Powell.

General Powell became the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to lead the military

and fight a war under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. No stranger to the inner workings of

the White House and the Department of Defense, Powell’s career exposed him to the

highest political and military levels. While the lessons of Vietnam shaped Powell’s view

of how the military should and should not be used, his experience as Weinberger’s senior

military assistant solidified his perceptions on the use of military force. He later wrote

that “war should be the politics of last resort. And when we go to war, we should have a

purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize the country’s

resources to fulfill that mission and then go in to win.”81 Powell’s remarks reflect the

thoughts of his mentor, Caspar Weinberger, and capture the character of Huntington’s

professional military ethic as well. His experience as national security advisor exposed

him to the politics of the White House which helped, and challenged him, in his role as

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

In Powell’s confirmation hearing, Senator Nunn noted that Powell would be the

first Chairman serving under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In the hearing, Powell

expressed his views on the use of military force and his role as the Chairman: the

military’s “role is simply to be strong, to be ready, to serve as a symbol of strength to provide for more efficient use of resources, improve joint officer management, enhance the effectiveness of military operations, and improve Department of Defense management. 79 Locher, 438. 80 Ibid, 440. 81 Colin L Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 148.

27

both our potential adversaries as well as to our friends…always from a position of

strength—political strength, moral strength, value strength, and yes, the strength of our

armed forces.”82 Powell reiterated his concern for a clear mission when using military

force: “So there is no hesitancy to use the Armed Forces as a political instrument when

the mission is clear and when it is something that has been carefully thought out and

considered and all the ramifications of using military forces have been considered.”83

With respect to his role as the principal military advisor to the President, Powell

confirmed that he would work with his fellow Chiefs, Commanders-in-Chief, and Vice

Chairman to formulate military advice and make sure that he and the Joint Staff provided

the best possible advice.84 Less than one year later, Powell, and his role as Chairman,

were put to the test as Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The Gulf War

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and started the United States on the road

to war.85 Operation Desert Shield saw the buildup of over 250,000 troops to protect

Saudi Arabia. After the number of troops almost doubled, Operation Desert Storm began

January 16, 1991 to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This examination of Agency theory

addresses the period from August 2 to January 16.

Feaver suggests that during the Gulf War, “civilians monitored far more

intrusively than was generally believed at the time.”86 Feaver argues in his examination

of the Gulf War that although the military resisted intrusive monitoring by civilians,

evidence of shirking is at best suggestive from the debate behind the scenes over how to

respond to Iraq’s invasion.87 Feaver bases his evidence of shirking on Powell’s resistance

to the offensive option in favor of sanctions and the belief of some civilians that the

military shaded its estimates so as to constrain the civilian choice in a direction favored

82 Senate Armed Services Committee, Nomination of Gen Colin L. Powell for Reappointment in the Grade of General and for Reassignment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 20 September 1989, 616. 83 Ibid, 652. 84 Ibid, 617. 85 Powell, My American Journey, 462. 86 Feaver, 235. 87 Ibid, 237.

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by the military.88 In fact, Powell’s expression of the professional military ethic and

Weinberger Doctrine explains his resistance of the offensive option in favor of sanctions

and the estimates of force required for the offensive option not captured in Feaver’s

explanation. From August 2 into late October, Powell favored sanctions over the

offensive option because he believed that the force deployed to Saudi Arabia could only

deter Iraqi aggression and later defend Saudi Arabia. His military ethic told him that

there was inadequate force to conduct an offensive operation therefore it should not be

pursued. In late October, once the defense of Saudi Arabia was secure and the buildup of

overwhelming force was underway, Powell supported the offensive option to either

convince Saddam’s forces to leave Kuwait or produce a decisive victory.

On August 2, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Powell saw America’s political

objectives as deterring Iraqi aggression and defending Saudi Arabia. Powell based his

advice on the initial goal of deterring an Iraqi move south. From that, Powell and

General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command,

developed a plan and initial force structure consisting of parts of the 82nd Airborne

Division and the 1st Fighter Wing to quickly position a deterrence force in Saudi Arabia.

The forces already in place were lightly armed and extremely vulnerable if Saddam’s

forces attacked. The buildup of defensive forces outlined in Operation Plan 90-1002

would bring the total number of troops to roughly 250,000 by December.89

Bush’s announcement on August 4 that Iraqi aggression “will not stand” stunned

Powell, especially since he hadn’t been consulted.90 “The President had now clearly,

categorically, set a new goal, not only to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia and defend

Saudi Arabia but to reverse the invasion of Kuwait.”91 Wondering if the small U.S. force

structure in Saudi Arabia could actually defend Saudi Arabia, Powell knew ejecting Iraqi

troops from Kuwait was a completely different venture. Powell wondered where the U.S.

buildup in Saudi Arabia was leading: “If the invasion of Kuwait were going to be

reversed, what did that mean in practical military terms? How much force was needed

88 Feaver, 237. 89 Woodward, 249. 90 Ibid, 260. 91 Ibid.

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and what kind of action should they be planning for?”92 Knowing it would take 8-12

months to get enough forces into the region to conduct an offensive, Powell pressed for a

clarification on the mission.93 On August 15, Powell briefed the President on the

buildup. At that time, there were currently 30,000 troops in place, enough to deter an

attack on Saudi Arabia. In early September they would have enough troops to move from

the deterrence to the defensive phase. By December 5, there would be about 184,000

troops and there would be no doubt that the mission to defend Saudi Arabia could be

accomplished.94 Powell tried to find out the President’s intentions: “What we need Mr.

President, is for you to tell us before that mission is accomplished what you want us to do

next…do we stop the pipeline or keep it going, or whatever?”95 Since the U.N. had

imposed a trade embargo on Iraq six days earlier, Powell added: “If your goal is only to

defend Saudi Arabia and rely on sanctions to pressure Saddam out of Kuwait, then we

should cap the troop flow probably sometime in October…We’ve got about two months

to assess the impact of sanctions.”96

In Powell’s view, the 30,000 troops could barely deter an Iraqi invasion, could not

yet defend Saudi Arabia, and almost certainly would not be able to liberate Kuwait.

Powell’s efforts to clarify the mission emphasize what Powell saw as a mismatch

between the military force and resources and the political objectives. In following the

Weinberger Doctrine, Powell wanted to connect military means with political ends.

Weinberger highlighted the importance of clearly defined military and political objectives

as critical tools to determine the forces and resources required. Powell looked to the

President for authorization to move more troops to the region to reach a force level

capable of achieving the political objective of removing Saddam from Kuwait. In line

with Huntington’s professional military ethic, Powell stressed the need for a strong, ready

military committed only when victory is certain and the use of force as the last resort.

Powell felt the projected size of the forces in Saudi Arabia could not achieve the political

92 Woodward, 280. 93 Ibid, 281. 94 Woodward, 281. Powell, My American Journey, 469. 95 Woodward, 281. 96 Powell, My American Journey, 470. Powell’s reason for October was that it would take about a month or so for the personnel pipeline to clear equating to 184,000 troops in Saudi Arabia by early December.

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objectives or military victory. Since Powell knew the U.S. could not achieve a military

victory he resisted the offensive option and supported sanctions.

In late September, with the deployment nearing completion, and no decision to

continue introducing forces, Powell wanted to continue economic sanctions. Powell

outlined the case to Cheney that if there was a chance sanctions might work there might

be an obligation to continue waiting.97 In sharing his views on economic sanctions with

British Air Chief Marshall Sir Patrick Hine, Powell relayed his uncertainty and caution

on the use of military force preferring instead to let economic sanctions work.98 Powell

had difficulty convincing either Cheney or Scowcrof